FM 7-100 Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy (MAY 2003) - page 4

 

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FM 7-100 Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy (MAY 2003) - page 4

 

 

_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
in hardship. Otherwise, the populace may not have the same patience as the
State leadership or maintain the same willingness to sacrifice over time.
6-12. In its internal information campaign, the State will continue to exag-
gerate its gains and downplay the extent of its losses. It will continue to extol
benefits of continuing the strategic campaign. It will tell citizens that its stra-
tegic campaign is a success and will continue to be an even greater success if
the citizens dedicate more time and effort to the State’s cause. It will con-
tinue to use the citizens of the invaded territory as pawns in its information
campaign, which also will exploit enemy deserters, as well as prisoners of
war from extraregional forces.
6-13. The State uses perception management and other tools to attack the
enemy’s will to fight or otherwise continue its intervention, and to manipulate
international opinion. If it still occupies territory of a neighboring country, it also
tries to turn the populace there against the intervening extraregional force.
6-14. During adaptive operations, the informational element of strategic op-
erations continues to attack the intangible components of the enemy’s efforts
against the State. It targets those elements that can most affect factors such
as enemy soldiers’ and leaders’ confidence, political and diplomatic decisions,
public opinion, the interests of private institutions, national will, and the col-
lective will and commitment of alliances and coalitions.
6-15. The extraregional force and its individual soldiers tend to lack cultural
awareness of the region and will thus make mistakes that unintentionally of-
fend the local populace. The State will publicize these unintentional offensive
actions in order to solidify its own people’s hatred of the outsiders or to turn
regional neighbors against them.
6-16. The State can create or manufacture humanitarian crises to embarrass
the enemy or force him to divert resources to correct the real or manufactured
crises. It can also stage incidents, riots, and demonstrations for media atten-
tion and to delay or disrupt enemy movement.
ECONOMIC MEANS
6-17. The State will continue tighten the internal economic controls it im-
plemented previously. It will nationalize all small, private factories that had
not previously come under its control. The State may close schools in order to
allow children to join the workforce and assist in the production of war mate-
rials. The presence of children in the factories may deter the enemy from
bombing them. The State will authorize release and use of equipment, energy
sources, and goods that are stored in national wartime stockpiles. However, it
will normally impose or increase rationing of civilian supplies and services.
6-18. The State continues and intensifies economic sanctions and pressure on
other nations. It will look for new or expanded lines of communication (LOCs)
that open up routes closed by intervention of extraregional forces. If diplo-
matic sanctions are not imposed, the State will continue to produce, trans-
port, and stockpile key military and civilian goods from State-owned factories
based in other countries. It will seek to transport supplies and materiel under
foreign-flagged commercial transportation, as well as through the supply
networks of affiliated forces.
6-3
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
MILITARY MEANS
6-19. Adaptive operations occur as a result of an extraregional power inter-
vening with sufficient forces to thwart the State’s original offensive opera-
tions in the region. Adaptive operations are often more defensive in nature
than were regional or transition operations. They may focus on preserving
forces, retaining gains in the region, and defending the State’s home terri-
tory. The State’s forces disperse to the extent their command and control (C2)
allows and conduct decentralized operations in both offense and defense. The
State views adaptive operations as temporary in nature, serving as a means
for the State to return to regional operations.
6-20. Once an extraregional power commits forces in the region, State forces
will not avoid battle. They will seek it often, but on their own terms. Battles
will occur at a place and time of the State’s choosing and will involve dis-
persed maneuver, precision fires, and simultaneous actions by all services of
the Armed Forces as well as affiliated forces.
6-21. Adaptive operations are often sanctuary-based. Sanctuaries are areas
that limit the ability of an opponent to apply his full range of capabilities.
The State’s forces can use physical and/or moral sanctuaries for preserving
and applying forces. They can defend in sanctuaries or attack out of them.
When defending, the State’s forces generally do not employ fixed, contigu-
ous defensive fronts. They may conduct limited-duration operational- and
tactical-level offensive actions to prevent buildup of intervening forces, to fa-
cilitate the defense, or to take advantage of an opportunity to counterattack.
6-22. When State forces can create a window of opportunity or exploit oppor-
tunity created by natural conditions that limit or degrade enemy capabilities,
they move out of sanctuary and attack. They try to force the enemy to operate
in areas where the State’s own long-range fires and strike operations can be
most effective. They use windows of opportunity to destroy key enemy sys-
tems or cause mass casualties. If these fires and strikes change the balance of
forces, State forces can exploit success with decisive offensive maneuver.
Otherwise, they go back into sanctuaries.
6-23. The State uses flexible and unpredictable force structures task-
organized for particular missions. Forces may be combined arms, joint, inter-
agency, and possibly multinational. The State may fully mobilize all available
means to create large conventional force and paramilitary capability in sup-
port of adaptive operations. Full mobilization involves all military and para-
military forces, including militia. During adaptive operations, the State will
use conventional forces in adaptive ways. It will also employ unconventional
and specialized forces tailored to the needs of combat against an extrare-
gional force with technological overmatch. Operations may also involve vari-
ous types of affiliated forces.
6-24. In military terms, the extraregional force might have technological
overmatch, but may not be able to apply it fully against the State. This can
occur when successful strategic operations cause the extraregional power to
impose political limitations on its participation in the conflict. Such political
considerations can limit the amount of forces being brought to bear, the time-
table for deployment, and the application of forces. The State can change the
nature of conflict to something for which the extraregional force was not
6-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
prepared or optimized. The enemy’s organization and capabilities may be
mismatched to the situation. The State’s forces may be able to deplete enemy
force not through attrition, but through forcing them into noncombat commit-
ments. The State can also affect enemy capabilities by attacking, threatening, or
infiltrating the host-nation contractors on which the extraregional force depends.
6-25. The types of adaptive actions that characterize “adaptive operations” at
the strategic level can also serve the State and its Armed Forces well in re-
gional or transition operationsat least at the tactical and operational levels.
However, once an extraregional force becomes fully involved in the conflict,
the State will conduct adaptive actions more frequently and on a larger
scale.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
6-26. Planning and preparation for adaptive operations begin with the origi-
nal plan for the strategic campaign, in the form of branches and sequels. Dur-
ing regional and transition operations, the State refines plans and carries out
further preparation for adaptive operations.
6-27. Compared to regional or transition operations, adaptive operations rely
even more on centralized planning and decentralized execution. Commanders
at various levels determine the exact means of execution based on the State’s
strategic goals, missions received from higher headquarters, assessment of
the enemy’s capabilities and intentions, and conditions at hand. When over-
matched in conventional power, the State expects its commanders to seize
opportunity, tailor organizations to the mission, and make creative use of
existing capabilities even more than they did in regional and transition
operations.
6-28. There are two essential problems the State must solve if it must fight
an extraregional opponent. First, since this enemy is a modern force, the
State will be at a disadvantage in protecting its own C2 against a more tech-
nologically able enemy. Secondly, State planning is driven and developed
from the top. Yet, the State must assume there will be disruption to highly
centralized command and control. Equally important, adaptive operations also
require decentralized execution because the State believes the only way to match
or control the tempo of a modern force is to delegate operational and tactical con-
trol to the lowest levels of command. Thus, the State’s C2 concept still empha-
sizes the four essential elements: objective, opportunity, method, and end state.
6-29. The State realizes that, in the event of extraregional intervention, it is
particularly vulnerable to attacks on its communications system. It attempts
to resolve this problem by using commercial digital communications that it
can encrypt. The C2 concept, however flexible in theory, is nonetheless a vul-
nerability. Despite a C2 concept that encourages initiative at all levels, the
State does have communications requirements, and it prefers assured com-
munications. It attempts to assure communications by a number of means,
including the providing of cellular or digital phone technology to the tactical
level. In sanctuary-based adaptive operations, it will pre-position and install
fiber-optic communications cable and make other hard-wired arrangements.
It understands that there is risk inherent in this approach, but believes that
the tempo of operations it is able to sustain will offset the risk.
6-5
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
6-30. The State concept for C2 takes into account the State’s vulnerabilities
as well as the vulnerabilities it perceives in its potential adversaries. It
stresses planning centrally, but encourages flexibility and initiative in decen-
tralized execution. This concept both mitigates State weaknesses and enables
it to accelerate its decision making and accelerate or slow the pace of its opera-
tions as required. Equally important, the State believes it can operate effectively
at a tempo that will challenge potential extraregional opponents. In sanctuary-
based adaptive operations, it will afford itself more robust C2 by hard-wiring to
the extent possible. It believes this will enable its militia forces and regular
forces to act in concert effectively, while accounting for the fact that its mili-
tia forces are less able to execute its fundamental approach to command and
control.
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES
6-31. Internal Security Forces resubordinated to Supreme High Command
provide support-zone security, collect information on foreign organizations
and spies, and protect the President and other high-ranking State officials.
Some of the paramilitary Internal Security Forces have combat potential to
conduct defensive operations if required. Internal Security Forces also ensure
that mobilized militia forces remain loyal to the State.
ARMY
6-32. The Army will seek to conduct adaptive operations in circumstances,
opportunities, and terrain that optimize its own capabilities and degrade
those of the enemy. It will employ a force that is optimized for the terrain
or for a specific mission. For example, it will use its antitank capability,
tied to obstacles and complex terrain, inside a defensive structure de-
signed to absorb the enemy’s momentum and fracture his organizational
framework.
6-33. The Army plans and prepares sanctuaries and defenses throughout
State territory in anticipation of intervention. It makes maximum use of pre-
positioned logistics. Then it tries to dictate when and where combat opera-
tions occur. Success depends on two critical factors—transition operations
that have allowed the Army to occupy defensive positions, and an enemy
driven by a timeline for completion.
