Главная Manuals FM 3-11.4 MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL (NBC) PROTECTION (June 2003)
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• Bleeding from body openings or blood in urine, stool, or sputum (spit).
• Shock (symptoms appear in minutes or hours after the toxin attack).
(2)
Unmasking Procedures. Unless prior warning is received from higher HQ to
mask in advance of the arrival of a biological attack, units will likely not be aware that they
have been exposed to a biological agent. However, if a unit has received prior warning of an
advancing cloud, there are procedures that can be implemented. For example, a biological
agent point detector can indicate (through its air-monitoring capability) when an aerosol
cloud has passed the point detector. Once that occurs, units use devices, such as hand-held
assays, to conduct testing to determine if positive test results are received. The report
information is passed to the NBC center (NBCC). The commander, with the advice from
the intelligence officer/noncommissioned officer (NCO), NBC officer/NCO, and the command
surgeon considers this data as well as data from other sources (e.g., weather, time of day,
threat, etc). Based on the multiple sources of data, the commander considers whether to
reduce protective levels.
(3)
Filter Exchange. When assessing filter exchange criteria several factors
must be considered. Exchange criteria for filters is based on service equipment directives or
when the following conditions are applicable:
• Physical damage occurs.
• Filters have become waterlogged or wet.
• High resistance to airflow is observed.
• Directed to exchange filters by higher HQ.
5.
Chemical Protection
This paragraph discusses preattack, during-attack, and postattack aspects of
protection that must be accomplished in the event of a chemical attack. Protection against
chemical agents begins before an attack. Chemical agents can enter the body through the
skin, eyes, ingestion, and respiratory tract. Leaders conduct defensive planning against
possible chemical-agent attack. Units prepare SOPs that specify their chemical defense
techniques and procedures.
a.
Background.
(1)
Chemical agents having military significance are categorized as nerve,
blister, blood, incapacitating, or choking agents. These chemical agents kill, seriously
injure, or incapacitate unprotected personnel. Chemical agents are classified according to
their physical states, physiological actions, and uses. The terms “persistent” and
“nonpersistent” describe the duration of chemical agents remaining in a targeted area.
(2)
Agents may exist as vapors, solids, liquids, or gases (depending on the
temperature); and they may cause casualties in multiple physical states. For example, an
agent may be disseminated as a liquid casualty hazard from a delivery vehicle, yet remain a
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vapor hazard if the agent has high volatility or off-gases from a porous surface during high
temperatures. To a certain extent, the state in which an agent exists determines its use,
fate, and effects.
(3)
Personnel can be exposed to chemical warfare (CW) agents through
breathing (inhalation), the skin, and the eyes. The casualty-producing effects of chemical
agents can occur within seconds, minutes, or hours. For example, nerve agents are quick-
acting and can cause casualty-producing effects within minutes. Alternatively, blister
agents can take hours to cause their casualty-producing effects. Drink and food
contaminated by CW agents are also harmful. Other means of exposure are breaching of
the full-protective ensemble (e.g., from a tear caused by a munitions fragment) and/or
transfer from a contaminated surface during processing through a contamination control
area (CCA).
(4)
Personnel could potentially come into contact with casualty-producing
liquid agents prior to the agents absorbing into a nonporous surface. Alternatively, once a
liquid agent absorbs into a porous surface, such as concrete (e.g., during cool evening
temperatures), the agent may off-gas as a vapor during higher daytime temperatures and
also cause chemical-agent symptoms among exposed personnel. Furthermore, there are
other possible situations wherein casualty-producing effects of chemical agents can be
impacted by temperature and type of surface (for example, during cold weather, chemical
agent droplets are absorbed by an individual’s protective clothing, the agent off-gases
during the person’s entry into a shelter for warming, causing the individual to exhibit
chemical agent signs and symptoms).
(5)
Solid and liquid agents may provide an operational hazard for hours, days,
or months depending on the agent, weather conditions, and other factors.
b.
Preattack Actions.
(1)
Assess chemical threat, potential risk, and likelihood of attack.
(2)
Implement coordinated chemical defense plan.
(3)
Prepare to provide first aid for unit personnel.
(4)
Determine and implement appropriate MOPP levels.
(5)
Minimize skin exposure.
(6)
Continue good hygiene and sanitation methods.
(7)
Deploy and activate detectors.
(8)
Designate and prepare shelters.
(9)
Watch for attack indicators (e.g., a chemical cloud, a distinctive odor, and
release of an agent).
(10) Cover unprotected mission-essential equipment.
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c.
During-Attack Actions.
(1)
Give Attack Warnings. Detection and warning of the attack are critical to
the implementation of protective measures. The warning signal for the attack directs
personnel to take cover and use protective measures.
(2)
Take Cover. Taking cover protects personnel against blast, shrapnel, heat,
liquid, and particulate contamination. After taking cover, personnel don their masks and
other protective gear, as appropriate.
(3)
Use MOPP4. All personnel should assume MOPP4 (full IPE) in the absence
of any other information and remain in MOPP4 until directed to reduce their MOPP level.
The use of the MOPP ensemble could also be supplemented by the use of protective
clothing—such as wet-weather clothing; an air crewman’s cape; or the suit, contamination
avoidance, and liquid protective (SCALP). (See Appendix A for more information on these
items of IPE.)
d.
Postattack Actions.
(1)
Begin post attack recovery. If an adversary uses an air-bursting chemical
munition, mission permitting, personnel will avoid outside activities to the maximum
extent possible after an attack during the chemical droplet fall phase. Additionally, the
chemical droplet fall phase could last up to approximately 60 minutes. The length of time
depends on factors such as meteorological data and the weapon’s height of burst. Outside
activities could result in erroneous initial reconnaissance results and unnecessarily
contaminated personnel and equipment.
(2)
Avoid potentially contaminated surfaces/areas. All personnel should
minimize contact with potentially contaminated surfaces until there are indications that
surface contamination is no longer a hazard.
(3)
Obtain and report observations or evidence of an attack. Personnel provide
reconnaissance and assessment information for all types of damage, hazards, and chemical
agents.
(4)
Survey, control, and mitigate health hazards (treat and evaluate
casualties). The HSS provides treatment for casualties according to established medical
protocols.
(5)
Adjust MOPP. Commanders should adjust MOPP to the lowest possible
level consistent with identified hazards.
(6)
Document exposure. Medical staffs should clearly document exposure in the
medical records of those personnel who have been exposed.
(7)
Sample, monitor, and analyze for residual hazard. Once the situation
permits, the detection efforts determine the extent and duration of the residual hazards.
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(8)
Plan and implement decontamination and contamination containment
actions. These actions are planned and implemented to minimize the operational impacts of
contamination.
(9)
Conduct unmasking procedures (all-clear). Commanders should revert to an
appropriate MOPP level based on the current threat in conjunction with the all-clear signal.
Personnel engaged in passive-defense functions should repair and resupply defense
equipment in preparation for follow-on attacks. All personnel should return their IPE to a
ready status in anticipation of the next attack warning.
(a) Selective Unmasking. Selective unmasking is an operational
precautionary procedure used to support mask removal decisions. The unmasking process
acknowledges detector limitations and requires one or more individuals to unmask for brief
periods while others observe them for agent effects. Do not perform selective unmasking if
agent detectors continue to detect an agent within the area or structure. Also recognize
that the recommended unmasking methodology should meet personnel safety requirements
and that accomplishing unmasking procedures does not guarantee the absence of low-level
exposure.
(b) Unmasking Procedures Using the M256-Series Chemical Detector Kit.
An M256-series chemical detector kit does not detect all agents. Therefore, consider also
using unmasking procedures listed below in subparagraph (c), even if the detector is
available. These procedures take approximately 15 minutes. After all tests with the kit,
including a check for liquid contamination, have been performed and the results are
negative, the senior person should select one or two individuals to start the unmasking
procedures. If possible, move to a shady place. Bright, direct sunlight can cause pupils in
the eyes to constrict, giving false signs of nerve agent exposure. The selected individuals
unmask for 5 minutes and then reseal and clear their masks. Observe them for 10 minutes.
If no symptoms appear, the commander/leader considers issuing the all-clear signal for
unmasking. Continue to watch the personnel for possible delayed symptoms. Always have
first aid treatment immediately available in case it is needed.
(c)
Unmasking Procedures Without the M256-Series Chemical Detector
Kits. If an M256-series kit is not available, the unmasking procedures take at least 35
minutes. Find a shady area. Use M8/M9 paper to check the area for possible liquid
contamination. When a reasonable amount of time has passed after the attack, the senior
person should select one or two individuals. They take a deep breath, hold it, and break the
seal for 15 seconds, keeping their eyes wide open. They then clear and reseal their masks
and are observed for 10 minutes. If no symptoms appear, the selected individuals break the
seal of their mask, take two or three breaths (keeping their eyes wide open), and clear and
reseal their masks. Observe them for 10 minutes. If no symptoms appear, the selected
individuals unmask for 5 minutes and then remask. If no symptoms appear in 10 minutes
after remasking, the commander considers issuing a directive for an all-clear. This process
takes a minimum of 35 minutes. Leaders continue to observe the selected personnel in case
delayed symptoms develop.
(d) Personnel Displaying Symptoms. In both cases, if personnel display
symptoms of agent poisoning, ensure that first aid procedures are available and provided. If
an agent is still present, the senior person present must select one of the following options:
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• If possible, move to a new area and retest.
• If the mission dictates that movement cannot be conducted,
conduct a retest after 1 hour.
