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*FM 5-0, C1
Field Manual
Headquarters
Department of the Army
No. 5-0
Washington, DC, 26 March 2010
The Operations Process
Contents
Page
PREFACE
v
INTRODUCTION
vi
±Chapter 1
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
1-1
±The Nature of Operations
1-1
±Mission Command
1-2
±The Operations Process
1-3
±Integrating Processes and Continuing Activities
1-6
±Running Estimates
1-7
±Fundamentals
1-7
Chapter 2
PLANNING
2-1
Planning and Plans
2-1
Planning and the Levels of War
2-1
The Value of Planning
2-2
Conceptual and Detailed Planning
2-6
Fundamentals of Planning
2-8
Key Components of a Plan
2-14
Chapter 3
DESIGN
3-1
Design Defined
3-1
Design Goals
3-2
Design in Context
3-3
Leading Design
3-6
Design Methodology
3-7
Chapter 4
PREPARATION
4-1
Preparation Functions
4-1
Preparation and the Operations Process
4-2
Preparation Activities
4-3
Chapter 5
EXECUTION
5-1
Fundamentals of Execution
5-1
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 5-0, 20 January 2005, and FMI 5-0.1, 31 March 2006.
18 March 2011
FM 5-0, C1
i
Contents
Responsibilities During Execution
5-3
Decisionmaking During Execution
5-5
Rapid Decisionmaking and Synchronization Process
5-8
Chapter 6
ASSESSMENT
6-1
Assessment Fundamentals
6-1
Assessment Process
6-1
Assessment and the Levels of War
6-4
Considerations for Effective Assessment
6-5
Assessment Working Groups
6-9
Assessment Support
6-10
Appendix A
COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS
A-1
Appendix B
THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
B-1
Appendix C
TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES
C-1
Appendix D
GUIDELINES FOR COMMANDER’S PLANNING GUIDANCE
D-1
Appendix E
ARMY OPERATION PLAN AND ORDER FORMAT
E-1
Appendix F
TASK ORGANIZATION
F-1
Appendix G
RUNNING ESTIMATES
G-1
Appendix H
FORMAL ASSESSMENT PLANS
H-1
Appendix I
REHEARSALS
I-1
Appendix J
MILITARY BRIEFINGS
J-1
GLOSSARY
Glossary-1
REFERENCES
References-1
INDEX
Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. The operations process
1-3
±Figure 2-1. The Army problem solving model
2-3
Figure 2-2. The planning construct
2-7
Figure 2-3. Commander’s visualization
2-9
Figure 3-1. The design methodology
3-7
Figure 5-1. Decisions in execution
5-6
Figure 5-2. Rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process
5-8
±Figure A-1. Functional and integrating cells
A-3
Figure A-2. Integration of plans, future operations, and current operations
A-5
±Figure B-1. The steps of the military decisionmaking process
B-3
±Figure B-2. Mission analysis
B-6
Figure B-3. COA development
B-16
Figure B-4. Sample brigade COA sketch
B-21
Figure B-5. COA analysis and war-gaming
B-22
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FM 5-0, C1
18 March 2011
Contents
Figure B-6. Sample belt method
B-27
Figure B-7. Sample modified belt method using lines of effort
B-27
Figure B-8. Sample avenue-in-depth method
B-28
Figure B-9. Sample modified avenue-in-depth method using lines of effort
B-28
Figure B-10. Sample box method
B-29
Figure B-11. Sample modified box method using lines of effort
B-29
Figure B-13. Sample sketch note technique
B-31
Figure B-14. COA comparison
B-34
Figure B-15. Sample advantages and disadvantages
B-35
Figure B-16. Sample decision matrix
B-35
Figure C-1. Parallel planning
C-2
Figure C-2. Planning at company and below
C-3
Figure C-3. Sample schedule
C-4
Figure C-4. Sample mission and COA statements
C-9
Figure E-1. Paragraph layout for plans and orders
E-4
±Figure E-2. Annotated Army OPLAN/OPORD format
E-9
±Figure E-3. Annotated attachment format (general)
E-18
±Figure E-4. Annotated WARNO format
E-20
±Figure E-5. Annotated sample FRAGO
E-22
Figure E-6. Example of overlay order graphic
E-23
±Figure F-1. Sample outline format for a task organization (52d Infantry Division)
F-5
Figure G-1. Generic base running estimate format
G-2
Figure H-1. Sample of end state conditions for defensive operations
H-3
Figure H-2. Sample of end state conditions for stability operations
H-4
Figure H-3. Sample assessment framework
H-6
Figure I-1. Rehearsal techniques
I-3
Figure J-1. Information briefing format
J-1
Figure J-2. Decision briefing format
J-2
Figure J-3. Considerations during planning
J-4
Figure J-4. Considerations during preparation
J-5
Tables
Table 2-1. Types of problems and solution strategies
2-4
Table 5-1. Decision types and related actions
5-7
±Table 5-2. Examples of change indicators
5-9
±Table 5-3. Considerations for synchronization and decision implementation actions
5-12
Table 6-1. Assessment measures and indicators
6-3
Table B-1. Historical minimum planning ratios
B-17
±Table E-1. Designated letters for dates and times
E-6
±Table E-2. List of attachments and responsible staff officers
E-16
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iii
Contents
Table F-1. Army command relationships
F-3
Table F-2. Army support relationships
F-4
±Table F-3. Order for listing units in a task organization
F-7
Table I-1. Example sustainment and protection actions for rehearsals
I-12
iv
FM 5-0, C1
18 March 2011
Preface
FM 5-0 (C1), The Operations Process, constitutes the Army’s view on planning, preparing, executing, and
assessing operations. It describes how commanders—supported by their staffs, subordinate commanders, and
other military and civilian partners—exercise mission command during the conduct of full spectrum operations.
It describes how design assists commanders with understanding complex problems and developing an
operational approach to solve or manage those problems throughout the conduct of operations.
This manual applies to all Army forces. The principal audience for this manual is Army commanders and unit
staffs (officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers). Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving
as a joint task force or a multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine
for the exercise of command and control. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this manual.
Terms that have joint or Army definitions are identified in both the glossary and the text. Glossary references:
The glossary lists most terms used in field manual (FM) 5-0 that have joint or Army definitions. Terms for
which FM 5-0 is the proponent field manual (the authority) are indicated with an asterisk in the glossary. Text
references: Definitions for which FM 5-0 is the proponent field manual are printed in boldface in the text. These
terms and their definitions will be incorporated into the next revision of FM 1-02, Operational Terms and
Graphics. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent manual follows
the definition.
FM 5-0 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United
States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of this publication is the United .States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The
preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written
comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms)
to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (FM 5-0),
300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS
66027-2337; by e-mail to: leav-cadd-web-
cadd@conus.army.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
18 March 2011
FM 5-0, C1
v
Introduction
This change to FM 5-0 updates the operations process to account for new doctrine established in change 1 to
FM 3-0 (2008). While the major activities of the operations process have not changed, changes in FM 3-0 that
significantly impact FM 5-0 include—
Replacement of the term and definition of command and control with the term and definition
of mission command. The revised definition of mission command now accounts for both the
Army’s philosophy of command (formerly known as mission command) as well as the exercise
of authority and direction to accomplish missions (formerly known as command and control).
(Note: Joint, other Service, and some allied doctrine retain the term command and control).
Replacement of the term, definition, and tasks of the command and control warfighting
function with the term, definition, and tasks of the mission command warfighting function.
Rescindment of the term battle command. While the term is rescinded, the commander’s
activities of understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess remain the primary activities
commanders use to drive the operations process.
Replacement of the five Army information tasks (information engagement, command and
control warfare, information protection, operations security, and military deception) with the
mission command warfighting task Conduct inform and influence and cyber/electro-
magnetic activities. As part of this change, the terms information engagement, command and
control warfare, and information protection are rescinded. In addition, the term and definition
of psychological operations is replaced with the term and definition of military information
support operations.
FM 5-0, Change 1, provides doctrine on the operations process as a whole, a chapter on design, and a chapter
for each activity of the operations process. The appendixes describe the tactics, techniques, and procedures
for conducting the military decisionmaking process, conducting troop leading procedures, and writing
operation plans and orders.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the operations process. It describes the general nature of operations in
which commanders, supported by their staffs, exercise mission command. Next, this chapter describes the
operations process and highlights the commander’s role in its execution. Discussions of integrating processes,
continuing activities, and running estimates follow. The chapter concludes by discussing fundamentals
commanders and staffs consider for the effective execution of the operations process. Change 1 updates the
chapter with the new mission command taxonomy and modifies the fundamentals of the operations process.
Chapter 2 addresses the planning. It describes planning as an essential element of mission command and a
continuous activity of the operations process. This chapter defines planning, describes planning at the
different levels of war, and lists the value of effective planning. This chapter concludes offering fundamentals
for effective planning and describes the key components of a plan or order. Change 1 updates the chapter
with the new mission command taxonomy.
Chapter 3 describes design. It describes a methodology that assists commanders, staffs, and others in
understanding the operational environment, framing problems, and developing an operational approach to
solve those problems. This chapter addresses requirements to reframe the problem when changes in the
operational environment render the operational approach and its associated logic no longer applicable.
Change 1 updates the chapter with the new mission command taxonomy.
Chapter 4 is about preparation—the activity that helps transition the force from planning to execution. The
chapter discusses activities within the headquarters and across the force that improve a unit’s ability to
execute operations. Change 1 updates the chapter with the new mission command taxonomy and updates the
discussion on building partnerships and teams.
vi
FM 5-0, C1
18 March 2011
Introduction
Chapter 5 provides doctrine on execution. It lists fundamentals to guide execution and describes the roles of
the commander and staff when directing and synchronizing the current operation. It describes assessment and
decisionmaking in execution and concludes with a discussion of the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization
process. Change 1 updates the chapter with the new mission command taxonomy and adds a discussion of
operational adaptability.
Chapter 6 provides the fundamentals of assessment, including its definition and purpose. It describes the
assessment process and offers guidelines for effective assessment. Change 1 updates the chapter with the new
mission command taxonomy.
Ten appendixes complement the body of this manual. Appendix A discusses command post organization and
operations. The steps of the military decisionmaking process are in appendix B. Troop leading procedures are
addressed in appendix C. Commanders planning guidance and formats for operation plans and orders are
addressed in appendixes D and E respectively. Appendix F provides formats for developing task organization.
Running estimates are described in appendix G. Guidelines for developing a formal assessment plan are
addressed in appendix H. Techniques for conducting rehearsals and developing military briefings are addressed
in appendixes I and J respectively. The updated appendixes account for the new mission command taxonomy to
include the mission command warfighting task,
“Conduct inform and influence and cyber/electrometric
activities.” The modified operation order format accounts for these changes.
18 March 2011
FM 5-0, C1
vii
Chapter 1
±Fundamentals of the Operations Process
This chapter describes the general nature of operations in which commanders,
supported by their staffs, exercise mission command. Next, this chapter describes the
operations process and highlights the commander’s role in its execution. Discussions
of the integrating processes, continuing activities, and running estimates follow. The
chapter concludes with the fundamentals commanders and staffs consider for the
effective execution of the operations process.
±THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS
1-1. To understand doctrine regarding the operations process, Soldiers first must appreciate the general
nature of operations. Military operations are characterized by the continuous, mutual adaptation of give and
take, moves and countermoves among all participants. In operations, Army forces face thinking and
adaptive enemies, changing civilian perceptions and differing agendas of various actors (organizations and
individuals) in an operational area. Leaders can never predict with certainty how enemies or civilians will
act and react or how events may develop.
1-2. The enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted upon but an independent and active force with its
own objectives. While friendly forces try to impose their will on the enemy, the enemy resists and seeks to
impose its will on friendly forces. This dynamic also occurs among civilian groups whose own desires
influence and are influenced by operations. Appreciating these relationships among opposing human wills
is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of operations. As all sides take action, each side reacts,
learns, and adapts.
1-3. Whether operations are designed to relieve suffering from a natural disaster or to defeat a large
enemy force, operations are conducted in complex, ever-changing, and uncertain operational environments.
An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the
employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander
(JP
3-0). An operational
environment includes physical areas (air, land, maritime, and space domains) and cyberspace. It also
includes the information that shapes conditions in those areas as well as enemy, adversary, friendly, and
neutral aspects relevant to operations. An operational environment is not isolated or independent but
interconnected by various influences (for example, information and economics) from around the globe.
