|
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____________________________________________________________________Planning Considerations
escort or perimeter security, but also training and equipping of contractor
personnel in self-protection (NBC and weapons). When the threat exists and
the commander of a combatant command has granted approval, contractor
personnel may be trained and equipped to work in an NBC environment. The
same personnel may carry individual, military specification weapons for per-
sonal protection, provided the contractors’ company policy permits and the
employee agrees.
CSS TO OTHER AGENCIES
2-46. When directed, logistic assistance is provided to agencies other than the
US military that lack the capability to sustain operations. Army CSS capa-
bilities—such as transportation, supply, or medical services—often support
other agencies, private organizations, and individuals during these opera-
tions. At the same time they continue to support friendly forces.
COMBAT HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT
2-47. Combat health resources may be used across a broad spectrum of mis-
sions (from consulting to delivering health care) in stability operations and
support operations. Due to Title 10 restrictions and the constraints imposed
by the Geneva Conventions, the command surgeon, in conjunction with the
staff judge advocate advises the commander on which groups of individuals
are eligible beneficiaries to receive military health care and the methods of
reimbursement for services rendered. In humanitarian assistance and dis-
aster relief operations, the population served will differ from the traditional
healthy and fit military force, and will be comprised of children; infants; and
obstetrical, gynecological, and geriatric patients. The composition of the
affected population will require augmentation of existing medical equipment
sets with specialized equipment, instruments, and medicines. Consultation
and advice may be required to assist the host nation in enhancing or
developing the medical infrastructure, civilian medical programs, basic
health and sanitation services, and animal husbandry programs.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
2-48. Many possible sources of funding exist in stability operations and sup-
port operations; legal restrictions often limit using these funds. Unauthorized
expenditure of funds can lead to criminal or administrative action against
those responsible. Some basic principles participants in these operations
should be aware of include—
• Expenditures must be reasonably related to the purpose for which
Congress made the appropriations.
• Expenditures must not fall specifically within the scope of some other
category of appropriation (such as Title 10 Operations and Mainte-
nance funds versus Title 22 Security Assistance Funds).
• If two appropriations permit the expenditure, either may be used, but
not in combination or interchangeably to achieve the same objective.
This is a prohibition against augmentation of funds.
• Upon mission receipt, resource managers must begin accounting for
expenditures and tracking the use of CSS assets to capture costs of the
operation for reimbursement. Financial accountability at all levels is
2-11
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
important for reimbursement and is legally required for reporting the
costs of operations to Congress.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
2-49. Because stability operations and support operations tend to be joint,
multinational, or interagency, they are often planned and conducted in
concert with those outside the US military. As stated in Chapter 1, Army
forces are often the supporting organization rather than the lead agency.
However, the efforts of all involved must be coordinated toward a unified
effort. Senior Army commanders devote much of their time and energy to the
problems of coordination and cooperation. Commanders use liaison elements
and coordination centers to facilitate unity of effort. (Appendix A discusses
liaison and coordination centers.)
2-50. No single command and control (C2) option works best for all stability
operations and support operations. Commanders should be flexible in modi-
fying standard arrangements to meet specific requirements of each situation
and to promote unity of effort.
2-51. When operating inside a multinational organization, commanders
should expect to integrate units down to the company level for combat units,
and to the individual level for support units. Commanders must train with
this reality in mind. Units operate under established procedures modified to
accord with the standing operating procedures for the alliance or multi-
national coalition. It is accepted that effectiveness will initially decrease
when operating in a multinational force, but through training and under-
standing of standards and procedures, unit performance will improve.
2-52. One factor that distinguishes stability operations and support opera-
tions from offensive and defensive operations is the requirement for inter-
agency coordination at the task force level and below. In interagency opera-
tions, Army commanders have inherent responsibilities including the require-
ments to clarify the mission; to determine the controlling legal and policy
authorities; and to task, organize, direct, sustain, and care for the organiza-
tions and individuals for whom they provide the interagency effort. They also
assure seamless termination under conditions that ensure the identified
objectives are met and can be sustained after the operation.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
2-53. The ground commander often executes the military portion of an inter-
agency plan. He must know and understand the relationship that Army
forces have with others participating in the operation.
2-54. Although the US can conduct stability operations and support opera-
tions unilaterally, it seldom pursues its national interests alone. Several
options may be employed for the C2 of multinational forces including coali-
tions and alliances. See FM 3-16 for additional considerations in C2 in multi-
national operations.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
2-55. Information management is a critical C2 consideration during all
operations. In stability operations and support operations, sharing of relevant
2-12
____________________________________________________________________Planning Considerations
information with NGOs, local
Information management is the
officials, police, and other non-
provision of relevant informa-
military agencies will achieve
tion to the right person at the
effective coordination and unity
right time in a usable form to
of effort. Approaches to civilian
facilitate situational under-
organizations, including the
standing and decision making.
media, for information should be
It uses procedures and informa-
open and transparent, including
tion systems to collect, process,
a clear statement of the use of
store, display, and disseminate
the information. This will avoid
data and information.
undermining cooperative efforts
with such agencies.
FM 3-0
2-56. Clarity and accuracy of information are critical, especially when
involving multiple agencies in activities such as scheduling airlifts and pro-
cessing resources. Information sharing is essential to establish ground
truth—a critical and sensitive process. Not all agencies may agree on the
nature or scope of support required or on the operation’s progress. To pre-
empt false impressions, Army forces routinely share information with other
agencies. Information sharing helps other agencies execute their missions.
For example, providing overhead photography to relief officials can assist in
the design and construction of needed refugee camps or aid search efforts.
Data on the quantity and type of relief aid moved by various means can assist
in the transportation planning of other agencies. Sharing information on the
use of cluster munitions and other ordnance is needed to help establish safe
routes for returning refugees and to protect the local population along with
the international and nongovermental organizations in the AO.
OTHER PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
METT-TC ANALYSIS
2-57. The planning process outlined in FM 5-0 is valid for all operations.
However, the nature of the environment in which forces conduct stability
operations and support operations requires commanders and staff to view the
six factors of METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available, time available, civil considerations—from a different per-
spective than when conducting offensive and defensive operations. Analyzing
the factors of METT-TC is critical during the military decision making
process (MDMP). The impact of each factor will differ from operation to
operation, but each must be considered carefully in light of the operational
environment:
• Mission. In stability operations and support operations, the missions
may come from various sources. The operation order of a higher head-
quarters may not be the only source for mission analysis. Terms of
reference, special agreements (such as the Dayton Accords for Bosnia-
Herzegovina or the Military-Technical Agreement regarding Kosovo),
status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), ROE, status of mission agree-
ments, and executive orders are examples of mandates and declara-
tions that must be reviewed for mission requirements. A
2-13
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
comprehensive mission analysis is the best safeguard against mission
creep (see discussion of Mission Creep in Chapter 1).
•
Enemy. The characterization of the enemy is a critical concern in sta-
bility operations and support operations. For combat operations con-
ducted in support of stability operations, such as forcible separation of
adversaries during peace enforcement operations, the enemy is ana-
lyzed, as it would be for offensive and defensive operations. But for
other operations, the concept of enemy could be much different. In PO,
it is the conflict and not the parties to the conflict that is the enemy. In
complex contingencies, it may be hunger or disease and not competing
political factions that is the enemy. Forces conducting domestic
counterdrug operations must carefully avoid characterizing the object
of their surveillance as a military enemy. Commanders must guard
against taking actions that would inadvertently create an enemy where
there was not one. For example, the impression that one of the parties
to a conflict is receiving favorable treatment could turn other parties
against the PO forces (as in Lebanon when Shi’a forces attacked US
Marines whom they saw as favoring the Maronite Christian-dominated
government). See the discussion of Modified Concept of the Enemy in
Chapter 1.
•
Terrain and weather. The five military aspects of terrain—obser-
vation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles
and movement, and cover and concealment (OAKOC)—remain valid,
but the way the commanders use these aspects to analyze the environ-
ment may require a different perspective. Decisive terrain may not be a
hilltop or defile, but rather the attitude of the people or civil infra-
structure. The impact of weather on civilians and the potential for a
worsening humanitarian crisis may create unique concerns for com-
manders in stability operations and support operations.
•
Troops. When considering troops available, commanders must expand
their thinking to consider different sources of support to the mission.
Many stability operations and support operations require a greater mix
of combat support and combat service support units than do offensive
and defensive operations. Multinational forces, other US government
agencies, contractors, and host-nation civilians may be available to
support the commander in accomplishing his mission. Commanders
will also seek to coordinate and leverage the substantial contributions
to the overall goals of the operation made by international and non-
governmental organizations.
•
Time. Commanders at all levels must consider the possibility of long-
term commitment to some stability operations. As a result of the 1978
Camp David Accords, Army forces have been providing peacekeepers to
the multinational forces and observers for more than 20 years. As a
result of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, NATO-assigned US forces
continue to enforce the peace in Bosnia after five years. Many support
operations, such as disaster relief missions, only last a matter of weeks.
Planners must anticipate long-term commitments that may require
rotating units or individuals.
•
Civil considerations. Civil considerations are important in all opera-
tions but are a critical concern in stability operations and support
2-14
____________________________________________________________________Planning Considerations
operations. The primary purpose of many of these operations is
improving the quality of life of the local populace, whether through
mitigating the effects of disasters or creating a secure environment for
social, economic, and political development.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
2-58. Military commanders must consider not only the military forces, but
also the environment in which those forces operate. One factor of the environ-
ment that commanders must consider is the civilian populace and its
impactwhether it is supportive, neutral, or hostile to the presence of mili-
tary forces. A supportive populace can provide resources that facilitate
friendly operations. It can also provide a positive climate for military and
diplomatic activities that a nation pursues to achieve foreign policy objec-
tives. A hostile populace threatens the immediate operations of deployed
friendly forces and can often undermine public support at home for the
nation’s policy objectives.
2-59. Civil-military operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander that
establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces,
governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities,
and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in
order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational
US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military
forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local,
regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during,
or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in
the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be
performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combi-
nation of civil affairs and other forces (JP 3-57). The very nature of stability
operations and support operations places our forces in direct contact with
civilians, governments, and NGOs. This relationship makes CMO critical to
any stability operation or support operation.
2-60. CMO have three objectives. CMO enhance military effectiveness by
reducing interference with military operations by the civil population. They
support our national objectives by encouraging the development of a country’s
material and human resources. And lastly, CMO reduce the negative impact
of military operations on civilians. Some support operations, such as domestic
support operations and foreign humanitarian relief, are in and of themselves
CMO. Some stability operations include civil-military activities in support of
the larger mission and objective. For example, emergency civil administration
conducted as part of a peace enforcement mission is a civil-military operation.
JP 3-57 and FM 3-57 discuss specific CMO activities.
2-61. The G5/S5 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning civil-
military operations. The G5/S5 must enhance the relationship between mili-
tary forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the AO. The G5/S5 is
required at all echelons from battalion through corps level, but authorized
only at division and corps levels. Once deployed, units below division level
may be authorized an S5. (See FM 6-0.) The CMO staff may be augmented
with civil affairs (CA) teams to assist in planning and executing CMO. CA
forces are an essential element of CMO by virtue of their area and linguistic
2-15
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
orientation, cultural awareness, training in military-to-host nation advisory
activities, and civilian professional skills that parallel common government
functions.