Note: Leaders remain aware that selected chemical agents (e.g., blister agents) may not
result in the onset of symptoms for several hours.
(e) Assessing Detector Information. Detector capabilities necessitate that
leaders analyze the situation to determine if it is safe to unmask after the detection
instruments or devices indicate negative results. This need for analysis exists because of
the potential presence of low-level vapors that, through their cumulative effect on the body,
may cause eye damage or more severe effects within minutes or hours. Analysis is required
even if the above-mentioned unmasking procedures are used. NBC personnel should utilize
service directives and materials to assist in this process. The key is the use of risk
assessment to balance force survivability and the mission and to acknowledge that different
agents dissipate at various rates from different surfaces. For example, the hazard time
lines associated with contaminated equipment may exceed those associated with soil and/or
concrete surfaces.
(10) Chemical Filter Exchange. Filter exchange is another action that is based
on design, physical condition, climatic conditions, and the possible threat agent that could
be employed. Information in the following paragraphs addresses peacetime, transition-to-
war, and wartime exchange criteria.
Note: The information in this section is not meant to supersede other guidance contained in
service-specific TTP or technical publications.
(a) Peacetime Filter Exchange. When assessing filter exchange criteria,
several factors must be considered. Commanders and NBC personnel must monitor
replacement schedules for pieces of NBC equipment having filters. Peacetime exchange
criteria for all filters must occur when the following conditions are applicable:
• Physical damage occurs.
• Filters have become waterlogged/wet.
• High resistance to airflow is observed.
• Directed to exchange filters by higher HQ.
• Filters are listed as unserviceable in applicable supply bulletins
(SBs), technical orders (TOs), etc. Selected service directives, may indicate specific filter lot
numbers are unserviceable; however, if those filters are not clogged or damaged, they
should still be considered serviceable for peacetime applications.
(b) Transition to War Filter Exchange. Commanders will determine when
their units should remove their training filters and replace them with filters from unit
contingency stocks. This guidance should be reflected in an SOP or an order. Factors for
filter exchange consideration are unit location, unit readiness/deployability alert status,
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last filter exchange, threat, time availability, and stocks available. For example, a forward
deployed unit commander, based on an enemy chemical capability in the AO, directs (by
SOP) that his unit install its contingency filter set. Alternatively, a CONUS-based unit
commander determines that the basis for installing contingency filters would occur upon an
increase in unit alert status for deployment to an area with an NBC threat. Before
initiating filter exchange, leaders consider the implications for their units. Some
considerations are—
• Mission. What is the unit mission?
• Enemy. What is the current NBC threat assessment? Is the unit
likely to be attacked on arrival in the operational area?
• Terrain and weather. Where should filters be exchanged—at the
home station, en route, or in the operational area?
• Time available. When should filters be exchanged? When will
there be adequate time to exchange filters?
• Troops and support available. Are the right people available to
conduct the exchange?
(c)
Wartime Filter Exchange. The decision to change filters is driven by
two considerations: the amount of chemical agent the filter has been exposed to and the
time the filter has been exposed to the atmosphere. These separate considerations are
based on the two mechanisms by which the filter provides protection from chemical agents.
For all agents, the filter uses mechanical filtration and absorption as the protection
mechanism. For blood agent cyanogen chloride (CK), the filter uses a chemical reaction. The
chemical reaction mechanism is degraded by prolonged exposure to CK. The absorption
capacity is degraded by exposure over time to air, particularly hot, humid air. Based on
these factors, the following filter change criteria apply:
Note: In an AO with no chemical attacks confirmed and no CK threat, filters should be
changed annually. In an AO with no chemical attacks confirmed but where a CK threat
exists, the filters should be changed according to guidance provided in Table II-5.
Note: Information in this table is applicable to USA units; other services follow directives as
prescribed in applicable TOs and TMs.
• Physical damage occurs.
• Filters have become waterlogged/wet.
• High resistance to airflow observed.
• When directed by higher authority.
• For units that have received chemical attacks, change all filters
every 30 days.
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Table II-5. Wartime Climatic Filter Exchange Intervals,
Blood Agent Threat Is High (Given In Weeks)
Climate Category
Filter
Cold
Warm
Hot
Hot
System
Humid
Moderate
Dry
Humid
C-2/M13A2
52
52
39
10
M40/M42/M43/MC-2AP-series protective
mask.
M10A1
52
52
52
13
M24/M25 protective mask.
M18 Gas
52
39
26
4
Filter composition of M13 tank GPFU.
M12A1 Gas
52
39
26
4
Fixed site filter used in structures and
buildings.
M48
52
52
39
10
M1A1 tank overpressure system.
Gas/Particulate
MCPE
52
39
26
4
MCPE.
Gas/Particulate
M10 Gas
52
39
26
4
Fixed-site shelter.
C-22 R1 Gas
52
52
52
13
GPFU M46 fixed-site filter.
Climatic Definitions
Category
Mean Temp (F)
Mean Relative Humidity (%)
Cold Humid
Less than 15 degrees
Less than 90 percent
Warm Moderate
Less than 80 degrees
Less than 70 percent
Hot Dry
Less than 98 degrees
Less than 27 percent
Hot Humid
Less than 96 degrees
Less than 76 percent
Note: The climactic intervals listed are applicable to USA units; other services follow directives as prescribed
in applicable technical publications.
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6.
Collective Protection Operations
COLPRO replaces neither MOPP gear nor the MOPP TTP. For example, the
ventilated-facepiece system enhances MOPP gear protection. Overpressure systems create
an overpressure environment. This changes the impact of the NBC threat and allows the
commander to order lower MOPP levels inside these facilities or systems. Commanders and
personnel should be familiar with several preattack, during-attack, and postattack actions
in the event of an NBC attack to make the use of available COLPRO systems more efficient
and effective.
a.
Preattack. Before an NBC attack occurs, several actions should make the use of
COLPRO easier.
(1)
Commanders should—
• Determine the appropriate MOPP levels inside the facilities/systems.
• Accomplish COLPRO planning.
• Ensure that personnel are accounted for and briefed on the threat
situation.
(2)
Individuals should—
• Assume the appropriate MOPP level.
• Check the protection system for proper operation.
• Know the entry and exit procedures.
• Accomplish the individual protective actions.
(3)
The shelter attendants should—
• Inspect and maintain the shelter filter system.
• Inspect and maintain the communication system.
• Know the entry and exit procedures.
b.
During-Attack.
(1)
Actions that should be taken include suspending or minimizing entry into
the shelter.
(2)
The shelter attendants should—
• Don masks and alert shelter occupants.
• Aid in securing air lock doors.
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• Prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the shelter.
• Conduct periodic tests for contamination. If entry from a
contaminated environment is mission-essential, internal monitoring becomes critical and
MOPP4 would be required if suitable CCA (personnel decontamination) activities cannot be
conducted.
• Ensure adherence to prescribed entry and exit procedures.
• Monitor the shelter interior periodically using detector/monitoring
equipment.
• Suspend “no mask” operations if a hazardous level of agent is detected
inside. Personnel should assume the appropriate MOPP level and consider whether to
continue to shelter in place or evacuate the shelter.
• Proceed with unmasking risk assessment when detector/monitoring
equipment no longer indicates the presence of agents.
• Know that further actions during an attack will depend on the type of
COLPRO.
c.
Postattack Actions.
(1)
Vapor and liquid contamination hazard may remain for some time after an
attack. Personnel also take the following additional actions:
• Ensure that contaminated items are not stowed in CPE.
• Acquire decontamination support if required.
• Resupply expendables, such as IPE, mask and shelter filters, and
individual decontamination kits.
• Continue entry and exit procedures until 1 hour after detectors
indicate the absence of agent vapors outside the shelter.
• Establish personnel decontamination sites.
• Resume preattack actions, but continue periodic monitoring of shelter
interior with detector/monitoring equipment.
(2)
After an attack, the shelter attendants will—
• Pass the all-clear signal to the shelter occupants when safe to do so.
• Service the filter system, if needed.
• Assist during entry and exit procedures.
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• Continue attendant duties.
7.
Toxic Industrial Material Protection
US forces frequently operate in environments in which there are TIM, particularly
toxic industrial chemical (TIC) and toxic industrial biological (TIB) material, and/or toxic
industrial radiological (TIR) material. A number of these chemicals could interfere
significantly across the range of military operations. Release of TIC is most dangerous at
night because typical nighttime weather conditions produce high concentrations that
remain close to the ground for extended distances. TIM can have other significant hazards.
TIC are often corrosive and can damage eyes, skin, respiratory tract, and equipment. Many
TIM are flammable, explosive, or react violently with air or water. TIM can have both
short- and long-term health effects, ranging from short-term transient effects to long-term
disability to rapid death. Military protection, detection, and medical countermeasures are
not specifically designed for the hazards from TIM. Often there are no specific antidotes for
TIM. See Appendix E for information on the assessment of protective mask filter
performance against selected TIC.
Self-protection is the key to successful response efforts. When personnel ensure
their self-protection, they can save lives, minimize the spread of contamination, and protect
property. Subsequently, units would likely isolate the area and deny entry except to
authorized and protected personnel. Personnel must remember that a TIM incident could
be a crime scene. As a potential crime scene, it is very important to preserve the evidence to
aid prosecuting the individual or individuals responsible for the act.
a.
Preattack Actions.
(1)
General Planning. Before any operation, the response element should
develop an understanding of the potential hazards from TIM in the area of concern.