COMPLEX AND EVER CHANGING
1-4. An operational environment is both complex and continuously changing. Complexity describes
situations with many parts and subparts (structural complexity) as well as the behaviors and resulting
relationships among those parts and subparts (interactive complexity). How the many entities behave and
interact with each other within an operational environment is difficult to discern and always results in
differing circumstances. No two operational environments are the same. While aspects of an operational
environment may be less complex than other aspects, an operational environment as a whole is both
structurally and interactively complex.
1-5. In addition, an operational environment is not static but continually evolves. This evolution results in
part, from humans interacting within an operational environment as well as from their ability to learn and
adapt. As people take action within an operational environment, the operational environment changes.
Some of these changes are anticipated while others are not. Some changes are immediate and apparent
while other changes are delayed or hidden. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment
makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the uncertainty of
military operations.
18 March 2011
FM 5-0, C1
1-1
Chapter 1
UNCERTAINTY
1-6. Uncertainty is what is not known about a given situation or a lack of understanding of how a
situation may evolve. Effective leaders accept that they conduct operations in operational environments that
are inherently uncertain. They realize that concrete answers or perfect solutions to operational problems are
rarely apparent. For example, the commander and staff may be uncertain about the exact location and
strength of an enemy force. Even if the staff feels confident about the enemies location and strength, the
commander still questions what to infer from those facts—the enemy’s intentions, for example. And even if
the commander makes a reasonable inference, the many options available to the enemy make predicting the
enemy’s exact behavior quite difficult.
1-7. Similarly, clearly discerning the motivations and reactions of various population groups with respect
to the friendly force or the enemy often proves difficult. American ideas of what is normal or rational are
not universal. Members of other societies often have different world views, notions of rationality,
appropriate behavior, levels of religious devotion, and cultural norms. These differences in perspectives
add to the uncertain nature of operations.
1-8. Chance and friction also contribute to the uncertain nature of operations. Chance is the lack of order
or clear predictability of operations. A major sand storm that delays offensive operations or the death of a
key local leader that leads to an eruption of violence illustrates chance. Friction is the combination of
countless factors that impinge on the conduct of operations. Friction may range from broken equipment that
slows movement to unclear and complicated plans that leads to confusion.
1-9. During operations, leaders make decisions, develop plans, and direct actions under varying degrees
of complexity and uncertainty. Predictability in operations is rare, making centralized decisionmaking and
orderly processes ineffective. Commanders seek to counter the uncertainty of operations by empowering
subordinates at the scene to make decisions, act, and quickly adapt to changing circumstances. As such,
commanders exercise mission command throughout the conduct of operations.
±MISSION COMMAND
1-10. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders
to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the
conduct of full spectrum operations. It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of
control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission (FM 3-0).
1-11. Effective mission command requires an environment of mutual trust and understanding among
commanders and subordinates. It requires a command climate in which commanders encourage
subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the
commander’s intent. Through mission orders, commanders focus their orders on the purpose of the
operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. Doing this minimizes detailed control
and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action. Finally, when delegating authority to
subordinates, commanders set the necessary conditions for success by allocating appropriate resources to
subordinates based on assigned tasks.
1-12. The commander is the central figure in mission command. Commanders combine the art of
command and the science of control to understand situations, make decisions, and direct actions. However,
commanders cannot exercise mission command alone except in the smallest organizations. Thus,
commanders perform these functions through mission command networks and systems—the coordinated
application of personnel, networks, procedures, equipment and facilities, knowledge management, and
information management systems essential for the commander to conduct operations (FM 3-0).
1-13. A commander’s mission command networks and systems begins with people. No amount of
technology can reduce the importance of the human dimension. Therefore, commanders base their mission
command networks and systems on human characteristics more than on equipment and procedures. The
staff is a key component of the mission command system. Staff members assist commanders and exercise
control on their behalf to include—
z
Providing relevant information and analyses.
z
Maintaining running estimates and making recommendations.
1-2
FM 5-0, C1
18 March 2011
±Fundamentals of the Operations Process
z
Preparing plans and orders.
z
Monitoring operations.
z
Controlling operations.
z
Assessing the progress of operations.
See appendix A for a detailed discussion of how commanders organize their headquarters into command
posts during the conduct of operations.
±THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
1-14. Throughout operations, commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous process and
activities within the headquarters and across the force as they exercise mission command. The Army’s
overarching framework to do this is the operations process. The operations process consists of the major
mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously
assessing the operation. The commander drives the operations process through leadership (FM 3-0). The
activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand as
shown in figure 1-1.
Figure 1-1. The operations process
THE COMMANDERS ROLE
1-15. At the center of the operations process is the commander. Commanders drive the operations process
by combining the art of command with the science of control to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead,
and assess operations. The commander’s role in the operations process takes on different emphasis during
planning, preparing, executing, and assessing. For example, during planning commanders focus their
activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing while directing, leading, and assessing. During
execution, commanders often focus on directing, leading, and assessing while improving their
understanding and modifying their visualization.
18 March 2011
FM 5-0, C1
1-3
Chapter 1
Understand
1-16. Throughout the operations process, commanders seek to build and maintain their understanding of
the operational environment and the problem. To understand something is to grasp its nature and
significance. Understanding includes establishing context—the set of circumstances that surround a
particular event or situation. Commanders lead design activities (see chapter 3) and collaborate and dialog
with superior, subordinate, and adjacent commanders, and other military and civilian partners to gain a
greater understanding of the operational environment and the problem. Commanders continuously update
their understanding throughout the conduct of operations based on inputs from others and their personal
observations. Based on their updated understanding to include an assessment of progress, commanders
adjust operations as required.
(See paragraphs 1-41 to 1-50 for a detailed discussion of situational
understanding).
Visualize
1-17. As commanders begin to understand the situation to include the problem, they start envisioning
potential solutions. Collectively, this is known as the commander’s visualization—the mental process of
developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence
of events by which the force may achieve the end state. The commander’s visualization provides the basis
for developing plans and orders. During execution, it helps commanders determine if, when, and what to
decide as they adapt to changing conditions.
Describe
1-18. As commanders visualize an operation during planning, they describe it to their staffs and
subordinates to facilitate shared understanding of the situation, the mission, and their commander’s intent.
During planning, commanders ensure subordinates understand the visualization well enough to begin
course of action development and preparation activities. Commanders describe their visualization in their
initial commander’s intent and planning guidance to include an operational approach—the broad general
actions that will guide the force toward the desired end state. They describe gaps in their visualization by
identifying commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIRs). During execution, commanders
describe their updated visualization as planning guidance that results in fragmentary orders.
Direct
1-19. Commanders direct all aspects of operations. Commanders make decisions and direct actions based
on their situational understanding during planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. They use
control measures to focus the operation on the desired end state. Commanders direct operations by—
z
Preparing and approving plans and orders.
z
Assigning and adjusting tasks, task organization, and control measures based on changing
conditions.
z
Positioning units to maximize combat power, anticipate actions, or create or preserve options.
z
Positioning key leaders to ensure observation and supervision at critical times and places.
z
Allocating resources based on opportunities and threats.
z
Accepting risk to create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
z
Committing the reserve.
z
Changing priorities of support.
Lead
1-20. Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation,
while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization (FM 6-22). Leadership inspires
Soldiers to accomplish things that they otherwise might not. Through leadership, commanders provide
purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate commanders, their staff, and Soldiers throughout the
conduct of operations. In turn, Soldiers respond to the leadership of the commander, and may seek to
emulate the style of leadership the commander exhibits. (See FM 6-22 for a detailed discussion on
leadership).
1-4
FM 5-0, C1
18 March 2011
±Fundamentals of the Operations Process
1-21. Commanders are ultimately responsible for what their forces do or fail to do. As such, where the
commander locates within the area of operations is an important consideration. Commanders balance their
time between leading the staff through the operations process and providing purpose, direction, and
motivation to subordinate commanders and Soldiers away from the command post. No standard pattern or
simple prescription exists for command presence; different commanders lead differently.
1-22. By spending time with the staff, the commander learns from the staff while providing knowledge and
expertise to ensure directives from the headquarters reflect their intent. By circulating among subordinate
units, commanders assess subordinates’ preparation and execution, get to know new units in the task
organization, and personally motivate Soldiers. Commanders also visit with civilian organization to build
teams and partnerships and promote unity of effort.
Assess
1-23. Commanders assess continuously to better understand current conditions and determine how the
operation is progressing. Commanders incorporate the assessments of the staff, subordinate commanders,
and other partners to form their personal assessment of the situation. (See chapter 6 for doctrine on
assessment.) Based on their assessment, commanders modify plans and orders to better accomplish the
mission. If their assessment reveals a significant variance from their original commander’s visualization,
commanders reframe the problem.
ACTIVITIES OF THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
1-24. The activities of the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) may be sequential at the
start of an operation. However, once operations have begun, a headquarters often conducts parts of each
activity simultaneously. Planning is continuous. After the completion of the initial order, the commander
and staff continuously revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparing begins when a unit
receives a mission. It always overlaps with planning and continues through execution for some subordinate
units. Execution puts a plan into action. As the unit is executing the current operation, the commander and
staff are planning future operations based on the assessment of progress. Assessing is continuous and
influences the other three activities. Subordinate units of the same command may be in different stages of
the operations process. At any time during the operations process, commanders may reframe based on a
shift in understanding or significant changes in the operational environment. This may lead to a new
perspective on the problem resulting in an entirely new plan.
Planning
1-25. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying
out effective ways of bringing that future about. Planning is both conceptual and detailed. Conceptual
planning includes developing an understanding of the operational environment, framing the problem,
defining a desired end state, and developing an operational approach to achieve the desired end state.
Conceptual planning generally corresponds to the art of operations and is commander led. Both design (see
chapter 3) and the military decisionmaking process (see appendix B) assist commanders and staffs with the
conceptual aspects of planning. Detailed planning translates the operational approach into a complete and
practical plan. Detailed planning generally corresponds to the science of operations and encompasses the
specifics of implementation. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical issues
involved with moving, sustaining, administering, and directing forces.
1-26. Planning results in a plan or order that communicates the commander visualization and directs
actions of subordinates focusing on the desired end state. Planning is continuous. While planning may start
an iteration of the operations process, commanders and staffs revise plans and develop branches and
sequels during execution (see chapter 2 for the fundamentals of planning).
Preparation
1-27. Preparation consists of activities that units perform to improve their ability to execute an operation.
Activities of preparation help the force and Soldiers improve their ability to execute an operation.
Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It requires staff, unit,
18 March 2011
FM 5-0, C1
1-5
Chapter 1
and Soldier actions to transition the force from planning to execution. It includes building effective teams
among modular formation and with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners.
1-28. Activities of preparation help develop a shared understanding of the situation and what is required
for execution. These activities—such as backbriefs, rehearsals, and inspections—help units, staffs, and
Soldiers better understand their roles in upcoming operations, practice complicated tasks, and ensure
equipment and weapons function properly. (Chapter 4 addresses preparation in detail.)
Execution
1-29. Planning and preparation accomplish nothing if the commander does not execute effectively.
Execution is putting a plan into action while using situational understanding to assess progress and adjust
operations as the situation changes. Execution focuses on concerted action to seize and retain the initiative,
build and maintain momentum, and exploit success. Commanders create conditions for seizing the initiative
by acting while encouraging operational adaptability across the force. (Chapter 5 discusses execution.)
Assessment
1-30. Assessment is continuously monitoring and evaluating the current situation and the progress of an
operation. Assessment involves continuously analyzing the operational environment to help commanders
and their staffs understand the current situation and its evolution during operations. Based on this
understanding, commanders and staffs evaluate relevant information to help them judge how operations are
progressing toward achieving objectives and the desired end state.
1-31. Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process and concludes each
operation or phase of an operation. However, the focus of assessment differs during planning, preparation,
and execution. During planning, assessment focuses on gathering information about the operational
environment to assist the commander and staff with understanding the current situation. Assessment
activities during planning also include developing an assessment plan that describes measurable tasks,
objectives, end state conditions, and associated criterion to assist with assessing progress. During
preparation and execution, assessment focuses on monitoring the current situation and evaluating the
operation’s progress toward stated objectives and end state conditions.
±INTEGRATING PROCESSES AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES
1-32. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs synchronize the warfighting functions in
accordance with the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Commanders and staffs use several
integrating processes and continuing activities to do this.
