|
|
|
Chapter 3
Human Resource Challenges of Multinational Operations
This chapter begins by discussing human resources support. It then discusses legal
considerations for commanders and ends with a discussion on environmental
considerations. A checklist for commanders and staffs is included at the end of the
chapter.
HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT
3-1. The G-1/S-1 is the principal staff assistant to the commander on human resources support. This
individual provides guidance, oversight, and coordination of manpower and personnel issues. The G-1/S-1
coordinates finance support and manages the religious ministry and legal personnel support. The G-1 is
responsible for human resources support for national contingents.
3-2. Multinational force human resources support assets are collocated for ease of coordination between
the national elements of the multinational force. Human resources support is the system and functions of
manning, human resource services, and personnel support.
z
Manning includes personnel readiness management, personnel, personnel information
management, and personnel accountability, strength reporting, and retention operations.
z
Human resource services include casualty operations management, postal, and essential
personnel services (promotions, awards, evaluations, and the like).
z
Human resources support includes morale, welfare and recreation; equal opportunity; band; and
drug and alcohol. In addition to human resources support, the G-1/S-1 normally assumes staff
coordinating responsibility of resource management, command information, and legal service
support.
3-3. The multinational G-1 coordinates with the national contingents to recommend a tour length policy
to the multinational force commander. A rotation policy is based on the multinational force’s mission,
length of operation, operational environment, requirements to place skills in positions, and procedures for
moving or removing personnel. A standard tour length for all personnel is equitable and impacts morale.
This is not supportable from an operational aspect. The rotation policies of participating nations and
Services preclude a standardized tour length. The multinational commander knows national contingent
rotations and their status to account for all the forces in the area of operations (AO).
RECEPTION CENTER
3-4. In multinational operations, the G-1 establishes a multinational personnel reception center. The
center familiarizes personnel with the multinational force, its mission, and the reason for multinational
force formation. It also helps personnel acclimate to the host nation’s culture, religion, language, customs,
and history. Each nation that contributes to troops is represented in the center. The multinational personnel
reception center is the location of national personnel service support operations.
VISITOR’S BUREAU
3-5. The number of visitors to an AO is reason to establish a multinational visitor’s bureau. This bureau
handles all visitors including distinguished visitors on a full-time basis. A senior officer with a protocol
background and favorable people skills directs the bureau. The multinational visitor’s bureau is a separate
entity and not part of the multinational information bureau or public affairs office. It includes
representatives from all multinational force nations. The bureau possesses sufficient communications and
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
3-1
Chapter 3
transportation capabilities. Its personnel require training in executive protection and proper escorting of
distinguished visitors.
RELIGIOUS MINISTRY
3-6. Religion influences military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Military
planners identify religious differences among multinational forces and indigenous populations in the AO.
Religion impacts multinational policy, strategy, and relationships. (See JP 1-05 for more information.)
3-7. National component commanders deliver religious ministry support to their forces in multinational
operations. The multinational force assigns the senior national component chaplain to the multinational
staff. The multinational staff chaplain (brigade and above) or unit ministry teams (brigade and below)
promote religious support cooperation. The chaplain also promotes appropriate understanding for any host
nation and national component religious sensitivities. The multinational force staff chaplain promotes
religious support coverage among multinational force personnel (including faith group requirements). The
multinational force staff chaplain—
z
Recommends deployment of religious ministry personnel by composition.
z
Advises the multinational force commander and staff on religion, morals, ethics, and morale
from a religious standpoint only.
z
Provides and performs religious support according to the chaplain’s faith and country practices
and standards.
z
Advocates that all nations’ religious support personnel receive professional support, worship
space, logistics, transportation, and program funding from the multinational force or national
component commander and staff. This support must be in accordance with national and Service
policies and regulations through appropriate staff channels.
z
Establishes and coordinates a multinational force religious ministry support plan for all elements
of the multinational force according to multinational force commander guidance.
z
Advises the multinational force commander on personnel replacement or rotational policies.
z
Advises the multinational force command and staff regarding humanitarian and disaster-relief
programs.
z
Refers requests for humanitarian assistance by religious non-governmental organizations to
multinational force civil-military operations center or equivalent.
z
Ensures detainees receive ministry and care appropriate to their needs.
z
Publishes multinational force religious support plan(s) for all phases of the operation with
multinational force operation plan and operation order.
z
Provides confidential and privileged communication in counseling for multinational personnel to
support stress management, morale, and early identification of critical personnel problems.
z
Executes engagements with religious leaders and other leaders as directed by the multinational
force commander.
LEGAL ADVISOR
3-8. Legal support is essential to multinational operations. Operations, especially peacekeeping and
peace-enforcement operations, involve a myriad of foreign and domestic statutory, regulatory, and policy
considerations. A commander calls on the legal advisor as often as the operations officer. The legal advisor
helps a commander understand the problems of multinational operations. The legal advisor is a vital part of
the planning team before deployment. However, adherence to the law is the responsibility of command at
all levels. Legal advisors will not be those called to account if the multinational force carries out an illegal
act. This is important in areas of national fiscal restrictions on the expenditures of funds, equipment, and
manpower. (See JP 1-04 for more information.)
3-9. Additionally, multinational operations and missions require subordinate commanders to be involved
with local governments and conduct negotiations among competing factions. Commanders negotiate with
governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other intergovernmental organizations to
3-2
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Human Resource Challenges of Multinational Operations
accomplish the mission. The command needs a legal advisor based on the situation to influence
decisionmaking.
3-10. The legal advisor—
z
Advises the commander on operational law including the law of war, rules of engagement
(ROE), law of the sea, air law, status-of-forces agreements (SOFA), and applicable international
laws, military justice, claims, legal assistance, and administrative law encompassing
environmental issues, contracts, and fiscal law.
z
Reviews operational plans for legal sufficiency and potential issues.
z
Drafts policy for the force regarding prohibited and permitted actions while deployed.
z
Serves as a member of the ROE planning cell and provides advice and counsel on the
development and promulgation of ROE.
z
Negotiates with local governments concerning procurement, seizure of property for military
purposes, and scope of foreign criminal jurisdiction in the absence of existing agreements.
z
Ensures that all adverse actions are properly administered.
z
Advises the commander on international directives and agreements that form the basis for the
multinational operations. This includes host nation support, diplomatic status, foreign criminal
jurisdiction, ROE, environmental matters, and medical treatment of civilians.
z
Provides legal advice on prisoners of war, refugees, displaced and detained civilians; military
information support operations (MISO) and stability tasks or civil-military cooperation; local
culture and customs; government, military, and political liaison; investigations; the legality of
landing fees; and interpretation of transit agreements.
z
Establishes liaison early with multinational, international, and host nation legal officials and
local police, authorities, and court officials who administer the judicial system.
z
Implements, interprets, or executes a system for payment of claims arising from personal injury
or property damage from the operation.
z
Advises the force on legal and fiscal constraints involving logistics assistance to nonmilitary
organizations and multinational forces.
z
Advises the command on issues affecting the detention of persons who attack or disrupt the
force according to customary international law, applicable UN Security Council resolutions,
alliance or multinational directives, and national policies. The force must be sensitive to
apprehension and turnover procedures, especially where there are distinct cultural differences in
the AO.
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMANDERS
3-11. Commanders and planners of multinational forces understand the legal basis for all operations. These
laws apply to all multinational forces. Even multinational forces conducting operations under UN mandates
do not have immunity under the law.
JURISDICTION
3-12. Jurisdiction is based on the national laws of the country sending the troops, as far as they have
extraterritorial application outside the country concerned. SOFAs for stability tasks grant exclusion of host
state jurisdiction and provide a legal framework for the strictly international and neutral status of the
multinational forces. The multinational force is more effective if it is not subject to the jurisdiction of any
of the parties engaged in the conflict. To do so would lead to an undermining of impartiality. Additionally,
the ability to arrest, detain, and try members of the multinational force or community influence the
activities of the operation.
3-13. The consensual basis for the multinational force’s presence in the host country, its mandate, and the
privileges and immunities of any civilians is established. In most cases, an intergovernmental organization,
such as the UN, performs this task. When the operation is an exercise in regional peacekeeping,
participating nations establish a legally sound basis for such an operation sustainable under international
law.
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
3-3
Chapter 3
3-14. A claims regime compensating for damages arising from such acts will be a feature of any SOFA or
other agreement with the receiving state. In matters not related to official duties, multinational members are
subject to local jurisdiction with only a few minor concessions in favor of the force. If Service members are
involved in any incident while on leave, they may be liable for any damage they do or injury they cause.
3-15. International law applies to all operations. Multinational partners comply with obligations that arise
from the treaties. Not all multinational members are party to the same treaties. This creates a marked
disparity between partners as to what they can or cannot do. Some obligations under international law arise
from customary international law bind states whether or not they have entered into a treaty on the subject.
Commanders and staff remain aware of this complication and ensure plans and operations reflect this
reality. Most rules relating to humane treatment of persons within the power of the force fit in this category.
3-16. The element of international law that applies is a complex issue that depends on several
considerations. Commanders and staffs need to seek out expert legal advice. No multinational force will
conduct operations in a legal vacuum. The international law requirement for humane treatment and respect
for the life, rights, and property of noncombatants remains constant even if the treaty or customary basis for
those protections differ.
USE OF FORCE LEGAL BASIS
3-17. There are a variety of internationally recognized legal basis for using force in multinational
operations. The UN charter is the primary authority for using force under security council sanctions in the
majority of multinational operations.
(See Chapter VII of the UN charter and FM 1-04 for more
information.)
3-18. Multinational force commanders and planners understand the legal basis for their involvement in the
operation and coordinate with the multinational force legal advisor. Legal issues affecting use of force,
detention, searches and seizures, foreign criminal jurisdiction, and adherence to international law impact
mission accomplishment.
FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
3-19. Multinational forces perform a variety of stability tasks. Criminal jurisdiction is one of the most
important issues that affect commanders and their Soldiers’ ability to accomplish the mission in
multinational operations. The multinational force is not subject to the jurisdiction of any of the parties
engaged in the conflict. This would lead to an undermining of impartiality essential to mission success.
Additionally, the ability to arrest, detain, and try members of the multinational force directly influences the
activities of the operation. The consensual basis (mandate) for the multinational force’s presence in the host
country and the privileges and immunities of any civilians are established.
3-20. In a best-case scenario, these protections are in a document with treaty status and, because of the
nature of multinational operations, negotiated by an intergovernmental organization such as the UN.
However, when the operation is an exercise in regional peacekeeping, the participating nations establish a
legally sound basis sustainable under international law. Thus, during the initial mission analysis and
planning, staff planners make the appropriate arrangements to have all multinational partners contribute to
this legal documentation.
STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENT
3-21. International law recognizes that each sovereign nation has jurisdiction over all persons in its
recognized borders. A receiving state consents to any limitations on this sovereign right before any foreign
nation sending forces (sending state) into that host nation asserts jurisdiction over sending state personnel
sent for military operations. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, military personnel participating
in a multinational operation are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. Because of the
potential ramifications that result from a receiving state exercising jurisdiction over multinational deployed
personnel, a SOFA is essential before a deployment. While a SOFA is in many procedural formats, it
generally addresses three substantive areas of foreign criminal jurisdiction:
3-4
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Human Resource Challenges of Multinational Operations
z
The first area includes cases where the sending state has exclusive jurisdiction. Under exclusive
jurisdiction, the sending state retains sole jurisdiction over cases where its personnel have
committed an offensive punishable under its laws, but not the laws of the receiving state. These
offenses are primarily those characterized as purely “military” offenses (such as absent without
leave or dereliction of duty) under the sending state’s military criminal code.
z
The second area includes cases where the receiving state exercises exclusive jurisdiction. These
offenses are commonly receiving state traffic offenses. These offenses are punishable under the
laws of the receiving state and not the sending state.
z
The third area includes cases where the sending and receiving states share jurisdiction. This is a
concurrent jurisdiction. Under concurrent jurisdiction, either the sending or receiving state
exercises a primary right of jurisdiction depending upon the negotiated offense. As is often the
case, in those cases where the receiving state has a primary right of jurisdiction, the receiving
state either waives its right, or, gives “sympathetic consideration” to requests by the sending
state for jurisdiction.
3-22. In the absence of a SOFA, a sending state retains some criminal jurisdiction over its deployed forces.
In those cases where military personnel participate in a United Nations (UN) mission, those military
personnel have special protection. Further, (under Article VI of the convention on the privileges and
immunities of the UN charter) the state grants deploying forces “expert on mission” status to provide a
strong legal framework for the international and neutral status of the multinational force. In this case,
complete immunity for crimes committed by members of the multinational force is granted. The UN
negotiates a SOFA with the host nation. This is a status of mission agreement. This agreement has
exclusive criminal jurisdiction in the sending states participating in the multinational mission.
3-23. In addition to criminal jurisdiction, civil liability for acts of omission by multinational personnel is
also an important concern to commanders and planners. (This includes, for example, claims by receiving
state civilians for damage during a deployment.) Most SOFAs allow members of the multinational force
exemption from local jurisdiction in civil proceedings for acts
“related to the official duties of the
member.” For example, a claims procedure compensating for damages arising from such acts are a feature
of any SOFA or other agreement with the receiving state. In matters not related to official duties,
multinational members are subject to local jurisdiction with only a few minor concessions in favor of the
force. If service members are involved in any incident not a part of their official duties, they could be liable
in the courts of the receiving state for any damages or injuries they cause.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
3-24. International law applies to all operations. Multinational partners comply with obligations from the
treaties to which they are party. Not all multinational members are party to the same treaties. This creates a
marked disparity between partners as to what they can or cannot do. Some obligations under international
law arise from “customary” international law and are binding on states whether or not they have entered
into a treaty on the subject. For example, most of the internationally recognized rules relating to humane
treatment of persons within the power of a military force fit in this category.
3-25. The law of war is binding on the multinational partners in any operation where a state of armed
conflict exists to which the multinational members are a party. Some aspects of the law of war, such as
prohibitions on using certain weapons, bind multinational partners even though no “state of war” exists.
Even when not strictly applicable, the law of war provides guidance and applies as a part of a multinational
member’s national policy. Within the scope of multinational operations, international human rights law is
an issue. In particular, both treaty and customary international law prohibitions are binding on the
multinational force and its members. These prohibitions include—
z
Genocide.
z
Slavery.
z
Torture.
z
Inhumane treatment.
z
Arbitrary detention.
z
Deprivation of civil rights.
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
3-5
Chapter 3
PRISONERS OF WAR AND DETAINED PERSONS
3-26. Troops involved in peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate are in a special position. These
troops respect the laws relating to using force, but are not parties to the conflict where they maintain peace.
If any troops are taken prisoner, they are not prisoners of war. They are held illegally and must be
immediately released.
3-27. Although not a party to the conflict, members of the multinational force complies with the spirit of
all provisions of the law of war. In many operations, persons who are not entitled to prisoner of war status
are detained by the force. Either the situation has not reached the threshold of international armed conflict
or the individual is not a combatant or otherwise entitled to enjoy prisoner of war status under Geneva
Convention III. The force also detains common criminals who pose a threat to the force or to law and order.
3-28. The status of a captured person is not immediately known. This occurs where opposing forces
comprise or include irregular militia, where there are civilians accompanying the force or acting as
unlawful combatants, or where a spontaneous uprising has occurred.
3-29. The law of war makes clear distinctions between armed and international armed conflict. The legal
distinctions determine the status of any detainees a force takes. The law of war can have limitations.
Detainees are taken in circumstances where law of war does not strictly apply, such as a UN or other peace
operations. For these reasons, international law has evolved to ensure no person is detained without legal
protection.
3-30. International rules of humane treatment apply to anyone who is captured, arrested, interned, retained,
or otherwise detained by multinational personnel. It does not matter whether the persons are enemy
prisoners of war, retained personnel, internees, or detainees. It does not matter whether captivity arises out
of international armed conflict, armed conflict not of an international character, or during peace support
operations. It is important to understand that different countries have different rules regarding the holding
and transfer of enemy prisoners of war. These rules preclude the transfer of enemy prisoners of war
between national contingents.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR NATIONS
3-31. Each nation’s respective chain of command in the multinational force provides its nation’s ROE. The
force headquarters develops multinational force ROE during planning. Subsequently, subordinate
formations from nations other than the force headquarters develop supporting ROE. Some subordinate
ROE vary from the lead-nation’s ROE to comply with national legal requirements and the parameters of
national ROE provided by national chains of command. Subordinate ROE for any given national contingent
provides clear national guidance on other nations’ weapons usage prohibited by law or restricted in usage
for that contingent. Commands know that using another nation’s capability prohibited by the command’s
national ROE place the command at risk of national prosecution.
3-32. U.S. forces assigned operational control or tactical control to a multinational force follow the ROE of
the multinational force to accomplish a mission if authorized by the President of the U.S. or secretary of
defense. U.S. forces use necessary and proportional force for unit and individual self-defense to respond to
a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When U.S. forces under U.S. operational control or tactical
control operate with a multinational force, reasonable efforts are made to affect common ROE. If such
ROE are not established, U.S. forces operate under standing ROE. To avoid misunderstanding, U.S. forces
inform multinational forces before U.S. participation in the operation that U.S. forces intend to operate
under these standing ROE. Varying national obligations derived from international agreements complicate
participation in multinational operations. For example, other multinational force members may not be
parties to treaties that bind the U.S. or treaties to which the U.S. is not a party may bind them. U.S. forces
remain bound by U.S. international agreements even if the other members are not parties to these
agreements and do not need to adhere to the terms.
3-33. ROE are the primary tools used by multinational forces to regulate using force. ROE provide
operational constraints based on the mission the multinational force conducts. Numerous legal factors serve
as a foundation for multinational ROE. This reflects both international law and the national laws of the
various participating nations. Nonlegal issues, such as the political objectives of the multinational force and
3-6
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Human Resource Challenges of Multinational Operations
the individual troop-contributing nations combined with military mission limitations, are also important to
create and apply ROE. Commanders and their legal advisors face the challenge of determining and
implementing acceptable ROE between all nations involved in the multinational operation. The
multinational force legal advisor helps commanders and staffs prepare, disseminate, and train ROE.
However, ROE are the commander’s “rules” the force implements.
3-34. It is probable that some subordinate nation’s ROE differ from the lead nation’s ROE because of
national legal requirements and the parameters of national ROE provided by their respective national
chains of command. To prevent confusion that affects the multinational force’s ability to accomplish its
mission, a subordinate command’s ROE provides clear national guidance on other participating nations’
ROE differences. The operational planning staff defines the ROE of weapons use (such as use of riot
control agents and measures) prohibited by law or restricted in use for one nation for all other multinational
participants. Participating nations do not adhere to ROE measures (whether multinational force or another
troop-contributing nation) that violates their own national laws. Doing so places the command at risk of
national prosecution. An example would be using landmines when their nation signed international treaties
banning landmine use.
3-35. ROE are a control mechanism for use of force during military operations. Individual Soldier and
collective unit training is essential. There is potential for varied differences between the national ROE that
a contributing force regularly uses in training or operations and the ROE set by the multinational force
headquarters. Therefore, the multinational headquarters coalition CJ-3 provides predeployment training
information to any new multinational forces. The commander provides experienced personnel to help with
predeployment training. Realistic and rigorous scenario- or vignette-driven training exercises are the best
way to train ROE to help the command ensure that ROE is properly understood and applied under mission
conditions.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-36. Force members are aware of host nation environmental considerations and participating nations’
environmental legislation during multinational operations, particularly stability tasks. Military materiel
restrictions by one or more armies or the host nation—such as using depleted uranium rounds—limits the
method forces conduct operations. Commanders consider the cultural and historical sensitivities as a factor
in planning. They provide the appropriate guidance to the planning teams. The force headquarters produce
environmental constraints and factors checklist for the force. This helps subordinate commands understand
how operations impact the environment. Force planners also consider these as factors in operational
planning.
CHECKLIST
3-37. Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should answer the following
questions with respect to the personnel support portion of the operation.
PERSONNEL
z
What areas come under multinational control? What areas remain national issues?
z
What are the special skill requirements (unit or individual) of the command?
z
What are the requirements for reserve component units, individuals, or a combination of both?
z
What is the personnel replacement and rotation scheme?
z
What language-qualified personnel are needed for augmentation? What training is available?
z
Has the G-3 or S-3 been consulted on required augmentation?
z
What is the primary means of maintaining personnel accountability and strength management?
z
What is the primary means of processing awards and evaluations?
z
How is the G-1 tracking medical evacuations?
z
What national agreements relating to personnel policy or Service exist? If there are any
constraints, what are they?
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
3-7
Chapter 3
z
What communications capabilities exist to support the submission of personnel reports? (For
example, automation nonsecure internet protocol, secure internet protocol, and combined
enterprise regional information exchange voice networks.) At what echelon are the capabilities
available? What are the theater and national reporting requirements?
z
What are the personnel service support capabilities of multinational force units to provide
essential services? Where do units require capabilities augmentation to ensure minimum
essential services? What liaison officer requirements exist? What translator requirements exist
for the multinational force units?
z
What is the leave policy for force members? Which units are eligible to participate in the rest
and recuperation leave and/or pass programs? Which are not eligible? Can a multinational or
joint task force limit multinational force units’ leave programs to ensure personnel readiness?
z
What are the equivalent modified tables of organization and equipment for multinational force
units? How can a multinational or joint task force headquarters perform personnel replacement
and rotation to ensure unit personnel readiness levels?
z
Does the deployed theater accountability system or the joint personnel status report all
personnel?
z
How do multinational force units track, process, and report casualties in the theater of operations
and to national headquarters? What are the next-of-kin notification procedures? What is the
theater feedback mechanism to the controlling headquarters?
z
What support agreements exist to facilitate postal operations for multinational force units? Do
units have access to Army Post Office and free mail?
z
How are multinational force replacements requisitioned, processed, and delivered to their
respective units?
z
What are the morale, welfare, and recreation capabilities of the multinational force units? What
agreements exist to share morale, welfare, and recreation assets? Are there any special morale,
welfare, and recreation considerations?
z
What national service and/or achievement awards are available to force personnel? What are the
theater processing requirements? How does the theater awards policy ensure equity?
