Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

10 September 2009 FM 3-07.10 / MCRP 3-33.8A / NTTP 3-07.5 / AFTTP 3-2.76

command should be used to obtain and disseminate guidance and assistance. The
advisor is responsible for ensuring the intent of the US chain of command is
received and understood by the FF. While FF can be effective within their nation,
their leadership methods may be different. Units with poor leadership will often
benefit from a more active coalition role in mentoring the leadership. Their
operations may lack the standardization expected of US units, but often they will
achieve equal or better results.
(2) The advisor provides recommendations to FF, not orders. Only the counterpart
should issue orders. The FF counterpart is the advisor’s peer not his boss; nor is
the advisor the counterpart’s boss. Given the key advising task of conducting
bilateral negotiations, the advisor will need to study how to achieve a successful
negotiated outcome with the FF counterpart using leverage where appropriate.
Much of the success of an advisor will be based on the personal and professional
relationship he has with his FF counterpart. Advisor duty is definitely “leadership by
example” and the FF counterpart will watch what the advisor does more than listen
to what he says. Saving face and avoiding embarrassment are strong motivators for
FF leadership. What is obvious to us is not obvious to them and vice versa. Clear
communications are essential. Advisors must make sure what was said equates to
what was understood. Politeness and fear of embarrassment can backfire if the
counterpart is afraid to admit he doesn’t understand what was really meant. Advisor
teams also have limited ability to influence FF higher headquarters policies. One of
the major advisor mentoring challenges is to know your target audience and adapt
your methods to the circumstances.
(3) There needs to be a comprehensive understanding throughout the advisor chain
of command. Higher levels need to have feedback on implications and effects of
broad policies. Lower level teams need to have access to raise concerns on how
polices might affect operations, training, and the general effects on the FF and the
AO.

b. Planning Considerations. Understand MDMP versus the British estimate process.
Rather than using the highly structured US MDMP planning model, some FF may be
more comfortable using the British process. The British process fits well with certain
cultural norms and is summarized below. The British estimate process, or

All Arms

Tactical Aide Memo,

Army Code 71770, consists of seven components:

(1) What is the enemy doing and why? (Based on IPOE – terrain/enemy
capabilities and intent.)
(2) What have I been told to do and why? (Based on commander’s intent and
mission analysis.)
(3) What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction must I give to
develop a plan?
(4) Where can I best accomplish each action/effect? (Results in outline scheme of
maneuver.)
(5) What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect? (Relative strength,
troops to task.)

FM 3-07.10 / MCRP 3-33.8A / NTTP 3-07.5 / AFTTP 3-2.76 10 September 2009

(6) When and where does each action take place in relation to each other?
(Coordinating instructions: fire plan; tasking timeline; wargaming “what-if's.”)
(7) What control measures (coordinating instructions, boundaries, objectives,
routes, report lines, fire support coordination measures, and operational security) do
I need to impose?

c. Intelligence.

(1) There may be coalition organizations in the AO that can assist with intelligence
requirements but you may still lack intelligence about your AO, FF, and the
surrounding civilian personalities who dwell in your AO. What may be missing is an
adequate intelligence fusion cell to “piece the intelligence picture together.” This
challenge can be met by establishing relationships with the various “special units”
that undoubtedly operate within the operational environment. Most will not contact
you or offer assistance unless you make the request. These organizations may
include cross functional teams of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other
US law-enforcement personnel, along with many US intelligence agencies. Many of
these special coalition intelligence / law enforcement task forces will share
information with you if you merely ask them for assistance. Reciprocal intelligence
sharing also helps keep their interest in the process.

(a) As an advisor, you are in an interesting role to train and potentially collect
intelligence concerning your FF. Detailing extensive enemy insurgent infiltration,
weapons smuggling, or other criminal activities associated with FF is invaluable
to intelligence collectors.
(b) Such first-hand information is valuable to many of these organizations and
can be used by your team to assist in building packets and case files for these
organizations. In exchange for the information, they will share information
regarding targets, intelligence, and human factor information, such as sectarian
infiltration routes and ethnic cleansing areas of focus. This information helps you
understand enemy location, kill zones, and determine how the enemy is trying to
target you or your team. Though many advisors may have unmitigated trust with
their FF, others may not. It is important to understand your environment and
observe your FF carefully. The intelligence you witness can be invaluable.

(2) Take the lead as an advisor by coordinating with your coalition unit to invite all
available organizations to assist in your AO. There is too much information at stake
to not take advantage of the capability. Be creative and the results you gain will
surprise you.
(3) In order to promote national policy and attain overall objectives, it may be
necessary for advisors to plan and to conduct intelligence training. The advisor
should assist their FF counterpart in developing a local intelligence collection
program, in training intelligence personnel in their respective specialties, and in
effectively utilizing trained intelligence personnel. Advisors may accomplish this aim
by:

(a) Assisting in the establishment of an operations center to coordinate
intelligence efforts.

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(b) Maintaining liaison with police and intelligence agencies responsible for
counter-subversion.
(c) Providing intelligence support and force protection information to US
personnel working at other levels.
(d) Establish secure and reliable communications channels.
(e) Preparing daily reports on intelligence-related activities.
(f) Assisting in the development of effective procedures for the collection and
dissemination of intelligence information.
(g) Assisting in the establishment of an adequate security program to safe-guard
against subversion, espionage, and sabotage.
(h) Encouraging and assisting the establishment and maintenance of a source
control program.
(i) Assisting in development and achievement of intelligence training quotas for
selected, qualified personnel.

(4) The advisor should be familiar with area studies, area assessments, and after-
action reports (AARs). The Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS) database
and the special operations debrief and retrieval system (SODARS) are useful tools
for reviewing AARs. Pertinent documents should be compared to detect trends or
changes. The advisor also should evaluate the following:

(a) FF intelligence staff section (G-2 or S-2), its SOPs, and its effectiveness.
(b) Personalities of counterparts and other persons with whom business is
conducted.
(c) Chain of command and communication channels of the FF unit.
(d) Intelligence projects initiated by predecessors.
(e) Intelligence projects that predecessors believed should have been initiated.
(f) Advisor communication channels.
(g) Reference material available from other intelligence agencies.

(5) Advisors should prepare and maintain a list of essential elements of information
(EEIs) and insurgent indicators, if appropriate. Advisors should determine if:

(a) Trained subversive insurgent leaders have been discovered.
(b) Evidence exists of an underground insurgent organization.
(c) Efforts exist to create or increase civil disturbance and dissension.
(d) An insurgent psychological campaign is ongoing against existing or pro-
posed government policies and programs.
(e) Attempts are being made to provoke the government into harsh measures
(such as curfews).

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(f) Assassinations and kidnappings of local political leaders, doctors, or
schoolteachers are taking place.
(g) Guerrilla actions are occurring.
(h) An appreciable decline exists in school attendance.

(6) Advisors may be called upon to provide guidance and assistance in
counterintelligence (CI) activities. When acting in such roles, advisors should
attempt to answer the following questions:

(a) Is intelligence information disseminated on a need-to-know basis?
(b) Are security precautions observed?
(c) Is access to sensitive areas positively controlled?
(d) Are cryptographic systems available and used in transmitting classified
information?
(e) Do personnel follow proper communications procedures?
(f) Are personnel with access to classified information properly cleared? How
thorough or effective is the investigation process?
(g) Are security inspections of installations conducted at regular and irregular
intervals?
(h) Are periodic security lectures conducted?
(i) Does the counterpart have a covert CI program?
(j) Does the degree of coverage provide reasonable assurance of gaining
knowledge of insurgent intelligence, subversion, or sabotage within the area?
(k) What means of communication are employed and do they jeopardize the
security of the source?
(l) How much time elapses between a source’s acquisition of information and the
submission of a report? Does the elapsed time allow for reaction by friendly
forces?
(m) How is the reliability of a source determined? Is reliability (or lack thereof)
considered in evaluating information?
(n) How do counterparts evaluate the accuracy of information received from the
source?
(o) How do counterparts protect operations against—

•

Double agents (agents working for two or more opposing intelligence

agencies, only one of whom knows of the dual relationship)?

•

Dual or multiple agents (agents reporting to two or more agencies of the

same government, which may result in false confirmation of information)?

•

Confusion agents (agents fabricating information to mislead friendly

forces)?

