Главная Manuals FM 3-11.4 MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL (NBC) PROTECTION (June 2003)
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*FM 3-11.4 (FM 3-4)
MCWP 3-37.2
NTTP 3-11.27
AFTTP (I) 3-2.46
2 June 2003
FM 3-11.4
US Army Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia
MCWP 3-37.2
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia
NTTP 3-11.27
Navy Warfare Development Command
Newport, Rhode Island
AFTTP (I) 3-2.46
Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
xi
PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
xiii
CHAPTER I
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL PROTECTION
Background
I-1
Basic Fundamentals
I-1
Planning
I-6
Protecting the Force
I-7
Preparedness
1-8
Protection Components
I-11
CHAPTER II
PREATTACK, DURING-ATTACK, AND POSTATTACK PROTECTIVE
ACTIONS
Background
II-1
*This publication supersedes FM 3-4, 29 May 1992
iv
Common Preattack Actions
II-1
Nuclear Protection
II-7
Biological Protection
II-15
Chemical Protection
II-19
Collective Protection Operations
II-26
Toxic Industrial Material Protection
II-28
CHAPTER III
OPERATIONS IN UNIQUE ENVIRONMENTS
Background
III-1
Cold Weather
III-1
Desert
III-7
Jungle
III-8
Mountains
III-8
Urban Areas
III-9
Littoral Environments
III-10
CHAPTER IV
MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE ANALYSIS
Background
IV-1
Analysis
IV-1
Guidance
IV-3
Levels
IV-4
CHAPTER V
SUSTAINED OPERATIONS IN A NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND
CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT
Background
V-1
Impact of a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment
V-1
Impact of a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment on
Operations
V-3
Impact of a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment on
Sustainment
V-5
Executing Countermeasures
V-6
CHAPTER VI
INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION
Background
VI-1
Mission-Oriented Protective Posture
VI-1
Individual Protection Logistics Considerations
VI-5
Toxic Industrial Material Individual Protection
VI-6
CHAPTER VII
COLLECTIVE PROTECTION
Background
VII-1
Planning for Collective Protection
VII-1
Fixed-Site Collective Protection
VII-5
Transportable Collective Protection
VII-10
v
Mobile Collective Protection
VII-12
Navy Collective Protection Systems (Surface Ship)
VII-16
APPENDIX A
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE
EQUIPMENT
Background
A-1
Protective Clothing
A-1
Protective Masks
A-5
Toxic Industrial Material Protection
A-9
Decontamination Equipment
A-10
Chemical Detector Paper/Kits
A-12
First Aid Equipment
A-12
Related Equipment (Chemical Monitors, Radiation Detection
Instruments and Biological Detectors)
A-14
APPENDIX B
GUIDELINES FOR THE NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL
PORTION OF A COLLECTIVE PROTECTION STANDING OPERATING
PROCEDURE
Background
B-1
Suggested Guidelines for Preparation of a Collective Protection
System Standing Operating Procedure
B-1
Entry and Exit Procedure
B-6
Wartime Shelter Preparation and Operation
B-28
Classes of Site Collective Protection and Associated
Protective Equipment
B-31
APPENDIX C
HUMAN FACTORS EFFECTS OF MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE
POSTURE
Background
C-1
Physiological Factors
C-1
Psychological Factors
C-4
Chemical Protective Overgarment Work/Rest Cycles and Water
Replacement Guidelines
C-5
APPENDIX D
RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION
Background
D-1
Operational Exposure Guidance
D-1
Low-Level Radiation
D-5
Depleted Uranium
D-12
APPENDIX E
TOXIC INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS-AN ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR,
BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL FILTER PERFORMANCE
Background
E-1
Filter System Operations
E-1
Filter Assessment
E-2
vi
APPENDIX F
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
Background
F-1
Planning
F-1
Stages of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
F-1
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in a Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Environment
F-2
APPENDIX G
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT
DATA
APPENDIX H
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREATS USING POSTAL
MAIL/ PACKAGES
Background
H-1
Possible Indicators and Characteristics of Suspect
Mail/Packages
H-1
Handling Instructions
H-2
Reach-Back Capability
H-5
APPENDIX I
PROTECTIVE MASK PRESCRIPTION OPTICAL INSERTS
Background
I-1
M40/M42 Series
I-1
M43 Series
I-2
M45 Series
I-2
M48 Series
I-2
MCU2/P Series
I-2
M17 Series
I-3
M17 A1/A2
I-3
Joint Service General-Purpose Mask
I-3
APPENDIX J
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS
Background
J-1
Electromagnetic Pulse
J-1
Electromagnetic Pulse Mitigation Techniques
J-1
REFERENCES……………………………
References-1
GLOSSARY
Glossary-1
INDEX
Index-1
FIGURES
I-1
NBC Information Management
I-10
VII-1 General Layout for an NBC Shelter
VII-5
VII-2 Tent used as a CCA
VII-8
A-1 Wet-Weather Gear
A-3
vii
A-2
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Equipment Bag
A-3
A-3
Chemical Protective Helmet Cover
A-5
A-4
Aircrew Eye/Respiratory Protection
A-7
A-5
MCU-2A/P Protective Mask
A-8
A-6
M41 Protection Assessment Test System
A-9
A-7
ABC-M11 Portable Decontaminating Apparatus
A-11
A-8
M13 Decontaminating Apparatus, Portable
A-12
B-1
M12 Protective Entrance
B-33
B-2
Collective-Protection Entrance Configurations
B-34
TABLES
II-1
Standardized Alarm Signals for the US and its
Territories and Possessions (Recommended)
II-4
II-2
Standardized Alarm Signals for OCONUS Bases and Stations
Subject to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Attacks
(Recommended)
II-6
II-3
Shielding Values of Each Cover for a 2,400-Centigray
Free-In-Air Dose
II-10
II-4
Shielding Values of Each Cover for a 2,400-Centigray, Sand or
Clay-Filled Sandbags, Free-In-Air Dose
II-10
II-5
Wartime Climatic Filter Exchange Intervals, Blood Agent
Threat is High (Given in Weeks)
II-25
IV-1
MOPP Analysis
IV-1
IV-2
MOPP Level 0
IV-5
IV-3
MOPP Level 1
IV-6
IV-4
MOPP Level 2
IV-7
IV-5
MOPP Level 3
IV-8
IV-6
MOPP Level 4
IV-9
IV-7
MOPP Differences (Afloat versus Ashore)
IV-10
V-1
Factors That Influence Decreased Tolerance
V-2
V-2
Common Signs of Physiological and Psychological
Degradation
V-2
V-3
Depression/Hyperactivity Behaviors
V-3
V-4
Impact of an NBC Environment on Leaders
V-3
V-5
Impact of an NBC Environment on Individuals
V-3
V-6
Potential Risks From Operations in an NBC Environment
V-5
VI-1
Protective Clothing Capabilities
VI-2
VII-1
Sample Sheltering Instructions
VII-10
VII-2
Types of COLPRO Systems
VII-13
viii
VII-3 COLPRO MOPP Levels
VII-14
VII-4 Advantages and Disadvantages of COLPRO
Systems
VII-15
B-1 CCA Processing Steps to Enter an Open-Air TFA
B-17
C-1 Work Intensities of Military Tasks
C-1
C-2 Work/Rest Cycles and Water Replacement Guidelines
C-6
D-1 Operational Radiation Exposure Status and Risk Criteria
D-2
D-2 Low-Level Radiation Guidance For MOOTW
D-4
D-3 Contamination Control Guidance (For up to a 7-day mission or
within a 90-day mission)
D-6
D-4 Recommended Maximum-Permissible Contamination
Levels
D-13
E-1 Protection Afforded By NBC Filters For Selected TIC
E-3
G-1 NBC Defense Equipment
G-2
H-1 Reach-Back Points of Contact
H-5
ix
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Protection
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Protection
Chapter I discusses NBC protection challenges.
Preattack, During-Attack, and Postattack Protective Actions
Chapter II addresses actions that can be taken before, during, and after an NBC
attack. Because operations in an NBC environment can include TIM incidents, this chapter
also addresses suggested protective actions that can be taken in response to a TIM event.
Operations In Unique Environments
Chapter III addresses how weather and terrain affect the need for NBC protection.
Certain weather conditions will greatly influence the use of NBC weapons. Likewise,
different types of terrain will alter the effects of NBC weapons.
Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Analysis
Chapter IV addresses the guidance for determining the appropriate levels of
protection in an NBC environment.
Sustained Operations in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment
Chapter V provides insights into the degradation to be expected from enemy
employment of NBC weapons. The basic goals remain to avoid or minimize the impact of
the contamination and to enhance endurance and task performance. When individuals are
encapsulated in individual protective equipment (IPE), they are subjected to both
physiological and psychological stresses; however, given an understanding of the NBC
environment, its impact, and proper training, individuals can perform assigned tasks
successfully for a considerable period of time.
Individual Protection
Chapter VI provides an overview of the individual protection capabilities that are
available and/or issued to the armed forces of the US.
Collective Protection
Chapter VII addresses COLPRO planning considerations. It also discusses COLPRO
capabilities such as fixed-site, transportable, mobile, and Navy COLPRO systems.
x
PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this publication.
Joint
Joint Chiefs of Staff, J5, Nuclear, and Counterproliferation Division, The Pentagon, Room
2S938, Washington, DC 20318.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060.
Army
United States Army Chemical School, 401 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 1029, Fort Leonard
Wood, MO 65473.
United States Army Medical Department Center and School, 1400 E. Grayson Street, Fort
Sam Houston, TX 78234.
United States Army Soldier Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21040.
