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Chapter 11
weapons operating procedures emphasize safety, but it is up to leaders to continually enforce proper
equipment-operating procedures and safety TSOP. Continuous focus on safety can prevent accidents.
COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL STRESS CONTROL
11-49. Many stressors in a combat situation are due to deliberate enemy actions aimed at killing,
wounding, or demoralizing our Soldiers and our allies. Other stressors are due to the natural environment,
such as intense heat and cold, humidity, or poor air quality. Still others are due to leaders’ own calculated
or miscalculated choices (such as, decisions about unit strength, maneuver, and time of attack, and plans
for medical and logistical support). Sound leadership works to keep these operational stressors within
tolerable limits and prepares troops mentally and physically to endure them. In some cases, excessive stress
can affect both leaders’ and Soldiers’ decision-making and judgment, resulting in missed opportunities, or
worse, in high casualties and/or failure to complete the mission. Finally, some of the most potent stressors
are interpersonal in nature and can be due to conflict in the unit or on the home front. In the extreme,
reactions to such stressors may involve harm to self or to others. These stressors must be identified and
when possible, corrected or controlled. For behavioral health/combat operational stress control (COSC)
support, contact the supporting medical company through the medical support section. For information on
control of combat stressors and for details about specific leader and individual actions to control stress, see
FM 4-02.51, FM 22-51, and FM 6-22.5.
11-50. Combat and operational stress control focuses on FHP aspects of treatment and prevention of
COSR including the rapid reversal of COSR. These PVNTMED capabilities are essential to enhancing
Soldier survivability across full spectrum operations. By making continual health hazard assessments a
priority, disease and injury can be minimized. All BCTs have a mental health section consisting of a
behavioral science officer and a mental health specialist. The BCT chaplain assists with behavioral health
and COSC services by helping unit commanders identify Soldiers who are stressed. "
UNIT FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION PROGRAM
11-51. The weapons company commander and all leaders, in conjunction with the company combat
medic and field sanitation team, emphasize and enforce high standards of health and hygiene at all times. A
proactive FHP program implemented at the Infantry weapons company level should include personal
health and hygiene, preventive medicine, preventive dentistry, combat and operational stress control, food
safety, and awareness of potential health threats. Company leaders and members must be informed on
preventive medicine measures to counter health threats and to maintain their health and overall fitness to
perform their mission. Health and hygiene and FHP activities may require —--
• Developing a FHP SOP.
• Daily shaving to ensure proper fit of the protective mask.
• Regular bathing and changing of clothes.
• These include cold injuries such as frostbite, trench foot, and immersion foot, and heat injuries
like heat exhaustion and heat stroke. Soldiers must understand the effects of conditions such as
sunburn and wind-chill.
• Prevention of diseases. Insect-borne diseases such as malaria and Lyme disease, and diarrhea
diseases can be prevented with effective field sanitation measures, including unit waste control,
water purification, rodent control, and use of insect repellents.
• Combat and operational stress control
(COSC) to include training for preventing and/or
identifying and providing initials care for a Soldier with a combat and operational stress
reaction.
• Adherence to and strict implementation of the unit sleep plan.
• Requesting assistance from supporting mental health section with COSC classes for stress
reduction techniques and the prevention of combat and operational stress reactions (COSR).
• Conducting sanitation inspections of troop living area, food service areas, waste disposal and
potable water distribution point and equipment.
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1 July 2008
Sustainment Operations
HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT
11-52. A major function HSS is the care of sick, wounded, or injured Soldiers. It encompasses the
treatment and evacuation of casualties. It also covers the training of nonmedical personnel in combat
lifesaver in order to care for injured personnel until treatment by medical personnel is available.
CASUALTIES
11-53. First response is defined as the initial, essential stabilizing care rendered to wounded, injured, or
ill Soldiers at the point of initial injury or illness. The first responder is the first individual to reach a
casualty and provide first aid, enhanced first aid, or emergency medical treatment. First aid can be
performed by the casualty (self-aid) or another individual (buddy aid), while enhanced first aid is provided
by the CLS. The individual who has medical military occupational specialty (MOS) training is the combat
medic. He provides emergency medical treatment for life-threatening trauma, stabilizes and prioritizes
(triages) wounded for evacuation to the battalion aid station (BAS). At the BAS, wounded Soldiers receive
advanced trauma medicine by the medical treatment teams composed of the surgeon, physician’s assistant,
and health care specialists.
Casualty Response
11-54. Casualty response for the weapons company is similar to that of the rifle company with few
exceptions. For additional details on casualty response, see FM 3-21.10. The tiered levels of responsibility
to a casualty remain as follows:
Combat Lifesaver--The nonmedical Soldier trained to provide enhanced first aid/lifesaving
procedures beyond the level of self-aid or buddy aid.
Senior Combat Medic (Company Senior Medic)--The company's primary medical treatment
practitioner and the supervisor of all battlefield medical operations.
Combat Medic--The platoon medic is often called “doc” or “medic.”
Platoon Sergeant - Typically responsible for ensuring that wounded or injured personnel receive
immediate first aid and that the commander is informed of casualties.
First Sergeant - Oversees the operation of the company CCP and supervises/coordinates casualty
operations.
Commander - Bears overall responsibility for medical services.