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
z
What areas come under multinational control and what areas remain national issues?
z
Do legal advisors understand national policies?
z
Has a SOFA or status of mission agreement been established with the receiving nations?
z
What are the key differences in SOFAs, if any, across the multinational force area of
responsibility?
z
What are the environmental constraints and factors that affect the conduct of operations?
z
Is there a system to pay for claims arising from personal injury or property damage resulting
from the operation?
z
What are the legal and fiscal constraints involving logistic assistance to nonmilitary
organizations and other nations’ forces?
z
What are the multinational force’s obligations to war crimes’ investigations and indictment? Are
these obligations consistent with the multinational force’s mandate?
z
What are the multinational force’s obligations to the host nation police forces, international
police force, or both forces deployed in the multinational AO?
z
What are the host nation laws with respect to civil rights of its citizens?
z
Are host nation judicial infrastructures intact? If so, has liaison been affected? If not, what
resources and procedures are required to establish them?
z
What is the legal status of enemy prisoners of war?
z
What is the legal status of displaced civilians?
z
What are the differing troop-contributing nation’s national policies for using antipersonnel
mines? How does this affect the multinational force?
3-8
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Human Resource Challenges of Multinational Operations
z
Who is responsible for interrogation of enemy prisoners of war or detainees?
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
z
Are there multinational ROE that all nations have agreed to?
z
How does the ROE impact the troop-contributing nations?
z
How does each troop-contributing nation disseminate and train ROE to its Soldiers?
z
Have the ROE been distributed to the Soldiers? Has training been performed before
deployment? Has the ROE training been effective?
z
What are the key differences in ROE across the multinational force? How does this impact upon
the multinational force headquarters’ ability to accomplish its mission?
z
Are there national restrictions or points of contention concerning ROE that the commander must
know?
z
Are there ROE on using indirect fire? Are there force guidelines on using indirect fire as a
demonstration of intent? Is there a difference between the multinational force ROE on using
indirect fire and national protection requirements?
z
Does each troop-contributing nation have a common or clear understanding of the terms used in
the ROE?
z
Has the use of certain systems or equipment—such as defoliants, riot control agents, or
landmines—been evaluated for its impact in relation to the ROE and upon the multinational
force’s ability to accomplish its mission?
z
Is there joint targeting? Are there ROE for joint fires? Are there systems available to assess
collateral damage from joint fires?
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
3-9
Chapter 4
Intelligence Concerns for Multinational Operations
This chapter begins by discussing multinational intelligence and multinational
information sharing. It then discusses multinational forces operations planning. Next,
the chapter discusses effective coordination for multinational operations, stability
operations support, and information gathering importance. Lastly, this chapter
discusses information versus intelligence and includes a checklist for commanders
and staffs.
MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
4-1. The multinational forces synchronize its intelligence efforts with unified action partners to achieve
unity of effort and to meet the multinational commander’s intent. Intelligence unity of effort is critical to
accomplish the mission. Unified action partners are important to intelligence in all operations.
Multinational and interagency partners provide cultural awareness and unique perspectives that reinforce
and complement Army intelligence capabilities. Using appropriate procedures and established policy,
multinational force intelligence leaders provide information and intelligence support to multinational
forces. The G-2/S-2 staff leverages the intelligence enterprise to answer the commander’s requirements.
4-2. Intelligence leaders ensure that the intelligence warfighting function operates effectively and
efficiently. They are the commander’s primary advisors on employing intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance (ISR) and information collection assets. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is an
activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing,
exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an
integrated intelligence and operations function (JP 2-01). The ISR effort must be unified. Intelligence
leaders drive ISR and information collection. Additionally, intelligence analysts support their commanders
with analysis and production of timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive assessments and products tailored
to the commander’s needs. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on intelligence and the intelligence
warfighting function.)
MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING
4-3. Every multinational operation is different and so are the ways the force collects and disseminates
intelligence. Classification presents a problem in releasing information, but keeping as much unclassified as
possible improves interoperability, trust, and operational effectiveness in the multinational force.
Intelligence sharing is the most contentious issue in multinational operations, and one that commanders
fully address to ensure everyone understands national policy limitations. Commanders know other nation’s
positions on intelligence sharing and assure that intelligence is shared to the degree possible, especially if
required for mission accomplishment and force protection. Early information sharing during planning
ensures that multinational force requirements are clearly stated, guidance supports the commander’s intent,
and the multinational force uses procedures supportable by other nations.
4-4. The G-2/S-2 articulates the release instructions to analysts and planners who write for releasability to
the members of a particular coalition. The G-2/S-2 consults the intelligence foreign disclosure officer early
in an operation to facilitate lines of communication between Army elements and allied nations.
4-5. The national policies on intelligence affect intelligence. Each multinational force develops
intelligence procedures tailored to the mission. These procedures are responsive to the commander and
deliver timely intelligence products.
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
4-1
Chapter 4
MULTINATIONAL FORCES OPERATIONS PLANNING
4-6. Centralized control is important but often unattainable in intelligence operations. As with command
relationships, an organization evolves that has some national assets and intelligence at the multinational
force’s disposal, while others are under national control. Due to the nature of many intelligence sources, it
is unlikely that nations make all of their sources available for a multinational force to task. Those who plan
multinational intelligence operations consider this during the planning phase. Many nations have a national
intelligence cell at the multinational force headquarters. Taskings by, and support to, the multinational
force flow through this cell. Integrating intelligence representatives and liaison personnel at each
organizational level improves access to intelligence capabilities. Matching intelligence requirements with
available assets in an area of operations (AO) is the basis of a collection plan.
4-7. The multinational force executes ISR through operations and intelligence (with an emphasis on
intelligence analysis and leveraging the larger intelligence enterprise) and information collection. The
commander provides the G-2/S-2 with a clear mission statement, commander’s intent, and commander’s
critical information requirements. A multinational force’s ability to gather and process intelligence varies
widely. The command’s synchronization manager accounts for this and tasks accordingly. The
synchronization manager matches various sources with requirements to answer commander’s critical
information requirements. Sharing and mutual support are key to integrating all resources into a unified
system to best meet the command’s intelligence requirements. The G-2/S-2 prioritizes intelligence
requirements to meet the commander’s needs.
MULTINATIONAL FORCES COMMUNICATIONS AND
PROCESSING
4-8. The ability to collect, process, and disseminate information to many users requires effective lateral
and vertical communication. The multinational force has a system and operating procedures to transmit
critical intelligence rapidly to units. This system relies on the distribution of standardized equipment by the
lead nation to ensure commonality. It includes liaison officers at major intelligence centers to provide
redundant communication to their parent nation and to determine and obtain intelligence suited for that
nation’s mission in time to exploit it.
4-9. Multinational intelligence operations cannot be conducted exclusively using U.S. systems.
Multinational force members exchange intelligence information among each of the partners. As a result,
intelligence staffs help develop an intelligence architecture that enables participating members to
communicate effectively in the multinational force without compromising U.S. security interests. The
establishment of a local area network using systems such as linked operations-intelligence centers Europe
or Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System greatly enhance information sharing in the
coalition. The Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System operational architecture
framework is the same for all combatant commands and leverages existing networks, technology, and
network centers. Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System services include e-mail,
web, chat, and common operational picture capabilities and use controlled interfaces for two-way
information flows among U.S. military commands and multinational partners.
EFFECTIVE COORDINATION FOR MULTINATIONAL
OPERATIONS
4-10. A multinational force compensates for the lack of standardization through coordination. The
communications architecture is an essential element in this area. Areas requiring extensive coordination
include—
z
Friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
z
Use of space assets, location of intelligence assets, and location of intelligence collection targets.
z
Intelligence effort that is multinational and serves both the multinational and national needs.
4-11. The commander’s critical information requirements and priority information requirements are the
focus of the intelligence effort. Commanders find answers by coordinating at all levels. Fusion centers
4-2
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Intelligence Concerns for Multinational Operations
improve dynamic operational support by integrating mission command with focused analysis in a single
centralized entity. These centers are not intelligence-led organizations. These centers are an ad hoc
collaborative effort between several units, organizations, or agencies that provide resources, expertise,
information, and intelligence to a center with the goal of supporting the rapid execution of operations by
contributing members. Fusion centers focus collection and promote information sharing across multiple
participants in a specific geographic area or mission type. These centers are not operations centers, but
enable multinational operations. Multinational commanders at various echelons create fusion centers to
manage the flow of information and intelligence, focus information collection to satisfy information
requirements, and process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the resulting collection.
STABILITY OPERATIONS SUPPORT
4-12. There are no standard templates for intelligence support to stability operations. Commanders use the
same approach for stability operations as for war. In stability tasks, the nature and intensity of a potential
threat changes even more suddenly and dramatically than in other operations.
4-13. Stability operations demand greater attention to the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in
an AO than conventional war. Stability operations expand intelligence preparation of the battlefield beyond
geographical and force capability considerations. The centers of gravity frequently are not military forces
or terrain. Cultural information is critical to gauge the potential reactions of the population to the operation,
to avoid misunderstandings, and to improve the effectiveness of operations. Changes dependent on the
situation in populace behavior suggest a needed change in multinational strategy. Biographic information
and leadership analyses are key factors to understand adversaries, their methods of operation, and
interaction with the environment. Knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO and the
historical background of hostilities underlying the deployment are vital to mission accomplishment. Such
information helps prevent unintentional mission creep and achieve the objectives of the operation.
4-14. The commander’s understanding of the local infrastructure improves situational understanding.
Traditional reconnaissance elements still provide information, but local media, diplomatic mission
personnel, and civilian agencies provide information not available elsewhere.
4-15. A commander’s approach to civilian organizations for information, including the media, is open and
transparent. The commander states the information’s intended use to avoid undermining cooperative efforts
with such agencies. Keep the media informed to maintain the willingness for information exchange.
INFORMATION GATHERING IMPORTANCE
4-16. The commander considers the intelligence and information role that all Soldiers have in stability
operations. The primary source of intelligence in stability tasks come from human intelligence. Medical,
transportation, civil affairs, military information support operations
(MISO), military police, engineer
personnel, patrols and advisors or observers are also sources of information. These personnel operate in the
host nation environment and discern change in it. Interpreters, elicitations, debriefs of indigenous
personnel, screening operations, and patrolling are primary sources to assess the economic and health
needs, military capability, and political intent of those receiving assistance.
4-17. The commander emphasizes the importance of intelligence gathering to all personnel and provides
guidelines to improve intelligence gathering. Multinational commanders know that each nation has a set of
established legal norms that govern intelligence operations. These include all intelligence domains and
counterintelligence. Achieving multinational intelligence operation requires coordination at the national
level.
4-18. The intelligence community works with several government agencies in multinational operations.
Synthesizing and leveraging intelligence information from the various agencies presents many challenges.
To overcome this, agencies assign personnel to a multinational headquarters to improve interagency
coordination. For example, during past operations—
z
Central Intelligence Agency analysts worked with military intelligence analysts.
z
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents worked with military members performing forensic
analysis of explosions.