Marine Corps
United States Marine Corps NBC Defense School, 1273 Iowa Avenue, Fort Leonard Wood,
MO 65473.
United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 3300 Russell Road, Suite
318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021
Navy
United States Navy Warfare Development Command, 686 Cushing Road, Sims Hall,
Newport, RI 02841.
United States Navy Surface Warfare Officer School Command, 446 Cushing Road,
Newport, RI, 02841
United States Navy, Chief of Navy Operations N70 CP, 2812 Summerfield Road, Falls
Church, VA 22032.
United States Navy Facilities Command, 1322 Patterson Avenue, Washington, DC 20374.
xi
United States Navy Surface Warfare Development Group, 2200 Amphibious Drive, Norfolk,
VA 23521.
Air Force
Air Combat Command, 129 Andrews Street, Suite 102, Langley AFB, VA 23655.
United States Air Force Civil Engineer Support Activity, 14a Barnes Drive, Suite 1, Tyndall
AFB, FL 32403.
United States Air Force Special Operations Command, 100 Bartley Street, Suite 153W,
Hurlburt Field, FL 32544.
United States Air Force Doctrine Center, Detachment 1, 216 Sweeney Boulevard, Suite
109, Langley AFB, VA 23665.
United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB,
AL 36112.
xii
Chapter I
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL PROTECTION
1.
Background
This chapter discusses NBC protection fundamentals, protection planning, basic
considerations for protection of the force, NBC preparedness, and the components of NBC
protection.
2.
Basic Fundamentals
There are several basic fundamentals that impact NBC protective actions. These
actions can include conducting intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), providing
exposure guidance, conducting risk assessment, establishing protection requirements,
conducting protective actions, sustaining protective actions, providing supervision and
evaluation, ensuring warning and dewarning of personnel, and conducting medical
surveillance.
a.
Conducting IPB. The IPB process must account for both confirmed as well as
plausible but unconfirmed adversary capabilities, plans, and actions. The commander uses
the IPB process to identify and answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). The IPB
allows the commander to visualize the area of operation (AO) and discern the adversary’s
probable intent. The commander must take into account the potential adversary’s NBC
capabilities in assessments, estimates, and plans. The NBC staff uses the IPB process (in
coordination with the medical and intelligence sections) and addresses the capabilities and
limitations of the adversary’s NBC weapons and delivery systems; the procedures for
command, control, and release; the indicators of intent to employ NBC weapons; and the
identification of possible TIM in AOs. The NBC staff must understand the adversary’s
intent, weapons capabilities, and weapons effects. The adversary may use weapons
systems that range from artillery or rockets to theater ballistic missiles (TBMs). Delivery
tactics could include overt or covert means (e.g., special operations forces [SOF]), state
sponsored terrorism, or other asymmetric methods.
b.
Providing Exposure Guidance. Exposure to NBC warfare agents or TIM may
occur through inhalation, ingestion, skin contact, or other percutaneous exposure. Such
exposure may have significant, immediate, or prolonged health effects. Therefore, the goal
is to keep the exposure as low as reasonably achievable. The commander will ensure that
military personnel, Department of Defense (DOD) essential civilians, contractors, and other
essential personnel who support US military operations use appropriate protective
equipment when operating near any detectable NBC agents or TIM, operating where
agents are suspected, or participating in decontamination operations. Exposure to NBC
agents or accidental release of TIM may adversely impact mission performance and result
in disease or nonbattle injuries. As such, risk exposure must be assessed and integrated
into overall military operational risk management. Typical scenarios for potential exposure
to agents could include—
I-1
• Downwind hazard from the enemy’s attack.
• Collateral damage from the enemy’s NBC or TIM storage facilities or
transportation systems.
• Vapor off-gassing from material or surfaces in previously contaminated
areas.
• Contamination at unit locations from an enemy NBC attack.
• Contact hazard from an enemy NBC attack.
(1)
The medical preventive medicine (PVNTMED) and NBC planners provide
essential staff support to the commander on the hazard from TIM and NBC warfare agents.
The PVNTMED planners carefully analyze the medical threat and evaluate the
environmental and occupational health risks in the AO. The NBC planners assess the NBC
threat. Both planners then coordinate with the unit’s intelligence section. After
coordination, the NBC planners recommend protective actions to the commander.
(2)
The exposure guidance furnished will depend on factors that include
sensitivity of exposed individuals, the potential exposure durations, potential agent
concentrations, and the potential combinations of agents to which individuals may be
exposed.
(3)
The sensitivity of individuals and the exposure duration affect the severity
and characteristics of toxic effects that may be experienced by exposed individuals. A short
exposure to an NBC agent or TIM may produce only minimal adverse effects, such as mild
irritation, whereas longer exposure may produce more severe effects, which could interfere
with mission function or result in death. The first indication of exposure to NBC agents or
TIM will likely be noticeable symptoms.
(4)
Exposure frequency and concentration are often critical factors in
estimating the severity and onset of casualty-producing effects from exposure. Exposure
frequency describes how often individual exposures have occurred during a specific time
period. This is important because the human body does not detoxify agents in a timely
manner.
(5)
Additionally, increased physical workload in a deployed military population
may actually increase the probability of occurrence and the severity of casualty-producing
effects. Some factors, such as the breathing rate, increase as workload increases—leading
to an increased intake of NBC agents or TIM.
c.
Conducting Risk Assessments.
(1)
Vulnerabilities should be examined through comprehensive risk
assessments. Commanders have multiple means to contain, mitigate, and manage the
consequences of identified risks. In order to preserve combat power and minimize
casualties, commanders should—
• Identify potential health hazards.
I-2
• Assess the probability of adverse health effects to determine risks.
• Develop controls and make risk decisions.
• Implement controls.
• Supervise operations and evaluate the situation.
(2)
When US, host nation (HN), or other civilian populations or infrastructures
are at risk to an NBC attack, the commander assists the appropriate military and civil
authorities to protect against, mitigate, and manage the consequences of these risks.
(3)
Risk assessment also addresses the hazards posed by TIM, as well as
negligible exposure to NBC agents, including radiological and other environmental
contamination. Negligible levels are defined as below detectable levels of currently fielded
chemical agent point detectors. Because standard military NBC individual protective
equipment (IPE) does not always provide necessary protection, the assessment of the
possible presence of TIM within the AO must be part of the IPB information collection
process. Particular care must be taken in identifying the nature of such hazards. In some
instances, avoiding the hazard may be the most effective or only course of action (COA). In
all circumstances, the unit should act to minimize the immediate and long-term effects of
toxic hazards to health by exposing the smallest number of personnel for the shortest
period of time.
(4)
Control measures can be taken to eliminate or minimize exposure over a
wide range of actions. Example control measures could include representative measures
such as—
• Ensuring predeployment vaccination and prophylaxis.
• Moving operations (e.g., relocating a base camp).
• Managing work schedules and limiting shift duration.
• Managing personnel rotation on high-risk missions.
• Monitoring and conducting surveillance of potential threat risks.
• Ensuring understanding and exercising of unmasking procedures.
• Briefing commanders and service personnel on potential threats and
safe and appropriate responses.
• Enforcing the correct wear of uniforms.
• Enforcing health and hygiene standards.
• Isolating an operation by means of barriers or enclosures.
I-3
• Using pretreatments, prophylaxis, immunizations, and collective
protective shelters (CPSs).
• Shielding a radiation source and/or using time and distance
considerations.
• Conducting continuous medical surveillance and occupational and
environmental health surveillance.
• Using mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear.
• Monitoring weather conditions and considering the increase of
protective levels for forces during periods of high threat and weather conditions that are
favorable for the use of chemical and biological (CB) weapons.
d.
Establishing Protection Requirements. Commanders direct the establishment of
coordinated NBC protection requirements through the preparation of NBC defense plans.
This kind of action is common across the various components and includes, but is not
limited to, dispersing and networking available detectors, designating NBC warning and
reporting requirements, implementing periodic sampling and analysis, and designating
shelters for applicable personnel. Other NBC defense protection requirements may
include—
(1)
Ensuring interoperability among components exercising important mission
tasks (e.g., warning and reporting).
(2)
Implementing the NBC defense plan as part of an integrated exercise and
adjusting plans as a result.
(3)
Using input from the theater missile defense (TMD) warning system to
ensure connectivity and the rapid dissemination of information.
(4)
Validating existing reach-back capability with regard to key elements, such
as sustaining the force’s capability to operate in an NBC environment (e.g., resupply of
NBC defense equipment and contracted logistics support [CLS] for critical, commercial, off-
the-shelf [COTS] NBC defense equipment).
(5)
Evacuating suspect NBC samples for laboratory analysis, as required.
(6)
Testing the warning and reporting system to warn or dewarn selected
units.
(7)
Conducting waste-handling operations.
e.
Conducting Protective Actions.
(1)
Leaders and staffs implement protective actions by ensuring that such
actions (e.g., directed MOPP level and dewarning) are integrated into standing operating
procedures (SOPs), written and verbal orders, mission briefings, and staff estimates. The
critical check for this step, with oversight, is to ensure that required actions (controls) are
I-4
converted into clear, simple execution orders. Implementing actions includes coordination
and communication with agencies such as higher, adjacent, and subordinate units and
those executing the mission.
(2)
Leaders also understand the impact of implementing protective actions.
Examples of implementation include—
• Conducting rehearsals and war-gaming possible COAs.
• Conducting local threat briefings.
• Conducting installation-specific NBC defense training for replacement
personnel.
• Installing and maintaining communications links for military and key
civilian organizations.
• Assessing personnel, operational, and logistics readiness.
