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FM 101-5 STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS (May 1997) - page 6

 

 

FM 101-5
ANNEX M (DEEP OPERATIONS) TO OPERATION ORDER NO_______
See Figure H-10 for completing this annex. Additional specific items are listed below to ensure inclusion
in this annex.
1. SITUATION
2. MISSION
3. EXECUTION
a.
Scheme of support. Explain the overall deep operations plan, with tasks and purposes. Detail
how organizational assets committed for deep operations are employed and operating in relation to the rest
of the force. Show how intelligence assets are employed either in a primary or support role. Detail how
forces committed for these operations get to their assigned areas and return or link up with friendly forces.
Detail how fires (lethal and nonlethal) are used to set and support the deep operations plan.
b. Tasks to subordinate units.
(1) Include how the unit will get to its assigned area to participate in or support the operation
(routes, passage points, and so on).
(2) Provide the primary objective for the unit or asset.
(3) List specific tasks identified in the overall plan.
c.
Coordinating instructions.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Configure service support assets to provide flexible and responsive support.
CSS planners must understand the intent of the mission and be able to address the following.
• Length of the operation.
• Resupply expected during the operation.
• Resupply and CSS assets available to support the operation.
• Mode of resupply (air or ground).
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Command. Cross-FLOT operations require centralized planning and decentralized execution.
b. Signal.
• State whom to report collected information to specifically and on what nets.
• Provide retransmission plan to support the operation.
Figure H-23. Annex M (Deep Operations) instructions and format
H-61
FM 101-5
ANNEX N (REAR OPERATIONS) TO OPERATION ORDER NO_______
See Figure H-10 for completing this annex. Additional specific items are listed below to ensure inclusion
in this annex.
1. SITUATION
2. MISSION
3. EXECUTION
a.
Scheme of rear area operations. Identify how the rear operations center will support the higher
headquarters' deep and close operations by executing rear operations.
(1) Terrain management. Identify areas to be used for reconstitution, and when the rear bound-
aries will be moved forward during operations.
(2) Security. Identify the tactical combat force (TCF), response force, and reaction forces. State
the counterreconnaissance plan, and how aviation overflights (routine in support of sustainment operations)
will be used to provide additional reconnaissance. Identify CI tasks to assist in threat reduction, location, and
identification. Plan for integrating any HN, multinational, or joint forces support.
(3) Sustainment. Monitor status of sustainment operations within the command. Identify posi-
tioning of support assets. Identify critical CSS facilities and movements that require priority protection. Plan
for the establishment of forward supply points.
(4) Movements. Monitor administrative and tactical movements in the rear area. Identify critical
choke points that require sustained engineer support. Plan for the rerouting of sustainment on MSRs to en-
sure no interference with the movement of tactical units. Plan for tracking of all units, to include HN, multina-
tional, and joint, moving through the rear area.
b. Tasks to subordinate units, to include tactical combat forces, military police, and base clus-
ter reaction forces.
c.
Coordinating instructions.
• Designate responsibilities for specific units to conduct rear area security.
• Specify tasks to units for intelligence gathering, liaison, response operations, base and base
cluster self-defense, and rear area fire support.
• Specify tasks to rear CP for coordinating rear operations to include planning and conduct of rear
security operations.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a.
Command.
(1) Identify rear operations commander, establish chain of command for the rear CP, identify base
and base cluster commanders, and their chain of command.
(2) Designate the location of the alternate rear CP.
b. Signal.
Figure H-24. Annex N (Rear Operations) instructions and format
H-62
FM 101-5
ANNEX O (AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL) TO OPERATION ORDER NO_________
See Figure H-10 for completing this annex. Additional specific items are listed below to ensure inclusion
in this annex.
1. SITUATION. Include information affecting AC2 that is not included in paragraph 1 of the operations order
and Annex G (Air Defense) or that requires expansion.
a.
Enemy.
(1) Enemy capability and activity.
(a) List known and templated ADA locations and enemy air corridors.
(b) List significant enemy maneuver capabilities that affect AC2 operations such as radio com-
bat capabilities.
b. Friendly situation. Note additional airspace users, including Air Force, Navy, Marine, coalition
ADA, FA, and UAV that affect the scheme of maneuver.
2. MISSION
3. EXECUTION
a.
None.
b. None.
c.
Coordinating instructions.
• Identify routes and corridors (such as minimum-risk routes, LLTRs, standard-use routes, UAV
operating areas, restricted operations zones (ROZs), Air Force routes, and coordination requirements).
• Identify fire support coordination measures that affect airspace users.
• List areas of large area smoke operations.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Figure H-25. Annex O (Airspace Command and Control) instructions and format
H-63
FM 101-5
ANNEX P (COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE ) TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO_____
See Figure H-10 for completing this annex. Additional specific items are listed below to ensure inclusion
in this annex.
1. SITUATION
a.
Enemy. Identify relevant enemy C2 nodes in the commander's AO and the vulnerability of those
nodes.
b. Friendly situation. Identify friendly C2 nodes and their vulnerability, and the assets to defend
those nodes. Identify assets to attack enemy C2 nodes.
2. MISSION
3. EXECUTION
a.
Scheme of support. State the C2W concept of support to the operation. Include a discussion of
the overall C2W operation, with the specific details in appendixes. This annex should contain the information
to coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize each of the components of C2W.
(1) Military deception. Identify what organic and assigned assets can accomplish, and what sup-
port is required from organizations or agencies external to the command. Coordinate, deconflict, and syn-
chronize this component with the other four components. Annex S, Deception Plan, is approved by the
commander two echelons higher than written and supports that commander's deception plan. Annex S is
provided on a “must know” basis.
(2) EW. State the EW mission, enemy EW capabilities, defensive and offensive EW measures,
and coordination with other parts of the OPLAN. Identify target sets and effect, by priority, for EW opera-
tions. Clearly identify what organic and assigned assets can accomplish, and what support is required from
organizations or agencies external to the command. Coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize this compo-
nent with the other four components. Refer to Annex T, Electronic Warfare, for detailed information.
(3) OPSEC. Deny the enemy information concerning the speed and size of the US buildup, as well
as the specific course of action the United States will execute in the decisive combat phase. Emphasis in ini-
tial stages is on denying the enemy access to his own or foreign intelligence capabilities. Identify target sets
and desired effect, by priority, for OPSEC. Coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize this component with the
other four components. Refer to Annex Q, Operations Security, for detailed information.
(4) PSYOP. Identify, in support of C2W, the audiences and key communicators, and desired ef-
fect, by priority, for PSYOP efforts. Clearly identify what organic and assigned assets can accomplish, and
what support is required from organizations or agencies external to the command. Coordinate, deconflict,
and synchronize this component with the other four components. Refer to Annex R, Psychological Opera-
tions, for detailed information.
(5) Physical destruction. When employed in a C2W role, use physical destruction to destroy the
enemy’s communication, integrated air defense system, and intelligence collection and fusion capabilities
and to destroy the enemy’s ability to strike at friendly C2 and C2W capabilities. Identify target sets and effect,
by priority, for EW operations. Clearly identify what organic and assigned assets can accomplish, and what
support is required from organizations or agencies external to the command. Coordinate, deconflict, and
synchronize this component with the other four components. Refer to Annex D, Fire Support, for detailed
information.
Figure H-26. Annex P (Command and Control Warfare) instructions and format
H-64
FM 101-5
b. C2W tasks. Review specific and implied tasks by command.
NOTE: Include in appendixes any additional information needed to further clarify missions and tasks. An
appendix may include a C2W synchronization matrix.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Figure H-26. Annex P (Command and Control Warfare) instructions and format (continued)
H-65
FM 101-5
ANNEX Q (OPERATIONS SECURITY) TO OPERATION ORDER NO_____
See Figure H-10 for completing this annex. Additional specific items are listed below to ensure inclusion
in this annex.
1. SITUATION
2. MISSION
3. EXECUTION
a.
Scheme of operational security programs and actions.
• State the OPSEC mission including the concept for the conduct and control of OPSEC. Describe
phased operations where applicable and describe how OPSEC will ensure the accomplishment of the com-
mander's intent and end state vision.
• List the OPSEC tasks not listed in the base OPORD to be performed by maneuver elements. En-
sure maneuver units implement the appropriate program against the current threat.
• List the countermeasures to be taken by the unit to ensure enemy collection efforts are unsuc-
cessful.
• List countermeasures and counterintelligence methods, assets, and programs of special impor-
tance to operations. Include personnel security, physical security, COMSEC, SIGSEC, patrolling, or coun-
terreconnaissance, for example, efforts are aimed at both external and internal security threats.
b. Tasks to subordinate and supporting units. List countermeasures that specific units are to im-
plement. List the countermeasures that require special emphasis by assigned, attached, or supporting units.
These countermeasures are designed to counter a specific enemy intelligence threat.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Figure H-27. Annex Q (Operations Security) instructions and format
H-66
FM 101-5
ANNEX R (PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)) TO OPERATION ORDER NO_______
See Figure H-10 for completing this annex. Additional specific items are listed below to ensure inclusion
in this annex.
1. SITUATION
a.
Enemy. State enemy resources and capabilities, both military and civilian, to conduct PSYOP.
State past enemy PSYOP efforts (who was targeted, using what means, and their effectiveness).
b. Friendly.
c.
Attachments and detachments.
2. MISSION
3. EXECUTION
a.
Scheme of psychological operations. Address how PSYOP efforts are centrally orchestrated
and managed by the supporting psychological operations task force (POTF) and the commander's role in the
decentralized execution of higher headquarters' PSYOP programs.
b. Tasks to subordinate units. Ensure tasks clearly fix responsibilities and provide feedback on
effectiveness of PSYOP activities.
c.
Coordinating instructions.
• Identify National Command Authorities (NCA)-approved PSYOP objectives, themes to stress,
and themes to avoid (or refer to appropriate appendix).
