Главная Manuals FM 3-11.22 Weapons of Mass Destruction–Civil Support Team Operations (December 2007)
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Chapter 4
vehicles, transport time and linkups must be coordinated and confirmed and appropriate documentation
must be generated, including manifests and documentation of transportation hazards. Load plans may
need to be adjusted accordingly for METT-TC and the selected mode of transportation.
4-59.
The unit prepares personnel and equipment for movement. The OPCEN provides a
redeployment order appropriate for the distance and mode of travel. A redeployment timeline is
established, and appropriate logistic support and services are planned or coordinated. Comprehensive
safety briefings are provided in conjunction with a redeployment or movement order. Once the unit
returns to the home station, closure reports are submitted according to the unit SOP and NGB guidance.
4-60.
The preparation for subsequent operations should begin immediately. Reporting and recovery
procedures (CoMSUPCEN, NGB, JFHQ-S, unit policy) must be quickly conducted to reconstitute the
unit to a mission-capable status. Appropriate clinical support, counseling, and critical-incident stress
management procedures must be initiated.
NONRESPONSE SUPPORT
4-61.
The WMD-CST can provide highly trained personnel and unique equipment for nonresponse
support. WMD-CSTs commonly provide such support in the form of standby missions. This type of
support can occupy a substantial portion of the unit operating tempo (OPTEMPO). Therefore, METT-TC
must be closely examined before committing a WMD-CST to standby or other support missions.
COMMUNICATIONS
4-62.
WMD-CST communications support can improve communications horizontally or vertically
within and between organizations throughout each of the three operational phases.
4-63.
WMD-CST communications capabilities include ultrahigh frequency
(UHF), very high
frequency (VHF), high-frequency (HF), FM, and digital communications. This support can be provided
through the ADVON and UCS vehicles. WMD-CST communications personnel also have the ability to
establish a local area network (LAN) and secure digital communications in remote areas.
4-64.
Communications personnel have detailed knowledge of their unique equipment and its
capabilities, limitations, and optimum employment methods. Extreme care must be taken not to endanger
the crews or communications systems. To preserve the capability of the WMD-CST, comprehensive
control measures must be in place for the WMD-CST and supported elements. This ensures that the
nonresponse support provided does not hinder a WMD-CST response mission.
4-65.
JFHQ-S and WMD-CST personnel must develop a planning template to address pertinent
aspects of WMD-CST communications support missions. This template can be used to access
communications support requests and assist in building a comprehensive OPORD. The template also
facilitates a rapid and inclusive identification of support requirements provided by the supported party.
Due to the size and limited organic support capability, communications support assets tasked separately
from the WMD-CST may require additional support to address sustainment issues.
4-66.
Any plan tasking WMD-CST communications assets must specifically address command
support relationships. However, regardless of the command support relationships, WMD-CST command
and operations personnel must maintain visibility of communications personnel and equipment due to
their importance in a WMD-CST response. Furthermore, the flow of intelligence to a WMD-CST cannot
be interrupted by providing communications support to another organization. Communications response
and support plans must be developed to ensure a minimal impact to the WMD-CST mission, approved
by the WMD-CST commander, analyzed by the operations section, and then briefed to the unit. Great
care must be taken to ensure that WMD-CST members assigned to the support mission fully understand
the command support relationships. Agreements must be in place that allow for immediate recall of
WMD-CST personnel should the WMD-CST receive a response WARNO. Internal WMD-CST
preparation for providing communications support to other units must address internal shifts in duties
and responsibilities in anticipation of key leaders or individuals with special skills being unavailable
during the support mission. C2 must be exercised according to the command support relationship
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10 December 2007
Mission, Capabilities, Limitations, Phases of Operation, and Nonresponse Support
dictated by the communications support plan. The WMD-CST OPCEN monitors the employment of the
WMD-CST communications section to ensure that appropriate use, adequate support, and force
protection measures are utilized. WMD-CST members providing support in low-density advisory roles
initiate contact with the WMD-CST OPCEN when a significant change to location, mission, or status
occurs.
4-67.
WMD-CSTs must plan to conduct operations according to the RUF published for the response.
WMD-CST personnel must be prepared to perform measures appropriate for the planned or anticipated
FPCON. Planning must include force protection for communications personnel while they are displaced
from the WMD-CST.
4-68.
WMD-CST communications vehicles are designed for use on improved roads. However, they
are also suitable for use on some unimproved roads and may even be suitable for some off-road use. The
WMD-CST communications vehicles possess a survivability level comparable to a commercial
passenger vehicle. The utilization of organic WMD-CST communications vehicles with operational
loads provides adequate mobility and survivability for most communications support missions.
4-69.
Special considerations that impact sustainment planning include the unique nature of the
communications equipment, the limited support available, and the limited number of qualified operators.
These considerations and their impacts on employment and sustained operations must be addressed in
the communications support plan. The WMD-CST communications section must prepare for
communications support missions that require the section to operate independently of the remainder of
the WMD-CST. Reach-back data for logistic and technical support must be maintained, and load plans
that include required Class I (subsistence and comfort) items must be prepared. Planning includes
procedures for Class III resupply during times when the UCS is displaced from the WMD-CST. Once
support plans are developed, mission-support capabilities can be enhanced by adding additional
equipment such as battery chargers and cables. The WMD-CST support contractor (CoMSUPCEN)
remains the primary supporting element for WMD-CST equipment and supplies. Support operations
involving other military forces may potentially provide additional sources of logistics support. Liaison is
performed to better understand configurations, capabilities, and the level of support available through the
supported unit.
SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT
4-70.
WMD-CSTs can provide highly trained, uniquely qualified individuals to assist in mission
accomplishment for a supported unit. In many instances, the skill sets that WMD-CST members possess
can be used to support the JFHQ-S JOCs in specific technical advisory roles. Limitations in the quantity
and types of SMEs provided by the WMD-CST must be established by the WMD-CST commander
based on METT-TC.
4-71.
Control measures which address the quantity, use, and stationing of SMEs must be in place and
adhered to by the WMD-CST and supported units. This is especially important during protracted
operations, when the elements may request support for an extended period of time.
4-72.
A detailed review and comparison of the existing NG response plans with WMD-CST skill sets
produces an initial crosswalk for potential support. Although the initial crosswalk is not all-inclusive,
prior planning facilitates a more rapid response.
4-73.
Agreements must be in place that allow for the immediate recall of WMD-CST personnel
should the WMD-CST receive a response WARNO. Internal WMD-CST preparation for providing SME
support to other units must address internal shifts in duties and responsibilities in anticipation of key
leaders or individuals with special skills being assigned to SME support duties. WMD-CST members
providing support in low-density advisory roles initiate contact with the WMD-CST OPCEN when a
significant change to location, mission, or status occurs.
4-74.
WMD-CSTs must plan to conduct operations according to the RUF published for the response.
WMD-CST personnel must be prepared to perform measures appropriate for the planned or anticipated
FPCON.
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Chapter 4
4-75.
WMD-CST members employed as SMEs have no organic sustainment capabilities. When
performing SME support, all sustainment and mobility required is the responsibility of the supported
unit.
LIAISON
4-76.
WMD-CST liaison support includes contact or intercommunication maintained between
elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and
action. This is not the same type of liaison activity routinely performed by the WMD-CST in preparation
for and during response operations. WMD-CST personnel can assist their JFHQ-S by providing
appropriate and timely liaison support.
4-77.
Control measures addressing the quantity, use, and stationing of personnel must be in place and
adhered to by the WMD-CST and supported units. This is especially important during protracted
operations, when the elements may request liaison support for an extended period of time. Limitations in
the quantity and types of liaison officers provided by the WMD-CST must be established by the WMD-
CST commander based on METT-TC.
4-78.
The identification of areas where WMD-CST personnel may be able to provide liaison support
to JFHQ-S is the initial step in planning this support. A review of NG response plans which do not
employ the WMD-CST as a unit indicates potential liaison areas requiring training and skill sets not
resident in the JFHQ-S. A limited number of WMD-CST members can be identified as liaison officers
(LNOs) based on their skill sets and duty positions. These LNOs should be made aware of specific
support requirements and tentative plans. Liaison support must not compromise the ability of the WMD-
CST to perform potential response missions.
4-79.
Agreements must be in place that allow for the immediate recall of WMD-CST personnel
should the WMD-CST receive a response WARNO. Internal WMD-CST preparation for providing
liaison support must address internal shifts in duties and responsibilities in anticipation of key leaders or
individuals with special skills being assigned to liaison support duties. The utilization of WMD-CST
personnel can provide the JFHQ-S or another agency with highly trained, skilled personnel who have
experience in emergency response operations. Preevent planning to determine the liaison capabilities of
each WMD-CST provides for the rapid employment of WMD-CST personnel as LNOs. WMD-CST
members providing support as liaisons in low-density support roles initiate contact with the WMD-CST
OPCEN when a significant change to location, mission, or status occurs.