Further, information collection requirements that can support vulnerability analysis and
assessment during the planning process (deliberate or crisis action) include some of the
following key factors:
• Identifying all possible industrial plants, storage sites, and shipment
depots and pipelines.
• Identifying TIM routinely produced, used, or processed in the area.
• Assessing the effects of the TIM release as a result of collateral
damage or an accident.
• Assessing whether deliberate TIM release is realistic in this particular
situation.
• Identifying local hazard management procedures and civilian agencies
responsible for handling incidents.
• Identifying local hazard identification labeling and placarding
systems.
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• Assessing the need for special detectors and modifications of detectors.
• Assessing the need for specialized protection equipment, such as self-
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or special, impermeable chemical suits.
(2)
TIM Evacuation Planning. When time and mission allow, evacuation is the
best protective response to a TIM hazard. Plan for in-place protection when evacuation
may cause greater risk than remaining in place. In-place protection may not be an option if
the TIM vapors are flammable, the hazard is persistent, or buildings cannot be closed
tightly.
(3)
Risk Assessment. Selected measures that support risk assessment include
securing key information, assessing risk, and conducting NBC defense actions.
(a) Each situation has special problems and considerations. During
planning, attempt to secure pertinent information involving production, storage facilities,
distribution, and transportation of TIM. As a minimum, obtain the type, quantity, and
specific risk from fire, explosion, toxicity, corrosive effects, and/or persistency of gas.
Sources for this information include unit intelligence personnel; appropriate scientific,
civilian industrial and CW treaty experts; safety reports; and materiel safety data sheets
(MSDSs) on the facility; international code markings on storage tanks; and local civilian
authorities who have emergency response procedures and resources.
(b) A thorough vulnerability analysis provides an initial estimate of the
threat and is the first step toward mitigating the operational effects of damage or
destruction of a TIM facility. Determining the TIM hazard/threat and possible
countermeasures in an AO is a primary responsibility of the medical and supporting
PVNTMED staff. They are supported by the NBC and civil affairs (CA) staffs.
(c)
Military protection and decontamination equipment was not designed
for handling TIC. For proper handling, protection, and hazard management information,
units seek guidance from their C2 element. Commanders also identify the local civilian
authorities that may have additional emergency response procedures and resources that
can be used.
(d) Some plants, facilities, storage containers, or transport containers
may be identified by markers. These could take the form of international markers that are
diamond-shaped and contain information that can be used to identify the exact TIM.
(e) For firefighting or entering any enclosed space where there has been a
TIM or spill cleanup a SCBA must be used. The individual protective mask (NBC mask)
does not supply sufficient air or protection within the immediate hazard zone. TIM, such as
ammonia, may be present and the lack of oxygen will require the use of SCBA. The military
respirator should be used only for emergency protection against the immediate effects of a
TIM release and while evacuating the immediate hazard zone. Further, military CP suits
are not specifically designed for providing protection against TIC.
(f)
The most important action in case of massive TIC release is
immediate evacuation. The greatest risk from a large-scale TIC release occurs when
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personnel are unable to escape the immediate area and are overcome. For detailed
information on these hazards, see the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards; and/or Guide to Chemical Hazards; US
Department of Transportation, Emergency Response Guidebook; and FM 8-500, Hazardous
Materials Injuries: A Handbook for Prehospital Care.
(g) When planning for operations in areas where TIM may be present, the
combatant and subordinate commanders include consideration of these potential hazards as
part of the IPB process. These hazards could occur from massive deliberate releases,
accidental release from industrial sites, or leaks from storage and transport containers.
Particular emphasis should be placed on those TIM that produces acute effects when
inhaled.
b.
During-Attack Actions.
(1)
TIC or TIB.
•
Alert higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
• Start monitoring with available detection devices, and ensure that
results are reported.
• Assume MOPP4, and move to a safe distance as quickly as possible.
• Establish a security zone around the area.
• Evacuate casualties. Casualties should be considered as contaminated
and should be contained in one central location. Initiate emergency decontamination of
personnel.
• Identify witnesses for questioning.
• Establish a downwind hazard zone.
(2)
TIR.
• Take protective action.
• Assess casualties and damage.
• Identify potential locations of TIR materials.
• Begin continuous monitoring and report the arrival of fallout.
• Protect personnel and equipment from the effects of fallout and fires
that may be started.
• Report increase, decrease, or peak dose rates. Report the completion of
fallout.
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• Receive an NBC 2 nuclear report from higher HQ. Prepare a
simplified fallout prediction and inform the commander.
c.
Postattack Actions.
• Control the situation.
• Protect yourself.
• Prevent the situation from claiming more casualties.
• Rescue, protect, and treat victims.
• Decontaminate exposed victims, and minimize the spread of contamination.
• Conduct early hazard identification.
• Preserve evidence per the SOP.
• Follow emergency response SOPs and operation plans (OPLANs).
• Coordinate with local, state, federal, and HN agencies as required.
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Chapter III
OPERATIONS IN UNIQUE ENVIRONMENTS
1.
Background
Weather and terrain and how they affect the need for NBC protection must receive
special consideration. Certain weather conditions will greatly influence the use of NBC
weapons. Likewise, different types of terrain will alter the effects of NBC weapons. Also,
the type of operation can directly bear on the need for NBC protection. This chapter
addresses cold weather, desert, jungle, mountain, urban, and littoral operations.
2.
Cold Weather
Cold weather environments create unique and diverse conditions that must be
overcome to accomplish an assigned mission in an NBC environment.
a.
Nuclear Defense Considerations.
(1)
Weapons Effects. The winter environment influences the effects of a
nuclear detonation regarding blast, thermal, and radiation effects.
(a) Blast Effects. At subzero temperatures, the radius of damage to
material targets can increase as much as 20 percent. Tundra, irregular terrain features,
and broken ice caps will break up the pressure wave and, thereby, reduce the effects of this
powerful wave. Blast waves can drastically interfere with movement by breaking up ice
covers and causing thaws, triggering possible avalanches in mountainous areas. Avoid
avalanche-prone areas after the blast. Avalanches can be triggered up to 30 kilometers
away, and may cause massive flooding in valleys due to the instability caused by the blast
effects.
(b) Thermal Effects. Ice and snow have a high reflectivity. This may
increase the minimum safe distance (MSD) as much as 50 percent for unwarned personnel.
This reflectivity may increase the number of personnel whose vision is affected by the
brilliant flash or light dazzle, especially at night. Cold temperatures reduce thermal effects
on materials by reducing the possible heat signature. Snow, ice, and even frost coverings on
combustible materials greatly reduce the tendency of materials to catch fire. However, this
thermal effect will dry out exposed tundra areas and grass fires may result. Avoid
avalanche-prone areas after the blast. Avalanches can be triggered up to 30 kilometers
away due to the rapid warming and instability caused by the thermal effects.
(c)
Radiation Effects. The number of passable roadways is limited by
cold-weather conditions, and radiological contamination on roadways may further restrict
resupply and mobility. Seasonal, high winds in the arctic may present problems when
predicting radiological contamination and crossing contaminated areas.
III-1
(2)
Individual Protective Measures.
(a) At low temperatures, land forces operating in a field environment are
particularly vulnerable to the effects produced by a nuclear detonation because of the
difficulty in preparing fighting positions and underground fortifications for protection.
Shelters and fortifications constructed from snow and ice provide some protection and,
wherever possible, should be constructed to take maximum advantage of the additional
protection provided by natural terrain features.
(b) Snow and ice, although not as effective as earth in reducing radiation
hazards, are readily available and can be used to provide shielding against radiation
effects. Loose snow falling on a contaminated area will have a half-thickness of about 60
centimeters (24 inches), and 30 centimeters (12 inches) of hard-packed snow will reduce the
original value by half.
Note: Half-thickness is the thickness of material required to reduce the original radiation
level (reading) to half its value.
(c)
Cold weather clothing (white outer shell) provides an advantage of low
absorption properties, thereby reducing the thermal effects.
(3)
Monitor and Survey Operations.
(a) High winds will extend contamination zones, creating a problem for
monitor and survey operations. Aerial survey is a practical method in extreme cold weather
areas, depending on the operating altitude and environmental conditions.
(b) Hot spots or areas of concentrated accumulation of radiological
contamination may occur in areas of heavy snow and snowdrifts. These areas need special
attention during survey operations.
(c)
Radiac instruments (used to detect, survey, and monitor radiological
hazards) should be kept warm until used to ensure maximum efficiency. (Refer to the
appropriate technical publication for operating radiac systems in cold weather
environments.)
(4)
Decontamination Operations. Due to the freezing point of water (32 degrees
Fahrenheit [F]), decontaminate radioactive fallout on vehicles by brushing with brooms or
tree branches. Since radioactive effects (fallout) are removed from the items and not
neutralized, transfer of contamination occurs.
b.
Biological Defense Considerations.
(1)
Field Behavior of Agents. BW in the arctic is a possibility, and biological
agents are effective in cold weather environments (with few exceptions). Most vectors
(infected insects) will not survive the extreme environmental conditions, and it is more
difficult to aerosolize live biological agents in freezing temperatures. Toxins, on the other
hand, are less susceptible to the cold. At these temperatures spore-forming bacteria and
certain viruses survive and remain dormant. Upon warming, they become an active hazard
to personnel. Temperature inversions that exist over snowfields tend to prolong the
III-2
integrity of an aerosolized biological cloud. Thus, it disperses more slowly and, therefore,
remains a threat for a longer period.