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
4-3
Chapter 4
z
Department of the Treasury agents worked with military analysts on foreign funding of
insurgency operations.
z
Drug Enforcement Administration agents worked with military analysts to determine linkage of
drug trafficking and insurgent actions.
4-19. Agents serve as liaisons to a multinational corps or a multinational force to facilitate intelligence
support and synchronize agency operations with military operations. Interagency players have access to
many forms of specialized information that completes the intelligence picture. Multinational partners have
similar interagency personnel assigned from their own countries whose role commanders and staff must
understand.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
4-20. Intelligence operations are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain
information to satisfy validated requirements (ADRP 2-0). These requirements are in the information
collection plan. Intelligence operations collect information about the intent, activities, and capabilities of
threats and relevant aspects of the operational environment to support multinational commanders’
decisionmaking. Data and information collected during the course of intelligence operations is essential to
the development of timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence products. Intelligence
operations use mission orders and standard command and support relationships. Intelligence operations are
shaping operations used by the commander for decisive action. Flexibility and adaptability to changing
situations are critical to conduct effective intelligence operations. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on
intelligence operations and the intelligence disciplines.)
4-21. The multinational intelligence disciplines are as follows:
z
Counterintelligence is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive,
exploit, disrupt or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or
assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their
agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities (JP 2-01.2).
z
Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to
describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on
the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial
intelligence (JP 2-03).
z
Human intelligence is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and
provided by human sources (JP 2-0).
z
Measurement and signature intelligence is intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative
analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and
hydromagnetic) derived from technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive
features associated with the emitter or sender, and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or
measurement of the same. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted (JP 2-0).
z
Open-source intelligence is information of potential intelligence value that is available to the
general public (JP 2-0).
z
Signals intelligence - a category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination
all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals
intelligence, however transmitted (JP 2-0).
z
Technical intelligence is intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and
exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the
purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical
capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s technological
advantages (JP 2-0).
COMPLIMENTARY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
4-22. Complimentary intelligence capabilities contribute valuable information for all-source intelligence to
conduct operations. The complimentary intelligence capabilities are specific to the unit and circumstances
at each echelon and vary across the intelligence enterprise. See ADRP 2-0 for more information.
4-4
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Intelligence Concerns for Multinational Operations
z
Biometrics-enabled intelligence is the information associated with and/or derived from biometric
signatures and associated contextual information that positively identifies a specific person
and/or matches an unknown identity to a place, activity, device, component, or weapon (ADRP
2-0).
z
Cyber-enabled intelligence - produced through the combination of intelligence analysis and the
collaboration of information concerning activity in cyberspace and the electromagnetic
spectrum.
z
Document and media exploitation is the processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination of
collected hardcopy documents and electronic media that are under the U.S. government’s
physical control and are not publicly available. (See TC 2-91.8 for more information.) Threat
intent, capabilities, and limitations may be derived through the exploitation of captured
materials.
z
Forensic-enabled intelligence - helps accurately identify networked and complex threats and
attributes them to incidents and activities.
INFORMATION VERSUS INTELLIGENCE
4-23. National sensitivities exist about disseminating intelligence in multinational operations. These
sensitivities extend to the term intelligence. Consider the ramifications of labeling information as
intelligence, especially when dealing with civilian organizations. Many cultures view intelligence as
information gathered on the nation’s citizens for use against them.
4-24. Attempts to exchange information with civilian agencies are stifled. Civilian agencies maintain
neutrality by refusing to participate in any perceived intelligence programs. To enhance exchanging
information, the command labels unclassified data as “information” rather than “intelligence.”
4-25. The following concepts guide multinational intelligence operations:
z
Adjust for national differences in intelligence concepts.
z
Create an integrated multinational staff and intelligence center with representatives from all
participating nations in the national limits on intelligence sharing.
z
View the mission from a multinational and national perspective. Treat a threat to one member as
a threat to all members.
z
Agree to and plan for multinational intelligence requirements in advance of the operation.
z
Plan complementary intelligence operations using all multinational intelligence resources,
focusing on national strengths to enhance and overcome weaknesses in others.
z
Exchange liaison officers to help reduce problems of culture, language, doctrine, and
intelligence requirements.
CHECKLIST
4-26. Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the
following questions with respect to the intelligence portion of the operation.
WARNING/PLANNING PHASE
z
What are the commander’s critical information requirements? Have the commander’s critical
information requirements been clearly stated to focus the collection effort?
z
Does the multinational force have an initial all-source and collection management working
group? What are their positions in the deployment timetable?
z
Has the command performed initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield, including
counterintelligence estimates?
z
Does the collection plan identify gaps in intelligence? Does the collection plan incorporate all
collection assets available for tasking? Are there any specific cultural, historical, language,
customs, or religious relationships between the multinational force partners and the adversary?
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
4-5
Chapter 4
z
Have the cultural, social, political, religious, media, language, and economic factors in the AO
been included in the intelligence estimate?
z
Have the adversary’s use of space assets been analyzed? Have requests for denying militarily
useful space information to the adversary been considered?
z
What is the intelligence architecture?
z
Does the intelligence architecture meet mission requirements? Are there any gaps in coverage?
z
Has the command and control information system been established to disseminate the time-
sensitive information for targeting or rapid reaction to all participants?
z
Do multinational forces obtain or use intelligence and imagery data type commonly used by
other multinational forces?
z
Have sufficient intelligence collection resources been placed under the control of the
multinational force? Are the national resources immediately responsive to the multinational
force?
z
Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information into multinational
centralized processing and exploitation centers?
z
What are the commander’s requirements for intelligence briefings and products?
z
What is the counterintelligence plan?
z
Is there a single focus for asset management?
z
Are intelligence-gathering tasks assigned according to the commander’s critical information
requirements and the capability of the multinational equipment under multinational force
control?
z
Has theater reconnaissance been undertaken to use available assets?
z
What are the multinational force intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities and plans?
z
What are the procedures for sharing intelligence and information or releasing information
policies? Are all multinational partners treated equally, considering compartmented and national
sensitivities?
z
How is strategic intelligence shared among other forces?
z
What are the levels of interoperability between different intelligence information systems
including database compatibility?
z
What are the staffing requirements for the G-2/S-2 staff including specialists, linguists, and
liaison officers including a subordinate joint force intelligence directorate counterintelligence
and human intelligence staff element staff? What support is available from the G-1/S-1?
z
What are the requirements for national intelligence centers?
z
What are the differences in availability and capability of national collection sources?
z
What are the requirements for rules of engagement (ROE) governing intelligence aspects of the
operation such as human intelligence activities or reporting?
z
What are the contingency plans when normal communication channels fail?
z
What are the multinational or force security procedures?
z
What links should be established with civilian agencies including the media? Have efforts been
made to pool information with applicable civilian agencies?
z
Have human intelligence and counterintelligence operations been deconflicted through the joint
force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element?
z
Has using a counterintelligence coordinating authority and human intelligence operations chief
been staffed?
z
Are resources available in the joint force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and human
intelligence staff element to deconflict and synchronize collection, debriefing, and interrogation
activities in the AO?
z
Do the subordinate forces have collection assets available? What type? What are their
capabilities and limitations?
z
Is the analysis effort prioritized and have analytical production responsibilities been clearly laid
out for coalition members?
4-6
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Intelligence Concerns for Multinational Operations
z
Are intelligence liaison officers planned for in the operation?
z
Is the intelligence support package planned for with capabilities and limitations explained to
supporting units?
z
Have intelligence staff attachments and detachments been planned?
z
Are training programs in place with a focus creating a common view of the enemy, enemy
dispositions, threat characteristics, doctrine, capabilities, and intelligence systems?
z
Has intelligence daily cycle been established? Does it include reporting timelines and routine
briefings and conferences? Have collection management timelines been defined?
z
Have intelligence-reporting formats been defined and rehearsed?
z
Does the deployment plan provide for early deployment of intelligence assets in the theater of
operations?
z
Have routine and emergency “classified” destruction procedures been announced along with
classified handling procedures?
z
What is the criminal threat? How is criminal intelligence incorporated into the commander’s
critical information requirement?
THREATS
z
What enemy chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE),
delivery means, and employment doctrine exists?
z
What enemy conventional, irregular, special operations forces, and/or asymmetric forces exist or
may be introduced into AOs? What infrastructure (such as nuclear power plants, chemical
industries, hospital radiotherapy sources) exists that could result in low-level radiation or toxic
industrial chemical hazards?
z
What intelligence-gathering assets are available to monitor CBRNE threat changes?
z
The threat assessment should consider the following:
The adversary’s military intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
assets and capabilities. Can it detect and locate friendly activities?
The adversary’s espionage and covert intelligence capability. Does it have operatives in the
AO?
The adversary’s capability to conduct information operations and command and control
warfare activities, including those aimed at audiences or targets outside the AO.
The adversary’s early warning—including distant early warning—capability. Can it
intercept, direction find, jam, or interfere with friendly transmissions? Does it possess distant
early warning? Laser blinding weapons are currently available on the international market, and
other weapon systems will be fielded in the near future.
The adversary’s weapons of mass destruction capability. This considers political intent,
industrial infrastructure, delivery systems, and warheads. It also considers the impact of strikes
in terms of degradation, casualties, loss of tempo, and their physical and psychological effect on
allies and civil populace.
The adversary’s capability to conduct long-range operations, particularly with its longer-
range strike assets. Can its main forces interfere with the multinational’s sustaining operations?
The adversary’s weapons, logistics, doctrine, training, intent, and performance in recent conflicts
should be considered. Factors include air, surface-to-surface missiles, air-delivered forces, naval
and marine assets, special operations forces, operational level forward and raiding detachments,
and operational maneuver groups.
z
The threat assessment also considers—
Adversary sympathizers, agents, and partisans in the AO. Will they perform information
gathering, espionage, guerrilla acts, or a combination of activities?
Terrorist, criminal, and insurgent organizations. What are their aims, capabilities, and
methods?
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
4-7
Chapter 4
In stability tasks, the adversary’s antiair and antiarmor capability. Is additional protection
(such as defensive aid suites) required? An antiair and antiarmor capability is assumed in war
fighting.
The attitude of the civil population (by region if appropriate) to the force presence. Are they
hostile, neutral, or favorably disposed towards forces? Could the population’s perceptions be
altered by friendly or adversary actions, including information operations?
Sabotage, in the form of planned attacks by adversary special forces or other agents, or more
spontaneous activities by locally employed civilians.
Subversion and hostile MISO. An adversary attempts to subvert friendly forces, either
individually to gain leverage or collectively for political and military advantage.
Likelihood of theft. This is a significant problem in poorer countries.
Health risks. These include endemic and sexually transmitted diseases, climatic extremes,
and environmental and pollution hazards that include residual weapons of mass destruction
contamination and the prevalence of illegal drugs.
Mines. The presence and location of vehicle and antipersonnel mines in the AO. Current
and earlier conflicts must be considered.
Road conditions and local driving patterns. In Bosnia, road deaths outnumber those killed
by military action.
Fire hazards. Weather and vegetation create fire hazards. Living in makeshift
accommodations presents a substantial fire risk, particularly in a cold climate.