6-34. Various State forces engage the enemy simultaneously to his opera-
tional and even strategic depth. The goal is to present the enemy with a non-
linear, simultaneous battlefield, allowing him no sanctuary. This does not
allow the enemy to have any secure rear areas. The State tries to force the
enemy to commit forces at very low percentage of combat strength, possibly
with no reserve, before he has built up overwhelming forces on the ground.
The Army attempts to control enemy movement, using natural and manmade
obstacles and exploiting the presence of civilians on the battlefield. Overland
routes through complex terrain are obviously vulnerable to attack. Army
forces use the enemy’s predictable patterns of operation to set up raids and
ambushes. They look for opportunities to conduct fast, surgical attacks or
counterattacks and then return to sanctuary.
6-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
6-35. During dispersed operations, substantial gaps may exist between the
positions of units. In these gaps, the State will use precision long-range fires
or Special-Purpose Forces (SPF), insurgents, and militia to destroy key sys-
tems, cause politically unacceptable casualties, harass the enemy, and main-
tain contact. Some defensive positions may include complex battle positions
or heavily defended spaces that are able to fight in all directions within the
limitations of the terrain. These defenses are generally tied to complex ter-
rain. The Army conducts counterattacks at all levels, in the gaps or inside de-
fensive positions, to impose delay, inflict casualties, or preserve critical points
in the defense. Sanctuary-based operations require extensive planning,
preparation, and pre-positioning of forces, caches of supplies, and critical C2
systems. Urban or other complex terrain provides concealment for these as-
sets. The State’s forces also try to deny the enemy use of complex terrain that
could protect his forces from fires delivered by State forces from their dis-
persed locations.
6-36. Fighting in urban areas and other complex terrain is manpower- and
resource-intensive. The State may have more of both those types of assets
readily available in the region than does the extraregional power. When op-
erating in rugged terrain, the older, simpler systems of the State’s Armed
Forces may function better and more reliably that the high-technology sys-
tems of the extraregional force. In urban areas and other complex terrain, the
State can use cheap, plentiful, but lethal infantry systems to destroy enemy
platforms. It can also affect the extraregional force’s dominance by acquiring
niche technology and achieving technological surprise.
6-37. The extraregional enemy prefers to use his technological advantage in
the form of long-range, standoff engagement. The State can force such an en-
emy to engage in close, dismounted combat by conducting the fight in urban
or other complex terrain. It can also keep the enemy from using his standoff ca-
pability by using the civilian populace and third-party noncombatants as shields
or locating the State’s forces and systems close to sites that are culturally, politi-
cally, economically, or ecologically sensitive, especially in invaded territory.
6-38. The advanced C2 and reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and
target acquisition (RISTA) systems of the extraregional force are high-payoff
targets for computer warfare, information attack, or physical destruction.
Disruption or denial of these resources at critical times can degrade the en-
emy’s situational awareness and real-time intelligence ability. Attacking a
critical ground-based C2 or RISTA node can have a very big payoff for low
risk and relatively low investment, using common jamming systems and
other technologies readily available on the open market. Thus, the State
places high priority on identifying and locating enemy C2 and RISTA as-
sets, so that it can destroy, deceive, or manipulate them to its own advantage.
6-39. The Army recognizes the importance of preventing or at least delaying
enemy air superiority. Therefore, the Army maintains its own air defense
forces in addition to those subordinate to the Air Force. Army air defense in-
cludes mobile air defense units and large numbers of shoulder-fired surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs).
6-7
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
NAVY
6-40. The Navy will continue its efforts to limit or disrupt further enemy ac-
cess into the region by sea. Navy operations become more offensive. However,
it may make more aggressive use of its land-based antiship cruise missiles.
The State may risk a surge effort by its remaining naval forces in order to
produce politically significant casualties. Sinking a major naval combatant,
for example, may be worth the risk and effort. The Navy could also use its
submarine force to insert SPF for direct action against a high-payoff target
outside the region.
AIR FORCE
6-41. Against an extraregional enemy, the State starts to lose the air superi-
ority it had enjoyed against regional forces. Still, it can employ its relatively
limited air assets during early stages of enemy deployment, to control enemy
access or to inflict early casualties before the enemy builds up sufficient air
and air defense capabilities to dominate the airspace. It can also save its air
forces for a surge effort at a critical point in the conflict. However, the State
will not delay use of its Air Force assets until such a surge unless it has
means, such as underground shelters, to ensure the survivability of its air-
craft on the ground. Deep operations by the State’s attack helicopter units
against extraregional forces are unlikely except against high-value targets
that the State estimates to be worth the expenditure of scarce resources.
6-42. The Air Defense Forces, subordinate to the Air Force, focus their efforts
on destroying enemy aircraft, while protecting critical defensive positions and
key political and economic sites. The State watched with interest the air
campaigns in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force and concluded that it
is unlikely to be able to defend all of its airspace in the event of extraregional
intervention. Fundamentally, the State accepts that it may not be able to
employ a nationally integrated air defense system (IADS) against a modern
extraregional force. A vertically integrated system centrally directed at the
national level could be a liability from a C2 standpoint. Thus, the State is
prepared to use IADS at sector levels, where units may be hard-wired and do
not require as large a footprint physically and electronically.
6-43. The State arrays its Air Defense Forces in air defense sectors and de-
velops air defense ambushes along the most likely air avenues of ap-
proach. Within sectors, it may be able to challenge the most modern air forces.
In choosing to fight within sectors, it accepts risk, in that air defense sectors pre-
sent seams in the defenses and may be unable to provide mutual support.
6-44. The State also employs passive air defense techniques including disper-
sal, deception, and camouflage. To the extent possible, it disperses high-value
assets. Sector air defense provides three discrete benefits: facilitating passive air
defense, reducing the signature of defensive systems, and enabling the State to
mass air defense assets from dispersed sites to protect the most critical targets.
6-45. Air Defense Forces have a combination of passive early warning based
on observers and radar systems that will serve them well in the early stages
of combat operations against even the most modern opponents. In later
stages, the State accepts that it must rely heavily on observers and will lose
6-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
or at least not be able to use both airborne and ground-based early warning
systems with optimum effectiveness.
6-46. The State’s concept of air defense is not purely defensive in nature. It
also focuses on destroying not only enemy aircraft, but also the C2 systems
associated with enemy air operations. Thus, it will also attack enemy AEW
(AWACS) platforms, and use air defense jammers, GPS jammers, and other
electronic warfare methods to disrupt his air capability.
6-47. During adaptive operations in State territory, Air Force SPF provide
air base security. They also can conduct raids against enemy air bases and
installations within the region. They may also take part in joint SPF opera-
tions coordinated by the SPF Command as part of strategic operations.
STRATEGIC FORCES
6-48. The State considers the Strategic Forces capability, even when deliver-
ing conventional munitions, the responsibility of the National Command Au-
thority (NCA). Unable to mount robust air campaigns, the State can use
these weapons to mount an equivalent effort. While willing to use long-range
missiles and rockets, the State fully recognizes the international implications
of doing so, even with conventional warheads.
6-49. Perhaps the most promising means for the State to mitigate or offset
the tremendous technological advantage of an extraregional force is to use of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The State has invested in very capable
ballistic missiles and rockets that enable the Strategic Forces to deliver
WMD packages. These weapons do not require great accuracy to achieve re-
sults. They do not require sophisticated delivery means either. However, the
State does not use WMD casually. Although the State understands that
WMD confer advantages in first use, it recognizes that they carry great risks
for retaliation in kind. Accordingly, it may risk first use only when the payoff
appears to outweigh the potential costs.
6-50. During adaptive operations, the State shows greater willingness to use
WMD to extend and divert the enemy. It may conduct WMD attacks against
third parties in the region on order to draw enemy attention and resources
away from the main fight and to affect international opinion. It may use
WMD against the extraregional force, particularly in his rear area.
6-51. Escalation from conventional weapons delivery to delivery of WMD is
tightly controlled by the NCA. The State understands that the use of WMD
(including large high-explosive warheads) delivered by long-range rockets or
missiles represents a deliberate escalation or widening of any conflict in
which the State is a participant. Consequently, the State is likely to escalate
in stages in order to minimize reaction. For example, it might use Strategic
Forces units to deliver NBC weapons inside or outside of the region or theater
only after using the same units to deliver long-range conventional weapons.
It might use WMD operationally or tactically against troops in the field prior
to using them strategically. However, once having crossed the threshold of us-
ing WMD, the State may use them against any high-payoff target within the
range of its delivery systems. Positioning of its Strategic Forces units and sup-
porting C2 nodes could, if detected, serve as indicators of the State’s intentions.
Therefore, the State will seek to conceal the location of these forces and nodes.
6-9
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
6-52. Strategic Forces that are capable of delivering WMD are the exception
to the State’s C2 concept of being able to operate in the absence of assured
communications. Since the State does not believe that first use of chemicals
against units in the field will provoke a nuclear response, it is less rigid than
other nations in the control of chemical release. The NCA may pass chemical
release authority to operational or even tactical levels. That is not the case in
employing NBC warheads on any national- or theater-level systems or sys-
tems that have a strategic consequence.
6-53. Nuclear weapons would almost surely provoke response in kind. So the
State will probably avoid the use of nuclear weapons against an extraregional
power unless survival of the regime or the nation is at risk. Among NBC
weapons, the State is more likely to use biological or chemical weapons
against even an extraregional enemy, particularly if the enemy does not have
the capability to respond in kind. Biological weapons, particularly those of
high infection rate at relatively low rates of mortality, offer some advantage,
particularly if plausible deniability can be achieved. The State is most likely
to use chemical weapons, particularly if it can mitigate the risk of retaliation.
During the course of armed conflict, the State may intentionally or uninten-
tionally cause the release of toxic industrial chemicals into the environment.
Fuel-air explosives and large conventional warheads offer decided advantage
and do not necessarily trigger similar responses from the enemy. The State is
particularly likely to use these conventional weapons during adaptive opera-
tions when its forces are widely dispersed.
SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES COMMAND
6-54. During adaptive operations, the State may increase the level of SPF ac-
tions in the enemy rear area. Together with Strategic Forces, the national-
level SPF Command provides the State the ability to attack both regional and
extraregional enemies throughout their strategic depth. Strategic reconnais-
sance by SPF in support of national intelligence requirements is an essential
element of access-control operations. In addition to its own direct action
against enemy forces and installations, the SPF Command can also support
terrorist and irregular forces operations. While SPF belonging to other ser-
vice components are designed for use at the operational level, the SPF Com-
mand’s organic forces provide a regional and global strategic capability. The
SPF Command has the means to control joint SPF operations involving
Army, Naval, Air Force, and/or Internal Security Forces SPF, as required.
6-55. The State has trained SPF as alternate means of delivering nuclear,
biological, or chemical munitions packages it may develop for them. This as-
sures redundancy with Strategic Forces’ delivery means and provides a
worldwide strategic means of WMD delivery. With SPF delivery means, the
range of WMD is not limited to the range of the missiles of the Strategic
Forces. This is yet another example of a low-end investment that promises a
high payoff. However, the use of SPF deployed globally to deliver WMD
would require the same NCA-level authorization as delivery of WMD by the
Strategic Forces.
6-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
AFFILIATED FORCES
6-56. The State may form alliances with non-state actors, including insurgents,
terrorists, or even drug and criminal organizations. These affiliated forces do not
necessarily agree with all the State’s policies and goals, but may just be against
the intervention of an extraregional force whose influence they resent and resist.
6-57. Transnational corporations operating in the State or the region often
have their own private security forces that can act independently or as affili-
ated forces. Sometimes these are highly capable paramilitary forces, possibly
including armored vehicles.
6-58. The State may foster insurgency operations against enemy forces in
any portion of the region that enemy forces may occupy and in the enemy’s
operational rear areas. Insurgency operations can divert enemy attention and
assets from the main conflict.
6-59. In addition to other types of affiliated forces that may be present in re-
gional or transition operations, adaptive operations may involve partisan op-
erations within parts of the State contested by extraregional forces.
PARTISAN FORCES
6-60. When the territory of the State is partially overrun by extraregional
forces, yet another kind of forces can become involved on the part of the
Statepartisans. Partisan forces are an important element in the State’s
concept of total war. Whether or not partisans are considered “affiliated”
forces depends on their level of integration into the operations of the regular
Armed Forces. Partisan operations typically are conducted by militia units,
augmented by civilians and remnants of regular military units. Partisans are
“invisible infantry,” indistinguishable from the civilian populace.
6-61. If the State has insufficient forces to defend against an invader by
“conventional” means, its leadership plans to integrate partisan actions in an
attempt to prevent occupation of State territory and to eventually force the
invader to withdraw. Partisans task-organize their available forces based on
the mission. Many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by partisan
forces are similar to those used by insurgents.
6-62. The aim of partisan operations is to defeat the enemy through a series
of small combat actions aimed at harassing or attriting his forces and dis-
rupting or destroying his C2 elements, LOCs, or logistics support. Partisans
attempt to avoid decisive clashes as long as possible, expand the number of
lower-level tactical combat actions, and destroy the enemy by conducting raids
and ambushes against his vulnerable points, such as logistics and rear areas.
6-63. Partisans must know the terrain and maintain maximum mobility,
adapting quickly to new situations and tactics. Partisan forces have several
advantages over the enemy. Primary among these are the partisans’ exten-
sive knowledge of the State’s terrain and their ability to successfully execute
their missions in adverse weather conditions. Their familiarity with the terrain
allows them to use urban areas and other complex terrain to their advantage.
Partisans familiar with the terrain and possessing appropriate equipment can be
quite effective in this environment. They are more agile than regular forces.
6-11
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
6-64. Militia units participating in partisan operations may have been by-
passed, fragmented, or heavily attrited, or may not have had time to fully
mobilize. The effectiveness of these forces and the degree of their integration
into regular Army operations varies widely. For example, militia units that
have been fully mobilized and previously integrated into regional operations
would be more effective as partisans than would previously unmobilized units
fighting without knowledge of the missions and plans of regular Army units. Mi-
litia units may be augmented by remnants of regular Army forces that have been
bypassed, weakened, or attrited. As a rule, partisan units with such augmenta-
tion achieve a higher degree of integration into the operations of other regular
Army forces by virtue of their familiarity with the missions and plans of a higher
headquarters. However, these units are most likely to conduct operations against
smaller enemy combat units than do their regular Army counterparts.
6-65. Partisan operations may also include civilians, augmenting militia
forces. Enemy forces may have destroyed or bypassed the homes of these ci-
vilians. Their degree of integration into the operations of regular Army or mi-
litia units is normally low, and they are poorly equipped to engage enemy
combat units. However, they can still be effective against enemy logistics and
C2 facilities and LOCs.
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
6-66. During adaptive operations, the State uses all its instruments of power to
deny the extraregional enemy any sanctuary in the region or in his strategic
depth. Access-control operations and strategic attack of the enemy LOCs and rear
are essential to success. Unable to conduct strategic bombing campaigns, the State
may use other means to attack targets in its enemy’s homeland or along the LOCs
into the theater. The State will coordinate its attacks on enemy infrastructure or
even civilian targets with perception management efforts to convey the view that
these terrorist-type attacks are no worse than enemy bombing campaigns.
6-67.The Armed Forces conduct operational and tactical lines of operation that
accentuate what the State is doing at the strategic level. In most cases, opera-
tional and tactical efforts are focused on not being defeated, which offers no deci-
sion. Therefore, the State needs its strategic operations to be decisive.
6-68. Concurrent with adaptive operations, the State could also conduct or
support insurgency operations either within the region in support of its other
operations or outside the region. The purpose of such insurgency operations
could be to draw an extraregional enemy’s attention and resources from the
State’s main effort or merely to harass the State’s adversaries.
6-69. The State will instigate and support terrorist attacks and/or conduct
SPF direct action against the extraregional power, even in that power’s
homeland. It can also use these types of attack against an extraregional
force’s coalition partners and allies in order to force them out of the war. De-
pending on the situationhow the war is going or how the State perceives it
is goingthe State might use WMD at any time against any conceivable tar-
get it can reach. The long-range missiles and rockets of the Strategic Forces
are powerful political and psychological tools, whether armed with conven-
tional or WMD munitions. With SPF and terrorist delivery means, the range
of WMD is not limited to the range of the missiles of the Strategic Forces.
6-12
Chapter 7
Force Design, Mobilization, and Sustainment
The State strategic logistics complex is the foundation for the logistics
system. Fundamental to the logistics concept are the twin notions of total
war and all means necessary. As a consequence, the State fully integrates
civilian and military components of both its materiel and service indus-
tries. Thus, the State strategic complex includes the national industrial
base with its supply points, distribution centers, arsenals, plants, manu-
facturing facilities, medical support, and personnel support centers. The
national industrial base is capable of building everything from small arms
to nuclear-capable missiles. However, while the State has the ability to
design, produce, and field weapon systems, there are some serious quali-
tative production and integration shortcomings.
The State logistics system is designed to provide continuous support to
the civilian populace while simultaneously supporting military forces
from the strategic level to the individual fighting unit. The State’s na-
tional security strategy requires that the Armed Forces and the entire
population be constantly prepared for the sudden outbreak of war or
natural disasters. The State continues to make major improvements in all
aspects of its logistics system. This includes an increased emphasis on
support-zone security and plans for stockpiling war materiel throughout
the country.
STRATEGIC INTEGRATION DEPARTMENT
7-1. In planning and execution, the Minister of National Security establishes
priorities and assigns responsibilities for the Ministry of Defense (MOD) as
well as the civilian ministries. The Strategic Integration Department (SID) is
his executive agent, responsible for integrating all the instruments of na-
tional power under one cohesive national security strategy.
7-2. The State has an adequate labor supply to meet its civilian and military
manpower requirements. However, the SID must ensure that the military
does not employ personnel such as security, medical, technical specialists,
truck drivers, machinists, and mechanics to the extent that the economy be-
comes paralyzed. During peacetime, the State may be unable to fully man the
military with critical professional and technical specialists to maintain an
elaborate support structure. Thus, the Armed Forces may experience a short-
age of doctors, engineers, computer programmers, electronic technicians, and
other support professionals. Once the country has been mobilized, however,
these critical professionals are detailed into the military structure to aug-
ment existing professionals.
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FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
7-3. A primary SID objective is to ensure the national industrial base is re-
sponsive to both the civilian populace and the military during the strategic
campaign. For example, the SID may order stockpiling of critical civilian
supplies and materiel in anticipation of economic sanctions imposed by an
extraregional power and/or the United Nations. Thus, the impact of the eco-
nomic sanctions is minimized or has a limited effect.
7-4. The SID, in coordination with the MOD, must determine the functional
types and levels of civilian support to the military the State can afford with-
out placing the success of the strategic campaign at an unnecessarily high
risk. The scope of the support is limited only by the availability of resources
and the ability of the SID to reach a consensus across ministerial lines. The
SID designates a single point of contact or liaisons within each ministry to
coordinate the activities related to civilian and military support during
peacetime, mobilization, and war. This ensures the timely and efficient acti-
vation and integration of the civilian populace and the Armed Forces.
7-5. Within the MOD, the SID works closely with the Organization and Mo-
bilization Directorate of the General Staff. That office, one of the most power-
ful in the government, determines requirements, establishes priorities, and
resolves competition for resources in the Armed Forces. The Organization
and Mobilization Directorate, in turn, works closely with the Ministry of Fi-
nance and Economic Affairs. The objective is to assure that the acquisition of
materiel and the development of stockpiles to support sustained operations
meet the national priorities established in the State. The Chief of Logistics,
who heads the Logistics Directorate of the MOD, executes logistics plans in
response to the SID during transition to war and conducts planning with the
Organization and Mobilization Directorate.
