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Design
multiple units, Services, multinational forces, or other instruments of national power. Commanders mitigate
these risks with collaboration and by applying the design fundamentals:
z
Apply critical thinking.
z
Understand the operational environment.
z
Solve the right problem.
z
Adapt to dynamic conditions.
z
Achieve the designated goals.
Apply Critical Thinking
3-22. Commanders ensure that superiors and subordinates share a common understanding of the purpose
behind intended actions. Initial guidance provided by a higher political or military authority may prove
insufficient to create clearly stated, decisive, and attainable objectives in complex situations that involve
political, social, economic, and other factors. After commanders conduct a detailed study of the situation,
they may conclude that some desired goals are unrealistic or not feasible within the limitations. These
limitations stem from the inherent tension that often exists among different goals, historical tensions in the
local population, interactions of different actors seeking to improve their own survivability and position,
and limited resources and time available to achieve the mission. One can never fully understand the
dynamics of a conflict in advance. Well-intentioned guidance without detailed study may lead to an
untenable or counterproductive solution.
3-23. Design helps mitigate the risk associated with guidance that does not fully account for the
complexities of the operational environment by using a critical and creative approach for learning,
innovation, and adaptation. Design helps to clarify objectives in the context of the operational environment
and within the limits imposed by policy, strategy, orders, or directives. This does not imply that
commanders can arbitrarily disregard instructions. If, however, they receive unclear guidance or consider
the desired conditions unachievable, commanders engage in active dialog. Dialog clarifies guidance and
enables commanders to offer recommendations to achieve a mutual understanding of the current situation
and the desired end state. Design can assist commanders in leading the top-down/bottom-up approach at all
echelons.
Understand the Operational Environment
3-24. Design challenges leaders to understand the impact of their decisions and actions on the operational
environment. (See chapter 1.) Gaining a deeper and more thorough understanding of the operational
environment enables more effective decisionmaking and helps to integrate military operations with the
other instruments of national power. In an environment characterized by the presence of joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational partners, such understanding is essential to success. In this context,
human variables, interactions, and relationships are frequently decisive. Military force may be necessary to
achieve national policy aims, but, by itself, force proves insufficient to achieve victory in these situations.
More importantly, leaders and Soldiers must recognize the relationship between the character of conflict
and the approach one takes to effect changes in the operational environment.
3-25. Developing a thorough understanding of the operational environment is a continuous process. Even
though this understanding will never be perfect, attempting to comprehend its complex nature helps
identify unintended consequences that may undermine well-intentioned efforts. Deep understanding reveals
the dynamic nature of the human interactions and the importance of identifying contributing factors.
Leaders can gain this understanding by capitalizing on multiple perspectives and varied sources of
knowledge. For example, intelligence knowledge generated as part of the intelligence process contributes to
contextual understanding of the operational environment. (See FM 2-0.) Design encourages the commander
and staff to seek and address complexity before attempting to impose simplicity.
Solve the Right Problem
3-26. Commanders use design to ensure they are solving the right problem. When commanders use design,
they closely examine the symptoms, the underlying tensions, and the root causes of conflict in the
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operational environment. From this perspective, they can identify the fundamental problem with greater
clarity and consider more accurately how to solve it. Design is essential to ensuring commanders identify
the right problem to solve. Effective application of design is the difference between solving a problem right
and solving the right problem.
Adapt to Dynamic Conditions
3-27. Innovation and adaptation lead to capitalizing on opportunities by quickly recognizing and exploiting
actions that work well while dismissing those that do not. Adaptation does not rely on being able to
anticipate every challenge. Instead, it uses continuous assessment to determine what works and what does
not. Adaptation occurs through the crucial process of assessment and subsequent changes in how one
approaches problems. In the military domain, adaptation demands clearly articulated measures of
effectiveness. These measures define success and failure along with after action reviews that capture and
implement lessons at all echelons.
3-28. Effective use of design improves the ability to adapt. Adaptation in this sense involves reframing the
situation to align with new information and experiences that challenge existing understanding. Through
framing and reframing achieved through iterative collaboration and dialog, design provides a foundation
for organizational learning and contributes to the necessary clarity of vision required by successful
commanders.
Achieve the Designated Goals
3-29. If the link between strategy and tactics is clear, the likelihood that tactical actions will translate into
strategic success increases significantly. For complex, ill-structured problems, integrating and
synchronizing operations to link sequences of tactical actions to achieve a strategic aim may prove elusive.
Through design, commanders employ operational art to cement the link between strategic objectives and
tactical action ensuring that all tactical actions will produce conditions that ultimately define the desired
end state. As understanding of the operational environment and problem improves, design adapts to
strengthen the link between strategy and tactics, promoting operational coherence, unity of effort, and
strategic success.
LEADING DESIGN
3-30. ±Commanders are the central figure in design. Generally, the more complex a situation is, the more
important the commander’s role is in design. Commanders draw on design to overcome the challenges of
complexity. They foster iterative collaboration and dialog while leveraging their collective knowledge,
experience, judgment, and intuition to generate a clearer understanding of the conditions needed to achieve
success. Design supports the commander’s ability to understand and visualize the operational environment.
3-31. The practice of design is not exclusive to a particular level of command. Design can apply to all
levels, depending on the context and circumstances. However, given the complexity of the operational
environment, the need for design at lower echelons often increases as brigades and battalions contend with
the challenges of shaping environments and conducting operations over extended periods.
3-32. In leading design, commanders typically draw from a select group within the planning staff, red team
members, and subject matter experts internal and external to the headquarters. The commander selects
these individuals based on their expertise relative to the problem. The commander expects these individuals
to gain insights and inputs from areas beyond their particular expertise—either in person or through
reachback—to frame the problem more fully. Design serves to establish the context for guidance and
orders. By using members of the planning staff to participate in the design effort, commanders ensure
continuity between design and detailed planning as well as throughout the operations process. These are
purpose-built, problem-centric teams, and the commander may choose to dissolve them once they complete
the design effort.
3-33. Commanders compare similarities of their current situations with their own experiences or history
and the design team’s experiences or history to distinguish unique features that require novel, innovative, or
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Design
adaptive solutions. They understand that each situation requires a solution tailored to the context of the
problem. Design provides an approach for leading innovative, adaptive efforts from which to effectively act
on and efficiently solve a complex, ill-structured problem. It fosters thinking and interacting as
commanders develop approaches to resolve the differences between the current conditions and desired
conditions of the environment through the conduct of full spectrum operations.
3-34. Commanders leverage design to create and exploit opportunity, not just to ward off the risk of
failure. Design provides the means to convert intellectual power into combat power. A creative design
tailored to a unique operational environment promises—
z
Economy of effort.
z
Greater coherence across rotations among units and between successive operations.
z
Better integration and coordination among the instruments of national power.
z
Fewer unintended consequences.
z
Effective adaptation once the situation changes.
3-35. Design requires the commander to lead adaptive, innovative efforts to leverage collaboration and
dialog to identify and solve complex, ill-structured problems. To that end, the commander must lead
organizational learning and develop methods to determine if reframing is necessary during the course of an
operation. This requires continuous assessment, evaluation, and reflection that challenge understanding of
the existing problem and the relevance of actions addressing that problem.
DESIGN METHODOLOGY
3-36. Three distinct elements collectively produce a design concept as depicted in figure 3-1. Together,
they constitute an organizational learning methodology that corresponds to three basic questions that must
be answered to produce an actionable design concept to guide detailed planning:
z
Framing the operational environment—what is the context in which design will be applied?
z
Framing the problem—what problem is the design intended to solve?
z
Considering operational approaches—what broad, general approach will solve the problem?
Figure 3-1. The design methodology
3-37. During design, the commander and staff consider the conditions, circumstances, and factors that
affect the use of capabilities and resources as well as bear on decisionmaking. As an organizational learning
methodology, design fosters collaboration and dialog as commanders and staffs formulate conditions that
define a desired end state and develop approaches that aim to achieve those conditions. When initial efforts
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do not achieve a thorough enough understanding of behaviors or events, commanders reframe their
understanding of the operational environment and problem. This cycle of inquiry, contextual
understanding, and synthesis relies on continuous collaboration and dialog. Collaboration—especially with
joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners—is fundamental to success. Collaboration
affords commanders opportunities to revise their understanding or approaches so they can execute feasible,
acceptable, and suitable approaches to achieve desired conditions or objectives.
3-38. Design is essentially nonlinear. It flows back and forth between environmental framing and problem
framing while considering several operational approaches. No hard lines separate the efforts of each design
element. When an idea or issue is raised, the commander can address it in the appropriate element, even if
the idea or issue is outside the current focus. The change in emphasis shifts from focusing on understanding
the tendencies and potentials of actors in the operational environment, to understanding how they relate to
and affect the problem, to understanding their likely contributions toward transforming existing conditions
to a desired end state. As commanders and staffs gain new knowledge or begin a new line of questioning,
they often shift their focus among elements of design while building understanding and refining potential
operational approaches to solve the problem.
FRAMING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
3-39. Framing involves selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to
provide guideposts for analyzing, understanding, and acting. Framing facilitates hypothesizing, or
modeling, that scopes the part of the operational environment or problem under consideration. Framing
provides a perspective from which commanders can understand and act on a complex, ill-structured
problem.
3-40. In understanding the operational environment, the commander and staff focus on defining, analyzing,
and synthesizing the characteristics of the operational variables. They do so in the context of the dynamic
interactions and relationships among and between relevant operational variables and actors in the
operational environment. Often, learning about the nature of the situation helps them to understand the
groupings, relationships, or interactions among relevant actors and operational variables. This learning
typically involves analysis of the operational variables while examining the dynamic interaction and
relationships among the myriad other factors in the operational environment.
3-41. Understanding the operational environment begins with analyzing the context of the situation in
accordance with guidance and direction from a higher authority. This fosters learning while generating an
increased understanding of the operational environment. Commanders and their staffs review relevant
directives, documents, data, previous guidance, and missions. Commanders inform their higher authority of
new information or differences in initial understanding of the operational environment. Commanders also
confirm the desired end state if provided by the higher authority, or propose their own. For the commander,
this knowledge clarifies the higher authority’s perspective of the operational environment.
3-42. To achieve a shared understanding of higher directives and policy, the commander and staff—
z
Clarify the reasons and expectations to change existing conditions.
z
Compare current or new instructions with other standing guidance or policies.
z
Identify and resolve conflicting guidance with known facts.
z
Assess feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of any directed action for achieving the desired
end state.
3-43. Commanders apply critical thinking to every aspect of this analysis. Critical thinking leads to a
deeper appreciation of the higher commander’s intent and helps to refine the higher commander’s
understanding of the operational environment. This is an essential step to gain a shared understanding of
the situation. The environmental frame depicts the current state of the operational environment. Based on
higher guidance, it also defines the desired conditions that constitute a desired end state by examining the
tendencies and potentials of relevant actors and operational variables.
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Design
Environmental Frame
3-44. The commander and staff develop a contextual understanding of the situation by framing the
operational environment. The environmental frame is a narrative and graphic description that captures the
history, culture, current state, and future goals of relevant actors in the operational environment. The
environmental frame describes the context of the operational environment—how the context developed
(historical and cultural perspective), how the context currently exists (current conditions), and how the
context could trend in the future (future conditions or desired end state). The environmental frame enables
commanders to forecast future events and the effects of potential actions in the operational environment.
The environmental frame explains the actors and relationships within a system and surfaces assumptions to
allow for more rapid adaptation. The environmental frame evolves through continuous learning, but scopes
aspects of the operational environment relevant to higher guidance and situations.
3-45. Within the environmental frame, commanders review existing guidance, articulate existing
conditions, determine the desired end state and supporting conditions, and identify relationships and
interactions among relevant operational variables and actors. They analyze groupings of actors that exert
significant influence in the operational environment knowing that individual actors rarely share common
goals. By identifying and evaluating tendencies and potentials of relevant actor interactions and
relationships, commanders and their staffs formulate a desired end state that accounts for the context of the
operational environment and higher directives.
End State and Conditions
3-46. The desired end state consists of those desired conditions that, if achieved, meet the objectives of
policy, orders, guidance, and directives issued to the commander. A condition is a reflection of the existing
state of the operational environment. Thus, a desired condition is a sought-after future state of the
operational environment. Commanders explicitly describe the desired conditions and end state for every
operation. This description provides the necessary integration between tactical tasks and the conditions that
define the end state.
3-47. Time is a significant consideration when developing the desired end state. How time relates to the
desired end state heavily influences not only the expectations of higher authorities but also how
commanders use forces and capabilities to achieve desired conditions. Staffs exercise diligence throughout
design to account for the expected time required to achieve the desired conditions. They also qualify
whether the desired conditions are intended to be lasting or transient in nature. This temporal dimension is
essential to developing effective operational approaches. It impacts the feasibility, acceptability, suitability,
and completeness of any resulting plan.
3-48. The characteristics and factors of conditions vary. Conditions may be tangible or intangible. They
may be military or nonmilitary. They may focus on physical or psychological factors. They may describe or
relate to perceptions, levels of comprehension, cohesion among groups, or relationships between
organizations or individuals. When describing conditions that constitute a desired end state, the commander
considers their relevance to higher policy, orders, guidance, or directives. Since every operation focuses on
a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable end state, success hinges on accurately describing those
conditions. These conditions form the basis for decisions that ensure operations progress consistently
toward the desired end state.
Relevant Actors
3-49. Commanders use the environmental frame to understand and explain behaviors of relevant actors in
the operational environment. An actor is an individual or group within a social network who acts to
advance personal interests. Relevant actors may include states and governments; multinational actors such
as coalitions; and regional groupings, alliances, terrorist networks, criminal organizations, and cartels. They
may also include multinational and international corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and other
actors able to influence the situation either through, or in spite of, the appropriate civil, religious, or
military authority.