PROTECTION
2-62. Protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of a force so the
commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place. Protec-
tion has four components: force protection, field discipline, safety, and fratri-
cide avoidance. Protection bears significantly on every aspect of stability
operations and support operations. Commanders must take great pains to
protect the force from attack. Adversaries opposed to US interests, or who
seek to destabilize an area, will go to great lengths to expel US forces. They
will employ terrorist tactics such as bombings, kidnappings, assassinations,
ambushes, and raids. Commanders address force protection during planning
and revise their plan as necessary during execution. (FM 3-07.2 provides a
process by which commanders can assess the threat to the force and act to
defeat that threat.) This does not mean that commanders must isolate their
troops from contact with the indigenous population. Mission degradation, or
even increased risk to the force, can result if commanders restrain forces
from conducting prudent missions and establishing an active and capable
presence in the area.
Force Protection
2-63. Because of unusual and uncertain threats associated with stability
operations and support operations, force protection is a key consideration for
commanders. Force protection consists of those actions to prevent or mitigate
hostile actions against Department of Defense (DOD) personnel (to include
family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. It minimizes
the effects of enemy firepower
(including weapons of mass destruction,
maneuver, and information) (see FM 3-07.2). Commanders attempt to accom-
plish a mission with minimal loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies by
integrating force protection considerations into all aspects of the operations
process. But the commander must balance force protection measures against
a “bunker mentality” in his force and diminishing interaction with the
indigenous population. Force protection consists of air, space, and missile
defense; NBC defense; antiterrorism; defensive IO; and local security to
operational forces and means.
2-64. Air, Space, and Missile Defense. The commander must consider the
use of air defense artillery forces if evidence exists of belligerent forces having
the ability to employ fixed- or rotary-winged aircraft, unmanned aerial vehi-
cles, or cruise missiles against any friendly forces, civilians, or NGOs he is
obligated to protect. Stability operations in these situations require forces to
be thoroughly trained on passive and active air defense measures. Visual
aircraft recognition may be particularly challenging since more than one of
the forces involved may use similar aircraft. Air defense considerations are
more important in peace enforcement operations that deny or guarantee
movement and safe passage or that enforce sanctions (see JP 3-10).
2-65. NBC Defense. NBC defensive measures provide the capability to
defend against attack by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and to
2-16
____________________________________________________________________Planning Considerations
survive and sustain combat operations in an NBC environment. Survival and
sustainment must use the following principles: avoidance of NBC hazards,
particularly contamination; protection of individuals and units from
unavoidable NBC hazards; and decontamination. An effective NBC defense
counters belligerent threats and attacks by minimizing vulnerabilities, pro-
tecting friendly forces, and maintaining an operational tempo that compli-
cates targeting. By denying or countering any advantages that the adversary
may accrue from using NBC weapons, Army forces and their multinational
partners significantly deter their use.
2-66. Antiterrorism. Antiterrorism is the defensive measures used to reduce
the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include
limited response and containment by local military forces (JP 1-02) (see
JP 3-07.2 and Chapter 5). Terrorism may well be the most likely threat that
Army forces will face when conducting stability operations and support
operations. Commanders have an inherent responsibility for planning,
resourcing, training, exercising, and executing antiterrorism measures to pro-
vide for the security of the command. Likewise, every soldier, DOD employee,
independent contractor, and local national hired by DOD has an inherent
responsibility to maintain vigilance for possible terrorist actions.
2-67. Defensive IO. See Information Operations in this chapter.
2-68. Security. At the operational level, rear area and base security contri-
butes to force protection (see JP 3-10.1). Commanders should consider—
•
Sites, accommodations, and defensive positions. Precautions
should be taken to protect positions, headquarters, support facilities,
and accommodations. These may include obstacles and shelters. Units
must also practice alert procedures and develop drills to rapidly occupy
positions. A robust engineer force can provide support to meet surviva-
bility needs. Units should maintain proper camouflage and conceal-
ment based on METT-TC. Additional information on precautions is
provided in FM 3-34.112 and FM 3-06.
•
Roadblocks. Military police (MP) forces may establish and maintain
roadblocks. If MP forces are unavailable, other forces may assume this
responsibility. Roadblocks can be used not only to restrict traffic for
security purposes, but also to control the movement of critical cargo in
support of humanitarian operations. As a minimum, the area should be
highly visible and defensible with an armed overwatch.
•
Personnel vulnerabilities. Forces are always vulnerable to personnel
security risks from local employees and other personnel subject to
bribes, threats, or compromise. The threat from local criminal elements
is also a constant threat and force protection consideration.
•
Personal awareness. The single most proactive measure for surviva-
bility is individual awareness by soldiers in all circumstances. Soldiers
must look for things out of place and patterns preceding aggression.
Commanders should ensure that soldiers remain alert, do not establish
a routine, and maintain appearance and bearing.
•
Sniper threats. In stability operations and support operations, the
sniper can pose a significant threat. Counters include rehearsed
responses, reconnaissance and surveillance, and cover and
2-17
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
concealment. ROE should provide specific instructions on how to react
to sniper fire, to include restrictions on weapons to be used. Units can
use specific weapons, such as sniper rifles, to eliminate a sniper and
reduce collateral damage.
• Security measures. Security measures are METT-TC dependent and
may include the full range of active and passive measures such as
patrolling, reconnaissance and surveillance, and use of reaction forces.
• Coordination. Commanders should coordinate security with local
military and civil agencies and humanitarian organizations when
possible.
• Evacuation. Commanders must have a plan to evacuate the force
should conditions warrant, such as war erupting during the conduct of
a peacekeeping operations or a host nation withdrawing support for
humanitarian assistance. This plan should include appropriate routes
for ground, sea, or air evacuation. All units should rehearse their evac-
uation plan and develop contingency plans that cover such tasks as the
breakout of an encirclement or the fighting of a delaying action. Opera-
tions security (OPSEC) is critical as public knowledge of such plans or
witnessing of a rehearsal could erode the confidence of the local popu-
lation and thus the legitimacy of the mission.
Field Discipline
2-69. Field discipline guards soldiers from the physical and psychological
effects of the environment. Soldiers can adapt to the point where they out-
perform indigenous populations. Commanders take every measure and pre-
caution to keep soldiers healthy and maintain their morale. Such actions
include securing equipment and supplies from loss or damage. Commanders
ensure that systems are in place for adequate health services to include
preventive medicine and medical surveillance programs, stress control, and
medical laboratory services. They provide effective systems for maintenance
evacuation and rapid replacement or repair of equipment.
Safety
2-70. Commanders in stability operations and support operations may reduce
the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety
officer and staff, conducting a safety program, and seeking advice from local
personnel. The safety program should begin with training conducted before
deployment and continue throughout the deployment. Training will include
factors that could affect safety such as the environment, terrain, road condi-
tions, and local driving habits; access or possession of live ammunition;
unlocated or uncleared mine fields; and special equipment such as tanks and
other systems that present special hazards. Safety is also important during
off-duty and recreational activities. If possible, the safety officer and staff
should coordinate with local authorities concerning environmental and health
concerns. The presence of US forces should not adversely impact the environ-
ment (see FM 5-19).
2-18
____________________________________________________________________Planning Considerations
Fratricide Avoidance
2-71. Most measures taken to avoid fratricide in stability operations and sup-
port operations are the same as those measures taken during offensive and
defensive operations. However, commanders must consider other factors such
as local hires or NGO personnel that may be as much at risk as US forces.
Fratricide avoidance is an important part of CMO; effective civil-military
coordination and sharing of information will reduce fratricide and collateral
damage. Accurate information about the locations and activities of both
friendly and hostile forces (situational understanding) and an aggressive air-
space management plan assist commanders in avoiding fratricide. Liaison
officers increase situational understanding and enhance interoperability.
Using night vision light-intensifier devices aids units in target identification
during limited visibility. ROE might prevent soldiers from using some wea-
pon systems and lessen the risk of fratricide. The collateral effects of friendly
weapons in urban and restricted terrain can affect fratricide. Soldiers must
know the penetration, ricochet, and blast consequences of their own weapons.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
2-72. Information is at the very heart of many stability operations. In fact, IO
may be designated as the main effort during certain phases of an operation.
These operations are often sensitive and politically charged where perception
and public support may be centers of gravity. In stability operations, IO may
be the most critical and acceptable means of achieving stated objectives con-
sistent with the ROE.
2-73. As an element of combat power, information plays a critical role in
stability operations and support operations. IO will have an even greater
relative importance given the reduced emphasis on firepower in stability
operations and support operations. Refer to FM 3-13 for a more comprehen-
sive and detailed discussion.
Offensive IO
2-74. Offensive information operations are the integrated use of assigned and
supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to
affect enemy decision makers or to influence others to achieve or promote
specific objectives (FM 3-0). Offensive IO may impact more in stability opera-
tions and support operations because they promote legitimacy and reduce
bias, ignorance, and confusion by persuading, educating, coordinating, or in-
fluencing. Soldiers, participants, and populations must understand the objec-
tives and motives of friendly forces, as well as the scope and duration of
friendly actions.
2-75. Public affairs and CMO are activities related to IO. Both communicate
information to critical audiences to influence their understanding and
perception of military operations. Related activities are distinct from IO
because they do not manipulate or distort information; their effectiveness
stems from their credibility with the local populace and news media. Public
affairs and CMO—prime sources of information—link the force, the local pop-
ulace, and the news media. They also provide assessments of how military
operations impact civilians, neutrals, and others in the area of operations.
2-19
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
2-76. Adversaries and other organizations will use propaganda and disinfor-
mation against the force to influence the public. PSYOP and public affairs
must work closely with the intelligence community to be predictive, rather
than reactive, to such attacks. Public affairs personnel inform and counter
the effects of propaganda and misinformation. FM 3-61 contains details on
conducting public affairs activities. The command should establish mecha-
nisms such as a joint information bureau and media working groups to edu-
cate as well as inform local and international media. An informed public,
with accurate and timely information, is a force multiplier in stability opera-
tions and support operations.
Defensive IO
2-77. Defensive information operations are the integration and coordination
of policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect
and defend friendly information and information (FM 3-0). IO are critical to
preserving operations security and freedom of action. Protecting information
is key to protecting the force and the mission. The need to be candid and
responsive to requests for information must balance the need to protect
operational information, such as troop movements, security plans, and vul-
nerabilities. Working closely with all parties, information operations
planners must develop the essential elements of friendly information to
preclude inadvertent public disclosure of critical or sensitive information.
2-78. A critical aspect of IO is the discovery of capabilities and intentions of
potential adversaries and threats. In stability operations and support opera-
tions, such adversaries will use IO to integrate all elements of their power
and capabilities to target friendly forces. The likely adversaries that US
forces may face in these operations will not be concerned about information
superiority and will seek only temporary advantages at critical points and
times. They may see Western concepts of laws of conflict as an unnecessary
handicap and be willing to use deception, trickery, civilian-run enterprise, or
the media when implementing an IO campaign. Friendly forces should expect
that adversary IO will include all venues and media that adversary leader-
ship can manipulate, including
• Adversary propaganda directed at friendly forces and propaganda for
domestic consumption.
• Statecraft and public diplomacy used to generate media events that
serve IO objectives.
• Censorship of domestic and international media as well as use of all
media to transmit propaganda and false, misleading information to all
audiences.
DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT
2-79. In stability operations and support operations strategic deployment and
redeployment planning and execution considerations are the same as those
for any other operation. However, some considerations deserve special
emphasis.
2-20
____________________________________________________________________Planning Considerations
Unit Preparation and Training
2-80. Warfighting skills developed and honed in training form the basis for
mission success. Combat-ready units can adapt readily to noncombat situa-
tions, but units not trained to standard cannot survive in combat. The know-
ledge, discipline, cohesion, and technical skills necessary to defeat an enemy
are also needed in environments that seem far removed from the battlefield.