1-33. Integrating processes combine efforts of the commander and staff to synchronize specific functions
throughout the operations process. The integrating process includes—
z
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. (See FM 2-01.3.)
z
Targeting. (See FM 3-60.)
z
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization. (See TC 2-01.)
z
Composite risk management. (See FM 5-19.)
z
Knowledge management. (See FM 6-01.1.)
1-34. The commander and staff also ensure several activities are continuously planned for and coordinated.
The following continuing activities require particular concern of the commander and staff throughout the
operations process:
z
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. (See TC 2-01.)
z
Security operations. (See FM 3-90.)
z
Protection. (See FM 3-37.)
z
Liaison and coordination. (See FM 6-0.)
z
Terrain management. (See FM 3-90.)
z
Information management. (See FM 6-0.)
z
Airspace command and control. (See FM 3-52.)
1-6
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±Fundamentals of the Operations Process
±RUNNING ESTIMATES
1-35. The running estimate is a principle knowledge management tool used by the commander and staff
throughout the operations process. A running estimate assesses the current situation to determine if the
current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if future operations are
supportable.
1-36. Effective plans and successful execution hinge on current running estimates. Running estimates
always include recommendations for anticipated decisions. During planning, commanders use these
recommendations to select feasible courses of action for further analysis. During preparation and execution,
commanders use recommendations from running estimates in decisionmaking. Failure to maintain running
estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed plans or bad decisions.
1-37. The commander’s running estimate includes a summary of the problem, the operational approach,
and all variables that affect the mission. Commanders integrate personal knowledge of the situation,
analysis of the operational and mission variables, assessments by subordinate commanders and other
organizations, and relevant details gained from running estimates. Commanders use their personal
estimates to cross-check and supplement the running estimates of the staff. (See appendix G for more
detailed discussion on running estimates.)
±FUNDAMENTALS
1-38. The operations process, while simple in concept (plan, prepare, execute, and assess), is dynamic in
execution. Commanders and staffs use the operations process to integrate numerous processes and activities
executed throughout the headquarters and subordinate units. Commanders organize and train their staff to
plan, prepare, and execute operations simultaneously while continually assessing. Commanders are
responsible for training their staffs as integrated teams to do this. They use the following fundamentals to
guide the effective execution of the operations process:
z
Commanders drive the operations process.
z
Situational understanding is fundamental to effective decisionmaking throughout the operations
process.
z
Design pervades the operations process.
z
Commanders continually consider and combine tasks focused on the population as well as those
tasks focused on enemy forces.
z
Continuous assessment enables organizational learning and operational adaptability.
COMMANDER CENTRIC
Commanders drive the operations process.
1-39. Commanders are the most important participant in the operations process. While staffs perform
essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, commanders play the central role in the
operations process by applying the art of command and science of control to understand, visualize,
describe, direct, lead, and assess operations. Through leadership—the process of influencing people by
providing purpose, direction, and motivation—commanders drive the operations process. Commanders rely
on their education, experience, knowledge, and judgment as they make decisions and lead subordinates
throughout the conduct of operations.
1-40. Mission command requires commanders to take prudent risks, exercise initiative, and act decisively.
Because uncertainty exists in all military operations, commanders incur risk when making decisions during
the conduct of operations. Faced with an uncertain situation, there is a natural tendency to hesitate and
gather more information to reduce the uncertainty. However, waiting and gathering information might
reduce uncertainty but will not eliminate it. Waiting may even increase uncertainty by providing the enemy
with time to seize the initiative or it may allow events to deteriorate. It is far better to manage uncertainty
by acting and developing the situation.
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Chapter 1
SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
Situational understanding is fundamental to effective decisionmaking throughout the operations
process.
1-41. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to
determine the relationships among the mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking (FM 3-0). Success in
operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available information
and knowledge. Building and maintaining situational understanding is essential for commanders when
establishing the situation’s context, developing effective plans, assessing operations, and making quality
decisions during execution.
1-42. Commanders and staffs continually work to maintain their situational understanding and work
through periods of reduced understanding as the situation evolves. As commanders develop their situational
understanding, they see patterns emerge, dissipate, and reappear in their operational environment. These
patterns help them direct their own forces’ actions with respect to other friendly forces, civilian
organizations, the enemy, the terrain, and the population. While complete understanding is the ideal for
planning and decisionmaking, commanders accept they will often have to act despite significant gaps in
their understanding.
Operational and Misson Variables
1-43. Commanders and staffs use the operational and mission variables to help build their situational
understanding. They analyze and describe an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated
operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical
environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT). (See FM 3-0.) Upon receipt of a mission, commanders
filter information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information with respect to the
mission. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their
understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct operations. The mission variables are
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.
As a set, the mission variables are abbreviated METT-TC. (See FM 3-0.)
Cultural Understanding
1-44. As part of building their situational understanding, commanders consider how culture (both their own
and others’ within an operational area) affects operations. Culture is the shared beliefs, values, customs,
behaviors, and artifacts members of a society use to cope with the world and each other. Culture influences
how people make judgments about what is right and wrong and how they assess what is important and
unimportant. Culture provides a framework for rational thought and decisions. What one culture considers
rational another culture may consider irrational.
1-45. Understanding the culture of a particular society or group within a society can significantly improve
the force’s ability to accomplish the mission. Leaders are mindful of cultural factors in three contexts:
z
Awareness of the cultures within a region that the organization operates.
z
Sensitivity to the different backgrounds, traditions, and operational methods of the various
military (joint and multinational), civilian (intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and private),
and host-nation organizations.
z
Awareness of how one’s own culture affects how one perceives a situation.
1-46. Understanding other cultures applies to all operations, not just those dominated by stability. For
example, some enemies consider surrender a dishonor worse than death whereas others consider surrender
an honorable option. Commanders use different tactics with the enemy depending on the culture.
1-47. Understanding the culture of joint and multinational forces and civilian organizations within an
operational area is crucial to successful operations. Army leaders learn the customs as well as the doctrine
and procedures of their partners. These leaders consider how culture influences how their military and
civilian partners understand situations and arrive at decisions. This understanding helps build unity of
effort.
1-8
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±Fundamentals of the Operations Process
1-48. Effective Army leaders understand and appreciate their own culture
(individual, military, and
national) in relation to the various cultures of others in the operational area. Just as culture shapes how
other groups view themselves and the world around them, culture shapes how commanders, leaders, and
Soldiers perceive the world. Individuals tend to interpret events according to the principles and values
intrinsic to their culture. Effective commanders acknowledge that their individual perceptions greatly
influence how they understand situations and make decisions. Through reflection, collaboration, and
analysis of differences between their culture and that of the cultures in the operational area, commanders
expose and question their assumptions about the situation. (See FM 3-24 and FM 2-01.3 for details to
analyze socio-cultural data.)
Red Teaming
1-49. Red teams also assist the commander and staff in building and maintaining their understanding. Red
teaming is a function that provides commanders an independent ability to fully explore alternative plans
and operations in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of partners,
adversaries, and others. Red teams assist the commander and staff with critical and creative thinking and
help them avoid groupthink, mirror imaging, cultural missteps, and tunnel vision throughout the conduct of
operations.
1-50. Throughout the operations process, red team members help identify relevant actors, clarify the
problem, and explain how others may view the problem from their perspectives. They challenge
assumptions and the analysis used to build the plan. In essence, red teams provide the commander and staff
with an independent capability to challenge the organization’s thinking.
DESIGN
Design pervades the operations process.
1-51. Design underpins the commander’s role in leading innovative, adaptive efforts throughout the
operations process. Design—an approach to critical and creative thinking—assists commanders with
understanding, visualizing, and describing problems and developing approaches to solve them.
Commanders use design to gain a greater understanding of the operational environment and an appreciation
of the problem. They visualize and describe an operational approach that serves as the main idea. This idea
informs detailed planning and guides the force through preparation and execution. While continuously
assessing changes in the operational environment and the progress of operations, design helps commanders
determine if they need to reframe the problem, which may lead to a new operational approach. (Chapter 3
discusses design in detail). Key aspects of design continuously applied throughout the operations process
include—
z
Critical and creative thinking.
z
Collaboration and dialog.
Critical and Creative Thinking
1-52. To assist commanders in understanding and decisionmaking, commanders and staffs apply critical
and creative thinking throughout the operations process. Critical thinking is a deliberate process of thought
used to discern truth in situations where direct observation is insufficient, impossible, or impractical.
Critical thinkers are purposeful and reflective thinkers that apply self-regulating judgment about what to
believe or what to do in response to observations, experience, verbal or written expressions, or arguments.
Critical thinking involves determining the meaning and significance of what is observed or expressed. It
also involves determining whether adequate justification exists to accept conclusions as true based on a
given inference or argument. Critical thinking is key to understanding situations, identifying problems,
finding causes, arriving at justifiable conclusions, making quality plans, and assessing the progress of
operations.
1-53. Creative thinking involves creating something new or original. Often leaders face unfamiliar
problems or old problems requiring new solutions. Creative thinking leads to new insights, novel
approaches, fresh perspectives, and new ways of understanding and conceiving things. Leaders look at
different options to solve problems by using adaptive approaches
(drawing from previous similar
18 March 2011
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1-9
Chapter 1
circumstances) or innovative approaches (coming up with completely new ideas). In both instances, leaders
use creative thinking to apply imagination and depart from the old way of doing things. (See FM 6-22 for a
detailed discussion on critical and creative thinking.)
Collaboration and Dialog
1-54. Commanders encourage active collaboration and dialog throughout the operations process.
Collaboration and dialog aids in developing shared situational understanding throughout the force.
Throughout the operations process, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and other partners
collaborate and dialog actively, sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to better
understand situations and make decisions. Collaboration is two or more people or organizations working
together toward common goals by sharing knowledge and building consensus. Dialog is a way to
collaborate that involves the candid exchange of ideas or opinions among participants that encourages frank
discussions in areas of disagreement.
1-55. Effective collaboration includes continuous dialog that leads to increased understanding of the
situation across the force, including the current problems. In addition to the organizations within their
command, commanders also collaborate with civilian and other military organizations in the operational
area to better understand their perspectives and build unity of effort. This leads to a shared understanding of
the situation and improves coordination and cooperation among all participants toward common objectives.
1-56. Through collaboration and dialog, the commander creates a learning environment by allowing
participants to think critically and creatively and share their ideas, opinions, and recommendations without
fear of retribution. Groupthink—a characteristic exhibited by members of a group who seek to reach
consensus on issues while minimizing conflict within the group—is the antithesis of healthy collaboration.
Effective collaboration and dialog requires candor and a free, yet mutually respectful, competition of ideas.
Participants must feel free to make viewpoints based on their expertise, experience, and insight; this
includes sharing ideas that contradict the opinions held by those of higher rank. Successful commanders
willingly listen to novel ideas and counter arguments concerning any problem.
1-57. Disciplined questioning helps commanders, staffs, subordinate commanders, and other partners
probe their own and others’ thinking as they collaborate and dialog. Disciplined questioning helps to
explore ideas, understand problems, and uncover assumptions. These questions help challenge claims or
premises by revealing a contradiction or internal inconsistency in logic. Examples of disciplined questions
that probe reasons and evidence include the following:
z
Could you give me an example?
z
How does X relate to Y?
z
When you say X, are you implying Y?
z
All your reasoning depends on the idea that X exists. Why have you based your reasoning on X
instead of Y?
z
Why do you think that is true? What is your evidence?
1-58. Collaboration occurs during planning and continues through execution regardless of the physical
location of participants. Today’s information systems and collaborative planning tools enable commanders
and staffs worldwide to collaborate in real time. During planning, commanders, subordinates, and other
partners share their understanding of the situation, participate in course of action development and
decisionmaking, and resolve conflicts before the higher headquarters issues the operation order. This
collaboration results in an improved understanding of the situation, commander’s intent, concept of
operations, and tasks to subordinate units throughout the force. Since all echelons develop their plans
nearly simultaneously, collaborative planning shortens planning time.
1-59. Similar benefits of collaboration apply during preparation and execution. Commanders, subordinates,
and partners compare assessments of the situation and exchange ideas on how to act during execution.
Coupled with firm decisionmaking by the commander, collaboration and dialog enable the force to adapt
more quickly in changing conditions. Assessment, which occurs continuously, is also enhanced when
commanders and subordinates collaborate in assessing the progress of the operation, to include sharing
ideas on what is or is not working and how to modify plans to better accomplish the mission. Knowledge
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±Fundamentals of the Operations Process
management facilitates collaboration and the transfer of knowledge among the commander, staff,
subordinate commanders, and other partners throughout the operations process. (See FM 6-01.1.)
FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
Commanders continually consider and combine tasks focused on the population as well as those tasks
focused on enemy forces.
1-60. Military operations involve more than combat between armed opponents. Winning battle and
engagements while shaping the civilian situation is critical to long-term success. Because of this,
commanders conduct full spectrum operations—offense, defense, stability or civil support operations—to
balance actions taken to protect the population with actions taken against the enemy. Commanders
continually consider and combine stability tasks focused on the population with offensive and defensive
tasks forces on the enemy throughout the operations process. For homeland security, commanders focus
tasks on civil support with defensive and offensive tasks. No single element is always more important than
the others. Rather, combinations of the elements, which commanders constantly adapt to changing
conditions, are the key to successful full spectrum operations.
ASSESS, LEARN, AND ADAPT
Continuous assessment enables organizational learning and operational adaptability.
1-61. Army organizations must learn throughout the conduct of operations to effectively adapt to changing
circumstances. Assessment is a continuous activity of the operations process and a primary feedback
mechanism that enables the command as a whole to learn and adapt (see chapter 6).
1-62. Plans are based on imperfect understanding and assumptions on how the commander expects a
situation to evolve. Continuous assessment helps commanders recognize shortcomings in the plan and
changes in the operational environment. During execution, commanders and their staffs principally learn by
assessing the results of action. In those instances when assessment reveals minor variances from the
commander’s visualization, commanders adjust plans as required. In those instances when assessment
reveals a significant variance from the commander’s original visualization, commanders reframe the
problem and develop an entirely new plan as required.
1-63. The learning that occurs through assessment enables operational adaptability—a quality that Army
leaders and forces exhibit based on critical and creative thinking, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, a
willingness to accept prudent risk, and their ability to rapidly adjust to changing circumstances. Operational
adaptability requires a mindset based on flexibility of thought calling for leaders at all levels who are
comfortable with collaborative planning and decentralized execution, have a tolerance for ambiguity, and
possess the ability and willingness to make rapid adjustments according to the situation.
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1-11
Chapter 2
Planning
This chapter provides an overview of planning. It describes planning as an essential
element of mission command and a continuous activity of the operations process. It
defines planning, describes planning at the different levels of war, and lists the value
of effective planning. This chapter concludes by offering fundamentals for effective
planning and describing how to develop key components of a plan or order.
PLANNING AND PLANS
2-1. Planning is the process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the commander’s
visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results
(FM 3-0). Put another way, planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a
desired future, and laying out an operational approach to achieve that future. Based on this understanding
and operational approach, planning continues with the development of a fully synchronized operation plan
or order that arranges potential actions in time, space, and purpose to guide the force during execution.
2-2. Planning is both a continuous and a cyclical activity of the operations process. While planning may
start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with production of an order. During
preparation and execution, the plan is continuously refined as situational understanding improves. Through
assessment, subordinates and others provide feedback as to what is working, what is not working, and how
the force can do things better. In some circumstances, commanders may determine that the current order (to
include associated branches and sequels) is no longer relevant to the situation. In these instances,
commanders reframe the problem and initiate planning activities to develop a new plan.
2-3. Planning may be highly structured involving commanders, staff, subordinate commanders, and others
to develop a fully synchronized plan. Planning is also less structured, such as platoon leaders and squad
leaders rapidly determining a scheme of maneuver for a hasty attack. Planning is conducted for different
planning horizons, from long-range to short-range. Depending on the echelon and circumstances, units may
plan in years, months, or weeks, or in days, hours, and minutes.
2-4. A product of planning is a plan or order—a directive for future action. Commanders issue plans and
orders to subordinates to communicate their understanding of the situation and their visualization of an
operation. A plan is a continuous, evolving framework of anticipated actions that maximizes opportunities.
It guides subordinates as they progress through each phase of the operation. Any plan is a framework from
which to adapt, not a script to be followed to the letter. The measure of a good plan is not whether
execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen
events. Good plans and orders foster initiative.
2-5. Plans and orders come in many forms and vary in scope, complexity, and length of time addressed.
Generally, a plan is developed well in advance of execution and is not executed until directed. A plan
becomes an order when directed for execution based on a specific time or an event. Some planning results
in written orders complete with attachments. Other planning produces brief fragmentary orders issued
verbally and followed in writing. See appendix E for instructions and formats for writing plans and orders.
PLANNING AND THE LEVELS OF WAR
2-6. The levels of war help clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. The three
levels are strategic, operational, and tactical, although no distinct limits or boundaries exist between them.
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2-1
Chapter 2
2-7. The levels of war correspond to specific levels of responsibility and planning with decisions at one
level affecting other levels. Among the levels of war, the planning horizons differ greatly.
2-8. Joint strategic planning provides strategic guidance and direction to friendly forces for security
cooperation planning, joint operations planning, and force planning. Joint strategic planning occurs
primarily at the national and theater strategic levels. This planning helps the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and other members of the National Security Council—
z
Formulate political-military assessments.
z
Define political and military objectives and end states.
z
Develop strategic concepts and options.
z
Allocate resources.
2-9. Combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish their
mission. Commanders base these estimates, strategies, and plans on strategic guidance and direction from
the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See JP 5-0 for more
information on joint strategic planning.)
2-10. Typically, operational-level planning focuses on developing plans for campaigns and major
operations. Joint force commanders
(combatant commanders and their subordinate joint task force
commanders) and their component commanders
(Service and functional) conduct operational-level
planning. Planning at the operational level focuses on operational art, the application of creative
imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design
strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art
integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war (JP 3-0). Operational-level planners use the Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System (known as JOPES), the joint operation planning process (known
as JOPP), and elements of operational design to develop campaign plans, joint operation plans and orders,
and supporting plans. (JP 5-0 discusses joint operation planning. JP 3-31 discusses operational level
planning from a land component perspective.)
2-11. While components of a joint force assist joint force commanders in developing a campaign plan,
Army forces do not develop independent campaign plans. A campaign plan is a joint operation plan for a
series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time
and space (JP 5-0). Army forces develop supporting plans (operation plans and orders) nested with the joint
force commander’s campaign plan.
2-12. Operational- and tactical-level planning complement each other but have different aims. Operational-
level planning involves broader dimensions of time, space, and purpose than tactical-level planning
involves. It is often more complex and less defined. Operational-level planners need to define an
operational area, estimate forces required, and evaluate operation requirements. In contrast, tactical-level
planning proceeds from an existing operational design. Normally, areas of operations are prescribed,
objectives and available forces are identified, and sequences of activities are specified for tactical-level
commanders.
2-13. Tactical-level planning revolves around how best to achieve objectives and accomplish tasks
assigned by higher headquarters. Planning horizons for tactical-level planning are relatively shorter than
planning horizons for operational-level planning. While tactical-level planning works within the framework
of an operational-level plan, tactical planning includes developing long-range plans for solving complex
problems. These plans combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations to achieve
objectives and accomplish the mission over extended periods.
THE VALUE OF PLANNING
2-14. All planning is based on imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future. Planning cannot
predict exactly what the effects of the operation will be, how enemies will behave with precision, or how
civilians will respond to the friendly force or the enemy. Nonetheless, the understanding and learning that
occurs during planning have great value. Even if units do not execute the plan precisely as envisioned—and
few ever do—the process of planning results in improved situational understanding that facilitates future
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Planning
decisionmaking. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower referred to this quality of planning when
saying, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.”
2-15. All military activities benefit from some kind of planning. If commanders had no way to influence
the future, if they believed that the natural course of events would lead to a satisfactory outcome, or if they
could achieve the desired results purely by reacting, they would have no reason to plan. While there may be
instances where these conditions apply, they are rare. Planning and plans help leaders—
z
Understand and develop solutions to problems.
z
Anticipate events and adapt to changing circumstances.
z
Task-organize the force and prioritize efforts.
z
Direct, coordinate, and synchronize action.
PLANNING HELPS LEADERS UNDERSTAND AND DEVELOP SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS
2-16. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. In a
broad sense, a problem exists when an individual becomes aware of a significant difference between what
actually is and what is desired. In the context of operations, an operational problem is the issue or set of
issues that impede commanders from achieving their desired end state.
2-17. Throughout operations, Army leaders face various problems, often requiring unique and creative
solutions. Planning helps commanders and staffs understand problems and develop solutions. Not all
problems require the same level of planning. For simple problems, leaders often identify them and quickly
decide on a solution—sometimes on the spot. Planning is critical, however, when a problem is actually a
set of interrelated issues, and the solution to each affects the others. For complex situations, planning offers
ways to deal with the complete set of problems as a whole. Some situations require extensive planning,
some very little. In general, the more complex a situation, the more important and involved the planning
effort.
2-18. Just as planning is only part of the operations process, planning is only part of problem solving. In
addition to planning, problem solving includes implementing the planned solution (execution), learning
from the implementation of the solution (assessment), and modifying or developing a new solution as
required. The object of problem solving is not just to solve near-term problems but to do so in a way that
forms the basis for long-term success.
2-19. The Army problem solving model appears in figure 2-1. Army problem solving applies to all Army
activities, not just operations. The Army problem solving model establishes the base logic for the military
decisionmaking process and troop leading procedures.
• Identify the problem.
• Gather information.
• Determine evaluation criteria.
• Generate potential solutions.
• Analyze potential solutions.
• Select the best solution.
• Make and implement the decision. .
±Figure 2-1. The Army problem solving model
2-20. Depending on the structure of the problem, leaders may take different approaches to both
understanding problems and developing solutions. (See table 2-1.) The degree of interactive complexity of
a given situation (see chapter 1) is the primary factor that determines the problem’s structure. In terms of
structure, there are three types of problems: well-structured, medium-structured, and ill-structured.
Perception of the individual as to whether a problem is well, medium, or ill structured depends, in part, on
the knowledge, skills, and ability of that individual.
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Chapter 2
Table 2-1. Types of problems and solution strategies
Well-structured
Medium-structured
Ill-structured
Professionals have difficulty
Problem
The problem is
Professionals easily agree
agreeing on problem structure and
Structuring
self-evident.
on its structure.
will have to agree on a shared
hypothesis.
Professionals will disagree on—
There may be more than
• How the problem can be
Solution techniques
one “right” answer.
solved.
Solution
are available and
Professionals may disagree
Development
there are verifiable
on the best solution. A
• The most desirable end state.
solutions.
desired end state can be
• Whether the end state can be
agreed on.
attained.
Success requires learning to
Success requires
Success requires learning
Execution of
perfect technique, adjust the
learning to perfect
to perfect techniques and to
Solution
solution, and continuously refine
technique.
adjust the solution.
understanding of the problem.
Adaptive iteration is
Adaptive iteration is required both
Adaptive
No adaptive
required to find the best
to refine the problem and to find the
Iteration
iteration required.
solution.
best solution.
Well-Structured Problems
2-21. Well-structured problems are easy to identify, required information is available, and methods to
solve them are fairly obvious. While often difficult to solve, well-structured problems have verifiable
solutions. Problems of mathematics and time and space relationships, as in the case with detailed logistics
planning and engineering projects, illustrate well-structured problems.
Medium-Structured Problems
2-22. Medium-structured problems are more interactively complex than well-structured problems. For
example, a field manual describes how a battalion task force conducts a defense, but it offers no single
solution that applies to all circumstances. Leaders can agree on the problem (“how best to conduct a
defense”), appropriate tasks, and the end state for the operation. However, they may disagree about how to
apply the doctrinal principles to a specific piece of terrain against a specific enemy. Furthermore, a defense
can succeed against one enemy yet fail against another under precisely the same circumstances. Success
and failure may differ as a function of interactive complexity rather than a structure or technical difference
between the two enemy forces. Success during execution requires not only learning to perfect a technique
but also adjusting the solution based on changing conditions. Army problem solving, the military
decisionmaking process (MDMP) (see appendix B), and troop leading procedures (TLP) (see appendix C)
are methods to help leaders understand and develop solutions for medium-structured problems.
Ill-Structured Problems
2-23. Ill-structured problems are the most interactive. They are also complex, nonlinear, and dynamic—
and therefore the most challenging to solve. Unlike well- or medium-structured problems, leaders disagree
about how to solve ill-structured problems, what the end state should be, and whether the desired end state
is even achievable. At the root of this lack of consensus is the difficulty in agreeing on what is the problem.