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3-50. A diagram illustrating relevant actor relationships is a valuable tool for understanding and visualizing
the operational environment. However, such diagrams may become so complicated for more complex
situations that they impart only limited insight and inhibit critical and creative thought when viewed in
isolation. The environmental frame’s narrative captures a more detailed understanding of the relevant
actors and their interactions and relationships. Often relationships among actors are multifaceted and differ
depending on the scale of interaction and their temporal aspects (history, duration, type, and frequency).
Clarifying the relationships among actors requires intense effort since relationships must be examined from
multiple perspectives. Commanders can also depict relationships by identifying and categorizing their
unique characteristics.
Tendencies and Potentials
3-51. In developing understanding of the interactions and relationships of relevant actors in the operational
environment, commanders and staffs consider natural tendencies and potentials in their analyses.
Tendencies reflect the inclination to think or behave in a certain manner. Tendencies are not considered
deterministic but as models describing the thoughts or behaviors of relevant actors. Tendencies identify the
likely pattern of relationships between the actors without external influence. Once identified, commanders
and staffs evaluate the potential of these tendencies to manifest within the operational environment.
Potential is the inherent ability or capacity for the growth or development of a specific interaction or
relationship. Not all interactions and relationships support achieving the desired end state. The desired end
state accounts for tendencies and potentials that exist among the relevant actors or other aspects of the
operational variables in the environmental frame.
FRAMING THE PROBLEM
3-52. Problem framing involves understanding and isolating the root causes of conflict—defining the
essence of a complex, ill-structured problem. Problem framing begins with refining the evaluation of
tendencies and potentials and identifying tensions among the existing conditions and the desired end state.
It articulates how the operational variables can be expected to resist or facilitate transformation and how
environmental inertia can be leveraged to ensure the desired conditions are achieved. The staff relies on
text and graphics to articulate the problem frame.
The Problem Frame
3-53. The problem frame is a refinement of the environmental frame that defines, in text and graphics, the
areas for action that will transform existing conditions toward the desired end state. The problem frame
extends beyond analyzing interactions and relationships in the operational environment. It identifies areas
of tension and competition—as well as opportunities and challenges—that commanders must address so to
transform current conditions to achieve the desired end state. Tension is the resistance or friction among
and between actors. The commander and staff identify the tension by analyzing the relevant actors’
tendencies and potentials within the context of the operational environment.
3-54. The commander and staff challenge their hypotheses and models to identify motivations and agendas
among the relevant actors. They identify factors that influence these motivations and agendas. The
commander and staff evaluate tendencies, potentials, trends, and tensions that influence the interactions
among social, cultural, and ideological forces. These may include political, social, or cultural dispositions
in one group that may hinder collaboration with another group.
3-55. In the problem frame, analysis identifies the positive, neutral, and negative implications of tensions
in the operational environment given the differences between existing and desired conditions. When the
commander and staff take action within the operational environment, they may exacerbate latent tensions.
Tensions can be exploited to drive change, so they are vital to transforming existing conditions. If left
unchecked, other tensions may undermine transformation and must be addressed appropriately. Because
tensions arise from differences in perceptions, goals, and capabilities among relevant actors, they are
inherently problematic and can both foster and impede transformation. By deciding how to address these
tensions, the commander identifies the problem that the design will ultimately solve.
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Design
Identifying the Problem
3-56. A concise problem statement clearly defines the problem or problem set to solve. It considers how
tension and competition affect the operational environment by identifying how to transform the current
conditions to the desired end state—before adversaries begin to transform current conditions to their
desired end state. The statement broadly describes the requirements for transformation, anticipating
changes in the operational environment while identifying critical transitions. The problem statement
accounts for the time and space relationships inherent in the problem frame.
CONSIDERING OPERATIONAL APPROACHES
3-57. Considering operational approaches to the problem provides focus and sets boundaries for the
selection of possible actions that together lead to achieving the desired end state. The staff synthesizes and
reduces much of the information and products created during the design to create the design concept and a
shared understanding of a rationale behind it. The staff converges on the types and patterns of actions
determining how they will achieve the desired conditions by creating a conceptual framework linking
desired conditions to potential actions. The entire staff considers how to orchestrate actions to solve the
problem in accordance with an operational approach.
The Operational Approach
3-58. The operational approach is a broad conceptualization of the general actions that will produce
the conditions that define the desired end state. In developing the operational approach, commanders
consider the direct or indirect nature of interaction with relevant actors and operational variables in the
operational environment. As commanders consider various approaches, they evaluate the types of defeat or
stability mechanisms that may lead to conditions that define the desired end state. Thus, the operational
approach enables commanders to begin visualizing and describing possible combinations of actions to
reach the desired end state given the tensions identified in the environmental and problem frames. As
courses of action are developed during detailed planning, the operational approach provides the logic that
underpins the unique combinations of tasks required to achieve the desired end state.
3-59. One method to depict the operational approach is by using lines of effort that provide a graphic to
articulate the link among tasks, objectives, conditions, and the desired end state. (See appendix B for more
detailed guidance on developing lines of effort.) Design offers the latitude to portray the operational
approach in a manner that best communicates its vision and structure. Ultimately, the commander
determines the optimal method to articulate the operational approach. However, it is important that
narratives accompany lines of effort to ensure Soldiers understand the operational approach.
Operational Initiative
3-60. In developing an operational approach, the commander and staff consider how potential actions will
enable the force to maintain the operational initiative. The operational initiative is the setting or dictating
the terms of action throughout an operation (FM 3-0). The staff evaluates what combination of actions
might derail opposing actors from achieving their goals while reinforcing their own desired end state. This
entails evaluating an action’s potential risks and the relevant actors’ freedom of action. By identifying the
possible emergence of unintended consequences or threats, commanders consider exploitable opportunities
to create effects that reinforce the desired end state. The staff explores the risks and opportunities of action
by considering exploitable tensions. This includes identifying capabilities and vulnerabilities of the actors
who oppose the desired end state. The commander and staff can then formulate methods to neutralize those
capabilities and exploit such vulnerabilities.
Resources and Risks
3-61. When creating the broad recommendations for action, the commander and staff consider resources
and risks. The staff provides an initial estimate of the resources required for each recommended action in
the design concept. Rarely does one organization directly control all the necessary resources. However, to
create lasting changes in conditions, the effort may require substantial resources. Creative and efficient
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approaches can greatly amplify the limited resources directly controlled by the commander. Detailed
planning determines the exact resources required.
3-62. The initial planning guidance addresses risk. It explains the acceptable level of risk to seize, retain, or
exploit the initiative and broadly outlines risk mitigation measures. Planners identify and consider risks
throughout the iterative application of design. Collaboration, coordination, and cooperation among
multinational military and civilian partners are essential to mitigating risk, conserving resources, and
achieving unity of effort. These are easier to achieve if military and civilian partners participate in design
from the outset to build trust and confidence in the effort and one another.
FORGING THE DESIGN CONCEPT
3-63. The design concept is the link between design and detailed planning. It reflects understanding of the
operational environment and the problem while describing the commander’s visualization of a broad
approach for achieving the desired end state. The design concept is the proper output of design, conveyed
in text and graphics, which informs detailed planning. It is articulated to the planning staff through the—
z
Problem statement.
z
Initial commander’s intent.
z
Commander’s initial planning guidance.
z
Mission narrative.
z
Other products created during design.
3-64. Products created during design include the text and graphics of the operational environment and
problem. Diagrams representing relationships between relevant actors convey understanding to the
planning staff. The problem statement generated during problem framing communicates the commander’s
understanding of the problem or problem set upon which the organization will act.
3-65. The initial commander’s intent and planning guidance visualize and describe the desired end state
along with implications for further planning. The design concept organizes desired conditions and the
combinations of potential actions in time, space, and purpose that link the desired end state to the conduct
of full spectrum operations. The planning guidance orients the focus of operations, linking desired
conditions to potential combinations of actions the force may employ to achieve them. Other information
provided in the initial planning guidance includes—
z
Information integration.
z
Resources.
z
Risk.
3-66. The mission narrative is the expression of the operational approach for a specified mission. It
describes the intended effects for the mission, including the conditions that define the desired end state. The
mission narrative represents the articulation, or description, of the commander’s visualization for a
specified mission and forms the basis for the concept of operations developed during detailed planning. An
explicit reflection of the commander’s logic, it is used to inform and educate the various relevant partners
whose perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are pertinent to the operation. It also informs
development of supporting information themes and messages for the mission and serves as a vital tool for
integrating information engagement tasks with other activities during execution.
3-67. In applying design, the commander and staff may draw on the elements of operational design
relevant to the situation. (See FM 3-0.) The design concept promotes mutual understanding and unity of
effort throughout the echelons and partner organizations. Thus, the design concept is the rationale linking
design to detailed planning. From the design concept, planners determine how to apply forces and
capabilities to achieve the desired end state.
REFRAMING
3-68. ±Reframing is a shift in understanding that leads to a new perspective on the problems or their
resolution. Reframing involves significantly refining or discarding the hypotheses or models that form the
basis of the design concept. At any time during the operations process, the decision to reframe can stem
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from significant changes to understanding, the conditions of the operational environment, or the end state.
Reframing allows the commander and staff to make adjustments throughout the operations process,
ensuring that tactical actions remain fundamentally linked to achieving the desired conditions.
3-69. Because the current operational environment is always changing and evolving, the problem frame
must also evolve. Recognizing when an operation—or planning—is not progressing as envisioned or must
be reconsidered provides the impetus for reframing in design. Reframing criteria should support the
commander’s ability to understand, learn, and adapt—and cue commanders to rethink their understanding
of the operational environment, and hence rethink how to solve the problem. Generally, reframing is
triggered in three ways: a major event causes a “catastrophic change” in the operational environment, a
scheduled periodic review shows a problem, or an assessment and reflection challenges understanding of
the existing problem and the relevance of the operational approach.
3-70. During operations, commanders decide to reframe after realizing the desired conditions have
changed, are not achievable, or cannot be attained through the current operational approach. Reframing
provides the freedom to operate beyond the limits of any single perspective. Conditions will change during
execution, and such change is expected because forces interact within the operational environment.
Recognizing and anticipating these changes is fundamental to design and essential to an organization’s
ability to learn.
3-71. Reframing is equally important in the wake of success. By its very nature, success transforms the
operational environment, creating unforeseen opportunities to exploit the initiative. Organizations are
strongly motivated to reflect and reframe following failure, but they tend to neglect reflection and
reframing following successful actions.
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Chapter 4
Preparation
This chapter defines preparation and lists its functions. Next, it describes the
relationship of preparation to the other operations process activities. The chapter
concludes by listing the preparation activities commonly performed within the
headquarters and across the force to improve the unit’s ability to execute operations.
PREPARATION FUNCTIONS
4-1. Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation.
Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement (FM 3-0). Preparation creates conditions that
improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to
ensure the force is ready to execute operations.
4-2. Preparation helps the force transition from planning to execution. Preparation normally begins during
planning and continues into execution by uncommitted units. Preparation activities help commanders,
staffs, and Soldiers to understand the situation and their roles in the upcoming operations. The primary
functions of preparation include—
z
Improving situational understanding.
z
Developing a common understanding of the plan.
z
Practicing and becoming proficient on critical tasks.
z
Integrating, organizing, and configuring the force.
z
Ensuring forces and resources are ready and positioned.
IMPROVING SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
4-3. Developing and maintaining situational understanding requires continuous effort throughout the
operations process. (See chapter 1.) Commanders realize that their initial understanding developed during
planning may be neither complete nor accurate. During preparation, commanders strive to improve their
situational understanding. Leader reconnaissance and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
operations help improve understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. Inspections, rehearsals,
liaison, and coordination help leaders improve their understanding of the friendly force. Based on their
improved situational understanding, commanders refine the plan as required, prior to execution.
DEVELOPING A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLAN
4-4. A successful transition from planning to execution requires those charged with executing the order to
understand the plan fully. The transition between planning and execution takes place both internally in the
headquarters (among the plans cell, future operations cell, and current operations integration cell) and
externally (between the commander and subordinate commanders). Several preparation activities assist the
commander, staff, and subordinates in fully understanding the plan. A confirmation briefing, rehearsals,
and the plans-to-operations transition briefing help them all develop a common understanding of the plan.
Additionally, when possible, commanders personally brief plans to subordinates to ensure understanding.
PRACTICING AND BECOMING PROFICIENT ON CRITICAL TASKS
4-5. During preparation, units and Soldiers practice to become proficient in those tasks critical to the
success of a specific operation. Commanders issue guidance on which tasks to rehearse and train. They
base their guidance on time available and unit readiness. Commanders also allocate time during preparation
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for units and Soldiers to train on unfamiliar tasks prior to execution. For example, a unit unfamiliar with
small boat operations requires significant training and familiarization prior to crossing a river by small
boat. Units may need to practice crowd control techniques in support of a local election. Leaders also
allocate time for maintaining proficiency on individual Soldier skills (such as zeroing individual weapons,
combat lifesaving tasks, language familiarization, and cultural awareness) during preparation.
INTEGRATING, ORGANIZING, AND CONFIGURING THE FORCE
4-6. Task-organizing the force is an important part of planning. During preparation, commanders allocate
time to put the new task organization into effect. This includes detaching units, moving forces, and
receiving and integrating new units and Soldiers into the force. When units change task organization, they
need preparation time to learn the gaining unit’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) and the plan the
gaining unit will execute. The gaining unit needs preparation time to assess the new unit’s capabilities and
limitations and to integrate new capabilities. See appendix F for a detailed discussion on task organization.
ENSURING FORCES AND RESOURCES ARE READY AND POSITIONED
4-7.
±Effective preparation ensures the right forces are in the right place, at the right time, with the right
equipment and other resources ready to execute the operation. Concurrent with task organization,
commanders use troop movement to position or reposition forces to the correct location prior to execution.
This includes positioning sustainment units and supplies. Preoperations checks confirm that the force has
the proper equipment and the equipment is functional prior to execution.
PREPARATION AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
4-8.
±Preparation often begins during planning and continues into execution. During planning, the higher
headquarters issues a series of warning orders to subordinates alerting them of an upcoming mission and
directing preparation activities such as reconnaissance and troop movements. During execution,
uncommitted units continue to prepare. Assessment during preparation focuses on identifying changes in
the situation that may require plan refinement and determining the readiness of the force to execute
operations.
