FM 7-100.1 OPFOR Opposing Force Operations (DECEMBER 2004) - page 11

 

  Главная      Manuals     FM 7-100.1 OPFOR Opposing Force Operations (DECEMBER 2004)

 

Search            copyright infringement  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Content      ..     9      10      11     

 

 

 

 

FM 7-100.1 OPFOR Opposing Force Operations (DECEMBER 2004) - page 11

 

 

FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
12-91. The following are examples of some specific considerations for
planners to use during the development of logistics plans supporting offensive
operations:
Maintenance units should pre-plan maintenance collection points along
movement routes, in order to reduce recovery requirements.
Supply points consisting of fuel and ammunition are positioned in the
battle zone or as close to it as possible.
Arrangements are made in advance for aerial resupply of critical items
in order to maintain the operational tempo.
Planners arrange to throughput obstacle-breaching and bridging mate-
rial if required.
Planners must consider potential bypassed enemy units; they must
have the latest intelligence on the enemy situation.
DEFENSE
12-92. The logistics objective in supporting defensive operations is to sustain
the attrition of enemy attacking forces through support from dispersed sites
located in the support zone. An OSC support zone may be dispersed within
the support zones of subordinate divisions or brigades, or the OSC may have
a separate support zone site of its own.
12-93. During defensive operations, supply activity is greatest in the
preparation stage. Supplies generally are stockpiled or pre-positioned in
initial and subsequent defensive positions. Critical supplies such as
ammunition and barrier material should be as mobile as possible to ensure
continuous support as combat power is shifted in response to enemy attacks.
12-94. To support stay-behind operations, supply stockage levels may be two
to three times higher than normal amounts. This ensures a redundancy of
caches and needed equipment that cannot be readily resupplied. Stay-behind
forces may require unique maintenance support arrangements to ensure that
equipment remains operational.
12-95. Logistics units position themselves in relatively secure positions far
enough from maneuver and fire support units to be out of the flow of the
battle. However, they should not be so far removed as to render the logistics
effort less effective.
12-96. The following are examples of some specific considerations for
planners to use during the development of logistics plans supporting
defensive operations:
Maintenance units should position maintenance teams in the battle
zone to return the maximum number of weapons systems to the battle
as soon as possible.
Emphasis is on keeping supply and evacuation routes open.
Nonessential logistics units and operations move into the depth of the
support zone as early as possible.
In a maneuver defense, supply points consisting of fuel and ammunition
are positioned as far forward as possible and in successive battle posi-
tions.
12-20
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
SUPPORT ZONE SECURITY
12-97. The OPFOR expects any enemy to make an effort to conduct
reconnaissance, espionage, and diversionary action in its operational support
zone. These enemy actions can be particularly effective in areas where the
local population is not sympathetic to the OPFOR’s cause. In addition to
these threats, the OPFOR anticipates attacks on its support zone by airborne
and heliborne forces as well as larger-scale attacks by enemy operational
maneuver forces.
12-98. The OPFOR uses a security force to counter any threats in its support
zone. Each OSC deploys a considerable counterintelligence effort. It can
assign up to an entire division for security tasks. The security force is
equipped and trained for conventional as well as unconventional warfare. As
airborne and amphibious threats grow, there is increasing stress on
deploying antilanding reserves, including, or even based on, heliborne units
to provide a rapid reaction.
MISSION SUPPORT SITES
12-99. A mission support site (MSS) is a temporary base used by units that
are operating at a considerable distance from their support zone, during an
extended mission. The MSS may provide food, shelter, medical support,
ammunition, or demolitions. The use of an MSS eliminates unnecessary
movement of supplies and allows a force to move more rapidly. When
selecting an MSS, consideration is given to cover and concealment, proximity
to the objective, proximity to supply routes, and the presence of enemy
security forces in the area. Security dictates that drop zones or landing zones
be a considerable distance from an MSS, cache, or support zonealthough
this may increase transportation problems.
POST-COMBAT SUPPORT
12-100. Strategic and operational logisticians are not only focused on
supporting units in combat. They are also focused on other post-combat
support requirements such as personnel replacement, weapon systems
replacement, reconstitution, and receiving and preparing reinforcements.
(For information on personnel replacement, see the Personnel Support
section of this chapter.)
WEAPON SYSTEMS REPLACEMENT
12-101. Weapon systems replacement is simply a procedure for providing a
weapon system to a combat unit. It involves processing the vehicle or
equipment from a storage or transportation configuration to a ready-to-fight
condition. It also involves the integration of a completely trained crew with
the weapon system.
RECONSTITUTION
12-102. Reconstitution is performed in support of all combat operations.
Although it is mainly a command and operations function, the actual
refitting, supply, personnel fill, and medical actions are conducted by logistics
12-21
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
units. There are two methods for conducting reconstitution: reorganization
and regeneration.
Reorganization
12-103. Reorganization is action taken to shift resources internally within a
degraded unit to increase its level of combat effectiveness. Reorganization is
normally done at unit level and requires only limited external support such
as supply replenishment, maintenance assistance, and limited personnel
replacement. When continuity of the mission is of paramount importance,
composite units may be formed from other units reduced by combat
operations.
Regeneration
12-104. Regeneration is action taken to rebuild a unit through large-scale
replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Additionally, it is action
taken to restore C2 and conduct mission-essential training. Overall, the effort
is directed at restoring the unit’s cohesion, discipline, and fighting
effectiveness.
PREPARING REINFORCEMENTS
12-105. OPFOR strategic and operational logisticians prepare contingency
plans for the mobilization and reception of reserve forces. Once the unit
personnel and equipment are mobilized, they are sustained, configured, and
transported to their respective OSC. Normally, strategic-level logistics units
provide this type of support. Once units arrive at the OSC level, the OSC
assumes responsibility for their further sustainment and transport.
12-22
Chapter 13
Airborne, Special-Purpose Forces, and Amphibious
Operations
The OPFOR views airborne and special-purpose forces (SPF) as means to
carry the battle into the enemy’s depth. The General Staff uses these
highly mobile forces against strategic objectives or for regional power
projection. It may also allocate such forces down to the operational and
tactical levels. It has the capability to conduct amphibious operations,
which sometimes occur in conjunction with airborne or SPF operations in
a coastal area. Insertion of any or all these forces into enemy rear areas
can disrupt the stability and cohesion of his defense.
AIRBORNE AND HELIBORNE OPERATIONS
13-1. Airborne and heliborne forces have the capability to surprise the enemy,
rapidly envelop key objectives, or exploit targets weakened by the effects of
deep fires. Airborne and heliborne forces are especially critical given the fluid-
ity and rapid tempo that characterizes the modern battlefield. The OPFOR
expects to capitalize on the added vertical dimension that airborne and heli-
borne forces provide when working in concert with ground maneuver forces.
13-2. The OPFOR also uses airborne forces as a means of projecting power in
its region. Significant portions of invasion forces could consist of airborne
units, which are well suited for such roles. They train for operations in a
variety of geographical environments. They also train specifically to establish,
defend, and expand an airhead. Their equipment is air-transportable.
13-3. Airborne forces are particularly valuable as a means to control access
into the region by extraregional forces. The early seizure of ports and airfields
critical to enemy deployment can be an essential ingredient in the conduct of
access-control operations. Airborne and heliborne forces are especially suited
for operations conducted during the transition from regional to adaptive
operations. Their unique capabilities also render them especially useful in
support of adaptive operations. They can serve as fixing, assault, exploitation,
or deception forces when the rapid positioning of such forces in support of of-
fensive operations is critical.