Unlike medium-structured problems, there is no clear action to take because the nature of the problem itself
is not clear. This is often the case in operations involving multiple military (joint and multinational) and
civilian organizations over extended periods. Leaders use design to help them understand complex, ill-
structured problems and to develop a broad operational approach to manage or solve them. (See chapter 3.)
Based on this understanding and operational approach, Army leaders continue more detailed planning using
the MDMP to develop a fully synchronized plan or order that serves as the practical scheme for solving the
problem.
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Planning
PLANNING HELPS ANTICIPATE EVENTS AND ADAPT TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES
2-24. The defining challenges to effective planning are uncertainty and time. Uncertainty increases with
the length of the planning horizon and the rate of change in the operational environment. Planning horizon
refers to how far into the future commanders try to shape events. The farther into the future the commander
plans, the wider the range of possibilities and the more uncertain the forecast.
2-25. A fundamental tension exists between the desire to plan far into the future to facilitate preparation
and coordination and the fact that the farther into the future the commander plans, the less certain the plan
will remain relevant. Given the fundamentally uncertain nature of operations, the object of planning is not
to eliminate uncertainty but to develop a framework for action in the midst of such uncertainty. Planning
provides an informed forecast of how future events may unfold. It entails identifying and evaluating
potential decisions and actions in advance to include thinking through consequences of certain actions.
Planning involves thinking about ways to influence the future as well as how to respond to potential events.
Put simply, planning is thinking critically and creatively about what to do, how to do it, and what can go
wrong along the way.
2-26. Planning keeps the force oriented on future objectives despite the requirements of current operations.
By anticipating events beforehand, planning helps the force seize or retain the initiative. To seize the
initiative, the force anticipates events and acts purposefully and effectively before the enemy can act or
before situations deteriorate. (For example, the force identifies the possibility of and implements controls to
prevent large-scale looting by the populace.)
2-27. Planning entails identifying and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance rather than
responding to events as they unfold. Planning involves visualizing consequences of possible courses of
action to determine whether they will contribute to achieving the desired end state.
2-28. Effective planning also anticipates the inherent delay between decision and action, especially
between the levels of war and echelons. Sound plans draw on fundamentals of mission command to
overcome this effect, fostering initiative within the commander’s intent to act appropriately and decisively
when orders no longer address the changing situation sufficiently. This ensures commanders act promptly
as they encounter opportunities or accept risk to create opportunities and counter threats when they lack
clear direction. Identifying decision points and developing branch plans and sequels are keys to anticipating
events and are inherent in effective planning.
2-29. A branch describes the contingency options built into the base plan. A branch is used for changing
the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on
anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions (JP 5-0). Branches
are also used in stability operations to address how civilians potentially act and react.
2-30. In a campaign, a sequel is a major operation that follows the current major operation. In a single
major operation, a sequel is the next phase. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (success,
stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation (JP 5-0). A counteroffensive, for example,
logically follows a defense; exploitation and pursuit follow successful attacks. Building partner capacity is
a logical sequence to restoring essential services, and security force assistance is a logical sequel to
restoring minimum civil security. Normally, executing a sequel begins another phase of an operation if not
a new operation. Branches and sequels are tied to execution criteria. Commanders carefully review them
before execution and update them based on assessment of current operations.
PLANS TASK-ORGANIZE THE FORCE AND PRIORITIZE EFFORTS
2-31. When developing their concept of operations, commanders first visualize the decisive operation and
develop shaping and sustaining operations to support the decisive operation. The decisive operation is the
focal point around which commanders develop the entire operation and prioritize effort. When developing
their concept of operations and associated tasks to subordinate units, commanders ensure subordinates have
the means to accomplish them. They do this by task-organizing the force and establishing priorities of
support.
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2-32. Task-organizing is the act of configuring an operating force, support staff, or sustainment package of
specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. It includes allocating available assets to
subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. Through task
organization, commanders establish relationships and allocate resources to weight the decisive operation.
Task-organizing results in task organizationa temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a
particular mission. Appendix F contains guidelines and formats for developing task organizations.
2-33. In addition to task-organizing, commanders establish priorities of support. Priority of support is a
priority set by the commander to ensure a subordinate unit has support in accordance with its
relative importance to accomplish the mission. Priorities of movements, fires, sustainment, and
protection all illustrate priorities of support that commanders use to weight the decisive operation.
2-34. The concept of operations may also identify a main effort if required; otherwise, the priorities of
support go to the unit conducting the decisive operation. The main effort is the designated subordinate unit
whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted
with the preponderance of combat power (FM 3-0). Designating a main effort temporarily gives that unit
priority of support. Commanders shift resources and priorities to the main effort as circumstances and the
commander’s intent require. Commanders may shift the main effort several times during an operation. A
unit conducting a shaping operation may be designated as the main effort until the decisive operation
commences. However, the unit with primary responsibility for the decisive operation becomes the main
effort upon execution of the decisive operation.
PLANS DIRECT, COORDINATE, AND SYNCHRONIZE ACTION
2-35. Plans and orders direct, coordinate, and synchronize subordinate actions and inform those outside the
unit how to cooperate and provide support. Effective plans clearly stipulate end state conditions and
objectives that help coordinate the activities of the force. Good plans direct subordinate actions by stating
who, what (the task), where, when, and why (the purpose to perform the task). They leave much of the how
(the method to perform the task) to subordinates. Directing and coordinating actions synchronize the force
as a whole to accomplish the mission. A key aspect of planning is synchronization—arranging actions in
time, space, and purpose to generate maximum effort or combat power at the decisive point and time.
2-36. Synchronization is a way, not an end. Commanders balance it with agility and initiative. However,
overemphasizing the directing and coordinating functions of planning can result in detailed and rigid plans
that stifle initiative. Mission command encourages the use of mission orders to avoid creating overly
restrictive instructions to subordinates. Mission orders direct, coordinate, and synchronize action while
allowing subordinates the maximum freedom of action to accomplish missions within the commander’s
intent.
CONCEPTUAL AND DETAILED PLANNING
2-37. Planning activities occupy a continuum ranging from conceptual to detailed. (See figure 2-2.) On one
end of the continuum is conceptual planning. Developing tactical and operational concepts for the overall
conduct of military operations is conceptual planning. Understanding the operational environment and the
problem, determining the operation’s end state, establishing objectives, and sequencing the operation in
broad terms all illustrate conceptual planning. Conceptual planning helps answer questions of what to do
and why. In general, conceptual planning focuses heavily on synthesis supported by analysis. Conceptual
planning generally corresponds to the art of operations and is the focus of the commander with staff
support. The commander’s activities of understanding and visualization are key aspects of conceptual
planning.
2-38. At the other end of the continuum is detailed planning. Detailed planning translates the broad
operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is associated with the
science of war and falls under the purview of the staff, focusing on specifics of execution. Detailed
planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems involved with moving, sustaining,
synchronizing, and directing the force. Unlike conceptual planning, detailed planning does not involve
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establishing end state conditions and objectives; instead, it works out actions to accomplish the
commander’s intent and concept of operations.
Figure 2-2. The planning construct
2-39. The commander personally leads the conceptual component of planning. While commanders are also
engaged in parts of detailed planning, they often leave the specifics to the staff. Conceptual planning
provides the basis for all subsequent planning. Planning normally progresses from general to specific. For
example, the commander’s intent and concept of operations form the framework for the entire plan. This
framework leads to schemes of support, such as schemes of intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires,
protection, sustainment, and mission command. In turn, the schemes of support lead to the specifics of
execution, including tasks to subordinate units. However, the dynamic does not operate in only one
direction, as shown in figure 2-2. Conceptual planning must respond to detailed constraints. For example,
the realities of deployment schedule (a detailed concern) influence the concept of operations (a conceptual
concern).
2-40. Full spectrum operations demand a flexible and adaptive approach to planning. Based on the
situation, Army leaders use and combine several methods to help them understand the situation and make
decisions. Methodologies that assist commanders and staffs with planning include—
z
Design. (See chapter 3.)
z
The MDMP. (See appendix B.)
z
TLP. (See appendix C.)
±DESIGN
2-41. Commanders conduct design to help them with the conceptual aspects of planning to include
understanding, visualizing, and describing operations. After receipt of or in anticipation of a mission,
commanders use design to understand the operational environment, frame the problem, and develop an
operational approach to solve the problem.
2-42. Design emphasizes developing a holistic understanding of the operational environment and problem
through collaboration and dialog. From this understanding, commanders continue to use design as they
consider an operational approach for problem resolution. The operational approach serves as the foundation
for more detailed planning and orders production using the MDMP.
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THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
2-43. The MDMP combines the conceptual and detailed aspects of planning. Commanders use it to build
plans and orders for extended operations as well to develop orders for short-term operations within the
framework of a long-range plan. The MDMP can be conducted based on a design concept or based on a
higher order or directive without the benefits of formal design activities preceding the MDMP.
2-44. The MDMP helps commanders understand situations, develop courses of action, and decide on a
course of action to accomplish missions. This methodology includes identifying and understanding the
problem and determining a desired outcome. From this understanding, commanders develop several
options for achieving that outcome. Commanders study and test these options in detail and then evaluate
them against a set of criteria. Such actions help commanders determine the best option. This comparative
analysis may result in a choice that modifies one of the options by incorporating features of others. The
MDMP proceeds with the production of a fully synchronized plan or order for execution.
2-45. The MDMP integrates activities of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other
military and civilian partners when developing an operation plan or order. Not only does the MDMP
integrate people into the planning process, it also integrates several processes and continuing activities as
described in appendix B.
DESIGN AND THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS INTERFACE
2-46. Depending on the situation—to include the complexity of the problem—commanders conduct design
before, in parallel with, or after the MDMP. When faced with an ill-structured problem or when developing
initial plans for extended operations, commanders often initiate design before the MDMP. This sequence
helps them better understand the operational environment, frame the problem, and develop an operational
approach to guide more detailed planning.
2-47. Commanders may also elect to conduct design in parallel with the MDMP. In this instance, members
of the staff conduct mission analysis as the commander and other staff members engage in design activities.
Knowledge products—such as results from intelligence preparation of the battlefield and running
estimates—help inform the design team about the operational environment. Commanders may direct some
staff members to focus their mission analysis on certain areas. This focus helps commanders better
understand aspects of the operational environment while examining the environmental and problem frames
as part of design. The results of mission analysis (to include intelligence preparation of the battlefield and
running estimates) inform commanders as they develop their design concept that, in turn, facilitate course
of action development during the MDMP.
2-48. In time-constrained conditions requiring immediate action or if the problem is well structured,
commanders may conduct the MDMP and publish an operation order without formally conducting design.
As time becomes available during execution, commanders may then initiate design to help refine their
commander’s visualization and the initial plan developed using the MDMP.
TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES
2-49. TLP extend the MDMP to the small-unit level. TLP are a dynamic process used to analyze a mission,
develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. These procedures enable leaders to maximize available
planning time while developing effective plans and adequately preparing their unit for an operation. TLP
consist of eight steps as addressed in appendix C. The sequence of the steps of TLP is not rigid. The
sequence is modified to meet conditions of METT-TC. Some steps are done concurrently while others
continue throughout the operation.
FUNDAMENTALS OF PLANNING
2-50. Effective planning requires dedication, study, and practice. Planners must be technically and
tactically competent, be disciplined to use doctrinally correct terms and symbols, and understand
fundamentals of planning. Fundamentals of planning that aid in effective planning include the following:
z
Commanders focus planning.
z
Commanders plan for full spectrum operations.
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z
Commanders continuously test the validity of assumptions.
z
Planning is continuous.
z
Planning is time sensitive.
z
Simple, flexible plans work best.
z
Commanders avoid planning pitfalls.
COMMANDERS FOCUS PLANNING
2-51. ±The responsibility for planning is inherent in command. Commanders are planners—the most
important participants in effective planning. Often they have the most experience and are ultimately
responsible for the execution of the plan. As such, the plan must reflect how commanders intend to conduct
operations. Commanders use plans and orders to describe their understanding and visualization and to
direct action during execution.
2-52. Commanders ensure the approaches to planning meet requirements of time, simplicity, and level of
detail. They ensure that all plans comply with domestic and international law. Commanders also ensure the
product is relevant and suitable for subordinates. Generally, the more involved commanders are in
planning, the faster the commander and staff can plan. Through personal involvement, commanders learn
from the staff and others about the situation while ensuring that the plan reflects the commander’s intent.