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(7) Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE). It is foolish to
assume technology will be the sole savior of your team in combat. In fact, the
enemy is proving extremely adept at overcoming new technological advancements
and changing tactics and techniques routinely. The best way to survive as a team,
and train your FF to survive, is through IPOE. It is better to avoid or mitigate kill
zones with combat power than trust IED defeat mechanisms on your vehicles to do
the work. Be a learning organization and train your FF to do the same. Understand
that outthinking the enemy is the best way to defeat him. Do not assume away the
enemy and do not forget that the “enemy always gets a vote.” The following
fundamental questions regarding the enemy are more important to answer than
turning on your vehicle CREW systems and relying on chance:

(a) WHO AM I FIGHTING?

•

Terrorist, insurgent, or militia?

•

Identify zones (attack, support, kill, recon, sanctuary).

•

Identify trends that exist.

(b) WHAT CAN THE ENEMY DO TO US?

•

IED, complex ambush, recon, demonstration.

•

How will the enemy use the locals?

•

Times of day/night for activity (where and when).

•

How can your team and FF mitigate enemy actions?

•

What joint effects does your FF have?

•

What coalition forces can assist and how?

•

Deception: where and how?

(d) HOW WILL THE ENEMY REACT TO MY PLAN?

•

Throughout the mission, what are anticipated enemy reactions to my FF

and my team and how do I counter them?

(8) Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Once your team understands and applies the
basics of IPOE, train the FF to do the same. Do not assume FF has a good grasp of
HUMINT. Many FF may lack a basic understanding of how to analyze their
operational environment despite being in the same culture and sharing a common
language. Also, FF may not even live in the same operating area. Oftentimes, their
deference for rumors will drive conclusions regarding enemy activity. Source
operations may in fact be telephonic single-source rumors that create unproductive
combat operations. Counterinsurgencies fought in Algeria, Vietnam, and Malaya
were all primarily intelligence driven operations based upon solid human intelligence.
Train the FF to analyze their area correctly and focus their understanding into
actionable HUMINT.

d. Human Rights and Misconduct. The advisor must stress the consequences of
mistreating suspects, detainees, or prisoners taken into custody. These persons must
be treated in accordance with Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. This means that

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advisors or FF provide care for the sick/wounded and protect prisoners/detainees from
all types of abuse or harm. Murder, mutilation, and torture are expressly forbidden as is
humiliation or degrading treatment. Sentences and executions may not be carried out
unless judgment has been pronounced by a regularly constituted court. US Service
members must never be active participants in the conduct of any such punishment and
strongly discourage any such activity. They must explain to their counterparts that they
are obliged to report any atrocities of which they have knowledge.
e. If you are risk adverse, they will be risk adverse. Your task isn’t to merely teach
them MDMP, IPOE, and institute battalion systems to operate effectively in garrison.
Your mission is to advise and train them on how to be effective in combat. You are not
school house instructors or observer/controllers. You are also not special forces
operators that plan and execute independent operations. Your combat missions must
be deliberately planned and executed in a combined, sometimes joint fashion with your
FF. You must take a moderate amount of risk to win in the COIN environment.
Understand and respect the difficulty of your mission, but the benefits received through
aggressive prosecution of your duties will directly reflect in the FF units you advise. The
better you can do this, the faster you and your team will achieve success and work
yourselves out of a job.

20 Advisor Guidelines

1. Learn enough of the language for simple conversation. Know the basics and use
them from your first meeting: “hello”, “please”, “thank you”, “yes”, “no”, and “goodbye”.
Language demonstrates a willingness to understand and be competent in the host
nation culture. Cultural awareness yields situational awareness and leads to increased
force protection for you and your team.

2. Be patient and subtle. Explain the benefits of an action. Get them to accept it as
their idea. After the advisor plants an idea, let the counterpart modify it and take full
credit for it as his own. The advisor’s mission is to enable and mentor. The only
successful plan belongs to the FF counterpart.

3. Respect rank and position of counterparts. They often outrank you in their societies
and station. Always demonstrate respect towards counterparts.

4. Make corrections diplomatically. Praise success and build unit pride. Upon entering
the AO, look for the good systems and policies and praise the counterpart on his
successes. At this point, the counterpart is more willing to hear criticism and engage in
problem solving sessions designed to improve unit effectiveness.

5. Assist and enable—do not command. Refrain from engaging in bribery or coercion
or threatening (even psychologically). Correct important deficiencies first. Reinforce
and praise success.

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6. Keep counterparts informed—both US and host nation forces. As a corollary,
maintain a series of lessons learned for a RIP / TOA plan, on how to work with your
counterparts.

7. Encourage continuous training and improvement. Help develop SOPs.

8. Be prepared to act as liaison to multinational units. Liaison is NOT your primary
function, but is a skill you must accept to some degree. For instance, maintain liaison
with civil affairs units.

9. Be ready to advise on equipment maintenance. However, refrain from using status
reports as the most important metric of a FF unit; the reports are difficult, time-
consuming and the logistics/maintenance systems may not adhere to FF frameworks.

10. Know small unit tactics and unit security procedures (such as base defense).
Teach hand and arm signals (universal and quiet language) for actions in combat
patrolling. Integrate indigenous forces into your battle drills—teach them what to expect
from a professional force.

11. Use “confidence” missions to validate training and gauge progress. Civil-military
operations and static defense operations are valuable confidence missions.

12. Stay with the unit—do not separate yourself from them. Eat their food, live their
conditions.

13. Be aware of operations in the area to prevent fratricide. Advisors deconflict the AO
on behalf of the FF unit, in addition to providing access to coalition effects; e.g., quick-
reaction forces, MEDEVAC for casualties, unmanned aircraft (UA) surveillance, aviation
assets, combat camera.

14. Insist on observing human rights standards. Report violations through the chain-of-
command.

15. Be objective in reports on unit and leader proficiency, nothing will be gained from
glossing over problems. Report gross corruption or incompetence.

16. Maintain your military bearing and professional manner.

17. Train security units to standard and fight alongside them. The amount of advising
during combat is small—the advisor does most of his advising while preparing for
combat. He bases his advice on his observations or those of his fellow advisors during
past operations.

18. Be flexible and exercise tempered patience. Consider unit limitations and adjust
within FF organizational framework.

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Chapter VII

WORKING WITH US PARTNER UNITS

“When American units get in theater, they are focused on the traditional measures of
success: the number of insurgents killed and captured and the number of caches
found. It is very difficult convincing these commanders that you [the advisor] have
something to offer them [your US partner unit].”

—Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Battalion MTT Team Leader, November 2007

1. Understand What Wrong Looks Like

a. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a method to help an advisor team establish
credibility in the COIN fight with US and/or coalition maneuver units sharing their AO.
While many brigade and battalion commanders understand the value of the advisor
team, there is a real possibility of having difficultly integrating US and coalition units with
FF units and your advisor team. Advisor team leaders should prepare their teams for
an initial worst-case scenario when it comes to conducting operations with these units.
Items to consider: you may not have conducted pre-deployment training with the US
unit in your AO; the US unit is probably not aware of your specialized predeployment
training; they may not be familiar with the FF leaders, capabilities, or limitations in the
AO; there will be wariness and mistrust based on crucial unknown qualities. Therefore,
you must approach your relationship with the US unit commander in the same way you
approach the FF commander. You must build the relationship from the ground up.
There are many examples of poor advisor/ US partner unit relations. For example:

(1) US unit commanders assign company grade officers from their unit to mentor
the FF, despite the presence of the advisor team.
(2) US unit commanders attempt to issue orders to the FF unit through the advisor
team (not using the FF chain of command).
(3) US units conduct civic works projects in the AO and taking full credit for the civic
improvements (by not informing the advisor team, they cannot put an FF “face” on
the project and thus build the credibility of the FF in the eyes of the civilian
populace).
(4) US unit commanders routinely not telling the advisor team leader of impending
offensive operations for fear of compromising security and losing the element of
surprise.
(5) Advisor team leaders have been told not to attend US unit battle update
briefings.
(6) US units augment the advisor team with individuals who they deem
“undesirable”; e.g., primarily behavioral cases.
(7) US units withholding support from the advisor team in order to get leverage on
the FF.
(8) US units demanding the return of ammunition issued to the advisor team when
they leave the AO.