4-80.
WMD-CSTs must plan to conduct operations according to the RUF published for the response.
WMD-CST personnel must be prepared to perform measures appropriate for the planned or anticipated
FPCON.
4-81.
WMD-CST members employed as liaisons have no organic sustainment or mobility
capabilities. Required sustainment and mobility are the responsibilities of the supported unit.
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Chapter 5
Interoperability
Coming together is a beginning. Keeping together is progress. Working together is success.
—Henry Ford
This chapter addresses the interoperability of the WMD-CST with other agencies.
Emphasis is placed on operations that WMD-CSTs are most likely to perform, such as
interagency, joint, multiple WMD-CST response, split-unit, relief-in-place, and
retrograde operations. This chapter also addresses unique support requests with the goal
of improvement in planning, preparing for, and executing operations other than single
WMD-CST response operations.
OVERVIEW
5-1. Successful response operations rely heavily on preevent planning and coordination, integrating
operations through joint training and exercises, and adapting operations to ensure the unity of effort.
INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS
5-2. WMD-CSTs respond to incidents that may increase in scope and involve one or more federal agencies.
The term interagency operations refers to the synchronization that occurs between agencies of the U.S.
Government, including the DOD, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. For example, interagency
coordination may occur for a national special security event (NSSE), which may involve intergovernmental
and nongovernmental organizations.
CONTROL MEASURES
5-3. Regardless of the response, WMD-CSTs are always under the control of the established Title 10 USC,
Title 32 USC, or state active-duty military chain of command, but normally remain in direct support of the IC.
PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION
5-4. The preparation for a response begins before the receipt of a response tasking. The WMD-CST must
scrutinize AARs and lessons learned to develop and revise tentative plans. Planning for response operations
involving one or more federal agencies requires that the WMD-CST perform liaison with these agencies.
Participating with federal agencies in response and exercise planning is a WMD-CST priority. Lessons learned
from these training opportunities directly impact the development of response plans and unit SOPs.
Command and Control
5-5. The WMD-CST must liaise with federal agencies who are likely to be involved in crisis and CM
activities. WMD-CSTs must make every effort to participate in plans and exercises to facilitate an
understanding of response methods, operations, and activities conducted by these agencies. This allows the
WMD-CST to better support integration with the other agencies. TTP that enable the WMD-CST to work
more efficiently with federal agencies are developed, staffed, and added to unit SOPs. AARs from other
WMD-CSTs performing interagency operations provide valuable insight and serve as a means to rapidly share
lessons learned. In large-scale responses involving multiple agencies, WMD-CSTs are employed under an
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Chapter 5
established Title 32 USC or state active-duty military chain of command unless federalized under Title 10 USC
and employed as a federal asset.
Intelligence
5-6. Each WMD-CST must identify agencies within their AO that can provide intelligence information
appropriate for WMD-CST planning and response support purposes. A communications plan must be
developed, enabling updated information to be shared between the ICS, the military chain of command, and
the responding WMD-CST.
Movement and Maneuver
5-7. The WMD-CST coordinates with responding federal agencies to ensure SA and to facilitate possible
support. The WMD-CST must also keep the chain of command informed of all movement and operations
planned, performed, and completed.
Protection
5-8. WMD-CSTs must establish a standardized level of protection through the employment of table of
distribution and allowances (TDA) equipment and systems. Providing security forces is normally a function of
the interagency response; however, force protection remains the responsibility of the military command.
WMD-CSTs conduct operations according to the RUF established and published by the military chain of
command. WMD-CST personnel must be prepared to perform measures appropriate for the planned or
anticipated FPCON. The WMD-CST immediately provides a SITREP to inform the military chain of
command of changes or modifications to the RUF.
Sustainment
5-9. The WMD-CST support contractor (CoMSUPCEN) remains the primary supporting element for WMD-
CST-specific equipment and supplies. The CoMSUPCEN SOP is, therefore, the primary guide for specialized
WMD-CST support requirements in this type of response. However, WMD-CSTs are often able to use
available specialized support from other agencies in lieu of organic support or the CoMSUPCEN. Operations
involving other federal agencies potentially provide additional sources of compatible supplies. Liaison is
performed to determine configurations, capabilities, and support available through those agencies. In addition,
coordination with ICS representatives may indicate other sources of nonspecialized support available to the
WMD-CST. WMD-CSTs operating in an environment where additional support is available should capitalize
on that support.
JOINT OPERATIONS
5-10. Joint operations is a general term used to describe military actions conducted by joint forces or by
service forces in relationships (support, coordinating authority) which, of themselves, do not establish joint
forces (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02). The term connotes activities, operations, organizations, and actions in
which elements of two or more military departments participate. Joint military response operations can have
many and varied forms that change as the response develops. In its simplest form, joint operations involve any
two military units from different military departments working together. More complex scenarios include a
response involving the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, and Reserves in addition to NG
assets.
CONTROL MEASURES
5-11. During most initial response operations, the WMD-CSTs are employed under an established Title 32
USC or state active-duty military chain of command. The WMD-CST can be federalized under Title 10 USC
and employed as a federal asset.
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Interoperability
PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION
5-12. The WMD-CST must prepare to support joint operations, including those potentially involving other
military departments. The preparation for responses involving joint forces is accomplished through liaison
efforts, training opportunities, and modifications to operational plans and unit SOPs. Successful joint
operations require services to overcome differences in tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment
(TTP&E) and take advantage of similarities and differences in capabilities.
Command and Control
5-13. The WMD-CST must liaise with military units who are likely to be involved in crisis and CM
activities. The goal is to better understand the internal response activities and methods of these units. WMD-
CSTs seek opportunities to participate in tabletop exercises with training objectives that support the
integration of military response assets available throughout the DOD. They develop and execute joint training
based on plans and procedures practiced in previous tabletop exercises. AARs from other WMD-CSTs
performing joint operations provide valuable insight and serve as a means to rapidly share lessons learned.
WMD-CSTs also develop communications plans that facilitate the exchange of voice and digital information
in support of C2. In large-scale responses involving multiple military units, WMD-CSTs are employed under
an established Title 32 USC or state active-duty military chain of command unless federalized under Title 10
USC and employed as a federal asset.
Intelligence
5-14. Each WMD-CST must identify DOD agencies within their AO that can provide intelligence
information appropriate for WMD-CST planning and response support purposes. A communications plan
must be developed, enabling updated threat information to be shared between the ICS, the military chain of
command, and the responding WMD-CST. The WMD-CST must also share pertinent data gathered.
Movement and Maneuver
5-15. WMD-CSTs should plan for coordination with joint forces to ensure SA and to facilitate possible
support. They often capitalize on the capabilities and assets of joint forces for mobility support (air, sea, and
land). WMD-CSTs must plan to establish a standardized level of mobility through the employment of TDA
equipment and systems. Load plans and TTP must be modified to maximize the use of the available mobility
assets that joint forces can provide. The WMD-CST must inform the chain of command of all movement and
operations planned, performed, and completed.
Protection
5-16. WMD-CSTs can capitalize on the capabilities and assets of joint forces for survivability. Identified
assets that are likely to be available during actual operations should be used for training. WMD-CSTs conduct
operations according to the RUF established and published by the military chain of command. WMD-CST
personnel must be prepared to perform measures appropriate for the planned or anticipated FPCON. The
WMD-CST immediately provides a SITREP to inform the military chain of command of changes or
modifications in the RUF.
Sustainment
5-17. The WMD-CST support contractor (CoMSUPCEN) remains the primary supporting element for
WMD-CST-specific equipment and supplies. The CoMSUPCEN SOP is, therefore, the primary guide for
specialized WMD-CST support requirements in this type of response. However, WMD-CSTs are often able to
use available support from other military organizations in lieu of organic support or the CoMSUPCEN.
Operations involving other military forces potentially provide additional sources of compatible supplies.
Liaison is performed to determine configurations, capabilities, and support available through joint forces
elements likely to work with the WMD-CST. In addition, coordination with ICS representatives may indicate
other sources of nonspecialized support available to the WMD-CST. WMD-CSTs operating in an environment
where additional support is available should capitalize on that support.