The combat capability of Army forces is the basis for all they do. In stability
operations, the threat of force may deter escalation; in a support operation, it
may preempt violence and lawlessness.
2-81. The mission essential task list (METL) development process remains
the link between anticipated stability operations and support operations
missions and predeployment training (see FM 7-0 and FM 7-1). In stability
operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to
influence belligerent actions. The combat tasks, tactics, techniques, and
procedures used in offensive and defensive operations are the same as those
employed in stability operations. Peace operations, noncombatant evacuation
operations, foreign internal defense, and show of force are some examples of
stability operations where forces may be required to conduct combat tasks.
However, the conditions and standards of performance for these tasks are
modified by METT-TC considerations and the more restrictive ROE required
in stability operations. Commanders use basic tactical concepts and control
measures for offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations.
(See
FM 3-90.)
2-82. Although Army forces are not specifically organized, trained, or
equipped for support operations, their warfighting capabilities are particu-
larly suited to domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assis-
tance. Units trained for their wartime mission are disciplined with well-
established, flexible, and adaptable procedures. Army units have a functional
chain of command, reliable communications, and well-equipped organiza-
tions. They can operate and sustain themselves in austere environments with
organic assets. They can move large forces to the affected area with organic
transportation.
2-83. Army engineer, military police, medical, transportation, aviation, and
civil affairs assets are especially valuable for support operations. Support
operations often require the accomplishment of combat tasks. For example, a
scout platoon establishing observation posts in support of counterdrug opera-
tions or combat engineers reducing obstacles after a natural disaster. Some
missions require specialized training such as that provided by the National
Interagency Fire Center to train soldiers in fighting forest fires. Many combat
service support missions and tasks are the same across the entire spectrum of
operations.
2-84. The major Army command, Army service component, continental US
Army, and corps commanders determine the battle focus, resources, and
METL that maintain the required readiness posture for anticipated opera-
tions in war or military operations other than war. For planned stability
operations and support operations, unit commanders may adjust their battle-
focused training to reflect the unique aspects of these operations. For units
deployed to conduct stability operations or support operations with little or
2-21
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
no preparation, their warfighting competencies will sustain them as they
adjust to the stability operation or support operation.
Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
2-85. The primary challenge for commands executing deployment or rede-
ployment in stability operations and support operations is developing the
time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The TPFDD is critical to
refine, validate, and coordinate movement requirements for the force. Unit
movement officers must prepare and submit TPFDD through their higher
headquarters for the supported combatant commander’s validation. Once
movement requirements and priorities are validated, the supported combat-
ant commander submits the requirement to the US Transportation Com-
mand for scheduling. For support operations in the continental United
States, TPFDD validation rests with US Army Forces Command in its role as
lead operating agent for US Joint Forces Command. Non-DOD movement
requirements and priorities for US domestic disaster relief operations are
forwarded through the federal coordinating officer appointed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency to the appropriate defense coordinating offi-
cer. FM 3-35 and JP 3-35 further explain deployment and redeployment.
Predeployment Survey
2-86. Before deploying the advance party, a predeployment survey team
should move to the location of future operations. The team should be
resourced to effectively perform coordination and reconnaissance and to pro-
vide information to elements conducting planning. At a minimum, the team
should include the officer in charge and appropriate personnel from the
specialties of operations, intelligence, logistics, and communications. Depend-
ing on the situation, commanders may also consider sending engineer, medi-
cal, air liaison, public affairs, PSYOP, civil affairs, legal, explosive ordinance
disposal, and unit ministry personnel. This team should include personnel
from other US agencies, such as the US Agency for International Develop-
ment, and may include allied personnel. The United Nations (UN) and
specialized agencies will also conduct surveys. Commanders should consult
these and other organizations
(typically including NGOs) with detailed
knowledge of the area.
Transition
2-87. Multinational and multiagency operations will normally require the
handover of AOs and responsibilities to other military forces, governmental
agencies, or NGOs. Similar to a relief, the military force will carefully plan,
coordinate, and manage the transition to the relieving force or agency. The
units involved will present a seamless transfer of responsibility, both for effi-
ciency and effectiveness and to prevent any divergence or discrepancy that an
adversary may exploit. Planning for transition should begin before
deployment and the assumption of the mission. Only through multinational,
political-military planning can a proper transition be conducted.
2-88. Transitions between units in offensive and defensive operations are
usually reliefs in place focused on units and areas of responsibility. A relief in
place is also appropriate in peace operations. But in other stability operations
2-22
____________________________________________________________________Planning Considerations
and support operations, transition by functions may be more effective. Some
of these functions include medical and engineer services, local security, com-
munications, and logistics. Forces should not remove a capability until the
replacement capability is operating.
Redeployment
2-89. How US forces terminate their involvement in stability operations and
support operations may influence the perception of legitimacy of the entire
operation. Planners should schedule redeployment of specific units as soon as
possible after each unit has completed its part of the operations. This is
critical for maintaining readiness for future operations in either the primary
role of fighting the nation’s wars or deploying for subsequent stability opera-
tions or support operations. Additionally, forces must properly account for
funds and equipment during the transition.
2-90. Redeployment of military forces will result in a cessation or handover of
operational tasks to another agency. The nature of any redeployment may
vary from an emergency extraction to an administrative withdrawal or the
battle handover of a peace operation mission to another force. When appro-
priate, redeployment will cover the transfer of operational and administrative
activities to relieving troops, responsible NGOs, or civilian authorities. Units
must share comprehensive after-action reviews and lessons learned as part of
unit recovery operations.
Force Tailoring
2-91. In planning for stability opera-
Force tailoring is the
tions and support operations, com-
process of determining the
manders must tailor a force suitable
right mix and sequence of
for the mission. They should plan
units for a mission.
based on each unit’s ability to con-
FM 3-0
tribute to achieving national interests
and objectives and perceptions of the
indigenous population, the international community, and the American
public. Commanders should also consider the synergy and enhanced capa-
bilities inherent in joint operations when tailoring the force. Building
teamwork early and continually is vital to success when forces are rapidly
tailored for the mission.
2-92. The force must be appropriate to the stated goals of the sponsoring
authority and provide sufficient capability to deploy, complete the mission,
and protect itself. The perception that employed forces exceed the limits of
the mandate weakens legitimacy. Suitability varies based on the changing
international perceptions, the missions to be performed, the threat, and the
intensity of operations. Commanders should prepare for worst-case situations
by planning to use combined arms assets.
2-93. The unique requirements of stability operations and support operations
will result in the migration of CS and CSS below their doctrinally assigned
levels. To maintain flexibility and agility, nondivisional CS and CSS assets
can be tailored to the force in division and in some cases brigade levels. Civil
affairs, military police, and PSYOP units normally assigned to a corps can be
2-23
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
tailored to the force to augment divisions and brigades. The inherent
decentralized execution of stability operations and support operations will
continue to create unique challenges when tailoring to the force.
2-94. Reserve component soldiers and units may be included in the US force
under specific authority, usually under a Presidential Selected Reserve
Call-up Authority. This authority carries with it unique planning require-
ments. FM 3-35 covers these considerations in detail.
2-95. Commanders must recognize the availability and contribution of civil-
ians and contractors as part of the total force. Civilians may participate to
provide expertise not available through uniformed service members and to
most effectively use government resources. Support provided by civilians in
past conflicts included, but was not limited to, communications, intelligence,
contract construction, real estate leasing, water detection, civil engineering
technical assistance, and logistic services. Civilians in the nonappropriated
fund category staff the service exchanges and provide morale, welfare, and
recreation programs. Local civilians may also be a source of both skilled and
unskilled labor.
Augmentation and Liaison
2-96. The unique aspects of stability operations and support operations may
require individual augmenters and augmentation cells to support personnel
shortfalls and unique requirements to tailor the force. Augmentation sup-
ports coordination with the media, government agencies, NGOs, other multi-
national forces, and civil-military elements. METT-TC considerations drive
augmentation. Augmentation requires life support, transportation, and com-
munication. Liaison requirements are extensive in joint and multinational
operations. Commanders must provide augmentees with resources and
quality of life normally provided to their own soldiers.
2-97. Commanders may consider task-organizing small liaison teams to deal
with situations that develop with the local population. Teams can free up
maneuver elements and facilitate negotiation. Unit ministry, engineers,
counterintelligence, linguists, and logistics personnel may be candidates for
such teams, but combat elements may also be required. Commanders ensure
that teams have transportation and communication allocated.
2-98. Commanders may form special negotiation teams that can quickly
locate to diffuse or negotiate where confrontations are anticipated or occur.
Teams must have linguists and personnel who have authority to negotiate on
behalf of the chain of command (see Appendix E).
Special Technology
2-99. In tailoring the force, commanders must weigh the suitability of using
technology based on the nature of the mandate, maintenance requirements,
local sensitivities, and other factors. Technology available from battle labora-
tory experiments, even in small numbers, can make a big difference. Com-
manders of operations, however, must decide on its use consistent with
mission accomplishment.
2-24
____________________________________________________________________Planning Considerations
2-100. Aircraft normally used for transport may conduct air surveillance.
Satellites, scout aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, airborne reconnaissance
low, and the joint surveillance, target attack radar systems are means of
aerial surveillance. Ground surveillance technology—such as radar, night
vision devices, sensors, and thermal sights—may also prove useful in stabil-
ity operations and support operations. All such devices may prove useful in
observing and monitoring situations.
2-101. Technology with which soldiers may be less familiar includes using
instruments that may assist forces in conducting operations in consonance
with the principle of restraint and minimal necessary force. These types of
weapons are those that could disrupt communications, radar, computers, or
other communications or stop adversaries without killing or wounding them.
Such technology requires special consideration of the rules of war or humani-
tarian practices, unintended environmental or personnel effects, availability
and state of development, and postconflict activities or requirements.
2-102. Experimental electronic translation devices may be available through
research and development programs, such as those sponsored by the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development).
2-25
Chapter 3
Foreign Internal Defense
Foreign internal defense (FID) is a primary program used to support
friendly nations operating in or threatened with potential hostilities. FID
promotes regional stability by supporting a host-nation program of inter-
nal defense and development (IDAD). These national programs free and
protect a nation from lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency by empha-
sizing the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of
society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely to be
economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, those needs should
prescribe the principal focus of United States
(US) efforts. FID can
include training; material, technical, and organizational assistance;
advice; infrastructure development; and tactical operations. Military
assistance is often necessary to provide the secure environment for those
efforts to become effective (see JP 3-07.1). Army units and individuals can
be tasked to provide this military assistance.
FID is a program involving all ele-
Foreign internal defense is par-
ments of national power. Ideally,
ticipation by civilian and mili-
this program will incorporate all
tary agencies of a government
elements in a synergistic manner
in any of the action programs
that best supports both host-
taken by another government
nation requirements and US na-
to free and protect its society
tional policy and interests. The
from subversion, lawlessness,
US government must integrate
and insurgency.
the efforts of multiple government
JP 1-02
agencies. The combatant com-
manders with geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) must plan and
execute the military operations in support of FID within their regions.
Army forces will participate in FID as part of a joint task force, normally
to advise and assist host-nation forces conducting operations. FID is also
a specified and significant mission for selected Army special operations
forces (ARSOF). (See FM 3-05.)
CONTENTS
Categories of FID Operations
3-1
Host-Nation Security Force Operations . 3-5
Indirect Support
3-1
The Role of the Army in
Direct Support
3-2
Counterinsurgency
3-6
Combat Operations
3-3
Planning Considerations for FID
3-7
The Nature of Counterinsurgency
3-3
3-0
____________________________________________________________________ Foreign Internal Defense
CATEGORIES OF FID OPERATIONS
3-1. The military plays an important supporting role in the FID program.