13-4. Airborne landings require many valuable assets. Therefore, only after
careful consideration would a commander make the decision to use airborne
forces. If other units are capable of fulfilling a given mission, they execute it
instead of airborne units. Heliborne landings also require valuable assets but
are often more economical than airborne landings.
13-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
COMMAND AND CONTROL
13-5. Administratively, airborne forces are part of the Army. During wartime,
to allow flexibility in employment, they are directly subordinate to the
Supreme High Command (SHC), with control exercised by the General Staff.
When the OPFOR establishes more than one theater headquarters, the
General Staff may allocate some airborne units to each theater. A theater
commander with dedicated airborne assets could further dedicate airborne units
to an operational-strategic command (OSC) or, dependent upon the mission, he
could also place airborne units in support of an OSC. A theater commander
with constituent airborne assets can allocate them to an OSC in a constituent,
dedicated, or supporting relationship. These command and support relation-
ships ensure that airborne objectives support the overall mission of the theater or
OSC to which the airborne units are allocated. Even in a supporting relationship,
the commander of the theater or OSC receiving the airborne unit(s) establishes
those units’ objectives, priorities, and time of deployment.
13-6. The landing force commander is the commander of the airborne or
ground force unit forming the basis for the airborne or heliborne landing force.
He is responsible for preparing and positioning troops for loading. He shares
with the aviation commander the decision to proceed with the landing, based
on the assessment of the situation at the drop zone (DZ) or landing zone (LZ).
After the landing, the landing force commander is solely responsible for con-
ducting the operation, until linkup with ground maneuver forces. While the
landing force commander can plan the scheme of maneuver, final approval of
the plan comes from the OSC or theater commander.
MISSIONS
13-7. The OPFOR categorizes airborne or heliborne missions based on the
depth and importance of the objective, the size of forces involved, and the
level of command of the controlling commander. The three categories of
missions are strategic, operational, and tactical. The location of enemy
forces, the level of the controlling headquarters, the significance of the target,
weapons systems capabilities, and geography also determine the scope of the
operation. Many factors can affect the decision of where to insert an airborne
or heliborne force, including
The size of the force.
Anticipated enemy resistance.
The air situation (presence or absence of air superiority).
The potential for reinforcement of the force.
The position and projected rate of advance of friendly forces designated
for linkup.
Strategic Missions
13-8. In wartime, the SHC establishes strategic missions, which the General
Staff controls. The outcome of a strategic mission should have significant im-
pact on the war or strategic campaign. The use of airborne forces in a regional
power-projection role is also a strategic mission.
13-2
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
13-9. Airborne forces conduct strategic missions against deep targets. Forces
from other arms and services can also participate, but typically would not
arrive in the target area until a later time. Depending on the depth of the
airborne mission, linkup with ground forces may not occur for several days.
Since troops on the ground receive supplies by airdrop or airlift, the operation
requires substantial air combat and transport support.
13-10. Objectives of strategic missions could be national capitals or other
administrative-political centers, industrial or economic centers, ports or
maritime straits, or airfields. Strategic missions also may establish a new
theater or neutralize one member of an enemy coalition.
Operational Missions
13-11. An OSC does not necessarily include airborne forces in its task or-
ganization. However, the SHC or General Staff may allocate such forces to an
OSC for a given operation, in a constituent, dedicated, or supporting role.
Operational objectives could include
Headquarters or command posts.
Communications facilities.
Enemy precision and nuclear weapons.
Logistics facilities.
Airfields.
Ports.
Bridges and other water- or gap-crossing sites.
Lines of communications (LOCs).
An airborne force of brigade size is the most common force used to accomplish
operational missions. Typical missions can include deception operations,
blocking a withdrawing enemy, or enveloping enemy defensive positions.
Tactical Missions
13-12. While recognizing the need to limit the use of airborne forces to primar-
ily strategic and operational missions, the OPFOR also recognizes the need for
the capability to insert troops to perform tactical missions. A tactical airborne
mission could have the same types of objectives as an operational mission. On
occasion, airborne troops may be allocated for such missions, but the force is
more likely to consist of infantry troops. In either case, the units involved
would normally rely on helicopters for tactical insertions, rather than fixed-
wing aircraft. The primary function of these tactical airborne or heliborne
landings is to cooperate with ground maneuver forces in reaching operational
or tactical objectives. In other situations, heliborne insertions can serve as a
rapid means for positioning or repositioning forces on the battlefield.
13-13. Heliborne units can perform reconnaissance missions when inserted
into the disruption zone or the enemy rear area. They may perform tactical
security missions, or cover, delay, or defend against an enemy approach to a
vulnerable flank. Heliborne units can also serve in an antilanding reserve,
providing rapid reaction to the threat of enemy airborne or amphibious landings.
Ambushes, raids, sabotage, and deception activities are examples of other
13-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
missions suited to heliborne operations. Heliborne units can also lay and clear
mines in the enemy rear.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION
13-14. Planning considerations for airborne and heliborne operations include
the mission, troops and support available, terrain, the depth of the operation,
flight routes, air superiority, DZs or LZs, surprise, security, and the enemy
situation. Deception operations are planned to mislead the enemy as to the
true purpose and location of air activity. Given routine readiness conditions,
the time required to prepare transport aviation and to plan a battalion-size
or larger airborne mission is, as a minimum, approximately 24 hours. This
planning time includes
Notification of alert and moving out: 2 hours.
Preparation of aviation units: 18 hours.
Embarking troops and equipment and final aircraft preparation: 4 hours.
When exercising a preplanned contingency or starting from an increased
readiness condition, the preparation time is reduced by 5 to 8 hours.
13-15. The time required to plan for a battalion-size heliborne assault is similar.
Troop embarkation times can be reduced if few or no vehicles accompany the
force. The force selected to conduct a heliborne assault may require training,
and this adds at least one day to the preparation time. To avoid this delay, the
OPFOR trains selected infantry battalions for heliborne employment.
13-16. Preparation for an airborne or heliborne landing includes the following:
Determining the composition, strength, and capabilities of the enemy
forces in the area of the DZ or LZ (or those near enough to interfere
with the landing operations and subsequent attack of the objective).
Determining the nature of the terrain and condition of the road network.
Locating natural and manmade obstacles that would interfere with air
drop of troops and equipment.
Selecting suitable primary and alternate DZ or LZs.
13-17. Aerial reconnaissance, clandestine agents, sympathizers, maps, signals
reconnaissance, long-range patrols, or air-dropped reconnaissance teams all
provide intelligence information for an airborne operation. Reconnaissance of
the DZ or LZ, by both air assets and SPF, continues throughout the planning
and execution stages of the operation. If enemy troops are located in the area,
they are attacked and neutralized by aviation, artillery, or SPF. Reconnais-
sance takes place when the airborne or heliborne operation is first conceived,
when troops embark, and while aircraft are en route to the DZ or LZ. Enemy
armor, artillery, and air threats are of major concern. Reconnaissance activi-
ties also occur outside the projected objective area, as a deception measure.
13-18. Airborne and heliborne operations require extensive coordination between
the committed landing force and the controlling headquarters, supporting avia-
tion, and ground maneuver forces. The following principles contribute to success:
Surprise should be used to advantage. Extensive security measures are
necessary in all phases of the operation to prevent early detection and
13-4
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
to minimize enemy reaction time. Night airborne operations are a pri-
mary means of achieving surprise. False insertions aid deception and
surprise when conducting heliborne operations.
Landings should be in undefended areas or in areas where enemy
defenses have been effectively neutralized.
There must be effective air cover for the en route formation. Suppres-
sion of enemy ground-based air defense weapons along the flight route
is imperative.
Airborne assaults receive fire support from aircraft, surface-to-
surface missiles (SSMs), and artillery, as the latter comes within
supporting range of airborne forces.
Artillery fires are essential to the support of heliborne forces.