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Chapter 5
MULTIPLE TEAM RESPONSE OPERATIONS
5-18. A multiple WMD-CST response refers to an event or response requiring two or more WMD-CSTs. A
multi-WMD-CST response normally occurs in situations involving complex operations, operations involving
large geographic areas, or operations extending over long periods of time. If METT-TC dictate, multiple
WMD-CSTs can respond to and operate concurrently at an incident. In such situations, the JFHQ-S JOC or
JTF-S can act as the coordination element for all WMD-CSTs. Alternatively, a single WMD-CST can be
designated as the coordination element, with the other WMD-CSTs operating in supporting roles. When a
WMD-CST acts as the coordinating element, it is likely to be colocated with the JFHQ-S JOC or JTF-S.
5-19. If a WMD-CST is designated as the coordination element, it is normally the WMD-CST whose AO
encompasses the event, incident, or response that is designated and, therefore, acts as a hub for all WMD-CST
operations. That particular WMD-CST’s detailed knowledge of the AO, state and local response elements, and
military assets within the state make it ideally suited for assisting in the integration of follow-on WMD-CSTs
into the response effort. As the coordinating element, a WMD-CST performs vital liaison missions, including
advising the JOC on capabilities, limitations, and appropriate or optimal employment of the responding
WMD-CSTs. It can also serve as a central source for WMD-CST employment information; the battle tracking
of all WMD-CSTs involved in the response; and the coordination of assignments, relief, reports, and support.
The WMD-CST coordination element assists in performing reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration (RSOI) for teams subsequently employed in the response. The continuity achieved by using a
WMD-CST in this capacity is invaluable at large-scale events.
5-20. Multiple WMD-CSTs may be involved in separate response operations that are portions of the same
event. Such response linkages, which may or may not be known before the employment of the teams, could be
the result of well-coordinated, synchronized attacks or simply combinations of incident effects covering
multiple jurisdictions or political boundaries. Establishing and maintaining a unity of effort throughout these
types of operations is vital.
5-21. When a WMD-CST involved in response operations becomes aware of the possibility of related
WMD-CST responses, coordination is immediately initiated. Information management (IM) systems must be
adapted to ensure that data may be shared between WMD-CST teams and the next higher HQ. To facilitate a
proper response, information gleaned from enemy actions, targets, and TTP&E must be immediately added to
the WMD-CST COP. If the response escalates or appears to be of extended duration, additional WMD-CST
support is requested.
CONTROL MEASURES
5-22. Clearly defined missions, AOs, and control measures are invaluable to the management of large-scale,
multiagency response operations. The use of a WMD-CST as the coordinating element greatly assists in the
development of the COP and simplifies communications by providing a single source for ICS, JFHQ-S, NGB,
and combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) information requirements. When a WMD-CST acts as a coordination
element, the intent is for the team to operate as a separate branch or division under the ICS/joint task force
(JTF), assuming the lead for force integration and coordination requirements for WMD-CSTs—not to operate
as a separate JTF that exercises C2 over other WMD-CSTs. Although a WMD-CST designated as a
coordination element does not perform classic WMD-CST operations (survey, analytical, decontamination) as
a whole, it can attach specific sections to other WMD-CSTs if METT-TC dictate. Under no circumstances
should a WMD-CST performing as the coordinating element compromise its ability to perform liaison and IM
by excessive cross attachment of personnel or sections.
PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION
5-23. Planning for operations involving multiple WMD-CSTs cannot be completed prior to learning the
specifics about a response. However, each WMD-CST performs individual mission preparation according to
the ICS mission assigned by the coordination element. The WMD-CSTs can also develop strategies, build
scenarios, and train for multiple team response operations well in advance of any mission. Protocols, common
operating procedures, and system integration processes can be developed and rehearsed. Planning templates
that can greatly increase the speed and efficiency of planning during the response can also be constructed. The
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10 December 2007
Interoperability
establishment of a particular team as the coordination element further allows for the assignment of associated
tracking and support function requirements. Using a WMD-CST as the coordination element helps ensure that
each WMD-CST has a COP and that there is a unity of effort. Recognizing the requirement and planning to
establish and perform duties as a coordination element for a multi-WMD-CST response facilitates the rapid
assumption of that mission. Successfully executing multiple WMD-CST operations requires initiative,
flexibility, and an excellent understanding of the response operation as a whole.
Command and Control
5-24. Commanders maintain C2 of their teams, but establish means and channels to submit appropriate
reports and requests through the coordination element. WMD-CSTs finalize their mission planning and
preparations for the establishment of adequate C2 while performing the response. OPCENs from each WMD-
CST maintain SA of the others’ operations and include appropriate elements of information in their own
planning process. The communications team develops a joint communications plan, ensuring that voice and
data interfaces are addressed. Units may employ LNOs as needed.
Intelligence
5-25. Sharing gathered intelligence among WMD-CSTs operating under a multi-WMD-CST response is
critical in ensuring interoperability and a COP among the teams. A communications plan must be developed,
enabling updated threat information to be shared among the WMD-CSTs involved in the response. The
coordination element performs the additional function of ensuring timely and inclusive information sharing
across the responding WMD-CSTs. When a WMD-CST acts as a coordination element, it must perform
liaison operations with the JFHQ-S JOC and state emergency operations center (EOC), actively assisting in
information transfer and reporting and satisfying outstanding RFIs.
Movement and Maneuver
5-26. METT-TC may call for the cross attachment of personnel, equipment, or vehicles. WMD-CSTs
augment the capabilities of one another by supporting analytical or survey operations with uniquely trained
WMD-CST members or equipment sets. The coordination element must be informed of all movements and
operations that are planned, performed, and completed by responding WMD-CSTs. Additional WMD-CSTs
arriving in support of the operation must report to the coordination element to ensure adequate RSOI and a
unity of effort. Responding WMD-CSTs completing operations and anticipating release from the ICS must
inform the coordination element of their status to facilitate timely reporting and synchronized disengagement.
Protection
5-27. WMD-CSTs must establish a plan and report the level of survivability achieved through the
employment of TDA equipment and systems. Shortcomings affecting survivability must be reported to the
coordination element upon discovery and prior to commencing WMD-CST operations. WMD-CST personnel
must be prepared to perform measures appropriate for the planned or anticipated FPCON and to conduct
operations according to the RUF published for the response. The coordination element must immediately
disseminate changes or modifications of the RUF to responding WMD-CSTs.
Sustainment
5-28. The CoMSUPCEN SOP is the primary guide for specialized WMD-CST support requirements in this
type of response. Based on the “due in” status for contractor support, METT-TC can dictate that the WMD-
CST cross level critical equipment or supplies. The coordination element assists in expediting the processes of
cross leveling. Appropriate property control is maintained throughout the response.
SPLIT-UNIT OPERATIONS
5-29. A split-unit operation is performed when METT-TC require that a single WMD-CST operate as two
smaller, task-organized elements simultaneously conducting operations at two locations. Split-unit responses
are primarily conducted for small-scale or limited-scope operations such as low-threat, white-powder incidents
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Chapter 5
or NSSEs. In some instances, only certain WMD-CST sections or personnel are required to complete a
mission; therefore, WMD-CSTs should develop “packages” of support that consist of parts or pieces of the
unit. METT-TC impacts determine the TTP&E that the team must employ to conduct the operation. Without
augmentation, the overall effectiveness and ability to perform sustained operations with a split team is
dramatically reduced.
CONTROL MEASURES
5-30. Several factors are of critical importance throughout these types of operations—establishing and
maintaining C2 of both entry elements, SA of the overall response, and unity of effort. It is necessary that one
element of the WMD-CST maintain C2 of the entire unit while also allowing the subordinate element adequate
autonomy to perform its own operations.
PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION
5-31. Split-unit operations present specific challenges and require appropriate planning. Primary preparatory
tasks include documenting, validating, and establishing internal SOPs and practicing split-unit operations.
TLPs must be applied to provide an understanding of the urgency of such operations and to ensure adequate
planning, preparation, and follow-up. The crawl-walk-run training technique should be used until the unit is
prepared to incorporate this operation as part of the commander’s training objective for larger exercises.
Command and Control
5-32. Establishing and maintaining C2 of a unit conducting split operations is extremely challenging and
normally requires the use of one or more of the following techniques:
Employment of the ADVON as a forward command post (CP) for one location.
Use of a WMD-CST section with adequate communications to act as the forward CP at one site.
Formation of an ad hoc C2 element from an organic element, JTF-S, other responders, or a
combination of these.
Development of communications plans using organic equipment, systems, and frequencies that can
support two C2 elements controlling limited entry and decontamination operations. Unimpeded
information flow from entry elements to corresponding C2 elements is required. COP development
continues within the element that maintains overall C2 of the WMD-CST.