During planning, commanders focus on developing and describing their commander’s visualization.
2-53. Commander’s visualization is the mental process of developing situational understanding,
determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will
achieve that end state (FM 3-0). Figure 2-3 depicts the general sequence involved in developing the
commander’s visualization. First, commanders understand the conditions that make up the current situation.
From this understanding, commanders next visualize desired conditions that represent a desired end state.
After envisioning a desired end state, commanders then conceptualize an operational approach of how to
change current conditions to the desired future conditions.
Figure 2-3. Commander’s visualization
2-54. A condition is an existing state of affairs in the operational environment. Some desired future
conditions may be prescribed by higher authority. For example, the higher headquarters may establish a
desired future condition that an enemy force has withdrawn across the international border. Other future
conditions are envisioned by the commander based on their understanding of the current situation and the
mission. The operational approach represents the envisioned broad general actions designed to achieve the
desired end state. The commander’s visualization of the end state and operational approach of how to
achieve that end state serve as the framework for more detailed planning.
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2-55. ±To develop their commander’s visualization, commanders draw on several sources of knowledge
and relevant information. These include—
z
The elements of operational art. (See FM 3-0.)
z
Input from the staff, other commanders, and partners.
z
Principles of war. (See FM 3-0.)
z
Operational themes (see FM 3-0) and related doctrine.
z
Running estimates.
z
The common operational picture.
z
Their experience and judgment.
z
Subject matter experts.
2-56. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it as
circumstances require. Commanders express their initial visualization as—
z
Initial commander’s intent.
z
Planning guidance, including an initial operational approach.
z
Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
z
Essential elements of friendly information that must be protected.
COMMANDERS PLAN FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
2-57. Full spectrum operations requires continuous, simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and
stability for operations conducted overseas or civil support for operations conducted in the United States
and its territories. (See FM 3-0.) Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories often
involve more than combat between armed opponents. Winning battles and engagements is important but
alone is not sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to long-term success. Hence, when
developing their concept of operations, commanders equally consider stability tasks focused on the
population with offensive and defensive tasks focused on the enemy. These stability operations shape the
broader situation and restore security and normalcy.
2-58. The concept of operations provides the unifying direction for the entire operation. Within the concept
of operations, the proportion and role of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks vary based on several
factors. Commanders, however, always develop plans to account for follow-on operations. When planning
offensive and defensive operations, commanders anticipate what will follow. They seek to avoid creating
conditions that may lead to greater instability. They plan for and assign tasks to forces to establish or
maintain civil security and civil control, restore essential services, and provide support to governments.
Doing this helps to improve stability among the civilians and avoids creating conditions for insurgency.
(See FM 3-07 and JP 3-28 for details concerning planning for stability and civil support operations
respectively.)
COMMANDERS CONTINUOUSLY SEEK TO VERIFY ASSUMPTIONS
2-59. Commanders and staffs gather facts, develop assumptions, and consider opinions as they build their
plan. A fact is something known to exist or have happened. Facts concerning the operational and mission
variables serve as the basis for developing situational understanding during planning. An assumption is a
supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both
assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof. An assumption may also be an explanation of past
behavior. An assumption is accepted as true in the absence of actions or information contradicting it.
Assumptions are probably correct but cannot be verified. Appropriate assumptions used during planning
have two characteristics:
z
They are likely to be true.
z
They are necessary, that is essential, to continue planning.
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2-60. In the absence of facts, the commander and staff consider assumptions from their higher headquarters
and develop their own assumptions necessary for continued planning. Assumptions could relate to any
mission variable, such as the strength and disposition of an enemy force or postconflict conditions.
2-61. Assumptions must be logical and reflect the reality of the situation. Commanders and staffs use care
with assumptions to ensure they are not based on preconceptions; bias; false historical analogies; or simple,
wishful thinking. Additionally, planners must be aware of any unstated assumptions.
2-62. Accepting a broad assumption without understanding its sublevel components often leads to other
faulty assumptions. For example, a division commander might assume a combined arms battalion from the
continental United States is available in 30 days. This commander must also understand the sublevel
components—adequate preparation, load and travel time, viable ports and airfields, favorable weather, and
enemy encumbrance. The commander considers how the sublevel components hinder or aid the battalion’s
ability to be available.
2-63. Commanders and staffs continuously question whether their assumptions are valid throughout
planning and the operations process. Key points concerning the use of assumptions include—
z
Assumptions must be logical, realistic, and considered likely to be true.
z
Too many assumptions result in a higher probability that the plan or proposed solution may be
invalid.
z
The use of assumptions requires the staff to develop branches and sequels to execute if one or
more key assumptions prove false.
z
Often, an unstated assumption may prove more dangerous than a stated assumption proven
wrong.
PLANNING IS CONTINUOUS
2-64. Even after the operation order is issued, planning continues throughout the operations process. Since
situations (or the information available about them) continuously change, plans are revised as time allows
and variations
(options or branches) continue to be developed. Accurately predicting an operation’s
outcome is difficult, as is anticipating the possible contingencies. As planners develop a solution to a
problem, the problem changes. Continuous planning enables organizations to adjust from an existing
concept of operations based on a common understanding of the situation and the expected result. Based on
their assessment, the commander and staff refine and revise the plan during preparation and execution.
PLANNING IS TIME SENSITIVE
2-65. Time is a critical factor in operations. Time management is, therefore, important in planning.
Whether done deliberately or rapidly, all planning requires skillfully using available time to optimize
planning and preparation throughout the unit. Understanding how time affects conducting operations helps
commanders determine how fast and how far ahead to plan. Taking more time to plan often results in
greater synchronization; however, any delay in execution risks yielding the initiative—with more time to
prepare and act—to the enemy. When allocating planning time, commanders must ensure subordinates
have enough time to plan and prepare their own actions.
One-Third-Two-Thirds Rule
2-66. Effective execution requires issuing timely plans and orders to subordinates. Timely plans are those
issued soon enough to allow subordinates enough time to plan, issue their orders, and prepare for
operations. At a minimum, commanders follow the “one-third-two-thirds rule” to allocate time available.
They use one-third of the time available before execution for their planning and allocate the remaining
two-thirds to their subordinates for planning and preparation.
2-67. When time is short, commanders develop the best possible products. In time-constrained
environments, best products contain just enough information for commanders to make a reasoned decision
and subordinates to assess the situation quickly and plan, prepare, and execute the necessary actions. To
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optimize available time and ensure the best possible synchronization, commanders encourage collaborative
and parallel planning between their headquarters and higher and lower headquarters.
Collaborative and Parallel Planning
2-68. Collaborative planning is commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and other partners
sharing information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts regardless of physical location
throughout the planning process. Collaboration occurs during all operations process activities, not just
planning. (See chapter 1.) During planning, commanders, subordinate commanders, and others in the area
of operations share assessments, statuses, and ideas. Commanders, subordinate commanders, and staffs
share their understanding of the situation, participate in course of action
(COA) development and
decisionmaking, and resolve conflicts before the higher headquarters’ order is issued. This collaboration
can improve understanding of the situation, commander’s intent, concept of operations, and tasks to
subordinate units throughout the force. Since several echelons develop their plans simultaneously,
collaborative planning can significantly shorten the time required for synchronization.
2-69. Parallel planning is two or more echelons planning for the same operation nearly
simultaneously. Since several echelons develop their plans simultaneously, parallel planning can
significantly shorten planning time. The higher headquarters continuously shares information concerning
future operations with subordinate units through warning orders and other means. Frequent communication
between commanders and staffs and sharing of information, such as intelligence preparation of the
battlefield products, helps subordinate headquarters plan. Parallel planning requires significant interaction
among echelons. With parallel planning, subordinate units do not wait for their higher headquarters to
publish an order to begin developing their own plans and orders.
2-70. Higher commanders are sensitive not to overload subordinates with planning requirements.
Generally, the higher the headquarters, the more time and staff resources are available to plan and explore
options. Higher headquarters involve subordinates with developing those plans and concepts that have the
highest likelihood of being adopted or fully developed.
Planning in Time
2-71. Tension exists between planning too far ahead and not planning enough. Planning too far into the
future may overwhelm planning staffs’ capabilities, especially those of subordinate organizations. It also
risks preparations and coordination becoming irrelevant. However, not planning far enough ahead may
result in losing the initiative and being unprepared for unforeseen opportunities and threats. Commanders
should plan to the foreseeable end of the operation, even if that future condition is somewhat unclear. They
can and should extend and add detail to their basic plan as their operation develops and their visualization
becomes clearer, including anticipated sequels to the current operation.
2-72. Planning horizons help commanders think about operations and divide planning responsibilities
among integrating cells (current operations integration, future operations, and plans). Planning horizons are
measured from weeks or months to hours or days. Organizations often plan within several different
planning horizons simultaneously. As commanders think in terms of planning horizons, they can better
organize their planning efforts and allocate resources. As a rule, the higher the echelon, the more distant the
planning horizon with which it is concerned.
(See appendix A for a discussion of organizing
responsibilities within the command post by planning horizons.)
SIMPLE, FLEXIBLE PLANS WORK BEST
2-73. Simplicity is a principle of war. It is vital to effective planning. Effective plans and orders are simple
and direct. Staffs prepare clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. They use doctrinally
correct operational terms and graphics. Doing this minimizes chances of misunderstanding. Shorter rather
than longer plans aid in simplicity. Shorter plans are easier to disseminate, read, and remember.
2-74. Complex plans often rely on intricate coordination that has a greater potential to fail in execution.
Operations are always subject to the fog of war and friction. The more detailed the plan, the greater the
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chances it will no longer be applicable. Sometimes the situations change in response to friendly and enemy
actions. Sometimes outside factors occur beyond the control of either side (such as the weather).
2-75. Simple plans require an easily understood concept of operations. Planners also promote simplicity by
minimizing details where possible and by limiting the actions or tasks to what the situation requires.
Subordinates can then develop specifics within the commander’s intent. For example, instead of assigning a
direction of attack, planners can designate an axis of advance.
2-76. Simple plans are not simplistic plans. Simplistic refers to something made overly simple by ignoring
the situation’s complexity. Good plans simplify complicated situations. However, some situations require
more complex plans than others do. Commanders at all levels weigh the apparent benefits of a complex
concept of operations against the risk that subordinates will be unable to understand or follow it.
Commanders prefer simple plans because they can understand and execute them more easily.
2-77. Flexible plans help units adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Commanders and planners build
opportunities for initiative into plans by anticipating events that allow them to operate inside of the
enemy’s decision cycle or react promptly to deteriorating situations. Identifying decision points and
designing branches ahead of time—combined with a clear commander’s intent—help create flexible plans.
Incorporating control measures to reduce risk also makes plans more flexible. For example, a commander
may hold a large, mobile reserve to compensate for the lack of information concerning an anticipated
enemy attack.
2-78. Commanders stress the importance of mission orders as a way of building simple, flexible plans.
Mission orders is a technique for developing orders that emphasizes to subordinates the results to be
attained, not how they are to achieve them. It provides maximum freedom of action in determining how to
best accomplish assigned missions (FM 3-0). Mission orders focus on what to do and the purpose of doing
it without prescribing exactly how to do it. Control measures are established to aid cooperation among
forces without imposing needless restrictions on freedom of action. Mission orders contribute to flexibility
by allowing subordinates freedom to seize opportunities or react effectively to unforeseen enemy actions
and capabilities.
2-79. Mission orders follow the five-paragraph format and are as brief and simple as possible. Mission
orders clearly convey the unit’s mission and commander’s intent. They summarize the situation (current or
anticipated starting conditions), describe the operation’s objectives and end state (desired conditions), and
provide a simple concept of operations to accomplish the unit’s mission. When assigning tasks to
subordinate units, mission orders include all components of a task statement: who, what, when, where, and
why. However, commanders particularly emphasize the purpose (why) of the tasks to guide (along with the
commander’s intent) individual initiative. Effective plans and orders foster mission command by—
z
Describing the situation to create a common situational understanding.
z
Conveying the commander’s intent and concept of operations.
z
Assigning tasks to subordinate units and stating the purpose for conducting the task.
z
Providing the control measures necessary to synchronize the operation while retaining the
maximum freedom of action for subordinates.
z
Task organizing forces and allocating resources.
z
Directing preparation activities and establishing times or conditions for execution.