Attack helicopters escort lift helicopters to prepare the LZ before the
landing of troops and to provide fire support once the landing force
is on the ground.
13-19. A typical DZ is three by four km; a typical LZ may be smaller. An air-
borne brigade normally receives one primary and at least one alternate DZ.
Within a brigade DZ, each airborne battalion has a designated, individual DZ.
The landing force commander designates alternate zones for emergency use.
Follow-on forces normally use the zones used by the initial wave. Heliborne
forces use one or more LZs depending upon the situation and size of the land-
ing force. The landing force commander designates at least one alternate LZ.
CONDUCT
13-20. The use of airborne forces in an operation depends upon whether it would
enhance the likelihood of surprise, deep penetration, and rapid exploitation. Also
essential is a favorable forces analysis in the DZ or LZ and the objective area.
These criteria, together with the achievement of at least temporary local air su-
periority and the availability of airborne and airlift assets, constitute the main
elements in a planner’s decision to conduct an airborne or heliborne operation.
Air Movement
13-21. The Air Force allocates the transport aviation units required for
deployment. Either transport aircraft or lift helicopters or a combination of
the two can air-land airborne units or insert airborne battalions. Lift helicop-
ters from army aviation can support heliborne landings. Aircraft of civil avia-
tion can augment military capabilities. Civil fleet equipment consists of some
medium- and long-range passenger transports and a number of short-range
transports and helicopters. Staging bases and associated airfields are located
at distances that protect aircraft and troop concentrations from enemy tactical
aircraft and short-range SSMs. Airfields and equipment are camouflaged and
concealed against aerial observation, and aircraft are placed in revetted positions.
13-22. The OPFOR considers the air movement phase of an airborne or heliborne
operation to be its most vulnerable phase. The OPFOR emphasizes the necessity
of creating a threat-free flight corridor from the departure area to the DZ or LZ.
All along the flight path, fire support assets target enemy air defenses. Fighters
escort transport aircraft during an airborne operation to protect them from
13-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
enemy fighters and ground fires. Attack helicopters can escort lift helicopters
during a heliborne operation to protect them from ground fires.
13-23. Passive defense measures taken during the air movement phase in-
clude conducting movement during hours of darkness, using more than one
flight route, maintaining radio silence, and flying at low altitudes. The
OPFOR can use electronic warfare measures during air movement, including
escort jammers, which suppress enemy air defense and surveillance systems.
Air Drop or Heliborne Landing
13-24. Airborne forces normally conduct combat air drops at an altitude of
from 150 to 300 m. They emphasize the necessity of dropping at low altitude
to minimize the amount of time individuals are in the air. Low-altitude drops
also increase the likelihood that a unit’s personnel and equipment would land
close together.
13-25. Forces inserted by helicopter have the advantage of arriving on the LZ
as organized units. To minimize their vulnerability to ground fires, helicopters
remain on the ground in the LZ only long enough to disembark troops. If the
LZ is under effective enemy fire, the landing force commander, after consult-
ing the aviation commander, may divert the force to an alternate LZ.
Drop Zone or Landing Zone Procedures
13-26. The air drop or landing and reorganization phase is the second most
vulnerable period in an operation, following the air movement phase. The
airborne or heliborne force must clear the DZ or LZ quickly, before the enemy
arrives to counter it.
13-27. If the airborne force is dropped or landed during daylight hours,
personnel either move directly to their predesignated attack positions or, if
the DZ or LZ is not on the objective, first assemble in battalion assembly
areas. If the drop or landing occurs at night, personnel may first assemble as
companies and then move to battalion assembly areas, before occupying pre-
designated attack positions.
13-28. If the DZ is under strong enemy attack, personnel assemble and
move immediately to the perimeter to establish defensive battle positions.
Personnel use any available light armored vehicles to reinforce battle po-
sitions, and do not sort out the vehicles until after repelling the enemy attack.
13-29. If the DZ is not on the objective and units assemble first, they try to
avoid combat with enemy ground force units and hide from an air threat. If
required to actively defend against an air attack, at least one entire platoon
per company or one company per battalion is responsible for the mission. For
a planned follow-on air landing, the initial landing force leaves a rear detach-
ment at the DZ. This detachment provides security on the DZ for the landing
of the follow-on force.
13-30. The heliborne force lands on its objective if possible. If it is not on the
objective, the LZ should be as close as possible but outside of the direct fire
range of enemy forces at the objective. Once on the ground, the heliborne land-
ing force organizes rapidly in an assembly area.
13-6
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
Movement to Objective
13-31. Speed and security are the primary concerns during movement to the
objective. If the landing force is moving at night, it can use established road
networks to reach the objective before dawn. If movement is during the day,
the unit moves cross-country using terrain features to provide concealment
when possible. During movement, the landing force maintains radio silence
until making contact with the enemy, with only the landing force commander
transmitting messages.
13-32. Since the information received before departure is perishable,
reconnaissance missions during the ground movement phase are ex-
tremely important. For airborne forces, these missions are performed by
reconnaissance teams from the brigade and/or battalion level. These teams
may have engineer or chemical defense personnel attached.
13-33. Rapid execution is especially important to the heliborne force. The force
departs the assembly area with reconnaissance in the lead and on the flanks.
The landing force attacks the target as quickly as possible in order to gain
surprise and maintain momentum.
Offense
13-34. Once on the ground, offensive tactics of airborne forces are similar to
those of similarly equipped infantry forces. Before the attack, the airborne
force deploys its fire support units to provide maximum support. Airborne
forces at the final objective attack to destroy the enemy or to seize control of
the enemy-held area or facility. A heliborne force can be augmented with
combat engineers, antitank weapons, artillery, and chemical defense troops.
The force usually attempts to attack its objective from several directions at
once. A heliborne force is generally assigned an objective less heavily defended
than that assigned to an airborne force.
Defense
13-35. Once the landing force has seized an objective, it must defend that
objective until the arrival of friendly ground maneuver forces. Usually, the
landing force establishes a perimeter defense. In some cases, the terrain and
the enemy’s situation may permit establishing a defense in depth, with a
small, mobile reserve. A number of factors influence the capability to remain
on the objective: days of supply on hand, a secure air resupply corridor, the
availability of air support, and the enemy’s ability to respond to the landing.
Heliborne forces, especially those drawn from the regular ground forces, have
little sustainability, and their ability to remain on the objective is limited.
Linkup with a ground maneuver force should occur as quickly as possible.
Linkup
13-36. Airborne or heliborne units either await a linkup with friendly forces
or, when necessary, fight their way back to friendly lines. The rule of thumb is
that the probability of overall success is greater the sooner the linkup occurs.
To accomplish linkup, the unit sends a reconnaissance patrol to meet the
approaching ground maneuver force units. The reconnaissance patrol provides
information on the best approaches into the area, the security situation on the
13-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
objective, and the enemy situation. A linkup with ground maneuver forces
normally completes the mission of an airborne or heliborne force. Once linkup
occurs, control of the landing force unit returns to the parent headquarters.
SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES OPERATIONS
13-37. The OPFOR maintains a broad array of SPF. One of the six service
components, the SPF Command, provides the capability to attack both
regional and extraregional enemies throughout their strategic depth. In
addition to conducting direct action, this command fields strategic recon-
naissance forces with which it is able to support national intelligence re-
quirements. It also has a capability to support operations of terrorists and
other irregular forces. The SPF Command includes both SPF units and com-
mando units. Its units provide a balanced capability including some tactical
transport for use in inserting SPF or commando units.
13-38. In addition to the SPF Command, four of the other five service
components have their own SPF. The Army, Naval, and Air Force SPF are
intended primarily for use at the operational level and enable each service to
conduct reconnaissance and direct action to the opponent’s operational depth.