±THE COMMANDER’S ROLE
4-9. During preparation, commanders continue to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess.
They gather additional information to improve their situational understanding, revise the plan, coordinate
with other units and partners, and supervise preparation activities to ensure their forces are ready to execute
missions.
4-10. During preparation, commanders update and improve their commander’s visualization as they
receive relevant information that helps satisfy their commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs)
and verify assumptions made during planning. Preparation activities—particularly subordinate
confirmation briefs and rehearsals—help commanders visualize the situation from their subordinates’
perspectives. Additionally, information from ISR and liaisons improves the commander’s situational
understanding. Commanders describe any changes in their visualization to their subordinates resulting in
additional planning guidance and fragmentary orders prior to execution.
4-11. During preparation, commanders circulate among subordinate units and with the population in areas
under friendly control. This allows commanders to assess subordinates’ preparation, get to know new units
in the task organization, and personally motivate Soldiers. By personally briefing subordinates,
commanders gain firsthand appreciation for the situation as well as ensure Soldiers understand the
commander’s intent. Commanders also visit with civilian organizations
(other government agencies,
intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector) in the
operational area to build personal relationships with civilian partners. Knowledge gained during these visits
allows the commander to maintain situational understanding and continuously update their commander’s
visualization prior to execution.
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PREPARATION DURING PLANNING
4-12. Planning and preparation often overlap. In operations, subordinate forces begin preparation before
the operation order is published. Subordinate headquarters can begin planning prior to or in parallel with
their higher headquarters; they begin preparation as information about the upcoming operation becomes
available and as preliminary decisions are made, particularly concerning information gaps. Using warning
orders or collaborative planning to disseminate new information increases subordinate units’ preparation
time. Several preparation activities begin during planning. Commanders often direct troop movements,
task-organizing, and sustainment preparation in warning orders before they issue the operation order.
4-13. While waiting on the details of an upcoming operation, units train on basic skills, maintain weapons
and equipment, and work on tasks identified as needing improvement during recent operations. Sometimes,
preparation during lulls may mean giving Soldiers a chance to rest and restore themselves.
PREPARATION DURING EXECUTION
4-14. During execution, some of the force may be still preparing. Uncommitted forces continue preparation
for the operation’s next phase or branch. Committed forces revert to preparation when they reach their
objectives, occupy defensive positions, or pass into reserve. Units in reserve conduct route reconnaissance
for counterattacks and rehearse those actions deemed most likely for their commitment.
ASSESSMENT DURING PREPARATION
4-15. Assessment during preparation focuses on determining the force’s readiness to execute the mission
and identifying any significant changes in the situation requiring a change to the plan. During preparation,
staffs continue to build and maintain their running estimates, providing commanders results of their
analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. Commanders continue to modify their understanding and
visualization based on new information concerning the friendly force and other aspects of the operational
environment. This assessment helps the commander and staffs verify assumptions and refine plans as
required. Assessment results during preparation may reveal significant changes in the situation requiring
commanders to reframe and develop a new plan.
PREPARATION ACTIVITIES
4-16. Mission success depends as much on preparation as on planning. Higher headquarters may develop
the best of plans; however, plans serve little purpose if subordinates do not receive them in time.
Subordinates need enough time to understand plans well enough to execute them. Subordinates develop
their own plans and prepare for the operation. After they fully comprehend the plan, subordinate leaders
rehearse key portions of it and ensure Soldiers and equipment are positioned and ready to execute the
operation. To help ensure the force is protected and prepared for execution, commanders, units, and
Soldiers conduct the following activities:
z
Conduct ISR.
z
Conduct security operations.
z
Conduct protection.
z
Manage terrain.
z
Coordinate and conduct liaison.
z
Continue to build partnerships and teams.
z
Conduct confirmation briefs.
z
Conduct rehearsals.
z
Conduct plans-to-operations transitions.
z
Revise and refine the plan.
z
Complete task organization.
z
Integrate new Soldiers and units.
z
Train.
z
Initiate troop movements.
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z
Prepare terrain.
z
Conduct sustainment preparation.
z
Initiate deception operations.
z
Conduct preoperations checks and inspections.
±CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
4-17. During preparation, commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational understanding
prior to execution. This requires aggressive and continuous surveillance and reconnaissance during
preparation. Commanders often direct ISR operations early in the planning process that continue in
preparation and execution. Through ISR, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ
collection assets and forces. These assets and forces collect, process, and disseminate timely and accurate
information, combat information, and intelligence to satisfy CCIRs and other information requirements.
4-18. Commanders consider requesting assistance from sources beyond their control, including long-range
surveillance teams and joint assets, through ISR synchronization. They synchronize reconnaissance
operations with their own organic assets as well as the intelligence collection and analysis effort to
continuously update and improve their situational understanding.
4-19. Commanders give the same care to reconnaissance missions as to any other combined arms
operation. They ensure all warfighting functions are synchronized to support forces conducting
reconnaissance. This includes, but is not limited to, fires, sustainment, and mission command. Relevant
information from surveillance and reconnaissance helps commanders fill in information gaps, validate
assumptions, and finalize the plan prior to execution.
±CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS
4-20. The force as a whole is often most vulnerable to surprise and enemy attack during preparation.
Forces are often concentrated in assembly areas. Leaders are away from their units and concentrated
together during rehearsals. Parts of the force could be moving to task-organize. Required supplies may be
unavailable or being repositioned. Security operations—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local
security—are essential during preparation. (See FM 3-90.) Units assigned security missions execute these
missions while the rest of the force prepares for the overall operation.
±CONDUCT PROTECTION
4-21. Protection is both a warfighting function and a continuing activity. The protection warfighting
functions consist of twelve tasks (see FM 3-0) for which commanders and staffs continuously plan and
execute to preserve the force. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel
(combatants and
noncombatants), physical assets, and information of the United States and multinational military and
civilian partners. (See FM 3-37 for doctrine on protection.)
4-22. Because the force is often most vulnerable to attack and surprise while preparing, emphasis on
protection increases during preparation and continues throughout execution. While all protection tasks are
important, commanders particularly emphasize the protection tasks of operations security, survivability,
and operational area security during preparation.
4-23. Operations security identifies and implements measures to protect essential elements of friendly
information. During preparation, forces implement measures that eliminate or reduce the vulnerability of
friendly forces to exploitation. These measures include concealing rehearsals, troop movements,
positioning of forces, and other indicators of unit intentions that enemy intelligence may exploit.
4-24. Survivability includes protecting the force while deceiving the enemy. It includes developing and
constructing protective positions to reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapon systems. Protective positions
can include earth berms, dug-in positions, overhead protection, and counter-surveillance. Survivability
tactics range from employing camouflage, concealment, and deception to the hardening of facilities, signal
nodes, and critical infrastructure.
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4-25. Operational area security focuses on protecting areas, routes, or installations. During preparation,
operational area security focuses on protecting assembly areas and securing routes required for task
organization, sustainment, or positioning units for upcoming operations.
MANAGE TERRAIN
4-26. Terrain management is the process of allocating terrain by establishing areas of operation,
designating assembly areas, and specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities
that might interfere with each other. Terrain management is an important activity during preparation as
units reposition and stage prior to execution. Commanders assigned an area of operations manage terrain
within their boundaries. Through terrain management, commanders identify and locate units in the area.
Staffs can then deconflict operations, control movements, and deter fratricide as units get in position to
execute planned missions. Commanders also consider the civilians and civilian organizations located in
their area of operations.
COORDINATE AND CONDUCT LIAISON
4-27. Coordinating and conducting liaison helps ensure that military leaders internal and external to the
headquarters understand their unit’s role in the upcoming operation and are prepared to execute it. In
addition to military forces, many civilian organizations may operate in the operational area. Their presence
can affect and are affected by the commander’s operations. Continuous coordination and liaison between
the command and civilian organization helps to build unity of effort—coordination and cooperation toward
common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or
organization—the product of successful unified action (JP 1). (See FM 3-07 and JP 3-08 for detailed
discussions on interagency, intergovernmental organization, and nongovernmental organization
coordination.)
4-28. During preparation, commanders coordinate with higher, lower, adjacent, supporting, and supported
units and civilian organizations. Coordination includes the following:
z
Sending and receiving liaison teams.
z
Establishing communication links that ensure continuous contact during execution.
z
Exchanging SOPs.
z
Synchronizing security operations with ISR plans to prevent breaks in coverage.
z
Facilitating civil-military coordination among those involved.
4-29. Establishing and maintaining liaison is vital to external coordination. Liaison provides a means of
direct communications between the sending and receiving headquarters. It may begin with planning and
continue through preparing and executing, or it may start as late as execution. Available resources and the
need for direct contact between sending and receiving headquarters determine when to establish liaison.
Establishing liaisons with civilian organizations is especially important in stability operations because of
the variety of external organizations and the inherent coordination challenges. (See FM 6-0 for doctrine on
liaison.)
±CONTINUE TO BUILD PARTNERSHIPS AND TEAMS
4-30. Developing teams among modular formations and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational partners is a key mission command task that begins early in the operations process. While the
Army’s modular brigade-based force allows for greater flexibility, the modular construct creates challenges
in building cohesive teams. Often, modular units are task-organized to meet specific mission requirements.
In addition, they may not have trained with the higher headquarters that employs them.
4-31. To help build teams among modular formations, commanders encourage active collaboration and
dialog with subordinates (see chapter 1). Through collaboration and dialog, commanders gain insight into
Soldiers’ needs while providing their own vision and expectations. Commanders circulate among
subordinate units as much as possible to help establish personal relationships and build the team. By
circulating, commanders assess subordinates’ preparation and execution, get to know new units in the task
organization, and personally motivate Soldiers. Commanders appreciate the situation firsthand and ensure
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subordinates understand their commander’s intent. Commanders lead, coach, and mentor subordinate
leaders, establishing close relationships that foster trust and confidence.
4-32. Conducting full spectrum operations requires commanders to shape civil conditions in concert with
other military and civilian organizations within an operational area. In some circumstances, commanders
have an established command or support relationship with these organizations. In other instances, they will
not. In those instances where commanders lack a formal command or support relationship with an
organization, they seek unity of effort. (See paragraph 4-48.) They try to build partnerships and teams with
these organizations to develop common goals, including local political leaders, host-nation police and
security forces, and nongovernmental organizations. Capable and cooperative civilian organizations
substantially enhance military operations by performing complementary civil functions that inform and
assist the population and add legitimacy to the mission.
4-33. Building partnerships and teams with organizations begins early in planning, is a key activity of
preparation, and continues throughout execution. Civilian organizations, including those of the host nation,
are frequently present before forces arrive and remain after forces depart. As part of mission analysis,
commanders identify civilian organizations in the operational area and develop plans to build relationships
with them. During preparation, commanders, staffs, and subordinate commanders identify and make
contact with those various organizations. A challenge in building partnerships among civilian and military
efforts is the differing capabilities and cultures in the civilian and host-nation organizations compared to
those of the headquarters. To help build partnerships, commanders strive to have participants—
z
Represented, integrated, and actively involved in planning and coordinating activities.
z
Share an understanding of the situation and problems to solve.
z
Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal.
z
Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities wherever possible.
z
Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goal.
Note: Commanders avoid creating a false impression of the headquarters’ readiness to make
available classified military materiel, technology, or information when coordinating with foreign
governments and international originations. See AR 380-10 for guidance on foreign disclosure
and contacts with foreign representatives.
4-34. Developing partnerships with civilian organizations requires considerable effort by the commander,
staff, and subordinate commanders. Some organizations willingly cooperate with the command. Other
organizations may avoid a close affiliation. Sometimes they fear compromising their impartiality with the
local populace or have suspicions that the force may intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent
operations. Despite different goals among military and civilian agencies and organizations, discovering
common ground is essential to unity of effort.
CONDUCT CONFIRMATION BRIEFS
4-35. The confirmation brief is a key part of preparation. Subordinate leaders give a confirmation brief to
the commander immediately after receiving the operation order. A confirmation brief ensures the
commander that subordinate leaders understand—
z
The commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations.
z
Their unit’s tasks and associated purposes.
z
The relationship between their unit’s mission and those of other units in the operation.
Ideally, leaders conduct the confirmation brief in person with selected staff members of the higher
headquarters present.
CONDUCT REHEARSALS
4-36. A rehearsal is a session in which a staff or unit practices expected actions to improve
performance during execution. Commanders use this tool to ensure staffs and subordinates understand
the concept of operations and commander’s intent. Rehearsals also allow leaders to practice synchronizing
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Preparation
operations at times and places critical to mission accomplishment. Effective rehearsals imprint a mental
picture of the sequence of the operation’s key actions and improve mutual understanding and coordination
of subordinate and supporting leaders and units. The extent of rehearsals depends on available time. In
cases of short-notice requirements, rehearsals may not be possible.
4-37. Rehearsals contribute to external and internal coordination. Even if staff members do not attend a
rehearsal, they may receive a tasking for internal coordination. Properly executed, they—
z
Help commanders visualize conditions associated with decisionmaking before, during, and after
the operation.
z
Help prepare commanders and staffs to synchronize the operation at key points. Rehearsals do
this by identifying actions, times, and locations that require coordination.
z
Reveal unidentified external coordination requirements.
z
Support internal coordination by identifying tasks needed to accomplish external coordination.
z
Help staff sections update internal coordination tools, such as the synchronization matrix and
decision support template.
4-38. Uncommitted units rehearse during execution of the overall operation if time allows. These
rehearsals help Soldiers prepare for their part of the operation. For example, the reserve might practice their
movements to attack or defend positions. Units defending in depth can rehearse their movements and
engagements. (See appendix I for more information on rehearsals.)
±CONDUCT PLANS-TO-OPERATIONS TRANSITION
4-39. The plans-to-operations transition is a preparation activity that occurs within the headquarters to
ensure that members of the current operations integration cell fully understand the plan before execution.