5-33. The unit validates techniques developed during split-unit operations planning to establish and maintain
adequate C2 for a subordinate element within the WMD-CST. The element maintaining overall C2 of the
WMD-CST is responsible for submitting all reports and information to the ICS and the chain of command.
Subordinate element operations provide information feedback that is added to the COP.
Intelligence
5-34. Updated threat information must be shared between WMD-CST C2 elements. Regardless of the
technique used to establish C2, threat information provided to or developed by the main C2 element must be
rapidly shared with the subordinate C2 element and vice versa; the subordinate C2 element must maintain
information flow and SA throughout an operation.
Movement and Maneuver
5-35. The WMD-CST must develop techniques that facilitate the disengagement of an element from an
initial response site and the subsequent movement of that element to a second entry location for the purpose of
conducting independent entry operations. The organic survivability of the displaced element is roughly
comparable to that of the main body of the WMD-CST. Although split-unit operations may not be directly
linked, the unity of effort must be maintained.
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Interoperability
Protection
5-36. A rapidly employed split-unit operations configuration is embedded into the normal vehicle/equipment
configuration so that split-unit operations can be performed with little or no adjustments to load plans,
vehicles, or personnel. WMD-CST personnel must be prepared to perform measures appropriate for the
planned or anticipated FPCON and to conduct operations according to the RUF published for the response.
The deployment of a WMD-CST as a split-unit operation requires that the ICS provide security for all
elements.
Sustainment
5-37. Operations of short duration can be performed using organic capabilities, including immediate,
operational, or thorough decontamination packages. However, sustainment plans must be developed and
embedded in all major components of the split-unit operations plan, such as load plans, vehicle configurations,
and equipment employment. Specific planning must be accomplished to clearly define the particular support
required to conduct split-unit operations. In addition, the decontamination capabilities of both elements must
also be clearly defined. Split-unit operations sustainment coordination is performed with the appropriate
portions of the ICS before deploying the subordinate WMD-CST element.
RELIEF-IN-PLACE OPERATIONS
5-38. A relief-in-place operation is one in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is
replaced by an incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced elements are transferred to the incoming
unit. The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered.
5-39. A relief-in-place operation can be deliberate or hasty depending on the depth and detail of planning,
the amount of preparation, and the length of the execution timeline. Detailed planning generally facilitates
rapid execution by providing a clear understanding of exactly what the commander believes needs to be done
and the resources needed to accomplish the mission. In a deliberate relief effort, units exchange plans and
liaison personnel, conduct briefings, perform detailed reconnaissance, and publish orders with detailed
instructions. When performing a hasty relief, the commander abbreviates the planning process and controls the
execution using oral instructions and FRAGOs.
CONTROL MEASURES
5-40. Regardless of the technique used to perform the relief, C2 of the WMD-CST and adequate support of
the ICS must be maintained. When possible, relief activities are synchronized with the ICS shift changes to
maintain continuity of operations while minimizing disruption to the ICS.
PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION
5-41. When a WMD-CST is directed to perform a relief operation, a portion of the planning is directed
toward equipment use. Fiscal and operational responsibility call for minimizing the contamination or loss of
equipment within METT-TC. When WMD-CSTs perform recurring relief operations for a period of time, the
essence of the relief is generally limited to personnel. Personnel shift on and off duty, and durable equipment
and major end items used by the WMD-CST performing the initial response remain deployed in the hot,
warm, and cold zones. Detailed coordination between teams must occur to ensure minimal disruption of the
mission during the relief operation; this is the foundation for establishing a battle rhythm and recurring
handover process. Detailed preparation for mission assumption by the WMD-CST relieving the initial
response team is required. Successfully executing a relief operation of this nature requires the flexible
application of doctrinal principals and guidance. Ideally, the relief of a WMD-CST is virtually transparent to
members of the ICS.
Command and Control
5-42. WMD-CSTs generally plan to conduct deliberate relief operations. The incoming unit establishes
communications and liaison with the unit to be relieved. An effective planning technique for relief-in-place
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5-7
Chapter 5
operations is for the on-scene WMD-CST to form a planning element to coordinate with the relieving unit and
to assist in the RSOI of the relieving unit. This planning element must be separate from the ongoing response
effort conducted by the on-scene WMD-CST. Performing a comprehensive relief requires the incoming unit to
establish the ICS requirements, goals, and WMD-CST portion of the IAP and site safety plan. (If METT-TC
dictates a hasty relief, WMD-CST personnel can use the more detailed, deliberate process as a guide in
expediting the hasty relief.) The incoming and outgoing commanders coordinate and decide on a time or an
event that is to be used to initiate the passage of command. A WARNO designating the time frame of the relief
is issued. Normally, relief occurs when the individual sections assume responsibility for their respective areas
and the incoming commander has sufficient C2 facilities in place to control the operation.
Intelligence
5-43. When performing a relief-in-place operation, WMD-CSTs develop a list of desired threat information.
One of the critical tasks of a relief-in-place operation is the transfer of all information related to the
response—including photographs, maps, logs, unprocessed samples, results of laboratory analyses, records of
readings, and measurements—to the relieving unit. The relieving unit must receive a comprehensive incident
situation brief and a detailed SITREP from the commander being relieved. The incoming unit must also be
aware of the CCIRs, PIRs, and IC’s goals and objectives. A properly conducted relief-in-place operation
permits the maintenance of a seamless COP.
Movement and Maneuver
5-44. To ensure a safe and seamless relief operation, the relieving commander must prepare a detailed plan
for assuming responsibility for the assigned AO. Vehicles and equipment that belong to the relieved unit and
remain on the scene must be identified—as must the vehicular routes leading out of the incident site.
Relocation of the relieved unit occurs after the assumption of the mission by the relieving unit.
Protection
5-45. To occupy the area, the relieving commander uses the best ICS-approved upwind routes and METT-
TC-dependent techniques. Additional planning considerations that should be taken into account include the
use of ground guides, excessive fatigue of the relieved unit (possibly preventing the safe operation of motor
vehicles on the roadways), and travel to and reoccupation of a staging area by the relieved unit. WMD-CST
personnel must be prepared to perform measures appropriate for the planned or anticipated FPCON and to
conduct operations according to the RUF published for the response. WMD-CST personnel must also be
briefed regarding supporting security forces.
Sustainment
5-46. The unit to be relieved briefs the incoming unit on applicable sustainment issues, including particular
sustainment requirements for the response, the status of critical equipment and consumable items remaining on
the scene, and the status of outstanding support requests. Methods of maintaining accountability vary
depending on the type of relief provided, the duration of the response, and the status of the equipment.
Logistics regulations contain overarching guidance that can be applied to the planning of these operations. The
relieving unit must develop an equipment transfer and property accountability plan agreed upon by both
commanders. When the owning unit remains at the incident, responsibility for the equipment can be
transferred to the relieving team by means of a locally generated hand receipt or an equipment inventory
listing established according to Army Regulation (AR) 710-2. In this manner, responsibility for the equipment
can be expeditiously transferred from one unit to another without a DA Form 3161 (Temporary Hand
Receipt). It the equipment is clean, it is laterally transferred between the relieving and relieved units when the
units are in the same component and when they are directed to do so by the lowest-level commander over both
units.
(See DA Pamphlet [Pam] 710-2-1.) Only clean equipment is laterally transferred between units.
Contaminated equipment always remains on the site throughout the entire incident; information about
contaminated items is captured in an itemized list which is provided to the ICP prior to the departure of the
relieved unit.
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FM 3-11.22
10 December 2007
Interoperability
5-47. Major end items, such as the ALS and UCS, are likely to be emplaced in one location throughout the
entire response effort. Coordination is necessary to identify and secure staging areas for major end items from
the relieving unit that will not initially be used in the response effort.
5-48. Planning must be coordinated with the TNCC to allow the UCS of one WMD-CST to support the
information provider protocols of another. Without prior coordination and testing, follow-on data
communications support is difficult.
5-49. Coordinate transportation for the relieved unit if it is deemed unsafe for them to operate their organic
vehicles or if insufficient vehicles are available.
RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
5-50. Retrograde operations refers to any movement of a command to the rear or away from the enemy. In
the context of a WMD-CST response, a retrograde operation is a movement away from the source of
contamination, the spread of contamination, or another hazard. A commander primarily executes retrograde
operations to preserve the force and avoid hazards. There are many factors that may cause a WMD-CST to
relocate after initial occupation of the WMD-CST footprint. Situations that may result in retrograde operations
include substantial wind direction shifts or the expansion of the hazard area around an incident.
CONTROL MEASURES
5-51. Specific control measures must be developed, incorporated into the unit SOP, trained, and exercised to
ensure that retrograde maneuvers can be safely executed.
PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION
5-52. Initial planning for a retrograde operation requires the identification and development of collective and
individual supporting tasks to execute the maneuver. It also requires that additions be made to the unit tactical
SOP to ensure the unity of effort and standardized execution of the maneuver. Preparing for retrograde
operations begins when required tasks are identified, initial training has been completed, and the unit is
prepared to crawl-walk-run through the maneuver. Preparation ends when the unit is prepared to sustain the
proficiency level of maneuver and the maneuver can be executed as a battle drill. Retrograde operations are
performed as both published and unpublished training objectives during exercises.
Command and Control
5-53. If the tactical situation requires that the WMD-CST perform a retrograde operation, the situation is
likely to be sudden, unanticipated, and extremely confusing. C2 planning, therefore, begins with developing
procedures, drills, and training to institutionalize a corresponding battle drill. The battle drill must be initiated
with a unique and unmistakable signal that is recognizable throughout the WMD-CST footprint. Once the
retrograde operations battle drill has been developed and initially trained, it must be continually performed in
order to prepare the unit. WMD-CSTs incorporate this task into training with first responders to inform and
encourage planning for this contingency. C2 is degraded during most retrograde operations, but can be
maintained through previous establishment of clearly defined signals and drills. Retrograde operations
activities are briefed as part of the OPORD. When retrograde operations are executed, a SITREP is sent to
higher HQ.
Intelligence
5-54. Information pertaining to incident location, terrain, route restrictions, and friendly and potential threat
locations must be gathered and analyzed. Plotting information on a graphic overlay aids in SA, which can be
vital during a retrograde operation.
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5-9
Chapter 5
Movement and Maneuver
5-55. Planning for retrograde operations includes identifying an area in which to relocate the WMD-CST.
Locations can be identified during preincident planning, or they can be individually identified based on
response considerations such as wind direction, wind speed, or the type of hazard.
Protection
5-56. Preparation for retrograde operations is the key to survivability. The possibility of performing a
retrograde operation must be considered when planning the mission; occupation plans should address possible
retrograde operations, specifying the orientation of vehicles and equipment in a way that facilitates rapid
relocation to a safer area and ensuring that routes leading away from the footprint remain trafficable to the
maximum extent possible. Established decontamination sites and the location of the WMD-CST relative to the
incident should also be considered. In the event that a retrograde operation must be initiated, PPE is
immediately donned according to the unit SOP, critical equipment is loaded onto vehicles, and the unit moves
to an alternate site according to METT-TC and the OPORD. Elements of the team move to a designated rally
point or assembly area and assess the situation according to the unit SOP. WMD-CST personnel must be
prepared to perform measures appropriate for the planned or anticipated FPCON and to conduct operations
according to the RUF published for the response.
Sustainment
5-57. Planning for decontamination operations is critical. Large-scale reconstitution requests are planned in
case large quantities of equipment are contaminated or destroyed. Requests for decontamination support are
submitted, as appropriate, through the ICS.
5-10
FM 3-11.22
10 December 2007
Chapter 6
Assessment
You can never do too much reconnaissance.
—General George S. Patton
War As I Knew It, 1947
This chapter provides information on conducting WMD-CST assessments using a
modified intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process in support of emergency
plans, operations, and training of the WMD-CST. The purpose of a WMD-CST
assessment is to identify potential threat targets and to conduct planning before an event.
The assessment involves the continuous monitoring and evaluation of a team’s
operational environment. It is continuous throughout planning, preparation, and
execution. This process precedes, accompanies, and follows all operations. The end state
is a manageable list of high-value targets (HVTs) and the identification of relevant
organizations/agencies to which the WMD-CST should direct training, coordination, and
liaison efforts. See Appendices C and F for further information.
OVERVIEW
6-1. The doctrinal principles of IPB can be applied to conduct an appropriate WMD-CST assessment that
focuses on critical areas throughout a team’s assigned AO. The IPB process is a joint command and staff
planning tool that helps identify and respond to the commander’s PIR. WMD-CST assessment uses a modified
IPB process to enable the commander to visualize the AO. The main goal of an assessment is to focus WMD-
CST response planning, the unit liaison program, TTP&E development, and training management in a proactive
way.
6-2. WMD-CSTs support civil authorities during intentional or unintentional releases of CBRNE and during
natural or man-made disasters. Assessments are critical to the success of a response long before that response
begins. Developing and maintaining effective assessment and liaison programs are essential to better
understanding the current operational environment. WMD-CSTs must identify existing assessments to avoid
duplicative efforts. Forging relationships with agencies that can assist in building a comprehensive picture of
the AO is critical to mission accomplishment.
6-3. The assessment is an ongoing process; it should be performed before, during, and after an event. A rapid
and positive response to any incident requires an adequate understanding of the specific incident site and AO,
as well as applicable emergency, contingency, and response plans for the AO. Once the AO assessment has
been conducted, the unit continues to build assessment products for individual HVTs and target areas of interest
(TAIs).
Note. WMD-CSTs are prohibited from collecting, processing, retaining, or distributing information
regarding the activities of U.S. citizens as set forth in Executive Order 12333.
PROCESS
6-4. The assessment process used by WMD-CSTs is the same doctrinal process described in detail in Field
Manual (FM) 34-130. An assessment is a continuous process consisting of four steps that are performed each
time an assessment is conducted.
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6-1
Chapter 6
6-5. The assessment process is greatly enhanced when the WMD-CST operations section is used to coordinate
the overall effort. Involvement in the assessment process is beneficial for continued development and skills
sustainment of the hazard modeler, the nuclear medical science officer (NMSO), and the survey team.
STEP 1: DEFINE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS
6-6. Characteristics of the environment are gathered during this step, which is commonly referred to as the
collection phase. Those characteristics that are expected to influence the WMD-CST commander’s decisions or
affect the COAs are of special significance in the assessment process and must be captured. Examples of
significant environmental characteristics may include, but are not limited to, the following:
Terrain (general).
Weather (general).
Identification of population centers.
Weather effects on CBRNE.
Choke points (areas of traffic congestion or limited avenues of approach).
Law enforcement capabilities (municipal, county, state, special teams).
Fire service capabilities (HAZMAT, U.S. Army Reserves [USAR], decontamination units).
Water sources for decontamination operations.
Emergency services capabilities.
Medical infrastructure.
Hospital and treatment facility capabilities.
Development of or access to geographic information system (GIS) imagery.
Gaps in the available intelligence summary.
Voids in the assessment data.
Electrical power generation.
Utilities and services.
Land and cellular phone infrastructure.
Location and capability of care distribution sites contained in federal, state, and local emergency
response plans (ERPs).
Potential rotary- and fixed-wing landing zones (LZs).
STEP 2: DESCRIBE THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS
6-7. Once sufficient information is gathered, it can then be analyzed. This analysis should focus on the effects
of the environment on operations. Some examples of the types of information analyzed during this step
include—
Terrain.
Weather effects.
Legal aspects.
Limitations of the WMD-CST.
Limitations of the threat.
Opportunities for the WMD-CST.
Opportunities for the threat.
Population density and status (presented on GIS graphics or overlays).
Impacts/effects of seasonal weather changes (illustrated using a weather analysis matrix).
Modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) (possibly presented as a critical infrastructure GIS
graphic or overlay).
CBRNE (depicted as day/night, heavy/light plume, explosive blast effect graphics or overlays).
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FM 3-11.22
10 December 2007
Assessment
STEP 3: EVALUATE THE THREAT
6-8. During this step, the threat is assessed. WMD-CSTs are not expected to conduct formal, IPB-like threat
analyses. Rather, assessments performed by WMD-CSTs incorporate analyses already developed by the JFHQ-
S intelligence staff officer (J-2) and other agencies within local, state, and federal governments. Information
assessed by the WMD-CST may include an historical overview of potential threats. The WMD-CST may
construct templates based on threat strategy, tactics, procedures, and weapons.
STEP 4: DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
6-9. The goal of this step is to determine logical threat COAs. The WMD-CST then develops friendly COAs
in response to threat COAs. Even if the threat COAs developed by the WMD-CST are not entirely correct,
performing the assessment and developing friendly COAs enhances future response mission capabilities.
6-10. The most likely objectives, COAs, and desired end state of the threat should be identified and evaluated
according to the following six criteria:
Suitability.
Feasibility.
Acceptability.
Uniqueness.
Consistency with known threat behaviors.
Flexibility and adaptability.
6-11. The threat COAs are then analyzed and prioritized based on judgments made as a result of —
Analyzing each COA to determine its strengths, weaknesses, centers of gravity, and decision points.