The Internal Security Forces also have their own highly-trained SPF units,
equipped to conduct direct-action missions in the enemy’s rear. All of these
SPF organizations provide the OPFOR a flexible and capable means of sup-
port to regional, transition, and adaptive operations.
13-39. The Air Force fields light transport aircraft for insertion of its own SPF
or those belonging to other service components, within the region. The Navy’s
submarine force may also insert SPF for reconnaissance or direct action out-
side the region.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
13-40. The SPF Command includes both SPF units and commando units.
(Command and control for the SPF Command’s commando units is discussed
under the subsection on Commandos later in this chapter.) The Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Internal Security Forces also have their own SPF. Any of these
various types of SPF units may remain under the command and control of
their respective service headquarters or may be suballocated to operational- or
even tactical-level commands during task organization.
Administrative Force Structure
13-41. The SPF Command is one of the six service components subordinate to
the SHC and is thus under the control of the General Staff. The General Staff
normally reserves some SPF brigades under its own control for strategic-level
missions as directed by its Intelligence Directorate. Likewise, the Army, Navy,
and Air Force could maintain some of their own SPF directly subordinate to
the service headquarters, although most of them are intended for use at the
operational level and thus can be subordinate to operational-level commands,
even in the administrative force structure.
13-42. In peacetime and in garrisons within the State, SPF of both the SPF
Command and other services are organized administratively into SPF companies,
battalions, and brigades. These organizations facilitate peacetime administrative
13-8
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
control and training. However, even these administrative organizations do not
have a fixed structure. Each consists of a varying number of small SPF teams
normally composed of 5 to 12 men each. The number of teams contained in
each administrative organization depends on the team size required for spe-
cific missions that are envisioned for it. Every SPF operation is unique and
unlike any other, and thus requires forces organized not in a standard fashion
but rather adapted into a task organization based on the mission.
Task Organization
13-43. When the OPFOR establishes more than one theater headquarters, the
General Staff may allocate some SPF units to each theater. From those SPF
assets allocated to him in a constituent or dedicated relationship, the theater
commander can suballocate some or all of them to a subordinate OSC.
13-44. The General Staff (or a theater commander with constituent or
dedicated SPF) can allocate SPF units to an OSC in a constituent or
dedicated relationship or place them in support of an OSC. These command
and support relationships ensure that SPF objectives support the overall
mission of the OSC to which the SPF units are allocated. Even in a sup-
porting relationship, the commander of the OSC receiving the SPF unit(s)
establishes those units’ objectives, priorities, and time of deployment. The
OSC commander may employ the SPF assets allocated to him as constitu-
ent or dedicated as part of his integrated fires command (IFC), or he may
suballocate them to his tactical-level subordinates. Even SPF units allocated
to an OSC may conduct strategic missions, if required.
13-45. The SPF units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Internal Security
Forces may remain under the control of their respective services (or be allo-
cated to a joint theater command). However, they are more likely to appear in
the task organization of an OSC. In that case, the OSC commander may
choose to suballocate them to tactical-level subordinates. If necessary, SPF
units from any of these service components could become part of joint SPF op-
erations in support of national-level requirements. In that case, they could
temporarily come under the control of the SPF Command or the General Staff.
13-46. Regardless of the parent administrative organization, SPF normally in-
filtrate and operate as small teams. When deployed, these teams may operate
individually, or they may be task organized into detachments. The terms team
and detachment indicate the temporary nature of the groupings. In the course
of an operation, teams can leave a detachment and join it again. Each team
may in turn break up into smaller teams (of as few as two men) or, conversely,
come together with other teams to form a larger team (of perhaps up to 30
men), depending on the mission. At a designated time, several teams can join
up and form a detachment (for example, to conduct a raid), which can at any
moment split up again. This whole process can be planned before the opera-
tion begins, or it can evolve during the course of the operation.
13-47. When deployed outside the State, each SPF team or detachment is in
direct communication with a higher headquarters. The controlling headquar-
ters is at the very least an OSC, and some SPF units receive orders directly
from the General Staff or theater headquarters. Thus, the chain of command
during operations is simple and flexible.
13-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
13-48. SPF are a major source of human intelligence (HUMINT), placing
“eyes on target” in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory. They
gather information to satisfy strategic and operational intelligence requirements
at extended distances (sometimes more than 100 km) or close to tactical recon-
naissance, in nonlinear and noncontiguous situations. Their priorities include
Precision weapons.
NBC delivery systems.
Headquarters and other command and control (C2) installations.
Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RISTA) systems and centers.
Rail, road, and air movement routes.
Airfields and ports.
Logistics facilities.
Air defense systems.
Once SPF teams locate such targets, they may simply monitor and report on
activity there, or they may conduct direct action or diversionary measures.
13-49. The SPF can train and employ affiliated forces and civilians to perform
HUMINT activities. They may also operate in conjunction with HUMINT
agents controlled by the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff.
DIRECT ACTION
13-50. Direct action involves an overt, covert, or clandestine attack by armed
individuals or groups to damage or destroy high-value targets or to kill or seize a
person or persons. Examples of direct-action missions for SPF units are assas-
sination, abduction, hostage taking, sabotage, capture, ambushes, raids, rescue
of hostages (civilian and military), and rescue of downed pilots and aircrews. Im-
plementation of direct-action missions depends on the size of the enemy’s defenses,
the element of surprise, and the assets available to the SPF unit commander.
13-51. The term diversionary measures refers to direct actions of groups or
individuals operating in the enemy’s rear area. These measures include the
destruction or degradation of key military objectives and the disruption of C2,
communications, junctions, transport, and LOCs. They could include misdi-
recting military road movement by moving road markers and generating false
communications. They also involve killing personnel, spreading disinformation,
destroying military hardware, and other actions to weaken the morale and will
of the enemy by creating confusion and panic. Diversionary measures may
contribute to the conduct of information warfare.
MISSIONS
13-52. While SPF belonging to other service components are designed for use
at the operational level, forces from the SPF Command provide a regional and
global strategic capability. Collectively, all these SPF assets can engage the
enemy simultaneously to his operational and even strategic depth. They are
prepared to attack enemy forces anywhere in the region, at overseas bases, at
home stations, and even in military communities. They can attack his airfields,
13-10
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
seaports, transportation infrastructures, and LOCs. Targets include not only
enemy military forces, but also government agency heads, contractors, and
private firms involved in transporting troops and materiel into the region or
supporting enemy forces in any manner.
13-53. SPF are likely to be used against key political, economic, or population
centers or tangible targets whose destruction affects intangible centers of
gravity, rather than against military targets for purely military objectives.
These efforts often place noncombatants at risk and aim to apply diplomatic-
political, economic, and psychological pressure. The goal is to present the
enemy with a nonlinear, simultaneous battlefield. Attacking such targets can
not only deny the enemy sanctuary, but also weaken his national will, par-
ticularly if the OPFOR can attack targets in the enemy’s homeland.
13-54. SPF are capable of conducting the following basic missions:
Neutralize weapons of mass destruction and precision weapons.
Attack air defense facilities and airfields.
Disrupt LOCs.
Attack C2 and RISTA facilities.
Exploit surprise to disrupt defensive actions.
Undermine morale and spread panic.
Disrupt enemy power supplies and transportation networks (power
utilities, POL transfer and storage sites, and internal transportation).
Conduct reconnaissance for future ground force operations or for
airborne and/or amphibious landings.
Organize local irregular forces.
Prevent efficient movement of enemy reserves.
Assassinate important political and military figures.
Provide terminal guidance for attacking aircraft, missiles, and precision
weapons.
In addition to these basic missions, SPF may have specific missions in
peacetime, transition to war, and wartime.