• Identify target audiences in the AO to include key communicators. Identify relevant background
information on target audience perspectives, vulnerabilities, effectiveness, and susceptibility to friendly and
enemy PSYOP (or refer to appropriate appendix).
• Identify military activities and actions conducted by subordinate units that support or facilitate
PSYOP efforts (or refer to appropriate appendix).
• Provide OPSEC guidance on PSYOP sensitivity and employment.
• State classification authority for PSYOP activities.
• Address mechanisms for coordinating PSYOP with attached PSYOP support elements,
assigned PSYOP staff, and other informational activities operating in the commander's AO.
• State procedures for coordinating fixed-wing, rotary-wing, UAV, and field artillery delivery of
PSYOP products.
• State PSYOP-specific current intelligence requirements (or refer to appropriate appendix).
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a.
Command-regulate classes of supply.
b. Supply distribution plan. Discuss provisions for control and maintenance of PSYOP-unique sup-
plies and equipment to include PSYOP products.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a.
Command
• Explain command relationships between attached PSYOP forces and the POTF elements oper-
ating in the AO, the unit, and the supporting POTF.
Figure H-28. Annex R (Psychological Operations) instructions and format
H-67
FM 101-5
• State the PSYOP approval and release authority that has been delegated or retained by higher
headquarters.
• State the PSYOP approval authority the commander has delegated or specifically retained to
subordinate commanders for the development of proposed PSYOP products, actions, and programs.
• State the PSYOP release authority the commander has delegated, or specifically retained, to
subordinate commanders for releasing and disseminating approved PSYOP products in their respective
areas of responsibility.
b. Signal. Identify and explain unique PSYOP-related acronyms and abbreviations.
Figure H-28. Annex R (Psychological Operations) instructions and format (continued)
H-68
FM 101-5
ANNEX S (DECEPTION) TO OPERATION ORDER NO_______
See Figure H-10 for completing this annex. Additional specific items are listed below to ensure inclusion
in this annex.
1. SITUATION
2. MISSION
3. EXECUTION
a.
Scheme of deception programs and actions.
• State the deception concept (target and story) including the concept for the conduct and control
of the deception operation. Describe phased operations where applicable and describe how the deception
plan will ensure the accomplishment of the commander's intent and end state vision.
• List the deception operation tasks not listed in the base OPORD to be performed by maneuver
elements. Ensure maneuver units implement the appropriate program against the current threat.
• List the countermeasures to be taken by the unit to ensure enemy collection efforts are unsuc-
cessful at exposing the deception operation.
• State the objectives of the deception plan and the enemy collection and analysis mechanisms
and means the plan will target. State what phases of the operation the deception measures are implemented
in and which countermeasures and counterintelligence methods, assets, and programs are of special impor-
tance to operations.
b. Tasks to subordinate and supporting units. List tasks to subordinate units that support the de-
ception operation. Include in the tasks description the cover story and description of how the tasks support
the overall deception plan. Include also what enemy observation measures the tasks are intended to target.
c.
Coordinating instructions. State the coordination of two or more units during specific deception
tasks. State what data is to be collected on enemy forces to exhibit success or failure of the deception
operation.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Figure H-29. Annex S (Deception) instructions and format
H-69
FM 101-5
ANNEX T (ELECTRONIC WARFARE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO_______
See Figure H-10 for completing this annex. Additional specific items are listed below to ensure inclusion
in this annex.
1. SITUATION. Detail enemy electronic capabilities, communications, noncommunications, and radio-
electronic combat systems. ( NOTE: These may be provided in appendixes to the annex.) Outline the higher
headquarters' EW plan with any additional EW assets or resources supporting the unit.
2. MISSION
3. EXECUTION. State the proposed EW and electronic combat operations. Establish priorities.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Figure H-30. Annex T (Electronic Warfare) instructions and format
H-70
FM 101-5
ANNEX U (CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ) TO OPERATION ORDER NO_____
See Figure H-10 for completing this annex. Additional specific items are listed below to ensure inclusion
in this annex.
1. SITUATION. Include information affecting CMO operations not included in the OPORD or OPLAN.
Identify the impact of civilians on unit ability to complete its mission. Identify higher and adjacent unit CMO
plans. Identify CA resources attached and detached with effective times.
2. MISSION
3. EXECUTION. State the proposed CA operations. Establish priorities. Define unique requirements for
liaison, particularly with agencies outside the normal Army channels (for example, Department of Defense,
Department of State, and nongovernment organizations).
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a.
Command.
b. Signal. Designate the reporting functions for the various units and CMO activities.
Figure H-31. Annex U (Civil-Military Operations) instructions and format
H-71
FM 101-5
ANNEX V (PUBLIC AFFAIRS TO OPERATION ORDER NO_____
See Figure H-10 for completing this annex. Additional specific items are listed below to ensure inclusion
in this annex.
1. SITUATION. Include information affecting public affairs (PA) operations not included in the OPORD or
OPLAN. Identify the impact of media and news technology on unit ability to complete its mission. Identify
any higher and adjacent unit PA plans. Identify PA resources and news media attached and detached with
effective times.
2. MISSION
3. EXECUTION. State the proposed PA operations. Establish priorities. Define unique requirements for
media liaison, particularly with any foreign news agencies.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Designate the reporting functions for the various PA activities.
Figure H-32. Annex V (Public Affairs) instructions and format
H-72
FM 101-5
OPERATION ORDER VIGNETTE
The following order, Field Order 18, represents a typical order seen during the continuing operations of
US Army forces in WWII. Field Order 18 was completed under a time-constrained environment with proven
SOPs. This order uses an overlay order with additional mission orders provided personally by the
commander.
VII Corps, commanded by MG (later GEN) J. Lawton “Lightning Joe” Collins, had to expand the Rema-
gen Bridgehead as well as plan for the breakout and exploitation into the German industrial heartland.
VII Corps had prepared, and the CG had given the order orally on 22 March, following up on the 23d with a
written order, including overlay, intelligence annex, and fire support annex. The order, both the oral and writ-
ten, left sufficient flexibility for adaption from the time of its issue until its execution.
Especially notable is the brevity and simplicity of the basic order. Such simplicity and brevity reflect the
combat-tested experience and SOPs of VII Corps and the divisions within First US Army.
Field Order 18 contains the minimum essential information by today’s doctrine for an OPORD:
1. Five basic paragraphs (slightly different from now, but nevertheless similar in name and order).
2. Task organization (found in subparagraphs of paragraph 3 rather than between paragraphs 2 and 3
as per the 1940 format.
3. Mission statement (paragraph 2).
4. An operations overlay.
MG Collins used oral orders and an overlay to issue his order, with the written order confirming those di-
rectives. Today a commander's intent and concept of the operation are mandatory. In Field Order 18, a con-
cept is perceived in the subparagraphs of paragraph 3 and, presumably, the corps commander issued his
concept in the oral orders. It is apparent from the execution of the operation that the subordinates under-
stood MG Collins' concept.
D-day and H-hour for Field Order 18 were at 0400 hours, 25 March 1945. The Corps accomplished its
initial objectives by 26 March, seized the Corps objective by 27 March, and exploited to Marburg on
28 March. The Corps issued a subsequent field order (FO 19) on 28 March for follow-on operations. These
eventually involved closing the Ruhr Pocket with XIX Corps from Ninth Army to the north on 1 April 1945, af-
ter covering 300 kilometer in seven days, with over 300,000 German soldiers in the pocket. During the Euro-
pean campaign, VII Corps issued only 20 field orders, or an average of two per month, to control operations;
many of these “confirmed oral orders CG VII Corps.”
H-73
FM 101-5
HQ, VII CORPS
APO 307
23 MARCH 1945
NOTES:
FO 18 (Confirming oral orders CG VII Corps issued 22
MG Collins used oral and
March 1945)
overlay techniques for delivery
of order
Maps: GSGS 4416 CENTRAL EUROPE 1/100,000
1. a. See Annex 2, Intelligence.
1. Annex 2 not included;
consisted of main body
b.
(1) NINTH US ARMY, with XIX Corps on its right,
(3 pp) and 2 appendixes: App
continues its defense of the RHINE River from WORRINGEN
1, Counterintelligence (2 pp);
(F3874) (excl) to the NORTH.
App 2, Tactical Study of the
Terrain (2 pp)
(2) FIRST US ARMY will attack on D-day from
present bridgehead area to drive EAST between the SIEG
River on the NORTH and the LAHN River on the SOUTH to
capture the road center at LIMBURG (M2398), and the high
ground extending generally NORTH thereof.
2. a. VII Corps will (1) attack at H-hour, D-day
2. MISSION
within zone of action EAST of the RHINE and SOUTH of the
Operation commenced
250400MAR45 following cross-
SIEG River to capture the high ground generally WEST of
ing of Rhine to north by 21
the DILL River between WURGENDORF (G2740) and NENDEROTH
Army Group
(G3220); (2) be prepared to resume the attack to the
NORTHEAST; (3) maintain defense of the WEST bank of the
RHINE in the Corps zone and NORTH of BONN (F5537); and
Technically this is an OPLAN
(4) protect the left flank of the FIRST ARMY EAST of the
IAW current doctrine (see
RHINE.
Operations Overlay.)
b. For Corps and Division boundaries and initial
objectives, see Annex 1, Operations Overlay.
c. H-hour and D-day to be announced.
Doctrinal location (1944) for
task organization (between
paras 2 and 3)
In this case, task organization is
included in para 3 for subordi-
nate units.
3. a.
3d Armored Division, Major General Maurice Rose,
3. TACTICAL MISSIONS FOR
SUBORDINATE UNITS
Commanding.
Implied concept: 3 AD
(1) Attachments:
pass through IDs; Seize Corps
objectives in order.
414th Inf (104th Inf Div)
Initial objectives taken 2d day,
183d FA Bn (155 How)
DILL River crossed on 3d day.