Evacuation
11-55. The two areas of medical support are treatment and evacuation. Casualty transport, commonly
called CASEVAC, is the movement of casualties by nonmedical assets without en route medic care.
Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) is the movement of casualties using medical assets while providing en
route medical care. Ideally, casualties are transferred to a CCP by CASEVAC and from the CCP normally
by the supporting ground ambulance from the medical platoon in DS of the weapons company or
supporting air ambulance asset. Effective evacuation of casualties has a positive impact on the morale of a
unit. Ideally, casualties are cared for at the point of injury (or under nearby cover and concealment) by self-
or buddy aid, receive enhanced first aid from the combat lifesaver, and emergency medical treatment from
the combat medic (company or platoon medic) prior to or during CASEVAC operations.
11-56. Before casualties are evacuated to the CCP or beyond, leaders should remove all key operational
or sensitive items and equipment, including communications security
(COMSEC) devices or signal
operating instructions (SOI), maps, position location devices. Every unit should establish an SOP for
handling the weapons and ammunition of its WIAs. Protective masks must stay with the individual.
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Chapter 11
Casualty Reporting
11-57. Each individual Soldier should carry a blank DA Form 1156 (Casualty Feeder Card) for casualty
reporting purposes. The 2007 version of DA Form 1156 is also the witness card. Persons having firsthand
knowledge of a reportable casualty should prepare the casualty feeder card. Squad leaders and platoon
sergeants are encouraged to carry extra copies of DA Form 1156. Soldiers will report casualties they
witness or find, to include American civilians, personnel of other Services, Allied forces, and Soldiers from
other units, using DA Form 1156. If DA Form 1156 is not available, casualty information will be written
on blank paper. This information will be forwarded to the company commander/first sergeant. The
company commander/first sergeant or a designated Soldier will collect the casualty feeder cards and verify
as much information as possible and update the battle roster and casualty log. The reports will then be
forwarded to the BN S-l.
SOLDIERS WOUNDED IN ACTION
11-58. During the fight, casualties should remain under cover where they received initial treatment (self-
or buddy aid). As soon as the situation allows, casualties are moved to the platoon CCP. From the platoon
area, casualties are normally evacuated to the company CCP and then back to the BAS. The unit SOP
addresses specifics for evacuation as well as the marking of casualties in limited visibility operations. Once
the casualties are collected, evaluated, and treated, they are prioritized for evacuation back to the company
CCP. Once they arrive at the company CCP, the above process is repeated while awaiting their evacuation
back to the BAS. When possible, the HHC medical platoon ambulances provide evacuation and en route
care from the Soldier's point of injury or the company's CCP to the BAS.
Evacuation of Soldiers Wounded in Action
11-59. As a highly mobile unit, the weapons company has additional resources for casualty evacuation as
the situation permits. Depending on the METT-TC conditions, the weapons company may have the
opportunity to perform quicker CASEVAC procedures using platoon or company vehicles to the platoon
and/or the company CCP. This allows for more options for casualty evacuation especially if the attached
ambulance is unavailable. Casualties may also be evacuated directly from the platoon CCP via air
ambulance or using nonstandard air platforms for CASEVAC. However, flights may be restricted due to
the threat of enemy ground to air small arms, shoulder fired or other air defense weapons. In these cases,
casualties often must be moved to the company CCP before further evacuation making the use of organic
vehicles a great asset. If the capacity of the battalion's organic ambulances is exceeded, and platoon
vehicles are not available due to mission requirements, unit leaders may use supply or other vehicles to
backhaul casualties to the CCP or BAS. Field Manual 3-21.10, unit SOPs and OPORDs address casualty
treatment and evacuation in further detail. They cover the duties and responsibilities of key personnel, the
evacuation of chemically contaminated casualties (on separate routes from noncontaminated casualties),
and the priority for operating key weapons and positions. They specify preferred and alternate methods of
evacuation and make provisions for retrieving and safeguarding the weapons, ammunition, and equipment
of casualties. For procedures in the use of the casualty feeder card, DA Form 1156, see FM 1-0, Human
resources Support and FMI 1-0.01, S1 Operations.
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Sustainment Operations
Section V. OTHER OPERATIONS
To maintain effective, consistent combat power, the company must have specific plans and procedures that
allow each element to integrate replacement personnel and equipment quickly. Unit standing operating
procedure (SOP) defines how Soldiers and equipment are prepared for combat, including areas such as
uploading, load plans, precombat inspections (PCI), and in-briefings.
REORGANIZATION
11-60. Reorganization includes all measures taken by the commander to maintain the combat
effectiveness of his unit or return it to a specified level of combat capability. Any reorganization actions
not completed during an operation are accomplished during consolidation. These action include:
• Redistributing or cross-leveling supplies, ammunition, and equipment as necessary.
• Matching operational weapons systems with crews.
• Forming composite units by joining two or more attrited units to form a single, mission capable
unit.
• Replacing key personnel lost before or during the battle.
• Reporting unit location and status to keep the next higher commander informed.
• Recovering, treating, and evacuating causalities, prisoners of war, and damaged equipment.
• Resupply of basic loads of ammunition, fuel, and repair parts as time permits.
• Integrating replacement Soldiers and systems into the unit.
• Revising communication plans as required.
• Reestablishing unit cohesion.