Peacetime Missions
13-55. During peacetime, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
carefully coordinates reconnaissance programs geared to meet the intelligence
requirements of the State and of the OPFOR in war. Aside from SPF troops, it
maintains agent networks in the target country to support SPF operations.
Some of these agents actively engage in subversion; others are “sleepers,”
prepared to act on call in time of war. The SPF Command trains agents to
operate as political agitators, intelligence collectors, and saboteurs. The
agents establish residence near military targets such as airports, missile
bases, arsenals, communications centers, logistics centers and depots, and
routes used for troop movements. Just before the beginning of hostilities, SPF
teams link up with agents already operating in the target area.
13-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
13-56. Clandestine SPF sabotage agents do little intelligence collection. Their job
is to assimilate into the local culture, establish residences near transport and power
facilities, and when ordered, emplace explosive charges in preselected targets.
13-57. Another important task for clandestine SPF sabotage agents in
peacetime is to acquire houses and plots of land to prepare safe areas where
sabotage teams (civilian and military) can find refuge after landing behind
enemy lines in times of hostilities. These places are usually in the countryside,
in forested areas near the sea, or in the mountains.
13-58. Agents provide incoming sabotage and assassination teams with safe
areas, motor transport, fuel, and supplies. They then guide the teams to their
objective. Both intelligence and sabotage agents can come under the control of a
theater or OSC chief of reconnaissance. The chief of reconnaissance can transfer
agents from one category to the other at any time or order them to fulfill both roles.
Transition to War
13-59. Before hostilities begin, SPF conduct clandestine operations in the target
area. This increases the probability of destroying key targets well before enemy
force protection measures tighten. This is the most critical period because
clandestine agents or teams can efficiently use the enemy’s lack of awareness
as an opportunity to disorganize and disrupt troops and the local population.
Since the SPF often use terror tactics, direct action during this transition period
still allows plausible deniability. Missions generally include the following:
Conduct strategic and operational reconnaissance.
Train and assist insurgents operating in foreign countries.
Organize local irregular forces.
Weaken the target country’s military capabilities or will to fight
through either subversion or direct action.
Assassinate key military and political figures.
Sabotage enemy mobilization and deployment.
13-60. The General Staff directs the planning of SPF wartime missions, which
form an integral part of combined arms operations. Intended to support
theater-level campaigns as well as OSC-level operations, SPF are capable of
operating throughout enemy territory.
Wartime Missions
13-61. SPF play an important role in support of both the offense and defense.
They may perform their missions separately, in support of strategic objec-
tives, or in support of a theater-level campaign or an OSC-level operation.
Missions generally include some of the following:
Conduct deep reconnaissance operations.
Conduct direct action along strategic or operational axes, including
ambushes and raids.
Destroy critical air defense systems and associated radars.
Support follow-on conventional military operations.
Assist local irregular forces to prepare for offensive operations.
13-12
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
Provide communications, liaison, and support to stay-behind partisan
operations in the defense.
13-62. The OPFOR conducts SPF operations in the enemy’s operational and
strategic depth to undermine his morale and to spread panic among the
civilian population and the political leadership. Refugees can hamper enemy
deployment, defensive maneuver, and logistics.
13-63. SPF allocated to an OSC often become part of the disruption force,
frequently operating in enemy-held territory before the beginning of an
operation or battle. They may become part of an OSC’s IFC, to assist in
locating and destroying key enemy formations or systems (see Chapter 2).
13-64. Regional Operations. In operations against the State’s regional
neighbors, Army SPF inserted in advance can support the ground forces
at the operational level and conduct reconnaissance and direct action to
the opponent’s operational depth. Naval and Air Force SPF can carry out
reconnaissance in support of landings or conduct raids against critical
targets. The SPF Command uses its assets to conduct missions throughout
the strategic depth of current regional opponents and to detect indicators of
possible outside intervention in the regional conflict. The SPF can also
support terrorist and insurgent operations in the region.
13-65. Transition Operations. During transition operations, when an
extraregional force begins to intervene, the SPF Command can use its re-
gional and global intelligence-gathering capabilities to the enemy’s strategic
depth. It can use SPF teams to conduct direct-action attacks against ports,
LOCs, and early-entry forces. The SPF can use terror tactics and are well
equipped, armed, and motivated for such missions. The SPF can also support
insurgent and terrorist operations to delay or disrupt the extraregional force’s
mobilization and deployment.
13-66. During transition operations, Army SPF conduct raids against enemy
logistics sites, LOCs, and vulnerable military targets in the region. The Navy
and Air Force can also insert Naval and Air Force SPF to conduct raids
against critical installations within the region. The SPF Command can
conduct attacks to the enemy’s strategic depth, to divert enemy resources to
protect politically or ecologically sensitive targets and to undermine the
enemy’s will to enter or continue the fight. Although these attacks are
characteristically part of transition operations, they are also conducted
during regional and adaptive operations if required.
13-67. Adaptive Operations. During adaptive operations, substantial gaps
may exist between the positions of dispersed OPFOR units. In these gaps, the
OPFOR may use SPF to destroy key systems, cause politically unacceptable
casualties, harass the enemy, and maintain contact.
13-68. Air Force SPF provide air base security in State territory or other areas
occupied by the OPFOR. They can conduct raids against enemy air bases and
installations within the region. They may also take part in joint SPF opera-
tions coordinated by the SPF Command as part of strategic operations. The
Navy could use its submarine force to insert SPF for direct action against a
high-payoff target outside the region.
13-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
13-69. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR may increase the level of
SPF actions in the enemy rear area. The national-level SPF Command provides
the ability to attack both regional and extraregional enemies throughout
their strategic depth. Strategic reconnaissance by SPF in support of national
intelligence requirements is an essential element of access-control operations.
In addition to its own direct action against enemy forces and installations, the
SPF Command can also support operations of irregular forces.
13-70. The OPFOR has trained SPF as alternate means of delivering nuclear,
biological, or chemical (NBC) munitions packages it may develop for them.
This provides a worldwide strategic means of NBC delivery that is not limited
to the range of the missiles of the Strategic Forces.
INTEGRATED FIRES COMMAND
13-71. An IFC may include an SPF unit as one of its many components (see
Chapters 2 and 7). At OSC level, the SPF component provides the OPFOR
the ability to attack both regional and extraregional enemies throughout
their strategic depth. They conduct operations to achieve strategic military,
political, economic, and/or psychological objectives or to achieve tactical or
operational goals in support of strategic objectives. Such operations may have
either long-range or immediate impact on the enemy.
COMMANDOS
13-72. The SPF Command also includes elite commando units. Like SPF units,
commandos normally operate in territory not controlled by the State. Normally,
personnel selected for commando units come from soldiers who have already
served 3 to 7 years in other combat arms. In addition to proficiency in various
infantry-type tactics, they receive training for more specialized commando mis-
sions, with emphasis on infiltrating and fighting in complex terrain and at night.
Command and Control
13-73. In the administrative force structure, commando battalions are
subordinate to the SPF Command. For administrative purposes, these battal-
ions may be grouped under a commando brigade headquarters. However,
commandos are employed as battalions, companies, platoons, and squads or as
small teams, depending on the type of mission. Commandos are elite units,
specially trained for missions in enemy territory. When assigned such mis-
sions, the commando units may disperse into small teams (typically 5 to 12
men). These small teams are harder to detect during infiltration and provide
the ability to attack many targets simultaneously to achieve maximum effect.
However, based on factors such as the enemy situation and the size of the tar-
get, the individual teams may come together temporarily to form commando
detachments. If necessary, they can re-form into platoon- to company-size
units to perform attacks against critical military and civilian targets.