• Carrying and maintaining IPE, prophylaxis, water, etc.
f.
Sustaining Protective Actions. Leaders ensure that actions are taken to equip
and train US military and emergency-essential civilian personnel. Leaders may have to
plan for the protection of dependents and noncombatants, depending on the situation.
Deployable personnel are fitted with appropriate IPE, to include the protective mask.
Sustainment also ensures that adequate supplies (e.g., detection and decontamination kits,
mask filters, and medical provisions) are available and that required maintenance is
conducted.
g.
Providing Supervision and Evaluation. During mission preparation and
execution, leaders conduct risk assessments to continuously evaluate and assess risk levels
that may yield lessons learned and/or identify new hazards. Leaders supervise mission
rehearsal and execution to ensure that standards and controls are maintained. Techniques
may include spot checks, inspections, situation reports (SITREPs) and brief backs, periodic
monitoring to minimize any exposure to NBC agents or TIM, buddy checks for heat stress,
and close supervision.
h.
Ensuring Warning and Dewarning of Personnel. The NBC Warning and
Reporting System (NBCWRS) provides the data and information to inform leaders of
important information requirements. Key information requirements that can be derived
from NBCWRS include—
(1)
Time and place of the attack.
(2)
Who and what was affected.
(3)
Impact of the attack.
(4)
Specific type and extent of the hazard.
I-5
(5)
Type of weapons and/or munitions employed.
i.
Conducting Medical Surveillance. Before and during deployment, service
members are informed of significant health threats and corresponding medical prophylaxis,
immunization, and other unit and individual countermeasures for the AO. Additionally,
commanders ensure that deployment health surveillance and readiness documentation are
conducted according to applicable medical directives. For example, the documentation may
include data such as the names of personnel who were exposed, their location and time in
the hazard area and the monitoring results. Further, commanders provide personnel with
appropriate medical support and training, equipment, and supplies to implement unit and
individual countermeasures. For example, predeployment anthrax vaccinations can
provide increased force protection (FP). Once deployed, personnel are provided updates to
health threats and countermeasures based on need and the situations encountered.
3.
Planning
The armed forces of the US must be prepared to conduct prompt, sustained, and
decisive operations, in NBC environments. An adversary’s NBC capabilities can have an
impact on a commander’s objectives, plans, and supporting actions and, therefore, must be
taken into account at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The planning process
basically remains the same across the range of military operations, regardless of the level of
war. Nevertheless, specific NBC defense protection considerations may vary considerably
between strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level operations due to differences in the
mission, available resources, and the size of the operational areas.
a.
Strategic-Level NBC Defense Protection Planning. The strategic-level planning
will address potential adversaries who might have NBC capabilities—such as global
adversaries, regional adversaries, or nonstate actors. A number of these potential
adversaries have, or could rapidly acquire, NBC weapons and other TIM. Other planning
considerations include providing FP (e.g., minimum MOPP level) and exposure level
guidance.
b.
Operational-Level NBC Protection Planning. At the operational level, planning
could concentrate on characteristics such as the capability of road, rail, air, and sea
transportation networks to support the movement of adversary NBC weapons; zones of
entry into and through the operational area and area of interest (AOI); the impact of large
geographic features such as mountains, large forests, deserts, and archipelagos on NBC
defense operations; and seasonal climatic effects on NBC weapons. Operational-level
planning also further refines protection guidance and integrates the theater-wide warning
and reporting system.
c.
Tactical-Level NBC Defense Protection Planning. Tactical-level planning focuses
on ensuring that commanders can accomplish their mission-essential tasks in NBC
environments. At the tactical level, the size and location of the battlespace are influenced
by the physical location of the adversary’s land, air, naval, space, and other forces that
could pose a direct threat to the security of friendly forces or the success of their mission.
The extent to which the battlespace environment is analyzed at the tactical level is largely
dependent on the mission and planning time. Tactical-level planning continues to address
I-6
risk management, protective actions, changing conditions, warning and dewarning of
personnel, and medical surveillance.
4.
Protecting the Force
Protecting the force consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile
actions against personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions
conserve the force’s fighting potential so that it can be decisively applied. In NBC
environments, the commander must take into account a number of unique considerations
that have a significant effect on FP. These include, but are not limited to, the commander’s
intent, training and leader development, psychological operations (PSYOP), force health
protection, protective equipment, and operations security (OPSEC).
a.
Commander’s Intent. The commander conducts risk assessments and outlines
what his unit must do to succeed with respect to the enemy, the terrain, and the desired
end state. The intent outlines the key tasks that must be performed. Risk is stated in the
commander’s guidance and is addressed in all COAs. Overall, the risk assessment balances
FP and mission accomplishment.
b.
Training and Leader Development. Rigorous and realistic individual and joint
unit training across the force ensures readiness to fight and win should an adversary
employ NBC weapons. Training, exercises, professional military education, and leadership
development programs should incorporate the principles for operations in NBC
environments and include the realistic consideration of NBC weapons effects on sustained
combat operations.
c.
Psychological Operations. As a means to minimize the potential for, and mitigate
the effects of, adversary NBC use, PSYOP can decrease an adversary’s perception of the
utility of NBC weapons, contribute to deterring their employment, and enhance efforts to
reduce an adversary’s domestic and international support.
d.
Force Health Protection. Medical protection of the force against NBC threats
involves integrated preventive, surveillance, and clinical programs. The commander’s plans
should include PVNTMED, joint medical surveillance, medical evacuation, and provisions
for readily available treatments and supplies to counter the physical effects of NBC
exposure.
e.
Protective Equipment. Sufficient and appropriate equipment (e.g., protective
masks) must be available to protect not only the uniformed force but also the essential
supporting civilian workforces. Individual and unit training is required for proper sizing,
use of, and care for individual and crew-served equipment. Mask fit validation is also
conducted as part of this process.
f.
Operations Security. In affecting an adversary’s intelligence, information
operations (IO) (including OPSEC) provide forces with a significant measure of protection
by preventing an adversary from acquiring information necessary to successfully target
forces and facilities. Deception, dispersion of forces, communications security (COMSEC),
and effective use of terrain are examples of measures that complement OPSEC.
I-7
5.
Preparedness
Varied and unpredictable challenges to US interests in the international security
environment require adequate preparedness in peacetime to facilitate rapid transition to
operations.
a.
Preparedness in the US and Its Territories.
(1)
Commanders of forces and facilities in the US assess threats and
vulnerabilities that may compromise peacetime operations. A number of state and
nonstate adversaries may choose early NBC employment against the US civilian population
and infrastructures as well as military forces and facilities. Therefore, peacetime
preparedness and planning for transition to operations account for the vulnerabilities that,
if exploited by adversaries, could impede execution of mission-essential tasks.
(2)
Peacetime planning, training, equipping, and supporting actions must
include plans to understand threats, minimize vulnerability, and mitigate the effects of
NBC attacks in order to maintain required force preparedness. Commanders coordinate
with civilian authorities and agencies to prevent and, if necessary, mitigate and manage
the consequences of deliberate or accidental NBC employment or similar toxic material
events in the US. Detailed interagency processes guide the armed forces of the US in
providing military support to civil agencies to cope with such events.
b.
Preparedness in the Theater Operational Area. Peacetime preparedness for
operations in NBC environments includes measures taken by commanders at intermediate
staging bases or in theater operational areas abroad. Force requirements (including
readiness and FP) in any particular combatant command area may require support not only
from the US but also from other combatant commands.
c.
Preparedness—Using all the Tools (NBC Information Management).
(1)
Commanders require accurate and timely information (e.g., threat data) as
they prepare for operations in an NBC environment. Decisions rely on SA and an
understanding of the significance of the information (e.g., impact of degradation on the
force). Units translate all source information into an understanding of the NBC threat and
the operational environment. Commanders and staff conduct timely risk assessments and
recommend specific COAs for reducing risk and countering specific threats. To maintain
SA, units use information from sources such as the NBCWRS to report suspected and
actual NBC attacks.
(2)
Units obtain relevant data (see Figure I-1, [page I-10]) from multiple
sources (e.g., sensors, detectors, and other reconnaissance and surveillance assets). The
appropriate data (e.g., type of agent, time of detection, weather data, and location) is
processed, extracted, formatted, and forwarded. Commanders and their staffs evaluate the
information to assess its impact on operations. The risk assessment then may lead to
directives/orders to help mitigate the impact of the assessed hazard. Commanders may
direct an integrated series of protective measures (e.g., increased MOPP posture) to
decrease the level of risk (e.g., decrease exposure opportunity), and the plan is revised as
updated information is received.
I-8
(3)
The command and staff conduct preplanning to determine critical data
requirements. The relevant choices are prioritized as PIR and a data collection plan is
prepared. The overall data collection effort shares common characteristics:
• Connectivity between lower, higher, and adjacent units.
• Ability to forward relevant data to multiple echelons of command
simultaneously.
• Capability to conduct technical reach back to obtain access to strategic
intelligence, operational, logistical, or technical information to provide information for
operational assessments. Reach back provides the additional capability to enhance
effective use of modeling and simulation to conduct region-specific, expert evaluation of
potential NBC weapons effects as well as toxic industrial chemical, biological, and
radiological releases.
(4)
Units receive, process, and evaluate data received. The data may be
incomplete; therefore, it is assessed and evaluated in light of information from other
sources. The available data is synthesized to assess its operational significance. The
evaluated information may result in no action being taken, or the information received may
be translated into an input that affects the military decision-making process (MDMP).
(5)
The evaluated information is used to support the MDMP. For example, the
process could provide information to support hazard prediction and selected warnings to
affected units.