Evaluating how well each COA meets the criteria of sustainability, feasibility, acceptability,
uniqueness, consistency with known threat behaviors, and flexibility and adaptability.
Evaluating how well each COA takes advantage of the environment and determining how the
environment encourages or discourages the selection of each COA.
Comparing the advantages and risks of each COA. Most threat forces choose the COA that provides
the greatest advantages with minimal risk.
6-12. Once the threat COAs have been developed in as much detail as time permits and they have been
analyzed and prioritized, the commander reviews them and provides guidance for the development of friendly
COAs. Three threat COAs should be selected and addressed with corresponding friendly COAs. To ensure
completeness, each of the following five questions must be answered:
What? (What is the type of operation?)
When? (When will the action begin?) (The action usually begins as soon as it can be determined,
based on a decision point or on order [O/O], which COA the enemy has used.)
Where? (Where is the attack area?)
Why? (What objective or end state does the threat intend to accomplish?)
How? (What is the method of attack or operation?)
HIGH-VALUE TARGETS AND TARGET AREAS OF INTEREST
6-13. During the course of performing the overall assessment of the AO, HVTs and TAIs are identified based
on the criticality of the assets, their vulnerability, and their susceptibility to attack. Although HVTs and TAIs
are very similar, differentiating between the two types of targets further categorizes potential threats into
areas/facilities or specific events. An example of a TAI is a sports complex where large-scale events are held. A
high-visibility event taking place at that facility is an example of an HVT.
6-14. HVTs and TAIs are normally identified by some type of numerical tracking system and then placed into a
prioritized list according to the unit SOP. The commander establishes the criteria for priority selection; these
criteria may include the likelihood of attack by terrorist organizations, the level of impact (or payoff) of targets,
and the visibility of events or venues.
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Chapter 6
6-15. The four steps of the assessment process are applied to each HVT and TAI within the AO, with each
HVT and TAI considered its own AO for the purpose of this process. Assessments of HVTs and TAIs are
similar to assessments of the overall AO, except that they are site-specific, more detailed, and much narrower in
scope. Assessments conducted at the HVT/TAI level are tactical in nature and focus on the WMD-CST
response to the incident.
END-STATE PRODUCTS
6-16. WMD-CSTs are employed in environments that differ greatly; therefore, the assessment product of each
team may differ in type and quantity. Some examples of end-state products are—
Detailed terrain and infrastructure analysis products.
Climate summaries.
Prioritized lists of threat COAs.
Friendly COAs.
Tailored detection, sampling, and analysis plans.
COA graphics or overlays.
Comprehensive overviews of the AO.
UNIT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
6-17. The unit should maintain hard copies and electronic files of each assessment. A hard copy binder system
should be established; and the unit assessment SOP or the commander’s guidance, additional duty appointment
orders, and the AO assessment with prioritized HVT/TAI list should be included. Subsequent binders should
contain detailed assessments of specific HVTs and TAIs. Ideally, the HVT/TAI assessment binders are
transportable and used on the scene during maintenance of the assessment or during training or actual events.
MAINTENANCE
6-18. As with any plan, the assessment program must be periodically reviewed, updated, and briefed to the
unit; or it will progressively diminish in accuracy and effectiveness. The commander may wish to assign the
maintenance of individual assessments to team members as part of a leader development program.
BENEFITS
6-19. A robust assessment program can benefit a WMD-CST in many ways. These include—
Improved liaison, level of understanding, and appreciation for WMD-CST capabilities by state
EMAs.
Increased use of WMD-CSTs by state EMAs.
Development of and access to GIS imagery.
Inclusion in ERPs.
Identification of AIs.
Assessment of the seasonal impact of weather through matrices.
A “composite” view of multiple factors through GIS data, graphics, or overlays such as—
MCOO or critical infrastructure overlays.
CBRNE graphics or overlays (day/night, heavy/light plume blast effects graphics).
Graphics depicting threat ideology, mentality, motivation, or patterns of operation.
Comprehensive overviews of the AO.
6-4
FM 3-11.22
10 December 2007
Chapter 7
Liaison
A wise man in times of peace prepares for war.
—Horace
This chapter contains information on conducting liaison activities essential to the
successful planning of WMD-CST missions.
OVERVIEW
7-1. Liaison is critical to preoperational planning and coordination. SOP and METL development and battle-
focused individual and collective training are all influenced by information exchange that is facilitated by the
liaison effort. Liaison efforts are also essential to the success of WMD-CSTs. WMD-CSTs should integrate
liaison activities into all aspects of their missions, from planning through execution. It is important that WMD-
CSTs be totally integrated into emergency response communities for their AOs and that they maintain
operational and reach-back contact lists.
7-2. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report 086-808T and Congressional Report 109-377 mention
instances in which there was a lack of liaison throughout the DOD and response communities before and during
the events of Hurricane Katrina. WMD-CSTs are uniquely able to support liaison and planning with local,
state, and federal agencies.
7-3. During a response, WMD-CSTs assist the ICS and emergency responders by coordinating and
conducting liaison with other response assets. WMD-CSTs also assist in formulating and communicating
appropriate requests for additional support. In addition, they may provide recommendations on how to integrate
the use of follow-on CBRNE response assets.
PROGRAMS
7-4. Liaison activities should not be conducted without the knowledge and approval of the WMD-CST higher
HQ. Although all members of a WMD-CST perform liaison activities of some kind, the liaison program should
be formalized through an SOP. The appointment of responsible parties as primary and alternate LNOs allows
the command to monitor liaison efforts and initiatives for the entire team. The LNOs act as POCs for routing
incoming requests and monitoring assigned liaison activities. In this manner, information flow is facilitated,
appropriate liaison efforts are conducted, and the command is kept informed.
FEDERAL AGENCIES
7-5. WMD-CSTs must perform liaison activities with appropriate federal agencies within their AOs. Liaison
activities must begin as soon as a WMD-CST identifies the presence of a federal agency that can contribute to
an incident response. The identification of such agencies occurs as a result of a vigorous, proactive assessment
program. WMD-CSTs must work toward gaining a detailed understanding of the responsibilities, capabilities,
limitations, and tentative response or reaction plans of each federal agency in the event of a CBRNE incident or
a natural or man-made disaster.
7-6. During a domestic WMD incident in which terrorism is suspected, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) is responsible for all law enforcement and investigative functions
(searches, evidence collection,
interviews/interrogations). The FBI uses federal resources, including its own laboratory, to respond to WMD
terrorist incidents. The FBI may request support from other federal, state, and local resources (including
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Chapter 7
WMD-CSTs). It is essential that the WMD-CST make contact, establish a rapport, and build a relationship with
the FBI WMD coordinator for the AO. Some goals of this liaison are—
Ensuring that the federal agency has an adequate understanding of WMD-CST capabilities,
limitations, sustainment requirements, and employment means.
Ensuring that WMD-CST mission requests and validation processes are fully explained and that
appropriate POCs are provided.
Identifying and deconflicting jurisdictional boundaries and the limits of the AO.
Ensuring that WMD-CST assets are appropriately included in applicable federal response plans.
Providing visibility for the roles and missions that the federal agency may task the WMD-CSTs to
fill or perform.
Providing the WMD-CSTs with a detailed understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and
employment means of federal agencies.
Generating possible TTP&E adaptations and additional training requirements to support the federal
agency.
STATE LEVEL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCIES
7-7. WMD-CSTs must perform liaison activities with appropriate state EMAs within their AOs. WMD-CSTs
can facilitate liaison among the unit, JFHQ-S, and state EMAs through METL input or the assessment process.
Some goals of this liaison are—
Promoting an understanding of WMD-CST capabilities, limitations, sustainment requirements, and
employment means.
Ensuring that WMD-CST requests and mission validation processes are in place and have been
coordinated and approved.
Ensuring that WMD-CST assets are appropriately incorporated into state level ERPs.
Fostering and improving working relationships with civil emergency management agencies.
JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS-STATE
7-8. In some cases, the tactical higher HQ for WMD-CSTs is the JFHQ-S operations staff officer (J-3). In
these situations, there may be some overlap in the liaison process. As with any unit, it is impossible for the state
military department to properly utilize WMD-CSTs if the department is not fully aware of their capabilities,
limitations, sustainment requirements, and employment considerations. The military response to Hurricane
Katrina demonstrated that WMD-CSTs are invaluable assets in natural-disaster response operations. It also
showed that a lack of understanding of WMD-CST capabilities and employment criteria can significantly slow
a response. Some goals of the liaison with JFHQ-S are—
Ensuring that higher HQ is aware of all WMD-CST management guidance contained in
NGR 500-3/ANGI 10-2503 as it pertains to JFHQ-S.