• Conducting essential training including training replacements.
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, DETAINEES, AND OTHER
RETAINED PERSONS
11-61. All persons captured, detained, or retained by US Armed Forces during the course of military
operations are considered "detained" persons until their status is determined by higher military and civilian
authorities. The BCT has a military police platoon organic to the BSTB to take control of and evacuate
detainees. However, as a practical matter, Infantry squads, platoons, companies and battalions capture and
must provide the initial processing and holding for detainees. For further details on the handling of
prisoners, detainees and other personnel see FM 3-21.10.
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Chapter 12
Urban Operations
The weapons company takes part in urban operations as part of the battalion.
Weapons companies, platoons, and squads will seldom conduct urban operations
(UO) independently and will most likely conduct assigned missions as part of a
battalion operation. The weapons company may have one or more of its platoons
detached to other companies within the battalion and have one or more Infantry
platoons attached. It may act as a battalion reserve during operations and maneuvers
as required to reinforce other battalion units. If the urban area is small, the weapons
company may be assigned the task of isolating the objective by covering by fire
avenues of approach or exit. UO places a high demand on effective leadership at the
company, platoon, section, and squad levels. For more detailed information, refer to
FM 3-21.10: The Infantry Rifle Company, and FM 3-21.20: The Infantry Battalion.
Section I. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Urban areas consist mainly of manmade features such as buildings, streets, and subterranean systems. These
features of urban terrain create a variety of tactical problems and possibilities. To ensure the company can
operate effectively in the urban environment, the unit’s observation and direct fire plans must address the
ground level fight in streets and on the ground floors of buildings, the above ground fight in multistoried
buildings, and the subterranean fight. See FM 3-06, Urban Operations, and FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms
Operations in Urban Terrain, for more information on the types of urban environments. The following
considerations apply:
• Built up areas complicate, confuse, and degrade command and control.
• Streets are usually avenues of approach but they canalize forces and make obstacles more
effective.
• Buildings offer cover and concealment and severely restrict movement of military elements,
especially vehicles.
• Buildings severely restrict fire distribution and control, especially fields of fire. Every street
corner and successive cross street becomes a potential enemy field of fire, requiring careful
overwatch.
• Thick walled buildings provide ready-made fortified positions.
• Subterranean systems include subways, sewers, cellars, and utility systems
COMMAND AND CONTROL
12-1. The following considerations pertain to command and control in urban operations.
COMMUNICATIONS
12-2. The single-channel ground and airborne radio system
(SINCGARS) is the first choice for
communication in urban operations. However, during these operations, low-level task organization can
take place that require elements to establish additional communications links. These links, and some Force
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Chapter 12
XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) traffic, can be impaired or disrupted by buildings and
other urban terrain features.
FIRE CONTROL
12-3. Urban operations require extensive direct fire planning and restrictive fire control measures.
Extensive use of restrictive fire lines (RFL) and other graphic control measures are essential.
PROXIMITY AND VISIBILITY
12-4. During urban operations, friendly elements often must operate in confined and restrictive areas.
Because of these conditions, friendly elements may not be able to see other nearby friendly forces. These
factors significantly increase the danger of fratricide. Therefore, increased communications and use of
graphic control measures are critical. Phase lines, routes, and checkpoints will be most commonly used by
a weapons company element.
PERSONNEL FACTORS
12-5. Urban operations impose significant, and often extreme, physical and psychological demands on
Soldiers and leaders. Increased use of supplies by Infantry (such as: water, ammunition, marking materiel,
etc.), and the increased chance of casualties from urban operations add to these demands.
ROE/ROI AND CIVILIANS
12-6. The rules of engagement (ROE) and/or rules of interaction (ROI) may restrict the use of certain
weapons systems and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). This is because noncombatants are
integral parts of the urban environment and as such, create special operational challenges. If allowed by his
commander and the ROE, the weapons company commander can use his organic weapons to--
• Destroy enemy units and positions with machine gun fire.
• Provide accurate and destructive fires with close combat missiles.
• Suppress enemy fire positions with machine gun fire.
• Find and suppress enemy forces by conducting reconnaissance by fire missions
THE SLOW PACE OF URBAN OPERATIONS
12-7. Urban operations are usually slow and deliberate, and mounted weapon systems must maintain the
same pace as the dismounted Infantry. This can be accomplished by using graphical control measures such
as phase lines and maintaining close coordination and communication with the accompanying Infantry.
Staying within visual contact, supporting distance, and maintaining situational understanding of the
Infantry fight also enables the weapons leader to keep pace with the Infantry and provide fire support.
MANEUVER
12-8. The following factors relate to weapons company unit’s maneuver in the urban environment:
PREPARATION
12-9. Urban operations require extensive intelligence activities, efficient communication, and effective
rehearsals. This places a requirement at the company and platoon levels to conduct a thorough intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The IPB can be enhanced through the use of--
• Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).
• Reconnaissance patrols.
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Urban Operations
• Sniper teams and Weapons units to observe the area.
• Intelligence from units with experience of the area.
• Satellite photographs.
• Information from friendly civilians and/or informants.
PLANNING AND EXECUTION
12-10. Because of the control required and the decentralized nature of combat during urban operations,
detailed centralized planning and decentralized execution is required. Realistic and detailed rehearsals are
essential so that Soldiers at all levels understand the plan and the missions of other units.