However, military support has a far-reaching impact on all elements of
national power and cannot be conducted in isolation from other aspects of US
policy in the host nation (HN). In some cases, the role of the US military may
become more important because military officials have greater access to and
credibility with host-nation regimes that their own military heavily influ-
ences or dominates. Military FID programs are categorized into indirect sup-
port, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat opera-
tions. These categories represent significantly different levels of US diplo-
matic and military commitment and risk. However, various programs and
operations within these categories can occur simultaneously.
INDIRECT SUPPORT
3-2. Indirect support emphasizes the principle of host-nation self-sufficiency.
Indirect support builds strong national infrastructures through economic and
military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. The military contribu-
tion provides support primarily through security assistance, supplemented
by joint and multinational exercises and exchange programs:
•
Security assistance (SA) is a group of programs authorized by the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export
Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the
United States provides defense articles, military training, and other
defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in further-
ance of national policies and objectives (JP 1-02). It mainly aims to en-
hance regional stability of areas of the world facing external rather
than internal threats. (See Chapter 5 for a more on SA.)
•
Joint and multinational exercises strengthen US and host-nation rela-
tions and the interoperability of forces. They are joint- and service-
funded military exercises that demonstrate US support and commit-
ment and that can be used to complement other FID programs, such as
SA, civil-military operations (CMO), and civic assistance.
•
Military exchange programs foster mutual understanding between
forces, familiarizing each force with the organization, administration,
and operations of the other and enhancing cultural awareness. Ex-
change programs, coupled with international military education and
training programs are extremely valuable in improving HN and US
relations. They may also have long-term implications for strengthening
democratic ideals and respect for human rights among supported
governments. There are three types of exchange programs:
Reciprocal unit exchange program. This program is for squad- to
battalion-size elements. Each nation’s forces trains the other’s in
tactics, techniques, and procedures. US commanders can use this
program to sensitize their forces to the cultural and social aspects
of the HN while increasing the training and readiness of host-
nation forces. The proficiency of the units must be comparable to
preclude exchanging fully trained US forces for untrained host-
nation forces. To do so would be an extension of the SA training
program and subject to the rules and restrictions of SA.
3-1
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
Personnel exchange program. The personnel exchange program
(PEP) is a one- to three-year program in which one person from
the HN is exchanged with a US member. This program, like
reciprocal unit exchanges, requires that the exhanged personnel be
of comparable proficiency in their area of expertise.
Individual exchange program. This program resembles the PEP,
but it is a temporary assignment in theater. This program gives
commanders flexibility, since they will not lose personnel for
extended periods and can expose more soldiers to the program.
DIRECT SUPPORT
3-3. Direct support (not involving combat operations) involves US forces
providing direct assistance to the host-nation civilian populace or military. It
differs from SA in that it is joint- or service-funded, does not usually involve
the transfer of arms and equipment, and does not usually include training
local military forces. Normally, the US conducts direct support operations
when the HN has not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social
threats, economic or political instability, or military threats beyond its capa-
bility to handle. Assistance will normally focus on CMO (primarily providing
services to the local populace), communications, intelligence sharing, and
logistic support.
Civil-Military Operations
3-4. CMO are operations and activities that embrace the relationship
between military forces, civilian authorities, and the population
(see
definition and discussion of Civil-Military Operations in Chapter
2).
Commanders can use CMO to develop favorable emotions in friendly,
neutral, or hostile groups to facilitate military operations and to achieve and
consolidate US objectives. CMO may be used in a preventive manner to
address root causes of instability, or they may be used to support disaster
relief, civil defense, counterdrug, and antiterrorism.
(See Support to
Counterterrorism and Support to Counterdrug Operations in Chapter 6.)
CMO in FID normally include psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs
(CA), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), military civic action (MCA),
and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA). More specifically—
• PSYOP ensure clear communications of US intentions and goals and
take the offensive against deception initiated by adversaries. PSYOP
ensure that adversaries do not misrepresent US efforts and that US
forces themselves, through lack of information, do not cause the local
populace to misinterpret their actions. (See JP 3-53.)
• CA facilitates the integration of US military support into the overall
IDAD programs of the supported nation. (See JP 3-57 and FM 3-57.)
• FHA operations are conducted to alleviate the urgent nonmilitary
needs of the host-nation populace until the appropriate civilian agen-
cies are able to accept this responsibility. (See Chapter 6.)
• MCA is the use of predominantly indigenous military personnel to con-
duct construction projects, support missions, and services useful to the
local population. These activities may involve US supervision and
advice, but host-nation military forces will normally conduct them.
3-2
____________________________________________________________________ Foreign Internal Defense
MCA is an integral part of military support to FID to assist the local
government to develop capabilities to provide for the security and well
being of its own population. (See FM 3-57.)
• HCA activities assist the host-nation populace with US military opera-
tions. HCA programs improve the readiness of US forces deployed in
theater while residually benefiting the local populace. (See Chapter 5.)
Intelligence and Communications Sharing
3-5.
US intelligence sharing ranges from strategic analysis to current intelli-
gence summaries and situation reporting for tactical operations. An adequate
intelligence collection and dissemination capability is often one of the weak-
est links in a host-nation military capability. US military communications
hardware and operators may also be supplied when host-nation infrastruc-
ture cannot support intelligence operations.
Logistics Support
3-6.
US military capabilities may be used to provide transportation or main-
tenance support to the host-nation military in operations that do not expose
US personnel to hostile fire. The Foreign Assistance Act does not generally
authorize transferring equipment and supplies. (See Appendix B.) Logistic
support must be provided with consideration to the long-term effect on the
capability of the host-nation or local governments to become self-sufficient.
COMBAT OPERATIONS
3-7.
Introducing US combat forces into FID operations is a presidential deci-
sion. It serves only as a temporary solution until host-nation forces can stabi-
lize the situation and provide security for the populace. US military forces in
tactical operations primarily support, advise, and assist host-nation forces
through logistics, intelligence, or other combat support and service support
means. If US forces are committed to a combat role in FID, they will conduct
offensive and defensive operations to support a host-nation fight against
insurgents or terrorists.
There is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by
guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat,
by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the
enemy instead of engaging him…It prays on unrest…Our forces, therefore, must
fulfil a broader role, as a complement to our diplomacy, as an army of our diplo-
macy, as a deterrent to our adversaries, and as a symbol to our allies of our deter-
mination to support them.
John F. Kennedy
THE NATURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
3-8.
An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a
constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict
(JP 1-02). A counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, political, eco-
nomic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insur-
gency (JP 1-02). Post-FID activities focus on helping a HN prevent an active
3-3
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
insurgency. If an insurgency already exists or a preventive measure fails,
then FID focuses on eliminating, marginalizing, or reassimilating the insur-
gent element into society. (See Appendix D.)
3-9.
Internal defense and development is the full range of measures taken by
a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion,
lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions
(political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society
(JP 1-02). The counterinsurgency effort is the part of the IDAD strategy that
addresses the insurgency threat. (See JP 3-07.1.)
3-10.
Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the
greater popular support. The winner will be the party that better forms the
issues, mobilizes groups and forces around them, and develops programs that
solve problems of relative deprivation. This requires political, social, and eco-
nomic development. Security operations by military and police forces, com-
bined with effective and legitimate administration of justice, provide the
necessary secure environment in which development can occur.
3-11.
Neutralization in counterinsurgency is a political concept, not a euphe-
mism for killing. The intent is to render elements of the insurgent organiza-
tion ineffective. The first means of neutralization is political action that
discredits the insurgency, its programs, and its leaders. This includes
positive government programs to relieve relative deprivation and public
information to counter insurgent propaganda. Arrests, trials, and convictions
perceived as legitimate by the public neutralize the insurgent infrastructure.
So do amnesty programs that rally insurgents to the government. An
effective police, militia, and military capability neutralizes insurgent combat
potential. An insurgent combat force is effectively neutralized if forced to
remain inactive in remote jungles, mountains, or other difficult, sparsely
inhabited areas. Security forces have no compelling reason to pursue
insurgents into such areas. They can deal with them after the government
controls the populated areas and then expand to the more remote regions.
3-12.
The nature of the insurgency dictates the methods by which the mili-
tary must oppose it. Military operations designed for war must be modified
for counterinsurgency. Conventional tactics that ignore the nature of the
threat will exhaust government forces and provoke the people because of
harm to their lives and property. What the insurgents lose to government
violence, they make up in new recruits. These recruits are disaffected by
government excesses or incompetence and angered by government harm to
the people. Defense against insurgency is as political as the insurgency itself.
For a government conducting a counterinsurgency, military operations are
strategically defensive, although they include offensive action at operational
and tactical levels. Military operations must complement and reinforce
political, social, and economic reform.
3-13. The following vignette details a tactic that the Viet Minh guerillas
employed against the French in Vietnam in the 1950s. France deployed its
forces in small, defensive strong points, trying to protect valuable facilities
and friendly populations. The guerillas attacked and destroyed them one at a
time. They frequently ambushed French relief columns. The French attemp-
ted to break this pattern of slow attrition by establishing a garrison at Dien
3-4
____________________________________________________________________ Foreign Internal Defense
Bien Phu. The guerillas attacked and overwhelmed the French garrison in
1954, which led the French to abandon Vietnam.
The Dilemma of Concentrating Everywhere
Imagine yourself the commander of a locally recruited government rifle company
charged with defending a small geographic area. Within it are 10 things that must
be protected. These might be important political leaders, cultural sites, manu-
facturing plants, communications facilities, or anything else of political, social, or
economic value.
Your rifle company consists of three platoons. Each platoon has three squads of
nine soldiers each. Thus, you can assign a squad to defend 9 of the 10 things to
be protected but not to all of them. Another possibility is that you can take one
soldier from each squad and form a tenth squad, providing protection for each
thing of value, or you could assign a half squad to all 10 and keep four squads in
reserve.
The insurgents have one platoon, also locally recruited. It, too, has three squads
of nine soldiers each. The defender has a 3-to-1 numerical advantage. However,
the insurgents, using guerrilla tactics and attacking only when they have local
superiority, attack your defended areas one at a time, using their whole platoon
against each of your squads. In such circumstances, the insurgents have a 3-to-1
or better offense advantage. If the defenders have kept a reserve, the guerrillas
attack and withdraw before it can react. If terrain is favorable, the insurgents lay
an ambush for the reaction force, using the advantage of defense in prepared
positions.
If the government force takes the offensive and pursues the guerrillas, the guer-
rillas refuse to give battle. They simply move out of the government’s way until
the force completes its sweep. In the process, they may also attack one or more
of the defended areas while the government forces are occupied in a futile offen-
sive operation.
HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS
3-14. The security forces in counterinsurgency consist of the civil police, the
paramilitary (also called the militia), and the military. The elements of the
security force work in concert to—
• Protect or isolate the population from the insurgents.
• Neutralize or defeat the guerrilla forces.
3-15. The first line of defense for the government is its police forces, which
may be organized either nationally or locally. In either case, their actions
must be well coordinated into the total IDAD program. The first objective of
the police is to destroy the illegal infrastructure of the insurgent organiza-
tion. Police intelligence must identify and locate leaders, penetration agents,
intelligence and PSYOP agents, terrorists, and recruiters. The police arrest
them using the minimum violence necessary. These arrests should be based
on probable cause and executed on the warrant of a disinterested magistrate.