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(9) US units tasking the advisor team to do non-advisor combat support missions
that do not involve the FF (using the advisors as an additional maneuver platoon).
(10) US units not allowing senior FF officers to eat at US facilities without prior
written approval.
(11) US units searching the advisor teams and their vehicles at the same level as
foreign civilians entering a US forward operating base (FOB).
(12) US units conducting separate operations in the same AO as the FF unit; in
essence, they view the FF as a nuisance rather than an asset.
(13) US unit commanders attempting to task the FF with missions considered too
dangerous to give to the US units.

2. Expectation Management (Injecting Yourself into the Plan)

a. When your advisor team arrives in theater, you will have to make three initial
assessments over the period of your relief in place / transfer of authority (RIP/TOA):

•

The advisor team you are replacing.

•

The US unit operating in your AO.

•

The FF unit.

b. The first and most important assessment you must make is of the outgoing team,
and if they were successful advisors during their tour. If they have good relationships
with both the FF unit and the US unit, their SOPs will be very valuable and you can
continue these relationships. If you determine the outgoing team was ineffective, then
you can begin making lists of things you must fix and relationships you must build. Start
with the US unit commander.
c. The US commander is the first relationship you should build in your advisor mission.
His unit will provide critical support to you and your team, to include quick reaction
forces (QRF), medical evacuation, indirect fire, maintenance, recovery, supply, and
personnel augmentation. As an advisor, you must understand the concept that US
commanders are required to give you support. The quality, speed, and enthusiasm in
which this support is provided are primarily based on your relationship with the
commander. If he knows you and respects you as an advisor, he will see you and your
team as a combat multiplier for his forces. At the earliest possible opportunity, schedule
a block of time with him and use this opportunity to introduce yourself and your team.
Familiarize him with your operational background and experience level. It is highly
recommended that this meeting occur without the outgoing advisor team leader present.
Give both the US commander and yourself the opportunity to speak freely about what
opportunities exist to improve the FF and the advisor mission.
d. The most effective way to familiarize the US commander with your advisor mission
and all its components is to give him and his staff a formal briefing. Keep in mind you
are not reinventing the wheel. The majority of this briefing should be based on existing
information provided to you during the RIP/TOA briefing. The other components of the
brief can be compared to an initial counseling session, but it is you who are explaining
to your superior where your team is now and what direction you want your team to go.

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101

You are clearly defining your goals to the US commander. Elements of the brief should
include the following:

(1) Introduction. Introduce yourself and your team to the US unit. Include your
respective branches/military occupational specialties, number of previous tours, and
operational experience. Make sure you identify which staff section each officer/
NCO is covering, to include S1, S2, S3, S4, communications, and medical. This will
set the stage for introductions of your team to their US staff counterparts as
professionals and equals.
(2) Host Nation Unit Assessment. This is a basic statement of what you think the
capabilities and limitations are of the FF unit. Bring this information out in the open
and eliminate any assumptions that might be present. Include logistics capabilities,
maintenance, staff planning ability, effectiveness of FF checkpoints, patrols, and
intelligence gathering.
(3) FF Unit Leadership Profiles. This information comes straight from the RIP/TOA
briefing and should be the most current information on the leadership. It will refresh
the memories of the US staff who have already seen it and inform new members
who have not. These profiles include previous military assignments, religion, tribe,
number of children, work ethic, and basic personality traits.
(4) Your Advisor Philosophy and Plan. This section of the brief is where you convey
your “vision” to the US commander. Chances are, he will tell you his vision and the
two of you can find common ground. Both the US and FF unit will benefit from you
obtaining unity of effort with the US commander. You are the sole voice for the FF
unit’s capabilities and limitations. This portion of the brief will assist the US
commander in understanding how the FF unit can realistically fit into his scheme of
maneuver for securing the AO.
(5) Your Support Requirements. This is the support you will need, on a habitual
basis, to survive in theater. It includes virtually every class of supply,
communications support, maintenance support, ice, fuel, ammunition, and, most
importantly, intelligence. US units have access to collection assets you don’t. Real
time overhead imagery for raid planning is a good example of what you will need (FF
map reading skills are generally weak, and a picture is worth a thousand words). It
is vital to get your expectations out on the table early so the US commander gets a
clear idea of your logistical limitations.
(6) Your Personnel Augmentation Requirements. As a small team, you will be
consistently challenged to meet operational requirements. The US commander in
the AO may be willing to augment your team with personnel in key billets where you
may have a shortfall (e.g., communications, medical, security). Discuss these
shortfalls during your brief and be prepared to explain how filling them will benefit the
US commander (e.g., increase in FF effectiveness, ability to run 24-hour operations).
Discourage the unit from rotating Service members through your mission, as you will
have to continuously retrain the replacements on advisor team SOPs and cultural
lessons learned. Augmentation personnel should live with the advisor team in the
FF compound.

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3. Remove Misunderstanding and Mistrust

“I was escorting my Iraqi battalion commander, a colonel, around a newly established
American patrol base that was located near one of his checkpoints. An American
specialist (E-4) approached my Iraqi battalion commander, grabbed his shoulder, spun
him around, and said ‘dude, let me see your pistol’! After apologizing for the American
Soldier’s breach of military customs and courtesies, I spent the rest of the day
explaining to the Iraqi commander why our army, after 4 years, couldn’t tell an Iraqi
private from a colonel.”

—OIF Battalion MiTT Leader

a. As an advisor team member, you have received specialized training in both the
culture and the language of the FF. You have studied advising techniques and learned
the basic art of fighting a counterinsurgency. At the end of the RIP/TOA process, you
will have already interacted with FF and generated a unique comfort level with them
because they are familiar to you. Of note: the US commander, his staff, and the US
Service members in the unit do not have the same familiarity or comfort level. The good
news is you can help them and the first step is a simple introduction.
b. Keep it simple at first and arrange a meeting with the US commander and the FF
commander. As we are visitors to their country, encourage the US commander to meet
at the FF commander’s office. Offer to bring him to the meeting and give him a quick
block of instruction on manners and phrases he might encounter during the
conversation. Forewarn him of any support requests that may be introduced by the FF
commander and caution against making any promises at the first meeting. Arm him
with some simple tools to make him successful. The US commander must know and
trust you before he will fully accept you as a partner similar to the FF commander.
Advise the US commander to offer information about his military career, his family, and
his general plan for securing the AO. Inform the US commander of any preconceived
notions that the FF has about Americans. Such as, we are fixated on time and work:
Don’t we walk into meetings and begin right at the scheduled time and “get right down
to business”? Let the meeting flow without rushing it and expect 2 hours for the
meeting. The FF commander will demonstrate textbook hospitality for this meeting and
give the US commander a look at formal meeting protocol for the region. As the advisor
team leader, you are expected to be present for the duration of the meeting. After all,
the three of you are ultimately responsible for the security of the assigned AO.
c. After this initial meeting, schedule another meeting with a tour of the FF
headquarters by the US unit’s primary staff. The US commander now has a comfort
level with the FF commander and a simple understanding of the introduction protocol.
He will be anxious to demonstrate this newfound cultural proficiency to his staff. Let the
US staff see the FF headquarters, motor pool facilities, arms rooms, and barracks.
Many US Service members may have the initial feeling that they are not safe outside
the US FOB. Many feel they cannot take their armor and protective gear off while
visiting FF bases. If US leadership perceives FF as an organized professional army,
then the comfort level will increase. This confidence will facilitate effective personal and
working relationships. Lastly, maintain the relationship between the two units by
recommending a weekly meeting of the commanders at alternating headquarters. If you

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103

are successful, the two commanders will develop a friendship and a mutual respect.
Get to know your neighbor. It’s as simple as that.
d. You will learn cultural lessons and nuances as an advisor that your US counterparts
will not. You will get direct insight to reasons behind the FF’s “learned behavior” (i.e.,
behavior you can change). The most effective way to capitalize on this information is to
share it. Every member of your team can be scheduled, with the US commander’s
approval, to periodically brief their US staff counterpart on lessons learned.