7-6. The SID also works directly with the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Affairs to ensure that economic policies meet a variety of needs. These needs
include the financing of the infrastructure and other capital projects or de-
velopmental programs. The intent is to avert a major economic or political
crisis. Thus, the State’s leadership is afforded reasonable economic and po-
litical stability at all times.
7-7. The SID coordinates with the Ministry of Public Information to encour-
age constructive public support for the State’s policy objectives and to un-
mask and counter hostile attempts to distort and frustrate the State’s poli-
cies and programs. The wide range of information campaigns involves all of
the internal media sources.
7-8. The SID develops programs and coordinates humanitarian relief activi-
ties to support those who suffer from natural disasters such as earthquake,
famine, flood, and drought. The effort is conducted, often in conjunction with
those of other nations and nongovernmental organizations, to quickly allevi-
ate the effects of disaster and reduce human suffering.
FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT STRATEGY
7-9. The State’s concept of force design has two major components: force de-
velopment and investment strategy. The State develops its forces and employs
an investment strategy to deal with perceived threats and opportunities. Its
7-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
overall approach to force design is the product of a thoughtful analysis of its
strategic means in relation to internal threats, regional opponents, and the
potential for extraregional intervention. This analysis considers both the ad-
vantages the State enjoys and the disadvantages it has in comparison to po-
tential opponents.
7-10. The primary objective is to acquire technology to sustain or increase
the economic growth of the State. There are three priorities of technological
development. The first priority is the development of technology to support
the State’s infrastructure. The second priority is the development of dual-use
technology for use to support both the civilian and military sectors. The third
priority is technology unique to military applications.
GOALS
7-11. The State is pragmatic in
the design of forces and makes
Force Design Goals
few high-cost, high-technology
The State’s force design goals are to
investments beyond those that
allow it to
assure internal security and
regional dominance and enable
• Preserve its own regime.
the State to contest access to the
• Exert influence in its region.
region by potential extraregional
• Contest access to the region.
opponents. Where possible, it
also seeks the capability to deny its opponents sanctuary from the tactical to
the strategic level. In sum then, the State’s goals are the capabilities to preserve
its own regime, exert influence in its region, and contest access to the region.
7-12. For dealing with internal threats, the State maintains a variety of in-
ternal security forces. These run the gamut from national security and border
guard units to national, district, and local police units. Some of these units
are paramilitary forces (organized along military lines and in some cases
equipped with heavy weapons and armored vehicles. Thus, they can provide
combat potential to conduct defensive operations or otherwise supplement
regular military forces if required.
7-13. The State invests over the long term to assure strong conventional
forces able to overpower opponents in its immediate region, where its Armed
Forces enjoy relative strength. However, it does not attempt to match the ca-
pabilities of likely opponents from outside the region. Accordingly, it fields a
wide range of capabilities, from state-of-the-art systems to obsolescent or
even obsolete systems that have been modernized to the extent possible. It
places a premium on adaptive and innovative application of existing systems
as the only way in which it might be able to match the most modern armies
in the world today. It also develops and invests in special-purpose forces
(SPF), information warfare, and selected high-payoff modern systems that
inhibit outside intervention or have strategic reach.
7-14. Taking the fight to the enemy throughout his strategic depth is part of
the State’s concept of employing all means necessary. This idea drives the
State to fielding SPF with a global reach, as well as Strategic Forces with
long-range rockets and missiles.
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FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
FORCE DESIGN PRINCIPLES
7-15. Systems and weapons procurement is driven by the way the State de-
velops forces and, in turn, procurement drives force development. Thus, force
design includes three major principles regarding both procurement and force
development: whether a system is adaptable, affordable, and deployable.
Adaptability
7-16. The first principle is whether a system is adaptable—that is, can the
system serve multiple purposes, and can it be modernized effectively by up-
grades from the supplier or by applying upgrades developed indigenously or
procured from a third party? Wherever possible, the Armed Forces also try to
field forces and systems mounted on a common chassis. This approach allows
relatively low-cost upgrades and direct improvements to force effectiveness.
Affordability
7-17. The second principle is whether the system is affordable—that is, is the
payoff likely to offset the cost? More than any other consideration, this is es-
sential in the State’s thinking. For example, ballistic missiles may have a
fairly high unit cost, but have high strategic payoff. Missile units, while diffi-
cult to maintain, are low-density; so the State can assure relatively high-
quality units. On the other hand, state-of-the-art fighter aircraft have high
unit costs for relatively low strategic benefit. Moreover, the need to maintain
highly trained fighter units continues throughout the life cycle of the system.
Accordingly, the State tends to invest more heavily in ballistic missiles
rather than state-of-the-art fighter aircraft. The intent of the selective pur-
chase of such high-cost technology is twofold. The State may seek a niche
that has strategic value, such as ballistic missiles, or may attempt to achieve
surprise by introducing unexpected technology.
Deployability
7-18. The third principle is whether the system is widely deployablethat is,
can the State field it in significant numbers? Another factor driving force design
is the State’s concept of total war and applying all means necessary. The State
can field a large number of conventional units with low-cost, low-overhead sys-
tems to enable regional overmatch and a relatively large force of conventional
units capable of conducting adaptive operations against an extraregional enemy.
The concept of the total war also leads the State to field a large number of re-
serve and militia formations. While most of these reserve and militia formations
have little offensive capability, they are capable of defending the State against
outside intervention and are easily a match for likely regional opponents.
ACQUISITION AND PROCUREMENT
7-19. The Acquisition and Procurement Directorate of the MOD is responsi-
ble for the oversight and management of the military acquisition and pro-
curement program. Modernization is a critical and constant requirement for
the State. The State seeks to obtain a technological or qualitative edge over
any regional opponent through modernization of equipment. The overall ob-
jectives of the modernization effort are to maintain a deterrent to attacks
7-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
from a regional opponent and to win quickly in combat. The State recognizes
that new technologies serve to create new capabilities in old systems as hy-
bridization provides rapid, exponential improvements in some systems.
Therefore, it prefers initially to purchase equipment upgrades that produce
hybrid systems, rather than to create or purchase new systems.
7-20. The State focuses on upgrading weapon systems based primarily upon
the perceived regional threat. Depending on the threat, it may place a higher
priority on upgrades to a particular service of its Armed Forces. For example,
it may initially modernize its Navy and then shift emphasis to its Air Force
or Army. However, the modernization priorities generally favor the Army.
The modernization effort includes incremental hardware and software im-
provements, new system development, and the use of commercial off-the-
shelf components.
7-21. The rapid growth and proliferation of new technology, combined with
the modernization effort, allows the State to achieve equality or even an
overmatch of the enemy in niche areas. For example, the Armed Forces may
have a computerized fire control system that has limitations based on software
in the system. Software upgrades can be purchased from other nations or trans-
national organizations, transmitted or downloaded electronically, and applied on
a matter of minutes. Since the basic operation of the system is unchanged, this
improvement is transparent to the user. Thus, it improves system performance
with no time-consuming retraining or equipment maintenance downtime.
ACQUISITION PHASES
7-22. The acquisition process is divided into four phases. The concept explo-
ration phase consists of competitive, parallel short-term studies. The focus of
these efforts is to define and evaluate the feasibility of alternative concepts
and to provide a basis for assessing relative merits of these concepts at the
next milestone decision point.
7-23. The program definition and risk reduction phase is where one or more
concepts, design approaches, and/or parallel technologies are pursued as war-
ranted. Assessments of the advantages and disadvantages of alternative
concepts are refined. For example, the State may determine that the pro-
curement of commercial off-the-shelf equipment may be in its best interest in
the short term. However, the long-term goal is to reverse engineer, develop,
and domestically produce the equipment. This phase is also characterized by the
prototyping, demonstration, and consideration of early operational assessments
of equipment and weapon systems. This effort ensures that technology, manu-
facturing, and fielding risks are well in hand prior to the next decision point.
7-24. During the engineering, manufacturing, and development phase, the
most promising design approach is translated into a stable, interoperable,
producible, supportable, and cost-effective design. The equipment is produced
and fielded in limited quantities to facilitate the incorporation of design im-
provements and upgrades.
7-25. The fourth and final phase is production and operational fielding. The
objective of this phase is to achieve an operational capability that satisfies
the mission need or requirement. However, the potential for modification or
upgrades to the fielded system is continuously evaluated.
7-5
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
DOMESTIC
7-26. As a rule, the State gradually updates weapons as the overall economy
advances, improving existing equipment. Priorities aside, however, it may
choose to make opportunistic purchases for the procurement of key techno-
logical advances that can produce a qualitative edge over a regional opponent
or mitigate the advantage of an extraregional force. When selecting weapons
systems, the State considers training, technical, and support-equipment costs
required for maintaining and operating the weapon system, in addition to the
cost of the system itself. To reduce the overall operating and maintenance
costs, the State may procure systems with the intent of placing a majority of
them in long-term storage. A few of the systems (along with simulators and
training devices) are fielded to designated training units and facilities to
maintain established training standards. Thus, the State attains a benefit by
reducing the ownership costs of existing systems, extending their life cycle,
and maintaining established training standards.
7-27. Whenever feasible, systems and production facilities are dual-use, serv-
ing both civilian and military needs. For example, an aircraft plant may be
producing commercial transport as well as combat aircraft. The State may
purchase or import a foreign-made avionics package for the transport aircraft
with a possible use or application in the combat aircraft. This serves to meet
two objectives. First it reduces the unit cost of military production, and sec-
ondly it facilitates mobilization.
7-28. The State’s basic policy is to export or sell arms to obtain both financial
and political advantage. The State attempts to undersell its competitors and
usually is able to succeed, since its labor costs are lower than in most indus-
trialized nations. However, the bottom line is that money, as well as politics,
governs to whom the State sells. It sells arms for foreign exchange that in
turn it can use to pay for the acquisition of more technology and weapons sys-
tems it cannot produce.