I-9
Man-in-the-loop
Common NBC
Assessment
Situational Awareness
•
Validation
•
Feedback
•
False Alarms
•
Technical Reach-Back
Understanding
•
Dewarning
• Commander’s Intent
Protective Actions/
• Prioritization (Mission
Risk
Control Measures
Importance)
• Orders and execution
Judgment
• Integrated NBC Defense
• Risk Management
Knowledge
Risk Assessment: Hazard Prediction/COA
Analysis/MOPP Guidance
Cognition
Information
• Risk Assessment
• NBC Threat Status
• NBC Reports
• Impact of MOPP on Units
Processing
• Exposure Guidance
• Unit Protection Guidance
• Work Rate/Weather Data
Data
Figure I-1. NBC Information Management
d.
Preparedness—Understanding the Environment. Commanders and staffs
understand the impact of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and/or the
accidental or deliberate use of TIM on FP.
(1)
Chemical weapons can be used to restrict the mobility of maneuver forces,
contaminate air base (AB) or port operations, cause immediate and delayed casualties, and
force an increase in protective measures. Persistent agents are typically used against
deeper targets or those areas not expected to be immediately occupied.
I-10
(2)
Biological weapons can be used to cause large numbers of casualties, and
the area coverage for a biological warfare (BW) weapon can be far greater than for a
chemical attack.
(3)
Nuclear weapons can cause tremendous adverse blast, thermal energy,
radioactive, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects. The initial and residual effects of a
nuclear weapon can cause large numbers of casualties, material damage, and
contamination.
(4)
Potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons also creates tremendous
challenges for commanders. Potentially, a covert incident could occur at any time.
(5)
TIM (through accidental or incidental release or terrorist actions) may also
impact FP. A commander’s situational awareness (SA) extends throughout the AO within
which his forces will operate.
(6)
The proliferation of TBM increases the range from which an adversary
could strike.
(7)
Secondary threats may also exist during and after some TBM attacks.
TBMs may have warheads that do not separate from the missile body but remain together
until the missile warhead functions or the missile impacts the ground. Even if the warhead
functions or is hit with an antiballistic missile (ABM), the missile components continue on a
ballistic trajectory and impact the ground. In addition to potential explosive or CB hazards,
the missile may impact a building or create a crater. The impact site may contain hazards
from the remaining missile fuel and oxidizer or from the facility or structure the missile hit
(fuel, power lines, munitions, etc.). Personnel in MOPP4 are protected from potential CB
hazards but may not be fully protected from the unused or unburned missile oxidizers and
fuel hazards. Depending on the quantity remaining, the residual fuel and oxidizer (such as
red, fuming nitric acid) present a potential toxic chemical hazard to personnel. These
chemicals may also cause chemical detectors, such as M8 paper, to falsely indicate the
presence of an agent or mask the presence of the actual agent.
6.
Protection Components
NBC protection is a command responsibility and the commander must direct actions
to ensure continued mission accomplishment. There are broad groups of activity that
comprise protective measures, such as individual protection, reacting to an attack,
COLPRO, and health service support (HSS).
a.
Individual Protection. Individual protection includes actions taken by individuals
to survive and sustain operations under NBC conditions.
(1)
Background. The commander provides FP guidance in orders and/or
directives. The establishment of protection guidance provides unit personnel and mission-
essential civilian personnel with key information (e.g., individual protection guidance,
training, equipment) to ensure that they are prepared (see Chapter VI and Appendix A for
information and descriptions of individual protection and IPE capabilities, respectively).
I-11
(2)
Preattack Protection Measures. These protection measures can include—
• Providing realistic, integrated training.
• Using camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD). CCD measures
cannot protect personnel from the effects of enemy attacks but can hide individuals and
units from enemies threatening an NBC attack.
• Being ready to prepare positions. Take actions to make positions more
resistant to the blast effects of conventional or nuclear munitions; to the heat and radiation
of nuclear weapons; and to the contamination from CBRN weapons.
• Conducting MOPP analysis (see Appendixes A, B, and C).
• Being ready to prepare personnel. Under the threat of enemy NBC
attacks, leaders must ensure that individual and collective protection (see Appendix B)
equipment is prepared and readily available.
• Remaining mobile.
• Being ready to take actions, such as placing equipment under overhead
cover such as buildings or aircraft hangars.
• Covering supplies and equipment (e.g., use NBC protective covers).
• Monitoring unit radiation exposure (see Appendix D).
(3)
MOPP. MOPP balances protection requirements and performance
degradation with mission requirements. The commander has the responsibility for
providing guidance for levels of protection. The higher the MOPP level, the more protection
it provides, but the more it degrades performance. The leader’s MOPP decisions are based
on factors such as the threat, temperature, work rate, hydration requirements, and mission
(see Chapter V).
(a) MOPP Analysis. Leaders—generally at shipboard, air operating base,
and brigade/battalion level—establish protection levels based on a risk analysis (RA) of
their unit’s particular situation. The RA finds the balance between reducing the risk of
casualties and accomplishing the mission.
(b) Specialized Protective Requirements. Individual protective
requirements (see Appendix E) during TIM threat conditions—such as operations near
damaged industrial resources or other military operations other than war (MOOTW)
situations—may also require the use of other standard protection levels, such as those
specified by the US Environmental Protection Agency Levels A through D (see applicable
service references such as Field Manual [FM] 3-11.21 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence Management).
b.
Reacting to an Attack. Personnel take immediate action to reduce the impact of
an NBC attack. Commanders determine the risk they are willing to take depending on the
missions that must be accomplished. They take poststrike actions to restore fighting power
I-12
and prepare to continue the mission. Specific actions vary according to the type of attack
(see Chapter II).
c.
COLPRO. Collective NBC protection is that protection provided to a group of
individuals in an NBC environment and complements the individual protection provided by
MOPP gear. Under expected NBC contamination conditions, COLPRO is designed to
provide a toxic-free work environment for personnel. Under TIM conditions, COLPRO may
provide limited or uncertain protection for personnel. Alternatively, it may allow personnel
to temporarily remove overgarments. When CPS are used to provide relief from wearing
MOPP, commanders may establish a system for rotation of personnel (see Chapter VII and
Appendix B for more information on COLPRO). When COLPRO is used in support of
medical treatment facilities (MTF), commanders must ensure that contaminated patients
are decontaminated before they are received in the COLPRO area.
d.
HSS.
(1)
NBC protection must include provisions for adequate HSS. Commanders
are responsible for health maintenance of their personnel to ensure mission
accomplishment in the event of NBC attacks. Planning and training actions must include
health maintenance of the essential civilian workforce members supporting military
operations as well as the integration of military capabilities with those of the local public
health services, including those of the HN for operations abroad.
(2)
Preparations for operations in potential NBC environments include
preexposure immunizations, pretreatments, prophylaxis, and medical barrier materials
(e.g., creams) applicable to the entire force—including multinational, interagency, and
civilian participants. Postexposure measures require prior planning and include the
continuation of preventive measures. In contaminated environments, commanders take
action to ensure continued HSS capabilities, to include providing decontamination support
and security from nonmedical resources.
I-13
Chapter II
PREATTACK, DURING-ATTACK, AND POSTATTACK PROTECTIVE
ACTIONS
1.
Background
This chapter addresses preattack, during-attack, and postattack actions that can be
taken in the event of an NBC attack. Because operations in an NBC environment could also
include TIM incidents, this chapter addresses suggested protective actions that could be
taken in response to a TIM event.
2.
Common Preattack Actions
Personnel take protective actions before an attack (preattack), during the attack, and
following the attack (postattack). These actions are based on the type of attack and other
factors.
a.
There are many common preattack actions that can be taken to prepare for
operations in an NBC environment. These actions could include—
(1)
Designating Proposed Decontamination Sites. Commanders designate
proposed decontamination sites utilizing mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available—time available (METT-T); water availability; trafficability; accessibility;
and logistics supportability.
(2)
Assessing NBC Threat, Potential Risk, Likelihood of Attack, and
Vulnerability. Commanders must continuously monitor intelligence assessments,
SITREPS, and other related information to prepare themselves to make an informed
decision on whether or not to implement NBC defense measures upon notification of an
attack. The vulnerability assessment (VA) also provides for identification of TIM storage,
production, transit sites, and pipelines within an AO.
(3)
Implementing Coordinated NBC Defense Plans. Commanders should direct
implementation of the coordinated NBC defense plans developed for their unit. The kinds of
actions to be implemented include, but are not limited to, dispersing available detectors,
distributing IPE, and conducting training. The NBC defense plan may also include
provision for processing of noncombatants in an NBC environment (see Appendix F).
(4)
Preparing to Provide Primary Care for Unit Casualties. Unit commanders
should have their personnel prepare contingency plans for first aid and transport of unit
casualties.
(5)
Determining and Implementing MOPP. Based on the situation,
commanders should determine and implement the appropriate MOPP level and variation if
appropriate.
II-1
Note: See Chapters V and VI and Appendixes A and C for more information that supports
implementing appropriate MOPP levels.
(6)
Minimizing Skin Exposure. Commanders should direct personnel to
minimize skin exposure for protection against hazards (e.g., wearing shirt sleeves down and
closing neck buttons). Although inhalation of an agent is a concern, many agents can enter
the body by penetrating the skin or through skin cuts, cracks, or abrasions.
(7)
Continuing Good Hygiene Sanitation Methods. Commanders should require
their personnel to practice proper hygiene and sanitation methods at all times.
(8)
Deploying and Activating Detectors. Each unit, as part of the NBC defense
plan, should deploy available detectors.