(2)
Individual Protective Measures. Personnel are more susceptible to
biological agents in arctic environments, mainly due to the rapid rate that diseases can
spread in the crowded warming areas and the difficulty in maintaining an adequate intake
of food and water (calorie intake increases due to extreme physical demands), getting
adequate rest, and practicing good hygiene. Enemy forces will be more likely to target food
and water sources due to the difficulty in resupply and the reliance on these assets in cold
weather.
c.
Chemical Defense Considerations.
(1)
Chemical Agents. In arctic conditions, chemical agents act differently
because of their different physical properties but they are primarily more persistent.
(a) Blister Agents. Some forms of blister agents are ineffective as casualty
producers because the ambient temperature could be well below their normal freezing
points. This is not true for all blister agents, some of which can be effective as harassing or
casualty-producing agents.
(b) Nerve Agents. Low levels of contamination may remain at low
temperatures for hours or days. In severely cold conditions, nerve agents will remain liquid
and can be absorbed through normal, cold-weather clothing. However, it should be noted
that agent data indicates that liquid absorption into soil and concrete was not significantly
affected by temperature and that snow absorbed agents within minutes, to the point that
less than 2 percent of the agent remained as a pickup/transfer hazard.
(c)
Blood and Choking Agents. Blood and choking agents remain
extremely hazardous and nonpersistent throughout the low-temperature ranges.
(2)
Individual Protective Measures. With the addition of chemical protective
clothing, the cold-weather clothing ensemble increases the risk of heat casualties and
degrades unit performance. Leaders will need to capitalize on MOPP analysis, risk
assessment, and METT-T in order to determine the recommended protection requirements.
Grass is more effective as a transfer hazard than snow. As agents transition from a solid to
a vapor state in heated shelters, tents, or vehicles, a hazard can be created. Spring melt-off
may also spread contamination beyond its original boundaries.
(a) Protective masks. Always refer to the appropriate technical
publications for the IPE to obtain the proper procedures for wearing the IPE during
operations in cold-weather environments. When donning the protective mask in arctic
conditions, personnel should stop breathing, remove the mask from under the parka,
remove the gloves or mittens (lower the parka hood, and don and clear the mask according
to the direction of the leader). The following additional guidance provides quick tips for
leaders to use as a guide when assisting their personnel before, during, and after operations
in cold-weather environments during NBC events:
III-3
• Use neutral or gray eyelens to prevent snow blindness and the
fogging of field protective eyelenses.
•
Use tape on outserts so that only slits are left, if neutral or gray
outserts are not available.
•
Fill canteens to three-fourths full to prevent the canteen from
bursting should the water freeze.
•
Blow remaining water out of the drinking tube to prevent ice from
forming.
•
Exhale steadily and slowly to try to prevent frosting of the
eyelenses.
•
Wear the mask carrier in a position that permits maximum
mobility (see approved service and technical bulletins).
• Use a small towel or cloth to wipe the inside of the mask after
removal to prevent ice formation.
(b) Chemical Protective (CP) Clothing. The current CP clothing issued to
the armed forces will not be adversely affected by cold temperatures. Based on METT-T and
risk assessment, leaders will need to establish whether protective clothing is worn as an
outer layer (over extreme cold-weather clothing system [ECWCS]) or as an undergarment
(under ECWCS). The ECWCS will provide only marginal protection in a chemical
environment. Further, CP clothing is neither waterproof nor water-resistant, which will
affect the leader’s assessment during his METT-T evaluation. This consideration will also
impact on how the ensemble is worn (e.g., under the ECWCS with the white parka worn as
an exterior layer). The ECWCS includes a parka, trousers, mittens with inserts, gloves with
inserts, vapor barrier (VB) boots, baliklavas (a hood), a watch cap, and gaiters. The
wearing of the ECWCS also impacts the work/rest cycles assigned by the unit.
(c)
Chemical Protective Overboots. The CP overboots do not fit over the
cold-weather VB boots. The CP overboots can fit over the ski march boots, but they
interfere with the ski bindings. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 120 ski
binding can cut through an overboot at the toe plate, contaminating the leather boot inside.
During cold weather operations, the VB boots provide adequate protection when worn in
conjunction with CP clothing. The VB boots are double-layered, with an air pocket between
layers and natural rubber.
(d) Chemical Protective Gloves. Normal procedures when donning the CP
gloves, are to first put on the cotton liners and then the rubber gloves. During winter
operations in a chemical environment, use the wool glove liners (part of the black leather
glove set) under the butyl rubber gloves to absorb and wipe away perspiration from hand
surfaces. A proper glove fit is required to preclude restricting blood circulation and cold
weather injury. In extreme cold environments, the arctic mittens should be worn over the
rubber gloves to provide warmth. Decontamination of cold-weather mittens (if
contaminated) may be impractical and, hence, considered as a combat loss.
III-4
(e) Nerve Agent Antidote Kit (NAAK). Care must be taken when using
the NAAK to ensure that it penetrates through winter clothing to the muscle. NAAKs are
subject to freezing at about the same temperature as water. Therefore, when the
temperature is below freezing, the NAAK should be protected against freezing.
Autoinjectors are normally carried in the protective mask carrier. When the temperature is
below freezing, the injectors should be carried in an inside pocket close to the body. Should
the NAAK become frozen, it can be thawed out and used. Personnel should also ensure that
there is no transfer of contamination when the NAAK is placed into or withdrawn from an
inside pocket.
(f)
Antidote Treatment, Nerve Agent Autoinjector (ATNAA) System.
Arctic weather affects the ATNAA. When the temperature dips below freezing, the ATNAA
should be protected by removing it from the protective mask carrier and placing it in an
inside pocket close to the body. Keep it as close to body temperature as possible. This
precludes the danger of severe muscle spasms and/or shock from injecting an extremely cold
liquid into a muscle. If the ATNAA is allowed to freeze, it cannot be used until it is thawed.
In addition, protect the ATNAA from freezing during transit, storage, and resupply
operations. Care must be taken when using the ATNAA to ensure that it penetrates
through winter clothing to the muscle.
(3)
Monitor and Survey Operations. Toxic chemicals react differently at
extremely low temperatures. Even during cold temperatures, chemical-agent vapors can
still be present, and the concentration would be below the detector threshold level. Refer to
the appropriate technical publication for equipment operation during cold weather, and
monitor and survey operations.
(a) M256Al Chemical-Agent Detector Kit. Arctic weather affects the kit.
When temperature is -15 degrees F (-21 degrees Celsius [C]) or below, the kit can give
inaccurate indications. Solutions in the capsules freeze; and the solutions will not work,
even if they are reheated. In addition, it is difficult (or sometimes impossible) for the heat
tabs to heat the enzyme window to a reaction temperature. Take care to keep the kit at a
temperature above freezing. However, do not place the kit directly on a source of heat, such
as a vehicle heater. If possible, warm it with body heat by placing it inside the parka. A
system of identifying a sample of suspected agent is to collect the suspected agent and place
it on M8 or M9 paper. Once collected, the M8 or M9 paper is warmed and covered in a box
or can with the M256A1 kit. This will heat both the suspected agent and the kit sufficiently
to enable identification with the kit. Personnel can place samples into empty ammunition
cans and apply external heat to cause agent off-gassing. The external heat source may be a
small fire or a heat tab.
(b) Chemical-Agent Monitor (CAM) and Improved CAM (ICAM). At lower
temperatures, chemical agents such as blister agents, become more persistent or even
freeze, and reduce the amount of vapor present for the CAM or ICAM to detect. Cold
weather also shortens battery life. Refer to the appropriate technical publication for
operating the ICAM/CAM in cold-weather environments.
(c)
M8 and M9 Detector Paper. M8 and M9 papers are not specifically
limited in the cold, but they can detect only liquid agents. If the specific substance is
thickened or frozen, a sample can be collected with a stick or a scraper and wiped onto a
III-5
sheet of M8 or M9 paper. Place the sample on a heated surface, such as the hood of an
operating vehicle, the top of a power generator, or a burning heat tab under a canteen cup,
to stimulate thawing of the suspected agent so that identification is expedited. Because of
the possibility of off-gassing, this procedure must not be performed inside a heated vehicle
or tent.
(4)
Decontamination Operations. Refer to the appropriate technical and
service publications for decontamination considerations and guidance regarding cold-
weather environments.
(a) Equipment Decontamination. The use of water or 5 percent
hypochlorite solution for decontamination will be limited during cold-weather operations
due in part to the freezing point of water (32 degrees F). Alternatively, a dry mix of super
tropical bleach (STB) or high-test hypochlorite (HTH) (two parts STB/HTH to three parts
earth or snow) can be used. This method may require several applications at low
temperatures. Shovel the dry mix onto the contaminated surfaces or place it in sandbags
and dust it onto surfaces. After decontaminating, remove any residual elements of the dry
mix by brushing, scraping, or removing it with uncontaminated earth or snow. These
decontaminants are corrosive to metals and personnel must wear MOPP gear. Additionally,
sorbent decontamination is also limited during cold weather. Sorbent decontamination
systems are based on liquid absorption, and frozen agents cannot be absorbed.
(b) Personnel Decontamination. Time factors regarding MOPP exchange
or detailed troop decontamination (DTD) should be expanded with regard to cold-weather
conditions and the addition of the ECWCS. For example, the time required to doff the
ECWCS, the white parka, and the trousers will add more time to the MOPP exchange
process. Additionally, more time will be needed if the VB boots require decontamination.
(5)
COLPRO. For COLPRO, chemical hazards present additional challenges.