COOPERATION
12-11. Urban operations can be successful only when Infantry, direct fire support vehicles, and other
units (such as indirect fire and engineers) closely cooperate together at the lowest possible level. This can
be accomplished by having a simple and well-rehearsed plan and close coordination during its execution.
TASK ORGANIZATION
12-12. Task organization usually is done no lower than platoon level.
MUTUAL SUPPORT
12-13. Weapons company units provide firepower to support the Infantry and other weapons company
units while the Infantry provides, by their proximity, close-in security for the weapons company units.
ENEMY ORGANIZATIONS AND CAPABILITIES
12-14. In addition to conventional forces, the enemy in urban areas may include--
• Unconventional forces.
• Paramilitary forces.
• Militia and special police organizations
• Organized criminal organizations.
12-15. Trends indicate that potential opponents in urban operations increasingly find and use
sophisticated technology and unorthodox operational approaches to counter the responses of U.S. forces
and its allies. To offset their inherent weaknesses, enemy forces seek the advantage in urban and complex
terrain by remaining dispersed and decentralized. These forces can employ the full range of military
ordinance and organizations: from small arms, mortars, machine guns, antiarmor weapons, improvised
explosive devices (IED), and mines, to very capable mechanized and armored forces equipped with
current-generation equipment. The enemy uses these various approaches to counter the technological and
numerical advantages of U.S. and allied systems and forces. In addition, enemy forces seek to exploit
constraints placed on U.S. forces because of cultural bias, media presence, ROE/ROI, and distance from
the crisis location. The urban environment itself also presents many passive dangers, such as disease from
unsanitary conditions and psychological stresses.
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FUNDAMENTALS OF ENEMY OPERATIONS
12-16. While the nature of active enemies vary widely among specific urban areas, many principles and
techniques are common to all such elements. Several methods that can be used against U.S. forces in the
urban environment include--
• Trying to use the populace to provide camouflage, concealment, and deception for their
operations. The populace of a given urban area represents a form of key terrain; the side that
manages it best has a distinct advantage.
• Using the civilian populace to actively support their forces by providing: intelligence, logistical
support and transportation.
• Attempting to make the civilian populace a burden on our logistical and force protection
resources.
• Using the presence of the media to turn the sentiments of the civilian populace and other
countries against U.S. forces.
• Identifying and occupying key facilities, such as telecommunication sites, water treatment
plants, and power generation and transmission sites.
• Using the physical environment of an urban area to advantage. These include--
• Height advantage given by rooftops and tall buildings provide vantage points and ambush
positions. Top attack positions allow the enemy to strike vehicles at their most vulnerable
points and to use enfilading fire against exposed, dismounted Soldiers.
• Basements and other subterranean areas provide covered and concealed positions that allow
movement and access throughout the area of operations.
FIRE SUPPORT
12-17. The urban environment affects how and when the weapons company employs indirect fires. The
following can impact the planning and execution of indirect fire support:
• The urban environment creates special requirements for centrally controlled fires and more
restrictive fire control measures.
• Urban operations require the careful use of variable-timed ammunition to prevent premature
arming.
• Indirect fire may cause unwanted rubble.
• The close proximity of friendly troops to enemy forces and other indirect fire targets
necessitates careful coordination.
• White phosphorous (WP) ammunition can create unwanted fires or smoke.
• Artillery can be used in direct fire mode against point targets.
• Fuse delay should be considered to ensure rounds penetrate buildings or fortifications as
required.
• Mortars are the most responsive indirect fires available to the platoon in the urban environment.
They are well suited for combat in built-up areas because of their high rate of fire, steep angle
of fall, and short minimum range.
SUSTAINMENT
12-18. Guidelines for providing effective sustainment to units fighting in an urban environment include
the following:
• Protect supplies and sustainment elements from the effects of enemy fires by preventing and/or
avoiding detection, and by using effective cover and concealment.
• Provide security for sustainment units when they are moving within the combat area.
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Urban Operations
• Plan for a higher consumption rate of supplies, especially ammunition.
• Disperse and decentralize sustainment elements.
• Position support units as far forward as the tactical situation permits.
• Plan the locations of casualty collection points and evacuation sites.
• Plan for and use host country support and civil resources when authorized and practical.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
12-19. During urban operations inside a built up area, the weapons company will often be task organized
with one or more Infantry platoons attached and one or more weapons platoons detached to Infantry
companies. Although the weapons company vehicles are mobile, the Infantry platoons are not and the
company team’s speed is thus reduced. This is not a major drawback since by their very nature urban
operations require increased security and the terrain may be difficult to traverse. If the weapons company
has a mission to isolate a small urban area, then its tactics and maneuver are the same as in the offense and
defense.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
12-20. Because of the decentralized nature of urban combat and the need for a high number of troops to
conduct operations in dense, complex terrain, Infantrymen represent the bulk of forces. At the tactical
level, Infantry forces have disadvantages that can be overcome by mechanized Infantry, weapons company,
or armor units. Conversely, vehicles face problems in the confines of urban areas that place them at a
severe disadvantage when operating alone and unsupported by Infantry. Only by working together in
combined arms teams can these forces accomplish their missions with minimal casualties while avoiding
unnecessary collateral damage.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Infantry and Weapons Company Units.