To maintain government legitimacy, the police must follow due process of
law. Corruption and abuse of human rights by security forces and the
3-5
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
judiciary can contribute significantly to societal turmoil. The legislature
should enact emergency powers when required. These powers must provide
for a regular process that the people know well and protect the rights of the
innocent. Emergency powers should apply only in threatened combat zones
and be rescinded as soon as the situation permits.
3-16.
Militia forces are organized to provide for popular self-defense. Militia
forces serve in their home areas. They may be either full- or part-time forces,
depending on the situation. They combine light infantry capabilities with
police techniques. These forces aid the police in law enforcement, to include
searching the insurgent infrastructure. They also provide a local defense
against attack by insurgent combat forces. Together with the police, they pro-
tect or separate the insurgents from the people, preventing the insurgents
from mobilizing forces and resources.
3-17.
The regular armed forces are the shield behind which political, social,
and economic development occurs. Their primary mission is to protect the
government, police, militia, and development organizations from insurgent
guerrilla forces. Emphasis on the defensive nature of counterinsurgency helps
prevent government harm of the people. Collateral damage destroys govern-
ment legitimacy. The insurgents’ best recruiting program is indiscriminate
killing and damage by government forces. Keeping violence to the absolute
minimum is important to the government.
3-18.
Counterinsurgency is difficult, frustrating, and dangerous. Occasionally
government forces may behave incorrectly out of anger, from frustration, or for
some other reason. When members of the security forces engage in criminal
acts of any kind, punishment must be fair, quick, certain, and public. No
perception of special treatment for security forces must be permitted. Secur-
ity forces must not be permitted to harm the people with impunity.
3-19.
A major function of the security forces is intelligence. All operations
should be based on solid intelligence. It identifies insurgent personnel, activi-
ties, and organizations, enabling the government to neutralize offenders
without harming the innocent. Infantry forces must expand on the intelli-
gence provided by technical units to achieve contact with the enemy. Gener-
ally, government forces should only conduct offensive operations based on
good intelligence.
3-20.
The capabilities of the security forces are also employed in the develop-
ment side of the IDAD strategy. The armed forces are a valuable national
resource for development. The military capabilities of leadership, organiza-
tion, technical skills, discipline, equipment, mobility, and communications
can all be employed in the development effort. Their use is limited only by
the imagination of government planners and law. Armies and other security
forces can more capably work under hazardous and austere circumstances
than civilian organizations.
THE ROLE OF THE ARMY IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
3-21. The role of the Army in counterinsurgency centers on administering
and executing SA programs. Each geographical commander of a combatant
command advises the Department of State in developing SA packages appro-
priate for the situation. Each combatant command provides military supplies
3-6
____________________________________________________________________ Foreign Internal Defense
and services under the program as well as military advice, tactical and tech-
nical training, and intelligence and logistic support. (See Chapter 5.) Army
forces help the host government police, paramilitary, and military forces per-
form counterinsurgency, area security, or local security operations. They
advise and assist in finding, dispersing, capturing, and destroying the insur-
gent force. Army forces emphasize the training of national, state, and local
forces to perform essential defense functions. They aim to provide a secure
environment in which developmental programs can take effect while
respecting the rights and dignity of the people.
3-22.
US policymakers determine the scope of military participation based on
US interests and the desires of the HN. The US military aims to improve the
effectiveness of the supported security forces and to help stop external sup-
port to the insurgents.
3-23.
Generally, US forces do not engage in combat. The threat to American
interests does not support that degree of involvement, even if it were effec-
tive. An American combat role tends to undermine the legitimacy of the host
government and risks converting the conflict into an American war. However,
on the rare occasion when the threat to US interests is great and indirect
means have proven insufficient, US combat operations may be required.
Direct use of US combat forces in counterinsurgency remains a policy option
for the president, and Army forces must provide it when required.
3-24.
Host-nation forces should conduct security and stabilization programs
when necessary, employing, for example, populace and resource control. The
HN should provide representatives to assist US forces in their contacts with
local populations.
3-25.
US forces may conduct strike operations to disrupt and destroy insur-
gent combat formations. These operations prevent the insurgents from
attacking government-controlled areas. They also disrupt insurgent efforts to
consolidate and expand areas already under their control. US combat forces
may conduct security and defensive operations in support of host-nation
consolidation operations or to assist the HN to expand its mobilization base.
Success in consolidation operations enables the HN to resume the military
aspects of its counterinsurgency campaign and allows US combat forces to
withdraw.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR FID
3-26.
Planners must consider the long-term or strategic effects of all US
assistance efforts before implementing FID programs. This long-term con-
sideration is especially important in building host-nation development and
defense self-sufficiency. Both may require large investments of time and
materiel.
3-27. Planners must tailor military support of FID programs to the environ-
ment and to the specific needs of the supported HN. They must consider the
threat as well as local religious, social, economic, and political factors when
developing the military plans to support FID. Overcoming the tendency to
use a US frame of reference is important. This potentially damaging
3-7
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
tendency can result in unsuitable equipment, training, and infrastructure for
the nation receiving US assistance.
3-28.
Planners must understand that a basic premise of the FID program is
that the ultimate responsibility for IDAD rests with the HN. US planners
must measure all FID plans against this precept.
3-29.
The legal restrictions governing military activities in support of FID
are complex and subject to changing US legislation. (See Appendix B.) The
staff legal advisor has an active role in the FID planning process. The basic
funding authorizations for military activities in support of FID come through
the Foreign Assistance Act, Arms Export Control Act, or Department of De-
fense operations and maintenance funding sources. Appendix A of JP 3-07.1
details the legal aspects of FID and provides rulings on several FID programs
that may assist commanders in establishing a legal yardstick for FID plans.
3-30. US combat operations judiciously select and employ forces. Such selec-
tion and employment ensures that the host-nation military rapidly accepts
the responsibility for the security of the nation and ensures minimal civilian
casualties. Specific rules of engagement will likely be more restrictive in FID
than in offensive and defensive operations. However, the existence of such
restrictive rules of engagement does not preclude the US from employing
that level of force which the president determines necessary to stabilize a
friendly host government or to protect the lives of deployed US personnel.
3-8
Chapter 4
Peace Operations
Properly constituted, peace operations can be a useful tool to advance
American national interests and pursue our national security objec-
tives.
PDD 25
With the Cold War’s end, the threat of global war has become distant.
New opportunities have emerged to promote peace, prosperity, and en-
hanced cooperation among nations. The Cold War’s end has also brought
increasing regional instability. Although the causes are much debated,
many world situations continue to be complex, dynamic, and dangerous.
Uncertainty exists in how the security environment will evolve. Chal-
lenges to global and regional stability fall into the following categories:
cross-border aggression, internal conflict, transnational threats, develop-
ment and proliferation of dangerous military technologies, and humani-
tarian disasters. These challenges have compelled the international com-
munity to increasingly call on military forces to prevent or end conflicts.
Operations such as those occurring in Somalia (1992-1993) and Bosnia
(1992-1995) made obvious the need for clear guidance in United States
CONTENTS
Forms of Peace Operations
4-2
Civil-Military Operations
4-17
Peacekeeping
4-3
Legitimacy
4-19
Observation Missions
4-3
Perseverance
4-19
Supervision and Assistance
4-4
Command and Control
4-19
Peace Enforcement Operations
4-6
Command Relationships
4-20
Peace Enforcement Overview
4-6
Coordination
4-20
Peace Enforcement Subordinate
Intelligence
4-21
Operations
4-7
Principles of Intelligence and
Operations in Support of Diplomatic
Electronic Warfare Support
4-21
Efforts
4-11
Intelligence Functions
4-22
Support to Preventive Diplomacy
4-11
Information Operations
4-24
Support to Peacemaking
4-11
Nature of Information Operations
4-24
Support to Peace Building
4-11
Fundamentals of Information
Concept of Employment
4-12
Operations in Peace Operations
4-24
Fundamentals of Peace Operations
4-13
Civil Law and Order
4-26
Consent
4-14
Police
4-26
Impartiality
4-15
Judiciary
4-26
Transparency
4-15
Penal
4-27
Restraint
4-16
War Crimes and Criminals
4-27
Credibility
4-17
Logistics
4-27
Freedom of Movement
4-17
Force Protection
4-28
Flexibility
4-17
4-1
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
(US) participation for peace operations (PO). In response, the president
issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25. Joint doctrine for PO is
in JP 3-07.3.
As in all operations, the military remains subordinate to civilian
authority. Whether the mission is to conduct peacekeeping operations
(PKO), conduct peace enforcement operations (PEO), or support diplo-
matic efforts, PO are a continuation of the political process. Synchronizing
all instruments of national power leads to successful PO. This is best done
through strong interagency leadership and an integrated political-
military (Pol-Mil) plan. In May 1997, the president signed PDD 56. This
policy requires US government agencies to institutionalize the lessons
learned from recent experiences and outlines a process that establishes
procedures for an interagency body to produce an integrated plan to pro-
vide strategic clarity.
FORMS OF PEACE OPERATIONS
4-1.
PO are multiagency operations involving diplomatic and humanitarian
agencies with military support. They may be conducted to prevent or control
a conflict, in support of a peace settlement, or in response to a complex
emergency.
4-2.
Peace operations will be
The broad term peace opera-
conducted on the basis of appro-
tions encompasses peacekeeping
priate legal authority, the pre-
operations and peace enforce-
cise nature of which will often
ment operations conducted in
depend on the circumstances.
support of diplomatic efforts to
For example, the United
establish and maintain peace.
Nations (UN) Security Council
JP 3-07
or some other competent body
may issue a formal mandate for the operation. The mandate establishes both
the political and military objectives as well as its scope of authority. In some
cases, guidance is detailed; in others it may be vague. The end state is a
peaceful settlement among all parties. The military commander through the
military decision making process determines appropriate military objectives
and end states.
4-3. The Army will participate in PO, either as part of a UN, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), multinational force, or unilaterally. However,
unilateral employment is the least prevalent option. The US usually prefers
the enhanced legitimacy of a multinational force. Additionally, Army forces
will operate with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and other agencies participating in the peace process. The success of
the overall peace operation depends in part on the degree of cooperation
among these various actors. In PO, there is neither an enemy nor a military
victory. The forms of PO are peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement
operations, and operations in support of diplomatic efforts. (NATO refers to
PKO and PEO as “peace support operations.”)
4-2
__________________________________________________________________________Peace Operations
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
4-4.
Peacekeeping consists of military operations undertaken with the
consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate
implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement)
and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement (JP 3-
07). Before PKO begin, a credible truce or cease-fire is in effect, and the
parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. Peacekeeping takes
place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties to a
dispute, the sponsoring organization, and the potential troop-contributing
nations.
4-5.
The UN Charter makes no specific mention of PKO. These operations
have evolved as a pragmatic response to various conflicts with which the UN
has dealt. Peacekeeping seeks to settle disputes through the medium of
peaceful third-party initiatives. It has often proven valuable in peace accords
and agreements following interstate conflict. PKO have usually been con-
ducted in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
4-6.
The peacekeeping force must use all techniques available, short of coer-
cive force, to gain and maintain the initiative. Using force in a peacekeeping
mission is generally limited to self-defense. The force maintains and pro-
motes consent so the political process can continue to guide the parties to a
lasting settlement. A loss of consent by the parties usually necessitates the
withdrawal of the peacekeeping force or a change in its mission to one of
peace enforcement.