Promoting an understanding of WMD-CST capabilities, limitations, sustainment requirements, and
employment means.
Ensuring that the internal processes for mission request validations are in place.
Coordinating for specific support required by the WMD-CST.
Seeking input for METL development and the assessment process.
Initiating and coordinating a memorandum of understanding (MOU) and/or an MOA with other
JFHQs for WMD-CST support from other states.
NEXT HIGHER MILITARY HEADQUARTERS
7-9. WMD-CSTs must establish and maintain liaison with the next higher HQ. In instances where the WMD-
CST reports to multiple higher HQ (administrative/logistic support, operational control), liaison must be
conducted with each. Since WMD-CSTs are joint units, WMD-CST commanders must also consider liaison
with Army and Air Guard HQ. This promotes cross talk, provides a common understanding of roles and
7-2
FM 3-11.22
10 December 2007
Liaison
requirements, and deconflicts issues. Quarterly training briefings provided to higher HQ serve as excellent
forums for liaison activities and should be attended by the operational control HQ and the assigned higher HQ
commanders. Some goals of this liaison are—
Ensuring that higher HQ is aware of all pertinent WMD-CST management guidance contained in
NGR 500-3/ANGI 10-2503.
Making higher HQ aware of the Active Army training cycle used by WMD-CSTs for training
management.
Clearly delineating specific lines of WMD-CST support and control.
Seeking input for METL development and the assessment process.
OTHER MILITARY UNITS
7-10. WMD-CSTs should establish and maintain liaison with military units that have a role in or relationship
with applicable emergency plans. This may include various types and components of units and branches of
military service, such as the 20th Support Command, the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident
Response Force (CBIRF), and other specialized DOD units. Some goals of this liaison are—
Determining or verifying the capabilities and limitations of units.
Discussing WMD-CST operations with the command.
Briefing WMD-CST operations to the command.
Determining additional means of support that may be required, exchanged, enhanced, or expanded.
Determining potential training opportunities.
Sharing TTP&E.
Providing input to unit IPB processes.
Providing input to the WMD-CST assessment process.
EMERGENCY RESPONDERS
7-11. Liaison with emergency responders can range from in-depth discussions between members or key
leaders, through joint and cooperative training and, ultimately, to formal requests for support and/or inclusion
in ERPs. Some goals of this liaison are—
Determining or verifying the capabilities and limitations of jurisdictions.
Discussing WMD-CST operations with responders and leadership.
Briefing WMD-CST operations to responders and leadership.
Determining potential joint missions, entries, or equipment exchange.
Determining additional means of support that may be exchanged.
Determining potential training opportunities.
Sharing TTP&E.
Leveraging training to increase WMD-CST and emergency responder knowledge.
MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES
7-12. Liaison requirements within medical and scientific communities vary greatly and can be extremely
complex. WMD-CST medical teams should methodically develop liaison contacts. Initially, medical POCs can
be gleaned from existing ERPs. Another source of contacts may be traditional NG medical units, as many
members work for and with medical and treatment centers. Specific RFIs concerning health care capabilities
within the state may also be routed through JFHQ-S. Some goals of this liaison are—
Identifying analytical and medical reach-back SMEs.
Gaining access to and reviewing existing state level medical ERPs.
Determining the extent of involvement that WMD-CST medical and analytical assets have in state
level ERPs.
10 December 2007
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7-3
Chapter 7
Becoming familiar with—
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) strategic national stockpile distribution plans.
State level patient relocation plans.
Medical facilities which have been designated (by emergency plans) to receive contaminated
patients.
Local medical and evacuation protocols.
Analytical laboratory locations (state health, agricultural, environmental protection, crime).
Mental health facilities.
Medical examiner and mortuary procedures.
7-4
FM 3-11.22
10 December 2007
Chapter 8
Alert Management
An Army should be ready every day, every night and at all times of the day and night, to
oppose all the resistance of which it is capable.
—Napoleon I
This chapter contains information on alert and deployment procedures for the
WMD-CST.
MISSION REQUEST VALIDATION
8-1. All missions received by the WMD-CST must be validated according to NGR 500-3/ANGI 10-2503. The
state adjutant general ensures that a validation process is established for requested WMD-CST mission support.
UNIT RECALL AND PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING
8-2. Upon validation of a mission, the WMD-CST commander determines the personnel and equipment to be
deployed in the initial response and may initiate a personnel recall, as appropriate. The commander considers
mission planning and deployment preparation requirements, deployment times and distances, and individual
rest plans in facilitating safe deployment and execution. Responding WMD-CSTs are authorized to load and
transport the standard WMD-CST force package of personnel and equipment. The commander considers the
mission and prepares by beginning doctrinal TLPs. The use of TLPs ensures that planning elements are not
excluded from the planning process.
MOVEMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE
8-3. WMD-CSTs are designed to respond primarily by ground movement using organic vehicles. However,
they must plan for all forms of movement applicable to their AOs (ground, air, water). Movement planning
must consider primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency means of transportation and must be
accomplished with respect to METT-TC. Given the requirement for rapid response, the most expeditious
method of movement must be selected. Movement plans must be validated by the agency or organization
supporting the movement.
8-4. All WMD-CST equipment sets and vehicles are air-transportable by C-130 or larger aircraft. Movement
by air may increase the deployment time, and this should be a consideration when determining the deployment
method to be used. Readily available air movement assets may not be sufficient to move all WMD-CST TDA-
authorized equipment. Subsets of equipment are man-portable for rotary-wing movement; however, the use of
subsets may limit mission capability.
PLANS AND ORDERS
8-5. A deployment may be ordered to initiate the execution of a mission or to stage a WMD-CST for possible
execution of a mission. The operational decision to initially deploy is a decision that is made with great care to
ensure that the deployment is necessary and appropriate. To expedite operations, orders may be issued verbally
and later confirmed in writing.
8-6. WMD-CST deployments are accomplished using OPLANs, WARNOs, or OPORDs. If there is greater
than 72 hours of planning time available, an OPLAN with an effective date for conversion to an OPORD is the
mechanism that is used to deploy a team. If there is less than 72 hours of planning time available, a WARNO is
10 December 2007
FM 3-11.22
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Chapter 8
issued, and it is followed within 24 hours by a complete OPORD. FRAGOs are used to modify or update
OPORDs. All orders and plans are classified according to NGR 500-3/ANGI 10-2503. The unclassified code
word for the WMD-CST deployment and execution order is UTMOST ENDEAVOR (DTG-UNIT NUMBER).
8-7. OPLANs, OPORDs, WARNOs, and FRAGOs are distributed to all WMD-CSTs specifically listed in the
document, all JFHQ-Ss, and the NGB JOC. The JFHQ-S is responsible for distribution within the appropriate
state. The NGB is responsible for distribution to entities within the NGB and to authorized agencies outside the
NGB.
8-8. When deploying, the WMD-CST initiates a cost-capturing mechanism to trace the specific response and
generate a notification to appropriate state and federal agencies to ensure that the response is supported
operationally, logistically, and financially.
TRANSIT TIMELINES AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR MOVEMENT
8-9. In priority (gold) response status, the WMD-CST advanced party must deploy within 90 minutes of the
receipt of a validated deployment order. Response beyond a 250-mile ground movement radius may warrant the
use of rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft. Decisions to deploy by air or other specialized lift are made at the JFHQ-S
and NGB levels and are based on factors such as aircraft and crew availability, the time necessary for
reconfiguring WMD-CST equipment, the time required for aircraft positioning, air load times, en route travel
times (for ground, air, and water), download times, the distance from the point of debarkation to the incident
site, conditions at the response site, and other factors which may impact delivery of the unit. Ground
transportation may be the most viable, cost-effective transport option available in instances in which movement
is for administrative purposes, pre-positioning, or special events/operations.
RAPID-REACTION AIRLIFT FOR AN UNPLANNED EVENT
8-10. Upon being alerted of an unplanned event, the WMD-CST and JFHQ-S, in concert with the NGB J-3,
determine whether airlift would be more advantageous than ground deployment. If so, they identify and request
airlift through the NGB JOC.
8-11. The WMD-CST, which maintains current load plans for all types of aircraft (C-130s, C-17s, C-5s),
provides the appropriate load plans to the NGB-JOC. Together, they review the plans to identify and coordinate
airlift requirements, including HAZMAT declarations. WMD-CST and JFHQ-S air load planners maintain
information regarding the weight, volume, and dimensions of the cargo; the number of personnel and vehicles
involved in the event; and HAZMAT declarations.
8-12. The NGB JOC informs Air National Guard Deployments Execution Division airlift validators that airlift
assets are required to support the deployment of a WMD-CST and provides details on the aerial port of
embarkation (APOE) and the aerial port of debarkation (APOD).