(9)
Designating and Preparing Shelters. The commander should direct and
designate appropriate C2 and rest and relief shelters. Protection from weapons effects, such
as liquid and vapor contamination, blast, shrapnel, and heat, should determine the
suitability of buildings as shelters.
Note: See Chapter VII and Appendix B for information on COLPRO and collective
protective equipment (CPE), respectively.
(10) Watching for Attack Indicators. All personnel should be alert for signs of
attack. Attack indicators support the IPB process through providing data from NBC
reconnaissance measures. The NBC reconnaissance input can support confirmation or
denial of possible adversary COAs.
(11) Covering Unprotected, Mission-Essential Equipment. Commanders should
direct units to cover mission-essential equipment to prevent contamination from being
deposited on the equipment. This will reduce the need for decontamination and minimize
the possibility of personnel contaminating themselves if they have to handle the equipment
at a later time.
(12) Conducting Meteorological Monitoring. Meteorology is an important factor
on the impact of a CB aerosol release (whether overt or covert). If conditions for CB agent
release are possible (e.g., threat indicators are present), commanders may direct search or
surveillance activities or other NBC defense actions.
(13) Integrating Available Alarm and Warning Systems.
(a) Alarm and Detector Systems.
• CBRN Capability. CBRN agent alarms/detectors represent
another common critical element for effective defense. Without them, a unit cannot be
alerted and cannot detect contamination. Once in a high-threat area, alarms and/or
detectors must be in use. The alternative is to have the units take protective measures (e.g.,
donning protective gear). This equipment provides units with the capability to detect CBRN
agents.
II-2
• Biological Capability. The first signal that a unit has been exposed
to a biological agent may occur when large numbers of personnel become sick. However,
there are specialized biological point detectors that are available (e.g., USN Interim
Biological Agent Detection System [IBADS], DOD biological handheld sampling kits, and
USA Biological Integrated Detection System [BIDS]) for support of the air, land, and
maritime components.
(b) Warning Signals (Land Force and AB). The basic types of attack
warning signals are sound and visual. Personnel should warn others, using one or more of
these signals. Personnel give the alarm as soon as an attack or a hazard is detected and use
an alarm method that cannot be confused easily with other combat signals or sounds. All
who hear or see the alarm must repeat it swiftly throughout their areas and supplement
the warning with all available communications capability.
• Vocal. The spoken word is the first way of informing personnel of
an NBC hazard or attack. The vocal alarm for any CB hazard or attack is the word gas. The
person giving the alarm masks first and then shouts, “Gas!” as loudly as possible. Everyone
hearing this alarm immediately masks and then repeats the alarm. The vocal alarm for the
arrival of radiological contamination in a unit area is the word fallout. The first individual
to detect the arrival of fallout will usually be a radiological monitor operating a radiac
meter at the unit command post (CP). When the radiac meter records an increase in dose
rate to 1 centigray per hour (cGyph) or higher (or other service-determined threshold), the
monitor should immediately alert unit personnel.
• Sound. Sound signals reinforce the vocal alarm to warn of the
imminent arrival or the presence of NBC hazards. Sound signals consist of a succession of
short signals—such as the rapid and continuous beating on a metal object or anything that
produces a loud noise. The warning could be made by a succession of short blasts on a
vehicle horn or an interrupted warbling siren sound in situations where vocal alarms or the
sound of beating on metal would be lost because of battlefield noise.
• Visual. Standard hand-and-arm signals may be used for NBC
hazards. They consist of putting on the protective mask, extending both arms to the side
horizontally with doubled fists facing up, and moving the fists rapidly up to the head and
back down to the horizontal position.
• Visual/Audiovisual. If the automatic chemical agent alarms
(ACAAs) are in operation, detected agents will trigger a visual and auditory alarm unit.
The person who sees or hears an alarm signal from the alarm unit immediately masks and
augments this signal with a vocal signal. Communications personnel who hear the vocal
signal immediately mask and relay the signal over the unit communications nets.
Personnel reinforce this signal with other sounds or visual signals.
(c)
Shipboard Alarms. The shipboard interior communications general
announcing system is integrated with a system of alarm signals such as the general and
chemical alarm. The signals override the microphone control stations and are intended to
notify the crew of imminent danger.
II-3
• General Alarm. The general alarm signal is sounded by the officer
of the deck (OOD) to notify the crew of a battle condition. Some ships sound battle stations
(material condition ZEBRA) by the use of a bugle or a boatswain pipe. Others simply pass
the word, “Man your battle stations.” All hands will report to preassigned stations and set
material condition ZEBRA.
• Chemical Alarm. The chemical alarm signal is sounded by the
OOD, the damage control officer (DCO), or automatically by the shipboard chemical agent
point detection system when there has been an attack on or in the vicinity of the ship. All
hands exercise protective measures to reduce exposure and injuries.
(14) Designating proposed decontamination sites using METT-T, current
weather data, water availability, trafficability, accessibility, and logistics support ability.
(15) Using Warning Signals for AB/Fixed Sites.
(a) Standardized Warning Signals. Commanders use standardized
warning signals to prepare ABs or fixed sites for attacks, warn of attacks in progress,
initiate postattack recovery actions, and return the installation to a normal wartime state
of readiness. Table II-1 covers suggested warning signals and required actions for
installations within the continental United States (CONUS) and in US territories. Table II-
2 (page II-6) provides recommended standardized warning signals and required actions for
overseas bases subject to attack.
Table II-1. Standardized Alarm Signals for the US and its Territories and Possessions
(Recommended)
Warning Or
Signal
Meaning
Required Actions
Condition
Attack
3- to 5-minute wavering
Attack is imminent, or in
Proceed immediately to
tone on sirens or other
progress, or the arrival of
designated shelters or take
device.
nuclear fallout is imminent.
other appropriate actions.
Listen for additional
Warning
3 to 5 minutes of short
instructions.
blasts from horns, whistles,
or other devices.
Peacetime Emergency
3- to 5-minute steady tone
Peacetime disaster threat
Tune into local radio,
Warning
on sirens or long steady
exists.
television, or cable stations
blasts on horns, whistles,
for emergency information.
or similar devices.
Potential or confirmed
hazard to public health,
Listen to public address
safety, or property.
systems for additional
instructions.
Be prepared to evacuate,
take immediate shelter, or
take other appropriate
protective actions.
All Clear
Declared verbally by local
Emergency terminated.
Resume normal operations
official agencies.
or initiate recovery, if
applicable.
II-4
(b) Quick Communication. Warning signals quickly communicate the
commanders' intentions; direct personnel and units to take preplanned, time-phased
defense actions; or simply notify everyone to take cover. Signals used to initiate preplanned
actions may be specific to one or more functional areas. Other actions, such as assuming
predesignated MOPP conditions or seeking protective cover or shelter, may apply to most of
the base or the fixed-site population. Although warning signals are primarily designed to
provide air, missile, artillery, and ground attack warning, they may be used to warn of
covert attacks with CB weapons.
(c)
Alarm Conditions.
•
Commanders declare alarm conditions to initiate passive defense
actions in wartime. Unless local or theater requirements dictate otherwise, bases or fixed
sites generally use the warning signals and alarm conditions listed in Table II-2 (page II-6).
Alarm conditions, combined with supplemental instructions through the chain of command,
are the most effective way to establish a defensive posture. When NBC threats are present,
the commander can further direct options that could range from MOPP levels 0 to 4 and
also use variations (e.g., mask only) to provide the minimum level of protection for the
current mission and situation.
•
Warning signals are used that are compatible with HN, local, or
theater systems. The base or fixed site warning system must provide effective coverage for
all areas. Warning signals are displayed as visual aids in all work centers and common use
areas (such as billeting tents, post offices, latrines, dining facilities, recreation areas, etc.).
Transient and new personnel are briefed on warning signals and protective actions.
• Commanders are authorized wide latitude in determining warning
signals. This information may include changes in alarm color codes or audible signals to
accommodate theater or HN requirements and supplemental information to respond to
specific weapons or threats. Standard warning signals should be used to the greatest extent
possible. Regardless of the signals used, commanders are responsible for disseminating the
warning signals information to all assigned, attached, and transient personnel to ensure
that they take correct defensive actions in response to the base warning signals.
II-5
Table II-2 Standardized Alarm Signals for OCONUS Bases and Stations Subject to Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Attacks (Recommended)
Alarm
If You:
This Indicates
General
Condition
Actions
•
Don MOPP0 or as directed.¹,³
Green
Hear: Alarm
Attack is not probable.
•
Perform normal wartime operations.
“green”
•
Resume operations.
See: Green flag
•
Continue recovery operations.
•
Don MOPP2 or as directed.1
Hear: Alarm
Attack is probable in less than 30
•
Protect and cover assets.
“yellow”
minutes.
Yellow
•
Go to protective shelters or seek the
best protection with overhead cover.²
See: Yellow flag
Hear: Alarm “red”,
•
Seek immediate protection with
or a siren (wavering
overhead cover.²
Attack by air or missile is imminent or in
tone)
•
Don MOPP4 or as directed.1
progress.
Red
•
Report observed attacks.
See: Red flag
Hear: Ground
Take immediate cover.²,³
attack, or a bugle
Attack by ground force is imminent or in
Don MOPP4 or as directed.¹
(call-to-arms)
progress.
Defend self and position.
See: Red flag
Report activities.
Don MOPP4 or as directed.¹,³
Attack is over. and NBC contamination
Perform self-aid/buddy care.
Hear: Alarm “black”
and/or UXO hazards are suspected or
Black
or a siren (steady
Remain under overhead cover or
present.
tone)
within shelter until directed
otherwise.