13-74. Commando units can be allocated in a constituent or dedicated status
to be task organized as part of an OSC or of a division or brigade tactical group
(DTG or BTG) based on a regular ground forces organization. Even is such cases,
however, the reason for incorporating a commando unit into such an organization
normally would be to perform specialized commando missions that contribute to
13-14
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
the overall mission for which that task organization was created. In other cases,
commando units may be allocated in a supporting relationship, while remaining
under the command of their parent commando unit or the SPF Command.
Infantry-Type Missions
13-75. Sometimes, particularly in defensive situations, commandos may be
called on to perform regular infantry missions, filling gaps between dispersed
regular forces. In this case, commandos would typically fight as companies or
battalions, using tactics similar to those of regular infantry units.
Commando Missions
13-76. Commando units generally conduct various types of reconnaissance
and combat missions in the disruption zone or deep in enemy territory, during
larger operations or tactical actions that are either offensive or defensive. The
reconnaissance missions include actions such as surveillance, monitoring, and
searches. Commando units are expected to conduct reconnaissance within the
context of any combat mission. Conversely, when employed as reconnaissance
forces, the commando units’ activities are not limited to reconnaissance. They are
also tasked with assaulting and destroying military or civilian targets.
13-77. Commandos provide the OPFOR with flexible, lethal forces capable of
employment in a variety of roles. Typical missions that are assigned to the
commandos include but are not limited to
Collecting information on deployment of enemy forces and reserve unit
movement.
Collecting information on logistics facilities and seaports.
Collecting information on enemy aircraft operating from forward airfields.
Conducting reconnaissance of terrain and enemy forces, in support of
the offense.
Locating and destroying enemy weapons of mass destruction.
Conducting team- or platoon-size raids and ambushes and destroying
critical military or civilian targets in enemy territory.
Conducing larger-scale (company- or battalion-size) raids and ambushes
in the disruption zone or in enemy territory.
Clearing LOCs for use by supported regular ground force units during
the offense or defense.
Clearing or emplacing obstacles.
Conducting surprise attacks on enemy forces and create disturbances
after infiltrating into enemy territory.
Acting as a disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation, or security force.
Acting as an antilanding reserve.
13-78. Offense. Commandos are employed as infiltration units during the of-
fense. Following overland, airborne, seaborne, or waterborne infiltration,
commandosoperating independentlymay perform various reconnaissance
and combat missions described above. However, they may also act in conjunction
13-15
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
with regular ground forces. In the latter role, commandos can conduct the
following missions to ensure the success of the overall offensive action:
13-79. Commandos can act as a disruption force, or as part of such a force. In
addition to reconnaissance missions, they can be tasked with creating con-
fusion in the disruption zone or in enemy territory by
Removing or emplacing obstacles.
Raiding and destroying headquarters, LOCs, and tactical missile firing
locations.
Occupying key terrain features (in advance of regular ground forces).
Occupying ambush positions on enemy withdrawal routes.
13-80. Commandos can act as a fixing force. In this role, they can set up
ambushes or emplace obstacles to prevent further enemy forces from coming
to the aid of the target the regular forces’ attack. They can occupy key terrain
features that control choke points that hinder enemy reserve unit movements.
Such choke points may be valleys, bridges, and crossroads that are critical for
the enemy movement.
13-81. Commandos can act as part of an assault force. In this role, they can
conduct raids and surprise attacks against C2 sites, logistics elements, fire
support units (to include attack helicopter units), and other high-priority civilian
and military targets. They also conduct attacks against other objectives or seize
terrain that hinders enemy reserve unit movements or hampers his withdrawal.
13-82. As part of an exploitation force, commandos may attack a withdrawing
enemy force from his flank and rear. Commando units can be air-inserted
ahead of the withdrawing enemy force to establish ambush positions along the
enemy’s withdrawal route.
13-83. Defense. During a defensive operation conducted by an OSC, commando
units allocated to the OSC can support the action primarily in reconnaissance
and security roles. Commando units can conduct reconnaissance in the OSC
disruption zone or deep in enemy territory. They may also act as a security
force in the OSC support zone. When acting as a security force, commandos
are normally employed as companies or battalions. The commando unit can be
augmented with vehicles and/or additional forces (such as tank or mechanized
units, fire support, or aviation) to act as an assault force in limited-objective
attacks against enemy airborne, air assault, or special operations forces units.
13-84. A commando battalion or company is seldom used as a combat force in
the battle zone because of organization, equipment, and limited firepower.
However, if the defensive mission is more important than reconnaissance or
security, it may act as a combat force, using regular infantry or motorized
infantry tactics. Commando units may fill gaps between the battle positions of
regular forces. When performing such infantry-type missions, commandos are
normally employed as companies or battalions.
13-85. When OSC maneuver forces are forced to withdraw from an area, com-
mando units can remain deployed in the OSC’s original disruption zone and
battle zone to perform reconnaissance, raids, and ambushes. The stay-behind
commandos attempt to maneuver in small teams to conduct reconnaissance
13-16
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
sance and limited-objective attacks against enemy targets such as C2 sites,
isolated combat units, LOCs, and logistics units.
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
13-86. The Navy has a limited amphibious capability that allows it to insert
either naval infantry or regular ground forces or SPF from the sea. It also
fields a submarine force that could insert naval infantry to conduct raids
against critical installations within the region. The Navy also fields its own
Naval SPF that are able to conduct reconnaissance in support of landings or
raids against critical targets. Thus, amphibious operations can play an impor-
tant role in regional, transition, or adaptive operations.
MISSIONS
13-87. Amphibious landings can be either operational or tactical in scale. However,
either type can influence the outcome of a larger operation or strategic campaign.
Operational Missions
13-88. Amphibious operations can occur when the objectives are of critical
value and the enemy surface warfare capability allows. Although these opera-
tions may be conducted independently of SPF or regular ground forces, they
may have air, naval gunfire, and missile support. Thus, it is possible for an
operational amphibious landing to have major strategic consequences.
13-89. These operational missions may have the following objectives:
Conduct operations in concert with ground forces to envelop and
destroy enemy positions in a coastal area.
Seize or destroy ports, islands, peninsulas, and/or straits, radar sites,
and other important objectives in coastal areas.
Interdict enemy LOCs within the coastal areas.
Conduct combined operations with or in support of airborne and SPF
units landed deep within enemy territory.
Contribute to deception operations with amphibious landings mounted as
a feint to mislead the enemy about the direction of the OPFOR main effort.
Block the approach routes of enemy reserves or counterattack forces
that might influence the outcome of the main operation or campaign.
Establish coastal defenses on occupied coasts as other OPFOR forces
move deeper into enemy territory.
These objectives can be accomplished by conducting an unopposed, surreptitious
insertion of amphibious forces within striking distance of a lightly defended target.
Tactical Missions
13-90. Tactical amphibious landings probably are the most frequent form of
OPFOR amphibious operation. Their purpose is to attack the rear area or
flank of any enemy force along a coastline or to seize islands, naval bases,
coastal airfields, ports, and other objectives on an enemy-held coastline. This
diverts enemy attention and resources away from the decisive area of the
13-17
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
battlefield. The amphibious landing force can be up to a detachment, operat-
ing independently or with ground force units.
13-91. In an offensive operation, tactical amphibious landing forces can seize
bridges or road junctions near the coast and hold them until the arrival of the
main land forces. Such landings can stop or delay enemy reinforcements or cut
off his line of retreat. They may also help to maintain the tempo of the OPFOR
ground forces’ advance, or they can be for deceptive purposes. Thus, landings that
are tactical in scale may nevertheless have important operational repercussions.
Reconnaissance and Sabotage Missions
13-92. Reconnaissance and sabotage amphibious landings are in a special
category. Seaborne raids may perform the multiple functions of
Conducting reconnaissance.