Cold-weather operations use heated shelters, and shelters may or may not have COLPRO.
However, fluctuations in pressure may occur when the system is exposed to high winds. In
cold environments, indirect chemical-vapor absorption presents the greatest problem
during shelter entry and exit operations. For this reason, it is important to have a detection
capability in the shelter itself. If an agent is detected, personnel in the shelter will
immediately mask. The personnel inside the shelter will be monitored to identify who
brought in the contamination. Once identification has been made, the personnel exit and
the shelter is then immediately purged. If follow-on detection proves negative, personnel
may resume entry and exit procedures. Additionally, CP systems used as an MTF cannot
be easily evacuated. Therefore, contaminated personnel must not be allowed entry.
III-6
3.
Desert
Desert operations present many varying problems. Desert daytime temperatures can
vary from 90 to 125 degrees F (32 to 52 degrees C). An unstable temperature gradient
results, and this is not particularly favorable to NBC attacks. However, with nightfall, the
desert cools rapidly, and a stable temperature gradient results. A possibility of night or
early morning attacks must be considered in all planning of desert operations. Additionally,
planners understand that hot temperatures can adversely impact NBC defense
equipment/supplies during transit or storage. For information on specific items, check the
appropriate TOs and TMs.
a.
Nuclear. Nuclear defense planning is generally much the same in a desert as in
other areas, with exceptions. The lack of vegetation and permanent fixtures, such as forests
and buildings, make it necessary to consider construction of fortifications. Construction
may be difficult because of sand inconsistencies; but sand, in combination with sandbags,
will give additional protection from radiation exposure. Blowing winds and sands can also
produce widespread areas of radiological contamination.
b.
Biological. Most aerosolized, live biological agents, except for a few, are
ineffective weapons in the high temperatures of desert areas. An exception is spore-forming
biological agents. This is a result of low humidity and the ultraviolet radiation of direct
sunlight. Personnel crossing or occupying desert terrain face little danger from long-term,
live biological contamination except for spore-forming agents; however, because of favorable
night conditions, a covert aerosolized attack could occur. Toxins are resistant to this harsh
environment and could be employed in the same way as chemical agents.
c.
Chemical.
(1)
Chemical agents can be used in point or on-target attacks. This type of
attack can be used at high temperatures because of rapid agent evaporation. For example,
with a neutral temperature gradient, 90 degrees F (32 degrees C) temperature, and light
wind, sarin (GB) evaporates rapidly.
(2)
Desert soil may be very porous. For example, an attack with an
unthickened liquid agent may occur in support of a predawn attack. Soil soaks up the
agent. When the sun rises, it begins to heat the surface. The agent evaporates and can
create a vapor hazard.
(3)
A nonpersistent agent attack is unlikely during daylight hours. Weather
conditions may rapidly dissipate any agent. Night brings about a reversal of weather
conditions and creates ideal conditions for an attack. At night, agents linger and settle into
low areas, such as fighting positions.
(4)
In planning for defense, plan any strenuous activity for the nighttime
hours. This will reduce the heat stress caused by wearing MOPP gear. Take care to ensure
that sleeping personnel are masked (if appropriate). Also, see that they are checked
periodically to ensure that mask seals are not broken. An attack is more likely to occur at
III-7
night than during the day. Use the buddy system or have the guards check personnel
during their rounds. The unit SOP must address this subject.
4.
Jungle
Tropical climates require the highest degree of individual discipline and conditioning
to maintain effective NBC defense readiness. Dominating climatic features of jungle areas
are, constant high temperatures, heavy rainfall, and very high humidity. In thick jungle,
there is usually little or no wind, and the canopy blocks much of the sunlight from the
ground. Commanders must expect and plan for a rapid decrease in unit efficiency. They
must also expect heat casualties. In addition, they must ensure that special precautions are
taken to maintain unit NBC defensive equipment in usable condition. The rapid mildew,
dry rot, and rust inherent in jungle areas make this requirement necessary.
a.
Nuclear. Dense vegetation has little influence on the initial effects of nuclear
detonations, except that the heavy canopy provides some protection against thermal
radiation. The blast wave creates extensive tree blowdown and missile effects. Some falling
particles are retained by the jungle canopy, and reduced radiation hazards may result.
Subsequent rains, however, will wash these particles to the ground. Particles will
concentrate in water collection areas and produce radiation hot spots.
b.
Biological. Jungles provide excellent conditions for threat use of live biological
agents. Warm temperatures, high humidity, and protection from sunlight all aid the
survivability of disease-causing microorganisms. Low wind speeds and jungle growth limit
downwind hazards. Strict adherence to field sanitation procedures (especially vector and
rodent control), the use of skin and clothing repellents, and the use of permethrin-treated
bed nets are essential in jungles. These procedures will help control the naturally occurring
diseases that abound. Personnel should mask and roll down sleeves to cover exposed skin
and prevent possible contact with live biological agents.
c.
Chemical. Chemical agents used in jungle areas can cause extreme problems for
friendly forces. Persistent agents delivered by artillery shells and aircraft bombs may
penetrate the canopy before dissemination. These agents can remain effective on jungle
floors for extremely long periods. High temperatures can increase vapor hazards from liquid
agents. Nonpersistent agent vapors hang suspended in the air for extended periods because
of low wind speeds. However, these wind speeds minimize downwind vapor hazards.
Chemical agents employed in jungle areas make MOPP gear necessary for ground
operations. However, high temperatures and humidity combined with the heat-loading
characteristics of MOPP gear increases performance degradation.
5.
Mountains
Terrain and weather in mountainous areas dictate a requirement for a high degree of
NBC defense preparedness. Rugged terrain limits the employment of large forces. Adjacent
units may not be able to provide mutual support. Also, there may be reduced logistical
support and difficulty in achieving rapid maneuver. In these circumstances, small US units
can impede, harass, or canalize numerically superior threat forces. The intention is to
dissipate threat strength and compel threat forces to fight a decisive battle under
III-8
unfavorable circumstances. Mountain warfare requires friendly units to be almost
completely self-sufficient in NBC protection.
a.
Nuclear. Nuclear targeting in mountainous areas is easier than in flat terrain.
The reasons are the lack of roads and trails and the slow speed at which personnel must
move. Preparing fighting positions and building other protective shelters are difficult in
rocky or frozen ground. Improvised shelters built of snow, ice, or rocks may be the only
possible protection. Because of rapidly changing wind patterns, radiological contamination
deposit may be very erratic. Hot spots may occur far from the point of detonation, and low
intensity areas may occur very near it. Limited mobility makes radiological surveys on the
ground difficult, and the difficulty of maintaining a constant flight altitude makes air
surveys highly inaccurate. Natural shelters provide some protection from nuclear effects
and radiological contamination. These natural shelters include caves, ravines, and cliffs.
Clear mountain air extends the range of casualty-producing thermal effects. Added clothing
required by cool mountain temperatures, however, reduces casualties from these effects.
Units operating under nuclear warfare conditions should also carefully select positions
where they will not be hit or trapped by avalanches or rock/mud slides.
b.
Biological. Defense against biological agents does not differ in principle in
mountains from that in flat terrain.
c.
Chemical. Aerial delivery could be a likely means of chemical munitions
employment in mountain warfare. Personnel should be constantly alert for aerial strikes,
and they should take protective actions immediately. Defense against chemical attacks in
mountains is similar to that in flat terrain; however, the compartmentalization and
micrometeorological effects in mountainous terrain will affect the clouds’ downwind travel.
For example, the wind could be blowing in different directions in adjacent valleys.
Consequently, a chemical strike in one valley may not affect units in an adjoining valley.
6.
Urban Areas
To plan NBC defense, commanders must be familiar with how urban terrain will
affect their mission in an NBC environment. For example, the TIM density will likely
increase in an urban area, the downwind transport of aerosols will be influenced by the
unique micrometeorological considerations in urban terrain (e.g., increased thermal buildup
and thermal islands), and there will be a larger number of noncombatants.
a.
Nuclear. Without additional preparation, unreinforced buildings give inadequate
shelter from a nuclear blast. If used correctly, ground floors and basements of steel or
reinforced concrete offer excellent protection from most effects except overpressure.
Personnel should avoid windows because of possible injuries from flying debris and glass.
Personnel also may receive severe burns through openings facing ground zero (GZ). Storm
drains and subway tunnels are readily available in most urban areas. These provide better
protection than ground level buildings. Personnel should not use structures of wood or
other flammable materials because they could burst into flames. Buildings do provide a
measure of protection against radiological contamination; and personnel may travel
through buildings, sewers, and tunnels. However, they should consider the dangers of
collapse because of blast.
III-9
b.
Biological. Buildings and other urban structures can provide some immediate
protection from direct spray. However, the stable environment of these structures may
increase persistency of biological agents. Toxins are very effective in an urban environment,
and personnel should take the same precautions prescribed for chemical agents. Pound for
pound, biological agents are more toxic than chemical agents, and agent effects are
especially magnified in an enclosed area. Covert operations are particularly well-suited for
urban terrain. Existing water and food supplies are prime targets. Personal hygiene
becomes increasingly important. The urban terrain increases the potential for person-to-
person transmission of contagious biological agents. Commanders must establish and
consistently enforce sanitary and personal hygiene measures, including immunizations.
They must also ensure that personnel drink safe water and must never assume that
hydrant water is safe.
c.