See: Black flag
¹ Wear field gear and personal body armor (if issued) when outdoors or when directed.
² Commanders may direct continuation of mission-essential tasks or functions at increased risk.
³ This alarm condition may be applied to an entire installation or assigned to one or more defense sectors or zones.
(16) Analyzing Warning Time Assessments. Commanders analyze the potential
attack warning process to identify limitation and deficiencies. Warning times will vary by
threat and the real-time ability of both theater and installation warning systems to
disseminate warning information. Analyze the warning system performance for each
primary threat (missile, aircraft, ground, etc.). Use the analysis to develop a chain of events
timeline that identifies each primary and secondary warning event from initial event
detection through notification to the lowest unit level. These time lines enable the chain-of-
command to develop and practice preplanned scenarios and quickly adjust strategies to
react to attack situations. For example, installations may receive little (several minutes) or
II-6
no warning of missile or artillery attacks. However, aircraft, cruise missile, and remotely
piloted vehicle attack warning times (due to different flight profiles) may be long enough
(tens of minutes) to allow extensive preplanned actions. Regardless of the warning times,
commanders and their staffs must quickly analyze the available attack information,
evaluate the effect on current operations, and decide on the most effective COAs within the
time available.
(17) Monitoring status of NBC Equipment and Supplies. Units assess the
logistics supportability of each COA and determine what equipment and supplies (see
Appendix G) are needed.
(18) Preparing for Contingencies. Units prepare for unexpected situations. The
preparation could include handling instructions for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
threats using postal mail or packages (see Appendix H).
b.
Specific preattack, during-attack, and postattack actions (unique to NBC,
COLPRO, and TIM) are discussed in the following paragraphs.
3.
Nuclear Protection
This paragraph discusses preattack, during-attack, and postattack aspects of
protection that can be accomplished in the event of a nuclear attack. Personnel must make
defensive preparations to protect themselves; the effective use of terrain and shelter is also
very important. Additionally, a nuclear attack can also create EMP effects.
• By knowing how terrain affects nuclear weapons, personnel can greatly reduce
the risk of becoming casualties. With training and practice, they can learn to recognize
defensive positions that will give them optimum protection against a nuclear blast.
• Hills and Mountains. Reverse slopes of hills and mountains give some nuclear
protection. Heat and light from the fireball of a nuclear blast and the initial radiation tend
to be absorbed by hills and mountains. What is not absorbed deflects above the personnel
because of the slope.
• Depressions and Obstructions. The use of gullies, ravines, ditches, natural
depressions, fallen trees, and caves can reduce nuclear casualties. However, predicting the
actual point of a nuclear attack is almost impossible. The best protection remains an area
below ground with some sort of overhead cover.
• Obscuration. When the threat of nuclear weapons use is high, smoke can be used
to attenuate the thermal energy effects from nuclear detonations.
a.
Preattack Actions. Preattack actions are critical because they will increase the
unit’s survivability to the greatest possible extent. These actions range from selecting the
right shelters, fortifying those shelters, and protecting vital equipment to using equipment
to increase survivability. Whenever the tactical situation permits, units prepare defensive
positions. These will vary from individual fighting positions to improved defensive
positions. These actions and good prior planning protect against nuclear effects. One
primary concern should be protection from gamma and neutron radiation. Gamma
II-7
radiation protection requires thick layers of dense or heavy shielding material, such as
lead, iron, or stone. On the other hand, light, hydrogen-based material gives good neutron
radiation protection. Some examples are water, paraffin, and oil.
Note: The balance of the information in paragraphs 2 through 4 applies to land forces. See
NWP 3-20.31 (Revision A), Surface Ship Survivability, for TTP on maritime CBR defense
measures.
Note: See Appendix D for more detailed information on radiological protection—such as
operational exposure guide (OEG), low-level radiation (LLR) exposure, and depleted
uranium (DU).
(1)
Fighting Positions.
(a) Digging in provides improved defense, because earth is a good
shielding material. A well-constructed fighting position gives excellent protection against
initial nuclear effects. It can also reduce residual radiation (fallout). Personnel must harden
their fighting positions against the blast wave as time permits. Lining or revetting fighting
positions can significantly increase survivability and decrease the size of the opening into
the position. Smaller openings allow entry of less initial and residual radiation. However,
many metal surfaces are good thermal reflectors. Cover these surfaces to prevent an
increased danger of burns from the heat of nuclear blasts.
(b) The smaller the fighting position opening, the better. Most of the
gamma radiation in the bottom of a fighting position enters through the opening. The
smaller opening of a one-person fighting position reduces gamma radiation two to four
times below the amount that a two-person foxhole allows to enter.
(c)
A deep fighting position gives more radiation protection than a
shallow one. It places a greater thickness of shielding material or earth between the
occupant and the nuclear detonation. Therefore, it prevents less initial radiation from
entering. In a two-person fighting position, radiation reduces by a factor of 2 for each 16
inches of fighting position depth.
(d) Thermal radiation can reach personnel in fighting positions by line-of-
sight (LOS) exposure or by reflection off the sides. Use dark, rough materials to cover
potential reflecting surfaces and as protective covers. Examples are wool (such as blankets)
and canvas. Remember that thermal exposure may still burn or char these materials. Avoid
direct contact with them. Do not use rubber or plastic materials alone. These items might
melt and cause burns. Simply covering a position with ordinary metal screening material
blocks the thermal radiation by about 50 percent. Use this screening for thermal protection
without entirely blocking the view through the ports. Personnel must cover exposed
portions, and they must keep low. Keeping low reduces thermal exposure just as it reduces
nuclear radiation exposure.
(2)
Field-Expedient Overhead Cover.
(a) An overhead covering of earth or other material reduces exposure to
thermal and initial nuclear radiation and fallout. Overhead covering helps prevent collapse.
It also provides protection against debris, such as falling rocks.
II-8
(b) Beware of poorly constructed overhead covers. A cover must be strong
enough to withstand the blast wave. Use U-shaped metal pickets, timbers, or certain
fabrics; and overlay them with sandbags or earth. Ammunition boxes filled with earth also
make good cover. In constructing an effective overhead cover, remember the following:
• Choose dense covering materials.
• Cover in depth.
• Provide strong supports.
• Cover as much of the opening as possible.
(c)
A vehicle provides expedient overhead cover. A simple and fast
method is to drive a vehicle over the top of a fighting position. A heavy armored vehicle is
better than a wheeled vehicle. As with any type of overhead cover, initial radiation can still
enter the fighting position through the earth sides or the openings in the sides of the
vehicle (between treads, road wheels, and tires). If time allows, use sandbags to cover these
openings. Remember, the vehicle is not a good neutron shield. Also, the blast wave may
violently displace the vehicle and collapse a fighting position.
(3)
Earth-Shielded Positions.
(a) Well-constructed fighting positions and bunkers can provide excellent
protection against all effects of a nuclear detonation. Radiation is still an important
concern, though, because of its great penetrating power. Radiation scatters in all directions
after a blast.
(b) It is important that as much earth cover as possible be placed between
the individual and the blast. The more earth cover, the better the shielding. Table II-3
(page II-10) illustrates the value of increasing amounts of earth shielding from a
hypothetical, free-in-air dose. An open fighting position gives a protection factor of 8. It
blocks most of the LOS radiation and allows only a fraction of scattered radiation to enter.
Each added 6-inch thickness of overhead earth cover reduces the scattered radiation by a
factor of 2.
II-9
Table II-3. Shielding Values of Each Cover for a 2,400-Centigray, Free-In-Air Dose
Personnel In
Radiation Protection Factor
Resultant Dose cGy
Open
None
2,400
Open Fighting Position (4” Earth Cover)
8
300
Open Fighting Position (6” Earth Cover)
12
200
Open Fighting Position (12” Earth Cover)
24
100
Open Fighting Position (18” Earth Cover)
48
50
Open Fighting Position (24” Earth Cover)
96
25
(c)
The flat earth cover of an underground shelter protects much better
than an equivalent thickness of cover on a similar aboveground structure. This is because
the underground LOS thickness is greater.
(d) A second layer of sandbags gives more protection to fighting positions.
Each layer of sandbags, if filled with sand or compacted clay, reduces the transmitted
radiation by a factor of 2. Table II-4 shows the advantage of adding layers of sandbags for a
hypothetical, free-in-air dose of 2,400 centigray (cGy).
Table II-4. Shielding Values of Each Cover for a 2,400-Centigray, Sand or Clay-Filled
Sandbags, Free-In-Air Dose
Personnel In
Radiation Protection Factor
Resultant Dose cGy
Open
None
2,400
Open Fighting Position, 4’ Deep
8
300
Open Fighting Position, 4’ Deep, 1
16
150
Layer (4 Inches)
Open Fighting Position, 4’ Deep, 2
32
75
Layers (8 Inches)
Open Fighting Position, 18’ Deep, 3
64
38
Layers (12 Inches)
(e) Sand or compacted clay gives better radiation shielding than earth
because it is denser. Each layer of sand- or clay-filled sandbags can give up to 66 percent
more radiation protection than the same thickness of soil or soil-filled sandbags. Table II-4
shows that three layers of sand or clay-filled sandbags give a protection factor of 64 (38
cGy). Generally, heavy sandbags protect better than light ones.
(f)
Neutron radiation can be stopped. Water delays and absorbs neutrons,
but since some gamma radiation is given off in the process, dense shielding is still required.
Damp earth or concrete protects from both forms of radiation. For example, only 12 inches
II-10
of concrete or 24 inches of damp earth reduce neutron radiation exposure by a factor of 10.