4. Tactical Operations (Building a Partnership)

a. Advisor teams may get themselves in trouble when they first enter a country by
making a series of natural assumptions. We assume that the foreign civilians will obey
western traffic laws (they don’t). We assume they use the same calendar as we do
(Islamic calendar versus Gregorian). We assume the FF lack combat experience and
technical competency (Iran-Iraq War, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and First Gulf
War). We assume our FF partners wake up and go to bed at the same time we do, and
we quickly learn they operate on a significantly different cycle. It is the advisors that
must adapt and conform to this daily rhythm and not the FF. Your FF leaders may rise
early, between 5-6 am and begin working. They may break at 1130 and begin the
process of the mid-day meal, which is a combination of a meal and a command and
staff meeting with all the officers in the unit. This meal usually lasts 2 hours and is
followed by the mid-day nap. Many advisors who try and meet with their FF
counterparts in the middle of the day often find them unreceptive. It would be like
someone waking you up at midnight to discuss work. Your counterpart will rise around
1700, eat dinner, and then work until midnight. There is often a social period before
going to bed, between 0100 and 0200. If you assume that your counterpart is lazy
because he sleeps during the day, understand he may think you are lazy for being
asleep at midnight. The advisor team must conform to this new battle rhythm, and
many will find it appropriate for example in the desert as the crippling heat descends on
the region during the summer months and daylight operations are severely curtailed.
Lastly, our Muslim partners also have a different work week, with Friday being the
Sabbath instead of Sunday.
b. As the unofficial cultural liaison between the US and FF, you can convey information
to both parties that will avoid misconceptions. For example, brief the US unit on the FF
battle rhythm to help explain the region. Inform the FF commander that the Americans
will conduct 24-hour operations, 7 days a week by utilizing shifts. Cultural factors like
these can significantly affect tactical operations, so be diligent about passing on
everything you learn to the US partner units. An excellent method is to provide briefings
at company level to the US units. At this level you will be able to educate the core
group of Service members and officers who will be interacting with both the FF and the
civilian populace on a daily basis. Teaching points to make them more effective
partners include:

(1) Meals. You will find that you learn the most about the culture, language, and
your counterpart during meal times. While work is often discussed at length, it is
considered a social time. It is also imperative that you embrace the culture by eating
the local food on a consistent basis, and demonstrating your willingness to share all

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aspects of your FF counterpart’s day. Inform the Americans that meals are an
excellent time to discuss tactical matters and concepts. However, warn them a meal
is a minimum of 2 hours out of their day. FF units also use “feasts” to commemorate
special events. Encourage the US staff to attend these functions when invited and
reciprocate in kind with American style functions.
(2) Holidays. It isn’t necessary to know the entire list of holidays in the AO, but it is
important to know the most important ones (i.e., those comparable to Easter,
Thanksgiving, and Christmas). You will find that a small amount of cultural
understanding will carry a tremendous amount of weight with your FF partner.
Relationships can be advanced exponentially if US leaders know when not to
engage in specific operations, when to visit the FF unit for celebrations, and what
gifts are appropriate. For example, if you are in a Muslim country, important
holidays to educate the US unit on include:

(a) Ashura. This observance commemorates the martyrdom of Imam Ali
Hussein and the Battle of Karbala in 680. It is an emotional, week long period of
mourning that is marked by pedestrian processions and large gatherings at
mosques. American units can expect large amounts of pedestrian traffic on
roadways and large gatherings of men in public. Shia Muslims will conduct a
ritual of minor self mutilation and bloody themselves to show their devotion.
American units should be advised and expect to see crowds of bloodied
individuals.
(b) Ramadan. This holiday is observed by all Muslims and represents the month
in which the Koran was revealed to Muhammad. Muslims will not eat, drink, or
smoke during daylight hours. They traditionally eat large meals before and after
sunset. Americans should understand that their FF counterparts will often be in a
degraded physical state and a poor disposition. Night operations will be difficult
to schedule due to the meal considerations. In addition, it is considered rude to
eat or drink in front of a Muslim during the fast.
(c) Eid Ul-Fidr. This is the 3-day period that marks a festive end to the fasting of
Ramadan. Muslims will traditionally dress up to visit relatives and friends and
give gifts and food to the poor and needy. Americans should visit their
counterparts during this period to congratulate them on their accomplishment of
remaining pious during the fasting month, and give food or a gift to recognize the
occasion.
(d) Laylat-Al Qadr (Night of Power). This observance happens roughly in the
third week of Ramadan and represents the event when the first verses of the
Koran were revealed to Mohammad by the Angel Gabriel. In basic terms, this
night equals 80 times the amount of devotion of a regular day, so Muslims will
spend the entire night in the mosque praying. Shia Muslims believe their fate for
the coming year will be determined on this night, so they pray for the entire night.
Your American counterparts should be sensitive to scheduling operations during
this period, but also be aware that insurgent groups believe violence against
coalition forces during the night of power more than secures their place in
heaven. Traditionally, spikes in attacks have occurred at this time.

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(e) Hajj. This is an annual pilgrimage to Mecca that is supposed to be
undertaken at least once in a lifetime by Muslims if they are physically and
economically capable. During this period, a significant increase in traffic along
certain routes may preclude or alter operations.

(3) Mosques. Mosques serve many purposes in the community. Obviously they
are a place to worship, but they are also community meeting places, a source of
news (loudspeakers on the minarets), a school, and a dining hall. US commanders
must understand the mosque is key terrain, and if they damage the mosque, they
damage the relationship with the local populace. One man, the Imam, is in charge
of the mosque. Recommend to the US commander that he develop a relationship
with the Imam and include the local FF commander. The Imam has tremendous
influence over the local community and any actions against the mosque should be
carefully weighed against the long term consequences of the action. The US
commander can use the FF to apply security measures to the mosque, as the local
populace will be more willing to accept other Muslims in the sanctuary versus non-
Muslims. This information needs to be made clear down to the lowest levels in the
US unit. Other considerations when dealing with a mosque include:

(a) The local population is far less likely to use their own mosque for sanctuary
or to attack coalition forces. However, there are outside elements.
(b) US Service members should be discouraged from searching a mosque
unless it is an extreme circumstance. Advisor teams can organize, train, and
equip appropriate FF members to deal with entering a mosque. Both the US unit
and the advisor team will need strong justification and be able to clearly explain
the requirement to the FF commander. The FF commander is the person
ultimately responsible, in the eyes of the local populace, for the consequences of
the mosque entry. If you have to do it, make sure the results are worth it.
(c) Most problems arising in and around the mosque can be solved by a
dialogue with the Imam. While force is always an option, utilize this course of
action first before proceeding to another.

(4) House Searches. A house search is a routine event that happens daily,
throughout the COIN environment. Despite its regularity, it is potentially an event
that US forces can do the most damage in terms of their relationship with the local
populace. As an advisor team, you can only inform the US unit on cultural missteps
to avoid, however, you can ensure the proper integration of your FF unit to make
sure the searches are done correctly. Cultural considerations for house searches
include:

(a) Lead with the FF, but always make sure the search teams are properly
supervised by either an advisor or a FF officer.
(b) Avoid putting US Service members, not on the advisor team, in charge of FF
teams (unescorted by an advisor).
(c) By using FF, you will be able to communicate what you are looking for to the
residents of the house. If you start a dialogue with a resident prior to entering his
house, you may get information you are looking for that will negate the need to

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search the house. Your interpreters and the FF officers will assist in determining
the fidelity of what the resident is saying (filter the information).
(d) American forces dealing with women in the Muslim community is a very
fragile subject. If FF work in conjunction with the American unit, they can deal
directly with females involved in the search. It is always best to inform the senior,
male member of the family what your intentions are, so he can put all the women
into one room, away from your search.
(e) In the rare event that a female is to be detained, only use FF to do this,
unless it is an extreme circumstance.

(5) Night Operations. US commanders often make the incorrect assumption that FF
have the same capability to conduct night operations as the US forces, simply
because they have been issued night vision goggles (NVGs). If American forces
want to conduct a night operation with the FF unit, they must give them advance
notice and reasonable time for them to train for the task. In addition, a
comprehensive PCI, at all levels, will assist in preventing shortfalls of items like
functioning NVGs, helmet mounts, and batteries. If the American force in the AO
has a specialized, subordinate unit that operates only at night, it stands to reason
that the Americans should train a similar FF force to operate with them.

c. The cultural awareness piece, simply making the two units comfortable around each
other in a garrison environment, can be considered the crawl phase. The walk phase is
building trust between the Americans and the FF in a tactical environment. The most
effective way to do this is start small (small unit level) and build habitual working
relationships. As the advisor, work very hard to make sure your FF squadrons,
platoons, or flight work with the same American counterpart unit each time an operation
is conducted. Just as personal relationships are built with the leaders, FF members will
develop personal relationships with the Americans at the individual level.
d. A good starting point is patrol and raid operations that are conducted on a routine
and regular basis. These small unit operations give the FF a solid introduction to the
SOPs and the TTP of the US unit. As the spokesman for the FF unit, you are the voice
that will get the FF unit and its leaders into the planning and rehearsal process. You are
a vital link in this process and must always be present because the advisor team
provides the quality interpreter support which ensures the FF unit is being utilized
correctly. As the advisor, you will tell US platoon and company leadership the strengths
and limitations of the FF unit (expectation management). Examples of small unit
integration between the FF unit and US forces include:

(1) FF dismounted house search teams for raids.
(2) A squadron of FF trained for helicopter/ air assault raids.
(3) FF vehicles accompanying US mounted patrols.
(4) FF providing security for American medical assistance missions to civilian areas.
(5) FF vehicles and members included in the QRF mission.
(6) FF squad trained solely for night operations/ patrols with US forces.