83d Armd FA Bn (105 How SP)
486th AAA AW Bn (SP)
703d TD Bn (SP)
Figure H-33. VII Corps operation order (WWII)
H-74
FM 101-5
(2) Will attack H-hour D-day through elements
See next two subparas: Infantry
of the 104th Division and 1st Inf Div and advance
divisions following to clear
enemy forces.
rapidly to seize initially the high ground and road
center in the vicinity of ALTENKIR-CHEN (F9332) and
successive objectives thereafter to include crossings
of the DILL River between DILLENBURG (G3837) and
HERBORN (G3931).
(3) Will by-pass [sic] pockets of resistance in
order to seize objectives quickly.
(4) Will be prepared to exploit in the direction
VII Corps/3 AD exploited to
of MARBURG (G7347) - FRANKENBERG (G7473).
MARBURG on 4th day.
b.
104th Infantry Division, Major General Terry
Allen, Commanding.
(1) Attachments:
555 AAA AW Bn (M)
750th Tk Bn
Co. C, 644th TD Bn (SP)
(2) With its principal effort on the left, will
attack at H-hour on D-day to eliminate all enemy resis-
tance within its zone of action.
(3) Will assist the advance of 3d Armd Div.
c.
1st Infantry Division, Brigadier General Clifton
Andrus, Commanding.
(1) Attachments:
957th FA Bn (155 How)
193d FA Bn (25 Pdr)
103d AAA AW Bn (M)
634th TD Bn (SP)
745th Tk Bn
Co A, 86th Cml Bn
(2) With its principal effort on the right, will
attack at H-hour on D-day to eliminate all enemy resis-
tance within its zone of action.
(3) Will assist the advance of 3d Armd Div.
(4) Will protect the NORTH flank of the Corps
within its zone.
Figure H-33. VII Corps operation order (WWII) (continued)
H-75
FM 101-5
(5) Will be progressively relieved of responsi-
bility for protecting the NORTH flank of the Corps by
elements of 78th Inf Div and the 4th Cav Gp per par
3d(3) and par 3g below.
d.
78th Infantry Division, Major General Edwin P.
Parker, Jr., Commanding.
(1) Attachments:
76th FA Bn (25 Pdr)
893d TD Bn (SP)
774th Tk Bn
552d AAA AW Bn (M)
Co B, 86th Cml Bn
(2) Will protect the left flank of the Corps
along the SIEG from the RHINE River to the EAST, reliev-
ing elements of the 1st Inf Div along the SIEG River
initially as far as MERTEN (F7640) as the attack of the
1st Inf Div progresses.
e.
8th Infantry Division, Brigadier General Bryant
E. Moore, Commanding.
(1) Attachments:
69th Div Arty (-879th FA Bn (105 How))
445th AAA AW Bn (M)
644th TD Bn (SP) (-Co C)
(2) Will continue to secure the WEST bank of the
RHINE River between F383754 and F535410, preventing the
passage of any enemy across the river and maintaining
observation over the entire sector.
(3) Will be relieved by 86th Inf Div and assem-
ble in Corps reserve on order CG VII Corps.
f.
86th Infantry Division, Major General Harris M.
Melasky, Commanding.
Will relieve 8th Inf Div in its zone and take over
the mission of securing the WEST bank of the RHINE River
in its zone, preventing the passage of any enemy across
the river and maintaining observation over the entire
sector.
Figure H-33. VII Corps operation order (WWII) (continued)
H-76
FM 101-5
g.
4th Cavalry Group, Colonel John C. McDonald,
Commanding.
(1) Attachments:
4th Cav Sq
24th Cav Sq
759th Lt Tk Bn (-Co B)
Co A, 298th Engr C Bn
(2) Will assemble by 25 March in vicinity of
BONN (F5537) in corps reserve.
(3) Will be prepared to defend the NORTH flank
of the Corps along the SIEG River EAST of MERTEN (F7640)
on order CG VII Corps, progressively relieving elements
of 1st Inf Div as the attack advances.
h. VII Corps Artillery.
VII Corps Artillery will support the attack as per Annex
3, Artillery.
i. VII Corps Engineers.
Corps Engineer troops support the operation;
1120th Engr C Gp in the zone of 104th Inf Div with
one battalion in support of the Div; 1106th Engr C Gp
in the zone of 1st Inf Div with one battalion in sup-
port of 1st Inf Div and one battalion in support of
3d Armd Div.
j. Air Support will be provided for the operation
by fighter-bombers and medium bombers of IX TAC and IX
Bomb Div of NINTH AIR FORCE.
(1) No vehicles will be parked on main roads at
any time.
(2) Commanders will insure that main traffic
routes are cleared of road blocks and rubble and that
important traffic is not impeded by halted columns.
4.
ADMINISTRATIVE
4. Administrative Orders 114, 115, and 116.
Orders included Supply,
5. a.
(1) Current SOI.
Evacuation, Traffic, Service
Troops and Trains, Personnel,
and miscellaneous paras.
(2) Units not in contact with the enemy or not
deployed in a defensive role will maintain radio si-
lence except in case of emergency operational
requirements.
Figure H-33. VII Corps operation order Vignette (WWII) (continued)
H-77
FM 101-5
b.
Initial Command Posts:
VII Corps KONIGSWINTER (F617310)
1st Inf Div
F658307
8th Inf Div
WEIDEN (F362606)
78th Inf Div
NDR HOLTORF (F610375)
86th Inf Div
to be reported.
104th Inf Div
HONNEF (F649272)
3d Armd Div
HONNEF (F649272)
4th Cav Gp
BONN (F553372)
/s/ J. Lawton Collins
/t/ J. LAWTON COLLINS
Major General, U.S. Army,
Commanding
Figure H-33. VII Corps operation order (WWII) (continued)
H-78
Appendix I
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Proper information management ensures that the
complexity of information management. The com-
commander receives the information he needs to make
mander can help his staff gather necessary information
timely key decisions. A staff officer must maximize the
and preclude duplicating effort or gathering unnecessary
use of information systems to keep the commander from
information by focusing the staff through his intent,
being overwhelmed by information. To do this, the staff
guidance, and briefbacks.
officer must understand the characteristics of informa-
tion and its management.
THE MILITARY
INFORMATION SYSTEM
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO
Categories of Information
THE COMMANDER
Information provides a basis for decision making.
Information management narrows the gap, as much
The Army uses three traditional designations for the
as possible, between the information the commander re-
various types of information—critical, exceptional, and
quires and the information available to him. All infor-
routine.
mation that commands produce has one overriding
purpose—to enable the commander to make timely de-
Critical Information
cisions during the fog of battle. All information must be
Critical information directly affects the successful
reliable and the staff must ensure it is verifiable. The
execution of operations. The commander’s critical in-
commander seeks a dynamic battlefield visualization
formation requirements (CCIR) include information the
that will lead him to understand what actions the force
commander requires that directly affects his decisions
requires to produce success. His visualization includes
and dictates the successful execution of operations. The
military, political, and psychological considerations.
CCIR are—
Depending on the mission and situation, the major
• Applicable only to the commander who specifies it.
components of the commander’s visualization are based
on METT-T factors. Through his intent, he conveys his
• Directly linked to present and future tactical
visualization to subordinate commanders, the staff, and
situation.
units.
(See Commander’s Intent, Chapter 5.)
• Situation-dependent.
The meaning of any information the commander
• Events or activities that are predictable.
gains drives how he visualizes the operation. The man-
ner in which gained information fits into the com-
• Specified by the commander for each operation.
mander’s visualization determines its value.
(See
• Time-sensitive information that must be immedi-
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-70.) Staff members must un-
ately reported to the commander, staff, and subordinate
derstand the commander’s vision and intent if they are to
commanders.
support the commander’s information needs.
• Always included in an OPORD or OPLAN.
Army operations produce tremendous volumes of in-
formation. Much of this information is useful, but not
• Transmitted by a communications system specified
pertinent, to the commander during decision making.
in the SOP.
Commanders and staffs who understand this can avoid
Determining the CCIR helps the commander reduce
potential information overload by using effective sys-
the amount of information reported to him to what is im-
tems to accurately and rapidly convey necessary
portant and what is urgent to mission accomplishment.
information.
The answers acquired from CCIR communicate previ-
In effect, the demands of modern warfare compel
ously unknown information the commander might need
commanders to train their staffs and subordinates to be
or might consider critical to determine or validate a
effective information managers and to understand the
course of action. They ensure that the information the
I-1
FM 101-5
commander receives is meaningful and readily recog-
early warning of a pending emergency. Exceptional
nized as critical to his battlefield visualization.
information is—
The commander alone decides what information he
• Unexpected, unplanned, and situation-dependent.
deems to be critical, based on his experience, the mis-
• An immediate priority for command and staff ac-
sion, input from his staff, and the higher echelon com-
tion; the commander and staff must address exceptional
mander’s intent. Two means for deriving the CCIR are
information before the operation can continue.
war gaming and the production of a decision support
• Extremely time-sensitive in terms of decision mak-
template.
ing; there can be no delays in transmission.
The CCIR are expressed as three types of information
• Transmitted directly to the commander in as near
requirements:
real time as possible by whatever means is immediately
• Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
available.
• Friendly forces information requirements (FFIR).
• Applicable to both the friendly and enemy
situations.
• Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).
NOTE: See also Chapter 5 of this manual. For defini-
Routine Information
tion of these types of information requirements, see
Routine information is standard, repetitive informa-
FM 101-5-1
tion that occurs during day-to-day operations. It is made
The information manager, designated by the com-
routine by SOP. However, some routine information
mander, is normally the CofS (XO). He outlines and
might cross over to become CCIR (for a specific opera-
monitors the staff’s performance and responsibilities in
tion). Routine information—
processing information to support the operation and
• Should be used within and between staffs with little
flow that feeds the commander’s requirements. He col-
commander involvement.
lects, tasks, analyzes, and presents the CCIR in a timely
• Is used to prepare and verify estimates.
and accurate manner.