During preparation, the responsibility for developing and maintaining the plan shifts from the plans (or
future operations) cell to the current operations integration cell. This transition is the point at which the
current operations integration cell becomes responsible for controlling execution of the operation order.
This responsibility includes answering requests for information concerning the order and maintaining the
order through fragmentary orders. This transition enables the plans cell to focus its planning efforts on
sequels, branches, and other planning requirements directed by the commander.
4-40. The timing of the plans-to-operations transition requires careful consideration. It must allow enough
time for members of the current operations integration cell to understand the plan well enough to
coordinate and synchronize its execution. Ideally, the plans cell briefs the members of the current
operations cell on the plans-to-operations transition before the combined arms rehearsal. This briefing
enables members of the current operations integration cell to understand the upcoming operation as well as
identify friction points and issues to solve prior to execution. The transition briefing is a mission briefing
that generally follows the five-paragraph operation order format. Areas addressed include—
z
Task organization.
z
Situation.
z
Higher headquarters’ mission (one and two echelons up).
z
Mission.
z
Commander’s intent (one and two echelons up).
z
Concept of operations.
z
Commander’s critical information requirements.
z
Decision support template and matrix.
z
Branches and sequels.
z
Sustainment.
z
Command and signal.
z
Outstanding requests for information and outstanding issues.
4-41. Following the combined arms rehearsal, planners and members of the current operations integration
cell review additional planning guidance issued by the commander and modify the plan as necessary.
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Significant changes may require assistance from the plans cell to include moving a lead planner to the
current operations integration cell. The plans cell continues planning for branches and sequels.
±REVISE AND REFINE THE PLAN
4-42. Revising and refining the plan is a key activity of preparation. The commander’s situational
understanding may change over the course of operations, enemy actions may require revision of the plan,
or unforeseen opportunities may arise. During preparation, assumptions made during planning may be
proven true or false. Intelligence analysis may confirm or deny enemy actions or show changed conditions
in the area of operations because of shaping operations. The status of friendly forces may change as the
situation changes. In any of these cases, commanders identify the changed conditions and assess how the
changes might affect the upcoming operation. Significant new information requires commanders to make
one of three assessments regarding the plan:
z
The new information validates the plan with no further changes.
z
The new information requires adjustments to the plan.
z
The new information invalidates the plan requiring the commander to reframe and develop a
new plan.
The earlier the commander identifies the need for adjustments, the more easily the staff can incorporate the
changes to the plan and modify preparation activities.
4-43. Plans are not static. They should be made as flexible as possible by including on-order adjustments
or variations that can be implemented by fragmentary orders. Commanders adjust the plan based on new
information and changing circumstances. These new developments may correct or invalidate assumptions
made during planning. With such changes, commanders determine whether the new information requires
adjustment to the plan or whether to begin a reframing effort (see chapter 3) and develop a completely new
plan. Commanders decide by balancing the loss of synchronization caused by the change against the
problems created by executing a plan that no longer fits reality. Any adjustments to the plan must fit within
the higher commander’s intent. Commanders identify adjustments that create a major change in preparation
activities early enough to allow the force to react.
±COMPLETE TASK ORGANIZATION
4-44. During preparation, commanders complete task-organizing their organizations to obtain the right mix
of forces, capabilities, and expertise to accomplish a specific mission. The receiving commander integrates
units that are attached, placed under operational control, or placed in direct support. The commander
directing the task organization also makes provisions for sustainment. The commander may direct task
organization to occur immediately before the operation order is issued. This task-organizing is done with a
warning order. Doing this gives units more time to execute the tasks needed to affect the new task
organization. Task-organizing early allows affected units to become better integrated and more familiar
with all elements involved.
±INTEGRATE NEW SOLDIERS AND UNITS
4-45. Commanders, command sergeants major, and staffs help new Soldiers assimilate into their units and
new units into the force. They also prepare new units and Soldiers to perform their duties in the upcoming
operation with smooth integration.
4-46. For new Soldiers, integration includes—
z
Training new Soldiers on the unit SOPs and mission-essential tasks for the operation.
z
Orienting new Soldiers on their places and roles in the force and operation.
z
Confirming that all personal information is present and correct.
4-47. This integration for units includes—
z
Receiving and introducing new units to the force and the area of operations.
z
Exchanging SOPs.
z
Conducting briefings and rehearsals.
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Preparation
z
Establishing communications links.
z
Exchanging liaison teams (if required).
±TRAIN
4-48. Training prepares forces and Soldiers to conduct operations according to doctrine, SOPs, and the
unit’s mission. Training develops the teamwork, trust, and mutual understanding that commanders need to
exercise mission command and that forces need to achieve unity of effort. Training does not stop when a
unit deploys. If the unit is not conducting operations or recovering from operations, it is training. Training
while deployed focuses on fundamental skills, current SOPs, and skills for a specific mission. (See FM 7-0
for details on training the force.)
±INITIATE TROOP MOVEMENTS
4-49. The repositioning of forces prior to execution is a significant activity of preparation. Troop
movement is the movement of troops from one place to another by any available means (FM 3-90). Troop
movement is used to position or reposition units to ensure they are in the right starting places before
execution. Commanders integrate operations security measures with troop movements to ensure the
movements do not reveal any intentions to the enemy. (See FM 3-37.) Troop movements include assembly
area reconnaissance by advance parties and route reconnaissance. They also include movements required
by changes to the task organization. Commanders can use a warning order to direct troop movements
before issuing the operation order.
±PREPARE TERRAIN
4-50. Terrain preparation starts with the situational understanding of terrain through proper terrain
analysis. It involves shaping the terrain to gain an advantage, to include improving cover, concealment and
observation, fields of fire, new obstacle effects through reinforcing obstacles, or mobility operations for
initial positioning of forces. It can make the difference between the operation’s success and failure.
Commanders must understand the terrain and the infrastructure of their area of operations as early as
possible to identify potential for improvement, establish priorities of work, and begin preparing the area as
rapidly as possible.
±CONDUCT SUSTAINMENT PREPARATION
4-51. Resupplying, maintaining, and issuing supplies or equipment occurs during preparation. Any
repositioning of sustainment assets can also occur. In addition, sustainment elements need to accomplish
many other activities.
4-52. During preparation, sustainment planners at all levels take action to optimize means (force structure
and resources) for supporting the commander’s plan. These actions include but are not limited to
identifying and preparing bases, host-nation infrastructure and capabilities, contract support requirements,
lines of communications, and endemic health and environmental factors as well as forecasting and building
operational stocks.
4-53. Planners focus on identifying the resources currently available in the theater of operations and
ensuring access to them. During preparation, sustainment planning continues to support operational
planning (branch and sequel development) and the targeting process.
±INITIATE DECEPTION OPERATIONS
4-54. Deception operations commonly begin during preparation. Commanders use some troop positioning
and movement to deceive the enemy. Deceptive electronic activities, camouflage and decoys, and
circulation of false information also accompany preparation. These operations impose some burdens on a
force but may improve the effectiveness of execution. Preparation of the force cannot compromise the
commander’s deception plan.
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±CONDUCT PREOPERATIONS CHECKS AND INSPECTIONS
4-55. Unit preparation includes completing preoperations checks and inspections. These checks ensure
units, Soldiers, and systems are as fully capable and ready to execute as time and resources permit. The
inspections ensure the force has resources necessary to accomplish the mission. Also during preoperations
checks and inspections, leaders check Soldiers’ ability to perform crew drills that may not be directly
related to the mission. Examples of these drills include those that respond to a vehicle rollover or an
onboard fire.
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Chapter 5
Execution
This chapter provides doctrine for exercising mission command during execution. It
provides fundamentals to guide execution and describes the roles of the commander
and staff when directing and synchronizing the current operation. Next, this chapter
describes assessment and decisionmaking in execution. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process (RDSP).
FUNDAMENTALS OF EXECUTION
5-1. Planning and preparation accomplish nothing if the command does not execute effectively. Execution
is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational
understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions (FM 3-0). In execution,
commanders focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions to accomplish their missions.
5-2. In any operation, the situation may change rapidly. Operations the commander envisioned in the plan
may bear little resemblance to actual events in execution. Subordinate commanders need maximum latitude
to take advantage of situations and meet the higher commander’s intent when the original order no longer
applies. Effective execution requires leaders trained in independent decisionmaking, aggressiveness, and
risk taking in an environment of mission command. (See FM 6-0.) During execution, leaders must be able
and willing to solve problems within the commander’s intent without constantly referring to higher
headquarters. Subordinates need not wait for top-down synchronization to act.
5-3. Throughout execution, commanders (assisted by their staff) use forces and other resources for both
constructive and destructive purposes to mass effects at decisive points and times. To successfully execute
operations, commander’s consider the following execution fundamentals:
z
Seize and retain the initiative.
z
Build and maintain momentum.
z
Exploit success.
SEIZE AND RETAIN THE INITIATIVE
5-4. Initiative gives all operations the spirit, if not the form, of the offense. Operationally, seizing the
initiative requires leaders to anticipate events so their forces can see and exploit opportunities faster than
the enemy can or a situation deteriorates. Once they seize the initiative, Army forces exploit created
opportunities. Initiative requires constant effort to force an enemy to conform to friendly purposes and
tempo while retaining friendly freedom of action. Subordinates make reasoned decisions within the
commander’s intent. Their decisions and the commander’s intent create conditions for exercising
disciplined initiative.
Take Action
5-5. Commanders create conditions for seizing the initiative by acting. Without action, seizing the
initiative is impossible. Faced with an uncertain situation, there is a natural tendency to hesitate and gather
more information to reduce the uncertainty. However, waiting and gathering information might reduce
uncertainty but will not eliminate it. Waiting may even increase uncertainty by providing the enemy with
time to seize the initiative. It is far better to manage uncertainty by acting and developing the situation.
5-6. In stability operations, commanders act quickly to improve the civil situation while preventing
conditions from deteriorating further. Immediate action to stabilize the situation and provide for the
immediate humanitarian needs of the people begins the process toward stability. Friendly forces dictate the
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terms of action and drive positive change to stabilize the situation rapidly. In turn, this improves the
security environment, creating earlier opportunities for civilian agencies and organizations to contribute.
By acting proactively to influence events, Army forces exploit the initiative to ensure steady progress
toward conditions that support stability. Failing to act quickly may create a breeding ground for dissent and
possible recruiting opportunities for enemies or adversaries.
5-7.
±During execution, action must be synchronized with themes and messages. Commanders use inform
and influence activities in their area of operations to communicate, build trust and confidence, and
influence perceptions and behavior. Failure to synchronize words and actions may result in adverse
behavior by groups whose behavior is key to mission accomplishment.
Create and Exploit Opportunities
5-8. Events that offer better ways to success are opportunities. Commanders recognize opportunities by
continuously monitoring and evaluating the situation. Failure to understand the opportunities inherent in an
enemy’s action surrenders the initiative. Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) must
include elements that support exploiting opportunities. Commanders encourage subordinates to act within
the commander’s intent as opportunities occur. Vision, clear communication of commander’s intent, and
mission command create an atmosphere conducive to subordinates exercising initiative.
Assess and Take Risk
5-9. Uncertainty and risk are inherent in all military operations. Recognizing and acting on opportunity
means taking risks. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Carefully
determining the risks, analyzing and minimizing as many hazards as possible, and executing a supervised
plan that accounts for those hazards contributes to successfully applying military force. Gambling, in
contrast, is imprudently staking the success of an entire action on a single, improbable event. Commanders
assess risk in ascending orders of magnitude by answering four questions:
z
Am I minimizing the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage?
z
Am I minimizing the risk of friendly losses?
z
Am I risking the success of the operation?
z
Am I risking the destruction of the force itself?
5-10. When commanders embrace opportunity, they accept risk. It is counterproductive to wait for perfect
preparation and synchronization. The time taken to fully synchronize forces and warfighting functions in a
detailed order could mean a lost opportunity. It is far better to quickly summarize the essentials, get things
moving, and send the details later. Leaders optimize the use of time with warning orders, fragmentary
orders, and verbal updates.
BUILD AND MAINTAIN MOMENTUM
5-11. Momentum comes from seizing the initiative and executing decisive, shaping, and sustaining
operations at a rapid and sustainable tempo. Momentum allows commanders to create opportunities to
engage the enemy from unexpected directions with unanticipated capabilities. Having seized the initiative,
commanders continue to control the relative momentum by maintaining focus and pressure and controlling
the tempo. They ensure that they maintain momentum by anticipating transitions and moving rapidly
between types of operations.
5-12. Speed promotes surprise and can compensate for lack of forces. It magnifies the impact of success in
seizing the initiative. By executing at a rapid tempo, Army forces present the enemy with new problems
before it can solve current ones. Rapid tempo should not degenerate into haste. Ill-informed and hasty
action usually precludes effective combinations of combat power; it may lead to unnecessary casualties.
The condition of the enemy force dictates the degree of synchronization necessary. When confronted by a
coherent and disciplined enemy, commanders may slow the tempo to deliver synchronized blows. As the
enemy force loses cohesion, commanders increase the tempo, seeking to accelerate the enemy’s morale and
physical collapse.
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Execution
EXPLOIT SUCCESS
5-13. Ultimately, only successes that achieve the end state count. To determine how to exploit tactical and
operational successes, commanders assess them in terms of the higher commander’s intent. However,
success will likely occur in ways unanticipated in the plan. Commanders may gain an objective in an
unexpected way. Success signals a rapid assessment to answer these questions:
z
Does the success generate opportunities that more easily accomplish the objectives?
z
Does it suggest other lines of operations or lines of effort?
z
Does it cause commanders to change their overall intent?
z
Should the force transition to a sequel?
z
Should the force accelerate the phasing of the operation?
5-14. Exploitation demands assessment and understanding of the impact on sustainment operations.
Sustainment provides the means to exploit success and convert it into decisive results. Sustainment
preserves the freedom of action necessary to take advantage of opportunity. Commanders remain fully
aware of the status of units and anticipate sustainment requirements, recognizing that sustainment often
determines the depth to which Army forces exploit success.