Chemical. Urban structures can protect against spray attacks, but this exchange
for overhead cover creates other problems. Generally, chemical agents tend to find and stay
in low areas, such as those found in urban locations such as basements, sewers, and
subway tunnels. Personnel should avoid these low areas. Stay times of agents, such as GB,
greatly increase when agents settle in these areas. Once an attack occurs, detection of
chemical contamination becomes very important. Personnel must thoroughly check areas
before attempting to occupy or traverse them. Additionally, chemical-agent concentrations
will generally decrease with an increase in structure height, and personnel on the higher
stories of a tall building should experience lower agent concentrations.
7.
Littoral Environments
During operations at the sea-land interface, multiple considerations impact NBC
defense operations. For example, land and sea breezes occur almost daily in tropical and
midlatitude regions on the coasts of all islands and continents. This occurs because the land
cools and heats more rapidly than the adjacent water. Therefore, the commander must be
concerned about potential offshore CB agent threat.
a.
Nuclear. The blast effects from a nuclear detonation can cause significant
damage to military operations ashore and afloat. Additionally, ships could be damaged by
tidal surges caused by such an attack. Reflective surfaces, such as water, can also enhance
weapon thermal effects. Residual contamination can contaminate and hinder critical
logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) operations.
b.
Biological. During littoral operations, meteorological conditions can be especially
favorable for use of biological agents. Offshore line release of a biological agent can cover
larger areas. Biological-agent surveillance assets monitor for the presence of biological
agents in the littoral environment. Whether the littoral environment is in an extreme
temperate (cold or hot) climatic zone, a biological-agent aerosol can cause casualty-
producing effects.
c.
Chemical. Blister agents (especially mustards) may cause casualty-producing
effects if personnel encounter them in salt or fresh water. Generally, water will cause some
blister agents to hydrolyze; however, the temperature and relative acidity or basal content
of the water will affect the rate of hydrolysis. Further, littoral operations in tropical areas
III-10
(i.e., high temperatures and humidity) can also enhance the casualty-producing effects of
chemical agents.
III-11
Chapter IV
MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE ANALYSIS
1.
Background
This chapter addresses the guidance for determining appropriate levels of protection
in an NBC environment (MOPP analysis) and MOPP levels.
2.
Analysis
During the preattack phase, NBC personnel consider METT-T, and related
information to provide recommendations on protection requirements. Medical personnel
also provide recommendations to ensure safe and sustained operations under various
climatic conditions. The commander and staff should develop standard responses and COA
for each projected mission. After the attack, NBC personnel will use the information
collected to identify the type of agent used, the likely duration of exposure, and minimum
protection requirements. Leaders know they cannot expect the same work rates in MOPP4
as they achieved in MOPP0. They reevaluate their ability to meet mission requirements
and communicate changes to their forces. Should they neglect to provide additional
resources or adjust task completion times, first-line supervisors may assume the mission is
critical and try to maintain the original time lines. Depending on the task and climate, the
short- and long-range consequences to personnel may range from insignificant (cool or mild)
to catastrophic (hot and dry). MOPP reduction decisions are also among the most difficult to
make because of the many considerations that affect the final decision. Commanders must
evaluate the situation from both the FP and the mission perspectives. Factors include the
criticality of the current mission, potential effects of personnel exposure, and the impact on
the casualty care system. The commander and staff can then determine what follow-on
COAs to employ. Leaders determine the appropriate MOPP level by assessing METT-T
factors and weighing the impact of increased levels of protection (reducing the risk of CB
agent exposure and the increased risk of heat strain as protection levels increase) (see
Table IV-1).
Table IV-1. MOPP Analysis
• MOPP analysis considers:
• Mission.
• Enemy.
• Time available.
• Troops and support available.
• Terrain and weather.
• MOPP analysis provides recommended MOPP levels.
IV-1
a.
Mission. To support analyzing mission factors, the following questions can be
asked:
• What is the mission?
• What additional protection (such as COLPRO) is available?
• How physically and mentally demanding is the mission that must be
performed (i.e., work intensity)?
• How quickly must the mission be accomplished?
• What is the expected duration of the mission and likely follow-on missions?
• Are adequate food and water supplies available?
b.
Enemy (Threat). The following questions can be asked to support threat
considerations:
• Is an attack probable?
• Is an attack imminent or in progress?
• Is the immediate AO contaminated once the attack is over?
• What are the likely targets, threat agents, and warning times?
c.
Terrain and Weather. To support analyzing terrain and weather factors, the
following questions can be asked:
• What is the ambient air temperature? What is the humidity?
• What is the wet-bulb, globe temperature (WBGT) index reading for the unit’s
AO?
• Is it cloudy, sunny, or windy?
• Is the terrain sandy, mountainous, or marshy?
d.
Troops and Support Available. The following considerations could impact this
factor:
• How many personnel are available?
• What IPE do the personnel possess?
• What is the training status of available personnel?
e.
Time Available. To support this factor, the following considerations can apply:
IV-2
• What is the time of day (or night) for completion of the mission?
• How much time is available for completion of the task?
• Can completion of the task be delayed?
Note: Guidance for the prevention of heat injury and illness can be based on WBGT
readings. The WBGT reading provides a single measure of the major determinants of
environmental heat stress (e.g., air temperature, wind speed, solar load, and humidity).
Although the WBGT provides an adequate representation of the heat stress under most
conditions, it is not perfect and should be interpreted as approximate guidance. For
instance, it is not optimized for conditions commonly seen in environmental extremes, such
as the desert. Guidance based on the WBGT is appropriate only for personnel who are fully
acclimatized, optimally conditioned, hydrated, and rested. Additionally, WBGT guidelines
do not accurately forecast injury/illness rates under conditions of lower temperatures and
high humidity, such as may be experienced in the early morning hours. Humidity levels
over 75 percent substantially increase the risk of heat injury under all work conditions.
Note: See Appendix C and FM 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation, for detailed
information on human factors effects that can be caused by the wearing of MOPP gear.
Appendix C also provides information on suggested work/rest cycles while wearing MOPP
gear.
f.
Preattack, During-Attack, Postattack. MOPP analysis points of emphasis will
likely vary during preattack, during-attack, and postattack phases. For example—
• During preattack preparation, MOPP analysis may focus on enemy intent
and the probability of attack.
• During an attack, MOPP analysis may focus on the mission and what the
impact of increased protection measures will have on the mission.
• During postattack situations, MOPP analysis will likely focus on continuing
assessment of the hazard and how long the protection level will need to be sustained.
3.
Guidance
Leaders apply mission, environmental, and NBC threat information to help determine
what MOPP level is appropriate for the unit’s situation.
a.
Higher HQ (i.e., wing/corps/group/JTF) provides directives to subordinate
elements that will include a MOPP level. Within the constraints of service directives,
subordinate units apply flexibility and initiative to this guidance to account for local
conditions. Failure to do this exposes units to far greater hazards in the form of heat
casualties, direct fire losses, and mission failures. The following paragraphs provide
instructions for applying the guidance offered by higher HQ. Once MOPP levels are
established by higher HQ, subordinate units may not downgrade from this level except for
the following reasons:
IV-3
• Units may temporarily reduce MOPP levels, consistent with the risk,to
conduct decontamination operations (such as MOPP gear exchange).
• Personnel inside enclosures may reduce MOPP level at the discretion of the
section/flight/platoon leader or higher commander. The enclosure need not be airtight but
should be capable of protecting against the initial liquid hazard.
b.
Land forces may make decisions on increasing or modifying MOPP posture at the
tactical level (i.e., squad and platoon level). Small units (like platoons) frequently conduct
independent operations; therefore, the unit leader’s training and experience are essential to
successful operations under NBC conditions. Directives received by small tactical units
should also indicate a minimum MOPP level and, if needed, a percentage of personnel
masked. In some cases the guidance received by battalion or equivalent will be passed
without change down to team/section/squad level.
4.
Levels
In confronting an NBC threat, the MOPP analysis process can be used to help develop
protection levels (controls). The MOPP analysis process can be used as a tool to support
determining the appropriate protective posture, estimating unit/personnel effectiveness
(e.g., mission degradation), estimating additional logistics requirements (e.g., water
resupply, and IPE replenishment), and assessing/weighing the tradeoffs between agent
exposures versus degraded performance (e.g., wearing of MOPP4).
a.
Standard MOPP.
(1)
MOPP Levels. Leaders are familiar with standard MOPP levels;
familiarity with these levels aids in making rapid and educated decisions. Standardized
MOPP levels allow leaders to increase or decrease levels of protection through the use of
techniques such as readily understood prowords. Leaders determine which protective
posture their subordinate units will assume (see Tables IV-2 through IV-6 [pages IV-5
through IV-9]) and then direct their units to assume that MOPP level. Leaders are also
aware that the shipboard application of MOPP level will vary from ground force MOPP (see
Table IV-7 [page IV-10] for the differences). The commander or leader directive also can
include, based on the threat, the percentage of personnel that will mask; for example,
MOPP1, 50 percent masked. The system is flexible, and subordinate leaders can modify
their unit MOPP level to meet mission needs. The following standardized protective
postures assume that personnel are carrying their individual decontamination kit, M8/M9
detector paper, NAAK, and protective masks.