• Helps identify and anticipate potential problem
During operations, the information manager ensures
areas.
that a staff member is tracking the CCIR during a desig-
nated shift period. That staff member must understand
• Allows the staff to resolve routine matters, using
the requirements, review incoming and outgoing infor-
their own initiative.
mation traffic, and understand procedures for informing
• Is not time-sensitive in terms of decision making.
the commander and designated staff officers of critical
information. Units must establish CCIR procedures in
• Does not directly affect the execution of opera-
unit SOPs and train staffs in these procedures.
tional or tactical operations.
The commander must review his critical information
• Is not essential to the commander in its current raw
requirements for each operation based on METT-T fac-
format and, therefore, must be thoroughly analyzed
tors. He then adjusts his requirements as situations change.
before being transmitted to reduce overload on the staff
and information system.
Exceptional Information
• Is specified in the unit’s SOP, prescribing the se-
quence, time (or completion of an activity), and format
Exceptional information is specific and immediately
of the information.
vital information that directly affects the success of the
current operation. Unlike critical information, excep-
• Is normally transmitted via predetermined chan-
tional information is neither published nor explicitly
nels (also specified in the SOP), exchanged between
stated; rather, it must be recognized as vital by tactically
units, and handled staff-to-staff.
and technically competent subordinates and staffs.
Channels
Exceptional information signals the occurrence of
one or more unpredictable, extraordinary events,
Operational information normally moves throughout
such as an unforeseen opportunity for success or an
the command along specific channels. Channels help
I-2
FM 101-5
streamline information distribution by ensuring the right
• Display information accurately, reliably, and in a
information is passed in a timely manner to the right
timely manner.
person. There are three channels through which com-
• Be able to be changed promptly and easily as the in-
manders and their staffs communicate—-command
formation is updated.
channels, staff channels, and technical channels:
• Be rapidly distributed to higher, lower, and adja-
• The command channel is the direct chain-of-
cent units.
command link that commanders, or authorized staff offi-
cers, use for command-related activities.
Information Impediments and Solutions
• The staff channel is the staff-to-staff link between
headquarters. The staff uses the staff channel for
Every commander wants to make the right decision,
control-related activities and to coordinate and transmit
and he wants to be certain he has the best information
planning information, controlling instructions, and other
possible before he makes a decision. He expects the in-
information to support command and control, such as
formation to be accurate, valid, reliable, timely, and
the intelligence operations net or the administrative
clearly and directly stated. He also expects subordinates
logistics net.
to distribute information among his staff, subordinate
commanders and, as appropriate, with higher
• The technical channel is the technical link between
headquarters.
two similar commands within a larger command. Tech-
nical channels are typically used to control CS- and
The staff wants to prepare the best information possi-
CSS-related activities the larger organization requires,
ble to optimize the commander’s decisions. In meeting
such as in the fire direction net, the forward area air de-
this goal, however, the staff could actually impede infor-
fense (FAAD) command and control intelligence (C2I),
mation flow by trying to ensure perfection.
and so on.
Information management can contribute to a higher
headquarters’ over-control of subordinate headquarters,
Information Presentation
especially during high-tempo operations, if it demands
perfect or near-perfect information rather than the best
Desirable characteristics of all information include
available information at any critical time. When this oc-
utility, accuracy, clarity, brevity, coherence, objectivity,
curs, the higher commander’s control becomes dysfunc-
and veritability. There are three ways to present infor-
tional, thereby inhibiting the independent command of
mation—through written or verbal narrative reports or
subordinates.
through graphic displays. Written information must con-
Commanders who demand or allow their staffs to de-
form to established formats for reports, estimates, and
mand perfect information will be more vulnerable to de-
staff studies. Verbal information must conform to estab-
feat through the loss of initiative. Demands for perfect
lished formats for information, decision, mission, or
information can result in—
staff briefings.
• Diverting subordinate units’ efforts from mission
NOTE: See unit SOP for report formats, Appendix C for
activities to supporting the higher headquarters’
staff estimate formats, and Appendix D for staff study
information-reporting system.
formats. See Appendix E for verbal briefing formats.
• Areportingsystemoverflow,inundatingthehigher
Graphic displays (maps or charts) visually represent
headquarters’ staff with information it cannot effec-
current or future operational information. When possi-
tively sort, analyze, or distribute in time to be useful to
ble, commanders and staffs can graphically portray
the command.
quantifiable information using standard formats, using
either automated or manual means. Graphic information
• Getting information that is current but without suf-
should—
ficient analysis to help the commander with decision
making, or information that is comprehensive but out-
• Display symbols, graphics, and terminology con-
of-date and not reflective of the true situation.
sistent with FM 101-5-1.
• The commander having to delay decisions or
• Display essential information.
frequently review previous decisions while the staff
• Display information clearly and understandably.
gathers better or more recent data.
I-3
FM 101-5
• Subordinates who are more likely to defer their ac-
questions; implements decide, detect, and deliver; and
tions until their seniors direct them.
assesses methodology and decision points. The com-
mander’s principal subordinates (deputy or assistant
• All leaders having less confidence in the higher
commanders, CofS (XO), coordinating staff principals,
headquarters’ plan and in each other’s ability to effec-
and subordinate commanders) must know his CCIR. In
tively execute the plan.
turn, subordinates must coordinate the CCIR with their
Central to effective information management is a
own functional areas of responsibility.
good reporting system. The reporting system is based
Commanders and staffs must request only informa-
on information relevant to both higher and lower head-
tion critical for a decision and refrain from seeking or
quarters. Reports should demand only that information
being distracted by nonessential information. This al-
important to the organization receiving the report. Re-
lows the staff time to coordinate, integrate, and synchro-
ports should support the decision-making process and
nize activities and units. It also supports command and
the execution of operations. Limiting reporting to es-
control by minimizing constant interruptions or diver-
sential information reduces the amount of time and ef-
sions to run down nice-to-know or just-in-case
fort a subordinate must spend on collecting, analyzing,
information.
formatting, and transmitting reports.
To reduce the amount of information arriving at com-
Supplementing the reporting system with liaison per-
mand posts, units can send reports forward by exception.
sonnel who actively seek the commander’s critical in-
This ensures that decision makers receive only the most
formation requirements as well as exceptional
critical information. Labeling information by exception
information saves subordinate units time, effort, and dis-
also ensures that the critical information gets noticed
traction from current operations. Liaison officers can
rather than becoming lost among noncritical informa-
also provide the higher commander with information
tion. (Another way to reduce the volume of data arriving
more quickly, and that information will be considerably
at the command post is for the sender to first analyze the
more accurate and precise.
information and forward only the analysis.)
The commander bases his information-management
system on—
Charts and Maps
Charts and operations maps aid in the display of
• His degree of willingness to cope with uncertainty.
information within a command post. There are two
• The information he wants to make decisions.
types of charts—narrative (text) and pictorial (sym-
bols or colors). Narrative charts, such as a mission
• Use of mission orders to task subordinate
chart, require words to convey their meanings.
commanders.
Color-coded pictorial charts use decision graphics to
• Effective task organization.
reflect the current status of a unit or combat, CS, or
CSS system. Gumball charts expand the detail that
• Use of liaison officers.
combat-effectiveness charts show.
• Fostering of informal communications networks.
NOTE: FM 101-5-1 contains a description of these
• Information presentations that have self-
charts.
explanatory and meaningful contexts.
To correctly interpret a combat-effectiveness graph,
viewers must remember the significance of the symbols
Information Management Resources
that represent effectiveness. They must also remember
There are three ways to implement the decentralized
the significance of selected information (personnel, am-
information management philosophy.
munition, weapons systems, and POL). The combat-
effectiveness chart is difficult to keep accurate in man-
Reports by Exception
ual systems because its physical design inhibits easy,
rapid, or frequent changes.
The command center displays or retrieves only infor-
mation that directly contributes to the commander’s
The gumball chart can rapidly present each unit’s or
critical decision making. The commander’s critical in-
weapons system’s combat capability status through es-
formation requirements should always consist of infor-
tablished color codes. Color codes allow the staff to fo-
mation that, in part, answers PIR, EEFI, and FFIR
cus on solving or continuing to solve critical problems
I-4
FM 101-5
rather than less critical ones. If the commander re-
• Where is the enemy vulnerable?
quests further information, he can retrieve (pull) it from
• What will the enemy’s key decisions be, and how
the submitting staff section, major subordinate com-
do we want to influence them?
mand, or maneuver control system in automated sys-
tems. This technique uses the routine information
• What does the enemy see as the current friendly
category, passing information through staff or technical
activity?
channels. However, when the priority is high, or the ca-
• How does the enemy perceive friendly capabilities
pability is significantly degraded, the requested infor-
within the next time period? The time period varies
mation will change from routine to exceptional.
based on echelon of command.
To use the gumball-chart technique, the staff must
• What does the enemy see as friendly vulnerabilities
first establish the color codes each echelon will use. Dif-
he can exploit?
ferent elements of the same function use the same color
• What is the friendly flank situation?
code to avoid confusion at higher headquarters where
the staff must analyze and consolidate similar reports
• What combat power do friendly forces have? In the
from several units.
next time period? The time period varies based on eche-
lon of command.
Currently, color code criteria for maneuver control
systems are—
Charts and tactical maps display critical information
within the command center. They reflect an easily un-
• Green (80 percent or greater combat capability
derstood and continuously visual estimate of the total
remains).
operational situation for both current and future opera-
• Amber (from 60 percent to 79 percent combat
tions. The proponent staff element is responsible for
capability remains).
changes to the command post map and status boards.