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(7) Joint checkpoint operations.
(8) FF medics working in the American aid station.
(9) Joint rehearsals and after-action reviews for all missions.

e. The FF will learn best at the small unit level. Classroom instruction cannot replicate
hands-on training of tactical operations with partner US units. FF members will observe
the way the Americans conduct operations, how they dress, how they maintain their
equipment, their fire discipline, their logistics, and most importantly, how they behave in
the presence of both civilians and the enemy. This small unit partnering will facilitate
larger integration at company and battalion level ultimately leading to a state of training
readiness that does not require an American presence in the AO to be successful.
f. Once the US commander has reached a level of trust with the FF unit, on both a
personal and a tactical level, he will be ready to utilize the most valuable asset that the
FF unit brings to the COIN fight, HUMINT. US units have become adept at leveraging
the technological edge we have on the battle field, through use of satellite imagery,
unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), thermal technology, etc. However, US units remain
separated from information based on the language and culture differences. The advisor
team can bridge this gap. As the advisor team, you will develop a collection process
through the FF S2 section by utilizing civilian FF sources. You will piece together
information that is brought to you from across the operational environment. As you and
FF staff put these pieces together, you will find that your picture of the operational
environment is different than the Americans because your sources are different.
Organize the information and provide daily updates to the US commander. A typical
day of information flow should be your team S2 visiting the US unit S2 and getting the
intelligence update for the last 24 hours. He then hands over a similar product that
details the last 24 hours of the FF unit, to include assessments from the FF and the
advisor team S2. The last part of the process is sharing the American intelligence with
your FF unit. In addition, make sure they have access to all required imagery for their
operations. Intelligence sharing is a powerful tool that will increase the value of FF to
the American unit and improve both units’ ability to secure the AO.
g. The two most important services the advisor team receives from the US partner unit
are QRF and MEDEVAC. The US unit provides the advisor team with these vital
services without hesitation because you are a US unit. They may balk, however, at
providing these services with the same enthusiasm to your FF unit. It is your
responsibility to clarify the importance of FF unit requirements. The FF unit must be
treated as a true partner, to include the knowledge that Americans will make every effort
to save their lives if they are wounded. The FF unit will conduct more aggressive
tactical operations if they know a US unit will come to their aid when required. As the
FF unit improves their capabilities, they can also provide the same services to US units.
There is no stronger indication to the FF unit that the Americans are truly interested in
being equal partners in the AO than the unrestricted use of US assets to protect their
lives.

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5. Support Operations

a. It is logical to assume that at some point during your tour you will request every class
of supply for the FF unit. You are trying to get them to be self-sufficient, but you also
must keep them functioning in the face of fledgling national maintenance and supply
systems. In addition, there are times you will provide logistical support to the FF unit
simply to maintain your relationship with the FF commander. This is a cultural reality.
You will also find that FF leaders may attempt to get as much material support as
possible, far beyond what they reasonably need, simply because it is there for the
taking. This is a common situation where you must identify what the FF unit truly needs
versus what they simply want. Do not assume this is a product of greed, as much as it
is a display of status. The more stuff you have, the more powerful you are, the better
officer you are. As the advisor team, you are the reality check to the process. You
must constantly weigh what the FF unit wants versus what they actually need. You
must apply this support judiciously and not destroy your relationship with the FF
commander in the process. However, as an advisor, you must understand the FF’s
processes and improve those when needed, bounded by the cultural aspects of those
processes.
b. Because the FF unit may obtain logistical support from a US unit, you must be able
to clearly define actual FF requirements on a routine basis to the US staff. The reason
for this is that if you deny a support request to the FF staff, it is possible they will make
the same request directly to the US unit when you are not present. Support to the FF
requires unity of effort between the advisors and the US staff, and the advisor team’s
recommendation should be the most important factor that US commanders in theater
consider when supporting FF units. A common US commander mistake is touring the
AO and talking to the FF unit without an advisor present. The US trait of asking frontline
forces what they need is viewed as a positive leadership trait. However, US Service
members rarely ask for outlandish items or distort the truth of their logistical
requirements. FF units may ask for items they don’t need, exaggerate their support
requirements, or work very hard to illicit a sense of sympathy from the US commander.
Encourage US commanders to include advisors in their tours of the AO so that when
they discuss FF support someone is there to provide prospective on any requests.
Remember, there are many instances where you must trust the FF leadership to solve
their own problems, in a way that fits their culture.
c. Advisors must also be able to explain the cultural considerations of logistical support
to the US commanders who provide the classes of supply. For example, the US
commander may not understand that logistical support represents one of the best
leverage tools you have as an advisor to motivate the FF unit. It is a bargaining chip
and an excellent technique to assist the FF commander in getting what he wants by
trading concessions for things you want as an advisor. An example would be an FF
commander who wants all the accessories to make his vehicles look more like the US
vehicles. You may be able to fill these CL IX requests if the commander establishes
and enforces a maintenance program on his vehicles to improve the operational
readiness rate of his fleet. Also keep in mind that this type of bartering is common in
many parts of the world. By driving hard bargains you may gain a certain respect from
the FF officers. If you blindly give away goods and services to the FF unit, they may

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think you are weak of character, not respect you, and take full advantage of you. A
good tactic to unify FF unit support efforts are weekly meetings between the US unit
and the advisors to prioritize and execute routine and exceptional support requests from
the FF unit.
d. This same approach can be used in clarifying the required support for the advisor
team. First, the advisors should always live with their FF counterparts. However, the
advisors must have a near equal level of support as any US unit, so that they may
advise from a position of strength. US units will understand the advisor support concept
better when viewed in the context of observer controllers during training exercises.
Advisors can, theoretically, never accept logistical support from the FF unit they are
advising. This will give the FF commander leverage over the advisor team and thus
degrades the advisor’s status and ability to complete the mission. Advisors must have
access to their own food, electricity generator, fuel, and maintenance support. FF
commanders may try to get support items they want by depriving the advisors in their
compound of desired items. An example is fuel. By not running their generators during
the summer months for “lack of fuel,” an FF commander could deprive the advisors of
electricity needed to run their computers. This would force the advisors to request a
fuel resupply that the team may not need. If the advisors refuse to accept this type of
leverage, unnecessary support requests will decrease and the FF will be forced to
exercise their supply system.

6. Learning to Share

a. Advisors must understand that US commanders often conduct operations without
including the advisors or the FF unit in their planning. US units may occupy their AO,
survey the security situation in a vacuum, and begin conducting their mission. The
internal plans to secure population good will which include public works projects (water,
electricity, schools, clinics) could have much stronger impact with advisor/FF inputs.
Given US unit budgets relative to advisor/FF budgets for public works projects the
advisors must actively convince US commanders on the benefits (in the spirit of COIN)
to shared planning and execution of the projects. Simply deciding what projects to
undertake is critically important.
b. Appreciate local preferences. An accurate needs assessment reflects cultural
sensitivity and will correctly identify the items a populace considers high value. Ask,
how do I know this matters to the local populace? If there is no answer, the effort may
not be important. Local authorities are a good place to start with this question.
c. Civic works projects undertaken in the AO should be reviewed by the senior FF
commander, given he more than likely represents the most impartial and knowledgeable
person concerning the security and life support requirements of the local civilians in the
area. Once these projects are completed, they should never be handed over to the
local authorities by the US unit. In order to reinforce the legitimacy of the local
government and the FF, the credit should be given to the FF unit. Every effort should
be made to put an FF “face” on the project, including a completion ceremony that is
attended by local media, local civic authorities, and the FF commander and staff.
d. Advisor team leaders should remind US commanders that they are building the
confidence of the FF in addition to the tangible measures of the FF unit (troop strength,

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combat vehicles, weapons). This confidence can be established and maintained by
tactical success.
e. If the FF fails, the local populace may begin to lose confidence in the government’s
ability to protect them. A string of relatively minor insurgent victories can cause a
widespread loss of FF morale and encourage the “neutral majority” to side with the
insurgents. In short, the FF must be prepared for operations so that they have every
possible advantage. As their competence and confidence grows, these forces can
assume more complex assignments. Collaborating with US or multinational units will
help new FF units become accustomed to the stresses of combat.
f. The general concept is for the US unit to take the FF unit under its wing and begin
including it as a partner in operations. At first, the US unit will take the lead and show
the basic steps of company level and higher operations. Over time, the FF unit will feel
confident enough to take over operations as the lead force with an end state of trained,
manned, and equipped FF that conduct independent operations in conjunction with US
forces. As US units win tactical victories, they must share this success with the FF unit.
Methods of tactical sharing include:

(1) Including FF commanders in the after action reviews to higher headquarters.
(2) Including the mention of FF to US and local press organizations.
(3) Sharing “trophies” obtained from tactical operations (weapons, ammunition,
vehicles, and equipment). This may be a useful source of spare parts for FF
equipment.
(4) Let FF unit’s take possession and process any detainees.