RESPONSIBILITIES DURING EXECUTION
5-15. ±During execution, commanders focus their activities on directing, assessing and leading while
improving their understanding and modifying their visualization. Initially, commanders direct the transition
from planning to execution as the order is issued and the responsibility for integration passes from the plans
cell to the current operations integration cell. During execution, the staff directs, within delegated authority,
to keep the operation progressing successfully. Assessing allows the commander and staff to determine the
existence and significance of variances from the operations as envisioned in the initial plan. The staff
makes recommendations to the commander about what action to take concerning variances they identified.
During execution, leading is as important as decisionmaking as commanders influence subordinates by
providing purpose, direction, and motivation.
COMMANDERS, DEPUTIES, CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR
5-16. During execution, commanders at all levels locate where they can exercise command and sense the
operation. Sometimes this is at the command post. Other times, commanders may use a command group or
mobile command post to command from a forward location. Commanders must balance the need to make
personal observations, provide command presence, and sense the mood of subordinates from a forward
location with the ability to maintain continuity with the entire force. No matter where they are located,
commanders are always looking beyond the current operation to anticipate what’s next. They must
periodically step back and look at how the force is positioning itself for future operations.
5-17. Deputy commanders provide a command resource during execution. First, they can serve as a senior
advisor to the commander. Second, deputy commanders may directly supervise a specific warfighting
function (for example, sustainment). Finally, deputy commanders can provide command of a specific
operation (such as a gap crossing), area, or part of the unit (such as the covering force) for the commander.
5-18. The chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO) integrates the efforts of the whole staff during
execution. These efforts include the assignment of responsibilities among staff sections and command post
cells for conducting analysis and decisionmaking. While the unit standard operating procedures might
specify a division of responsibilities among integrating cells for these matters, often the COS (XO) makes
specific decisions allocating responsibilities among cells. The COS (XO) considers the situation, expertise,
and capabilities of individual cells as requirements arise or are forecast.
5-19. The command sergeant major provides another set of senior eyes to assist the commander. The
command sergeant major assists the commander with assessing operations as well as assessing the
condition and moral of forces. In addition, the command sergeant major provides leadership and expertise
to units and Soldiers.
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Chapter 5
STAFF
5-20. In execution, the staff—primarily through the current operations integration cell—integrates forces
and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. The staff assesses short-term actions and activities as
part of this integration. While the COS (XO) integrates staff activities among all functional and integrating
cells and separate sections, the operations officer integrates the operation through the current operations
integration cell. Other staff principals integrate within their areas of expertise.
5-21. Formal and informal integration of the warfighting functions by functional and integrating cells is
continuous. The integration occurs both within and among command post cells and staff sections and
between headquarters. When staffs need a more structured integration, they establish meetings (to include
working groups and boards) to share information, coordinate actions, and solve problems. (See command
post operations in appendix A.) The COS (XO) also identifies staff members to participate in the higher
commander’s working groups and boards.
CURRENT OPERATIONS INTEGRATION CELL
5-22. The current operations integration cell is the integrating cell in the command post with primary
responsibility for execution. Staff members in the current operations integration cell actively assist the
commander and subordinate units in controlling the current operation. They provide information,
synchronize staff and subordinate unit or echelon activities, and coordinate subordinate support requests.
The current operations integration cell solves problems and acts within the authority delegated by the
commander. It also performs some short-range planning using the RDSP. (See paragraphs Error!
Reference source not found. through 5-49.)
5-23. The current operations integration cell is staffed and equipped to—
z
Monitor and assess execution of the operation, to include tracking tasks assigned to subordinate
forces.
z
Maintain the location and status of friendly forces (higher, lower, and adjacent) and their
resources.
z
Maintain the location and status of threat forces.
z
Maintain the location and status of significant civilian agencies.
z
Track CCIRs and decision points.
z
Adjust the current order within its authority or recommend adjustments to the commander.
z
Conduct short-range planning to take advantage of opportunities or to counter threats. (The
future operations cell or plans cell solves complex planning problems and planning beyond the
short-range planning horizon.)
z
Conduct knowledge management and information management activities, to include—
Managing requests for information.
Maintaining displays, such as CCIRs, execution matrixes, and significant events.
Maintaining the common operational picture.
Receiving and sending reports, including operational and commander summaries.
Helping to prepare, authenticate, and distribute operation plans and orders, messages, and
other directives.
Conducting rehearsals.
Collecting, processing, storing, displaying, and disseminating relevant information.
5-24. Several decision support tools assist the commander and staff during execution. Among the most
important are the decision support template, decision support matrix, and execution matrix. The current
operations integration cell uses these tools among others to help control operations and to determine when
anticipated decisions are coming up for execution.
5-25. A decision support template is a combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of
wargaming. The decision support template depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of
forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific
friendly course of action (JP 2-01.3). Part of the decision support template is the decision support matrix.
5-4
FM 5-0, C1
18 March 2011
Execution
A decision support matrix is a written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision
points and associated actions at those decision points. The decision support matrix lists decision points,
locations of decision points, criteria to be evaluated at decision points, actions that occur at decision points,
and the units responsible to act on the decision points. It also lists the units responsible for observing and
reporting information affecting the criteria for decisions.
5-26. The current operations integration cell uses the decision support template and the decision support
matrix to determine the need and timing for execution decisions. This involves assessing the progress of the
operation and evaluating the criteria for upcoming decision points to see if the criteria for the upcoming
decision points have been met or not.
5-27. An execution matrix is a visual and sequential representation of the critical tasks and
responsible organizations by time. An execution matrix could be for the entire force, such as an air
assault execution matrix, or it may be specific to a warfighting function, such as a fire support execution
matrix. The current operations integration cell uses the execution matrix to determine which friendly
actions to expect forces to execute in the near term or, in conjunction with the decision support matrix,
which execution decisions to make.
DECISIONMAKING DURING EXECUTION
5-28. Decisionmaking is inherent in executing operations. Commanders observe the progress and results of
their operations and intervene to ensure success. Because operations never unfold exactly as envisioned and
because understanding of the situation changes, a commander’s decisions made during execution are
critical to an operation’s success. During execution, commanders direct their units forcefully and promptly
to overcome the difficulties of enemy action, friendly failures, errors, and other changes in the operational
environment.
5-29. Executing, adjusting, or abandoning the original operation is part of decisionmaking in execution.
Successful commanders balance the tendency to abandon a well-conceived plan too soon against persisting
in a failing effort too long. Effective decisionmaking during execution—
z
Relates all actions to the commander’s intent and concept of operations to ensure they support
the decisive operation.
z
Is comprehensive, maintaining integration of combined arms rather than dealing with separate
functions.
z
Relies heavily on intuitive decisionmaking by commanders and staffs to make rapid adjustments.
z
Is continuous and responds effectively to any opportunity or threat.
ASSESSMENT AND DECISIONMAKING
5-30. As commanders assess an operation, they determine when decisions are required. Plans usually
identify some decision points; however, unexpected enemy actions or other changes often present situations
that require unanticipated decisions. Commanders act when these decisions are required rather than waiting
for a set time in the battle rhythm. A commander’s visualization of the situation allows subordinate,
supporting, and adjacent commanders—and in some cases higher headquarters—to adjust their actions
rapidly and effectively in adapting to changing situations whether precipitated by the enemy, changes in
friendly force status, or new civil considerations. As commanders assess the operation, they describe their
impressions to the staff and subordinates and discuss the desirability of choices available. Once
commanders make decisions, their staffs transmit the necessary directives.
5-31. Assessment in execution identifies variances, their magnitude and significance, and the need for
decisions and what type—whether execution or adjustment. The commander and staff assess the probable
outcome of the operation to determine whether changes are necessary to accomplish the mission, take
advantage of opportunities, or react to unexpected threats. Figure 5-1 on page 5-6 depicts a basic model of
assessing and decisionmaking during execution.
26 March 2010
FM 5-0
5-5
Chapter 5
Figure 5-1. Decisions in execution
5-32. A variance is a difference between the actual situation during an operation and what the plan
forecasted the situation would be at that time or event (FM 6-0). Staffs ensure information systems display
relevant information that allows them to identify variances. The commander and staff evaluate emerging
variances. If necessary, staffs update the conclusions and recommendations of their running estimates for
the commander, who directs the necessary action. Two forms of variances exist: opportunities and threats.
5-33. The first form of variance is an opportunity to accomplish the mission more effectively. Opportunity
results from forecasted or unexpected success. When commanders recognize an opportunity, they alter the
order to exploit it if the change achieves the end state without incurring unacceptable risk. When exploiting
an opportunity, the concept of operations may change but the commander’s intent usually remains the
same.
5-34. The second form of variance is a threat to mission accomplishment or survival of the force. When a
threat is recognized, the commander adjusts the order to eliminate the enemy advantage, restore the friendly
advantage, and regain the initiative. Not all threats to the force or mission involve hostile or neutral
persons. Disease, toxic hazards, and natural disasters are examples of other threats.
5-35. In some instances, the variance is so extreme that no branch or sequel is available or the current plan
lacks enough flexibility to respond to the variance. In this situation, the commander and staff may have to
reframe the problem to better understand the operational environment as depicted in figure 5-1. (For more
on reframing, see chapter 3.)
TYPES OF DECISIONS
5-36. Decisions made during execution are either execution decisions or adjustment decisions. Execution
decisions involve options anticipated in the order. Adjustment decisions involve options that commanders
did not anticipate. These decisions may include a decision to reframe the problem and develop an entirely
5-6
FM 5-0
26 March 2010
Execution
new plan. Commanders may delegate authority for some execution decisions to the staff; however,
commanders are always responsible for and involved in decisions during execution. Table 5-1 summarizes
the range of possible actions with respect to decisions made during execution.
Table 5-1. Decision types and related actions
Decision Types
Actions
Minor Variances from
Execute Planned Actions
the Plan
•
Commander or designee decides which planned actions
best meet situation and directs their execution.
Operation proceeding
according to plan. Variances
•
Staff issues fragmentary order.
are within acceptable limits.
•
Staff completes follow-up actions.
Execute a Branch or Sequel
•
Commander or staff review branch or sequel plan.
Anticipated Situation
•
Commander receives assessments and recommendations
Operation encountering
for modifications to the plan, determines the time available
variances within the limits for
to refine it, and either issues guidance for further actions or
one or more branches or
directs execution of a branch or sequel.
sequels anticipated in the plan.
•
Staff issues fragmentary order.
•
Staff completes follow-up actions.
Unanticipated Situation—
Make an Adjustment Decision
Friendly Success
•
Commander recognizes the opportunity or threat and
Significant, unanticipated
determines time available for decisionmaking.
positive variances result in
•
Based on available planning time, commanders determine if
opportunities to achieve the end
they want to reframe the problem and develop a new design
state in ways that differ
concept or use the military decisionmaking process to
significantly from the plan.
develop a new plan. In these instances, the decision initiates
planning. Otherwise, the commander directs the staff to
refine a single course of action or directs actions by
subordinates to exploit the opportunity or counter the threat
Unanticipated Situation—
and exercise initiative within the higher commander’s intent.
Enemy Threat
•
Commander normally does not attempt to restore the plan.
Significant, unanticipated
•
Commander issues a verbal warning or fragmentary order to
negative variances impede
subordinate commanders.
mission accomplishment.
•
Staff resynchronizes operation, modifies measures of
effectiveness, and begins assessing the operation for
progress using new measures of effectiveness.
Execution Decisions
5-37. Execution decisions implement a planned action under circumstances anticipated in the order. In
their most basic form, execution decisions are decisions the commander foresees and identifies for
execution during the operation. They apply resources at times or situations generally established in the
order. For example, changing a boundary, altering the task organization, transitioning between phases, and
executing a branch are execution decisions. Commanders are responsible for those decisions but may direct
the COS (XO) or staff officer to supervise implementation. The current operations integration cell oversees
the synchronization of integrating processes needed to implement execution decisions.
Adjustment Decisions
5-38. Adjustment decisions modify the operation to respond to unanticipated opportunities and threats.
They often require implementing unanticipated operations and resynchronizing the warfighting functions.
Commanders make these decisions, delegating implementing authority only after directing the major
change themselves.
5-39. When basic operational assumptions prove inaccurate, the commander may have to change the
mission. Commanders do this only as a last resort while still accomplishing the higher commander’s intent.
26 March 2010
FM 5-0
5-7
Chapter 5
Changing the mission proves most difficult as it may desynchronize the force’s operations with those of the
overall force.
RAPID DECISIONMAKING AND SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS
5-40. The RDSP is a decisionmaking and synchronization technique that commanders and staffs
commonly use during execution. While identified here with a specific name and method, the approach is
not new; its use in the Army is well established. Commanders and staffs develop this capability through
training and practice. When using this technique, the following considerations apply:
z
Rapid is often more important than process.
z
Much of it may be mental rather than written.
z
It should become a battle drill for the current operations integration cells, future operations cells,
or both.
z
How much of the technique is explicitly performed varies by echelon and the time available.
5-41. While the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) seeks the optimal solution, the RDSP seeks a
timely and effective solution within the commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. Using the
RDSP lets leaders avoid the time-consuming requirements of developing decision criteria and comparing
courses of action (COAs). Mission variables continually change during execution. This often invalidates or
weakens COAs and decision criteria before leaders can make a decision. Under the RDSP, leaders combine
their experience and intuition with situational awareness to quickly reach situational understanding. Based
on this, they develop and refine workable COAs.
5-42. The RDSP facilitates continuously integrating and synchronizing the warfighting functions to
address ever-changing situations. It meets the following criteria for making effective decisions during
execution:
z
It is comprehensive, integrating all warfighting functions. It is not limited to any one warfighting
function.
z
It ensures all actions support the decisive operation by relating them to the commander’s intent
and concept of operations.
z
It allows rapid changes to the order or mission.
z
It is continuous, allowing commanders to react immediately to opportunities and threats.
z
It accommodates, but is not tied to, cyclical processes such as targeting.