Fratricide. The risk of fratricide increases in war fighting, but is present at all times. It is
particularly likely in multinational operations.
Attack aviation. Adversary aviation attacks threaten our own sustaining operations. The
most vulnerable area for a threat posed by an adversary’s attack is the sustaining operations area.
Commanders consider and plan for this threat.
PREDEPLOYMENT PHASE
z
Have the commander and staff been briefed on the initial intelligence preparation of the
battlefield?
z
Who are the host nation, civilian agency, and media contacts?
z
Have all intelligence systems, including communications and information systems, been
rehearsed?
z
Do subordinate forces have sufficient personnel to handle the amount of intelligence available?
z
Has all familiarization training on deploying intelligence systems been completed?
z
How will national intelligence cells exchange intelligence between multinational nations?
DEPLOYMENT PHASE
z
Have staff and liaison officers at all levels established and tested the intelligence architecture,
including communications and information systems and supporting liaison officers? Are links
with the host nation, civilian agencies, and the media functioning?
z
Has the collection management plan been refined?
z
Have the commander’s briefing and intelligence product requirements been refined?
z
What additional specialist personnel or equipment is required?
z
What is the effectiveness of standard operating procedures for—
Handover by the in-country force?
Operations of all-source cell, collection, coordination and intelligence requirements
management cell, and national intelligence cell?
Compatibility of intelligence communications and information systems?
Protocols for the handling human intelligence sources?
z
Was the process for the national intelligence cells to exchange intelligence between nations
effective?
4-8
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Intelligence Concerns for Multinational Operations
z
Have human and intelligence and counterintelligence operations been deconflicted?
z
Have national intelligence summaries, imagery, and threat assessments approved for
dissemination been shared?
EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS THREAT
z
What are the explosive hazards (such as mine, unexploded explosive ordnance, booby trap, or
improvised explosive device) in the AO?
z
What data is available on mines already in place or the types of booby traps/improvised
explosive devices employed in the AO?
z
What types of friendly munitions have been employed in the AO and at what location? What is
the likelihood of components of those becoming improvised explosive devices?
z
Are there indications that booby traps have been or will be emplaced by withdrawing forces or
threat elements that stay behind?
REDEPLOYMENT PHASE
z
What are the handover procedures for intelligence and physical architecture to the United
Nations (UN) or other agencies? Do the procedures include protocols for information exchange
and handling, resettlement, or handover of human intelligence sources?
z
Are security procedures for the redeployment of personnel, equipment, and documentation
adequate and properly supervised?
z
What are the requirements for briefings and have the various levels performed the necessary
debriefings?
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
4-9
Chapter 5
Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
This chapter begins by giving a multinational operations overview. It then discusses
the importance of early and transition planning in multinational operations. Lastly,
this chapter discusses the importance of training in multinational forces and then
provides a checklist for commanders and staffs.
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS OVERVIEW
5-1. Operations conducted by a multinational force require coordination among all entities. Coordination
occurs in all phases of the operation from planning and deployment to redeployment. Multinational force
commanders and their staff involve their multinational partners as much as needed. Exchanging
information among multinational formations must occur as soon as possible.
EARLY PLANNING
5-2. Multinational planning starts before the actual operation and uses generic plans to build the plan
around. Depending on the type and nature of operations conducted, planning includes governmental
agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Predeployment,
deployment, sustainment, transition, roles, participation, and redeployment operations are addressed in the
plans.
STRATEGIC SCHEME
5-3. Military advice to the President, state department, national security agency, and the secretary of
defense or another nation’s authority is critical in multinational planning and execution. Commanders
understand each national agency’s role to help shape multinational goals and objectives for an agreed upon
end state. This determines the strategic end state, objectives, capabilities, force composition, and key
command positions of the multinational force. Commanders ensure that political leaders understand the
force’s abilities, limitations, and time required to plan and prepare for an operation. The multinational
commander and staff know how the legitimizing authority intends to terminate the operation and ensure
that its outcomes endure.
5-4. The mandate of a legitimizing authority, such as the UN or other multinational political organization,
supports strategic planning. The mandate is expanded by terms of reference that establish the limits of the
mission, operational parameters, standardization of all operational measures, and specified authorities to
conduct operations for the military. (For example, the right to search civilians and seize property.) Nations
supplement the terms of reference with national guidance for their own military force.
5-5. Whether in terms of reference or another form, all staff elements secure guidance because it is the
starting point for the military appreciation, analysis, and estimate process. This is the first step in campaign
planning and it establishes a common understanding of the mandate among multinational partners. Without
a common understanding, agreement on the role of the military, required forces, acceptable risk, and rules
of engagement (ROE) cannot be formed. A comprehensive approach for a joint or multinational operation
or campaign is essential for the operation. Support from the international communities, contributing
nations, and the involved parties including the civil community is crucial. The military strategic objectives
for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other military forces in the area of operations (AO)
help achieve the desired outcomes, both national and international, for the different key representatives
involved with civilian organizations and agencies. In the framework of a NATO or alliance led operation,
this includes, but is not limited to, extraction operations; tasks to support disaster relief and humanitarian
operations; search and rescue or support to non-combatant evacuation operations; freedom of navigation
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
5-1
Chapter 5
and overflight enforcement; sanction and embargo enforcement; and counterinsurgency. At the tactical
level, this possibility creates incentive-based opportunities to cooperate while carrying out certain tasks.
CAMPAIGN PREPARATION
5-6. The ability to alert, mobilize, and rapidly deploy forces in any region is critical to mission success.
Understanding the limitations and capabilities of multinational forces’ contributions helps create a secure
and stable environment. Planners review national military contingents and host nation assets. These
considerations allow the necessary forces to deploy efficiently with the available lift assets. Understanding
the current infrastructure and transportation limitations in the region and host nation helps the force allocate
resources. Once resources are committed, national contingent units and liaison offices coordinate with the
host nation for deployment in the AO. Multinational operations require planners to anticipate and
coordinate requirements to maximize capabilities and minimize resources for the multinational force. This
minimizes duplication of effort from the host nation.
5-7. Transition planning is integral to campaign planning. Transition happens simultaneously with the
other elements. This helps the timely creation of the subsequent force and promotes a smooth transition.
The mandate of the host nation and the nation’s agreement expresses political will. The terms of reference
establish conditions for execution. The campaign plan translates these into military and political tasks,
ways, and means.
FORCE PROJECTION FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCES
5-8. Force projection for a multinational force is critical to mission accomplishment. Participants know
the multinational considerations from the beginning to deploy forces and use lift assets. Multinational
operations duplicate effort and unit capabilities. For example, before the United Nations (UN) protection
force deployed to the former Republic of Yugoslavia, each participating nation performed its own engineer
reconnaissance of the infrastructure. This resulted in duplications and omissions. The multinational force
coordinates and anticipates requirements during this phase to maximize capabilities and minimize
resources. Planners review national military contingents and host nation assets. The host nation and
multinational force planners agree on a division of labor.
5-9. Limited lift means maximizing efficiency during deployment. This requires coordination with the
host nation so units do not deploy capabilities already available, such as port operations forces. In some
cases, one multinational force transports another nation’s forces to the AO. Liaison officers from national
contingents coordinate with the nation moving its forces or with the multinational force headquarters
responsible for coordinating the movements with the nation providing lift. Chapter 6 provides additional
information on sustainment.
MISSION FOCUS FOR THE COMMANDER
5-10. Political considerations and the military capabilities of the multinational force are the most important
factors in multinational operations. The commander remains focused on the mission and understands the
reason each national contingent participates. This determines the structure and resultant taskings of the
multinational forces. Failure to understand causes the force to split into components operating under
differing political directions. The commander recognizes that political considerations force the choice of an
acceptable course of action, rather than the optimum military solution. The commander remains flexible to
adjust to unforeseen political influences, keeps the multinational forces focused on the military objective,
and avoids mission creep.
5-11. Leaders assign functions to a smaller group of partners to overcome differences in doctrine, training,
or equipment. For example, the multinational force assigns the mission of support area security to home
defense or police forces. Commanders entrust one member of the multinational force with air defense,
coastal defense, or some special operation based on the threat’s special capabilities. Commanders recognize
the strengths and differences of the forces’ cultures. Commanders’ decisions and military leadership on
employment consider the capabilities of the forces. Subordinate commanders request control of forces that
5-2
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
provide capabilities not organic to that nation’s forces. The guiding principle is to allocate assets, as
needed, and maintain concentrated critical capabilities.
5-12. The commander’s ability to understand and integrate each nation’s capabilities into a cohesive force
binds a multinational operation together. Commanders articulate their intent. This enables each nation to
form the same picture of end state and the rules governing engagements. Given the language difficulties
found in many multinational forces, commanders clearly and simply state their intent. The planning
guidance emphasizes the following at minimum:
z
The purpose of the operation.
z
A mission statement for the multinational forces.
z
Broad objectives and tasks for the multinational forces.
z
Desired end states and guidance on termination or transition.
z
Participating nations and expected initial contributions.
z
Common security interests.
z
Specific national limitations, concerns, or sensitivities.
COMMANDER’S INTENT
5-13. A commander clearly and simply articulates intent to avoid language barriers among multinational
forces. As a result, each nation forms the same picture of the end state and the rules governing
engagements.
TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
5-14. The designated multinational commander has authority over national units at some point. Planners
accomplish transfer of authority as early as possible. The timing of the transfer is part of the initial
negotiations that govern how the multinational force forms. Planners determine where the transfer of
authority and the subsequent integration of units and headquarters occur. Early transfer of authority enables
the multinational commander to plan and perform effective integration training.
5-15. The first option is to arrange transfer of authority to the multinational force before deploying a unit’s
home station. Commanders control the unit arrival sequence to best suit operational requirements and
facilitate reception area base operations. This option assumes clear political consensus, timely decisions on
national participation, and a significant lead-time for planning and setting up the multinational force
headquarters.
5-16. The second option is to have transfer of authority at an intermediate staging base en route to the
operational area. Forces resolve problems in a secure area. Forces deploy only when fully ready and in the
sequence required by the multinational force.
5-17. The third option is to have transfer of authority occur once forces arrive in the AO. This option
leaves each nation responsible to deploy its contingent and prepare it for operations. It does not allow the
multinational force positive control of deployment into the AO.
5-18. Centralized control of force flow provides the best support to the multinational force’s requirements
and the best support to the forces. Whichever option the commander chooses for transfer of authority,
central coordination of deploying forces is preferred so that reception operations are not done by repetitive
crisis management.
5-19. Each multinational nation has a different way to plan operations. If a lead-nation commands the
multinational force, then the lead-nations use their own planning. At national contingent headquarters,
nations use their own planning.
PLANNING GROUPS FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCES
5-20. A multinational planning group facilitates multinational planning. The planning group includes the
commander and representatives from appropriate multinational staff sections and national formations.
These planning groups have a wide range of diversity and different perspectives to strategic and operational
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
5-3
Chapter 5
problems and solutions. When the multinational force is formed, the commander decides on the
organization and functions of the planning group and how the group and the staff sections interact during
planning and execution. This planning group should—
z
Perform crisis action planning.
z
Be the focal point for operation plan or operation order development.
z
Perform future planning.
z
Perform other tasks as directed.