• Red (from 40 percent to 59 percent combat capabil-
The staff must keep the charts on the information dis-
ity remains).
play to an absolute minimum. The commander’s critical
information requirements and the units’ SOP should
• Black
(39
percent or less combat capability
guide the type and number of charts the unit needs. The
remains).
display must answer most of the CCIR, using multiple
Operations maps contain only the minimum-essential
means to display PIR, EEFI, FFIR, and decision points.
information to allow the commander to see the battle-
The future information display and the current infor-
field. Recording excessively detailed information is
mation display use the same format. Their main differ-
time-consuming and dramatically interferes with coor-
ence is that the current operations chart reflects the
dination, integration, and synchronization functions.
current situation; the future operations chart reflects as-
Staff section maps should follow these same guidelines,
sumptions based on current facts. The staff must con-
but they can have more detail because they must display
stantly reevaluate these assumptions on emerging facts.
the friendly situation and their respective proponent in-
The commander must assess the validity of all assump-
terests, tracking units, and activities two echelons down.
tions to determine their impact on the planned operation
and any modifications the plan might need.
Critical information for the commander is posted in
the unit’s command center. The command center sup-
ports the commander’s ability to see (visualize) the bat-
Impact on Decision Making
tlefield to assist him with decision making. The
Information is the key to effective synchronization.
effectiveness of the command center relates directly to
Synchronization requires early decisions that enable the
the type and quality of information used for decision
staff to arrange battlefield activities in time, space, and
making. The information in the command center
purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at
should, as a minimum, answer the following questions:
the decisive point. The time-distance and density fac-
• What is the enemy doing now?
tors that are associated with modern warfare require
commanders to—
• What are the enemy’s capabilities within the next
time period? The time period varies based on echelon of
• Make critical decisions using information based
command.
more on assumptions than facts.
I-5
FM 101-5
• Decentralize execution, providing subordinate
immediately available. Each commander, therefore, be-
commanders with task organizations capable of semi-
comes the catalyst for effecting changes within the C2 sys-
independent execution.
tem that his demands for information place on the
command.
• Specify and streamline the information flow
throughout the C2 system.
Risk is expected. The speed, type, and quality of
information the C2 system places in front of the deci-
• Comply with the commanders’ intentions, seeing
sion maker can effectively minimize risk while opti-
their own plan through to success.
mizing the unit’s capacity to remain responsive and
Commanders must be resolute in accepting risk and be
agile.
willing to make decisions based only on the information
I-6
Appendix J
RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management is integrated into the military
as limited visibility and extreme cold weather. Accident
decision-making process.
(See Chapter 5.) When as-
risk is managed by both the commander and the staff.
sessing the risk of hazards in operations, the commander
Staff members are constantly looking for accident haz-
and staff must look at two kinds of risk, tactical risk and
ards associated with their areas of expertise, and they
accident risk.
recommend controls to reduce risk.
Tactical risk is risk associated with hazards that exist
Tactical risk and accident risk may be diametrically
due to the presence of the enemy on the battlefield. The
opposed. The commander may accept a high level of ac-
consequences of tactical risk take two forms. The first is
cident risk in order to reduce tactical risk. For example,
if the enemy takes action in an area where the com-
during the seizure of the Remagen Bridge, the benefit of
mander has accepted risk, for example, an enemy attack
seizing an intact bridge over the Rhine outweighed the
where the friendly commander is conducting economy
extremely high risk of sending soldiers across a bridge
of force operations in order to mass the effects of combat
rigged for demolitions. Both types of risks are managed
power elsewhere. The second is one of lost opportunity,
by the commander with assistance from his staff. Risk
for example the commander takes risk in moving forces
decisions are the sole provenance of the commander.
across restricted terrain to gain the advantage of sur-
The same risk-management process is used to assess
prise, but is unable to mass the effects of combat power
and evaluate both tactical and accident risks. Risk man-
because the unit is unable to rapidly traverse the terrain.
agement must become a pattern of thinking—identify
The commander alone determines how and where he is
and assess the hazard, develop controls to reduce the
willing to take tactical risk.
risk, decide if the benefit from the operation justifies the
Accident risk includes all operational risk considera-
risk, and then implement controls and supervise.
tions other than tactical risk, and can include activities
Figure J-1 is a matrix of risk management steps as
associated with hazards concerning friendly personnel,
they relate to each step of the MDMP.
equipment readiness, and environmental conditions.
Accident hazards exist regardless of enemy action, even
in the absence of an enemy force. Examples of accident
DEFINITIONS
hazards include personnel that are not adequately
trained to conduct certain kinds of operations, equip-
Hazard is any actual or potential condition that can
ment that is not fully operational, and environmental
cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or
conditions that make operations more dangerous, such
loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation.
IDENTIFY HAZARDS
ASSESS HAZARDS
DEVELOP CONTROLS
IMPLEMENT
SUPERVISE &
& MAKE RISK
CONTROLS
EVALUATE
DECISION
RECEIPT OF MISSION
X
MISSION ANALYSIS
X
X
COA DEVELOPMENT
X
X
X
COA ANALYSIS
X
X
X
COA COMPARISON
X
COA APPROVAL
X
ORDERS PRODUCTION
X
PREPARATION
X
X
EXECUTION
X
X
Figure J-1. Risk management actions integrated into the military decision-making tasks
J-1
FM 101-5
Condition is the readiness status of personnel and
mission accomplishment. It is conducted by the com-
equipment with respect to the operational environment
mander and the staff and is applicable to any mission and
during mission planning, preparation, and execution.
environment. The five steps of risk management are:
Readiness that is below standards leads to human error,
Step 1. Identify hazards. Identify hazards to the
material failure, and inadequate precautions for environ-
force. Consider all aspects of METT-T for current and
mental factors, which may cause accidents, fratricide,
future situations. Sources of information about hazards
and mission degradation.
include reconnaissance, experience of commander and
staff, safety SOP, and the unit's accident history. Haz-
Risk is the probability of exposure to injury or loss
ards that cannot be adequately controlled by the unit or
from a hazard. Risk level is expressed in terms of hazard
its subordinate units, and which are most likely to result
probability and severity.
in loss of combat power, should be risk-managed. To
Exposure is the frequency and length of time person-
determine this, answer the questions in Figure J-2.
nel and equipment are subjected to a hazard.
Step 2. Assess hazards. Assess each hazard to de-
Severity is the degree of injury, property damage, or
termine the risk of potential loss based on probability
other mission-impairing factors (loss of combat power,
and severity of the hazard. Determining the risk from
adverse publicity) that could occur as a result of a
a hazard is more an art than a science. Use historical
hazard.
data, intuitive analysis, judgment, and the matrix at
Figure J-3 to estimate the risk of each hazard. The
Controls are actions taken to eliminate hazards or
risk assessment matrix is entered from the probability
reduce their risk.
column and the severity row. Probability and sever-
Risk assessment is the identification and assessment
ity levels are estimated based on the user’s knowl-
of hazards (the first two steps of the risk management
edge of probability of occurrence and the severity of
process).
consequences once the occurrence happens. The in-
tersection of the probability column and the severity
Residual risk is the level of risk remaining after con-
row defines the level of risk.
trols have been selected for hazards. (Controls are iden-
tified and selected until residual risk is at an acceptable
Step 3. Develop controls, determine residual risk,
level or until it cannot be practically reduced further.)
and make risk decision.
a.
Develop controls. For each hazard, develop
RISK MANAGEMENT STEPS
one or more controls that will eliminate or reduce the
risk of the hazard. Specify who, what, where, when, and
Risk management is identifying and controlling haz-
how for each control. When developing controls con-
ards to protect the force and increase the chance of
sider the reason for the hazard, not just the METT-T
Adequate
Q - Is hazard adequately controlled?
YES
NO
Support - Is support available (personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities) adequate
to control the hazard?
Standards - Is guidance or procedure adequately clear, practical, and specific to
control hazard?
Identified
METT-T hazard
Training - Is training adequate to control the hazard?
Leader - Are leaders ready, willing, and able to enforce standards required to con-
trol hazard?
Individual - Is soldier performance sufficiently self-disciplined to control hazard?
A - If all “yes,” no further action.
- If one or more “no,” risk-manage this hazard.
Figure J-2. Determining which hazards to risk-manage
J-2
FM 101-5
HAZARD PROBABILITY
Frequent
Likely
Occasional
Seldom
Unlikely
Catastrophic
E
E
H
H
M
S
E
V
Critical
E
H
H
M
L
E
R
I
Marginal
H
M
M
L
L
T
Y
Negligible
M
L
L
L
L
HAZARD PROBABILITY (The likelihood that an event will occur)
Frequent
- Occurs often, continuously experienced.
Likely
- Occurs several times.
Occasional
- Occurs sporadically.
Seldom
- Unlikely, but could occur at some time.
Unlikely
- Can assume it will not occur.
SEVERITY (The degree of injury, property damage, or other mission-impairing factors.
Catastrophic
- Death or permanent total disability, system loss, major property damage.
Critical
- Permanent partial disability, temporary total disability in excess of three months, major system damage, significant
property damage.
Marginal
- Minor injury, lost workday accident, minor system damage, minor property damage.
Negligible
- First aid or minor medical treatment, minor system impairment.
RISK LEVELS
E (Extremely High)
- Loss of ability to accomplish mission.
H (High)
- Significantly degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standard.
M (Moderate)
- Degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.
L (Low)
- Little or no impact on accomplishment of mission.