Strengths
12-21. The Infantry provides the following strengths in an urban environment:
• Infantry small-arms fire within a building can eliminate resistance without seriously damaging
the structure.
• Infantry can physically clear and occupy buildings.
• Infantrymen can move stealthily into position without alerting the enemy. Infantrymen can
move over, around, or through most urban terrain regardless of the amount of damage to
buildings.
• Infantrymen have excellent all-round vision and can engage targets with small arms fire under
almost all conditions.
12-22. Weapons company units in an urban environment provide the following strengths.
• The precision direct fires of missile systems and the destructive effects of the heavy machine
guns provide excellent support to Infantry in an urban environment.
• The thermal sights on close combat missile systems can detect enemy activity through darkness
and most smoke.
• The ability to conduct mounted patrols that can monitor large areas of a city while making their
presence known to the entire populace, both friendly and unfriendly.
• The mobile firepower of weapons company vehicles can add security to resupply convoys.
• The armored weapons company vehicles can resupply Infantry units and evacuate casualties.
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Limitations
12-23. Infantry forces have the following limitations in an urban environment.
• They lack heavy supporting firepower, protection, and long-range mobility.
• Exposed Infantry forces are subject to taking a high number of casualties.
• Infantry forces are more subject to fratricide-related casualties from friendly direct and
indirect fire.
12-24. Weapons company forces have the following limitations in an urban environment.
• Weapons squads can be blinded easily by various obscurants in the urban environment.
• If isolated or unsupported by Infantry, Weapons company vehicles are vulnerable to enemy
close in attack. They are also vulnerable to heavy machine guns and light or medium anti armor
weapons.
• Weapons company vehicle gunners cannot easily identify enemy targets from friendly units in
the confusing urban environment.
• Improvised barricades, narrow streets and alleyways, or large amounts of rubble can block
vehicles.
• Leaders and gunners usually require accurate target identification from forward Infantry units.
• The minimum arming distance for close combat missile systems may reduce their effectiveness
in close terrain. Hanging wires and other debris may also limit their effectiveness.
• Restrictive terrain may limit the crews ability to clear the backblast area for Improved Target
Acquisition System (ITAS) firing.
• Close combat missile systems may also be limited by the brief target exposure time for moving
vehicles.
• Heavy weapons may cause unwanted collateral damage and can destabilize certain structures.
Section II. EMPLOYMENT
Urban combat is often so decentralized and avenues of approach for vehicles so canalized that the situation
requires fewer weapons company vehicles employed over broader areas. The decision to disperse rather than
concentrate weapons company vehicles in a specific area should be made only after a careful consideration of
the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilians (METT-TC) and the anticipated operations in the
near future. Decentralized weapons company support greatly increases a small Infantry unit’s combat power;
however, dispersed weapons company elements in UO cannot be easily extricated and quickly massed to
achieve an overwhelming effect on the enemy. Weapons company units can support Infantry during UO by--
• Isolating objectives with direct fire to prevent enemy withdrawal, reinforcement, or
counterattack.
• Assisting Infantry entering into buildings when enemy fire, debris, or obstacles block
doorways.
• Securing portions of an objective by covering armored or mechanized avenues of approach.
• Providing suppressing fire support during Infantry movement
• Attacking appropriate targets designated by Infantry units.
• Establishing roadblocks or checkpoints.
TASK ORGANIZATION
12-25. The following basic methods may be used for task-organizing the weapons company for UO.
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Urban Operations
WEAPONS COMPANY RETAINED UNDER INFANTRY BATTALION CONTROL
12-26. With this task organization, likely missions for the weapons company unit are to support by fire or
to overwatch movement of the Infantry. This task organization poses the most difficulty in maneuvering
the weapons company unit with the dismounted Infantry. Moreover, it exposes the weapons company
vehicles to close-in attack. However, it provides greater flexibility to the battalion commander in
supporting the Infantry during the fight. This task organization provides the battalion commander the
ability to quickly shift and mass the preponderance of his firepower to destroy the enemy or to counter his
maneuver. This can be enhanced by combining the weapons company with an aerial platform, such as an
Army aviation unit or UAS.
WEAPONS COMPANY PLATOON(S) ATTACHED TO INFANTRY COMPANIES
12-27. Weapons company platoons are attached to Infantry companies. With this method, the maneuver
Infantry companies have a weapons company platoon to support the UO fight and to deploy at the critical
place and time. This task organization allows for the close support to the Infantry and direct control by the
Infantry company commander. This is in line with the decentralized combat that characterizes urban
warfare.
INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS SECTION AND SQUADS UNDER INFANTRY PLATOON CONTROL
12-28. In this technique, a weapons company section or squad may be attached to an Infantry or
reconnaissance platoon, usually by the Infantry company commander. The purpose of this type of task
organization is to provide selected platoons with increased direct fire in an urban area. However, a
weapons section can provide its own mutual support while a single squad cannot. Leaders must also ensure
that the platoon secures the weapons section or squad at all times. The Infantry platoon leader however,
may have difficulty effectively controlling this organization because of the increased span of control and
insufficient knowledge of the personnel and capabilities of the weapons company unit.