Damaging or destroying high-value installations located near a coast.
Disrupting the enemy’s C2 and/or logistics.
Tying down substantial numbers of enemy troops in the defense of
long, vulnerable coastlines.
Sea-delivered SPF teams may also perform deep reconnaissance and sabotage
tasks of operational or strategic importance.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
13-93. In the administrative force structure, naval infantry forces are part of the
Navy. However, they may conduct amphibious landings in support of an OSC or
theater command as part of joint and combined arms operations. The SHC or
theater command may allocate naval infantry units to an OSC in a given operation.
13-94. Some amphibious landings are conducted by naval infantry delivered
by naval transport, without support from or coordinated action with other ser-
vices of the Armed Forces. In this case, a naval commander could exercise
overall C2 of the amphibious operation.
13-95. However, most landings by naval infantry are part of a larger joint
operation or campaign in which they operate in conjunction with forces of other
services. When sufficient naval infantry forces are not available, the amphibious
landing force may consist of ground forces or SPF units that are transported by
naval vessels. In these cases, the OSC or theater commander normally organizes
and controls the amphibious operation, with expert advice from the chief of littoral
warfare on his functional staff. The OSC or theater commander coordinates the
joint actions of the naval and/or ground forces conducting the landing with support-
ing actions by airborne, SPF, Air Force, and air defense forces. The commander of
the naval transport unit and the commander of the transported unit usually share
responsibility for overall control during loading, transport, and landing.
13-96. The landing force commander is the commander of the naval infantry,
ground force, or SPF unit forming the basis for the amphibious landing force.
He is responsible for preparing and positioning his troops for embarkation on
naval craft that will transport them to the shore. He must coordinate with the
commander of the naval unit providing transport. After the landing, the land-
ing force commander is solely responsible for conducting the operation. While
13-18
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
the landing force commander can plan the scheme of maneuver, final approval
of the plan comes from the OSC or theater commander.
CONDUCT
13-97. The preference for smaller-scale landings reflects the limited and
subordinate role amphibious landings play in OPFOR thinking. Also, the
OPFOR does not use its naval infantry in exactly the same way as other
countries use their marines. For the latter, the seizure of a beachhead is
often merely a prelude to extended action ashore. The OPFOR, by contrast,
generally intends to use its specialized naval infantry troops only to secure a
beachhead (and perhaps to raid inland). Any buildup of effort is by ordinary
infantry or mechanized infantry units, with supporting artillery and staying
power. The OPFOR withdraws naval infantry from combat as soon as possible
to keep it available to ensure the success of subsequent landings. This, along
with coastal defense, is the primary role of OPFOR naval infantry.
Joint Forces and Combined Arms
13-98. An amphibious landing usually takes on a joint and combined arms
character. Its success normally requires at least temporary local air and naval
superiority. (The exception would be small-scale raids conducted under condi-
tions of limited visibility.) Against all but the weakest of enemy defenses, a
heavy fire preparation is also necessary to suppress the enemy. Naturally,
much fire is air-delivered, including using fires of accompanying helicopters.
Also, the main ground forces’ long-range artillery and/or naval gunfire may be
able to provide support for shallow landings.
13-99. An airborne or heliborne landing normally precedes or accompanies
any important amphibious landing. If the amphibious landing is to be small in
scale and shallow, a heliborne force may suffice. However, a major deep
landing probably requires the aid of an airborne drop. These air-delivered
forces may either seize a beachhead or port, interdict the approach of enemy
reserves, or attack important targets.
13-100. For successful amphibious and supporting air landings, the OPFOR
must have an accurate picture of what enemy land, air, and naval forces are in
range to intervene. Intensive intelligence-gathering always precedes the landing.
13-101. In a landing conducted jointly with sea-delivered ground forces, naval
infantry units constitute the assault force. They have responsibility for
breaching antilanding obstacles in the water and on the shore, for seizing a
beachhead, and for securing the approach of the exploitation force to the landing
area. Once ashore, naval infantry units employ standard OPFOR tactics as they
fight their way forward to link up with air-landed troops. Their immediate mis-
sion is to provide protection for the landing and deployment of exploitation forces.
13-102. After the naval infantry secures a beachhead, infantry or mechanized
infantry units can land and take over the battle. They normally replace,
rather than reinforce, the assault force, even if the latter has taken only light
casualties. Thus, the naval infantry remains available to spearhead additional
landings. Once that is accomplished, the assault force assists the exploitation
force in achieving the overall objective of the landing.
13-19
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
13-103. As pointed out, the OPFOR expects to commit infantry or mechanized
infantry units through a secure beachhead to perform combat missions inland.
However, these units may share in the assault landing role as well. If so, the
OPFOR recognizes the need for at least a degree of special training. The
ground force units may have attached naval infantry personnel to help over-
come the special problems of an assault landing.
Regional Operations
13-104. Against a regional opponent, the OPFOR may be able to conduct
amphibious landings as operational-level missions. In this case, a landing
force of battalion or even brigade size, once landed, could conduct large-scale
operations employing fixing, assault, and exploitation forces, as described in
Chapter 3.
13-105. The OPFOR’s naval infantry forces may be capable of forcible entry
against regional opponents. Amphibious operations may entail the landing of
a naval infantry battalion or brigade as the assault force. The exploitation
force, consisting primarily of infantry or mechanized infantry troops, follows
to exploit the opportunity created by the assault force.
13-106. Even in regional operations, larger-scale amphibious landings are
risky. Therefore, the OPFOR normally would not attempt them outside the
range of land-based air cover and support. Linkup with a ground maneuver
force should occur as quickly as possible.
Transition Operations
13-107. When an extraregional enemy has only early-entry forces deployed,
OPFOR naval infantry forces may still be capable of forcible entry. Their in-
sertion can complete the envelopment of a small enemy force. It could also
help control further enemy deployment from the sea.
Adaptive Operations
13-108. The OPFOR does not have the capability to conduct opposed amphibious
operations against a fully deployed extraregional force. It does, however, have
the capability to transport up to a regular infantry or naval infantry battalion
by sea, with limited amounts of supplies and heavy weapons. The unit is then
landed unopposed at a predetermined site, away from the enemy’s main
forces. In some cases, SPF or airborne troops may be inserted in lieu of using
conventional infantry or naval infantry.
13-109. During adaptive operations, amphibious operations typically comprise
small-scale landings conducted in detachment strength. These operations
include raids, ambushes, reconnaissance, and assaults, with detachment-
strength actions being the norm. The raids and ambushes in this case would
be small-scale actions conducted in a manner similar to those described for
SPF earlier in this chapter, against isolated small enemy forces. Because of
the extraregional force’s modern RISTA means, only shorter-range landings
conducted during hours of darkness have a chance of achieving the surprise
that is critical to success. Normally, linkup with friendly forces is planned to
occur within hours after the landing.
13-20
Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with joint definitions, and other
selected terms. Terms with specific OPFOR-related definitions for which
FM 7-100.1 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an
asterisk (*) and followed by the number of the paragraph (¶) or page
where they are defined. For other terms, refer to the document listed.