OBSERVATION MISSIONS
4-7. United Nations observation missions are performed primarily by
unarmed military observers
(MILOBs) but may also be performed by
peacekeeping (PK) forces. In either case, observer forces help ensure that the
parties to the dispute follow the agreements. UN observer groups may also
use civilian personnel or police as observers. Regional organizations, such as
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, also conduct obser-
vation missions. The multinational force and observers and Military Observa-
tion Mission Ecuador-Peru are examples of ad hoc observation missions. The
success of these missions depends on the willingness of the disputing parties
to cooperate with the terms of the accord or agreement. This willingness may
exist because MILOBs have established a visible presence and are able to
detect agreement violations. They have four tasks:
• Observing, monitoring, verifying, and reporting any alleged vio-
lation of the governing agreements. Agreements may include
treaties, truces, cease-fires, arms control agreements, or any other
binding agreements between the disputing parties. The primary means
for observing and monitoring include observation posts (OPs), mounted
and dismounted patrols, and aerial reconnaissance. OPs should provide
prolonged and unobstructed observation of people or areas as specified
by the mission. OPs can be temporary, occupied periodically for a
matter of hours or days, or more permanent. Permanent OPs may
require extensive engineer support for force protection, sustainment,
and use as a support base from which to mount patrols. Patrols are
used to confirm or supervise a cease-fire by establishing a presence to
4-3
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
grant legitimacy to both the PK force and the cease-fire accords or
agreement. Patrols also provide surveillance within a buffer zone (BZ)
to report violations of the agreement. Violations may include incidents
such as offensive combat operations, unauthorized troop movements,
reinforced defensive positions, or even provocative radio broadcasts.
Aerial reconnaissance conducted by rotary-winged aircraft permits the
commander to quickly survey a large area. On-board cameras can pro-
vide near-real time feedback to the commander. Terms of reference
(TOR) may restrict the types of weapon systems available to the PK
force. Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of
disputing forces in the operational area is critical to PKO. This will
require periodic visits to forward positions to observe and report on the
disposition of forces of the disputing parties.
•
Investigating alleged cease-fire violations, boundary incidents,
and complaints. The observer force investigates alleged infractions to
gain evidence regarding agreement violations. It may become involved
in negotiation or mediation, to include direct dialogue, between the
disputing parties. The two parties should conduct negotiation or media-
tion on neutral territory. The unit commander, if at all possible,
remains separate from the process to serve as the “honest broker” and
to maintain a sense of impartiality. The commander is provided or
selects a mediator whom all parties perceive as fair and impartial.
Some NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), can provide mediation services. Reconciling differences at the
lowest possible level often contributes to the overall success of PKO.
•
Conducting regular liaison visits within the operational area.
Disputes thrive on rumors, uncertainty, and prejudice. Therefore, liai-
son visits maintain personal contact. They permit a timely and routine
exchange of information with disputing parties, the host nation, local
civilian officials, international agencies, PK force headquarters, and
other national contingents.
•
Verifying the storage or destruction of certain categories of mili-
tary equipment specified in the relevant agreements. If the terms
of the relevant agreement require belligerents to establish weapon
storage sites for certain categories of weapons, the PK forces must
periodically inspect these sites to ensure compliance. The inspection
team will inventory supplies, weapons, and equipment at each site and
report discrepancies. PK forces must plan for uncooperative local
officials, demonstrations, and other forms of civil disturbance. As
observer and inspection teams are unarmed, the team will withdraw if
unable to negotiate entrance to the site.
SUPERVISION AND ASSISTANCE
4-8. Lightly armed forces normally perform supervision and assistance mis-
sions. The force undertaking these tasks requires large service support
organizations, equipment, and finances. In addition to those tasks being per-
formed by MILOBs in observation missions, PK forces may perform other
tasks when they are within the scope of the military mission, support the
desired end state, and are authorized by appropriate authority. These tasks
include—
4-4
__________________________________________________________________________Peace Operations
•
Supervising cease-fires. Once a cease-fire is arranged, forces may ob-
serve and report on the disputing parties’ compliance with a cease-fire.
The force may have to deploy on the territory of more than one nation
to perform its mission. The tempo and outcome of diplomatic activities
taken to establish a credible cease-fire are often unpredictable, and
negotiations to constitute and insert a force may occur simultaneously.
Therefore, the PK force may need to deploy rapidly. As heavy
weapons—such as tanks, fighting vehicles, and artillery—may be
inappropriate or prohibited, units may require additional vehicles and
helicopters to provide tactical mobility.
•
Supervising disengagements and withdrawals. As diplomatic
activity continues, agreement to establish a BZ may require PK forces
to supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of hostile forces. The
PK force positions itself between the disputing parties to prevent a
breakdown of the cease-fire and help ensure an uneventful disengage-
ment and withdrawal. Timely deployment and implementation of well-
conceived and detailed plans that are understood by all parties greatly
reduces the inherent risks associated with interpositioning. The PK
force personnel may mediate disagreements in the positioning of the
disputed parties’ forces, verify troop and equipment dispositions, and, if
authorized, provide assistance to the civilian population in the BZ.
•
Supervising prisoner of war exchanges. At any stage in resolving a
dispute, PK forces may be asked to supervise and assist in prisoner of
war exchanges between the parties. TOR, status-of-forces agreements
(SOFAs), rules of engagement (ROE), or the mandate of the force may
provide guidance on missions that PK forces are authorized to conduct.
PK units will be required to monitor the exchange site and may be
asked to provide logistic support, such as transportation for prisoners
of war and medical treatment and evacuation. The designated media-
tor, such as the ICRC or UN, will execute the actual exchange.
•
Assisting civil authorities. PK forces may assist civil authorities in
functions such as observing procedures at polling sites, transferring
authority, partitioning territory, evacuating, escorting convoys, or tem-
porarily administering civil functions. The civil-military operations
(CMO) staff officer, coordinating with the civil-military operations cen-
ter (CMOC), provides advice and assistance to execute these functions.
•
Providing military support to elections. PK forces may be asked to
support elections. Military forces may be required to assist civil
authorities in providing a secure environment so elections can proceed.
Such assistance may be as simple as providing administrative support
and security of polling stations to creating an environment conducive
for displaced persons to return to their rightful voting place. The mili-
tary’s primary responsibility is to prevent a disrupted election process.
The integrity of the elections themselves is the responsibility of the
election commissions. Many tasks—such as freedom of movement,
security patrols, OPs, and medical support—are ancillary to ongoing
PKO. Commanders must incorporate the appropriate agenciesInter-
national Police Training Force, UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees, mayors, local police, former warring factionsemphasizing
each agency’s responsibilities for maintaining law and order during the
4-5
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
election. Commanders can offer the use of psychological operations
(PSYOP) assets (audio, visual, and audiovisual) to more effectively
disseminate information regarding the elections (such as registration
procedures, polling places, security measures, and election results).
• Assisting in the maintenance of public order. PK forces may assist
in reestablishing or maintaining public order. The responsibility for
public order rests with the civil police. However, military assistance
may be required if a breakdown has occurred in the civil police struc-
ture or if situations are beyond the civil police capacity to control.
• Assisting in foreign humanitarian assistance operations.
Although foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) is not a peace opera-
tion, it may be necessary for PK forces to provide security and logistic
support for relief operations within a complex contingency. It may also
be necessary for PK forces to provide transportation and security for
NGOs and other agencies. Civil affairs (CA) personnel provide to the
commander a resource for the planning and conduct of FHA. See
Chapter 6 for discussion of FHA.
PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
4-9.
Peace enforcement (PE) is the application of military force, or the threat
of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel com-
pliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace
and order (JP 3-07). PE operations are by definition coercive in nature and
rely on the threat or use of force. However, the impartiality with which the
peace force treats all parties and the nature of its objectives separates PE
from war. Should it be necessary to conduct operations in support of one par-
ticular party against another, then the PE would deteriorate into war. If this
situation develops, then the authorizing authority must reassess the opera-
tion. The purpose of peace enforcement is not to destroy or defeat an enemy,
but to use force or threat of force to establish a safe and secure environment so
that peace building can succeed.
4-10.
The term peace enforcement is not specifically mentioned in the UN
Charter; however, the charter’s language allows the Security Council to auth-
orize military operations. Specifically, Chapter VII empowers the council to
take such actions “as may be necessary to restore or maintain international
peace and security” (Article 42 of the UN Charter). It is accepted that the UN
is not now in a position to adequately conduct peace enforcement operations
on its own, but rather only peacekeeping operations. Peace enforcement oper-
ations are often conducted by regional organizations or a coalition of states.
PEACE ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW
4-11. Since PE may include offensive and defensive operations, missions
must be clear and end states defined. Transition to combat action requires
successfully applying warfighting skills. In a theater of operations, offensive,
defensive, stability, and support operations will occur simultaneously. Forces
conducting PE may be involved in forcibly separating belligerent parties in
one location and assisting with refugees just a few kilometers away.
4-6
__________________________________________________________________________Peace Operations
4-12.
The forces employed for such operations will be armed and equipped
based on commanders’ visualizations and the factors of METT-TC—mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available,
civil considerations. Combat arms units, with combat support and combat
service support units are most often employed in this role. Special operations
forces, especially CA and PSYOP assets, directly assist in developing consen-
sus and sustaining legitimacy that contributes to peace and security.
4-13.
PE operations are normally conducted in several phases. The first
phase involves inserting rapidly deployable combat forces to establish a signi-
ficant and visible military presence. Subsequent phases involve stabilizing
the area and transitioning from a military presence to support for the
development of a competent civil authority. Any number of subordinate
operations may be conducted simultaneously or sequentially.
PEACE ENFORCEMENT SUBORDINATE OPERATIONS
Forcible Separation of Belligerents
4-14.
This operation poses the
PE Subordinate Operations
highest risk of any PEO. Forci-
ble separation may involve re-
• Forcible separation of belligerents
ducing the combat capability of
• Establishment and supervision of
one or more of the belligerent
protected areas
parties by disarming and de-
• Sanction and exclusion zone
mobilizing them. The PE force
enforcement
normally retains the right of
• Movement denial and guarantee
first use of force. Forces conduc-
• Restoration and maintenance of order
ting forcible separation require
• Protection of humanitarian assistance
extensive offensive combat
FM 3-0
capability, as well as combat
support and combat service support. The goal is to force the belligerent
parties to disengage, withdraw, and subsequently establish a BZ or demili-
tarized zone (DMZ). Security operations—such as screening, combat and
reconnaissance patrolling, performing cordon and search, and establishing
checkpoints and roadblocks to control movement into and within the BZ or
DMZ—may be conducted to maintain the separation of belligerent parties.
4-15. Separate Belligerents. PE force commanders must negotiate with
commanders of both sides, at the tactical level, to achieve and verify agree-
ment on withdrawal procedures. Belligerents should be required to withdraw
to positions that allow no observation and direct fires into the area. The com-
mander must understand the strength of the belligerent forces both in the
proposed area of separation (AOS) and those forces outside the area with the
capability to reinforce. The PE force must be prepared to conduct combat
operations, to seize key terrain and otherwise force the withdrawal of reluc-
tant belligerents, and to secure the AOS. The PE force should pre-position
itself quickly to fill the void created by the retreating belligerents. If possible,
the PE force should place liaison officers, with appropriate transportation
and communications, with the headquarters of the opposing sides. Once the
area of separation is established, PE forces secure the area with a highly
visible presence by patrols, checkpoints, and OPs. PE forces must be
4-7
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
prepared to conduct defensive combat operations to repel attack and offensive
combat operations to restore the area of separation. The AOS is three-
dimensional and may require air defense weapons and detection systems to
control no-fly zones.
4-16.