5-21. Simultaneously, commanders conduct operations and understand their decisions and actions affect
national and international decisions and the attitudes and actions of host nation citizens.
TRANSITION PLANNING
5-22. Transition looks like handing over security responsibility to rejuvenated or recently raised and
trained forces. For security, responsibility is one line of effort in the campaign, and the military campaign is
one strategy in a comprehensive national foreign policy.
5-23. Transition planning is an integral part of operational planning. Most multinational operations end in a
transition from multinational control to UN, host nation military, or host nation civilian control. Transition
planning extends throughout planning and into operations and redeployment. It must be as detailed as any
other planning. The commander and staff plan with the organization taking control. The multinational force
is most vulnerable during transition and redeployment if the multinational force draws down prematurely or
if the security environment is not stable and permissive. Protecting the force is the most important
consideration.
5-24. Staff sections highlight organization and function in the transition plan. Staff develops checklists to
facilitate the transition. Staff sections recommend how to organize the incoming staff and develop turnover
files. Staffs often forget these files in the haste to redeploy.
5-25. Planning links the departure of the force with the anticipated arrival of the organization taking
charge. All levels of command and staffs must have knowledge of the incoming force or organization.
Funding is a major obstacle, especially when working with the UN. Another concern in working with the
UN is ensuring enough UN staff and officers are deployed for transition. The incoming headquarters co-
locate with the multinational force headquarters. This enhances the assimilation of the incoming staff with
the outgoing staff.
5-26. Transition as part of an exit strategy involves a number of stages. As with many coalition foreign
policies, transition is complex and nonlinear. This depends on many variables. Military planners and
commanders remain flexible throughout transition as each national government adjusts priorities.
5-27. Regardless of context, transition fulfills a political objective first. The timing, tempo, and nature of
transition is inconsistent with other military activities. Transition is difficult to achieve with limited and
decreasing resources. It is a transition of military operations only, with other national government strategies
such as economic, governance, and development support, continuing in the future or involving a complete
disengagement from area of interest.
5-28. The center of any transition includes two elements supporting and being supported. These
relationships between the two are interdependent. Planners establish the degree of involvement and roles in
early planning.
5-29. The multinational force does not impose the end state. It reflects local situations to local issues. It
will always require compromises or mutually agreed standards “good enough” in a host nation context.
Transition remains fragile for some time. Transition is not just a handover or a straightforward handback.
5-30. The area of interest has a multi-stakeholder environment. These stakeholders come from other
government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nonprofit
organizations, private companies, and individuals. Stakeholders also include the UN, regional groupings,
third party states and bilateral/multinational police forces, diplomatic staff, government agencies,
multinational groups
(in areas of health, religion, human rights, rights of children, agriculture, and
5-4
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
engineering), intergovernmental organizations (the World Bank and World Health Organization), private
contractors
(security, logistics, construction, and health), private corporations, and well intentioned
individuals. All units understand this web of assistance and incorporate it into transition.
5-31. Developing working knowledge and understanding key stakeholders, including what they provide for
multinational forces, is vital to the overall success of the transition line of effort. The complexities of
operating under different objectives, timelines, situational understanding, and funding streams add new
challenges to help maintain momentum.
TYPES OF TRANSITIONS FROM MULTINATIONAL FORCES
5-32. The following describe the types of transitions. Some of the key planning aspects of transition
operations are also included.
z
Multinational force military relief-in-place. This transition has normal military operation
emphasis on mission and protecting the force. The relief-in-place would use doctrine from the
lead-nation.
z
Multinational force military to civilian or UN authorities. This transition occurs with a normal
UN civilian support type mission with emphasis on military support to the civilian and UN
missions. Both the military and civilian authorities—
Identify the conditions suitable for handover.
Identify and agree on responsibilities for command and control of operation.
Identify the necessary phases of the operation.
z
UN chapter escalation or de-escalation or the ROE situation. The command places emphasis on
ROE and protection. The command—
Confirms multinational members.
Identifies national differences of ROE.
Identifies protection issues.
z
Multinational force military handover to a national government. This transition is a withdrawal
performed in peaceful conditions when redeploying elements and host nation control achieves
the desired end state. The military places emphasis on fully handing over responsibilities and
allowing the government to assume power and authority. The command identifies those
capabilities that remain behind to ensure that a seamless handover of authority and support to the
government occurs.
CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD
5-33. The concept of using contractors on the battlefield as force multipliers has increased steadily since
the middle
1990’s. Contractors will not replace multinational force structure but will augment the
multinational force capabilities and provide additional options for meeting support requirements. This
means commanders and staffs manage risk assessments based on current threat and the additional planning
requirements. Commanders and staff include contractor needs when considering the unit’s life support,
logistics, security, and mission requirements on deploying units. This impacts the availability of
warfighters for the tactical missions.
5-34. There are two types of contractors on the battlefield: system and contingency.
z
System contractors are involved in the manufacture and life-cycle management of major systems
including vehicles, weapons, and aircraft. They provide the technical and maintenance support
for the systems they produce during peacetime and wartime. These contractors include host
nation, third country, or U.S. contractors.
z
Contingency contractors provide support primarily during contingencies. Depending on mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations
(METT-TC), they provide supplies and Services to support the multinational forces during
operations. These contractors include host nation, third country, or U.S. contractors.
5-35. Augmenting contractors to logistic support allows the multinational force to focus on its primary
mission. Commanders and staff are familiar with selecting contractors and prepare to perform parallel
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
5-5
Chapter 5
contingency planning if contractors cannot perform. The commander ensures that a clear understanding
between all members of a unified force on the use of and limitations of contractors is clear. All leaders
anticipate and plan for potential impacts on their missions and their forces. Finally, commanders and staff
must remember that civilian contractors are force multipliers only and avoid total dependence on them.
PRINCIPLES OF TRANSITION
5-36. Principles apply to all levels of transition, from short-term disaster relief to regime change after a
major conflict. Planning considerations vary based on the conditions predicting transition. The bulleted list
is a recommended starting point for staff.
z
Transition is condition and not time based. Transition is a process rather than an event and sits in
the context of other environmental factors. National decisionmakers determine the political
imperatives to exit theater. Commanders and planners understand that these political
imperatives, whether host nation, UN, multinational force, alliances, or coalition are likely to
shape any conditions-based approach.
z
Start at the bottom. Building a solid foundation at local levels with the start of transferring
ownership, authority, and responsibilities across all lines of effort builds a baseline to continue
transition.
z
Thin out and do not hand-off. As another party assumes responsibilities for functions or area of
interest, a gradual confidence process is required. Thinning out assistance gives the impression
that there is still support, supports confidence building, and allows the other party to assume
greater but graduated control. A well-publicized and ceremonial departure degrades the level of
confidence and undermines the plan.
z
Maintain situational awareness and points of influence. A great challenge through transition is
maintaining situational understanding.
z
Transition institutions, functions, and geographic areas. The functions of a host nation are not
limited to control of operational environments or geographic areas. It is accountable for national
institutions, public services, and fields of expertise. The challenge is for host nation and
multinational forces to identify how much the multinational forces are doing, where they have
control, what they are doing, and how much impact they have. This cannot be shown on a map.
Consideration goes to everything multinational forces do and the impact the transition has on
overall host nation capacity. A few examples are delivery of tactical information, aerial casualty
evacuation provisions, search and rescue service, organization of waste disposal, and
employment of locals and third country nationals.
z
Ensure enduring resources are not diverted simply to pursue transition. This shows a
multinational force commitment to the mission as a whole and sends a clear signal concerning
multinational force intent to complete the mission to local and regional audiences. Multinational
force accepts and focuses on countering insurgency while neutralizing any insurgent elements
through transition.
z
Always retain a headquarters. Retaining a headquarters with the appropriate level of command
provides direction and discipline for transition. A headquarters is a focal point for external
stakeholders. Decisions at an operational or strategic level is made during transition. As a result,
the transition tempo alters with little notice.
z
Reinvest the dividends. During transition, some resources and assets become available. These
resources and assets in the time between the release and its extraction from theater are reinvested
elsewhere in AOs to help other parts of the transition. Reinvesting these resources and assets
helps maintain momentum and efficiency. This occurs if this opportunity is identified in time to
permit the resource and asset to reorganize, retrain, and eventually redeploy.
z
Own and protect the influence campaign. The narrative or transition is centrally coordinated,
coherent across the whole force, and spread across all lines of effort. All involved stakeholders
deliver the narrative. There are numerous targeted audiences for this campaign and it requires a
variety of information operations and associated means to achieve success. However, the
successes of the host nation is one of the main themes for the campaign. This process occurs in
harmonization with the overall plan.
5-6
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS IN PLANNING
5-37. Care must be taken against over reliance on unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) at the expense of other
collections assets by the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3. An unmanned aircraft system is that system whose
components include the necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft (JP
3-52). This results in an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) or information collection plan
that is neither comprehensive nor integrated. All intelligence-gathering assets require equal consideration
and emphasis when developing a focused ISR or information collection plan that meets the multinational
force commander’s critical information requirements. All tactical UAS units directly support the brigade
combat team for maximum collection efforts.
5-38. The UAS contribute to the overall ISR/information collection effort. Their range and endurance
provide commanders with a bird’s-eye perspective, when and where they need it, without risking manned
aircraft. Unmanned aircraft fly deep into the AO and are flexible enough for dynamic retasking to provide
timely information on other areas.
5-39. The intelligence staff section G-2/S-2 reviews, validates, and prioritizes collection requirements for
multinational force UAS operations. The G-3/S-3 coordinates with the G-2/S-2 to forward these
requirements to the commander and exercise tactical control over theater reconnaissance and surveillance
assets. The component commander then tasks the assets to satisfy the multinational force requirement.
Normally, the multinational force air component commander in the air tasking order according to
multinational force priorities tasks airborne reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
TRAINING MULTINATIONAL FORCES
5-40. Training is the best way to develop an effective multinational force formed from national units. It is
continual for personnel and units. The operation’s success depends on training the command has before and
during the operation. Most components of the force have likely not trained together and is limited if they
have. Leadership stresses the importance of training together to participating nations. The benefits of early
relationships help develop standardized procedures, determine caveats, and identify strengths and
weaknesses. These are some of the key issues in mission accomplishment.
5-41. Commanders are flexible and adaptable. The predeployment and in theater training programs are
based on assessments of the mission and AO. This is a key to a commander’s plans development. A high
level of training allows more integrated plans while low level of training requires more independent
operations for nations so mission difficulty is tailored to the training level of each nation. The command
deals with national contingents from different cultural backgrounds at different states of training. The more
that multinational forces and civilian agencies participate in the training, the more the command learns
about how these organizations think and operate. This participation enhances team building and staff
member’s perceptions of one another. Multinational force commanders receive, train, and integrate
multinational contingents during the course of operations.
IDENTIFY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
5-42. Training occurs at all levels of command and includes all staffs. Training teaches participants about
the multinational partners’ strengths and weaknesses and how to integrate those into an effective force.
Before deployment, command post exercise simulations are used for staff training and solving problems in
the multinational force command structure.
5-43. Training continues once the command arrives in the AO. Training is based on requirements and
functions. Training includes exercises to rehearse operational tasks, the operation order, or new missions.