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Appendix A

ADVISOR TASK LIST EXAMPLE

1- Deploy the Team
2- Command and Control
3- Advise Foreign Forces
4- Protect the Team
5- Sustain the Team
6- Redeploy the Team

The advisor tasks required to accomplish advisor missions are listed below:

Task 1- Deploy the Team
1.1- Build an effective team.

1.1.1- Select team members based on SME skills, advisor knowledge, skill, and

ability, and mission objectives.

1.1.2- Internally task organize by ability, function, and personality.

1.1.3- Conduct team building activities, tasks or functions.

1.2- Conduct pre-deployment preparation.

1.2.1- Conduct individual, collective, unit, and directed tasks.

1.2.1.1- Understand and employ planning considerations for the advisor

environment.

1.2.2- Conduct pre-deployment site survey (PDSS).

1.2.3- Conduct area study/IPOE.

Task 2- Command and Control
2.1- Conduct planning for advisor specific missions.

2.1.1- Conduct planning for key leader engagements.

2.1.2- Conduct concurrent team planning for all FF Events.

2.1.3- Conduct rapid planning.

2.2- Coordinate and de-conflict with higher/supporting/adjacent units (coalition
and FF).

2.2.1- Identify higher/supporting/adjacent units.

2.2.2- Establish rapport/communication with higher/supporting/adjacent units.

2.2.3- Advise/influence higher/supporting/adjacent units on advisor mission and

requirements.

2.2.4- Execute reporting procedures and requirements.

2.3- Identify and establish rapport with key personnel in the AO.

2.3.1- Identify key FF personnel.

2.3.2- Establish rapport with key FF personnel.

2.3.3- Identify key local civilian/religious leaders.

2.3.4- Establish rapport with key local civilian/religious leaders.

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Task 3- Advise FF
3.1- Effectively communicate in an advising environment-

The ability to

communicate with your counterpart is critical to the success of the advisor mission.
Interpreters are often relied upon to bridge the communication gap, but they are not
always available or dependable for providing an accurate representation of a translated
conversation based on language skill or experience working with the military. Thus,
extensive language training for the advisor team is an important aspect of the train-up to
ensure mission success.

3.1.1- Effectively communicate without an Interpreter.

3.1.1.1- Exchange common greetings in the language used in the AO.

3.1.1.2-

Indentify

and

employ non-verbal communications common in the AO.

3.1.2- Effectively communicate through an Interpreter.

3.1.2.1- Understand the capabilities of your interpreter.

3.1.2.2- Evaluate the trustworthiness of your interpreter.

3.1.2.3- Understand the background and cultural biases of your interpreter.

3.1.2.4- Prepare an interpreter for a communications event.

3.1.2.5- Conduct a meeting/event through your interpreter.

3.1.2.6- Prepare to work with an unvetted/unfamiliar interpreter.

3.2- Gain and use influence to progress advisor mission objectives-

An advisor

must be able to influence his counterpart to act in ways that may be different from his
past experience and cultural norms. Without the ability to influence the counterpart’s
actions, the advisor mission may fail. Affinity between the advisor and the counterpart
must exist for true influence to occur. A successful advisor will put an influence strategy
in motion that results in a voluntary long lasting change in the counterpart’s actions
despite the absence of formal authority. Successful influence is gained through a
combination of rapport building techniques that can be used to demonstrate value,
credibility, and trust. This can only be achieved when each individual perceives the
other as competent, mature, responsible, and compatible (working toward a common
goal). If the advisor can convey an committed attitude to his FF counterpart, a long-
lasting, effective advisor relationship will exist.

3.2.1- Build rapport with FF counterpart.

3.2.1.1- Employ a rapport plan.

3.2.1.2- Build a close relationship with FF counterpart.

3.2.1.3-

Employ

cross cultural empathy.

3.2.1.4-

Understand

societal influences.

3.2.1.5-

Gain

the

trust of FF counterpart.

3.2.2- Establish credibility with FF counterpart.

3.2.2.1-

Demonstrate

professional skills "worthy of confidence."

3.2.2.2-

Maintain

professionalism and adhere to standards.

3.2.2.3-

Provide

sound

planning and tactical advice.

3.2.3- Demonstrate to FF counterpart that the advisor provides value.

3.2.3.1-

Demonstrate

SME advisor knowledge.

3.2.3.2-

Demonstrate

access to advisor team/coalition support or effects.

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3.2.4- Determine and employ the proper influence techniques.

3.2.5- Understand and employ effective negotiations.

3.2.5.1- Prepare to conduct negotiations with FF counterpart.

3.2.5.2- Prepare FF counterpart to conduct negotiations with local leaders.

3.2.5.3- Prepare FF counterpart to conduct negotiations with coalition forces.

3.2.6- Effectively advise higher/supporting/adjacent units or coalition forces.

3.2.6.1-

Build

rapport

with higher/supporting/adjacent units or coalition forces.

3.2.6.2-

Educate

higher/supporting/adjacent units or coalition forces on the

capabilities and limitations of FF counterpart/unit.
3.2.6.3-

Influence

higher/supporting/adjacent units or coalition forces in order to

progress advisor mission objectives.

3.3- Advise FF unit METL, mission objective or assigned tasks-

To be an advisor,

you must teach, coach, and/or advise foreign forces in order to develop their
professional skills. Teaching means to provide instruction and education to foreign
forces in order to develop skills and knowledge necessary to do a particular task or
mission. Coaching is to assist a counterpart to in reaching the next level of knowledge
or skill by practicing those skills and building on previous teaching. The goal is for your
FF to assume more responsibility for success while the advisor gives assistance as
required. Advising means to provide counterparts with counsel to assist them in making
a decision based on applying knowledge. The distinctive feature is that the recipient is
responsible for making the decision, while the advisor only provides counsel.

3.3.1- Develop advisor campaign plan.

3.3.1.1-

Incorporate

objectives into campaign plan.

3.3.2- Assess FF unit, team, or individual current strengths and capabilities.

3.3.2.1-

Develop

measures of effectiveness/performance.

3.3.3- Employ SME/military occupational specialty (MOS)/experience base.

3.3.3.1- Teach individual and collective tasks.

3.3.3.2-

Coach-walk

through/mission rehearsal/assist.

3.3.3.3- Advise FF leaders in execution of missions.

3.3.4- Evaluate effectiveness of advisor effort.

3.4- Understand and operate within operational limitations from higher
headquarters-

Every unit, team, or individual working with FF must receive guidance

on what operational constraints may exist. The advisor will almost always possess
more detailed information than the FF require or have a need to possess. The advisor
should always receive a detailed briefing from the appropriate intelligence office prior to
departing on any advisor mission. Likewise, the advisor may have many assets at his
disposal that may or may not be provided to FF counterparts. The advisor must be
thoroughly aware of all the assets at his disposal and under what conditions those
assets may be provided to the FF counterpart. In addition, the advisor must not only
verify the training tasks for the FF, they must evaluate the TTP that apply to those tasks.

3.4.1- Determine when to provide or withhold information from a counterpart.

3.4.2- Determine when to provide or withhold assets from a counterpart.

3.4.3- Determine effective TTP for counterpart usage.