FOREIGN
7-29. The cornerstone of the State’s foreign acquisition strategy is the import
of technology and technical assistance with the purchase of foreign systems
and subsystems. This includes the licensing for the manufacture and produc-
tion of systems and their respective components. The primary factor that de-
termines the State’s foreign weapons acquisition is the ability of the State to
pay in convertible or hard currency, barter for existing goods or services (in-
cluding food, fuel, raw materials, or illegal drugs), or possibly attain financial
assistance from allies. The State may initially purchase much of the equip-
ment for civilian use, but subsequently find military applications. It may
make opportunistic investment in high-payoff foreign systems to create tech-
nological niches or to lead into domestic development.
STATE-OWNED FACILITIES ABROAD
7-30. In the complex world of international business, it is possible for the
State’s wealthy families (or even the State government) to acquire controlling
interest or sole ownership of firms located in other countries. In some in-
stances, State seeks a third-party ownership of these firms in order to disguise
7-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
both the true ownership and purpose of these firms. Thus, the State has ac-
cess to factories and other enterprises that use human and natural resources
of another country to produce goods and services for the State’s use. Addi-
tionally, this facilitates the State’s ability to generate revenue with which it
can purchase other goods and services.
MOBILIZATION
7-31. The mobilization process is another reflection of the dual principles of
the total war and all means necessary. For example, the principle of total war
emphasizes universal military training and service. Thus, the State is able to
meet the personnel requirement for standing forces, significant reserves, and a
militia. Planning for mobilization of reserves and militia is the responsibility of
the Organization and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff.
7-32. The Organization and Mobilization Directorate must also coordinate
through the SID with other ministries of the government to assure that their
planning will meet wartime needs of the Armed Forces. During wartime, the
directorate identifies and recommends priorities of effort in coordination with
civilian ministries. It deals particularly with those ministries concerned with
transportation and the production or acquisition of food, fuel, and materiel.
7-33. The State’s Mobilization Law outlines the duties and responsibilities of
State ministries and the civilian populace during a State declared emer-
gency. For example, the liability for military service for men starts at age 18
and lasts until their sixtieth birthday. Once the initial training or service
commitment is completed, the personnel are transferred to the Armed Forces
reserves. Reserve and militia personnel may receive up to 120 days of train-
ing per year. The Mobilization Law also permits limited or selective mobiliza-
tion of resources appropriate for lesser emergencies. Mobilization measures
may be applied to specific organizations, agencies, or units. For natural disas-
ters, it facilitates shifting additional personnel to aid certain districts.
7-34. Priorities for acquisition and sustainment, once developed, are adhered
to ruthlessly. Nonetheless, the State’s growing economy and the limited
means of distribution require patience and time, since the State anticipates
outside intervention and the need to stockpile equipment and supplies. This
is especially so during peacetime. Despite the State’s penchant for preparing
for war all of the time, it is unable to meet all of its needs quickly. The need
to assign production to stockpiling efforts often means that some units may
not enjoy high readiness rates during peacetime. Additionally, the State’s
approach of stockpiling at numerous sites to offset its distribution problems
requires such long lead time that the logistics system imposes limitations on
the acquisition system.
7-35. During mobilization, the State’s logistics system moves very rapidly
and smoothly to support military requirements. Generally, the system func-
tions more effectively following mobilization, at least in part due to the set-
ting aside of civilian high-priority efforts. The SID has the requisite authority
to enforce national-level decisions. Thus, the State’s civilian populace and
Armed Forces logistics are afforded the emphasis and resources that the na-
tional strategy requires.
7-7
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
SUSTAINMENT
7-36. The State’s concept of the logistics visualizes war throughout the entire
country and region. This includes everything from battle positions to the
theater or national support zone.1 The Armed Forces logistics doctrine is a
blend of other nations’ systems and domestic concepts. This blend can be at-
tributed to the State’s previous experience in war, doctrine adapted from for-
eign sources, and analysis of the operational environment.
7-37. The largest vulnerabilities of the State’s logistics system are mainte-
nance of communications and a transportation network capable of sustaining
military operations. Therefore, the State must be opportunistic. For example,
it emphasizes the use of civilian and captured vehicles, equipment, and sup-
plies to maintain the tempo of military operations. It also places considerable
emphasis on improving the efficiency and security of the logistics system. It
has increased the depth of forward service areas and increased the mobility
and range of logistics units in support of frontline forces.
7-38. For the Armed Forces, all strategic logistics support is coordinated at
the national level through the MOD’s Chief of Logistics. The responsibilities
of the Chief of Logistics are the same during war and peace. These responsi-
bilities include
Procuring of personnel, materiel, and services required by the military.
Preparing the economy and the people to provide sustained support in
case of war.
Ensuring that an uninterrupted flow of personnel, materiel, and
equipment reaches the individual fighting unit at the proper place and
time.
7-39. Organizations within the national-level military logistics establishment
include materiel support and maintenance units, as well as mobilized civilian
resources, to include medical personnel and facilities. Some national-level lo-
gistics units may be allocated to subordinate commands to reinforce the units
forming their logistics bases, while the remaining units are centralized under
the General Staff control.
SUSTAINMENT TENETS
7-40. Given its disadvantages, the
Sustainment Tenets
State considers that logistics planning
is essential to executing the national
The State relies on the follow-
security strategy. The State relies on
ing sustainment tenets:
the following three tenets: long-term
• Long-term planning.
planning, centralized planning and
• Centralized planning and de-
decentralized execution, and inter-
centralized execution.
ministerial coordination.
• Interministerial coordination.
1 The support zone is that area of the battlespace designed to be free of significant enemy action and to permit the
effective logistics and administrative support of forces.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
Long-Term Planning
7-41. Long-term planning ensures that the right materiel is developed in
support of the military and assures the State is able to sustain operations.
The State plans for sustainment in accordance with mobilization of its
forces and the types of strategic-level courses of action it anticipates in a
strategic campaign. Conceptually, its logistics capability parallels its force
design philosophy. For example, mobile forces designed for regional force-
projection operations are generally modern and have the most robust
combat logistics capability. Logistics plans are primarily developed to sus-
tain military operations against regional threats. Additionally, the logis-
tics plans include sustainment of operations against an extraregional
threat.
Centralized Planning and Decentralized Execution
7-42. To ensure both priority of effort and efficiency in the sustainment proc-
ess, the State’s logistics operations are characterized by the tenet of central-
ized planning and decentralized execution. Logistics plans are developed at
higher levels and executed by units and organizations at lower levels. Cen-
tralized planning requires a focal point for logistics planning and resource al-
location at all levels. The individual or unit that is that focal point must be
constantly aware of requirements and capabilities. Decentralized execution
enhances the flexibility to meet local requirements and the rapid reprioriti-
zation of support.
7-43. This tenet is critical for support of reconnaissance fires and strike op-
erations. The Armed Forces use reconnaissance fires to attack specific enemy
systems in order to destroy or degrade the combat potential of the enemy
force. They employ a strike to destroy an enemy formation after setting
the conditions for its destruction. The Armed Forces use a series of caches
and short-duration facilities to sustain fire support and maneuver forces dur-
ing these operations.
7-44. This tenet is also important for supporting the deployment of SPF
in the enemy’s strategic depth or against his lines of communications
(LOCs). Generally, SPF are inserted with the requisite munitions and
supplies their missions require. Since SPF units are expected to sustain
themselves for the duration if their missions, the Armed Forces rely on
the careful planning and stockage of supply caches to sustain these
forces.
Interministerial Coordination
7-45. Finally, strategic logistics plans are coordinated across ministerial
lines. This is commonly referred to as interministerial coordination. Inter-
ministerial coordination by the SID ensures a balanced responsiveness of the
national industrial base to both the civilian populace and the military during
the strategic campaign.
7-9
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
LOGISTICS MISSIONS
7-46. Three terms describe how the Armed Forces provide support during
peacetime and wartime. The terms for these logistics missions are primary
support, area support, and depot support.
7-47. Primary support is a mission given to supply, services, transportation,
and maintenance units that normally provide support directly to other units.
This allows the primary support unit to respond directly to the supported
unit’s request for assistance or supplies.
7-48. Area support is a mission given to supply, services, transportation, and
maintenance units that normally provide support to primary support units
and other area support units. Lower-priority units may have to rely on area
support, rather than receiving supplies and services directly from the next-
higher echelon.
7-49. Depot support is a mission given to national-level or strategic units that
normally provide support to area support units. Depot support operations in-
clude the receipt, storage, and issue of war stocks and domestically produced
armaments and materiel, and the overhaul and rebuilding of major end
items.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
7-50. During regional operations, the State generally possesses the advan-
tage of secure LOCs and the latitude to sustain its forces with little to no disrup-
tion. In the best case, the State’s economy and industrial base may suffer little
or no damage from the war. The State may actually increase production of sup-
plies and materiel in a rush to increase national wartime stockpiles of key mili-
tary and civilian supplies and material prior to any extraregional intervention
that could destroy production facilities or disrupt imports.
7-51. Whether the State suffers damage to its domestic production capability
or not, it may also increase production in factories and facilities owned by the
State or its ruling elite in foreign countries, based on the perceived possibility
of intervention of an extraregional force. This action facilitates the State’s
ability to produce, transport, and stockpile key military and civilian supplies
prior to diplomatic initiatives of an extraregional force and/or the United Na-
tions to close down the State-owned foreign facilities.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
7-52. During transition operations, the stockpiling of critical civilian supplies
and material (such as food, petroleum products, and clothing) becomes the
primary focus of the State. The objective is to enable the State to resist eco-
nomic sanctions imposed by an extraregional power and/or the United Na-
tions. Thus, the impact of the economic sanctions has a limited effect. This af-
fords the State the ability to sustain military operations to attain strategic
objectives and satisfy the basic needs of the populace with minimal impact.