(2)
MOPP Ready (applies to USA/USMC only). Personnel carry their protective
masks with their load-carrying equipment (LCE). Individual MOPP gear is labeled and
stored no farther back than a logistics site (e.g., brigade support area [BSA]) and is ready to
be brought forward to the individual when needed. Pushing MOPP gear forward should not
exceed 2 hours. Units in MOPP ready are highly vulnerable to persistent agent attacks and
will automatically upgrade to MOPP0 when they determine or are notified that NBC
weapons have been used or that the threat exists for NBC weapons use. When a unit is at
MOPP ready, personnel will have field-expedient items, such as wet weather gear,
identified for use in the event of an unanticipated NBC attack. Additionally, USAF
IV-4
personnel stationed in or deployed to NBC medium- and high-threat areas are issued NBC
protective equipment capable of bringing them to the MOPP4 level of protection. Therefore,
when the theater commander declares MOPP ready, USAF personnel will automatically
assume MOPP0 as opposed to MOPP ready.
(3)
MOPP0 (see Table IV-2). IPE is issued to and inspected by the individual
and prepared for use. Personnel carry their protective masks with their LCE. The standard
issue overgarment and other IPE are carried or are readily available. To be considered
readily available, equipment must be carried by each individual, stored within arm’s reach,
or be available within 5 minutes; for example, within the work area, vehicle, or fighting
position. Units in MOPP0 are highly vulnerable to persistent agent attacks and will
automatically upgrade to MOPP1 when they determine or are notified that persistent NBC
weapons have been used or that the threat exists for NBC weapons use. The primary use
for MOPP0 is during periods of increased alert when an enemy has a CB employment
capability, but there is no indication of use in the immediate future. MOPP0 is not
applicable to forces afloat.
Table IV-2. MOPP Level 0
Available For Immediate Donning
•
IPE
•
Field Gear
Available
•
IPE issued and serviceable
•
Protective mask filter/hood installed
Primary Use
•
CB threat
•
Preattack
MOPP0 is used during periods of increased alert when the enemy has
CB employment capability but there is no indication of use in the
immediate future.
IV-5
(4)
MOPP1 (see Table IV-3). When directed to MOPP1, personnel immediately
don the overgarment. In hot weather, the overgarment jacket can be left open and the
overgarment can be worn directly over underwear and other IPE making up the individual
MOPP gear (e.g., footwear covers, mask, and gloves are readily available or carried). M8 or
M9 paper is attached to the overgarment, (carry the NAAK and decontamination kit or
keep them at hand). MOPP1 provides a great deal of protection against persistent agents.
The primary use for MOPP1 is when a CB attack in theater is possible. Personnel must
remove contact lenses and wear protective mask optical inserts. Leaders also monitor
hydration levels. For forces afloat, MOPP1 means IPE is available.
Table IV-3. MOPP Level 1
Worn
•
Overgarment
•
Field gear
Carried
•
Footwear covers
•
Mask
•
Gloves
Primary Use
•
CB threat
• Preattack
MOPP1 is generally used when a chemical, and/or biological attack in
theater is possible.
IV-6
(5)
MOPP2 (see Table IV-4). Personnel wear and/or put on their footwear
covers, overgarment, and the protective helmet cover. As with MOPP1, the overgarment
jacket may be left open, but trousers remain closed. The mask with mask carrier and gloves
are carried. The primary use for MOPP2 is when a CB attack in theater is possible.
Personnel carry M8 and M9 paper, nerve agent antidotes, and decontamination kits or keep
them at hand. Personnel wear the protective mask optical inserts and maintain hydration
levels. For forces afloat, MOPP2 means that personnel begin carrying masks.
Table IV-4. MOPP Level 2
Worn
•
Overgarment
•
Field gear
• Footwear covers
Carried
•
Mask
•
Gloves
Primary Use
•
CB threat
• Preattack
MOPP2 is generally used when a chemical, and/or biological attack in
theater is likely.
IV-7
(6)
MOPP3 (see Table IV-5). Personnel wear the overgarment, footwear covers,
protective mask, and protective helmet cover. Again, flexibility is built into the system to
allow for personnel relief at MOPP3, particularly in hot weather. Personnel can open the
overgarment jacket and roll the protective mask hood for ventilation, but the trousers
remain closed. The protective gloves are carried. The primary use of MOPP3 is for
personnel operating inside areas where a chemical-agent contact hazard does not exist.
MOPP3 is not appropriate if a contact hazard is present. At MOPP3, forces afloat don
protective suits and boots and activate intermittent countermeasure washdown.
Table IV-5. MOPP Level 3
Worn
•
Overgarment
•
Mask and hood
•
Field gear
•
Overboots
Carried
•
Gloves
Primary Use
•
CB threat
• Postattack
MOPP3 is generally used in areas with no contact hazard or
operationally significant percutaneous vapor hazard.
IV-8
(7)
MOPP4 (See Table IV-6). Personnel completely encapsulate themselves by
closing their overgarments, adjusting all drawstrings to minimize the likelihood of any
openings, and putting on their protective gloves. MOPP4 is used when the highest degree of
protection is required, or if CB agents are present but the actual hazard is not determined.
As with every other MOPP level, flexibility is built into the system to provide relief to the
individual. Once the hazard is identified and risk assessment measures are employed, the
overgarment may be left open.
Note: During coalition operations, US forces familiarize themselves with the protection
levels used by personnel from other nations.
Table IV-6. MOPP Level 4
Worn
•
Overgarment
•
Mask and hood
•
Field Gear
•
Footwear covers
•
Gloves
Primary Use
•
CB threat
•
During-attack
• During and postattack
MOPP4 is used when the highest degree of CB protection is required,
or when CB agents are present; but the actual hazard has not been
determined.
b.
MOPP Options. A MOPP option includes mask only. The mask is worn with the
long-sleeve duty uniform (for limited skin protection). The mask-only command may be
given under these situations:
• When riot control agents (RCAs) are being employed and no CB threat
exists.
• In a downwind vapor hazard of a nonpersistent CB agent.
CAUTION
Mask only is not normally an appropriate command when blister
or nerve agents are involved.
IV-9
Table IV-7. MOPP Differences (Afloat Versus Ashore)
Afloat*
Ashore**
MOPP
Description
MOPP
Description
MOPP Ready²
Carry mask and ensure that IPE is nearby².
(USA/USMC only)
MOPP0
Carry mask and ensure that IPE is available³.
MOPP 1
Ensure that IPE is available³.
MOPP1
Don overgarment.
MOPP 2
Activate installed detectors,
MOPP2
Don protective boots.
Carry mask¹ and post M8/M9
paper.
MOPP 3
Don protective suit, and
MOPP3
Don protective mask.
boots; activate intermittent
countermeasures washdown.
MOPP 4
Don protective gloves and
MOPP4
Don protective gloves.
mask
*USN, USCG, and MSC vessels.
**USN, USMC, USA, and USAF personnel.
1 The term “mask” includes any form of respiratory protection against NBC hazards as issued by services.
² IPE must be available to soldiers and marines within 2 hours. A second set must be available in 6 hours. MOPP ready does not
apply to the USAF.
3 IPE must be within arm’s reach of personnel.
c.
Automatic Masking. Automatic masking is the act of immediately masking and
assuming MOPP4 when encountering CB attack indicators. Before CB weapons usage is
confirmed, personnel will don their masks when there is a high probability of a CB attack.
When chemical agents have been employed, commanders at all levels may establish a
modified policy of automatic-masking by designating additional events as automatic
masking criteria. Once this information is disseminated, personnel will mask and assume
MOPP4 automatically whenever one of these events occurs. Automatic-masking criteria
should be used by the commander as a decision tool and is based on NBC IPB, risk
assessment, and METT-T. Subordinate commanders may add automatic masking criteria
at their discretion. High probability CB attack indicators can include—
• The sounding of a chemical-agent alarm.
• A positive reading on chemical-agent detector paper or a CAM.
• Personnel experiencing symptoms of chemical-agent poisoning.
d.
Identification of Personnel in MOPP. Identifying personnel in MOPP can be
accomplished through various means. Personnel follow the guidance prescribed in service
TMs or TOs. However, one way is to use tape that indicates the individual’s rank and first
and last names. Blood type and religion are optional data entries. When personnel are not
in MOPP, a strip of tape with all the information printed on it can be placed on the
IV-10
individual’s helmet (front and back), mask canister, overgarment bag, or mask carrier.
When overgarments are put on, personnel can pull the tape off the overgarment bag and
place it on their overgarments to further ease identification.
e.
MOPP System Flexibility.
(1)
MOPP is not a fixed or rigid system. Flexibility is the key to providing
maximum protection with the lowest risk possible, while still allowing mission
accomplishment. Flexibility allows designated commanders to adjust the amount of MOPP
protection required in their particular situations and still maintain combat effectiveness.
Additionally, commanders can place all or part of their units in different MOPP levels (i.e.,
split MOPP) or authorize variations within a given MOPP level. For example, a fixed-site
(e.g., AB or port) or base cluster commander may divide his AO into sectors. Based on
postattack NBC reconnaissance efforts, the commander could direct the use of different
MOPP levels (e.g., split MOPP) in the different sectors. Split MOPP is the concept of
maintaining heightened protective posture (MOPP4) only in those areas that are
contaminated, allowing personnel in uncontaminated areas to continue to operate in a
reduced posture (MOPP2). The reasons behind this idea are to reduce the impact on
personnel and to enhance mission accomplishment.
(a) There are challenges in using split MOPP. One of these challenges is
the fact that many individuals may routinely move from one area of an installation to
another in performing their duties. Split MOPP should be done on a zone-by-zone basis. A
base/fixed site could be divided into multiple NBC zones (not to be confused with on-base
sectors).
(b) Zone borders tend to be natural geographic markers (such as roads
and fences) to help differentiate the zones and ensure zone recognition.