Figure J-3. Individual hazard risk assessment matrix
factor itself (Figure J-2). Effective control can be imple-
Step 4. Implement controls. State how each control
mented through individual and collective training that
will be put into effect and communicated to personnel
ensures performance to standard. The CofS (XO) coor-
who will make it happen.
dinates development of controls with emphasis on de-
Step 5. Supervise and evaluate.
conflicting controls that affect multiple functional areas
and adjacent units.
a. Supervise controls. Explain how each control
will be monitored to ensure proper implementation.
b. Determine residual risk. For each hazard, as
b. Evaluate controls. Evaluate the effectiveness
controls are developed, revise the evaluation of the level
of each control in reducing or eliminating risk. For con-
of risk remaining (residual risk), assuming the controls
trols that are not effective, determine why and what to do
for it are implemented.
the next time the hazard is identified. For example, in
c. Make risk decision. The commander alone de-
the next operation the commander and staff might
cides whether or not to accept the level of residual risk.
change the control, develop a different control, or
If the commander determines the risk is too great to con-
change how the control will be implemented or super-
tinue the mission or a COA, he directs the development
vised. The commander and staff must fix systemic prob-
of additional controls, or he modifies, changes, or rejects
lems (Figure J-2) hindering combat effectiveness and
the COA or mission.
capture and disseminate lessons learned.
J-3
Appendix K
COMMANDER AND STAFF TRAINING
Developing an effective and efficient commander
The commander structures staff training on the
and staff team requires team training that focuses on
MDMP by presenting the staff with situations in which
critical tasks. Unit-training opportunities at the combat
the staff must conduct a complete MDMP or an abbrevi-
training centers such as the battle command training pro-
ated MDMP. The commander coaches and directs ques-
gram (BCTP) or joint readiness training center (JRTC)
tions to the staff members, asking them to explain or
are too infrequent to sustain a unit’s commander and
clarify their rationale. The commander then assesses the
staff proficiency. Therefore, it is the commander’s re-
accuracy and depth of their thought processes and their
sponsibility to train his staff and subordinate command-
products. He then provides feedback to the staff, assess-
ers to work as a cohesive team. The commander must
ing how well staff members have provided the informa-
continually determine his staff’s training needs, plan and
tion and support the commander’s desires.
execute a training program, and assess the results. This
The commander can use this procedure for staff train-
appendix discusses training on the military decision-
ing in individual and collective battle tasks, basing train-
making process (MDMP).
ing on hypothetical situations or on actual war plans.
This training helps the commander and staff to—
FUNDAMENTALS
• Sharpen thinking.
The commander and his staff must be a cohesive
• Assess what additional training the staff needs.
team. The staff must firmly understand Army doctrine
• Increase understanding of how the commander
and anticipate the commander in order to produce com-
thinks and operates.
prehensive and synchronized plans consistent with the
commander’s guidance. The challenges of battle com-
• Improve cohesion and enhance morale, trust, and
mand require meticulous commander and staff training
confidence.
in decision making (both the full MDMP and the abbre-
• Determine how best to modify the MDMP in a
viated process), estimate procedures, information man-
time-constrained environment and increase understand-
agement, orders preparation, and rehearsals. The
ing of each member’s role in the abbreviated process.
relationship between unit missions and the mission-
essential task list (METL) affects staff training just as it
This training procedure helps the staff officer to—
affects a unit’s individual and collective training. The
• Sharpen his thinking.
commander develops the staff METL for training in ac-
cordance with FM 25-100 and FM 25-101. Planning as-
• Increase his understanding of how his commander
sociated with the existing unit METL provides excellent
operates.
opportunities to exercise staff training and interaction.
• Improve his ability to anticipate requirements.
Rapid changes in staff composition require a training
• Improve cohesion between the commander and the
program that will—
staff.
• Quickly orient newly assigned staff members.
• Understand his role in the full MDMP and the
abbreviated process.
• Rapidly assess the staff’s technical and tactical
proficiency.
Staff skills are predominately trained during multi-
echelon training activities. The commander must ensure
• Provide battle-focused individual and collective
staff training.
multiechelon exercises provide the staff useful training.
The commander and CofS (XO) must not assume that
• Provide sustainment of soldier, leader, and team
training will inherently occur in the course of planning
skills.
and executing nonbattle-focused activities. The com-
• Develop skills in both the full MDMP and time-
mander should free the staff from administrative tasks
constrained variants.
that hamper their training.
K-1
FM 101-5
Planning Process
Cdr
Staff
Staff
RTOs
Clerks/
Officers
NCOs
Typists
Mission Analysis:
- Prepare charts for mission analysis
X
X
- Prepare terrain sketches
X
X
- Update and post unit reports/status
X
X
- Prepare TOC for planning process
X
X
X
- Conduct mission analysis
X
X
X
- Serve as a recorder during process
X
X
X
- Brief commander and staff
X
X
Commander’s Guidance:
- Assist commander in developing guidance
X
X
- Issue guidance
X
- Record/post commander’s guidance
X
X
X
X
COA Development:
- Prepare charts
X
X
- Sketch COAs
X
X
- Develop COAs
X
X
X
COA Analysis:
- Collect and prepare tools/charts
X
X
- Serve as recorders during war game
X
X
X
- Conduct war-game session
X
X
X
Decision:
- Make recommendation to commander
X
X
- Decide
X
- Record/post commander’s guidance
X
X
X
X
Orders Preparation:
- Write annexes
X
X
- Consolidate annexes
X
X
- Type order
X
X
X
- Reproduce order/graphics
X
X
- Review order
X
X
X
- Approve order
X
Figure K-1. Command and staff duties in the MDMP
If the staff is relatively inexperienced in the
planning process for the unit.
During this training, the
decision-making process, training should begin with
staff should identify specific roles and responsibilities of
classes on the MDMP. These classes should focus on
each individual involved. The frequency of this training
will depend on personnel turbulence. Figure K-1 identi-
ensuring that all personnel who participate in the plan-
fies command and staff duties in the MDMP.
ning process understand the formal process. This train-
ing should include slice units that will be expected to
After the initial training, the commander should exer-
participate in the process. This training will allow the
cise the staff using the MDMP. The staff must first be
commander to eventually customize and streamline the
able to conduct the MDMP to standard before it can
K-2
FM 101-5
attempt to abbreviate the process. A good technique to
While conducting planning exercises, the com-
conduct this training is the small group instruction (SGI)
mander and staff should identify what planning charts
method, similar to that used in the advanced courses,
and tools they want to incorporate into their SOP. The
with the commander serving as the SGI. This task
unit should develop and refine its planning SOP during
should not be left to the CofS (XO). This is the com-
this training.
mander’s opportunity to prepare and train his staff.
When the unit prepares quarterly training guidance, it
Training must incorporate staff NCOs and enlisted
should prepare, issue, and include an operation order or
soldiers. If trained properly, they can be an asset to the
operation plan. This order can then serve as a common
process, and save the staff officers significant time. Fig-
scenario for subordinate units to use to exercise their
ure K-1 shows where to incorporate NCOs and enlisted
decision-making process. They can use the same order
soldiers in the process.
to practice the MDMP and to work on abbreviating the
process under time constraints. This technique not only
TECHNIQUES
provides subordinates a training opportunity, but also al-
lows the staff to exercise the process and conduct all ver-
The commander should request support from sister
tical and horizontal coordination as necessary. The
service units to provide observer and controller (OC)
coverage during the exercise. The OCs conduct after-
training should include confirmation briefs, backbriefs,
action reviews (AARs) to provide feedback throughout
and rehearsals as well.
the planning process.
Many delays in the planning process are related to the
Command posts should be set up to replicate a field
IPB. Often this is because the G2 (S2) staff is conduct-
environment. Conducting the exercise in a garrison or
ing the majority of the IPB process itself. Commanders
an office environment is much different from conduct-
should dedicate time to train and refine skills for all sub-
ing the exercise in a field setting. This also provides the
ordinates in the G2 (S2) section. Training should focus
opportunity to exercise command posts and adjust to
on—
their organization or layout based on the commander’s
desires and the staff’s lessons learned.
• Reviewing enemy doctrine, tactics, techniques,
and procedures.
The commander and staff incorporate in the planning
process the production of plans and orders for as many
• Reviewing terrain analysis techniques and
day-to-day activities as possible. This should include
procedures.
developing orders for range operations; change of com-
• Developing doctrinal, situational, and event
mand ceremonies; gunnery; and squad, platoon, and
templates.
company lanes, as well as orders to initiate all field train-
ing and command post exercises.
• Developing event and TAI templates.
K-3
Appendix L
LIAISON
Liaison is the contact or intercommunication main-
tained between elements of military forces to ensure mu-
Liaison Qualifications
tual understanding and unity of purpose and action.
Recommended
Liaison helps reduce the fog of war through direct com-
(1 officer)
munications. It is the most commonly employed tech-
nique for establishing and maintaining close, continuous
Corps
Major
physical communication between commands.
Division
Captain
Brigade, regiment, or group
Captain
Liaison is used during operations and normal daily
Battalion
First Lieutenant
activity between units to help facilitate communication,
preserve freedom of action, and maintain flexibility.
Liaison ensures that senior commanders remain aware
Figure L-1. Rank composition of senior
of the tactical situation by providing them with excep-
liaison team personnel from the sending
tional, critical, or routine information; verification of in-
(dispatching) unit to the receiving unit
formation; and clarification of operational questions.
Liaison activities augment the commander’s ability
• Liaison detachments, composed of several teams
to synchronize and focus the combat power. Liaison ac-
with expertise in specialized areas, such as intelligence,
tivities include establishing and maintaining physical
operations, fire support, airspace command and control
contact and communication between elements of mili-
(AC2), engineering, CSS, and so forth; each team nor-
tary forces and, as directed, nonmilitary agencies. Liai-
mally remains at the receiving headquarters until re-
son activities ensure—
called to the sending unit.
• Mutual cooperation and understanding between
• Liaison teams, composed of liaison officers, a liai-
commanders and staffs of different headquarters.
son noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), cleri-
• Coordination on tactical matters to achieve mutual
cal personnel and drivers, and communications
purpose, support, and action.
personnel with their equipment.
• Exact and precise understanding of implied or in-
• Couriers (messengers) responsible for the secure
ferred coordination measures to achieve synchronized
physical transmission and delivery of documents and
results.
material.