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3.5- Operate with cross cultural competence-

The advisor must be able to anticipate

the actions of his counterpart, understand those actions within the cultural context, and
influence the actions of his counterpart to achieve an acceptable outcome. The advisor
will not always be able to influence these outcomes, but must determine an acceptable
level/line and influence adherence to that level. The advisor must also inform/educate
his chain of command on any deviations from advisor/unit acceptable norms and
convey the cultural context of his counterpart’s actions.

3.5.1- Understand local ethical model and employ acceptable solutions within that

model.

3.5.1.1- Educate chain of command on deviances from accepted cultural

behavior.

Task 4- Protect the Team
4.1- Plan for QRF.
4.2- Integrate FF into protection plan.
4.3- Execute emergency procedures.
4.4- Conduct personnel recovery.

Task 5- Sustain the Team
5.1- Develop relationship with supporting units/organizations/assets.
5.2- Coordinate for basic necessities.

5.2.1- Food and water, shelter, transportation, medical support.

5.2.2- CL IV, CL V, MEDEVAC, and other effects when required.

5.3- Mitigate culture shock.
5.4- Maintain unit cohesion and morale.

Task 6- Redeploy the Team
6.1- Conduct effective transfer of FF unit, or counterpart, to follow on advisor
team.
6.2- Prepare historical documentation of your mission.

6.2.1- Prepare written AAR.

6.2.2- Prepare written lessons learned or record of events/training

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Appendix B

BATTLE HANDOVER PROCEDURES

“Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency on your watch. Your tour will end,
and your successors will need your corporate knowledge. Start handover folders, in
every platoon and specialist squad, from day one. Ideally, you would have inherited
these from your predecessors, but if not, you must start them.”

—Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Ph.D., Australian Army,

“

28 Articles”

2006

The purpose of this appendix is to provide recommendations/checklists to conduct a
battle-handover with the outgoing advisor team and to discuss ideas/suggestions on
effective techniques to train your FF units.

1. Predeployment Site Survey (PDSS)

a. Prior to deploying, the team leader and/or selected members of the advisor team
may get an opportunity to visit the outgoing advisor team in the combat area. Ideally
the PDSS is scheduled 60 days prior to the RIP/TOA process and is an extremely
useful tool to help the new advisor team understand their operational environment. The
PDSS checklist below can help answer many questions regarding FF in the area,
coalition units operating in the area, and specific points of interest regarding current
advisor initiatives, shortcomings, or opportunities to focus advisor effort for the incoming
team.
b. Every advisor team will have differing missions, areas of operation, and units and
personalities with which they will engage. Their environment, their relationships, the FF
level of autonomy, and the level of stability within the AO will help define their mission.
Prior to departure for the PDSS, the incoming team leader should assemble the request
for information (RFI) list based on inputs from his team. The checklist in table 21 below
provides a basic outline. Team members going on the PDSS should follow the checklist
as a guide to focus on their mission and AO. However, it is important for the incoming
advisor team to remain flexible and keep an open mind with respect to
training/operating with their assigned FF.

(1) Site Survey Checklist. The site survey checklist helps answer questions
identified by the team during their preparation for deployment. The checklist can be
modified as needed to aid the site survey team in acquiring information for planning
before deployment.
(2) Site Survey Team Mission. The mission of the site survey team is to report on
the current FF mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) conditions. It also clarifies in-country
C2 systems/logistics relationships for the follow-on unit’s mission execution and
coordinates the in-country reception of the main body.

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(3) Site Survey Team Procedures.

(a) Before departure, the site survey team conducts pre-deployment activities to
include

―

•

Obtaining required travel documents (visas and passports) and a copy of

the country clearance message sent by the US embassy, if required,
through the battalion S-2 or S-3.

•

Ensuring site survey team member medical and immunization records are

current.

•

Determine financial management support (location of supporting finance

unit and J4 (funding)).

•

Confirming that all agencies concerned with the site survey have been

briefed on the team’s itinerary and are available for coordination.

•

Receiving and updating the threat briefing as well as reviewing the rules of

engagement (ROE) and SOFA.

•

Conducting a mission analysis and back brief in accordance with unit SOP.

The team tailors its mission analysis and back brief to the site survey
mission.

(b) Upon arrival in the AO, the team processes through customs, notifies the
security cooperation officer (SCO) of its arrival and status, and requests an
updated threat briefing. The survey team must be ready to brief the mission and
program of instruction (POI) to the SCO for approval and/or modification.
(c) The survey team commander and S-3 establish the command relationship
with the next-higher in-country US commander if he is not in the team’s normal
chain of command. The team commander also briefs the next-higher in-country
US commander on the planned execution of the survey and the required
preparations for the main body.
(d) The survey team commander also obtains any additional guidance from the
higher in-country US commander for the follow-on forces’ mission execution. As
a minimum, this guidance includes confirmation of the ROE, evasion and
recovery (E&R) support, as well as any limitations on the relationships with FF
counterparts. The survey team commander discusses the following areas with
the SCO:

•

Training objectives.

•

Terms of reference.

•

Political situation.

•

Social customs.

•

Guidelines for official and personal associations with foreign personnel.

•

Currency control.

•

Procedures for obtaining intelligence support from the next higher in-

country US commander.

•

Administrative support.

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•

Legal status in relation to the foreign country [SOFA].

•

Procedures for obtaining logistics from the next-higher in-country US

commander.

(e) The team commander confirms communications and reporting procedures
between the next-higher in-country US commander, the survey team, and the
follow-on advisor units still in mission preparation. The team commander must
also verify the availability of communications equipment needed to support the
mission.
(f) The team commander confirms procedures for obtaining logistics from the
next-higher in-country US commander. He identifies a POC at the country team
crisis management element or at the emergency operations center (EOC) of the
US military staff. The POC then informs the team of necessary actions during
increased threat/emergencies that require evacuation of US personnel from the
AO. The team commander also coordinates procedures to obtain intelligence
support from the higher in-country commander or other US agencies.
(g) The survey team establishes direct working relationships with its next-higher
in-country or out-of country support element. The survey team:

•

Identifies the supporting element location.

•

Contacts the supporting element to determine any limitations on available

support. Team should know expected reaction time between the initiation of
the support request and fulfillment.

•

Requests support for the in-country reception of the main body in

accordance with the requirements in the survey team OPORD.

•

Confirms or establishes communications procedures among the

supporting element, the survey team, and the follow-on advisor team. They
identify alternate and emergency communications procedures for C2,
logistics, and MEDEVAC.

•

Determines the established communications support-requesting

procedures for the follow-on advisor team.

(h) The survey team establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation
and synchronize operations. The team:

•

Identifies the location of any concerned FF or US agencies.

•

Contacts the concerned agency to establish initial coordination.

•

Exchanges information and intelligence.

•

Confirms or establishes communications procedures.

•

Reports the newly established or changed procedures for inclusion into the

follow-on advisor mission.

(i) The survey team commander establishes a direct working relationship and
rapport with the FF unit commander. The survey team:

•

Briefs the FF commander on the advisor team survey mission and the

restrictions and limitations imposed on the advisor team by the higher US
commander.

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•

Assures the FF commander his assistance is required to develop the

tentative objectives for training and advisor assistance.

•

Deduces or solicits the FF commander’s estimate of his unit capabilities,

required training, and advisor assistance to include material requirements.
They discuss training: plans, current status, units available, facilities, and
any additional requirements.

•

The survey team obtains the FF commander’s approval of the plan and

requests a linkup with their counterparts under the mutual supervision of the
FF commander and survey team commander.

(j) The team does not make any promises (or statements that could be
construed as promises) to the FF commander about commitments to provide
assistance or fulfill material requirements. In particular, the survey team does
not:

•

Make any comment to the host government on possible US government

resources of any kind.

•

Provide any kind of independent assessment or confirmation of the

external threat, as perceived by the FF.

•

Provide advice on tactics, doctrine, basing, combat planning, or

operations.

(k) The survey team analyzes the FF unit’s status to determine FF requirements
for advisor assistance. The team:

•

Collects enough information to confirm the validity of current intelligence

and selects tentative training and/or advisor assistance COAs.

•

Prepares written estimates for advisor assistance COAs prioritized in order

of desirability.

•

Determines the unit location and its effects on the populace.

•

Collects and analyzes all information affecting force protection.

•

Determines the FF unit’s existing logistics and maintenance support

shortfalls and capabilities.