Disarm Belligerents. The mandate may require the PE force to dis-
arm or demobilize the belligerent parties. These tasks are complex, difficult,
and often dangerous. The PE force demonstrates a clear resolve and intent to
disarm or demobilize designated belligerent parties according to the agree-
ment. If these actions are taken prematurely without adequately preparing
and involving the parties, the situation may destabilize, leading to a reemer-
gence of violence. If the PE force has responsibility to store, secure, and
account for collected weapons, it must establish a storage area large enough
for inspecting, storing, and if directed, destroying weapons and materiel.
Space must be allocated to support a security force and support administra-
tive requirements, such as accounting for materiel stored, collected, trans-
ferred, or destroyed. The PE force must maintain logs accounting for person-
nel or units surrendering materiel. Security and accountability is critical.
4-17.
Disarming may include seizing ammunition, collecting and destroying
weapons and supplies, closing weapons and ammunition factories, and pre-
venting resupply. Humanitarian demining operations (HDO) are a part of the
disarmament program. Because of the threat to peace and safety posed by
landmines, HDO have become a significant PO activity. Many countries
already have pre-existing mine clearance activities conducted by the UN or
NGOs. In many demining missions, military ordnance specialists from the
US or other countries partner with civilian organizations such as the United
Nations Mine Action Service. Demining is ultimately a host-nation responsi-
bility. Army participation in HDO focuses on mine awareness education and,
most importantly, training of host-nation personnel in the surveying,
marking, and clearing of mines. Army personnel do not remove mines; how-
ever, they assist and train others in demining techniques and procedures.
Specialists, such as explosive ordinance disposal personnel, may be called on
to destroy unexploded explosive ordnance, such as munitions shells, fuses,
grenades, and rockets. Special forces, CA, and PSYOP personnel are cur-
rently the primary means to execute the geographic combatant commanders’
HDO programs. Explosive ordnance disposal and engineer personnel are also
included in these programs and integrated into operational training missions.
4-18. Demobilization. Demobilization is the process of transitioning a con-
flict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy
into a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and eco-
nomic vitality. Following demobilization, Army forces may support integra-
ting military and paramilitary forces into society by providing training, ad-
vice, and assistance for the new defense or security force, and through infor-
mation operations. Army forces have a role in demobilization that may
include—
• Providing intelligence support and overall security during the demobi-
lization process.
• Providing incentives and disincentives for the forming, arming, and
training of the new defense force.
• Supporting with information operations.
4-8
__________________________________________________________________________Peace Operations
• Supporting these actions through the joint commissions.
• Providing liaison coordination teams to local commanders as a
confidence-building measure during the disarmament and demobiliza-
tion.
Establishment and Supervision of Protected Areas
4-19.
The requirement to establish and supervise a protected or safe area can
arise when any community is at risk from persistent attack. Unless those in
the safe area are disarmed, it may be used as a base from which to conduct
raids and attacks. Commanders must be clear on what is expected of the force
tasked to establish and maintain a protected or safe area. Inevitably, com-
manders will need to counter accusations from those within and beyond the
protected area that the operation is designed to assist the other side. The
nature of the threat will determine the force profile required to secure the
protected area.
4-20.
Protected areas may contain residents, refugees, displaced persons, and
substantial numbers of forces of one or more of the belligerent forces. Army
forces may be charged to establish and supervise such areas, as well as to
provide support and assistance to other organizations in the protected area.
The first requirement to making the area safe is to demilitarize the area.
Once accomplished, additional tasks may include—
• Establishing, monitoring, and enforcing weapon exclusion zones.
• Establishing and maintaining cantonment areas and weapon-holding
areas and sites.
• Conducting patrols and searches.
• Manning checkpoints and other control measures.
• Planning for reinforcement and extraction.
Sanction and Exclusion Zone Enforcement
4-21.
Enforcement of sanctions includes a broad range of possible missions.
Commanders must understand that actions to enforce sanctions, while en-
dorsed by the UN Security Council, have traditionally been considered acts of
war and should posture their forces accordingly.
4-22.
Restricting the flow of goods across international borders is accom-
plished by using OPs, dismounted and vehicular patrols, and aerial surveil-
lance integrated with checkpoints. Unauthorized or contraband supplies and
equipment are confiscated or destroyed. Units must be prepared to stop
individuals involved in illegal activity and turn them over to the civil
authority.
Movement Denial and Guarantee
4-23.
While similar to the PK mission of observing forces, in PE forces may
be authorized to use force to prevent unauthorized movement of military
forces versus merely to observe and report such activity. PE forces must have
sufficient firepower to compel the belligerent forces to honor the agreement.
4-24. PE forces guarantee transit rights of noncombatants, NGOs, or other
designated groups through their controlling presence and deterrence. PE
4-9
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
forces may have to physically occupy certain terrain and structures, such as
road intersections and bridges, to protect unobstructed freedom of movement.
PE forces must have sufficient strength to deal with a wide range of chal-
lenges, from civil disturbances to attacks by belligerent forces.
Restoration and Maintenance of Order
4-25.
Operations to restore order are conducted to halt violence and to sup-
port, reinstate, or establish civil authorities. In a failed state situation, inter-
national law may require the commander to establish law and order in his
geographic area of operations and to provide a minimum standard of humane
care and treatment for all civilians. These operations are designed to restore
stability to the point where indigenous police forces can effectively enforce
the law and reinstate civil authority. PE forces may be required to conduct
combat operations, confiscate weapons, and suppress or detain threatening
elements. They may provide security and assist in training a new police force
before transferring the responsibility for long-term security to the UN.
4-26.
When assisting in establishing law and order, PE forces may support
local or international police forces or—in the absence of any civil authority—
execute alone. PE forces may be given the authority to detain persons sus-
pected of criminal or unlawful actions. Detainees may possess weapons or
other forms of contraband. TOR, SOFA, and ROE define those activities that
PE forces are obligated to prevent. Interpreters and military police officers
should be used when possible. Detainees should be quickly processed on-site
and evacuated to a holding area. Procedures for search, interrogation, segre-
gation, and security are strictly enforced. PE forces are responsible for the
humane treatment and facilities accorded the detainees.
4-27.
PE forces may be required to search a particular site or a general area
(rural and urban) to apprehend personnel, confiscate contraband, interdict
smuggling operations, or to sustain a secure environment. Operations may be
as simple as using checkpoints to search personnel and vehicles or as complex
as a cordon and search operation. PE forces may have to temporarily restrict
civilian freedom of movement, using curfews or restricted routes and areas.
Searches, apprehensions, and seizures must be legal and in strict compliance
with the mandate or agreement.
Protection of Humanitarian Assistance
4-28. PE forces may be tasked to provide protection for humanitarian assis-
tance. This mission might include protection for NGOs, US government agen-
cies, and other military personnel who provide humanitarian assistance.
Such protection may include securing base areas, such as air and sea ports,
protecting routes or corridors for transporting relief supplies, escorting
convoys, and providing security for distribution sites. If belligerent parties
oppose the delivery of relief supplies by NGOs or other agencies, then PE
forces may deliver the supplies by providing airlift or other forms of logistic
support to FHA operations.
4-10
__________________________________________________________________________Peace Operations
OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
4-29.
Military support of diplomatic efforts improves the chances for success
in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demon-
strating resolve to achieve viable political settlements. In addition to or as an
integral part of PO, Army forces may conduct operations in support of diplo-
matic efforts to establish order before, during, and after conflict. While these
activities are primarily the responsibility of civilian agencies, the military
can support these efforts within its capabilities. Army forces may support
diplomatic initiatives such as preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and
peace building.
SUPPORT TO PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY
4-30.
Preventive diplomacy consists of diplomatic actions taken in advance of
a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence (JP 3-07). Army support to
preventive diplomacy may include shows of force (see Chapter 5) such as pre-
ventive deployments or increasing levels of readiness. A preventive deploy-
ment is the deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or
zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties Forces may be
employed in such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peacekeeping
force in terms of equipment, force posture, and activities (JP 1-02). The objec-
tive is to demonstrate commitment to a peaceful resolution while underlining
willingness to use a ready and capable military force if necessary. When con-
fronted with the military resolve of the international community, the com-
peting factions or governments will reluctantly engage in violent conflict.
Should deterrence fail, the preventive deployment force must be robust
enough to defend itself while a decision is made either to withdraw or
reinforce.
SUPPORT TO PEACEMAKING
4-31.
Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or
other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and
resolves the issues that led to it (JP 3-07). Diplomatic efforts are essential to
create the conditions for a signed agreement. Military leaders should be
involved in negotiating the military aspects of a peace agreement. This often
includes face-to-face meetings with the military leaders of the warring fac-
tions. Army support to peacemaking includes military-to-military relations,
security assistance (see Chapter 5), peacetime deployments, or other activi-
ties that influence the disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement.
SUPPORT TO PEACE BUILDING
4-32.
Peace building consists of post-conflict actions, predominantly diplo-
matic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastruc-
ture and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (JP 3-07). It
provides the reconstruction and social rehabilitation that offers hope to
resolve the conflict and sustain the peace. Military forces have a limited yet
essential role in supporting peace building. Peace building begins while PEO
or PKO are underway and may continue for years.
4-33. Army support to peace building can include the same activities as
longer-term foreign internal defense operations (see Chapter 3). Support to
4-11
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
peace building may also include military support to relief, rehabilitation,
reconstruction or development, negotiation and mediation, management of
arms, or assisting in human rights investigations by other agencies. In some
cases, Army forces may directly provide support to a recovering host nation or
population. Specific types of support may include, but are not limited to,
demobilization of belligerent parties, training for demining, temporary sup-
port to or repatriation for refugees, return of displaced persons to their origi-
nal homes, electoral assistance, maintaining public order and security, and
maintaining a deterrent presence. JP 3-57 and FM 3-57 provide details on
CMO activities that Army forces may conduct in support of peace building.
CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
4-34.
Complex contingency operations re large-scale peace operations
(or
elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmili-
tary organizations that combine one or more of the elements of peace opera-
tions which include one or more elements of other types of operations such as
foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgency, or
support to counterinsurgency (JP 3-57). These operations do not spring up
overnight. In the case of a humanitarian crisis, various organizations,
including governmental and nongovernmental organizations, will identify the
early symptoms and attempt resolution, usually before the situation attracts
the attention of the international media. A wider international response may
be demanded should the situation degenerate and an armed conflict causes
destabilization, starvation, or human rights violations beyond the immediate
capacity of diplomatic teams, UN agencies, and NGOs to resolve. These
organizations provide the international community with the first evaluation
of the crisis.
4-35.
As the situation degenerates, the media will focus on the issue. Na-
tional and international news media coverage plays a major role in quickly
framing public debate and shaping public opinion. The news media serves as
a forum for the analysis and critique of goals, objectives, and actions. It can
influence political, strategic, and operational planning, decisions, and mission
success and failure. It will be a major factor in shaping the international com-
munity’s response.
4-36.
Numerous actions on the diplomatic front will be mounted. The mili-
tary may support diplomatic efforts by conducting demonstrations, exercises,
or preventive deployments. If consensus can be reached between states or
among the parties to a dispute and a peace agreement is signed, then the UN
Security Council may authorize a peacekeeping operation in accordance with
Chapter VI of the UN Charter. If consensus is not reached or if the consensus
of all the participants is not clear even with a signed document, then the UN
Security Council may authorize a PE mission in accordance with Chapter VII
of the UN Charter.
4-37. The military objective in all these operations is to create the conditions
for other political, economic, and humanitarian peace building activities to
achieve the political objective stated in the mandate and to transition from
involvement. Building consensus among the parties to the conflict is critical
and allows the force to lower its operational profile to one more akin to PKO.
4-12
__________________________________________________________________________Peace Operations
As the situation allows, PK techniques should be gradually introduced and
the operation should come increasingly to resemble a PK mission.
4-38.