Wet sandbags achieve a reduction factor of 2 for every 4-inch layer. Other expedient
neutron-shielding materials include containers of water, fuel, or oil. Remember that
radiation scatters in all directions, and shielding must provide all-around protection.
(g) Protect sandbags from exposure to thermal radiation. Sandbags can
burn and spill their contents, which can then be moved more easily by the blast wave.
Cover sandbags with a small amount of earth and/or sod to eliminate this problem.
Covering sandbags also enhances camouflage and provides valuable fragmentation
protection.
(4)
Buildings.
(a) Certain types of buildings offer excellent shelter from nuclear hazards
and require minimum of time and effort to adapt for use. Choose buildings carefully. The
stronger the structure, the better the protection against blast effects. The strongest are
heavily framed buildings of steel and reinforced concrete. The worst choices are shed-type
industrial buildings with light frames and long beam spans. Even well-constructed frame
houses are stronger than the latter. Ammunition storage bunkers also give exceptional
protection. These are usually large enough for most vehicles and equipment.
(b) Many European, rural and urban structures can provide good
protection. Many types of pre-World War II European buildings provide good blast and
radiation protection. Examples are farmhouses, churches, and municipal buildings.
Characteristics to look for include the following:
• Pre-World War II buildings. These have thick, full-span floor and
ceiling beams; heavy roofing tiles; dense, reinforced walls; and, in most cases, a full
basement.
• Full basements constructed of concrete or stone. Make sure that
there is an exit directly to the outside as well as through the upper floors in case of
emergency.
• Thick-walled masonry structures.
• Buildings with very little glass. European windows are typically
protected by roll-up or folding shutters. These coverings provide some additional blast and
thermal protection.
(c)
A shielded building is best. Exterior rows of buildings in closely
arranged groups (towns) shield buildings in the interior. These shielded structures suffer
less blast overpressure and structural damage than exposed structures. However, debris
and rubble problems and fire hazards may increase toward the center of town.
Commanders should consider using shelters located two or three building rows from the
edge of town to avoid serious hindrance to postattack mobility.
(d) Personnel should move below ground level. The basement, because it
is below ground, provides increased blast protection and much more LOS radiation
II-11
protection than aboveground floors. This additional protection results from the surrounding
earth fill. Add additional radiation protection by placing a layer of earth or sandbags on the
floor above. This additional deadweight will be significant and may require shoring up the
floor. Alternately, more protection can be gained by sandbagging a smaller shelter in the
basement (such as a sturdy table) without increasing the possibility of the entire floor
collapsing. Block windows with sandbags and enhance the radiation protection and
structural strength of any aboveground exterior walls by piling dirt and sandbags against
the walls. Generally speaking, personnel can reduce radiation by a factor of 10 in
basements as compared to levels in aboveground floors.
(e) Positions inside the building can make a difference if sufficient time is
available to properly prepare them. On floors aboveground, the center of the building offers
the greatest protection from both initial and residual radiation. Belowground, the corners of
the building give the greatest protection. In either case, the dose to prone personnel would
be about one-half the dose to a standing individual. The lesson here is to seek shelter in an
underground structure and lie in a corner. If an underground shelter is not available, lie in
the center of a shelter under a sturdy table. Other options include lying inside a fireplace,
under a stairway, or in a bathroom where the plumbing and relatively close spacing of walls
might provide increased structural strength.
(5)
Tents. Tents are not a preferred shelter against the effects of nuclear
weapons. A tent does provide some protection from residual nuclear effects (e.g., particulate
fallout).
(6)
Armored Vehicles. Armored vehicles provide good nuclear protection. In
most situations, tanks offer the best vehicular protection available. Lightly armored
vehicles also offer good protection. These vehicles include infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs),
self-propelled artillery, and some heavy engineer equipment. If time is available, this
protection can be improved with any of the following actions:
(a) Keep as low as possible inside an armored vehicle. Crew members
normally elevated in a tank turret should get on the floor of the armored vehicle. This
applies to the tank commander, gunner, and loader. Assuming such a low position reduces
the radiation received by a factor of 4.
(b) Keep all hatches shut. Obviously, an open hatch will expose the crew
unnecessarily to explosion effects. It could subsequently allow the entry of fallout particles
and scattered gamma radiation. Close any other openings, such as the main gun breech.
(c)
Prevent injury while inside an armored vehicle. The blast wave will
throw personnel violently about inside an armored vehicle. Wear a helmet with the
chinstrap secured to help prevent head injuries.
(d) Secure all loose equipment inside the vehicle. The force of the blast
can throw about unsecured, loose equipment (such as tools, weapons, and helmets) inside
the vehicle and cause injury or death to personnel.
(e) Dig-in armored vehicles (hull defilade) or place them in trenches or
cuts in roadways. This provides some limited LOS radiation protection and considerable
II-12
blast protection. A hull defilade fighting position or a trench that allows half of the vehicle
sides to be covered can reduce gamma radiation by as much as a factor of 2.
(f)
Use sandbags as radiation shielding. A single layer of sandbags placed
on top of a tank turret or an armored vehicle hull provides valuable overhead gamma
shielding. Each layer of sandbags reduces the gamma radiation by a factor of 2. Wetting the
sandbags enhances the neutron radiation shielding and protects the sandbags from thermal
damage.
(7)
Wheeled Vehicles.
(a) Avoid using wheeled vehicles as shelter. Generally, wheeled vehicles
provide little or no protection from the effects of nuclear explosions. Worse still, they are
particularly vulnerable to overturning. This exposes drivers and passengers to increased
risks.
(b) Ensure that personnel protect themselves as much as possible inside
the vehicles.
(c)
Secure all loose equipment inside the vehicles.
(d) Plan for and prepare adequate field shelters immediately adjacent to
facilities that require personnel to continue operations in wheeled vehicles. Parking the
vehicle inside or under a shelter gives some protection to the personnel inside. Existing or
natural structures—such as ammunition bunkers, underpasses, tunnels, and caves—are in
this category.
(8)
Aircraft Ground Operations.
(a) Revetments give little protection against blast overpressure. However,
revetments and barricades protect aircraft from damage by dynamic wind. These also
protect aircraft from other hazards—such as the impact of rocks, sand, and other aircraft or
aircraft debris. The tactical situation may require revetting for protection from
conventional weapons blast and fragmentation damage. Use overhead cover for aircraft if it
is available. Close doors and windows against damaging overpressure.
(b) Tie-downs can reduce damage from tumbling of the aircraft.
Generally, tie-downs do not produce excessive stress on tie-down points. Aircraft plexiglass
windows shatter into fragments. This can happen at low-blast overpressure (1.5 pounds per
square inch [psi]) when there is no other significant damage. Tape the edges and the
centers of windows. This reduces the extent of fragmentation and the nuisance that
fragments may cause to cockpit operations.
(9)
Electromagnetic Equipment. When enough warning has been given,
commanders must ensure that electronic equipment, such as radios and computers, are
turned off and protected. EMP is the high-energy, short-duration pulse (similar in some
respects to a bolt of lightning) generated by a nuclear detonation. It can induce a current in
any electrical conductor and temporarily disrupt or overload and damage components of
improperly protected or unprotected electronic equipment.
II-13
b.
During-Attack Actions. Nuclear attack indicators are unmistakable. The bright
flash, enormous explosion, high winds, and mushroom-shaped cloud clearly indicate a
nuclear attack. An enemy attack would normally come without warning. Initial actions
must, therefore, be automatic and instinctive.
(1)
An attack occurring without warning is immediately noticeable. The first
indication will be very intense light. Heat and initial radiation come with the light, and the
blast follows within seconds. Time needed to take protective action will be minimal. If
exposed when a detonation occurs, personnel should do the following:
•
Drop facedown immediately with feet facing the blast. This will lessen
the possibility of heat/blast injuries to the head, face, and neck. A log, a large rock, or any
depression in the earth’s surface provides some protection.
•
Close eyes.
•
Protect exposed skin from heat by putting hands and arms under or
near the body and keeping the helmet on.
• Remain facedown until the blast wave passes and debris stops falling.
(2)
Personnel should stay calm, check for injury, check weapons and equipment
for damage, and prepare to continue the mission. Personnel in fighting positions can take
additional precautions. The fighting position puts more earth between personnel and the
potential source of radiation. They can curl up on one side, but the best position is on the
back with knees drawn up to the chest. This position may seem vulnerable, but the arms
and legs are more radiation-resistant and will protect the head and trunk. Personnel can
also seek other forms of overhead protection (if available) within a fighting position/shelter
in case the overhead cover/roof collapses. Store bulky equipment, such as packs or radios,
in adjacent pits if they prevent personnel from keeping low in their positions, or place these
items over the face and hands for additional radiation and blast protection.
(3)
Personnel inside shelters should take protective actions. A blast wave can
enter the shelter with great force, and the debris it carries can cause injuries. Lying
facedown on the floor of the shelter offers protection. However, avoid the violent flow of air
from doors or windows. Lying near a wall is safer than standing away from a wall.
Constructing baffles or turns in shelter entrances can prevent overpressure buildups and
the entry of dust and debris.
c.
Postattack Actions. Protection must not stop when the attack ends. Immediately
after an attack, postattack recovery begins.
(1)
Personnel must check for radioactive contamination and, then, must reduce
the hazard with basic decontamination. Decontamination techniques to reduce radioactive
contamination are to brush, scrape, or flush radiological contamination from surfaces.
(2)
As a minimum, unit personnel cover positions and shelters, and radiac
meter operators begin continuous monitoring. IPE reduces the amount of contaminants
that can enter the lungs and the potential for skin burns from beta and alpha particles.