•

Determines the compatibility of recommended US equipment with

equipment in the FF inventory.

(l) The survey team helps the FF unit prepare facilities (training, security, and
administration) for the execution of the mission. The survey team inspects the
facilities FF has designated for their use during the mission. Any deficiencies
that will prevent execution of the advisor assistance COAs need to be identified.
After the inspection, the survey team commander recommends to the FF
commander the most desirable COAs to correct any deficiencies found.
(m) The survey team commander tentatively recommends the most desirable
COAs to the FF commander emphasizing how to achieve the desired training
and/or advisor assistance objectives. The survey team commander:

•

Ensures the FF commander understands the desired COAs are still

tentative (contingent on the US commander’s decision).

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•

Ensures the higher in-country US commander is informed of significant

findings in the survey of the FF unit.

•

Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on advisor team, after

obtaining input from the FF commander.

(n) The survey team ensures its security at all times, according to the latest
threat assessment. The team:

•

Fortifies their position (quarters, communications, medical, and command)

using available means, keeping in mind the requirement to maintain low
visibility.

•

Establishes and maintains an internal alert plan.

•

Organizes and maintains an internal guard system with at least one

member who is awake and knows the location of all team members. The
guard is ready to react to emergencies by following the alert plan and
starting defensive actions according to established ROE and E&R
procedures.

•

Maintains communications with all team members outside the immediate

area occupied by the team’s main body.

(o) Before departing from the AO, the survey team again visits all concerned US
and FF staff agencies to clarify any unresolved problem areas.

Table 21. Site Survey Checklist

ADVISOR TEAM

S-2

(1) Intelligence briefing.
(2) Threat briefing.
(3) Maps and photos of the area.
(4) Weather forecast data.
(5) Restricted and off-limits areas.
(6) Local populace (attitudes, customs, and dangers).

S-3

(1) Initial coordination.

♦

Tentative training plans.

♦

Aviation support tentatively available (hours and type of aircraft).

♦

FF plans (tentative).

♦

Problem

areas.

♦

Evasion plan of action (EPA)-related directives, guidance, plans, or orders.

(2) Points of contact (POC), phone number list, communications requirements, and
systems used.

S-4

(1) Transportation requirements.
(2) Special equipment requirements.
(3) Other support requirements.
(4) Construction equipment and supply requirements.

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HOST UNIT COMMANDER

(1) Training plan.
(2) Current training status.
(3) Units available for training.
(4) C2.
(5) Additional training desires.
(6) Unit policies.

S-2

(1) Local civilians.
(2) Security policies and problems.
(3) Populace control requirements (identification [ID] cards/passes).

S-3

(1) Training plan.
(2) Support available.

♦

Ammunition.

♦

Weapons.

♦

Vehicles.

♦

Aircraft/air

items.

♦

Facilities: Training areas, classrooms, ranges, training aids, special

equipment.

(3) Unit equipment.
(4) Landing zones (LZ) and drop zones (DZ) in the area.
(5) Maps.
(6) Rations for field training.
(7) Daily training schedules and status reports.
(8) POC for training problems.
(9) Holidays and unit requirements that may interfere with training.
(10) Medical and dental support.
(11) Communications capabilities.
(12) FF activities.

S-4

(1) Detachment facilities.

♦

Barracks.

♦

Drinking

water.

♦

Messing

facilities.

♦

Secure storage areas.

♦

Electrical power supply.

(2) Fuel supply.
(3) Rations.
(4) Transportation.
(5) Lumber and materials for training aids.
(6) Special equipment.
(7) Ammunition.
(8) Availability of construction equipment/tools and supplies.

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121

2. Trading Spaces

a. Once you have reached your assigned AO, you will most likely start a RIP/TOA
schedule which generally doesn’t allow for much deviation. Typically, every advisor
unit follows a theater-approved RIP / TOA checklist that is managed by the outgoing
advisor team leader. As the incoming team, you must be careful to maximize
opportunities to learn from your replacements during this time. Observe the outgoing
team and learn how their relationships with their FF counterpart work. If you are
partnered with a coalition unit, understand the roles the FF unit will be expected to fill.
Ask lots of questions, but don’t question methods until you have walked in their shoes.
Remember “there is a reason they are doing what they are doing” your primary
consideration is still do no harm. If you are assigned to a new FF unit and do not have
the opportunity for a RIP/TOA you can still use some of the following tools:
b. The operational environment is often diverse, dynamic, and highly volatile. In
addition, every area of operation is different and requires an analysis based on political ,
military, economic, social, information, infrastructure-people and time (PMESII-PT) that
define your area. Understanding these aspects will explain how the FF unit operates,
define their motivations/perceptions, and can determine FF unit effectiveness in the
future. Questions for consideration by incoming advisor team include:

(1) Politics. What is the dominant political party in your area? Is the government
effective at influencing the people? Do the people support? Is there a shadow
government in place and are they the source of power? Is there an effective
neighborhood action council (NAC) and when/where do they meet? Is the NAC
process infiltrated by militia or insurgent sympathies?
(2) Military. What FF authorities operate in the area? Does the FF you advise have
jurisdiction? What is the division of labor between civil and military units in your AO?
What is the infiltration factor by insurgents and/or militia in the team’s assigned FF
and others in the area? What are the insurgent lines of communications and
support? What threats exist and how will they fight your FF unit? What coalition
units operate in your AO and what can be expected from them?
(3) Economic. What is the poverty level of your AO? What is the primary source of
income? What criminal activities exploit the AO (racketeering, prostitution, extortion,
illegal fuel sales, bomb-making)? What collective job opportunities exist to employ
the young and disenfranchised? What role do your FF currently have regarding
corruption within the economic arena in the AO? What corruption is best left alone
in the interest of mission accomplishment?
(4) Social. Is there a tribal network in your AO? Who runs the families and tribes?
Do the presence of women and children in the streets indicate stability, or merely the
perception of it? Is there a dominant religious or ethnic group, and if so, where do
they get their support? What is the ethnic breakdown by neighborhood or village?
Where do the sectarian fault-lines exist?
(5) Informational. Are there any local media in your area? How do the people
receive their news? How can I effectively use deception? What is the enemy using
to influence information in your area? What is your FF doing to promote a positive

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perception of security? What are FF or partnership units doing that detracts from
promoting a positive perception of security?
(6) Infrastructure. What is the current sewage, water, electric, and trash pick-up
assessment in your AO? What projects must be supported by your FF? What
projects require coalition support? What defines your AO—urban or agrarian (what
effect does the physical geography have on an insurgency)? What are the road
conditions? Are there any political offices, sensitive sites, or otherwise restricted
areas?
(7) People. Who are the power-brokers within the AO? What civilians are the
decision makers (Sheiks, Imams, political leaders, military leaders, teachers,
police)? Are you restricted from interacting with any people in the AO without
government approval?
(8) Time. Is there a sense of urgency in your AO from the people? How do they
view time? What time constraints does your coalition partner unit have? What are
the FF time constraints?
(9) Their Legacy. Finally, your FF counterparts will speak of the old team like long
lost brothers after their departure. Honor this relationship. They may have thought
your predecessors competent or incompetent, but they will usually speak highly of
them. Do not speak ill of your predecessors, regardless of your opinion as this will
not endear you to your counterparts.

3. Mission Handoff Procedures

a. Timeline. Table 22 is a sample timeline, or checklist, for mission handoff. It lists in
chronological order the tasks an advisor team performs for a mission handoff. During
long-term advisor operations, the commander may elect to replace an advisor team for
various reasons. Mission handoff is the process of passing an ongoing mission from
one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity. It is based on a 179-day
requirement and involves two advisor teams.

Table 22. Sample Mission Handover Timeline

Outgoing Team

Incoming Team

Day Requirements

Following planning and

preparation, the advisor team (less
advance party)

deploys to the AO

The advisor team deploys with all

personnel and equipment required to
perform the assigned mission. If this
is a first deployment to the AO, the
advisor team deploys a site survey
team (advisor team members) to
coordinate all training with the FF
unit and the US Embassy. If there is
an advisor team in-country, the
incoming replacement advisor team

179

The incoming advisor team

receives notification that it will
replace advisor team in 179 days

The advisor team starts its pre-
mission planning.

The advisor team coordinates for

its deployment into the AO.

Leaves, common tasks training,

and range qualifications take place
immediately after the mission
notification.

The advisor team starts training

for the mission assigned. The

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