The State may gradually begin the rationing of civilian supplies and services.
7-53. The State’s militia units may be employed in primarily defensive roles
during transition and adaptive operations. They are generally dependent on
stockpiled supplies and logistics units of limited mobility. During transition
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
operations, militia units may receive top priority in distribution and trans-
portation of supplies in order to facilitate their execution of missions in sup-
port of the strategic campaign plan.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
7-54. The State primarily shifts its emphasis to an area support mode during
adaptive operations, since it no longer possesses the advantage of secure
LOCs. For example, it may use all modes of transportation (air, rail, water-
way, and road) sparingly due to the Armed Forces’ inability to control the
State’s airspace. Thus, military units and the civilian populace are locally
sustained through short-duration facilities such as supply points, caches, and
depots. These facilities are capable of accommodating a majority of the de-
mands placed on the distribution system for activities located in their respec-
tive support zone.
7-55. Diplomatic initiatives may impact on the State’s ability to procure sup-
plies and materiel produced in State-owned factories and facilities based in
foreign countries. However, the State remains opportunistic during adaptive
operations. If the diplomatic sanctions are not imposed, the State can con-
tinue to produce, transport, and stockpile key military and civilian supplies.
It could seek to transport supplies and materiel under foreign-flagged com-
mercial transportation as well as through the supply networks of under-
ground or criminally-based activities. The SID normally imposes the ration-
ing of civilian supplies and services. Internal security forces are generally
vigilant in their efforts to reduce the impact of black marketing of supplies on
the civilian populace.
MATERIEL SUPPORT
7-56. The Armed Forces materiel support system comprises a mix of very
modern and unsophisticated capabilities that vary depending on the priority
of the supported units. Generally, high-priority or elite units enjoy the bene-
fits of a robust materiel support system that affords a higher degree of flexi-
bility and responsiveness to rapid changes in plans. For such units, the sys-
tem may be fully automated to track requirements and control the issue of
supplies. Less capable units (including reserve and the militia forces) typi-
cally have little or no automation support. Both types of materiel support
system are based on allocating supplies and services to units in order to
accomplish mission objectives. However, the aim of the State is to continue
the upgrade of its less capable units to a robust supply system capable of
sustaining the force in all environments.
7-57. Supply includes actions to acquire, manage, receive, store, and issue
the materiel required to equip and sustain the force from mobilization
through deployment, combat operations, and recovery into the State home-
land. The allocation of supplies is based on the unit mission, supply reports,
and the availability of supplies. During peacetime, the Armed Forces operate
under the “pull system” of supply. For example, personnel in the field may
request material from a depot where it must be picked up and delivered to
the field.
7-11
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
7-58. The State’s concept of services includes all troops, installations, and
duty positions that perform logistics support for combat arms units. Such ser-
vices are not specific to the ground forces, but support other Armed Forces
components as well.
7-59. During wartime, however, the Armed Forces operate under the forward
distribution or “push system” principle, in which the higher echelon directly
supplies and services the next-lower echelon. Supplies and services are deliv-
ered directly to subordinate elements using the organic transportation assets
of the higher headquarters. Supplies may be procured or obtained from social
groups, consumer cooperatives, government farms, or individual citizens, and
by coercion or foraging. Lower-priority units may have to rely on area sup-
port or even supply point distribution.
MAINTENANCE
7-60. Maintenance includes actions taken to keep materiel and equipment in
a serviceable condition, to return it to service, or to update and upgrade its
capability. Since supplies are limited, the Armed Forces stress preventive
maintenance, technical inspections, and proper operating methods to extend
the life cycle of equipment. The maintenance system is designed to repair ve-
hicles and equipment as far forward as possible. Repair facilities and units
move near the scene of combat rather than waiting for damaged equipment
to be evacuated to them. Fixed and mobile repair units extend repair capa-
bilities forward into the battle zone and provide service to the customer
unit. During wartime, the types of repair performed at each level depend
on the situation. Generally, they are of a lesser degree than in peacetime.
The Armed Forces classify three categories of repair: routine, medium, or
capital.
7-61. Routine repairssuch as replacements, adjustments, or repair of in-
dividual componentsrequire a short time to fix. Generally, maintenance
personnel do not disassemble major components as part of routine repair.
Medium repairs include the minor overhaul of equipment and the repair of
individual components requiring a short time to fix. Capital repairs are
conducted at depot level and involve the major overhaul and/or assembly
of equipment.
DEPOT FACILITIES AND OPERATION
7-62. Depots are part of the strategic logistics support structure and hold na-
tional-level stockpiles. They occupy fixed peacetime facilities, aboveground
and underground structures, plus dispersal sites throughout the country.
They manage the distribution of war stocks and domestically produced ar-
maments and materiel, and perform any higher-level repair work that is ac-
complished in country. Examples of these repairs include aircraft instrumen-
tation, optics, and electronics. The depots manage the distribution of con-
sumables such as fuel, food, and other items from the civilian economy.
Rocket and missile units, aviation support units, and air defense mainte-
nance units receive direct support from the nearest depot.
7-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
7-63. A single depot may have one
or more of the above missions. An
Depot Categories
area distribution depot
(ADD) re-
Depots are generally divided into
ceives, stores, and distributes items
the following categories:
for units operating or assigned
• Area distribution depots.
within the support zone. Major end
items may also be stored in an
• Ammunition depots.
ADD, but normally are stored in a
• Maintenance depots.
maintenance depot. The materiel
• Medical depots.
stored within an ADD should ac-
commodate a majority of the demands placed on the distribution system for the
units located in the support zone. An ammunition depot receives stores, reno-
vates, issues, and demilitarizes munitions of all types. Maintenance depots
overhaul major end items and repairable components and, as necessary, per-
form limited fabrication and manufacturing. All overhaul items are stored at
a maintenance depot until disposition instructions are received from the MOD.
Medical depots are discussed in the Medical Logistics section of this chapter.
ABOVEGROUND STRUCTURES
7-64. Aboveground structures range from factory warehouses to aboveground
hardened structures. Hardened structures are reinforced for protection
against aerial and ground attack. Earth mounded bunkers are an example of
an aboveground hardened structure. The State uses extensive camouflage,
concealment, cover, and deception techniques to reduce the detection signa-
ture of these structures to enemy reconnaissance platforms. The State can
also develop sophisticated decoy sites.
UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES
7-65. Underground structures include shallow buried and deep underground
bunkers and complexes. There are cases where the State uses underground
storage facilities to house its command and control (C2) complexes and medi-
cal facilities. Underground structures are dispersed throughout the country
and consist of intersecting tunnels with multiple exits. Some of these exits
may lead to either external combat positions or other subterranean facilities.
Large camouflaged doors cover the entrances. The camouflage material
matches the surrounding rock so closely that one has to knock on the surface
to determine the difference. Normally, a complex may extend over a square
kilometer or more. Auxiliary casements in the underground facility may hold
fuel, water, food, medical supplies, clothing, or life support equipment.
SHORT-DURATION FACILITIES
7-66. Short-duration storage facilities play a central role in any strategic
campaign that may involve intervention by an extraregional power. For example,
prior to conducting adaptive operations, the State plans, develops, and builds
short-duration facilities for the pre-positioning of equipment and supplies to sus-
tain deployed forces. The State attempts to anticipate outside intervention and
plan accordingly. Logistics items are stockpiled or cached in underground caves
and dugout holes, tents, or warehouses, and are dispersed over a wide area. These
7-13
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
facilities can be considered a mini-supply depot. They also undergo extensive
camouflage and concealment to reduce their detection signature.
TRANSPORTATION
7-67. The State’s military logistics planners base their estimates on the use
of all movement resources available. These estimates include tactical combat
vehicles as well as civilian transportation assets mobilized to move supplies,
equipment, and personnel. For example, during mobilization, civilian truck-
ing and bus companies may be organized as militia truck units to provide
transportation of cargo and personnel in the State’s homeland. The mobility
of logistics units must match that of the supported operation. If the logistics
support units fail to achieve this, they may jeopardize the overall success of
the State’s strategic campaign. Traffic management is the responsibility of
the Military Transportation Bureau. The bureau is subordinate to the Mate-
riel Support Department under the MOD Chief of Logistics and is responsible
for managing defense transportation requirements using military and civil-
ian resources.
TRANSPORTATION PRINCIPLES
7-68. The principles of movement apply to all military transportation ser-
vices and remain constant throughout peace and war. Additionally, they
apply regardless of the planning level. During wartime, civilian personnel,
transportation assets (including farm animals, vehicles, aircraft, and wa-
ter vessels), and materiel-handling equipment are mobilized to support
the war effort.
Centralized Planning and Decentralized Execution
7-69. Movement control is centralized at the highest level at which com-
manders charged with providing total logistics support and monitoring the
transportation system and infrastructure can exercise it. This requires a
focal point for movement planning and transportation resource allocation
at all levels. That focal point, whether an individual or unit, must be con-
stantly aware of requirements and capabilities. Decentralized execution
enhances the flexibility to meet local requirements and to rapidly repriori-
tize support.
Regulated Movement
7-70. All movement is regulated according to command priorities. Move-
ments are not validated, approved, or initiated if any part of the transporta-
tion system cannot meet the requirement. Regulating transportation assets
and LOCs is required to prevent congestion, confusion, and conflict of move-
ments. Unregulated use of the transportation system can severely hamper
the movement of critical cargo and personnel supporting the strategic cam-
paign. Therefore, traffic in the theater is programmed to provide fluid move-
ment throughout the transportation network. The State’s internal security
forces support movement control through protection of supply routes of
movement and key transportation nodes and centers in the State’s homeland
or in State-occupied territory in a neighboring country.
7-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
7-71. A movement program is a directive that allocates the available trans-
port mode capability to satisfy the movement requirements in accordance
with the commander’s priorities. The program normally contains detailed in-
formation concerning origins, destinations, weights, and cube of cargo, and/or
types and number of personnel to be moved.