2-80. Mission orders contain the proper level of detail; they are neither so detailed that they stifle initiative
nor so general that they provide insufficient direction. The proper level depends on each situation and is not
easy to determine. Some phases of operations require tighter control over subordinate elements than others
require. An air assault’s air movement and landing phases, for example, require precise synchronization. Its
ground maneuver plan requires less detail. As a rule, the base plan or order contains only the specific
information required to provide the guidance to synchronize combat power at the decisive time and place
while allowing subordinates as much freedom of action as possible. Commanders rely on individual
initiative and coordination to act within the commander’s intent and concept of operations. The attachments
to the plan or order contain details regarding the situation and instructions necessary for synchronization.
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COMMANDERS AVOID PLANNING PITFALLS
2-81. Commanders recognize the value of planning and avoid common planning pitfalls. These pitfalls
generally stem from a common cause: the failure to appreciate the unpredictability and uncertainty of
military operations. Pointing these out is not a criticism of planning but of improper planning. The four
pitfalls consist of—
z
Attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future.
z
Trying to plan in too much detail.
z
Using planning as a scripting process.
z
Institutionalizing rigid planning methods.
2-82. The first pitfall is attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future. This may result
from believing a plan can control the future. People tend to plan based on assumptions that the future will
be a linear continuation of the present. Their plans often underestimate the scope of changes in directions
that may occur and the results of second- and third-order effects. Even the most effective plans cannot
anticipate all the unexpected events. Often, events overcome plans much sooner than anticipated. Effective
plans include sufficient branches and sequels to account for the nonlinear nature of events.
2-83. The second pitfall consists of trying to plan in too much detail. Sound plans include necessary
details; however, planning in unnecessary detail consumes limited time and resources that subordinates
need. This pitfall often stems from the desire to leave as little as possible to chance. In general, the less
certain the situation, the fewer details a plan should include. However, people often respond to uncertainty
by planning in more detail to try to account for every possibility. This attempt to prepare detailed plans
under uncertain conditions generates even more anxiety, which leads to even more detailed planning. Often
this over planning results in an extremely detailed plan that does not survive the friction of the situation and
that constricts effective action.
2-84. The third pitfall consists of using planning as a scripting process that tries to prescribe the course of
events with precision. When planners fail to recognize the limits of foresight and control, the plan can
become a coercive and overly regulatory mechanism. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates mistakenly
focus on meeting the requirements of the plan rather than deciding and acting effectively.
2-85. The fourth pitfall is the danger of institutionalizing rigid planning methods that lead to inflexible or
overly structured thinking. This tends to make planning rigidly focused on the process and produces plans
that overly emphasize detailed procedures. Effective planning provides a disciplined framework for
approaching and solving complex problems. The danger is in taking that discipline to the extreme.
2-86. Using a prescribed planning methodology does not guarantee that a command will improve its
situation. Planning takes on value when done properly, using methods appropriate to the conditions and
activities being planned. Done appropriately and well, planning proves to be a valuable activity that greatly
improves performance and is a wise investment of time and effort. Done poorly, planning can be worse
than irrelevant and a waste of valuable time and energy. Planning keeps the force oriented on future
objectives despite the problems and requirements of current operations.
KEY COMPONENTS OF A PLAN
2-87. While each plan is unique, all plans seek a balance for combining ends, ways, and means against
risk. Ends are the desired conditions of a given operation. Ways are actions to achieve the end state. Means
are the resources required to execute the way. The major components of a plan are based on the answers to
the following questions:
z
What is the force trying to accomplish and why (ends)? This is articulated in the unit’s mission
statement and the commander’s intent.
z
What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state
(ends)? The desired
conditions are described as part of the commander’s intent.
z
How will the force achieve these desired conditions (ways)? The way the force will accomplish
the mission is described in the concept of operations.
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z
What sequence of actions is most likely to attain these conditions (ways)? The sequence of
actions, to include phasing, is described in the concept of operations.
z
What resources are required, and how can they be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions
(means)? The application of resources throughout the operation is addressed in the concept of
operations, the warfighting function schemes of support (for example, the scheme of protection
and scheme of sustainment), tasks to subordinate units, and task organization.
z
What risks are associated with that sequence of actions, and how can they be mitigated (risks)?
The concept of operations incorporates risk mitigation as does coordinating instructions.
2-88. The unit’s mission statement, commander’s intent, concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units,
coordinating instructions, and control measures are key components of a plan. Commanders ensure their
mission and end state are nested with those of their higher headquarters. Whereas the commander’s intent
focuses on the end state, the concept of operations focuses on the way or sequence of actions by which the
force will achieve the end state. The concept of operations expands on the mission statement and
commander’s intent. It describes how and in what sequence the commander wants the force to accomplish
the mission. Within the concept of operations, commanders may establish objectives as intermediate goals
toward achieving the operation’s end state. When developing tasks for subordinate units, commanders
ensure that the purpose of each task nests with the accomplishment of another task, with the achievement of
an objective, or directly to the attainment of an end state condition.
MISSION STATEMENT
2-89. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the
reason therefore (JP 1-02). Commanders analyze a mission in terms of the commander’s intent two
echelons up, specified tasks, and implied tasks. They also consider the mission of adjacent units to
understand how they contribute to the decisive operation of their higher headquarters. Results of that
analysis yield the essential tasks that—with the purpose of the operation—clearly specify the action
required. This analysis produces the unit’s mission statement—a clear statement of the action to be taken
and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and
why, but seldom specifies how. The format for writing a task to subordinate units also follows this format.
See appendix B for detailed instructions for writing mission and task statements as part of the MDMP.
COMMANDERS INTENT
2-90. The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions
the force must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the
desired end state (FM 3-0). The commander’s intent succinctly describes what constitutes success for the
operation. It includes the operation’s purpose and the conditions that define the end state. It links the
mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units. A clear commander’s intent facilitates a
shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions that represent mission accomplishment. During
planning, the initial commander’s intent summarizes the commander’s visualization and is used to develop
and refine courses of action. During execution, the commander’s intent spurs individual initiative.
2-91. The commander’s intent must be easy to remember and clearly understandable two echelons down.
The shorter the commander’s intent, the better it serves these purposes. Typically, the commander’s intent
statement is three to five sentences long.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
2-92. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate
to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end
state. It is normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations (FM 3-0). The
concept of operations expands on the mission statement and commander’s intent by describing how and in
what sequence the commander wants the force to accomplish the mission.
2-93. Commanders ensure they identify the decisive operation and units responsible for conducting the
decisive operation. From this focal point, commanders articulate shaping operations and the principal task
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Chapter 2
of the units assigned each shaping operation. Commanders complete their concept of operations with
sustaining actions essential to the success of decisive and shaping operations. Individual schemes of
support by warfighting function are addressed in subparagraphs of paragraph 3 (execution) in the base plan,
after the concept of operations. The concept of sustainment is addressed in paragraph 4 (sustainment).
2-94. When writing the concept of operations, commanders consider nested concepts, the sequence of
actions and phasing, decisive points and objectives, and lines of operations and lines of effort.
Nested Concepts
2-95. Nested concepts is a planning technique to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding
echelon’s concept of operations is aligned by purpose with the higher echelons’ concept of operations.
An effective concept of operations describes how the forces will support the mission of the higher
headquarters and how the actions of subordinate units fit together to accomplish the mission. Commanders
do this by organizing their forces by purpose. Commanders ensure the primary tasks for each subordinate
unit include a purpose that links the completion of that task to achievement of another task, an objective, or
an end state condition.
Sequence of Actions and Phasing
2-96. The concept of operations is described in sequence from the start of the operation to the projected
status of the force at the operation’s end. If the situation dictates a significant change in tasks during the
operation, the commander may phase the operation. Within this sequence, the commander designates a
main effort by phase.
2-97. Part of the art of planning is determining the sequence of actions that best accomplishes the mission.
Commanders consider many factors when deciding how to sequence actions. The most important factor is
resources. Commanders synchronize subordinate unit actions to link the higher headquarters’ concept of
operations with their own concept of operations.
2-98. Ideally, commanders plan to accomplish the mission with simultaneous actions throughout the area
of operations. However, resource constraints and the friendly force’s size may limit commanders’ ability to
do this. In these cases, commanders phase the operation. A phase is a planning and execution tool used to
divide an operation in duration or activity. A change in phase usually involves a change of mission, task
organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in planning and controlling and may be indicated by
time, distance, terrain, or an event (FM 3-0). Well designed phases—
z
Focus effort.
z
Concentrate combat power in time and space at a decisive point.
z
Achieve their objectives deliberately and logically.
Note: In joint operation planning, a phase is a definitive stage of an operation or campaign
during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually
supporting activities for a common purpose.
2-99. Phasing assists in planning and controlling operations. Individual phases gain significance only in the
overall operation’s context. Links between phases and the requirement to transition between phases are
critically important. Commanders establish clear conditions for how and when these transitions occur.
Although phases are distinguishable to friendly forces, an effective plan conceals these distinctions from
adversaries through concurrent and complementary actions during transitions.
Decisive Points and Objectives
2-100. Commanders can base a concept of operations on a single objective, lines of operations, or lines of
effort. Identifying decisive points and determining objectives are central to creating the concept of
operations in all cases. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function
that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute
materially to achieving success (JP 3-0). Examples of potential geographic decisive points include port
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Planning
facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and bases of operations. Specific events and elements of an
enemy force may also be decisive points. Decisive points have a different character during operations
dominated by stability or civil support. These decisive points may be less tangible and more closely
associated with important events and conditions. Examples include—
z
Participation in elections by a certain group.
z
Electric power restored in a certain area.
z
Police and emergency services reestablished.
2-101. Often, a situation presents more decisive points than the force can act upon. The art of planning
includes selecting decisive points that best lead to mission accomplishment and acting on them in a
sequence that most quickly and efficiently leads to mission success. Once identified for action, decisive
points become objectives. Objectives provide the basis for determining tasks to subordinate units. The most
important objective forms the basis for developing the decisive operation.
Note: An objective can be physical (an enemy force or terrain feature) or conceptual in the form
of a goal (rule of law established). As a graphic control measure, an objective is a location on the
ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide
for unity of effort (FM 3-90).
Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort
2-102. Lines of operations and lines of effort are two key elements of operational design that assist in
developing a concept of operations. Major combat operations are typically designed using lines of
operations. These lines tie tasks to the geographic and positional references in the area of operations.
Commanders synchronize activities along complementary lines of operations to achieve the desired end
state. Lines of operations may be either interior or exterior. (See FM 3-0.)
2-103. The line of effort is a useful tool for framing the concept of operations when stability or civil
support operations dominate. Lines of effort link multiple tasks with goal-oriented objectives that focus
efforts toward establishing end state conditions. Using lines of effort is essential in planning when
positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many
nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link subordinate unit tasks with objectives and
desired end state conditions. Lines of effort are often essential to helping commanders visualize how
military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. They are a particularly valuable
tool when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces or civilian
organizations, where unity of command is elusive if not impractical. (See appendix B and FM 3-07 for a
detailed discussion on describing the concept of operations by lines of effort.)
TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS
2-104. The commander’s intent describes the desired end state while the concept of operations broadly
describes how to get there. In contrast, tasks to subordinate units direct individual units to perform specific
tasks. A task is a clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations
(FM 7-0). Tasks are specific activities that contribute to accomplishing missions or other requirements.
Tasks direct friendly action. The purpose of each task should nest with completing another task, achieving
an objective, or attaining an end state condition.
2-105. When developing tasks for subordinate units, commanders and staffs use the same who, what
(task), when, where, and why (purpose) construct as they did to develop the unit’s mission statement.
Sometimes commanders may want to specify the type or form of operation to use to accomplish a task. For
example, the commander may direct an infiltration to avoid tipping off the enemy and synchronize the
timing of the unit’s tasks with other units’ tasks.
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Chapter 2
COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
2-106. Coordinating instructions apply to two or more units. They are located in the coordinating
instructions subparagraph of paragraph 3 (execution) of plans and orders. Examples include CCIRs, fire
support coordination and airspace coordinating measures, rules of engagement, risk mitigation measures,
and the time or condition when the operation order becomes effective.
CONTROL MEASURES
2-107. Planners develop and recommend control measures to the commander for each considered COA. A
control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (FM 3-0). Control measures
assign responsibilities, coordinate actions between forces, impose restrictions, or establish guidelines to
regulate freedom of action. Control measures are essential to coordinating subordinates’ actions and are
located throughout the plan.