(c)
When split MOPP is in effect, travel requires personnel to know not
only the zone status of their current area but also the status of the areas they will be
traveling through and their destination. If personnel will be traveling from a clean to a
dirty area, they must be prepared to don MOPP gear at the transition point to the
contaminated zone.
(d) Zone transition points (e.g., road intersections where clean and dirty
chemical zones meet) may be used, and the fixed-site/base personnel place
stanchions/barricades at these locations when zone transitions are in effect.
(e) Personnel must plan their routes to minimize contact with
contaminated areas, and they must know where to don MOPP gear if required.
(f)
Units also establish various procedures for managing transzone
movement. For example, personnel may coordinate routes through their unit operations
center.
(2)
When directed, personnel may leave the overgarment jacket open at MOPP
1, 2, 3, or 4, allowing greater ventilation. Personnel may leave the hood open or rolled when
the mask is worn. Commanders will decide which of these variations to use based on the
IV-11
threat, temperature, and unit work intensity. Personnel may also don (based on the
situation) clothing such as the air crewman’s cape, SCALP, or wet-weather gear.
(3)
Personnel wear protective gloves at MOPP1 through 4 when handling
equipment that has been decontaminated. This prevents contact with agents that may have
been absorbed by equipment surfaces.
(4)
Where the hazard is from residual nuclear effects (e.g., fallout), the
commander modifies the MOPP level based on his assessment of the situation and the
criticality of the mission. MOPP gear does not protect against gamma or neutron radiation;
however, wearing MOPP gear can reduce radiological hazards from beta particle burns and
alpha particle ingestion. Primary concerns are to reduce the amount of radioactive
contamination that contacts the skin and to prevent ingestion of radioactive particles.
f.
Impact of MOPP.
(1)
Personnel wearing MOPP4 will take about one and one-half times longer to
perform most tasks.
(2)
Decision making and precision control (e.g., typing a message or aiming)
are slowed even more than manual tasks. The normal expected completion time should be
multiplied by two and one-half (or more, if personnel have been in MOPP4 for an extended
period or are overheated).
(3)
Well-prepared personnel suffer less stress when in MOPP than personnel
who are less-prepared. Well-prepared personnel are those who are in good physical
condition and have trained extensively in protective gear. Physically fit personnel are more
resistant to physical and mental fatigue and acclimatize more quickly to climatic heat or
the heat associated with MOPP wear than less fit personnel.
(4)
Units that anticipate deployment to regions where the employment of CB
agents is possible should augment physical training (PT) programs and increase their state
of heat acclimatization. To optimize heat acclimatization, personnel should progressively
increase the duration (reaching 2 to 4 hours) and intensity of exercise in the heat over 7 to
14 consecutive days. Finally, when personnel are required to routinely work in MOPP gear,
it is important to practice good hygiene and keep the skin clean to avoid heat rash, which
can dramatically reduce the body’s ability to regulate temperature.
IV-12
Chapter V
SUSTAINED OPERATIONS IN A NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND
CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT
1.
Background
The modern battlefield and the threat of NBC weapons pose significant challenges to
leaders and their units. Based on those challenges, this chapter addresses the impact of the
NBC environment as it affects the performance of individuals and units. This chapter
provides insights into the degradation to be expected from enemy employment of NBC
weapons and provides suggested guidance for maintaining operational tempo in the NBC
environment. The basic goals remain to avoid or minimize the impact of the contamination
and to enhance endurance and task performance. The NBC environment impacts leaders
and subordinates from different aspects. Leaders provide the necessary command and
control to ensure successful operations, and leaders must train themselves to know what to
expect and to recognize common pitfalls. Subordinates, on the other hand, must focus on
the accomplishment of individual and collective tasks.
2.
Impact of a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment
When individuals are encapsulated in MOPP ensembles, they are subjected to both
physiological and psychological stresses. However, given an understanding of the NBC
environment, its impact, and proper training, individuals can perform assigned tasks
successfully for a considerable period of time.
a.
Physiological and Psychological Impact. There are physiological and
psychological factors that are common to military operations and operations in the NBC
environment. A number of these factors can contribute to decreased tolerance due to the
effects of operations in an NBC environment (see Table V-1 [page V-2]). Because these
factors are amplified in an NBC environment, leaders and their subordinates are alert for
those factors that can impact mission operations (see Table V-2 [page V-2]). Leaders are
also aware of psychological issues that can be magnified by an NBC environment (e.g.,
individuals may become depressed or hyperactive) (see Table V-3 [page V-3]). See Chapter
IV for information on how physiological and psychological degradation impacts MOPP
analysis and Appendix C for more detailed information on the stress incurred while
wearing IPE.
V-1
Table V-1. Factors That Influence Decreased Tolerance
•
Disease/medication
•
Dehydration
•
Heat/cold
•
MOPP gear
•
Exhaustion
•
Workload
•
Food deprivation
•
Isolation
b.
Impact on Leaders. A major element of leadership is that the leaders must take
care of themselves as well as their personnel. They are subject to the same degradation that
can befall their personnel. Leader neglect can result in leaders becoming casualties.
Leaders supervise countermeasures such as work/rest cycles, periodic fluid replacement,
and scheduling heavy work rate activities at times other than high temperatures (see Table
V-4). Leaders may also display actions and attitudes that affect their effectiveness (e.g.,
less leader adaptability and/or more leader casualties). To help mitigate this consideration,
confidence is developed during stressful NBC training.
Table V-2. Common Signs of Physiological and Psychological Degradation
Physiological Degradation
Psychological Degradation
• Nervousness
• Forgetfulness
• Trembling
• Inattentiveness
• Sweating
• Decreased confidence
• Pounding heart
• Frustration
• Dry mouth
• Difficulty concentrating
• Headache
• Startled response to noise
• Fatigue
• Uncooperative behavior
• Nausea
c.
Impact on Individuals. Just as leaders are impacted by operations in an NBC
environment, there are many stressors (see Table V-5) that impact an individual’s ability to
function in an NBC environment. For example, even though personnel become dehydrated,
they do not feel thirsty; thus, they do not practice forced drinking. MOPP4 can increase
perceptions of respiratory distress and decrease clear thinking. Personnel also may begin to
take dangerous shortcuts and make mistakes while performing tasks. Crews in closed
vehicles in MOPP4 can experience motion sickness. Individuals operating in high elevations
in MOPP4 can experience serious degradation and require up to 4 days to adjust.
V-2
Table V-3. Depression/Hyperactivity Behaviors
• Lack of movement
• Slow reaction
• Constant movement
• Rapid talking
• Arguing
• Anxiousness
•
Jerky movements
•
Lack of facial expression
Table V-4. Impact of an NBC Environment on Leaders
• Less adaptability
• More exhaustion
• Less delegation
• More irritability and impatience
• Less sleep
• More leader casualties (after 6 hours)
• Less effective communications
• More micromanagement
• Less leadership effectiveness
• More omission of critical items in OPORD
• Less initiative from subordinates
• More periods when no one is in charge
(after leader becomes casualty)
Table V-5. Impact of an NBC Environment on Individuals
•
Dehydration
•
Less clear thinking
•
Degraded communications
•
Restricted field of vision
•
Degraded vision
•
Degraded manual dexterity
•
More mistakes
•
Less concentration
•
Carelessness
•
Perceived respiratory stress
3.
Impact of a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment on Operations
Since NBC weapons can be delivered by multiple means, all phases of military
operations could be severely impacted. C2, maneuver, fires, and communications can be
impacted by operations in an NBC environment.
a.
C2. Because of physical and mental fatigue, leaders performance may be
degraded.
• Leadership judgment and response to changing situations are less effective.
• Tasks dealing with accuracy of reports, coordination of fire plans, and
issuance of OPORDs are degraded.
• Intelligence-gathering assets, such as scouts, are degraded, resulting in less
timely and less-detailed information to the commander.
V-3
• Clarity and conciseness of OPORDs can diminish rapidly with leaders
omitting essential items of information.
• Commanders required more time to prepare orders.
• Commander’s plans for and control of direct and indirect fires deteriorated
with time.
• Tactical commanders had a tendency to focus inward and were less aware of
adjacent units.
b.
Maneuver. Synchronization of tactical maneuver is more difficult in the NBC
environment. Control of units, timing of operations, and the ability to adhere to the scheme
of maneuver can be degraded. Specifically, units can incur additional risks when operating
in an NBC environment. The additional risks (see Table V-6) can manifest themselves in
many ways. For example, units may miss objectives (e.g., get lost) or lose more combat
vehicles to enemy fire, so the ability to control units is degraded. Overall, the vulnerability
of forces can increase the longer a unit operates in MOPP4.
c.
Fires. The effectiveness of direct and indirect fires can decrease in an NBC
environment. Target detection and acquisition is much more difficult. For example,
personnel conducting target acquisition acquire targets at considerably shorter distances;
land force, combat-fighting vehicles fire fewer rounds; and infantry-fighting vehicles tend to
fight at closer ranges. Further, fewer small-arms engagements occur and less antitank
missile rounds are expended. Other considerations include—
• Battle losses increase as units spend longer periods in NBC protection.
• The engagement range for direct-fire weapons decreases.
• Fratricide engagements increase.
• The battle intensity in the attack is considerably lower.
• The ability of indirect fire to support the direct-fire battle is degraded.
• The time to prepare and transmit live-fire requests for voice/digital
transmission increase, and the time to prepare indirect weapons for firing takes longer.
V-4
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