5-43. The RDSP focuses on synchronizing actions and understanding relationships within staffs as well as
among commanders. Leaders can use it with or without a staff and in interagency and multinational
environments.
5-44. The RDSP is based on an existing order and the commander’s priorities as expressed in the order.
The most important of these control measures are the commander’s intent, concept of operations, and
CCIRs. Leaders use these priorities as criteria for making decisions.
5-45. The RDSP includes five steps. (See figure 5-2.) The first two may be performed in any order, including
concurrently. The last three are performed interactively until commanders identify an acceptable COA.
Figure 5-2. Rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process
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FM 5-0
26 March 2010
Execution
COMPARE THE CURRENT SITUATION TO THE ORDER
5-46. Commanders identify likely variances during planning and identify options that will be present and
actions that will be available when each variance occurs. During execution, commanders and staffs
monitor the situation to identify changes in conditions. Then they ask if these changes affect the overall
conduct of operations or their part of it and if the changes are significant. Finally, they identify if the
changed conditions represent variances from the order—especially opportunities and risks. Staff members
use running estimates to look for indicators of variances that affect their areas of expertise. (See table 5-2
for examples of indicators.) The commander, COS, and command post cell chiefs look for indicators of
variances that affect the overall operation. While these indicators may come from any source, often they
come from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts or reports from units executing the
operation.
±Table 5-2. Examples of change indicators
Types
Indicators
•
Answer to a CCIR.
•
Change in capabilities of subordinate unit.
•
Identification of an IR.
•
Change in role of host-nation military force.
•
Change in mission.
•
Climate changes or natural disasters
impacting on the population, agriculture,
•
Change in organization of unit.
industry.
•
Change in leadership of unit.
•
Upcoming local election.
•
Signing or implementation of peace treaty or
other key political arrangement.
•
Changes in key civilian leadership.
•
Identification of enemy main effort.
•
Enemy electronic attack use.
•
Identification of enemy reserves or
•
Indicators of illicit economic activity.
counterattack.
•
Identification of threats from within the
•
Indications of unexpected enemy action or
population.
preparation.
•
Increased unemployment within the
•
Increase in enemy solicitation of civilians for
population.
intelligence operations.
•
Interference with freedom of religious
•
Identification of an IR.
worship.
•
Insertion of manned surveillance teams.
•
Identification of HPT or HVT.
•
Disruption of primary and secondary
•
UAS launch.
education system.
•
Answer to a PIR.
•
Unexplained disappearance of key members
•
Enemy rotary-wing or UAS use.
of intelligence community.
•
Success or failure in breaching or gap
•
Success or failure of a subordinate unit task.
crossing operations.
•
Modification of an airspace control measure.
•
Capture of significant numbers of EPWs,
•
Numbers of dislocated civilians sufficient to
enemy CPs, supply points, or artillery units.
affect friendly operations.
•
Establishment of road blocks along major
•
Damages to civilian infrastructure affecting
traffic routes.
friendly mobility.
•
Unexplained displacement of neighborhoods
•
Loss of one or more critical transportation
within a given sector.
systems.
•
Receipt of an air tasking order.
•
Execution of planned fires.
•
Battle damage assessment results.
•
Modification of a FSCM.
•
Unplanned repositioning of firing units.
•
Effective enemy counterfire.
•
Success or lack thereof in electronic attack.
•
Negative effects of fires on civilians.
•
Identification of HPT or HVT.
•
Destruction of any place of worship by
•
Identification of an IR.
friendly fire.
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Chapter 5
±Table 5-2. Examples of change indicators (continued)
Types
Indicators
•
NBC 1 report or other indicators of enemy
•
Identification of threats to communications
CBRN use.
or computer systems.
•
Report or other indicators of enemy
•
Reports of enemy targeting critical host-
improvised explosive device use.
nation infrastructure.
•
Indicators of coordinated enemy actions
•
Identification of threat to base or
against civilians or friendly forces.
sustainment facilities.
•
Increased criminal activity in a given sector.
•
Escalation of force incidents.
•
Increase in organized protests or riots.
•
Loss of border security.
•
Significant loss of capability in any class of
•
Degradations to essential civilian
supply.
infrastructure by threat actions.
•
Opening or closing of civilian businesses
•
Civilian mass casualty event beyond
within a given area.
capability of host-nation resources.
•
Identification of significant incidences of
•
Identification of significant shortage in any
disease and nonbattle injury casualties.
class of supply.
•
Closing of major financial institutions.
•
Outbreak of epidemic or famine within the
•
Mass casualties.
civilian population.
•
Medical evacuation launch.
•
Receipt of significant resupply.
•
Disruption of one or more essential civil
•
Dislocated civilian event beyond capability
of host-nation resources.
services (such as water or electricity).
•
Contact on a supply route.
•
Disruption of key logistics lines of
communication.
•
Answer to an FFIR.
•
Changes in availability of host-nation
•
Mass detainees.
support.
•
Impending changes in key military
•
Effective adversary information efforts on
leadership.
civilians.
•
Interference with freedom of the press or
•
Loss of civilian communications nodes.
news media.
•
Loss of contact with a CP or commander.
•
Receipt of a fragmentary order or warning
•
Jamming or interference.
order from higher headquarters.
CBRN
chemical, biological, radiological, and
FFIR friendly force information
IR
information requirement
nuclear
requirement
NBC
nuclear, biological, and
CCIR
commander’s critical information
FSCM fire support coordination
chemical
requirement
measure
PIR
priority intelligence requirement
CP
command post
HPT high-priority target
UAS
unmanned aircraft system
EPW
enemy prisoner of war
HVT high-value target
5-47. Staff members are particularly alert for answers to CCIRs that support anticipated decisions. They
also watch for exceptional information. Exceptional information is information that would have answered
one of the commander’s critical information requirements if the requirement for it had been foreseen and
stated as one of the commander’s critical information requirements (FM 6-0). Exceptional information
usually reveals a need for an adjustment decision. (See FM 6-0.)
5-48. When performing the RDSP, the current operations integration cell first compares the current
situation to the one envisioned in the order. (See chapter 2.) It may obtain assistance from the assessment
section or the red team section in this analysis. If the situation requires greater analysis, the COS (XO)
may task the future operations cell (where authorized) or the plans cell to perform this analysis. At
echelons with no future operations cell, the plans cell or the current operations integration cell performs
this function.
DETERMINE THE TYPE OF DECISION REQUIRED
5-49. When a variance is identified, the commander directs action while the chief of operations leads
chiefs of the current operations integration cell and selected functional cell in quickly comparing the
current situation to the expected situation. This assessment accomplishes the following:
5-10
FM 5-0, C1
18 March 2011
Execution
z
Describes the variance.
z
Determines if the variance provides a significant opportunity or threat and examines the
potential of either.
z
Determines if a decision is needed by identifying if the variance—
Indicates an opportunity that can be exploited to accomplish the mission faster or with fewer
resources.
Directly threatens the decisive operation’s success.
Threatens a shaping operation such that it may threaten the decisive operation directly or in
the near future.
Can be addressed within the commander’s intent and concept of operations.
(If so,
determine what execution decision is needed.)
Requires changing the concept of operations substantially. (If so, determine what adjustment
decision or new approach will best suit the circumstances.)
5-50. For minor variances, the chief of operations works with other cell chiefs to determine whether
changes to control measures are needed. If so, they determine how those changes affect other warfighting
functions. They direct changes within their authority (execution decisions) and notify the COS (XO) and
the affected command post cells and staff elements.
5-51. Commanders intervene directly in cases that affect the overall direction of the unit. They describe
the situation, direct their subordinates to provide any additional information they need, and order either
implementation of planned responses or development of an order to redirect the force.
5-52. Staff members constantly compare the current situation to their expectations to identify variances.
Likewise, as the time for an anticipated execution decision approaches, staff members assess the situation
in their area of expertise. Doing this allows them to confirm that the decision will produce the planned
effects. It initiates the RSDP, essentially bypassing recognition and allowing the staff to discover small
changes in conditions that might otherwise go unnoticed.
DEVELOP A COURSE OF ACTION
5-53. If the variance requires an adjustment decision, the designated integrating cell and affected
command post cell chiefs recommend implementation of a COA or obtain the commander’s guidance for
developing one. They use the following conditions to screen possible COAs:
z
Mission.
z
Commander’s intent.
z
Current dispositions and freedom of action.
z
CCIRs.
z
Limiting factors, such as supply constraints, boundaries, and combat strength.
5-54. The new options must conform to the commander’s intent. Possible COAs may alter the concept of
operations and CCIRs if they remain within the commander’s intent. However, the commander approves
changes to the CCIRs. Functional cell chiefs and other staff section leaders identify areas that may be
affected within their areas of expertise by proposed changes to the order or mission. Considerations
include but are not limited to those shown in table 5-3 on page 5-12. The commander is as likely as
anyone else to detect the need for change and to sketch out the options. Whether the commander, COS,
XO, or chief of operations does this, the future operations cell is often directed to flesh out the concept and
draft the order. The chief of operations and the current operations integration cell normally lead this effort,
especially if the response is needed promptly or the situation is not complex. The commander, COS, or
XO is usually the decisionmaking authority, depending on the commander’s delegation of authority.
5-55. Commanders may delegate authority for execution decisions to their deputies, COSs (XOs), or their
operations officers. They retain personal responsibility for all decisions and normally retain the authority
for approving adjustment decisions.
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Chapter 5
5-56. When reallocating resources or priorities, commanders assign only minimum essential assets to
shaping operations. They use all other assets to weight the decisive operation. This applies when
allocating resources for the overall operation or within a warfighting function.
±Table 5-3. Considerations for synchronization and decision implementation actions
Types
Actions
•
Modifying priority intelligence
•
Updating the enemy SITEMP and enemy
requirements and other intelligence
COA statements.
requirements.
•
Modifying the ISR synchronization plan.
•
Updating named areas of interest and
•
Confirming or denying threat COAs.
target areas of interest.
•
Updating the ISR synchronization matrix and
•
Updating the intelligence estimate.
tools.
•
Assigning new objectives.
•
Modifying airspace control measures.
•
Revising or refining the ISR plan.
•
Making unit boundary changes.
•
Assigning new tasks to subordinate units.
•
Emplacing obstacles.
•
Adjusting terrain management.
•
Clearing obstacles.
•
Employing smoke.
•
Establishing and enforcing movement priority.
•
Delivering fires against targets or target sets.
•
Modifying radar zones.
•
Modifying the high-payoff target list and
•
Modifying the priority of fires.
the attack guidance matrix.
•
Modifying fire support coordination measures.
•
Moving air defense weapons systems.
•
Changing air defense weapons control status.
•
Establishing decontamination sites.
•
Enhancing survivability through engineer
support.
•
Conducting chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance.
•
Revising and updating personnel recovery
coordination.
•
Establish movement corridors on critical
lines of communications.
•
Reassigning or repositioning response forces.
•
Prioritizing medical evacuation assets.
•
Repositioning and prioritizing general
•
Repositioning logistics assets.
engineering assets.
•
Modifying priorities.
•
Positioning and prioritizing internment and
resettlement assets.
•
Modifying distribution.
•
Moving communications nodes.
•
Moving command posts.
•
Modifying information priorities for employing information as combat power.
•
Synchronizing and adjusting information themes and messages to support the new decision.
•
Adjusting measures for minimizing civilian interference with operations.
•
Revising recommended protected targets to the fires cell.
•
Recommending modifications of stability operations, including employment of civil affairs
operations and other units, to perform civil affairs operations tasks.
COA
course of action
SITEMP situation template
ISR
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
5-57.
Commanders normally direct the future operations cell to prepare a fragmentary order or the current
operations integration cell to issue a fragmentary order setting conditions for executing a new COA. When
lacking time to perform the MDMP or quickness of action is desirable, commanders make an immediate
adjustment decision—using intuitive decisionmaking—in the form of a focused COA. Developing the
focused COA often follows the mental war-gaming by commanders until they reach an acceptable COA.
If time is available, commanders may direct the plans cell to develop a new COA using the MDMP, and
the considerations for planning become operative.
REFINE AND VALIDATE THE COURSE OF ACTION
5-58. Once commanders describe the new COA, the current operations integration cell conducts an
analysis to validate its feasibility, suitability, and acceptability. If acceptable, the COA is refined to
resynchronize the warfighting functions enough to generate and apply the needed combat power. Staffs
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FM 5-0, C1
18 March 2011
Execution
with a future operations cell may assign that cell responsibility for developing the details of the new COA
and drafting a fragmentary order to implement it. The commander or COS may direct an “on-call”
operations synchronization meeting to perform this task and ensure rapid resynchronization.
5-59. Validation and refinement is done very quickly. Normally, the commander and staff officers
conduct a mental war game of the new COA. They consider potential enemy reactions, the unit’s
counteractions, and secondary effects that might affect the force’s synchronization. When time allows, the
XO or chief of operations assembles command post cell chiefs and refines and validates the COA in an
open forum. Each staff member considers the following:
z
Is the new COA feasible in terms of my area of expertise?
z
How will this action affect my area of expertise?
z
Does it require changing my information requirements?
Should any of the information requirements be nominated as a CCIR?
What actions within my area of expertise does this change require?
Will it require changing objectives or targets nominated by the staff section?
z
What other command post cells and elements does this action affect?
z
What are potential enemy reactions?
z
What are the possible friendly counteractions?
Does this counteraction affect my area of expertise?
Will it require changing my information requirements?
Are any of my information requirements potential CCIRs?
What actions within my area of expertise does this counteraction require?
Will it require changing objectives or targets nominated by the staff section?
What other command post cells and elements does this counteraction affect?
5-60. The validation and refinement show if the COA will acceptably solve the problem. If it does not,
the XO or chief of operations modifies it through additional analysis or develops a new COA. The XO
informs the commander of any changes made.
IMPLEMENT
5-61.