2-108. Control measures can free up subordinate commanders to conduct operations within their assigned
area of operations without having to conduct additional coordination. Such control measures reduce the
need for subordinates to ask higher headquarters for permission to act or not to act. Commanders establish
only the minimum control measures needed to provide essential coordination and deconfliction among
units. The fewer restrictions, the more latitude subordinates have to exercise individual initiative.
2-109. Control measures can be permissive or restrictive. Permissive control measures allow specific
actions to occur; restrictive control measures limit the conduct of certain actions. For example, a
coordinated fire line—a line beyond which conventional and indirect surface fire support means may fire at
any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination—illustrates
a permissive control measure. A route—the prescribed course to be traveled from a specific point of origin
to a specific destination—illustrates a restrictive control measure. (FM 1-02 contains definitions of control
measures and how to depict them. FM 3-90 discusses control measures commonly used in offensive and
defensive operations.)
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26 March 2010
Chapter 3
Design
This chapter establishes the fundamentals that guide the application of design. It
defines and explains the goals of design. It discusses design in context and describes
how leaders drive design. Next, it describes the design methodology that includes
framing the operational environment, framing the problem, and developing a design
concept. The chapter concludes with a discussion of reframing.
DESIGN DEFINED
3-1.
±Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize,
and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them. Critical thinking
captures the reflective and continuous learning essential to design. Creative thinking involves thinking in
new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas. Design is a way of
organizing the activities of understanding, visualizing, and describing within an organization. Design
occurs throughout the operations process before and during detailed planning, through preparation, and
during execution and assessment.
3-2.
±Planning consists of two separate, but closely related components: a conceptual component and a
detailed component. The conceptual component is represented by the cognitive application of design. The
detailed component translates broad concepts into a complete and practical plan. During planning, these
components overlap with no clear delineation between them. As commanders conceptualize the operation,
their vision guides the staff through design and into detailed planning. Design is continuous throughout
planning and evolves with increased understanding throughout the operations process. Design underpins
the role of the commander in the operations process, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of
understanding, visualizing, and describing. As these iterations occur, the design concept—the tangible link
to detailed planning—is forged.
3-3. Design enables commanders to view a situation from multiple perspectives, draw on varied sources
of situational knowledge, and leverage subject matter experts while formulating their own understanding.
Design enables commanders to develop a thorough understanding of the operational environment and
formulate effective solutions to complex, ill-structured problems. The commander’s visualization and
description of the actions required to achieve the desired conditions must flow logically from what
commanders understand and how they have framed the problem. Design provides an approach for how to
generate change from an existing situation to a desired objective or condition.
3-4. Moreover, design requires effective and decisive leadership that engages subordinate commanders,
coordinating authorities, representatives of various staff disciplines, and the higher commander in
continuing collaboration and dialog that leads to enhanced decisionmaking. (Paragraphs 1-54 through 1-59
discuss collaboration and dialog.) This facilitates collaborative and parallel planning while supporting
shared understanding and visualization across the echelons and among diverse organizations. It is the key
to leveraging the cognitive potential of a learning organization, converting the raw intellectual power of the
commander and staff into effective combat power.
3-5. Innovation, adaptation, and continuous learning are central tenets of design. Innovation involves
taking a new approach to a familiar or known situation, whereas adaptation involves taking a known
solution and modifying it to a particular situation or responding effectively to changes in the operational
environment. Design helps the commander lead innovative, adaptive work and guides planning, preparing,
executing, and assessing operations. Design requires agile, versatile leaders who foster continuous
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Chapter 3
organizational learning while actively engaging in iterative collaboration and dialog to enhance
decisionmaking across the echelons.
3-6. A continuous, iterative, and cognitive methodology, design is used to develop understanding of the
operational environment, make sense of complex, ill-structured problems, and develop approaches to
solving them. In contrast to detailed planning, design is not process-oriented. The practice of design
challenges conventional wisdom and offers new insights for solving complex, ill-structured problems.
While plans and orders flow down the echelons of command, new understanding may flow up from
subordinate echelons where change often appears first. By enhancing and improving commanders’
understanding, design improves a higher authority’s understanding of the operational environment and the
problems commanders are tasked to solve.
DESIGN GOALS
3-7. Successfully applying design seeks four concrete goals that, once achieved, provide the reasoning
and logic that guide detailed planning processes. Each goal is an essential component to reshaping the
conditions of the operational environment that constitute the desired end state. Collectively, they are
fundamental to overcoming the complexities that characterize persistent conflict. The goals of design are—
z
Understanding ill-structured problems.
z
Anticipating change.
z
Creating opportunities.
z
Recognizing and managing transitions.
UNDERSTANDING ILL-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS
3-8. Persistent conflict presents a broad array of complex, ill-structured problems best solved by applying
design. Design offers a model for innovative and adaptive problem framing that provides leaders with the
cognitive tools to understand a problem and appreciate its complexities before seeking to solve it. This
understanding is fundamental to design. Without thoroughly understanding the nature of the problem,
commanders cannot establish the situation’s context or devise approaches to effect change in the
operational environment. Analyzing the situation and the operational variables provides the critical
information necessary to understand and frame these problems.
(FM 3-0 discusses the operational
variables. See chapter 2 for a discussion on the structure of problems.)
3-9. A commander’s experience, knowledge, judgment, and intuition assume a crucial role in
understanding complex, ill-structured problems. Together, they enhance the cognitive components of
design, enhancing commanders’ intuition while further enabling commanders to identify threats or
opportunities long before others might. This deepens and focuses commanders’ understanding. It allows
them to anticipate change, identify information gaps, and recognize capability shortfalls. This
understanding also forms the basis of the commander’s visualization. Commanders project their
understanding beyond the realm of physical combat. They must anticipate the operational environment’s
evolving military and nonmilitary conditions. Therefore, design encompasses visualizing the synchronized
arrangement and use of military and nonmilitary forces and capabilities to achieve the desired end state.
This requires the ability to discern the conditions required for success before committing forces to action.
3-10. Ultimately, understanding complex, ill-structured problems is essential to reducing the effects of
complexity on full spectrum operations. This understanding allows commanders to better appreciate how
numerous factors influence and interact with planned and ongoing operations. Assessing the complex
interaction among these factors and their influences on operations is fundamental to understanding and
effectively allows the commander to make qualitatively better decisions under the most dynamic and
stressful circumstances.
ANTICIPATING CHANGE
3-11. Applying design involves anticipating changes in the operational environment, projecting
decisionmaking forward in time and space to influence events before they occur. Rather than responding to
events as they unfold, design helps the commander to anticipate these events and recognize and manage
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18 March 2011
Design
transitions. Through the iterative and continuous application of design, commanders contemplate and
evaluate potential decisions and actions in advance, visualizing consequences of possible operational
approaches to determine whether they will contribute to achieving the desired end state. A thorough design
effort reduces the effects of complexity during execution and is essential to anticipating the most likely
reactions to friendly action. During detailed planning, these actions and sequences are often linked along
lines of effort, which focus the outcomes toward objectives that help to shape conditions of the operational
environment.
3-12. Design alone does not guarantee success in anticipating change—it also does not ensure that friendly
actions will quantifiably improve the situation. However, applied effectively and focused toward a common
goal, design provides an invaluable cognitive tool to help commanders anticipate change as well as
innovate and adapt approaches appropriately. Performed haphazardly and without proper focus and effort,
it may become time-consuming, ineffective, process-focused, and irrelevant. Iterative, collaborative, and
focused design offers the means to anticipate change effectively in the current situation and operational
environment as well as achieve lasting success and positive change.
CREATING OPPORTUNITIES
3-13. The ability to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative is rooted in effective design. Applying design
helps commanders anticipate events and set in motion the actions that allow forces to act purposefully and
effectively. Exercising initiative in this manner shapes the situation as events unfold. Design is inherently
proactive, intended to create opportunities for success while instilling the spirit of the offense in all
elements of full spectrum operations. Effective design facilitates mission command, ensuring that forces are
postured to retain the initiative and, through detailed planning, consistently able to seek opportunities to
exploit that initiative.
3-14. The goals of design account for the interdependent relationships among initiative, opportunity, and
risk. Effective design postures the commander to combine the three goals to reduce or counter the effects of
complexity using the initial commander’s intent to foster individual initiative and freedom of action.
Design is essential to recognizing and managing the inherent delay between decision and action, especially
between the levels of war and echelons. The iterative nature of design helps the commander to overcome
this effect, fostering initiative within the initial commander’s intent to act appropriately and decisively
when orders no longer sufficiently address the changing situation. This ensures commanders act promptly
as they encounter opportunities or accept prudent risk to create opportunities when they lack clear
direction. In such situations, prompt action requires detailed foresight and preparation.
RECOGNIZING AND MANAGING TRANSITIONS
3-15. A campaign quality Army requires versatile leaders—critical and creative thinkers who recognize
and manage not just friendly transitions but those of adversaries as well as the operational environment.
Commanders must possess the versatility to operate along the spectrum of conflict and the vision to
anticipate and adapt to transitions that will occur over the course of a campaign. Design provides the
cognitive tools to recognize and manage transitions by educating and training the commander. Educated
and trained commanders can identify and employ adaptive, innovative solutions, create and exploit
opportunities, and leverage risk to their advantage during these transitions.
DESIGN IN CONTEXT
3-16. The introduction of design into Army doctrine seeks to secure the lessons of eight years of war and
provide a cognitive tool to commanders who will encounter complex, ill-structured problems in future
operational environments like in March 2003. Division commanders of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault),
4th Infantry Division, and 1st Armored Division were ordered to maneuver their units from Kuwait and
into Iraq to defeat the Iraqi Army and to seize key cities and infrastructure. This was a task familiar to each
of them—a structured problem—and they communicated their intent and began to build orders through the
military decisionmaking process. Soon after accomplishing their mission, they were issued further
instructions to
“establish a safe and secure environment” in Ninewa Province, Diyala Province, and
Baghdad. This was a task unfamiliar to them—an ill-structured problem—and each of them realized that
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Chapter 3
they had to first understand the problem and frame the task before seeking to solve it. These commanders
used design intuitively and adapted their existing processes to gain this understanding.
3-17. As learned in recent conflicts, challenges facing the commander in operations often can be
understood only in the context of other factors influencing the population. These other factors often include
but are not limited to economic development, governance, information, tribal influence, religion, history,
and culture. Full spectrum operations conducted among the population are effective only when
commanders understand the issues in the context of the complex issues facing the population.
Understanding context and then deciding how, if, and when to act is both a product of design and integral
to the art of command.
PERSISTENT CONFLICT
3-18. In the 21st century, several global trends shape the emerging strategic environment and exacerbate
the ideological nature of current struggles. These trends present dilemmas as well as opportunities. Such
trends include—
z
Globalization.
z
Technological diffusion.
z
Demographic shifts.
z
Resource scarcity.
z
Climate changes and natural disasters.
z
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
z
Failed or failing states.
3-19. The collective impact of these trends makes it likely that persistent conflict will characterize the next
century. Persistent conflict is the protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors that
are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. (FM 3-0) Conflicts
will erupt unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and endure for extended periods. In a dynamic and
multidimensional operational environment, design offers tools vital to solving the complex, ill-structured
problems presented by persistent conflict.
±EVOLVING CHARACTER OF CONFLICT
3-20. Although the essential nature of conflict is timeless, its character reflects the unique conditions of
each era. Conflict is invariably complex because it is fundamentally human in character. . Design provides
additional tools necessary to understand this environment and to mitigate the adverse effects of complexity
on full spectrum operations. As modern conflict evolves, it is characterized by several key factors:
z
Conducted between and among diverse actors, both state and nonstate, with the former
frequently acting covertly, and the latter sometimes acting through state sponsorship or as a
proxy for a state.
z
Unavoidably waged among the people.
z
Increasingly unpredictable and sudden, with the potential to expand rapidly into unanticipated
locations and continue for unexpected durations.
z
Increasing potential for spillover, creating regionally and globally destabilizing effects.
z
Waged in transparency.
z
Increasingly likely to include hybrid threats, the diverse and dynamic combination of regular
forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting
effects.
FUNDAMENTALS OF DESIGN
3-21. Today’s operational environment presents situations so complex that understanding them—let alone
attempting to change them—is beyond the ability of a single individual. Moreover, significant risk occurs
when assuming that commanders in the same campaign understand an implicit design concept or that their
design concepts mutually support each other. The risks multiply, especially when a problem involves
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