Overall, liaison becomes another tool to help com-
See Figure L-1.
manders overcome friction, gain assurance that subordi-
nate commanders understand implicit coordination, and
achieve synchronized results. Effective liaison en-
THE LIAISON OFFICER
hances the commander’s confidence in planning and in
The commander uses a liaison officer to transmit
mission execution.
critical information while bypassing layers of staffs and
headquarters. A trained, competent, trusted, and in-
LIAISON ELEMENTS
formed liaison officer (either an officer or a noncommis-
sioned officer) is the key to effective liaison. The liaison
Joint and multinational operations require augmenta-
officer must have the proper rank and experience for the
tion by individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) or
mission and have the commander’s full confidence.
individual ready reserve (IRR) personnel to fill neces-
When interfacing with joint and multinational forces,
sary liaison positions. Liaison elements include—
rank may need to be increased to enhance accessibility
• The liaison officer (LNO), who represents the com-
and influence. Employing one individual conserves
mander or a special functional area.
manpower while guaranteeing the consistent, accurate
L-1
FM 101-5
flow of information. However, continuous operations
• Possess the necessary language expertise, if
require a liaison team.
required.
The liaison officer normally is a special staff officer.
He is the personal representative of the commander and
LIAISON PRINCIPLES
has access to his commander consistent with his duties.
A principle is a description of the inherent or natural
However, for routine matters, he works for and receives
laws governing how something works. When possible,
direction from the CofS (XO).
liaison should be reciprocal between higher, lower, and
The liaison officer’s parent unit is the sending unit;
adjacent formations. It must be reciprocal when US
the unit the liaison officer visits or is attached to is the re-
forces are placed under the command and control of a
ceiving unit. A liaison officer normally remains at the
headquarters of a different nationality and vice versa, or
when brigade-sized and larger formations of different
receiving headquarters until recalled to the sending unit.
nationalities are adjacent.
Because the liaison officer represents his commander,
he must be able to—
When liaison is not reciprocal, the following princi-
ples apply:
• Understand how his commander thinks.
• Higher-echelon units establish liaison with lower
• Interpret his commander’s messages.
echelons.
• Convey his commander’s vision, mission, and con-
• Units on the left establish liaison with units on their
cept of operations and guidance.
right.
• Represent his commander’s position.
• Supporting units establish liaison with units they
The liaison officer’s professional capabilities and
support.
personal characteristics must encourage confidence and
• Units of the same echelon and units in the rear es-
cooperation with the commander and staff of the receiv-
tablish liaison with those to their front.
ing unit. He must—
• Units not in contact with the enemy establish liai-
• Be thoroughly knowledgeable of the sending unit’s
son with units that are in contact with the enemy.
mission and its tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP); organization; capabilities; and communications
• When conducting a passage of lines, the moving
equipment.
unit establishes liaison with the stationary unit. (This
applies to both forward and rearward passages of
• Be familiar with the doctrine and staff procedures
lines.)
of the receiving unit’s headquarters.
• The incoming force establishes liaison with the
• Appreciate and understand the receiving unit’s pro-
outgoing force during a relief of combat troops.
cedures, organization, capabilities, mission, and cus-
toms.
(In the case of multinational forces,
If liaison is broken, both parties must attempt to rees-
understanding the unit’s doctrine is critical.)
tablish it. However, the primary responsibility rests with
the headquarters originally responsible for establishing
• Be familiar with the requirements for and the pur-
liaison.
pose of liaison; the liaison system, and its corresponding
reports, reporting documents, and records; and the train-
ing of the liaison team.
LIAISON RESPONSIBILITIES
• Observe the established channels of command and
The Sending Unit
staff functions.
The sending unit’s most important tasks include se-
• Be of sufficient rank to effectively represent his
lecting and training the right persons as liaison officers.
commander with the receiving unit’s commander and
The sending unit must ensure the liaison officer meets
staff.
all liaison characteristics and requirements and—
• Be trained in his functional area.
• Is tactically and technically competent, skilled, and
• Possess tact.
mature.
L-2
FM 101-5
• Is familiar with the receiving headquarters’ doc-
• Providing access to communications equipment
trine and staff procedures.
(and operating instructions, as needed) when the liaison
officer is to communicate on the receiving unit’s
• Understands the sending headquarters’ current and
equipment.
future operations and his commander’s mission, intent,
• Providing administrative and logistics support.
concept of operations, and critical activities.
• Understands what information his commander
Liaison Duties During the Tour
wants the receiving commander to know.
The sending unit must provide a description of the
Liaison officers also provide the receiving unit’s
commander or staff with knowledge of the sending
liaison party (number and type of vehicles, personnel,
unit’s needs or requirements. The liaison officer’s abil-
call signs, radio frequencies, and so on) to the receiving
ity to rapidly clarify questions about the sending unit can
unit. The liaison officer or team must also—
keep the receiving unit from wasting time (thus decreas-
• Have identification and appropriate credentials for
ing frustration) while planning a course of action that
the receiving unit.
best supports the senior commander’s intentions.
• Have appropriate security clearance, courier or-
During the liaison tour, the liaison officer or team—
ders, transportation, and communications equipment.
• Arrives at the designated location at the designated
• Have an SOP outlining the missions, functions,
time.
procedures, and duties of the sending unit’s liaison
• Promotes cooperation between the sending head-
section.
quarters and the receiving headquarters.
• Have weapons and ammunition for personal
• Accomplishes its mission without becoming ac-
protection.
tively involved with the receiving unit’s staff procedures
or actions; however, it may assist higher staffs in war
• Have rations for the transit from the sending unit to
gaming when requested to do so.
the receiving unit.
• Uses communications in accordance with the re-
ceiving unit’s procedures.
The Receiving Unit
• Accomplishes its mission without interfering with
The receiving unit is responsible for—
the receiving headquarters’ operations. The liaison team
• Providing the sending unit with the liaison officer’s
must be proactive in obtaining information.
reporting time, place, point of contact, recognition sig-
• Facilitates comprehension of the sending unit’s
nal, and password.
commander’s intent.
• Providing details of any tactical movement and
• Helps the sending unit’s commander assess current
logistics information relevant to the liaison officer’s
and future operations.
mission, especially while he is in transit.
• Remains informed of the sending unit’s current
• Ensuring that the liaison officer has access to the
situation and makes that information available to the re-
commander, the CofS (XO), and other officers for im-
ceiving unit’s commander and staff.
portant matters.
• Expeditiously informs the sending unit of upcom-
• Giving the liaison officer an initial briefing and
ing missions, tasks, and orders of the receiving unit.
allowing him appropriate access so that he may remain
• Reports to the sending unit on matters within the
informed of current operations.
scope of its mission.
• Providing protection for the liaison officer while he
• Ensures that a copy of the receiving unit’s SOP is
is at the receiving unit.
available at the sending unit.
• Publishing an SOP outlining the missions, func-
• Informs the receiving unit’s commander or CofS
tions, procedures, and duties of the liaison officer or
(XO) of the content of the reports it transmits to the
team at the receiving unit.
sending unit.
L-3
FM 101-5
• Keeps a record of its reports, listing everyone met
specific operation, is added to the new C2 relationships,
(including the person’s name, rank, duty position, and
the staff is again pushed to make the reduced time line.
phone number) as well as primary operators and their
The staff must expend additional time working through
phone numbers.
routine and nonroutine activities. The staff will generate
more requests for information and this increases time re-
• Attempts to resolve issues proactively within the
quirements. An example of this is requesting maps for
receiving headquarters before involving the sending unit.
the area of operations.
• Notifies the sending unit promptly if unable to
Unfamiliarity with the units in his command and the
accomplish the liaison mission.
area of operations can cause confusion for the com-
• Reports its departure to the receiving unit’s com-
mander. Such confusion, in turn, could cause conflict-
mander after completing the mission.
ing guidance, frequent planning changes, and inefficient
execution of deployment tasks. The commander must
• Reports future operations to the sending unit so that
anticipate conflicting conditions and have a system in
the sending unit can begin preliminary planning for
place to cut through the confusion. This increases the
anticipated future events or activities.
need for nonroutine information. In such a situation,
liaison is the key. During deployment, the liaison officer
Liaison Duties After the Tour
becomes a conduit for information. By providing accu-
After returning to the sending unit, the liaison team
rate information, he can help the commander establish
promptly transmits the receiving unit’s requests to the
order, efficiency, and expediency.
sending unit’s commander or staff, as appropriate. The
The liaison officer must always be mindful of his
team also briefs the CofS (XO) on mission-related liai-
commander’s need for information to complete plan-
son activities and prepares a written report, as
ning and coordination. Information needs might
appropriate.
include—
Accuracy is paramount. The team must provide clear,
• The type of transportation the unit needs for
concise, complete information. If accuracy is not cer-
deployment and resupply.
tain, it should quote the source. The liaison team should
limit its
remarks to observations that are
• The communications systems and intelligence
mission-related.
products available.
NOTE: For convenience, a liaison-team checklist and
• Opening of channels of communications that will
an example outline of a liaison officer’s handbook are
become routine later.
located at the end of this appendix.
• The level and extent of protection the unit needs as
it arrives, disembarks, and prepares for combat
operations.
LIAISON IN SPECIFIC
• The unit’s staging area requirements.
OPERATIONS
• The unit’s combat capability and sustainment
Liaison is a routine assignment having specific re-
requirements.
sponsibilities for specific operations, including deploy-
ment, joint, multinational, and interagency operations.
• The CSS commodities, services, and facilities the
Army component of a joint force must provide to other
Deployment Operations
service components in the area of operations.
The unfamiliarity of the area of operations requires
• Local tactical intelligence products otherwise
extensive research for staff estimates. Some operations
unavailable to the commander.
require tight security that restricts access or dissemina-
• Unit movement officer responsibilities.
tion and affects the time line. During certain operations,
completely new C2 relationships are established result-
Joint Operations
ing in slower staff coordination and action due to unfa-
miliarity with SOPs and even unit equipment and
During joint operations, interoperable communica-
personnel. When a tailored task organization, based on a
tions systems among services are rare. Therefore, Army
L-4
FM 101-5
liaison teams must have communications systems that
• Special communications and liaison arrangements
can rapidly exchange information between commands.
are required to ensure explicit understanding throughout
the multinational operation.