AA antiaircraft
*access limitation
¶1-61
*adaptive operations
¶1-6
ADCSINT Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
ADD area distribution depot
ADTDL Army Doctrine and Training Digital Library (now the General
Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library)
*administrative force structure
¶2-23
AFCS
automated fire control system
*affiliated
.................................................................................................. ¶2-14
AFL
affiliated
AIRCP
airborne command post
*air parity
...................................................................¶8-67 (see also FM 1-02)
*air superiority
.................................................................... ¶8-65 (see also JP 1-02)
*air supremacy
.................................................................... ¶8-64 (see also JP 1-02)
AKO
Army Knowledge Online
ALR
antilanding reserve
ALTCP
alternate command post
*annihilation
.................................................................................................. ¶7-10
*antilanding reserve
.................................................................................................. ¶4-64
*antitank reserve
.................................................................................................. ¶4-63
AOR
area of responsibility
AOS
airspace operations subsection
AP
antipersonnel
APC
armored personnel carrier
APOD
aerial port of debarkation
Glossary-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
APOE
aerial port of embarkation
¶1-60
*area defense
................................................................ ¶4-112 (see also FM 1-02)
*area of responsibility
................................................................... ¶2-68 (see also JP 1-02)
ARM
antiradiation missile
ASP
aviation support plan
AT
antitank
*assault force
..................................................................................................¶3-53
ATGM
antitank guided missile
ATR
antitank reserve
*attack
..................................................................................................¶3-69
*attack zone
............................................................................... ¶2-79, 3-43, 4-42
AUXCP
auxiliary command post
AWACS
Airborne Warning and Control System
*axis
........................................................................................ ¶3-45, 4-42
*battle line
..................................................................................................¶2-71
*battle position
.................................................................. ¶4-44 (see also FM 1-02)
*battle zone
............................................................................... ¶2-76, 3-37, 4-39
*brigade tactical group
..................................................................................................¶2-45
BTG
brigade tactical group
C2
command and control
C2W
command and control warfare
C3D
camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception
CAO
chief of airspace operations
CDR
commander
CGS
Chief of the General Staff
COE
contemporary operational environment
*combat system
................................................................................................¶1-114
*command and control
....................................................................................................¶2-3
*complex battle position
..................................................................................................¶4-46
*complex terrain
....................................................................................................p. ix
*computer warfare
..................................................................................................¶5-28
*constituent
..................................................................................................¶2-11
*contact force
..................................................................................................¶4-98
*contemporary operational environment
p. vi
Glossary-2
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
*contemporary OPFOR
p. xiii
COP command observation post
COTS commercial off-the-shelf
*counterattack
¶3-103 (see also JP 1-02)
*counterattack force
¶4-59
CP command post
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CTC combat training center
DAS direct air support
DC deputy commander
DCP deception command post
DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
*decentralized defense
¶4-85
*deception force
¶3-56, 4-66
DED dedicated
*dedicated
¶2-12
*defense information infrastructure
¶5-6
*defensive information warfare
¶5-61
*defensive maneuver
¶4-98
*demolition
¶7-11
*destruction
¶7-9
DII defense information infrastructure
*direct air support
¶8-49
*dispersed attack
¶3-80
*disruption force
¶3-50, 4-52
*disruption zone
¶2-75, 3-31, 4-35
*division tactical group
¶2-45
DOD Department of Defense
DOS denial of service
DTG divisional tactical group
DZ drop zone
ECM electronic countermeasures
ECCM electronic counter-countermeasures
Glossary-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
*electronic warfare
................................................................... ¶5-24 (see also JP 1-02)
*enemy
...................................................................................................p. xii
EO
electro-optical
EW
electronic warfare
*exploitation force
..................................................................................................¶3-54
FARP
forward arming and refueling point
FCP
forward command post
FG
field group
*field group
..................................................................................................¶2-33
*fixing force
..................................................................................................¶3-51
FM
field manual
FSCC
fire support coordination center
*functional forces
..................................................................................................¶3-46
*functional staff
................................................................................................¶2-109
GII
global information infrastructure
GPS
global positioning system
*harassment
..................................................................................................¶7-13
HE
high-explosive
HF
high-frequency
HPT
high-payoff target
HQ
headquarters
HUMINT
human intelligence
HVT
high-value target
IA
information attack
IADS
integrated air defense system
ICBM
intercontinental ballistic missile
IFC
integrated fires command
IFF
identification, friend or foe
IFV
infantry fighting vehicle
INFO
information
*information attack
..................................................................................................¶5-48
*information warfare
.................................................................. p. 5-1 (see also FM 1-02)
*integrated attack
..................................................................................................¶3-72
*integrated defense
..................................................................................................¶4-83
Glossary-4
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
*integrated fires command
¶2-47
*integrated support command
¶2-61, 12-42
*integrated support group
................................................................................................ ¶12-42
INTEL
intelligence
IR
infrared
ISC
integrated support command
ISG
integrated support group
IT
information technology
IW
information warfare
JP
joint publication
*kill zone
................................................................................¶2-80, 3-44, 4-43
km
kilometer(s)
LAN
local area network
*limited-objective attack
.................................................................................................. ¶3-89
*limit of responsibility
.................................................................................................. ¶2-68
LOC
line of communications
*local air superiority
.................................................................................................. ¶8-66
LOR
limit of responsibility
LZ
landing zone
m
meter(s)
*main defense force
.................................................................................................. ¶4-56
*maneuver defense
.................................................................................................. ¶4-89
*maneuver reserve
.................................................................................................. ¶4-61
MCP
main command post
*military strategic campaign plan
¶1-22
*military strategy
¶1-81 (see also JP 1-02)
mm millimeter(s)
MOD Ministry of Defense
MRL multiple rocket launcher
MSD movement support detachment
MSS mission support site
MTC military transportation center
*national information infrastructure
¶5-5
*national security strategy
¶1-1
Glossary-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
*national strategic campaign
¶1-15
*national strategic campaign plan
¶1-18
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA national command authority
NCO noncommissioned officer
*neutralization
¶7-12
NGO nongovernmental organization
NII national information infrastructure
NOE nap-of-the-earth
OBJ objective
objective
¶3-45 (see also FM 1-02 and JP 1-02)
OD obstacle detachment
ODCSINT Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
OE operational environment
*offensive information warfare
¶5-58
operational art
¶1-84? (see also JP 1-02)
operational environment
p. vi (JP 1-02)
*operational exclusion
¶1-59
*operational shielding
¶1-63?
*operational-strategic command
¶2-36?
OPFOR opposing force
*opposing force (OPFOR)
p. xii
OSC operational-strategic command
OTID OPFOR and Threat Integration Directorate
paramilitary forces
JP 1-02
*perception management
¶5-44
*personnel support
¶12-68
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
*precision weapon
¶7-40
*protected force
¶4-57
*protection and security measures
¶5-38
PSYWAR psychological warfare
PVO private volunteer organization
PWP plasticized white phosphorus
Glossary-6
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
QRF
quick reaction force
RCS
radar cross section
*reconnaissance fire
.................................................................................................. ¶7-60
*regional operations
.................................................................................................... ¶1-6
RISTA
reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
ROE
rules of engagement
RPV
remotely-piloted vehicle
SAM
surface-to-air missile
SAR
synthetic-aperture radar
SATCOM
satellite communication(s)
SCP
strategic campaign plan
*security force
.........................................................................................¶3-55, 4-58
SHC
Supreme High Command
SHF
super-high-frequency
*shielding force
.................................................................................................. ¶4-98
SID
Strategic Integration Department
*simple battle position
.................................................................................................. ¶4-45
SIW
strategic information warfare
SIWP
strategic information warfare plan
SIWPO
Strategic Information Warfare Planning Office
SLAR
side-looking airborne radar
SOCC
support operations coordination center
*sophisticated ambush
.................................................................................................. ¶3-93
SPF
Special-Purpose Forces
SPOD
sea port of debarkation
SPOE
sea port of embarkation
spoiling attack
.................................................................... ¶3-98 (see also JP 1-02)
SPT
supporting
SSM
surface-to-surface missile
*strategic information warfare
¶5-53
*strategic operations
¶1-6, 1-27
*strategic preclusion
¶1-57
*strike
¶3-110
*supporting
¶2-13
Glossary-7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Content      ..     9      10      11