GUIDELINES
12-29. The task organization must be tailored to accomplish the mission. Regardless of the technique
selected, the following guidelines apply:
• Weapons company sections may operate in support of Infantry.
• If using weapons company vehicles to support Infantry squads and fire teams moving from
building to building as part of the maneuver plan, the leader of the forward Infantry element
must control the movement of these vehicles.
• When controlling a weapons platoon or section, an Infantry company commander (or weapons
platoon or section leader) should move forward to a position where he can personally maneuver
it effectively in support of the Infantry.
• A task organization should not exceed the leader’s span of control (two to five subordinate
units).
• Weapons company sections or squads need Infantry support when the two elements are
working together. Do not leave vehicles alone. These sections or squads are ill prepared to
provide their own security during UO. Individual vehicles are extremely vulnerable to
dismounted attack when operating in a complex urban environment.
• Weapons unit leaders may have to dismount to reconnoiter the next positions or to
communicate directly with the Infantry leader.
• Weapons unit vehicles often move by alternating or successive bounds with vehicles on each
side of the street.
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TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
12-30. The following are some considerations for the employment of the weapons company as part of the
Infantry battalion operations in urban terrain. Thorough planning will increase response and reduce
uncertainty (for example, numbering buildings and apertures allow the weapons units to respond quickly to
the Infantry leaders requests for direct fire).
DIRECT-FIRE SUPPORT
12-31. Weapons company weapon units are powerful systems for supporting assault forces to isolate the
objective area and secure a foothold. As the Infantry force moves to clear the built-up area, the weapons
company unit remains in its initial support-by fire position. When possible, the weapons company unit
should move to a subsequent position where its direct fires can prevent enemy armor or mechanized
reinforcement from attacking the objective and can engage those enemy forces withdrawing from the
objective. Because of the non-contiguous nature of UO, enemy forces may move to the rear or flanks of the
now-isolated weapons company vehicles and destroy them. If a small element of Infantry cannot be spared
to support the weapons company unit, then vehicles should move to positions of cover and concealment
and mutual support. Weapons company Soldiers should be alert, especially for enemy Infantry approaching
from above, from the rear, or from the flanks.
MUTUAL SUPPORT
12-32. Infantry and weapons company forces work together to bring the maximum combat power
available to bear on the enemy. Infantry forces provide the eyes and ears, locating and identifying targets
for the weapons company units to engage. Infantry and weapons company forces move along covered and
concealed routes to assault enemy elements. Infantry forces provide protection from enemy Infantry while
weapons company forces provide supporting direct fires against enemy positions and vehicles. Weapons
company units try to direct fires onto the other side of the avenue of approach (example: The right hand
vehicle(s) fire on targets on the left-hand side of the avenue of approach).
MOVEMENT
12-33. Infantry elements normally lead the movement through built-up areas. The weapons company unit
follows closely behind and provides close direct fire support. If the Infantry discovers an enemy
fortification or vehicle, the weapons company unit responds immediately with direct fire to destroy, fix, or
suppress the enemy, allowing the Infantry unit to develop the situation. After allowing sufficient time to
develop the situation or conduct short-range reconnaissance, the Infantry leader directs the weapons
company unit to move to support by fire position, if necessary, and identifies specific targets to engage.
COORDINATION
12-34. Coordination between weapons company and Infantry leaders must be close and continuous. The
weapons company vehicle commander (platoon, section, or squad leader) may need to dismount the
vehicle and move, accompanied by the Infantry leader, to a position where he can see the route or target
better. All involved must understand the signals for initiating, shifting, lifting, or ceasing direct fires. The
greatest barrier to close coordination and command and control in UO is the intense noise and complexity
of situations. Verbal commands must be backed up by simple, nonverbal signals.
COMMUNICATIONS
12-35. Weapons company leaders must maintain communications with the Infantry commander.
Individual weapons company squads and Infantrymen communicate with one another using one or more of
the following techniques.
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Visual Signals
12-36. Visual signals, either prescribed by a SOP or coordinated during linkup, can facilitate some simple
communications.
FM Radios
12-37. Frequency modulation (FM) radios provide a reliable means of communications between Infantry
and close supporting weapons company units. These radios allow the Infantry to use terrain more
effectively to provide close-in protection for the weapons company unit. Infantrymen can observe enemy
elements while limiting exposure to enemy fires directed against the weapons company unit. This is a fast
and reliable method of communications that does not require additional assets. However, some urban
environments can severely degrade FM radio communications over long distances or between forces that
are inside and outside buildings. All leaders (weapons company and Infantry) must take this possibility into
careful consideration during their thorough analyses of the factors of METT-TC. The Infantry company
commander relies on the radio to help control the battle. It is essential that platoon leaders and
radiotelephone operators be well trained in sending reports. Timely, accurate, brief, and complete reporting
from the subordinate elements to the commander is critical for mission success.
Smoke
12-38. The use of smoke must be carefully coordinated. Although weapons company weapon system
sights can see through most obscurants, controlling weapons company and Infantry forces becomes
significantly more difficult when these forces are enveloped in dense smoke clouds. Smoke generated from
adjacent units can also affect control.
Other Considerations
12-39.
The following considerations also apply during UO.
• Identify available terrain during planning that will support weapons company vehicle
cross-country movement. While the rate of march may be slower, security may be significantly
enhanced.