±When the COA is acceptable, the XO recommends implementation to the commander or
implements it directly if the commander has delegated that authority. Implementation normally requires a
fragmentary order; in exceptional circumstances, it may require a new operation order. That order changes
the concept of operations
(in adjustment decisions), resynchronizes the warfighting functions, and
disseminates changes to control measures. The staff uses warning orders to alert the unit to a pending
change. The staff also establishes sufficient time for the unit to implement the change without losing
integration or being exposed to unnecessary tactical risk. Stability operations demand special attention to
execution of inform and influence activities. Part of implementing in stability operations includes
informing the population of the purpose of an operation and amending the inform and influence plan to
account for changes that occur as the operation proceeds.
5-62. Commanders often issue orders to subordinates verbally in situations requiring a quick reaction. At
battalion and higher levels, written fragmentary orders confirm verbal orders to ensure synchronization,
integration, and notification of all parts of the force. Common revisions to products needed to affect
adjustments include the following:
z
Updated enemy situation, including the situation template.
z
Revised CCIRs.
z
Updated ISR plan.
z
Updated scheme of maneuver and tasks to maneuver units, including an execution matrix and
decision support matrix or template.
z
Updated scheme of fires, including the fire support execution matrix, high-payoff target list, and
attack guidance matrix.
z
Updated information tasks.
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5-13
Chapter 5
5-63. If time permits, leaders verify that subordinates understand critical tasks. Methods for doing this
include the confirmation brief and backbrief. These are done both between commanders and within staff
elements to ensure mutual understanding.
5-64. After the analysis is complete, the current operations integration cell and command post cell chiefs
update decision support templates and synchronization matrixes. When time is available, the operations
officer or chief of operations continues this analysis to the operation’s end to complete combat power
integration. Staff members begin the synchronization needed to implement the decision. This
synchronization involves collaboration with other command post cells and subordinate staffs. Staff
members determine how actions in their areas of expertise affect others. They coordinate those actions to
eliminate undesired effects that might cause friction. The cells provide results of this synchronization to
the current operations integration cell and the common operational picture.
5-65. During implementation of the RDSP, the current operations integration cell keeps the warfighting
functions synchronized as the situation changes. It considers the following outcomes when making
synchronization decisions or allowing others’ synchronization in collaboration to proceed:
z
Combined arms integration.
z
Responsiveness—both anticipatory and reactive.
z
Timeliness.
Anticipating certain outcomes lets commanders mass the effects of combat power at decisive times and
places.
5-66. Commanders also synchronize collaboratively. Coordination among higher, adjacent, supporting,
and subordinate commanders facilitates effective execution by improving interaction between their units
as they anticipate and solve problems. Cross talk among subordinate commanders can provide
synchronization as well as lead to decisionmaking. Such synchronization occurs without the higher
commander becoming involved, except to affirm, either positively or through silence, the decisions or
agreements of subordinates.
CAUTIONS
5-67. Validating and refining action is a rapid and largely intuitive activity. It should be done quickly and
not be drawn out. Commanders focus on maintaining the tempo and minimizing necessary
synchronization. The RDSP is not designed to mass maximum combat power but to make the minimum
coordination needed to generate enough combat power to prevail.
5-68. Most decisions during execution are made at a relatively low level by command post cell chiefs.
They refine execution of the order without changing it significantly. However, even small changes can
affect other staff sections. All changes that affect operations should be coordinated between cells and
reported to the staff as a whole. When time does not allow this, the staff element making the change
immediately advises all affected elements.
5-69. To work, the RDSP must be done continuously, not tied to the battle rhythm. Commanders can use
cyclical events (such as targeting working groups) to review an entire process or evaluate the entire ISR or
targeting plan. The key is to be able to act and react in real time as events occur, not at predetermined
points. Only in this way can Army forces operate within the enemy’s decision cycles at a tempo the enemy
cannot match.
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Chapter 6
Assessment
This chapter provides the fundamentals of assessment, including its definition,
purpose, and process. It discusses how assessment works with the levels of war and
offers considerations for effective assessment. This chapter also covers assessment
working groups and assessment support with operations research/systems analysis.
Guidelines for developing assessment plans are discussed in detail in appendix H.
ASSESSMENT FUNDAMENTALS
6-1. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the
enemy, and progress of an operation (FM 3-0). Commanders, assisted by their staffs and subordinate
commanders, continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of the operation. Based on
their assessment, commanders direct adjustments thus ensuring the operation remains focused on
accomplishing the mission.
6-2. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the
overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander determine
progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also involves
continuously monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine what changes might
affect the conduct of operations. Assessment helps commanders determine if they need to reframe the
problem and develop an entirely new plan. (Chapter 3 addresses reframing.)
6-3. Throughout the operations process, commanders integrate their own assessments with those of the
staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners in the area of operations. Primary tools for assessing
progress of the operation include the operation order, the common operational picture, personal
observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan. The latter includes measures of effectiveness,
measures of performance, and reframing criteria. The commander’s visualization forms the basis for the
commander’s personal assessment of progress. Running estimates provide information, conclusions, and
recommendations from the perspective of each staff section. They help to refine the common operational
picture and supplement it with information not readily displayed.
6-4. Commanders avoid excessive analyses when assessing operations. Committing valuable time and
energy to developing excessive and time-consuming assessment schemes squander resources better devoted
to other operations process activities. Commanders reject the tendency to measure something just because it
is measurable. Effective commanders avoid burdening subordinates and staffs with overly detailed
assessment and collection tasks. Generally, the echelon at which a specific operation, task, or action is
conducted should be the echelon at which it is assessed. This provides a focus for assessment at each
echelon. It enhances the efficiency of the overall operations process.
ASSESSMENT PROCESS
6-5. Assessment is continuous; it precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes
each operation or phase of an operation. Broadly, assessment consists of the following activities:
z
Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.
z
Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing
tasks.
z
Recommending or directing action for improvement.
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6-1
Chapter 6
6-6. The three activities that make up the assessment process are also continuous; they are logically
sequential while constantly executed throughout the operations process. This process applies to assessments
of every type and at every echelon.
MONITORING
6-7. Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation.
Monitoring within the assessment process allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that
information about the current situation that can be compared to the forecasted situation described in the
commander’s intent and concept of operations. Progress cannot be judged, nor effective decisions made,
without an accurate understanding of the current situation.
6-8. During planning, commanders monitor the situation to develop facts and assumptions that underlie
the plan. During preparation and execution, commanders and staffs monitor the situation to determine if the
facts are still relevant, if their assumptions remain valid, and if new conditions emerged that affect the operations.
6-9. Commander’s critical information requirements and decision points focus the staff’s monitoring
activities and prioritize the unit’s collection efforts. Information requirements concerning the enemy,
terrain and weather, and civil considerations are identified and assigned priorities through intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) synchronization. Operations officers use friendly reports to
coordinate other assessment-related information requirements. To prevent duplicated collection efforts,
information requirements associated with assessing the operation are integrated into both the ISR plan and
friendly force information requirements. (See appendix H for more detail in building an assessment plan.)
6-10. Staffs monitor and collect information from the common operational picture and friendly reports.
This information includes operational and intelligence summaries from subordinate, higher, and adjacent
headquarters and communications and reports from liaison teams. The staff also identifies information
sources outside military channels and monitors their reports. These other channels might include products
from civilian, host-nation, and other government agencies. Staffs apply information management and
knowledge management principles to facilitate getting this information to the right people at the right time.
(See FM 6-0 and FM 6-01.1.)
6-11. Staff sections record relevant information in running estimates. Each staff section maintains a
continuous assessment of current operations as a basis to determine if they are proceeding according to the
commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. In their running estimates, staff sections use this
new information, updated facts, and assumptions as the basis for evaluation.
EVALUATING
6-12. The staff analyzes relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate the operation’s
progress. Evaluating is using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining
why the current degree of progress exists. Evaluation is the heart of the assessment process where most
of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps commanders determine what is working, determine what is not
working, and gain insights into how to better accomplish the mission.
6-13. Criteria in the forms of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) aid
in determining progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.
MOEs help determine if a task is achieving its intended results. MOPs help determine if a task is completed
properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria—they do not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and
MOPs require relevant information in the form of indicators for evaluation.
6-14. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or
operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an
objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both positive and
negative. MOEs help to answer the question “Are we doing the right things?” MOEs are commonly found
and tracked in formal assessment plans. Examples of MOEs for the objective to “Provide a safe and secure
environment” may include—
z
Decrease in insurgent activity.
z
Increase in population trust of host-nation security forces.
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Assessment
6-15. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task
accomplishment (JP 3-0). MOPs help answer questions such as “Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks
completed to standard?” A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are
commonly found and tracked at all levels in execution matrixes. MOPs are also heavily used to evaluate
training. MOPs help to answer the question “Are we doing things right?”
6-16. At the most basic level, every Soldier assigned a task maintains a formal or informal checklist to
track task completion. The status of those tasks and subtasks are MOPs. Similarly, operations consist of a
series of collective tasks sequenced in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions. Current operations
integration cells use MOPs in execution matrixes and running estimates to track completed tasks. The uses
of MOPs are a primary element of battle tracking. MOPs focus on the friendly force. Evaluating task
accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes or no answer. Examples
of MOPs include—
z
Route X cleared.
z
Generators delivered, are operational, and secured at villages A, B, and C.
z
Hill 785 secured.
z
$15,000 spent for schoolhouse completion.
6-17. In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information that provides insight into a
measure of effectiveness or measure of performance. Staffs use indicators to shape their collection effort
as part of ISR synchronization. Indicators take the form of reports from subordinates, surveys and polls,
and information requirements. Indicators help to answer the question “What is the current status of this
MOE or MOP?” A single indicator can inform multiple MOPs and MOEs. Examples of indicators for the
MOE “Decrease in insurgent activity” are—
z
Number of hostile actions per area each week.
z
Number of munitions caches found per area each week.
Appendix H provides a more detailed discussion of developing MOEs, MOPs, and indicators as part of
building the assessment plan. Table 6-1 provides additional information concerning MOEs, MOPs, and
indicators.
Table 6-1. Assessment measures and indicators
MOE
MOP
Indicator
Answers the question: Are we
Answers the question: Are
Answers the question: What is the status
doing the right things?
we doing things right?
of this MOE or MOP?
Measures purpose
Measures raw data inputs to inform
Measures task completion.
accomplishment.
MOEs and MOPs.
Measures why in the mission
Measures what in the
Information used to make measuring
statement.
mission statement.
what or why possible.
No hierarchical relationship to
No hierarchical relationship
Subordinate to MOEs and MOPs.
MOPs.
to MOEs.
Often formally tracked in formal
Often formally tracked in
Often formally tracked in formal
assessment plans.
execution matrixes.
assessment plans.
Typically challenging to choose
Typically simple to choose
Typically as challenging to select
the correct ones.
the correct ones.
correctly as the supported MOE or MOP.
6-18. Evaluation includes analysis of why progress is or is not being made according to the plan.
Commanders and staffs propose and consider possible causes. In particular, the question of whether
changes in the situation can be attributed to friendly actions is addressed. Commanders and staffs consult
subject matter experts, both internal and external to the staff, on whether staffs have identified the correct
underlying causes for specific changes in the situation. Assumptions identified in the planning process are
challenged to determine if they are still valid.
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FM 5-0
6-3
Chapter 6
6-19. A key aspect of evaluation is determining variances—the difference between the actual situation and
what the plan forecasted the situation would be at the time or event. Based on the significance of the
variances, the staff makes recommendations to the commander on how to adjust operations to accomplish
the mission more effectively. See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of assessment during execution to
include the relationship between the degree of variance from the plan and execution and adjustment
decisions.
6-20. Evaluating includes considering whether the desired conditions have changed, are no longer
achievable, or are not achievable through the current operational approach. This is done by continually
challenging the key assumptions made when framing the problem. When an assumption is invalidated, then
reframing may be in order. (Chapter 3 discusses framing and reframing.)
RECOMMENDING OR DIRECTING ACTION
6-21. Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is incomplete without
recommending or directing action. Assessment may diagnose problems, but unless it results in
recommended adjustments, its use to the commander is limited.
6-22. Based on the evaluation of progress, the staff brainstorms possible improvements to the plan and
makes preliminary judgments about the relative merit of those changes. Staff members identify those
changes possessing sufficient merit and provide them as recommendations to the commander or make
adjustments within their delegated authority. Recommendations to the commander range from continuing
the operation as planned, to executing a branch, or to making adjustments not anticipated. Making
adjustments includes assigning new tasks to subordinates, reprioritizing support, adjusting the ISR
synchronization plan, and significantly modifying the course of action. Commanders integrate
recommendations from the staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners with their personal
assessment. From those recommendations, they decide if and how to modify the operation to better
accomplish the mission. (See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of decisions during execution.)
6-23. Assessment diagnoses threats, suggests improvements to effectiveness, and reveals opportunities.
The staff presents the results and conclusions of its assessments and recommendations to the commander as
an operation develops. Just as the staff devotes time to analysis and evaluation, so too must it make timely,
complete, and actionable recommendations. The chief of staff or executive officer ensures the staff
completes its analyses and recommendations in time to affect the operation and for information to reach the
commander when it is needed.
6-24. When developing recommendations, the staff draws from many sources and considers its
recommendations within the larger context of the operations. While several ways to improve a particular
aspect of the operation might exist, some recommendations could impact other aspects of the operation. As
with all recommendations, the staff should address any future implications.
ASSESSMENT AND THE LEVELS OF WAR
6-25. Assessment occurs at all levels of war and at all echelons. The situation and echelon dictate the focus
and methods leaders use to assess. Normally, commanders assess those specific operations or tasks that
they were directed to accomplish. This properly focuses collection and assessment at each level, reduces
redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process.
6-26. For units with a staff, assessment becomes more formal at each higher echelon. Assessment
resources (to include staff officer expertise and time available) proportionally increase from battalion to
brigade, division, corps, and theater army. The analytic resources and level of expertise of staffs available
at strategic- and operational-level headquarters include a dedicated core group of analysts. This group
specializes in operations research/systems analysis
(ORSA), formal assessment plans, and various
assessment products. Division, corps, and theater army headquarters, for example, have fully resourced
plans, future operations, and current operations integration cells. They have larger intelligence staffs and
more staff officers trained in ORSA. Assessment at brigade and below is usually less formal, often relying
on direct observations and the judgment of commanders and their staffs.