The situation is considerably different and more challenging if a PK op-
eration must be reconfigured as a PE operation. If consent is lost, a PK force
is not capable of dealing with the situation (see Figure 4-1). New political
decisions, mandates, ROE, or force compositions will be necessary. Optimally,
Army forces should not transition from one peace operation role to another
unless a mandate or a political decision changes and appropriate adjustments
to force structure, ROE, and other aspects of the mission are made. The PK
force may have to be replaced rather than augmented. These changes will
take time during which the PK force may be placed in a precarious position of
having neither the authority nor the capability to accomplish its tasks. It is
essential that the political and military decision makers clearly understand
the local situation before issuing a mandate. PK forces should not be
deployed when consensus is lacking.
Framework of Peace Operations
F
Non-Combat
Prepared for Combat
Combat
o
Self Defense Only
No Consent or
Designated Enemy
Consent Uncertain
r
c
IMPARTIALITY
ENEMY
C
e
o
n
C
s
a
PK
PE
WAR
e
p
n
a
t
b
I
Enforcement and
l
Consent Promoting
Warfighting
Consent Promoting
Techniques
Techniques
I
Techniques
t
y
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
UN Charter
UN Charter
Figure 4-1. Framework of Peace Operations
4-39.
In the event of a collapsed or failing state, peace building is essential to
strengthen and rebuild government infrastructures and institutions. Peace
building creates a self-sustaining peace and avoids a relapse into conflict.
Peace operations are designed to establish a stable environment in which
peace building can occur. Without the active support and participation of the
parties in conflict as well as the host nation as a whole, no peace operation
will succeed.
FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACE OPERATIONS
4-40. The foundations of stability operations and support operations dis-
cussed in Chapter 1 apply to peace operations. The following fundamentals
also apply specifically to peace operations. Commanders and participants
4-13
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
should understand these concepts as they conduct peace operations: consent,
impartiality, transparency, restraint, credibility, freedom of movement, flexi-
bility, civil-military operations, legitimacy, and perseverance.
CONSENT
4-41.
In war, consent is not an issue for the military commander. In peace op-
erations, however, the level of consent determines fundamentals of the opera-
tion. One side may consent in whole or in part, multiple parties may consent,
there may be no consent, or the consent may vary dramatically over time.
There may be consent at the strategic level among the party representatives
signing an agreement. However, renegade local groups at the tactical level
may disagree with their leaders and remain hostile to a peace operation. By
its nature, a PE force must be employed in operations even when there is no
general consent or when there is uncertainty regarding consent. Figure 4-1
shows the relationship between the amount or level of consent and force
capability requirements. When strong consent or commitment by the parties
to the peace agreement exists, then reduced force capability is required.
Peacekeeping operations are appropriate under these conditions. But as the
level of consent decreases, the level of force capability to enforce compliance
must increase, creating conditions for peace enforcement operations.
4-42.
The promotion of consent is fundamental to achieving the political end
state in all peace operations. Closely linked to consent is the compliance with
the agreement or mandate. The enforcement of compliance may be a neces-
sary condition to maintain consent.
4-43.
Peace without justice may undermine consent and eventually the entire
peace operation. Civil strife may have destroyed or compromised the police
and judicial system beyond repair, forcing the PE force to assume those func-
tions until a civil system is in place, often under the supervision of interna-
tional civilian police. The commander must participate in the interagency
process to determine the tasks and responsibilities in relation to the rule of
law aspects of the operation. It will not be the military commander’s respon-
sibility to establish the institutions. Still, he must insist on an interagency
assessment on rule of law issues so that an interagency plan can be
developed and the military’s role defined.
4-44.
Commanders should seek ways to promote consent by giving the
people, parties, and local institutions a stake in the peace process. Informa-
tion regarding consent should be disseminated throughout the various
parties’ leadership at all levels. When a decision is reached with one leader,
all must be aware of this decision as soon as possible. Joint Military Commis-
sions, liaison officers, media broadcasts, and leaders throughout the force are
key means to promote consent and transmit agreements concerning consent.
4-45. Consent can be lost if one side perceives the peace operations force to
favor the other side. Loss of consent in a peacekeeping operation may lead to
an escalation of violence and profoundly change the nature of the operation.
Any decline of consent is therefore of concern to the peace operation com-
mander and may unfavorably influence how the campaign develops. A lightly
armed force specifically organized and equipped for peacekeeping will be
incapable of containing the escalating situation caused by the loss of consent.
4-14
__________________________________________________________________________Peace Operations
If the political body that authorized the operation desires to enforce a peace,
then it must change the mandate and deploy a force capable of offensive and
defensive operations. This will be a significant operational adjustment unless
the force was deployed under a Chapter VII (of the UN Charter) mandate
(peace enforcement) and was configured for combat.
4-46.
If consent develops and all sides demonstrate their commitment to the
peace process through acts and deeds, then a force organized and deployed as
a PE force can gradually introduce those techniques appropriate to peace-
keeping. For example, the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) entered
Bosnia as a PE force under a Chapter VII mandate. Under Stabilization
Force (SFOR), the force is gradually using peacekeeping techniques in areas
where compliance and consent exist. However, the mandate remains
unchanged and SFOR retains its combat power and authority.
IMPARTIALITY
4-47.
Impartiality is a fundamental of peace operations that distinguishes
PO from offensive and defensive combat operations. Impartiality requires the
PO force to act on behalf of the peace process and mandate, showing no
preference for any faction or group over another. Corrective actions are taken
for noncompliance rather than a desire to support or oppose a particular
party. Figure 4-1 illustrates that in war impartiality is not an issue, and that
ultimately the terms of any peace plan could be imposed on the belligerents
(enemy) without consultation or agreement.
4-48.
The degree to which the force acts in an impartial manner and the
degree to which the belligerent parties perceive the force to be impartial
influence a peace operation. Even-handed treatment of all sides in the conflict
can improve the prospects for lasting peace and security, even when combat
operations are underway. Compromised impartiality may trigger an uncon-
trollable escalation from a PK operation to a PE operation, or from a PE
operation to a conflict situation, by adversely affecting consent and jeopar-
dizing the success of any peace operation.
4-49.
Forces, whether peacekeeping or peace enforcement, must always
strive to be impartial and use information operations to support this percep-
tion among the populace and various parties. Impartiality should not be con-
fused with neutrality. An analogy can help to relate impartiality to the
conduct of operations: the impartial status of a legal system is not compro-
mised because it only punishes the guilty, though that may not be the percep-
tion of a career criminal. Therefore, using force, even when applied in an
even-handed manner, is unlikely to be perceived as such, especially by any
party that persistently transgresses. Thus, the power of information must be
brought to bear, and the fundamental of transparency becomes all-important.
TRANSPARENCY
4-50. Transparency means that the peace operation force must communicate
its intentions and capabilities to all audiences inside and outside the area of
operations. This differs from offensive and defensive operations when the
force conceals its intentions and capabilities. PE forces must make the par-
ties and the populace aware of the operational mandate, mission, intentions,
4-15
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
and techniques used to ensure compliance. Transparency serves to reinforce
legitimacy and impartiality. It is more difficult to challenge the impartial
status of an operation if the parties are kept informed. A failure to communi-
cate will foster suspicion and may erode the development of the trust and
confidence on which the long-term success of the operations depends. Inte-
grated and synchronized information operations are necessary to facilitate
transparency. Civil-military programs, joint commissions, and an effective
liaison system reinforce transparency. The need for transparency must be
balanced against the need for operations security. Some instances may exist,
especially in a peace enforcement operation, that security may initially
preclude the complete sharing of information. However, protocols are estab-
lished to share as much information as possible.
RESTRAINT
4-51.
In PO, restraint is an exercise in the prudent and appropriate applica-
tion of military capability. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of
violence characterize the environment of peace operations. While PK is
usually nonviolent, PE may include violent offensive and defensive opera-
tions. The use of excessive force may adversely affect efforts to gain or main-
tain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term
goals. On the other hand, appropriately using force to prevent factional
groups from destroying the peace process can strengthen consent. These
restraints should be clearly spelled out in the ROE provided for the operation
by higher authority. Commanders strive for full situational understanding to
determine how best to use this force.
4-52.
In PK, force is used only in self-defense. In PE, force may be used to
coerce (see Figure 4-1). It may have far-reaching international political conse-
quences. Use of force may attract a response in kind. It may also escalate ten-
sion and violence in the local area and embroil peace operations troops in a
harmful, long-term conflict contrary to their aims. For that reason, use of
force should be a last resort and, whenever possible, should be used when
other means of persuasion are exhausted. Use of force is a critical planning
concern. To be a credible deterrent, PO units must deploy with sufficient com-
bat capability tailored to circumstances of that particular peace operation.
4-53.
Commanders should always seek to de-escalate and not inflame an inci-
dent or crisis. Alternatives to force should be fully explored before armed
action is taken. They include negotiation (see Appendix E), which may be
used to reconcile opponents, both to one another and to the peace operations
force.
4-54. Restraint does not preclude the application of sufficient or overwhelm-
ing force when required to establish dominance, to display US resolve and
commitment, to protect US or indigenous lives and property, or to accomplish
other critical objectives. The fundamental of restraint will permeate consid-
erations concerning ROE, the choice of weapons and equipment, and control
measures such as weapon control status. When force is used, it should be
precise and overwhelming to minimize friendly and noncombatant casualties
and collateral damage.
4-16
__________________________________________________________________________Peace Operations
CREDIBILITY
4-55.
A credible force is essential to ensure mission accomplishment. Credi-
bility reflects the warring faction’s assessment of the capability of the PO
force to accomplish its mission. The force must have the proper structure and
resources with appropriate ROE to accomplish the mandate. It discharges its
duties swiftly and firmly, leaving no doubt as to its capabilities and commit-
ment. All personnel consistently demonstrate the highest standards of disci-
pline, control, and professional behavior on and off duty.
4-56.
Nations contributing to the peace operation force should demonstrate
their political will to see the mission through to its end. If nations withdraw
their support or fail to provide assets in a timely manner, credibility will be
weakened. Information operations promote credibility not just in the area of
operations but also in the international community.
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
4-57.
Freedom of movement equates to maintaining the initiative. As ampli-
fied in the mandate, no restrictions are allowed against the movement of the
peace force or of the civilian population. Attempts by the parties to impose
increased restrictions reflect lessened consent. Freedom of movement is a
necessary condition for the peace process to move forward. If the parties
persist in denying freedom of movement, the authorizing political organiza-
tion must assess the situation to determine if the mandate must change or
the force must withdraw.
FLEXIBILITY
4-58.
The complex multinational and interagency environment in which US
forces conduct peace operations require commanders at all levels to place a
premium on initiative and flexibility. Commanders and staffs must con-
tinually analyze their mission in the changing political context, and change
tasks, missions, and operations as appropriate. The successful transition to
peace involves managing change. Forces should be able to adapt and move
from one activity to another on short notice. Tailoring the force enhances
flexibility by providing for a force properly balanced for the mission in terms
of skills, capabilities, equipment, and logistics.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
4-59.
Military and civilian organizations have always interacted with each
other. As a central feature of peace operations, CMO help harmonize civilian
and military activities to maximize the use of resources designed to redress
the deprivation and suffering of the people. CMO enhance the credibility of
the friendly force. They promote consent and legitimacy and encourage the
parties of the conflict to work toward a peaceful settlement.
4-60. Humanitarian assistance will be a part of many peace operations.
Humanitarian assistance can significantly impact resources required and
other aspects of these operations. In peace operations, humanitarian
assistance encourages stability that reduces the civilian dependency on exter-
nal military assistance.
4-17
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