• Involve weapons company leaders in the mission analysis. Their expertise will hasten the
understanding of what weapons company units can and cannot do and will aid the Infantry
commander in making the best employment decision.
• Urban operations are resource intensive. Weapons company vehicles can carry ammunition,
water, and other supplies to support the urban fight.
• The Infantry battalion and company commanders can use the FBCB2 mounted on the weapons
company vehicles to track the progress of the forward platoons. Since the vehicles should be
relatively close behind the Infantry, their position should be relatively close to the friendly
forward elements.
• Commanders must specifically allocate time in the planning process for precombat inspections
(PCIs) and precombat checks (PCCs) of the weapons company unit.
• Conduct a rehearsal at the level where the weapons company units are task-organized. Try to
replicate conditions for mission execution during rehearsals
(for example, day, limited
visibility, civilians on the battlefield, host nation support, and ROE). Include the following:
-- Graphic and fire control measures.
-- Direct fire plans.
-- Communications.
-- Breach drills.
-- Techniques for employing weapons company vehicles and the Infantry.
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• To minimize casualties when moving outside or between buildings:
-- Cover all possible threat locations with either observation or direct fire.
-- Use smoke to set a screen to block enemy observation of friendly movement for those areas
not possible to cover with observation or direct fire.
-- Move weapons company units forward to support Infantry movement. Position the weapons
company units before the Infantry continues moving.
-- Preplan positions if possible, but devise a marking system and communication signals to
designate “situation-dependent” positions to help maintain momentum.
-- Weapons company vehicles must move at the Infantry’s rate of movement.
• Use simple, clearly understood graphic control measures. The following are particularly useful
during UO:
-- Phase lines.
-- Number and lettering systems for buildings.
-- Tentative support-by-fire positions.
-- No-fire areas.
Section III. OFFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS
The weapons company plans and executes offensive operations in the urban environment based on the factors
of METT-TC and established doctrine. This section focuses on the unique problems and challenges these
operations pose.
PHASES
12-40. Urban offensive operations can be broken down into phases. In combat these are by no means
clear and clean cut.
RECONNOITER THE OBJECTIVE
12-41. The reconnaissance phase of urban operations must provide the weapons company commander
and other friendly elements with adequate intelligence to stage a deliberate attack. Communications with
friendly elements in or near the urban area is essential to gain up-to-date information on the objective.
Current information of the area can be provided by UAS over flights, satellite photography, and
observation by sniper teams. Commanders do not want to arouse the enemy’s suspicions by concentrating
too much reconnaissance in one area and should include other areas for reconnaissance that are not part of
the attack. The weapons company may support the reconnaissance effort by conducting mounted patrols,
providing overwatch and reaction forces to support dismounted patrols, or by observing the objective with
its day and night optics
MOVE TO THE OBJECTIVE
12-42. Once the unit reconnoiters the objective, forces move to the objective by the most expedient,
covered, and concealed route to prevent detection by the enemy. The weapons company can provide
overwatch during movement or move with the battalion units to provide additional security and firepower.
ISOLATE THE OBJECTIVE
12-43. Isolating the objective involves seizing terrain that dominates the area so that the enemy cannot
supply or reinforce its defensive forces. This is critical for successful mission accomplishment. The
weapons company can be given this mission because of its mobility, and therefore the ability to quickly
reinforce threatened areas, and its long-range firepower. The commander may position the weapons
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company unit outside the built-up area, where they can cover high-speed avenues of approach. Before
providing support for the attack, weapons units maneuver into support by fire or attack-by-fire positions.
Infantry may be required to clear these positions before their occupation. Once isolated, the battalion
should gain a foothold as quickly as possible.
GAIN A FOOTHOLD
12-44. Gaining a foothold involves seizing an intermediate objective that provides attacking forces with
cover from enemy fire as well as a place at which they can enter the built-up area. When a weapons
company unit operates with the company, it provides direct fire support as the Infantry gains the foothold.
As the Infantry attacks to gain the foothold, it should be supported by direct and indirect suppressive fires,
and by obscuring or screening smoke operations. The weapons company unit can provide overwatch or
serve as a base of fire for the Infantry until the area is secured.
CLEAR THE URBAN AREA
12-45. When determining the extent to which the urban area must be cleared, the commander of the
attacking force must consider METT-TC factors. He may decide to clear only those parts of the area
necessary to the success of his mission. To do this, however, at least one of the following factors
must apply:
• An objective can be seized quickly.
• Enemy resistance is light or fragmented.
• Buildings in the area are of light construction with large open areas between them. In this
situation, the commander would clear only those buildings along the approach to his objective,
or those buildings necessary to ensure the unit’s security.
12-46. On the other hand, the attacking unit might have a mission to systematically clear an area of all
enemy forces. Through detailed analysis, the commander can anticipate if the unit will be opposed by a
strong, organized resistance, or if it will be operating in areas where buildings are close together. This
mission requires a street-by-street, room-by-room operation.
12-47. The weapons company can support the Infantry during the clearing phase by providing direct fire
support, rapidly moving its elements to reinforce units, or to block access to the objective area. Its
effectiveness however may be limited by the lack of maneuver space, obstructions, and ROE restrictions.