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FM 5-0
26 March 2010
Assessment
6-27. Often, time available for detailed analysis and assessment is shorter at the tactical level. Additionally,
tactical staffs are progressively smaller and have less analytic capability at each lower echelon. As such,
assessment at the tactical level focuses on the near term and relies more on direct observation and
judgments than on detailed assessment methods. This is not to say that tactical units cannot use detailed
assessment methods.
6-28. For small units (those without a staff), assessment is mostly informal. Small-unit leaders focus on
assessing their unit readiness—personnel, equipment, supplies, and morale—and their unit’s ability to
perform assigned tasks. Leaders also determine whether the unit has completed assigned tasks. If those
tasks have not produced the desired results, leaders explore why they have not and consider what smart
improvements could be made for unit operations. As they assess and learn, small units change their tactics,
techniques, and procedures based on their experiences.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT
6-29. The following considerations help commanders and staffs develop assessment plans and conduct
effective assessments:
z
Assessment is continuous.
z
Commanders drive assessment through prioritization.
z
Assessment incorporates the logic behind the plan.
z
Assessment facilitates learning and adapting.
z
Commanders and staffs use caution when establishing cause and effect.
z
Commanders and staffs combine quantitative and qualitative indicators.
z
Assessment incorporates formal and informal methods.
ASSESSMENT IS CONTINUOUS
6-30. Assessment is a continuous activity of the operations process. The focus of assessment, however,
changes for each operations process activity. During planning, assessment focuses on understanding current
conditions of the operational environment and developing an assessment plan, including what and how to
assess progress. Understanding the commander’s intent and desired future conditions is key when building
the assessment plan. During preparation, assessment focuses on determining the friendly force’s readiness
to execute the operation and on verifying the assumptions on which the plan is based. During execution,
assessment focuses on evaluating progress of the operation. Based on their assessment, commanders direct
adjustments to the order, ensuring the operation stays focused on accomplishing the mission. They adjust
their assessment plan as required.
6-31. Assessment is continuous, even when the unit is not actively engaged in operations. At a minimum,
staffs maintain running estimates of friendly force capabilities and readiness within their areas of expertise.
Some running estimates, such as the intelligence estimate, also assess operational environments to which
the unit is likely to deploy.
COMMANDERS DRIVE ASSESSMENT THROUGH PRIORITIZATION
6-32. The commander’s role is central to the assessment process. Commanders establish priorities for
assessment and discipline the staff to meet the requirements of time, simplicity, and level of detail based on
the situation. While the staff does the detailed work, to include collecting and analyzing information,
commanders ultimately assess the operation. Commanders are also responsible for decisions made based on
their assessments.
6-33. ±In assessing operations, commanders consider information and recommendations by the staff,
subordinate commanders, and other partners within and outside of their area of operations. Commanders
then apply their judgment to assess progress. As commanders monitor the situation, they compare the
current situation to their initial commander’s visualization and commander’s intent. Based on their
assessment of progress, commanders direct adjustments to the order—ensuring the operation stays focused
on the operation’s end state—or reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan.
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6-5
Chapter 6
6-34. To assist commanders learning throughout the conduct of operations, they establish their
commander’s critical information requirements, set priorities for assessment in the form of MOEs and
reframing criteria, and explicitly state assumptions. When results fail to meet expectations, commanders
decide whether this is due to a failure in implementing the plan (execution) or if the plan and its underlying
logic are flawed.
ASSESSMENT INCORPORATES THE LOGIC BEHIND THE PLAN
6-35. Effective assessment relies on an accurate understanding of the logic used to build the plan. Each
plan is built on assumptions and an operational approach—a broad conceptualization of the general actions
that will produce the conditions that define the desire end state. The reasons or logic as to why the
commander believes the plan will produce the desired results are important considerations when
determining how to assess the operations. Recording and understanding this logic helps the staffs
recommend the appropriate MOPs, MOEs and indicators for assessing the operation. It also helps the
commander and staff determine if they need to reframe the problem if assumptions prove false or the logic
behind the plan appears flawed as operations progress. (See chapter 3 for a discussion of framing and
reframing the problem and developing a design concept.)
6-36. When conducting design, the logic used to drive more detailed planning is captured in the design
concept that includes the mission narrative and problem statement. As planning continues, staff sections
identify and record the logic behind the plan relating to their area of expertise in their running estimates.
They also record assumptions and include key assumptions as part of the operation plan or order. An
explicit record of this logic used in building the plan proves valuable to the commander and staff as well as
to follow-on units and other civilian and military organizations in understanding the plan and assessing the
progress of operations.
ASSESSMENT FACILITATES LEARNING AND ADAPTING
6-37. One of the most important questions when assessing the operation is whether the plan is still
relevant. Assessment entails measuring progress according to the plan. It also includes periodically
reexamining the logic and assumptions of the original plan to determine if the plan is still relevant.
Throughout an operation, higher operational objectives may change and conditions may develop that did
not exist during planning. These conditions may create a somewhat different situation from the one the
commander originally visualized. When this occurs, modifications to the plan may be in order, or it may be
necessary to reframe the problem.
6-38. The assessment process prompts the decision to reframe in several ways. Commanders and staffs
continuously challenge the key assumptions in the plan. When an assumption is invalidated, reframing may
be in order. Another sign of a requirement to reframe is when task completion measured by MOPs is high
but purpose accomplishment measured by MOEs is low. That suggests that the wrong tasks have been
assigned and reframing is needed.
6-39. As commanders assess and learn throughout the operation, they determine if achieving their original
objectives leads to the desired end state. Collaboration and dialog with higher, lower, and adjacent
commanders and staffs, backed up by quantitative and qualitative assessments, contribute to this learning.
Assessing helps commanders to update their commander’s visualization (which may include a revised end
state), direct changes to the order, and adapt the force to better accomplish the mission.
COMMANDERS AND STAFFS USE CAUTION WHEN ESTABLISHING CAUSE AND EFFECT
6-40. Establishing cause and effect is sometimes difficult, but it is crucial to effective assessment.
Sometimes, establishing causality between actions and their effects can be relatively straightforward, such
as in observing a bomb destroy a bridge. In other instances, especially regarding changes in human
behavior, attitudes, and perception, establishing links between cause and effect proves difficult.
Commanders and staffs must guard against drawing erroneous conclusions in these instances.
6-41. Understanding how cause and effect works requires careful consideration and shrewd judgment.
Even when two variables seem to be correlated, commanders must still make assumptions to establish
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FM 5-0, C1
18 March 2011
Assessment
which one is cause and which one is effect. In fact, both may be caused by a third unnoticed variable.
Commanders clearly acknowledge all assumptions made in establishing causes and effects. The payoff for
correctly identifying the links between causes and effects is effective and smart recommendations.
Commanders and staffs are well-advised to devote the time, effort, and energy needed to properly uncover
connections between causes and effects. Assumptions made in establishing cause and effect must be
recorded explicitly and challenged periodically to ensure they are still valid.
6-42. ±In its simplest form, an effect is a result, outcome, or consequence of an action. Direct effects are
the immediate, first-order consequences of a military action unaltered by intervening events. They are
usually immediate and easily recognizable. Examples are an enemy command post destroyed by friendly
artillery or a terrorist network courier captured by a direct-action mission. Establishing the link between
cause and effect in the physical domains is usually straightforward, as is assessing progress.
6-43. ±It is often difficult to establish a link or correlation that clearly identifies actions that produce
effects beyond the physical domains. The relationship between action taken (cause) and nonphysical effects
may be coincidental. Then the occurrence of an effect is either purely accidental or perhaps caused by the
correlation of two or more actions executed to achieve the effect. For example, friendly forces can
successfully engage enemy formations with fire and maneuver at the same time as military information
support operations. Military information support operations might urge enemy soldiers to surrender. If both
these events occur at the same time, then correlating an increase in surrendering soldiers to military
information support operations will be difficult. As another example, friendly forces may attempt to
decrease population support for an insurgency in a particular city. To accomplish this task, the unit
facilitates the reconstruction of the city’s power grid, assists the local authorities in establishing a terrorist
tips hotline, establishes a civil-military operations center, and conducts lethal operations against high-
payoff targets within the insurgency. Identifying the relative impact of each of these activities is extremely
challenging but is critical for allocating resources smartly to accomplish the mission. Unrecognized
influences completely invisible to assessors can also cause changes unforeseen or attributed inaccurately to
actions of the force.
6-44. Furthermore, because commanders synchronize actions across the warfighting functions to achieve
an objective or obtain an end state condition, the cumulative effect of these actions may make the impact of
any individual task indistinguishable. Careful consideration and judgment are required, particularly when
asserting cause-and-effect relationships in stability operations.
COMMANDERS AND STAFFS COMBINE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE INDICATORS
6-45. Effective assessment incorporates both quantitative (observation based) and qualitative (opinion
based) indicators. Human judgment is integral to assessment. A key aspect of any assessment is the degree
to which it relies upon human judgment and the degree to which it relies upon direct observation and
mathematical rigor. Rigor offsets the inevitable bias, while human judgment focuses rigor and processes on
intangibles that are often key to success. The appropriate balance depends on the situation—particularly the
nature of the operation and available resources for assessment—but rarely lies at the ends of the scale.
6-46. A balanced judgment for any assessment identifies the information on which to concentrate.
Amassing statistics is easy. Determining which actions imply success proves far more difficult due to
dynamic interactions among friendly forces, adaptable enemies, populations, and other aspects of the
operational environment such as economics and culture. This is especially true of operations that require
assessing the actions intended to change human behavior, such as deception or stability operations. Using
quantitative and qualitative indicators reduces the likelihood and impact of the skewed perspective that
results from an overreliance on either expert opinion or direct observation.
Quantitative
6-47. In the context of assessment, a quantitative indicator is an observation-based (objective) item of
information that provides insight into a MOE or MOP. Little human judgment is involved in collecting a
quantitative indicator. Someone observes an event and counts it. For example, the individual tallies the
monthly gallons of diesel provided to host-nation security forces by a unit or the monthly number of tips
provided to a tips hotline. Then the commander or staff collects that number.
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Chapter 6
6-48. Some human judgment is inevitably a factor even when dealing with quantitative indicators.
Choosing which quantitative indicators to collect requires significant human judgment prior to collection.
During collection the choice of sources, methods, and standards for observing and reporting the events
require judgment. After collection, the commander or staff decides whether to use the number as an
indicator in a formal assessment plan and for which MOEs or MOPs.
6-49. Quantitative indicators prove less biased than qualitative indicators. In general, numbers based on
observations are impartial (assuming that the events in question were observed and reported accurately).
Often, however, these indicators are less readily available than qualitative indicators and more difficult to
select correctly. This is because the judgment aspect of which indicators validly inform the MOE is already
factored into qualitative indicators to a degree. Experts factor in all considerations they believe are relevant
to answering questions. However, this does not occur inherently with quantitative indicators. The
information in quantitative indicators is less refined and requires greater judgment to handle appropriately
than information in qualitative indicators.
6-50. Public opinion polling can be easily miscategorized. It often provides an important source of
information in prolonged stability operations. Results of a rigorously collected and statistically valid public
opinion poll are quantitative, not qualitative. Polls take a mathematically rigorous approach to answering
the question of what people really think; they do not offer opinions on whether the people are correct.
6-51. While the results of scientifically conducted polls are quantitative, human judgment is involved in
designing a poll. Decisions must be made on what questions to ask, how to word the questions, how to
translate the questions, how to select the sample, how to choose interviewers, what training to give
interviewers, and what mathematical techniques to use for getting a sample of the population.
Qualitative
6-52. In the context of assessment, a qualitative indicator is an opinion-based
(subjective) item of
information that provides insight into a MOE or MOP. A high degree of human judgment is involved when
collecting qualitative indicators. Qualitative indicators are themselves opinions, not just observed opinions
of others such as polls. For example, the division commander estimates the effectiveness of the host-nation
forces on a scale of 1 to 5. Sources of qualitative indicators include subject matter experts’ opinions and
judgments as well as subordinate commanders’ summaries of the situation.
6-53. Qualitative indicators can account for real-world complexities that cannot be feasibly measured using
quantitative indicators. Qualitative indicators are also more readily available; commanders often have
access to staff principals and other subject matter experts from whom to garner opinions. In some cases, the
only available indicator for a particular MOE or MOP is an expert opinion. For example, determining
changes in the size and number of enemy sanctuaries may prove impossible without asking local
commanders. Without large amounts of objective data, subjective indicators can be used to give a relatively
informed picture. However, subjective measures have a higher risk of bias. Human opinion is capable of
spectacular insight but also vulnerable to hidden assumptions that may prove false.
6-54. Differentiating between quantitative and qualitative indicators is useful but signifies a major
tendency rather than a sharp distinction in practice. Quantitative indicators often require a degree of
judgment in their collection. For example, determining the number of mortar attacks in a given area over a
given period requires judgment in categorizing attacks as mortar attacks. A different delivery system could
have been used, or an improvised explosive device could have been mistaken for a mortar attack. The
attack could also have landed on a boundary, requiring a decision on whether to count it. Similarly,
qualitative indicators always have some basis in observed and counted events. The same indicator may be
quantitative or qualitative depending on the collection mechanism. For example, the indicator may measure
a change in market activity for village X. If a Soldier observes and tracks the number of exchanges, then
the indicator is quantitative. If the battalion commander answers that question in a mandated monthly
report based on a gut feel, then the indicator is qualitative.
ASSESSMENT INCORPORATES FORMAL AND INFORMAL METHODS
6-55. Assessment may be formal or informal; the appropriate level of formality depends entirely on the
situation. As part of their planning guidance, commanders address the level of detail they desire for
6-8
FM 5-0, C1
18 March 2011
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