Training advertises the command’s capabilities and serves as a deterrent.
5-44. Command post and field training exercises are used with simulations. Distributed simulation
enhances training between remotely separated forces. A comprehensive training program helps
commanders identify weaknesses and helps build troop cohesion. Whenever possible, commanders arrange
seminars to develop or stress standard operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Protection requirements affect areas available for training. Some training, such as live-fire exercises,
requires host nation approval.
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
5-7
Chapter 5
IDENTIFY CAPABILITIES
5-45. Some nations have doctrine to address strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Other nations focus
at the tactical level. Some nations prepare for highly mobile, mechanized operations. Others focus on
counterinsurgency or infantry operations. A few nations stress rapid, agile operations—emphasizing
ingenuity, creativity, and improvisation within the commander’s intent. Some nations regard this approach
as too risky. Because of these variations, multinational commanders consider which units are best suited for
particular missions. Multinational commanders determine the available forces by collecting and analyzing
data and information about internal capabilities, external factors, and long-term sustainability with the host
nation.
5-46. When the situation permits, commanders seek to improve the contributions of national forces by
providing training assistance and sharing resources such as radios, vehicles, or weapons. The importance of
training assistance and dedicated liaison teams is important when working between a force with digital
warfighting capability and a force that works with analog means. Multinational exercises are essential to
training and doctrine refinement. Multinational exercises use logistic support mechanisms and identify
possible problems in providing logistic support with forces from other nations.
5-47. The last decade of conflict has seen integration of multinational forces at the company and battalion
level. To achieve synchronization in tactical operations, units have a solid understanding of the differences
in equipment, doctrine, communications, and national caveats that affect the operation. For example, many
potential partners require different fuel grades than NATO forces, operate in different frequency bands, and
employ combat support units such as artillery and engineers in doctrinal ways very different from NATO
forces. Effective integration in combat operations requires training beforehand through multinational
command post exercises or through the conduct of full-scale multinational exercises at combined training
centers such as the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany.
USE PROPER CONDUCT
5-48. It only takes one Soldier or small unit acting improperly to undo weeks of effort building goodwill in
an AO. Inappropriate individual statements and actions offend forces from other nations or civilians in the
AO. This creates negative perceptions. Individuals do not assume that others do not understand derogatory
statements made in their own language, slang, or gestures. Training on proper personal conduct and its
continued emphasis prevent this.
5-49. Leadership distributes instruction to all personnel. These instructions help personnel understand the
methods of operating in a multinational environment. Commanders do the following:
z
Ensure that all augments’ participate in their host formation training events.
z
Provide training to all units or individuals that receive equipment from other nations.
z
Evaluate training opportunities offered by each nation. This includes training offered by the Joint
Multinational Training Center in Germany, the UN Operational Training and Advisory Group in
the United Kingdom, and the Swedish Armed Forces International Center. These all have
extensive experience in training units and individuals for operations.
FOCUS ON PREDEPLOYMENT
5-50. Predeployment training includes the following areas:
z
Individual military skills.
z
Individual and collective preventive medicine procedures and practice.
z
First aid, both individual and “buddy.”
z
Terrorism awareness and prevention.
z
Ethical conduct.
z
Education lessons in the multinational structure, mandate, chain of command, and division of
responsibilities including nongovernmental organizations and international agency structures.
z
Unit training (rehearsals should be mandatory) based on projected operations.
5-8
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
z
Team building and staff training to include training with multinational forces and nonmilitary
organizations.
z
Liaison officer training to ensure that personnel are knowledgeable representatives.
z
Information on the customs, cultures, languages, religious practices, political situations,
geographies, and the economic and historical backgrounds of the situation and the population of
the AO.
z
Capabilities of the adversary.
z
Effective communication to the public through the news media.
z
Negotiation and mediation.
z
Language training including key phrases. Although American, British, Canadian, Australian, and
New Zealand (ABCA) armies all speak English, not all operational terms have the same
meaning to each army.
z
Customs and language phrases.
z
Vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, weapon, uniform, and insignia identification.
z
Marksmanship (includes foreign weapons training).
z
Stress management.
z
Sling load operations.
z
Mounted and dismounted patrolling.
z
Patrolling in urban terrain.
z
Identification of mines and handling procedures.
z
Situational understanding including mine, booby trap awareness, and weapons recognition.
z
ROE.
z
Law of war.
z
Crowd control and the use and employment of nonlethal riot control agents.
z
Employment and use of nonlethal weapons capabilities.
z
Training drivers and vehicle commanders on in theater driving conditions and skills.
z
Training service members to accommodate environmental constraints.
z
Detainee handling operations.
z
Fratricide prevention.
z
Medical evacuation procedures.
PERFORM IN-COUNTRY TRAINING
5-51. The multinational commander evaluates the level of training of each troop-contributing nation to
determine if the nation is ready to commit to the AO or if additional training is necessary before
commitment. This training relates to cultures, languages, religions, or other issues related to the host nation.
CHECKLIST
5-52. Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the
following questions with respect to the operations and planning portion of the operation.
OPERATIONS
z
What areas come under multinational control? What areas remain national issues?
z
Does the command have a capabilities brief and description or organizational chart of its own
force and the multinational forces?
z
What is the effect of national ROE and objectives on force composition and mission assignment?
(See chapters 1, 3, and 13 for additional information on ROE.)
z
Does ROE support protection?
z
Does the force have a mechanism to identify potential threats to the force?
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
5-9
Chapter 5
z
What nonlethal technology is available? How is the force trained to use it? Do the ROE
authorize its employment?
z
What is the current situation in the AO?
z
Has the mission, including commander’s intent, been disseminated? Do elements two echelons
down understand it?
z
Has planning begun for the transition to UN or other organizations that will take over from the
multinational force? (See transition in this checklist.)
z
What is the logistic situation?
z
What are the language and interpreter requirements?
z
What are the security screening procedures and limitations relating to contracted interpreters?
z
How does ROE apply to contracted civilians?
z
Have personnel recovery plans and assets been coordinated with multinational partners?
z
What are the special customs and courtesies of the population in the AO or among multinational
forces?
z
Does the command have standard operating procedures that include reporting requirements and
procedures?
z
What units are available to the command and when are they available?
z
How will the command coordinate ground and air reconnaissance?
z
Has G-3/S-3 established the common map database?
z
Have staff visits been coordinated?
z
Have visits by the unit commander to higher headquarters been coordinated?
z
What forces remain to support multinational and how long are they required when redeploying
or moving?
z
What national forces interface with the joint movement control center?
z
What training is required before deployment?
z
What training is required once deployed?
z
Has a military information support operations (MISO) program been developed to support the
operation?
z
Have MISO assets been requested?
z
Has a civil affairs operations or stability tasks civil-military operations plan been developed to
support the operation?
z
Have civil affairs or civil-military cooperation assets been requested?
z
Has an information operations plan been developed and synchronized with other multinational
force contributors to defense support of civil authorities?
z
Have information operations assets been requested?
z
Has a search been performed to determine if extant documents are available to defense support
of civil authorities or on a given capability? This includes military and nonmilitary agencies.
z
Is there a mine or unexploded explosive ordnance threat in the AO?
z
Is there an existing mine or unexploded explosive ordnance action center?
z
What is the status of law enforcement capabilities in the current environment?
z
Is there additional training required for law enforcement personnel in the current environment to
maintain security and stability?
z
Are there measures of merit for tasks and subtasks?
z
What force structure is required for potential intervention to support the host nation?
z
What is the long-term plan for further development of host nation capacity?
z
What forces are needed to support the host nation post transition?
PLANNING
z
Has the deployment sequence been completed and validated?
5-10
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
z
Have members of the multinational force been included on the operational planning team?
z
Has the political advisor, a representative from the Secretary of Defense, Department of State,
National Security Agency, and a representative from the host nation been included on the
operational planning team?
z
What are the planning principles for transition?
z
What are ways to improve the population’s faith in host nation civil and military security?
z
What are ways to support the restoration of services and other essential infrastructure?
z
What is needed to help local government establish procedures to resolve community disputes?
z
What are the operation security constraints to ensure proper information dissemination?
z
What procedures are needed to implement identification programs to vet host nation personnel,
encourage participation in representative government, and validate professional credentials?
z
Who prepares to provide assistance to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts by host
nation authorities and intergovernmental organizations?
z
What are ways to enhance relationships with local stakeholders and publicize multinational force
respect for key stakeholders and institutions, deference for host nation successes, and increasing
host nation security force in joint missions?
z
What are ways to improve economic development programs such as local business and
agriculture?
z
Has the inclusion of logistic planners from the outset for planning and execution been
established?
z
Has a process for notification and approval of transition been established?
z
How will transition affect the requirements to support the force with regard to logistics and force
enablers?
z
What are proactive measures to guard against loss of situational understanding as multinational
force assets decease?
z
What structures can be established to maintain linkage at the key levels of host nation command
and the ability to plug in multinational force assets as required?
z
Has an influence plan been established to support the transition plan?
z
Does the influence plan address host nation, UN, and multinational force target audiences at the
appropriate levels?
z
What is the plan to increase visibility on host nation successes during transition?
z
What are the combat propaganda campaigns?
z
What assets are available for immediate release of information within hours of the targeted
audience (the opposing force, host nation, UN, or multinational force)?
z
What are ways to improve outcomes for host nation economic initiatives?
z
What are ways to counter rumors and negative publicity?
z
What is the plan to alert the population to programs, services, and incentives?
z
Have the forces relying on strategic mobility for deployment and redeployment from other
multinational members been included in the supporting nation’s deployment sequence?
z
Has the deployment plan deconflicted civilian agency and contractor transportation requirements
to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?
z
Has a risk assessment been accomplished as appropriate?
z
To what standard have multinational forces been trained?
z
Does the multinational force have a standard of training? Is a standard provided by an outside
agency?
z
Have all multinational forces received the proper predeployment training?
z
What type of predeployment training have multinational forces received?
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
5-11
Chapter 5
AVIATION PLANNING GUIDE
Force Structure
z
What is the multinational aviation force structure?
z
What is the desired aviation organization for operations for early entry forces?
z
What is the desired order of arrival of aviation assets?
z
What types of readiness are multinational aviation forces and supporting elements, including
strategic air and shipping for deployment, ordered to maintain? How long can they sustain this
readiness?
z
What are the phases and flow of aviation units, capabilities, and materiel to the AO? Is this flow
reflected in the multinational time-phased force and deployment list?
Command and Control
z
What is the commander’s intent?
z
What is the multinational command and control structure for aviation?
z
Has a multinational aviation commander been appointed? What is the commander’s command,
control, and coordination authority?
z
What airspace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) use?
z
Have other nations’ navigational equipment performance (input requirements, accuracy and
susceptibility to attack) been ascertained? Will relative performance affect control and use of
operational environment? Will it affect control, direction, and coordination of fires and ROE?
z
Are nations’ target designators interoperable? If not, what effect will this have and what can be
done to avoid or mitigate these designators?
z
Where are the aviation coordination interfaces?
z
When will any changes of status of command and coordination measures take effect?
z
Is there a requirement for a multinational operational environment management cell?
z
What will be the multinational command relationships—for example, operational control versus
tactical control—for aviation assets?
z
What are the command arrangements for the conduct of multinational longer range operations?
z
What national aviation command arrangements are required to support the multinational
command structure?
z
What are the national requirements for aviation liaison officers?
z
How will national communications and information systems be integrated?
z
What multinational bearer communications system will be used?