Current joint operations communications systems do
not provide for all operational requirements. Therefore,
• Ideally, a liaison officer should speak the language
the Army must use liaison to ensure that the actions of
of the force to which he is attached. If not, he must be
Army forces and forces of other services are coordinated
accompanied by interpreters who have the same access
and synchronized, and that they support the joint force
to classified information as the liaison officer they
commander’s plan.
support.
In the joint force, the senior Army headquarters pro-
• Tact and an understanding of other nations’ charac-
vides liaison to the equivalent headquarters of the other
teristics and culture are essential. Other nations often re-
services. The senior Army headquarters should also es-
sent any semblance of a dictatorial manner in liaison
tablish liaison with the headquarters of the joint force
officers or visiting staff officers.
commander. Subordinate Army organizations and units
• The liaison officer must clearly impart to a foreign
with similar-size adjacent service commands might also
unit commander that the orders come directly from the
exchange liaison officers.
more senior commander—not from a staff officer em-
Liaison officers must have a working knowledge of
powered to speak in the senior commander’s name.
the supported unit’s doctrine and TTPs so that they can
• When a liaison officer must send a message from
rapidly translate information into information products
the receiving commander’s unit to the sending unit, he
Army personnel can understand. This is particularly
critical when units have no habitual relationship or have
should first show the English version of the message to
not recently trained together, such as when naval air pro-
the foreign force commander or his senior staff officer to
vides air support to Army maneuver units.
ensure the message correctly reflects the meaning and
emphasis of the original message.
• Specialist liaison officers (such as aviation, fire
Multinational Operations
support, engineer, intelligence, military police, trans-
Mutual confidence is the key to making multinational
portation, and civil affairs officers) may be exchanged
operations successful. Liaison activities require explicit
when foreign or US forces must interact with units,
coordination of doctrine and techniques, greater pa-
equipment, or procedures with which they are
tience and tact during personal interaction, and thorough
unfamiliar.
understanding of the strategic, operational, and tactical
aims supporting the international effort.
NOTE: See also FM 100-8.
When operating as a multinational force, US Army
units must cooperate with military forces and civilian
Interagency Operations
agencies of other nations. Cultural differences and sen-
Liaison teams may also represent their commanders
sitivities require special communications and liaison ar-
when the command is conducting operations in an inter-
rangements to ensure explicit understanding throughout
agency environment. This is true in war and when con-
the alliance or coalition.
ducting stability and support operations. Frequently, the
Significant differences may also occur because of
Army conducts peacetime operations under the leader-
each force’s differing degree of technological sophisti-
ship and control of civilian government agencies. For
cation. Doctrine and procedures may have been estab-
example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
lished
(for example, standardization agreements),
(FEMA) has overall charge of federal government disas-
developed, and practiced to maximize coordination. In
ter relief within the United States and its territories and
other cases, there may be no previous agreements. Also,
possessions.
US and other participating forces must often determine
In other peacetime operations, government agencies
procedures for multinational operations while under the
such as the US Forest Service, the Drug Enforcement
pressure of imminent conflict or even after combat has
Agency (DEA), or the FBI may be the lead agency, de-
begun.
pending on the problem. The US Army may find itself
In multinational operations, factors to consider in-
in a supporting role. However, unlike operations Army
clude the following:
forces normally conduct, interagency operations may
L-5
FM 101-5
lack unity of command. All government agencies may
procedures governing all agencies, departments, and or-
be working toward a common goal but not under a single
ganizations in interagency operations. Liaison elements
authority.
must work toward establishing mutual trust and confi-
dence, continuously coordinating actions to achieve co-
There may also be compelling reasons to coordinate
operation and unity of effort.
with nongovernment organizations and private volun-
tary organizations (PVOs). No overarching interagency
NOTE: See also JP 3-08.
doctrine delineates or dictates the relationships and
LIAISON CHECKLIST
Before Departing the Sending Unit
_____ 1. Do you understand what the commander wants the receiving commander to know?
_____ 2. Did you arrange for a briefing from operations, intelligence, and other staff elements concerning current
and future operations?
_____ 3. Did you verify the receipt of and do you understand the tasks your staff has given you?
_____ 4. Did you obtain the correct maps, traces, overlays?
_____ 5. Did you arrange for transport, communications and cryptographic equipment, codes, and signal instruc-
tions, and for their protection and security?
_____ 6. Did you arrange for replacement of these items, as necessary?
_____ 7. Did you arrange for the departure of the liaison party?
_____ 8. Did you complete route-reconnaissance and time-management plans so that you will arrive at the desig-
nated location on time?
_____ 9. Did you ensure that liaison personnel and interpreters have security clearances and access appropriate for
the mission?
_____ 10. Did you verify that the receiving unit received the liaison team’s security clearances and that the receiving
unit will grant access to the appropriate level of information the mission requires?
_____ 11. Did you verify courier orders?
_____ 12. Do you know how you are to destroy the information you are carrying in an emergency, in transit, and at the
receiving unit?
_____ 13. Do you have signal operating instruction (SOI)? (Do you know the challenge and password?)
_____ 14. Did you inform your headquarters of when you will leave, what route you will take, when you are to arrive
and, when known, the estimated time and route of your return?
_____ 15. Did you pick up all correspondence designated for the receiving headquarters?
_____ 16. Did you conduct a radio check? (Have current and next fill?)
_____ 17. Do you know the impending moves of your headquarters and of the receiving headquarters?
_____ 18. Did you bring automation or computers to support your operation?
_____ 19. Did you pack adequate supplies of Class I and III for use in transit?
During the Liaison Tour
_____ 20. Did you arrive at least two hours before any scheduled briefings?
L-6
FM 101-5
_____ 21. Did you check in with security and complete any required documentation?
_____ 22. Did you present your credentials to the CofS (XO)?
_____ 23. Did you arrange and receive an “office call” with the commander?
_____ 24. Did you meet the coordinating and special staff officers?
_____ 25. Did you notify your own headquarters of your arrival?
_____ 26. Did you deliver all correspondence designated for the receiving headquarters?
_____ 27. Did you visit staff elements, brief them on the situation of your unit, and collect information from them?
_____ 28. Did you annotate on all overlays the security classification, title, map scale, grid intersection points, date-
time group (DTG) information, DTG received, and from whom received?
_____ 29. Did you pick up all correspondence for your headquarters when you left the receiving unit?
_____ 30. Did you inform the receiving headquarters of when you would depart, what route you would take, and
when you expect to arrive at the sending unit?
After Returning to the Sending Unit
_____ 31. Did you deliver all correspondence?
_____ 32. Did you brief the CofS (XO) and the appropriate staff elements?
_____ 33. Did you prepare the necessary reports?
_____ 34. Did you clearly state what you learned from the mission?
_____ 35. Did you clearly state what you did NOT learn from the mission?
EXAMPLE OUTLINE OF
A LIAISON OFFICER’S HANDBOOK
1. Table of contents, with the sending unit’s proponency statement.
2. Purpose statement.
3. Introduction statement.
4. Definitions.
5. Scope statement.
6. Responsibilities and guidelines for conduct.
7. Actions before departing from the sending unit.
8. Actions on arriving at the receiving unit.
9. Actions during liaison operations at the receiving unit.
10. Actions before departing from the receiving unit.
11. Actions on arrival at the sending unit.
12. Sample questions. The following is a list of common questions that the receiving commander may ask a liaison
officer or that the liaison officer should consider to help represent his commander.
a. Does the sending unit have a copy of the receiving unit’s latest OPLAN, OPORD, FRAGO, and so on?
L-7
FM 101-5
b. Do the receiving unit’s plans support the higher headquarters’ plan? This includes logistics as well as the
tactical concept. Are main supply routes and required supply rates known? Can the controlled supply rate’s feasibility
support the receiving unit’s plan?
c. What are the commander’s critical information requirements? At what time, phase, or event do you expect
them to change? Are there any items the CCIR do not contain which the sending unit can help you with?
d. What sending commander decisions are critical to the receiving commander’s execution of his plan? What
are the no later than times for those decisions?
e. What assets does the unit need to accomplish its mission that it does not have now? How would they be
used? How do they support attaining the more senior commander’s intent? Where can the unit get them? Higher head-
quarters? Other services? Allies?
f. How are aviation assets (rotary and fixed wing) being used?
g. Do you know all the ways you can talk to the sending unit? Are there telephones, radios, facsimile ma-
chines, computers, and so on? Where are they located? Which ones are secure?
h. What terrain has been designated as decisive? Key?
i. What weather conditions would have a major impact on the operation?
j. What effect would a chemical environment have on the operation?
k. What effect would large numbers of refugees or EPWs have on the receiving unit’s operations?
l. What is the worse thing that could happen during execution of the current operation (plan)?
m. How would you handle a passage of lines by other units through your own force?
n. What conditions would cause your unit to request OPCON of a coalition or multinational force?
o. If your unit were placed under OPCON of a larger coalition or multinational force or given OPCON of a
smaller such force, what special problems would it present?
p. If going to a coalition or multinational force headquarters, how do their tactical principles and command con-
cepts differ?
q. What host nation support is available to the sending unit?
13. Information requirements.
14. Required reports (from higher and sending units’ SOP).
15. Packing list (administrative supplies and unit SOP, field uniform, equipment).
a. Credentials (including permissive jump orders, if qualified).
b. Forms.
(1) DA Forms 1594 (Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer’s Log).
(2) Other blank forms.
c. References.
d. Computers for information and data exchange.
e. Signal operating instructions extract.
f. Security code encryption device.
g. Communications equipment, including remote frequency modulation (FM) equipment.
L-8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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