II-14
(3)
For the commander, poststrike actions include damage assessment and the
restoration of combat power.
(4)
Commanders and NBC personnel must also monitor schedules for pieces of
NBC equipment having filters. Exchange is based on service equipment directives or when
the following conditions are applicable:
• Physical damage occurs.
• Filters have become waterlogged or wet.
• High resistance to airflow is observed.
• Directed to exchange filters by higher HQ.
• Listed as unserviceable in applicable directives.
d.
Nuclear Casualties. Blast, thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation all cause
nuclear casualties. Except for radiation casualties, treat nuclear casualties the same as
conventional casualties. Wounds caused by blast are similar to other combat wounds.
Thermal burns are treated as any other type of burn. First aid cannot help radiation
casualties. These casualties must be referred to medical facilities.
4.
Biological Protection
This section discusses preattack, during-attack, and postattack aspects of protective
actions that must be accomplished in the event of a biological attack. Protection against
biological agents begins long before the actual attack happens. Biological agents can enter
the body through the skin, respiratory tract, and digestive tract. Key preparations begin
with personal health maintenance followed by NBC defensive training, which all personnel
must master.
a.
Biological Agents. Biological agents can be classified according to their biological
type, operational effects, and physiological action. Operationally, biological agents are best
thought of as either pathogens or toxins.
• Pathogens. Pathogens are living organisms. As such, they require certain
conditions of temperature, humidity, protection from sunlight, and a susceptible host
population. The biological agent must overcome a host’s natural defenses (during a latent
period) in order to cause illness. The duration period of this incubation could last from
hours to days. Pathogens can be disseminated in wet or dry form or by vectors (e.g.,
mosquitoes). Additionally, some pathogens are contagious and can be spread from
individual to individual; therefore, personnel not in the initial area of attack could become
casualties. Following a large-scale dissemination of a biological agent, an initial disease
outbreak of epidemic proportions might occur.
• Toxins. Toxins are poisons naturally produced through the activities of living
organisms. Some toxins can now be artificially synthesized (e.g., powder form) and
disseminated in liquid or dry form. Generally, toxins do not cause immediate casualty-
II-15
producing effects, and any casualties will arise hours to days after exposure. Unlike
pathogens, toxins are not contagious (e.g., one person cannot infect another).
(1)
Duration of effectiveness. The effectiveness duration of a biological agent
depends on the characteristics of the agent, environmental factors, and any residual
hazards. Solar (ultraviolet) radiation, relative humidity, wind speed, and temperature
gradient are some of the most important weather factors in determining the effectiveness
duration. As previously mentioned, biological agents can be disseminated as aerosols, liquid
droplets, or dry powders.
(2)
Cause of Casualty-Producing Effects. The primary cause of biological-agent,
casualty-producing effects is through inhalation of an aerosol containing particles.
Additionally, casualties can also be caused by the percutaneous effects of agents such as
mycotoxins. Weather conditions have a tremendous impact on the employment of biological
agents. Pathogenic agents will generally dissipate and decay in the presence of ultraviolet
radiation. Some of the agent-containing particles (e.g., spores) disseminated as an aerosol,
may settle out of suspension onto the ground; however, the impact of any residual hazard
from reaerosolization of spores, such as anthrax, may present a hazard for personnel
operating in a contaminated area for extended periods of time.
(3)
Protective Measures. Protective measures include the use of IPE (e.g., a
well-fitted mask), good hygiene, proper sanitation, and up-to-date immunizations. An
individual’s IPE provides protection against BW agents; however, based on the delayed
casualty-producing effects of BW agents, personnel will not likely know an attack has
occurred. See applicable service publications for information on the prevention and
treatment of biological-agent casualties.
b.
Preattack Actions. Preparations before an attack can be accomplished long
before a biological attack happens. Personal health maintenance and realistic training are
just two ways in which commanders can minimize their biological casualties. All personnel
and leaders must adhere to the basic principles of good health; this applies especially under
NBC conditions.
(1)
Up-to-Date Immunizations. Immunizations reduce the chances of becoming
biological casualties. Proper immunizations protect against many known disease-producing
biological agents. All personnel should receive basic immunizations. Medical personnel will
periodically screen these records and keep them up to date. If units deploy to areas in which
specific diseases are prevalent, readiness preparation may include providing additional
immunizations for needed protection. This prophylactic inoculation should be part of the
IPB process and should be brought to the commander’s attention.
(2)
Good Hygiene. Protect against the spread of disease by practicing good
health habits. The best defense against biological agents is good personal hygiene, keeping
the body as clean as possible. This means not only washing the face and hands, but all
parts of the body—particularly the feet and exposed skin. Hands need to be cleaned before
meals or anytime bare hands are used to help ingest food and liquid or when smoking.
Shaving may seem unimportant in the field, but it is required to achieve a proper seal of
the mask. This is important because biological agents are usually most effective when
received via the respiratory system or the skin. Small nicks, scratches, and cuts are
II-16
unavoidable in a field situation. Pathogens, either naturally occurring or intentionally
employed as biological agents, enter these breaks in the skin and will cause infections if left
untreated. Personnel should clean any breaks in skin with soap and water followed by first
aid treatment.
(3)
Area Sanitation. Another way to stop the spread of disease is to keep the
area clean. Bury all empty ration packets and residue. Locate, construct, and use field
sanitation facilities properly. Latrine facilities should include soap and water for hand
washing. Latrines need to be cleaned daily. Avoid leaving such facilities open, and make
sure that they are properly filled and marked before moving to help prevent accidental
digging in the areas. Control of insects and rodents is also essential in preventing the
spread of disease. Additional information on field sanitation can be found in service
preventive-medicine (PVNTMED) publications.
(4)
Physical Conditioning. Good physical condition requires maintaining the
body in a well-rested, well-fed, and healthy state. Personnel should get as much exercise
and rest as the situation permits, and they must remember to eat properly. If they stay
healthy, their bodies will be better able to fight off germs. A high level of physical fitness
also reduces the likelihood of heat stress when MOPP gear is worn for extended periods.
Continuous operations will require that personnel learn to sleep in short naps and in
MOPP4. This is also part of the conditioning process. It may also become necessary to eat
smaller portions and at more frequent intervals.
(5)
DOD Insect Repellent System. Proper implementation of the DOD Insect
Repellent System will provide protection from those insects and ticks that may be used as
biological agent vectors.
(6)
NBC Training. Training in an NBC environment is integrated into all areas
of unit training—individual and collective. Personnel learn, practice, and train to perform
individual NBC survival tasks. Leaders are directly responsible for reinforcing these tasks
through continuous training, thereby instilling individual confidence.
c.
During-Attack Actions. If threat forces attack with biological agents, there may
be little or no warning. This will depend on the IPB assessment. Units automatically
assume MOPP4 to protect themselves against contamination when there are high-
probability indicators of an attack.
(1)
Biological-Attack Indicators. Biological agents may be disseminated as
aerosols, liquid droplets, or dry powder. Attacks with biological agents can be very subtle or
direct, if favorable weather conditions prevail. In nearly all circumstances, an individual
will not know a biological attack has occurred. Symptoms can appear from minutes to days
after an attack has occurred. Indicators may include—
• Mysterious illness (many individuals sick for unknown reasons).
• Large numbers of vectors, such as insects or unusual insects.
• Large numbers of dead or strange-acting (wild and domestic) animals.
II-17
• Mass casualties with flu-like symptoms—fever, sore throat, skin rash,
mental abnormalities, pneumonia, diarrhea, dysentery, hemorrhaging, or jaundice.
• Artillery shells with less powerful explosions than high-explosive (HE)
rounds.
• Aerial bombs that pop rather than explode.
• Mist or fog sprayed by aircraft or aerosol generators.
• Unexploded bomblets found in the area.
(2)
Immediate Actions. Assuming MOPP provides protection against biological
agents. However, an agent can gain entry through openings such as buttonholes; zipped
areas; stitching; poor sealing at ankles, wrists, and neck; or through minute pores in the
clothing fabric. Some toxins, however, require the same amount of protection as chemical
agents. Since no wide-scale immediate-warning, biological-agent detection device is fielded,
consider any unknown agent cloud as a sign of a biological attack and take the same actions
prescribed for a chemical attack. For COLPRO, personnel must be housed inside a shelter
with an efficient air filter system. Many buildings may be converted into temporary
shelters if cracks are carefully sealed and a CB filter system with a ventilating mechanism
is installed.
d.
Postattack Actions. Actions after a biological attack include submitting NBC
reports, beginning post attack recovery, and other actions—such as taking samples,
identifying casualties by the symptoms they exhibit, and treating those symptoms. Early
recognition of symptoms and treatment is essential in trying to limit the effects.
Additionally, personnel should decontaminate immediately after an attack by using
decontamination kits or washing with soap and water.
Note: Postexposure chemoprophylaxis is essential for preventing anthrax. See FM 8-284,
Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties, for details.
(1)
Agent Exposure. It is necessary to isolate individuals showing symptoms of
contagious disease. This isolation helps prevent possible spread to others if the disease is
communicable. Treatment of biological-agent casualties requires medical assistance as soon
as possible. Further, symptoms associated with some toxins mimic other illness or
chemical-casualty symptoms. Agent symptoms may include—
• Dizziness, mental confusion, or double or blurred vision.
• Skin tingling, numbness, paralysis, or convulsions.
• Formation of rashes or blisters.
• Coughing.
• Fever, aching muscles, fatigue, and difficulty in swallowing.
• Nausea, vomiting, and/or diarrhea.
II-18
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