CONSOLIDATE AND REORGANIZE
12-48. Once the objective is secure, the unit must prepare for counterattack, or continue the mission in
accordance with (IAW) the operation order (OPORD)/SOP. If the unit must prepare for a counterattack, it
must consolidate and reorganize equipment, supplies, and personnel quickly. The weapons company moves
its units to reinforce critical areas, provide observation, or provide security for elements bringing supplies
forward.
TASK ORGANIZATION
12-49. Based on a METT-TC analysis, the battalion commander determines his decisive and shaping
attacks. He may also task organize his companies so that each has Infantry and direct fire support units. In
urban operations, company commanders can in turn task organize their platoons so that they include
Infantry and direct fire support. The weapons company may have one or more platoons detached and have
an Infantry platoon attached. The weapons company may be assigned any mission to include a shaping
attack or acting as the reserve.
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Section IV. DEFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS
As in the offense, defensive operations in the urban environment require thorough planning and precise
execution based on METT-TC and established doctrine. This section examines urban considerations that affect
the weapons company in the defense.
ENEMY FORCES OUTSIDE URBAN AREA
12-50. While positioned in an urban area as part of a larger force, the commander may task the weapons
company to defend against an enemy approaching from outside of the built-up area. In general, procedures
and considerations are the same as those for defensive operations in open terrain. For example, the
commander designates battle positions
(BP) that take advantage of all available weapons systems.
Objectives are similar as well and may include preventing the:
• Isolation of the defensive position.
• Reconnaissance of the defensive position
• Gaining a foothold in the urban area.
12-51. These operations can transition into an in-depth defense of the urban area if the attacker continues
to commit forces to the battle, and the defending force fails to divert or destroy them.
ENEMY FORCES WITHIN URBAN AREA
12-52. When facing enemy forces within the urban area, the battalion commander may order the weapons
company to take part in defensive operations. These defensive operations include defense within an area of
operations (AO), defend a strongpoint, and/or defend a BP. Procedures and considerations for these
defensive operations are generally similar to those used in more conventional open terrain situations.
12-53. See FM 3-06.11 for detailed information on these operations. The commander should designate
engagement areas that take advantage of integrated obstacles and urban terrain features, and that can be
covered by direct and indirect fires.
ROLE OF WEAPONS COMPANY
12-54. In defensive urban operations, the weapons company provides the commander with a mobile force
that can respond quickly to the enemy’s scheme of maneuver. The company’s vehicles should be located to
cover likely enemy avenues of approach in positions that allow the vehicles to take advantage of their
long-range fires. Effective positioning enables the commander to employ the company in a number of
ways, such as--
• On the edge of the city in mutually supporting positions.
• On key terrain on the flanks of towns and villages.
• In positions from which they can cover barricades and obstacles by fire.
• As part of the reserve.
12-55. While weapons platoons are usually employed as a two-section platoon, the commander has the
option to task organize them with Infantry platoons and squads. This provides local security for the
vehicles.
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FIGHTING AND FIRING POSITIONS
12-56. Vehicle positions provide the optimal cover, concealment, observation, and fields of fire. At the
same time, they must not restrict the vehicles’ ability to move when necessary. The following
considerations apply--
• If fields of fire are restricted to the street area, weapons platoon vehicles should operate in
hull-down positions, which provide cover and enable fire directly down the streets. Examples
of using hull-down positions are piles of rubble, walls, reverse slope of high ground, and
burned out vehicles. In hull-down positions, the vehicles are protected while retaining their
ability to rapidly move to alternate positions.
• Before moving into position to engage the enemy, a weapons company vehicle can occupy a
hide position for cover and concealment. Hide positions exist in various locations, such as
inside buildings or underground garages, adjacent to buildings using the buildings to mask
enemy observation, or in culverts.
• Before pulling into a building to use it as a vehicle hide position, make sure the floor will
support the vehicle weight. Make sure the selected structure has not been damaged to the point
that it could collapse onto the vehicle.
• Primary, supplementary, and alternate battle positions are identified and routes between are
reconnoitered. Units are positioned in depth.
• Battle positions may have room for only a single vehicle.
• The hide position prevents the crew from seeing the advancing enemy. Therefore, an observer
from the weapons unit or a nearby Infantry unit must alert the crew from an observation post in
an adjacent building. When the observer acquires a target, he signals the weapons company
vehicles to move to the firing position and, at the proper time, to fire.
• After firing, the vehicle moves to an alternate position to avoid compromising its location.
EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY SQUADS
12-57. In a company defense, the limited number of available Infantrymen may require that squad
positions be interspersed between the weapons company positions for mutual support. The weapons crew’s
observation is primarily focused on the enemy and possible enemy locations. Both the Infantry Soldier and
the vehicle crew are responsible for being alert and maintaining safe positions in relation to each other.
EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE FORCE
12-58. The commander’s defensive scheme of maneuver in urban operations may include employment of
a reserve force. It must maintain situational awareness by monitoring appropriate digital messages and
radio frequencies. This force may function to--
• Regain key positions through counterattack.
• Block enemy penetrations.
• Protect the flanks of the friendly force.
• Provide a base of fire for disengaging elements.
12-59. The following are some characteristics of the reserve force during combat in built-up areas:
• It usually consists of a combined arms force.
• It must be as mobile as possible.
• It must maintain an appropriate readiness status.
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