Mission and Tasks
z
What is the multinational aviation mission?
z
What are the multinational aviation specified tasks?
z
Are there any multinational aviation implied tasks?
z
What is the multinational command and control warfare plan? Can aviation enhance its
effectiveness?
z
Are multinational aviation assets for communications and information systems protected against
possible attacks?
z
What is the multinational CBRNE weapons threat assessment? What can aviation forces do to
identify and monitor hazards, including contamination?
z
What is the multinational plan for recovery of critical aviation equipment, facilities, and
resources?
5-12
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
Constraints and Freedom of Action
z
Has the multinational headquarters established constraints on aviation output and technical
media activity or effect? Do these constraints include legal factors, acceptance of risk, financial
factors, and human factors such as physical, moral, and cultural?
z
Is the nations’ capability confirmed for night movement and finding, fixing, and striking the
enemy?
z
Do intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer
organizations, and stability tasks activities affect the aviation plan?
z
Have the multinational headquarters established environmental and AO characteristics (such as
terrain, altitude, and climate) likely to impact on aviation equipment and multinational
interoperability? Subsequently, has the multinational headquarters reviewed participating
nations’ capabilities and aircraft performance (weapons, payload, and radius of action) in light of
environmental conditions?
z
Has the multinational headquarters established the mapping, global positioning system, and
geodetic datum to be used? Has it ascertained consequent implications for multinational
interoperability and coordination of fires?
Control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum
z
Has a multinational aviation electronic preparation of the battlefield been prepared? Is the
electronic preparation of the battlefield continuously reviewed, developed, and disseminated
throughout the multinational aviation chain of command?
z
Is there a multinational aviation electronic warfare targeting process or surveillance and target
acquisition plan and battle damage assessment process? What countersurveillance control
measures are in force?
z
What factors will frustrate multinational control of the electromagnetic spectrum? Are all
nations’ cryptographic driven systems interoperable?
z
What multinational electronic warfare assets are available to support aviation maneuver?
Information and Intelligence
z
Has a multinational aviation intelligence preparation of the environment been prepared? Is the
intelligence preparation of the environment being reviewed or developed and disseminated
continuously throughout the multinational aviation chain of command?
z
What is the multinational ISR/information collection plan? How is this information collected
from and disseminated to aviation?
z
What foreign disclosure rules must be waived if there are nontraditional multinational partners
participating in operations?
Protection
z
What are the multinational aviation protection requirements?
z
Is there a multinational aviation electronic warfare targeting process or surveillance and target
acquisition plan? What countersurveillance control measures are in force? Have limitations been
placed on using white illumination to facilitate aviation night-vision goggle operations?
z
Have the national and individual aircraft electronic warfare and defensive aid capabilities been
compared against threat and aircrew individual protective equipment? Have they been compared
against laser and CBRNE hazards? Is the multinational command and control structure capable
of delivering threat information and essential codes and preflight messages? Are means and
media to move and load codes and fills interoperable? Are fills and threat library information for
the following available?
Identification, friend, or foe systems.
Missile approach warning equipment.
Infrared or radar jammers.
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
5-13
Chapter 5
z
Are combat identification systems available to all allies? If not, can these systems become
available and embodied to enhance allied freedom of action? Are nations’ combat identification
systems interoperable? If not, what multinational joint antifraticide measures are in place?
z
Are multinational plans, procedures, and training (scale, radius of action, quality, quantity, and
timeliness) suitable for likely combat search and rescue as well as recovery of encircled forces?
z
What CBRNE protection measures (individual and collective) are afforded to other nations’ air
crew, ground crew, and technical personnel? What effect will adopting protective measures or
using protective equipment have on multinational aviation operations (quality, quantity, and
sustainability)? Are nations able to decontaminate aircraft? To what standards and what effect
will residual CBRNE contamination or hazards have on operational output?
z
Has the multinational headquarters established differing national approaches to risk
management? How have these approaches affected multinational operational output? What is the
impact on the planning cycle and operations procedure?
Weapons Effects and Rules of Engagement
z
Has the multinational headquarters established contributing nations’ aircraft weapons’
capabilities and performance? What are their effects on ROE?
z
What systems will be used for collateral damage assessment?
Doctrine
z
What level of aviation doctrine standardization has been achieved in the multinational force?
What does the lack of standardization for multinational aviation operational output imply?
z
Is there a multinational aviation mechanism for capturing lessons learned and informing nations
to ease continuous review of equipment performance; doctrine; tactics, techniques, and
procedures; and other vital information?
z
What multinational agreements or standards are available to enhance operational output? What
scope is there to exploit existing agreements or standards or to develop new ones?
G-1 or G-4
z
What aircraft are multinational partners bringing to the theater of operations?
z
Has the nations’ aircraft performance, given ambient conditions in the AO (payload and radius
of action), been confirmed?
z
Has a multinational, host nation, or theater facilities survey been performed and coordinated at
the multinational headquarters aviation level?
z
What is the logistic structure?
z
What arrangements will be in place for multinational resupply of common user items? If fuel
and munitions are included, is the system appropriate for the planned operational activity level?
z
Does the lead nation’s criterion for fuel quality and fuel system icing inhibitor meet national
equipment requirements?
z
What will be the intratheater repair policy? What mutual support is planned for common
equipment?
z
Has the multinational headquarters established the support capabilities and levels of service—
including national environmental restrictions—that nation’s aviation forces offer each other?
z
Has the multinational headquarters established national aircrew duty time specifications? What
impact will this have on planned multinational aviation surge and continuous operational output?
z
Are there national fleet management issues that will reduce expected multinational operational
output?
z
Are there multinational support issues that affect the nations’ efficient aircraft fleet management
resulting in reduced operational output?
Finance and Budget
z
What are the multinational funding arrangements for aviation mission or tasks?
5-14
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
z
Are procedures in place to capture costing and expenditure information?
z
Are multinational and national funding authorities clearly understood throughout the
multinational force?
Training and Collective Performance
z
What scope is there for multinational aviation mission rehearsal and war gaming? Is appropriate
simulation equipment available? Can it be made available? Can an appropriate environmental
database be developed?
z
Are there any multinational mission-specific training requirements and training responsibilities?
z
What scope exists for multinational forces using multinational, national, or host nation facilities,
particularly simulation and live-firing training space?
Host Nation Issues
z
Has the multinational headquarters coordinated the host nation provision of aviation services?
z
Has the multinational headquarters anticipated and considered host nation cultural issues that
will likely impact multinational aviation operations.
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives Defense
z
What is the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE)
warning and reporting structure intratheater? What communication nets will be used to pass
CBRNE information?
z
How are the high-value assets such as biological detectors allocated and deployed intratheater?
Are there enough assets to available to be allocated among multinational partners?
z
What national caveats exist for deploying biological detection assets?
z
Have armies adopted a standardized individual CBRNE protective dress state?
z
Has an operation exposure guide been established to manage radiation exposures?
z
Have armies adopted standard guidance for interpreting hazards identified by chemical
detectors?
z
Are sampling standard and identification protocols in place to verify first use of weapons of
mass destruction?
z
Which national laboratories will be used to analyze collected samples for first use and treaty
violations?
z
What medical pretreatment or prophylaxis do multinational partners have for CBRNE protection
such as vaccinations, auto-injectors, and anti-emetics? What are national policies for their use?
z
How will the psychological impact of potential enemy weapons of mass destruction use be
countered?
TRANSITION
z
What are the issues and key multinational force events (past and present) that lead to the current
situation?
z
What work is required to accomplish the transition?
z
What force or agency is taking control of the operation?
z
Has contact been made with counterpart planning staffs?
z
Who will determine when the transition begins or is completed?
z
Who will fund the transition?
z
What is required for contractor and host nation capabilities?
z
Who are the stakeholders for the area of interest? Who are the potential promoters and
detractors? How can these be leveraged or mitigated respectively?
z
What are ways to leverage the stakeholder’s capabilities?
z
What are the stakeholder’s complexities including objectives, timelines, situation appreciation,
and funding streams?
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
5-15
Chapter 5
z
What key cultural or religious milestones and events could affect transition? Why is identifying
this important?
z
What are logistic support requirements for multinational force entities throughout the process?
z
What are the key engagements between stakeholders at all levels to ensure unity of purpose?
z
When and with whom are liaison officers embedded in relevant stakeholders’ headquarters?
z
What is the multinational force policy for transition and redeployment?
z
What issues exist before the transition? What potential issues exist for the transition force once
the transition is completed? Have these been provided to the incoming transition force?
z
Has the multinational force’s end state been accomplished? If not, will this have a bearing on the
incoming force?
z
If there is a new mission, can the multinational force help the incoming force in preparing for it?
z
What multinational forces, equipment, or supplies will remain behind?
z
What is the disposal plan to facilitate disposal of commodities?
z
What will be the command relationship for the multinational force during the transition and for
those multinational forces remaining behind?
z
Who will support the multinational force remaining behind?
z
What will be the communications requirement for the multinational force remaining behind?
z
Will the multinational force provide communications capability to the incoming force?
z
Has the security transition been coordinated as a compete function? Which are best done
incrementally?
z
Has the security transition been coordinated with the other lines of effort?
z
What are the dependencies within the security and other lines of operation that could be affected
by transition or could affect transition?
z
Can information be shared with the incoming transition force or organization?
z
Will new ROE be established for the transition?
z
Will ongoing operations be discontinued or interrupted?
z
Will the incoming force use the same headquarters facility as the multinational force?
z
What agreements have been developed with civilian agencies that impact the incoming force?
z
Have points of contact been developed for the incoming force?
z
What will be the requirement for liaison personnel?
z
Will sufficient security be available to provide protection? Who will provide it?
z
How will the turnover be accomplished?
z
Who will handle public affairs for the transition?
z
What command and control arrangements are for departure?
z
What are the customs, immigration, and quarantine implications for the incoming and outgoing
forces?
z
What are the identities of all stakeholders and their level of involvement in the transition
operation?
z
What are the outgoing multinational forces’ obligations with respect to employed local labors
and contractors?
z
What are the incoming multinational forces’ obligations with respect to employed local labors
and contractors?
z
What are the functions and appointments that the outgoing force should maintain during the
handover period?
z
Is it the intention to proceed with the transition upon achieving military end state or not?
z
What ongoing obligations has the outgoing force left to the incoming force?
z
What effects does transition have on the local economy and security situation?
5-16
FM 3-16
8 April 2014
Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
TRAINING
z
What predeployment training has the troop-contributing nations performed?
z
Have designated troops from the various participating nations previously trained with each
other?
z
What predeployment or intracountry training will be necessary before the commitment or
deployment of troops into the AO?
z
What level of training is posed by each of the troop-contributing nations?
z
Does each of the nations have some form of training for liaison officers or will the coalition
headquarters need to establish a program?
8 April 2014
FM 3-16
5-17
|
|