Fluid and Flexible Movement
7-72. The transportation system is designed to provide an uninterrupted flow
of traffic that adjusts rapidly to changing situations. It is flexible enough to
meet the changing priorities of a fluid battlefield and reallocate resources as
necessary. Adjustments must be made to meet the variations in wartime in-
tensity. For example, when units are in the offense, the transportation sys-
tem expands to maintain the tempo of the battle. Conversely, when units are
in the defense, the system is contracted, the mode changes, and differing
cargo priorities may be necessary. Changes in the operational environment
necessitate adjustments to operate in varying conditions and operational
and/or tactical situations that may dictate the types of convoys and controls
established for movement.
7-73. The availability and use of road and rail networks, airfields, inland wa-
terways, ports, and beaches not only allows the transportation system to
meet operational and tactical changes, but also provide redundancy within
the overall transportation network. For example, if a portion of a road net-
work is destroyed or rendered unusable, the mode could change to rail or
inland waterway.
Maximum Use of Carrying Capacity
7-74.The principle of making maximum use of carrying capacity involves
more than just loading each transportation asset to its optimum carrying ca-
pacity. Transport capability that is not used in one day cannot be stored to
provide an increase in capability for subsequent days. Similarly, a situation
allowing fully-loaded transport to sit idle is just as much a loss of carrying ca-
pacity as is a partially-loaded vehicle moving through the system. While allow-
ing for sufficient equipment, maintenance, and personnel rest, planners should
keep transportation assets loaded and moving as much as the situation permits.
TRANSPORTATION MODES
7-75. Transportation operations may include motor vehicles, rail, aircraft,
and waterway (coastal and inland) transport vessels. The Armed Forces gen-
erally uses motor vehicles to move large quantities of general cargo, petro-
leum products, and personnel throughout the theater. However, waterway
transport vessels may be used to move large quantities of supplies and per-
sonnel along coastal or inland waterways to remote areas that are not acces-
sible to motor vehicles.
7-76. As requirements for transportation fluctuate, each mode must be prop-
erly used to accomplish the commander’s objective. For example, air trans-
port is employed if reaction speed is the priority. Motor transport is consid-
ered the most flexible surface mode. It provides door-to-door delivery service
and an interface with all other transportation modes.
7-15
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
PERSONNEL
7-77. The MOD establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes
procedures for personnel readiness issues as they apply to all members and
components (standing forces, reserve, and militia) of the Armed Forces. The
Manpower and Readiness Department under the MOD Chief of Logistics is
responsible for the administration and management of the military personnel
system.
7-78. In consultation with the various service component chiefs, the Chief of
the General Staff (CGS) provides advice to the Minister of Defense on man-
power and personnel issues impacting the readiness of the Armed Forces and
the force structure required to support national security objectives. Addition-
ally, the CGS advises the Minister of Defense on the extent to which the ma-
jor programs and policies of the Armed Forces in the area of manpower con-
form with strategic plans.
7-79. In addition to recruiting, organizing, equipping, and training, each of
the six service components has the responsibility for providing personnel
support to its forces. Major combatant commanders exercise authority over
assigned forces. This authority allows the combatant commanders to direct
and approve those aspects of personnel support necessary to carry out as-
signed missions and to standardize personnel policies within the command to
the extent that such standardization is necessary to carry out missions as-
signed to the command.
7-80. The State considers people as one of the most critical assets to the suc-
cess of any military operation. Thorough planning and efficient personnel
management directly influences mission readiness. Therefore, the MOD re-
quires service components to resource personnel requirements in a timely man-
ner to support operational requirements. The State views “personnel support” as
all activities associated with assignment of personnel against authorized billets
and validated individual augmentation requirements, as well as those adminis-
trative activities associated with personnel programs within a command.
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
7-81. The Military Education Directorate of the MOD oversees universal
military training programs designed to maintain the population’s knowledge
of military operations and tactics. It also coordinates with the State Ministry
of Education to ensure military training is integrated within the general edu-
cation system. The National Military Schools and Colleges Department, sub-
ordinate to the Military Education Directorate is responsible for the over-
sight on all military academic training within the country. The schools in-
clude the National Military Academy, a National War College, service
schools, and specialized schools.
7-82. There are several levels of schools for the individual training of officers,
NCOs, and enlisted personnel. They include basic and advanced branch
schools; intermediate and higher-level staff schools; and a National War Col-
lege. The State also has specialized schools to support various special units
and/or military occupations. The specialized schools include airborne, SPF,
diving, and information warfare. The State also maintains a foreign ex-
change program with other countries.
7-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
Officer Training and Competence
7-83. The State believes that politically-aware commanders thoroughly
grounded in doctrine, organizations, capability, and strategy are essential to
the strategic and operational means of executing the State’s military art. All
military officers adhere to the rule of selfless service to the State. Officer
candidates undergo a rigorous academic, physical, and psychological screen-
ing process prior to selection for attendance at the National Military Acad-
emy. The literacy rate of officers approaches 100 percent. As a rule, the offi-
cer corps is comfortable with electronic and automotive technology. The very
best officers attend foreign military schools.
NCO Training and Competence
7-84. The State has established leadership schools for its NCO corps. Most of
these schools are oriented toward the development of the leadership qualities
of new or junior-ranking NCOs. However, NCOs attending these schools do not
necessarily get credit for promotion. The NCOs have a literacy rate of over 80
percent and have some familiarity with electronic and automotive technology.
Enlisted Training and Competence
7-85. The Combat Training Directorate of the MOD plans, coordinates and
supervises combat training in all service components. The State dedicates
special schools or units to receive and train newly enlisted or conscripted per-
sonnel. Normally, basic training for an enlisted soldier lasts 6 to 10 weeks.
Higher-caliber soldiers are identified to receive some type of specialized
training ranging from 8 to 12 weeks and sometimes longer. However, most
soldiers receive training lasting 4 to 8 weeks as specialists in one field or
another. There is a minimum 2-year service commitment for regular force
personnel and an 18-month service commitment for conscripts.
7-86. During wartime, soldiers attend 1 to 6 weeks of basic training and then
are sent to regular units and integrated into squads or crews. Junior-ranking
personnel equipped with training schedules or formal standards established
by a higher headquarters train newly accessed soldiers at unit level. Enlisted
soldiers have a literacy rate of over 80 percent and possess some familiarity
with electronic and automotive technology.
Unit Training
7-87. The military leadership clearly understands that the training methods
of the past are hopelessly inadequate to prepare units for modern warfare.
Regional conflicts are expected to be very lethal and may include high-
technology weapons. Lessons learned by observing the fate of Iraqi troops in
the Gulf War reinforced the need to improve training of the State’s Armed
Forces. The speed at which the U.S.-led coalition forces cut through the infantry-
heavy Iraqi units served to warn the State’s leadership of its own possible fate in
a future war. Except for a few elite, high-readiness units, most combat units
prior to the Gulf War adhered to a numbingly monotonous field-training regi-
men that expended few resources, took few risks, and produced predictable
results.
7-17
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
7-88. The State now has training centers that employ “aggressor” units
trained and organized to simulate potential enemy forces in the offensive and
defensive combat against the State’s Armed Forces. The “aggressors” use
electronic countermeasures, mobility and countermobility methods, recon-
naissance, counterreconnaissance, and heavy and light forces units.
7-89. Military operations provide the State’s military leaders the opportunity
to develop and implement new doctrinal and tactical techniques, as well as
gain combat experience. They are capable of task-organizing units based on
mission, terrain, enemy disposition, and availability of equipment. The task-
organized units function effectively, demonstrating a high degree of training
in C2 during combined arms operations.
MEDICAL SUPPORT
7-90. The basic principle of combat medical support is multistage evacuation
with minimum treatment by medical personnel at each unit level. They treat
the lightly wounded who can return to combat and those casualties who
would not survive further evacuation without immediate medical attention.
7-91. The State divides the range of medical treatment into three categories.
The first category of procedures includes only mandatory lifesaving meas-
ures. The second category includes procedures to prevent severe complica-
tions of wounds or injuries. The final category of treatment includes proce-
dures accomplished only when there is a low casualty load and reduced en-
emy activity.
7-92. In anticipation of an overtaxed combat medical support system, the
State’s military doctrine emphasizes the importance of self-help and mutual
aid among individual soldiers. This concept extends beyond the battlefield to
casualty collection points and unit aid stations. Self-help and mutual aid re-
duces the demands made on dedicated medical personnel, particularly when
there is a sudden and massive influx of casualties. Each soldier is required to
attend a first-aid training session.
MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH
7-93. The Military Health Services Department, subordinate to the MOD
Chief of Logistics, is responsible for providing health care to Armed Forces
personnel and their dependents. Health care is provided at civilian as well as
military health care facilities. The military health services are capable of
supporting combat forces in prolonged or major military operations.
7-94. The military health services also benefit from health services available
through the civilian sector. The Ministry of Health is responsible for manag-
ing public health services and regulating private medical services. The minis-
try’s goal is to ensure that all citizens receive health care. Preventive medi-
cine, including staff training, program management, vaccinations, public
education, and improved water supply, is a priority. The ministry seeks to ex-
tend primary health care centers, ensure availability of pharmaceuticals, and
control population growth. Primary, secondary, and tertiary medical services
are offered through a network of facilities. Secondary and tertiary care ser-
vices are also available through university hospitals under the Higher Edu-
cation and Scientific Research Directorate of the Ministry of Education.
7-18
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
7-95. During peacetime, members of the reserve and militia receive their
medical care through the government-sponsored National Social Health and
Security Fund. This fund, financed by employee, employer, and government
contributions, provide medical insurance to the civilian populace. It seeks to
control health care costs and gradually reduce the numbers of patients going
abroad for health care by improving services within the country. The fund of-
fers primary health care through numerous clinics and hospitals. During
wartime, the reserve and militia receive medical support through the mili-
tary health care system.
INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
7-96. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organi-
zations (PVOs) often operate within the borders of the State to provide hu-
manitarian assistance. However, there are cases where the assistance is
somewhat restricted by security problems. International aid consists primar-
ily of materiel, funds, and personnel (local and foreign).
MEDICAL FACILITIES
7-97. The best medical facility is the Central Army Hospital. During peace-
time, military personnel receive treatment at this hospital, which also is des-
ignated as one of the emergency medical care facilities for foreign diplomats
and their families. During wartime conditions, military personnel are treated
at all of the major civilian hospitals. The State has designated some of its
major university hospitals as emergency medical care facilities for foreign
diplomats, their families, and tourists. This action ensures consistent high-
quality medical staffing, care and treatment. These facilities are also staffed
with foreign medical personnel. A majority of medical facilities or clinics in
the outlying areas have sufficient numbers of trained personnel, supplies,
and reliable electric power and water. The facilities also contain high-quality,
sophisticated, domestic and imported medical equipment. The pharmacies
are stocked with high-quality domestic, and foreign-produced pharmaceuticals.
MEDICAL LOGISTICS
7-98. The medical logistics system operates on a “pull system.” Personnel in
the field request medical material (including repair parts for medical equip-
ment) from a medical depot where it must be picked up and delivered to the
field. Normally, medical supplies are transported forward on cargo carrying
transport vehicles, water vessels, or aircraft. However, ground ambulances
returning to forward areas may assist in transporting medical supplies for-
ward. A medical equipment maintenance unit at the medical depot provides
all medical equipment maintenance.
QUALITY OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL
7-99. The skills of the State’s medical personnel are comparable to those of
their foreign counterparts. The State’s military doctors are joined in wartime
by the mobilization of the bulk of the country’s physicians. Many medical
personnel have experience treating trauma patients and handling mass-
casualty situations. Military physicians are well trained, and the qualifica-
tions of most other medical personnel range from good to excellent. All medical
7-19
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
personnel receive annual training in advanced trauma life support. After ac-
tive duty, most of the physicians remain part of the medical reserve and are
subject to annual recalls. Once the country has been mobilized, civilian medi-
cal personnel are detailed into the military structure to augment existing
professionals.
7-100. The training of medical officers, dentists, and pharmacists is con-
ducted at both domestic and foreign specialized medical institutions. Medical
personnel also undergo advanced and continuing education through training
at the Central Army Hospital. The National Military Academy also has a
medical department that is the center of scientific research into theoretical
and practical military medical problems. The medical department serves as a
major training center for instructors in medical and biological sciences. The
medical department coordinates various medical research projects conducted
in both domestic and foreign civilian medical institutions.
CASUALTY HANDLING
7-101. The State has shown success in handling combat casualties. This suc-
cess stems from emphasis placed on trauma training and close coordination
with the civilian medical sector. Evacuation is based on a higher-to-lower
method. The next-higher echelon provides transportation for casualties. Each
level has specific responsibilities for the care of the sick and wounded. Be-
sides treating the wounded, medical personnel handle virtually all of their
own administration, especially at lower levels. As casualties move through
the combat evacuation system, medical personnel at each level make effective
use of medical facilities by repeated sorting of the wounded (triage). Helicop-
ters are used for all military and civilian search and rescue missions, medical
evacuations, and domestic disaster relief flights. During wartime situations,
most casualties arrive at a hospital within 6 to 12 hours after being wounded.
The evacuation time is reduced to 2 hours during peacetime.
7-102. Treating nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) casualties is a stan-
dard State trauma protocol. The NBC medical plan is based on three as-
sumptions: mass casualties will occur, casualties will be similar to those that
medical personnel have been trained to treat, and medical personnel will be
able to treat the casualties in a decontaminated environment. The Central
Army Hospital can be converted into a chemical decontamination center
within 2 to 6 hours. Most of the remaining major hospitals require 30 days to
convert to a decontamination center.
BLOOD MANAGEMENT
7-103. The Ministry of Health maintains a Blood Management Office to over-
see the collection, processing, storage, and distribution of blood (to include
liquid blood and blood components) to alleviate the effects of a natural disas-
ter or war. Blood management services are provided to support both civilian
and military establishments. The main source of blood to support wartime
casualty requirements comes from the collection and processing of blood from
the civilian populace during peacetime. The blood is generally stored in pre-
positioned underground structures throughout the country.
7-20
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
CIVIL DEFENSE, ENGINERING, AND CONSTRUCTION
7-104. The Civil Defense Directorate is subordinate to the Ministry of the
Interior. The directorate determines the assets and the services required to
perform peacetime and wartime civil engineering and construction efforts as
directed by the SID. During wartime, the work of the Civil Defense Director-
ate is to a large extent identifying and recommending priorities of effort in
repairing battle-damaged facilities and structures (including bridges, storage
depots, and airfields) and to minimize or reduce the impact of enemy strikes
on the overall infrastructure. This also ensures sustainability of the force to
meet the overall strategic goals or objectives.
7-105. Civil defense and engineering programs, directed by the SID, provide
for the construction, operation, and maintenance of roads and facilities, and
logistics enhancements required to sustain military operations. For example,
construction programs may include the building of shelters, warehouses,
aboveground and underground structures, road networks, terminals, and
hospitals. Engineers and support personnel may operate electric power, sew-
age treatment, and water and fuel storage and distribution facilities. These
personnel may also conduct environmental support operations, provide fire
protection, conduct explosive ordnance disposal, provide water purification
and disposal, conduct engineer reconnaissance, and provide force-protection
construction support.
LEGAL AFFAIRS
7-106. The Legal Affairs Department under the MOD Chief of Logistics pro-
vides professional legal services to the MOD and its staff. These legal ser-
vices include matters that affect the morale, order, and discipline of the mili-
tary. The department’s responsibilities are to
Supervise the administration of military justice within the country and
occupied territory.
Provide legal services to commanders, staffs, and other authorized per-
sonnel on all matters involving military law, domestic law, and inter-
national law.
Consult and coordinate with other governmental agencies on legal
matters. In particular, the department works in close coordination
with the Legal Affairs Directorate in the Ministry of Public Information.
7-21
Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and
other selected terms. Terms with specific OPFOR-related definitions for
which FM 7-100 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with
an asterisk (*) and followed by the number of the paragraph (¶) or page
where they are defined. For other terms, refer to the manual listed.
*access limitation
¶3-75
*adaptive operations
¶3-21, p. 6-1
ADD area distribution depot
*administrative force structure
¶2-99
AEW airborne early warning
APOD aerial port of debarkation
APOE aerial port of embarkation
*armed conflict
¶3-13
AWACS airborne warning and control system
BTG brigade tactical group
C2 command and control
CGS Chief of the General Staff
COE contemporary operational environment
*complex terrain
¶1-40
*contemporary operational environment
p. iv, p. viii
*contemporary OPFOR
p. xi
CTC combat training center
DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DOD Department of Defense
DTG division tactical group
*enemy
p. ix
EW electronic warfare
FG field group
FM field manual
GNP gross national product
Glossary-1
FM 7-100 _________________________________________________________________________________
GPS global positioning system
HUMINT human intelligence
IA information attack
IADS integrated air defense system
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
IW information warfare
JP joint publication
LOC line of communications
*military strategic campaign plan
¶3-37
MOD Ministry of Defense
*national power
¶2-1
*national security strategy
¶3-1
*national strategic campaign
¶3-30
*national strategic campaign plan
¶3-33
NBC
nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA
national command authority
NCO
noncommissioned officer
NGO
nongovernmental organization
OE
operational environment
ODCSINT
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
operational environment
........................................................................................p. iv, JP 1-02
*operational exclusion
.................................................................................................... ¶3-73
OPFOR
opposing force
*opposing force (OPFOR)
................................................................................................ pp. x, xi
OSC
operational-strategic command
*personnel support
.................................................................................................... ¶7-80
PME
peacetime military engagement
PVO
private volunteer organization
*regional operations
......................................................................................... ¶3-21, p. 4-1
RISTA
reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
ROE
rules of engagement
SAM
surface-to-air missile
SATCOM
satellite communication(s)
SCP
strategic campaign plan
Glossary-2
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
*services
.....................................................................................................¶7-58
SHC
Supreme High Command
SID
Strategic Integration Department
SPF
Special-Purpose Forces
SPOD
sea port of debarkation
SPOE
sea port of embarkation
SSM
surface-to-surface missile
*strategic operations
................................................................................ ¶3-21, 3-47, 3-103
*strategic preclusion
.....................................................................................................¶3-71
*supply
.....................................................................................................¶7-57
*support zone
.................................................................................................. ¶7-36n
*system
.......................................................................................................¶3-6
*systems warfare
.......................................................................................................¶3-7
TBM
theater ballistic missile
*theater
.....................................................................................................¶3-41
*threat
........................................................................................................ p. x
*total war
.....................................................................................................¶3-13
TRADOC
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
*transition operations
......................................................................................... ¶3-21, p. 5-1
UAV
unmanned aerial vehicle
VIP
very important person
*war
.....................................................................................................¶3-13
WMD
weapons of mass destruction
Glossary-3
Bibliography
The bibliography lists field manuals by new number followed by old
number.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
Available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/
FM 1-02 (101-5-1). Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: http://www.adtdl.army.mil
FM 7-100.1. Opposing Force Operations. TBP.
FM 7-100.2. Opposing Force Tactics. TBP.
FM 7-100.3. Opposing Force: Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and
Tactics. TPB.
FM 7-100.4. Opposing Force Small Unit Tactics. TBP.
FM 7-100.5. Opposing Force Organization Guide. TBP.
FM 7-100.6. Opposing Force: Worldwide Equipment Guide. TBP.
Bibliography-0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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