8-13. Once load plans and HAZMAT documents have been checked for correctness and verified, the NGB J-3,
in concert with the Air National Guard Deployment Division, contacts the U.S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM) to begin the aircraft sourcing process. As soon as the airlift has been secured, the NGB JOC
contacts the JFHQ-S and issues coordinating instructions, covering the numbers and types of aircraft and the
details of the movement.
8-2
FM 3-11.22
10 December 2007
Chapter 9
Training Management
In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so
irrevocable as in the military.
—General Douglas MacArthur
This chapter describes the WMD-CST training management process. Topics covered
include planning, management, individual and collective training, goals, doctrinal aspects
of training programs as they relate to WMD-CSTs, and WMD-CST exercises in general.
OVERVIEW
9-1. The establishment and sustainment of an effective, doctrinally correct training program is the foundation
of the unit, and such a training program is essential for successful mission accomplishment. WMD-CST
training includes military and emergency responder training. Team members require many hours of initial
training beyond their MOS/AFSC qualification or professional military education (PME) requirements. WMD-
CSTs must adhere to the doctrinal training management principles for Active Army units as set forth in FM 7-0,
FM 7-1, and NGR 500-3/ANGI 10-2503.
COMMANDERS AND TRAINING
9-2. The commander is the primary trainer, and effective training is the commander’s main priority.
Commanders and senior leaders must extract training value from every opportunity. Effective training requires
the commander’s active involvement and participation. A commander must develop and communicate a clear
vision to subordinates so that they understand their roles in training, train all elements so that they are proficient
at mission-essential tasks, train and develop subordinates, and incorporate risk management into all training
events.
MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST DEVELOPMENT
9-3. The unit commander conducts a battle-focused analysis to determine critical WMD-CST tasks, which are
mission-essential tasks whose accomplishment determines the success of the next higher echelon mission-
essential tasks. The METL, which is developed by the WMD-CST commander, is derived from an integrated
analysis of local, state, and federal terrorism ERPs and directives and developed as a result of the commander’s
analysis of the five doctrinal inputs as outlined in FM 7-1: wartime operational plans, enduring combat
capabilities, operational environment, directed missions, and external guidance. The METL, which serves as the
foundation for the WMD-CST training plan, must be approved by the next higher HQ and forwarded to the
NGB J-3 according to NGR 500-3/ANGI 10-2503. Training objectives are derived by establishing conditions
and standards for each mission-essential task. Unit leaders conduct an analysis of the METL and select
individual and collective tasks for training, thus narrowing the focus of training to an achievable number of
tasks.
TRAINING PLANS
9-4. The WMD-CST training plan starts with individual training; builds to team and full-unit collective
training; and culminates in full-scale, realistic, collective training exercises. Specific training events should
emphasize interoperability with other WMD-CSTs, air load (not required to include flight operations), and
support to a wide range of civilian agencies as appropriate for each AO.
10 December 2007
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Chapter 9
9-5. WMD-CSTs are unable to maintain maximum readiness 365 days a year. When developing the unit
training plan, WMD-CST commitments under the RMP must be considered. The RMP ORC—as it applies to
the unit—must be overlaid on the WMD-CST annual training plan. This process reveals the desired sustainable
mean within the band of excellence according to FM 7-1. Units that fail to program adequate sustainment
training are likely to experience valleys in training proficiency, thus requiring retraining to reattain minimum
proficiency.
9-6. The training plan is the primary document justifying the unit training budget. A JFHQ-approved training
plan must be turned in to NGB J-3/Domestic Operations-Future Operations to facilitate equitable distribution
of training funds by NGB.
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
9-7. Individual training is the basic building block of sustainment training. Without periodic sustainment
training on individual tasks, team members are not able to successfully accomplish individual tasks that make
up larger collective tasks. The tasks and the frequency with which they are trained are determined by unit
leaders and approved by the unit commander through the normal processes associated with unit training, as
outlined in FM 7-1. Individual training tasks range from mask maintenance to combat lifesaving and can be
cross-walked to collective tasks that support the WMD-CST METL. The training of individual tasks is often
overlooked as unit OPTEMPO increases; however, the failure to train to maintain and sustain eventually
compromises readiness.
INITIAL
9-8. Soldiers selected for the WMD-CST must be fully qualified in their MOSs/AFSCs. Proponent schools
allocate seats at their officer basic courses and other PME courses as needed. In addition, all members of the
WMD-CST must also attend intensive individual training tailored to the specific responsibilities of their
assigned duty positions during the first 12 months of their assignment to the unit. This instruction includes
substantial hands-on, performance-oriented exercises and formal classroom instruction.
INSTITUTIONAL
9-9. The institutional phase of training focuses on individual training and military specialty and branch
qualification. Each member receives instruction specific to the team mission. This instruction is in addition to
service-required military specialty training, common skills training, and professional education. Joint,
interagency, multifunctional WMD-CST institutional training maximizes the use of current civilian and military
courses and standards and leverages the expertise and capabilities of the instructors. Institutional courses
offered include—
Civil Support Skills Course (CSSC). The skills and knowledge required to prepare for and respond
to a WMD incident as civil support to the state emergency management response system are
presented in this course. The course provides a detailed overview of the organization and functions
of a CST. Upon completion of the course, students are able to prepare for and enter a potentially
contaminated area, operate a variety of specialized military and civilian CBRN agent detectors and
equipment in support of detection and identification operations (CBRN survey), conduct sample
collection, process suspected hazardous materials and substances, conduct personal decontamination
operations, and perform military support to civil authorities (MSCA). Successful course completion
results in certification at the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 472 hazardous materials
technician level of training and the award of skill qualification identifier (SQI) R or officer skill
identifier R1.
CST Operations Course. The skills and knowledge required to prepare for and respond to a WMD
incident as part of the state emergency management response system are presented in this course.
The course is specifically designed to provide selected personnel with training in WMD-CST
operations techniques and procedures.
ALS Operator Course. The skills and knowledge required to prepare for and respond to a WMD
incident as an ALS operator under the state emergency management response system are presented
9-2
FM 3-11.22
10 December 2007
Training Management
in this course. The course is specifically designed to provide selected personnel with training in
sample analysis techniques and procedures and a working knowledge of the technical and tactical
skills necessary to operate the ALS. Extensive hands-on training is used to ensure that Soldiers
master the requisite skills. Upon completion of the course, students are able to operate a variety of
specialized equipment to process and identify suspected hazardous materials and substances.
UCS Operator Course. The skills and knowledge required to prepare for and respond to a WMD
incident as a UCS operator under the state emergency management response system are presented in
this course. The course is specifically designed to provide selected personnel with a working
knowledge of the technical and tactical skills necessary to operate the UCS. Extensive hands-on
training is used to ensure that Soldiers master the requisite skills. Upon completion of the course,
students are able to operate a variety of specialized equipment to maintain communications with
other federal entities.
COLLECTIVE TRAINING
9-10. Collective training requires that exercises be frequently conducted with other WMD-CSTs and first
responders. Such training encourages joint and interagency cooperation, is battle-focused, and relates directly to
the unit METL. The training must be challenging and realistic so that it closely replicates the scenarios,
environments, threats, and magnitude of events to which the WMD-CST is likely to respond. Unit training is
conducted according to FM 7-0, FM 7-1, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 350-2, and the
WMD-CST mission training plan (MTP).
9-11. WMD-CST collective training focuses on collective MTP and METL tasks. Training includes, but is not
limited to—
Section and team training and command post exercises with other WMD-CSTs, first responders, and
state and local organizations and agencies.
Section and team training and field-training exercises
(FTXs) with other WMD-CSTs, first
responders, and state and local organizations and agencies.
Lanes training exercises.
9-12. Appropriately qualified external observers, controllers, and trainers are used for selected training; and
periodic external evaluations are conducted.
SUSTAINMENT TRAINING
9-13. The purpose of sustainment training, which is the unit commander’s responsibility, is to ensure that all
skills required by all members of the WMD-CST are maintained and that they can be properly executed in
response to a CBRNE incident or natural or man-made disaster. Sustainment training should be planned and
executed so that WMD-CSTs maintain proficiency in METL tasks.
9-14. Sustainment training includes, but is not limited to—
Initial training for new team members.
Advanced courses in selected team member skill areas.
Proficiency and refresher training to meet individual member certification requirements as
prescribed by federal and local laws and regulations.
Schools for individual MOSs.
Common skills training.
Professional education.
LEADER TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT
9-15. Requirements for leader training are derived from several sources, such as AR
350-1 and
DA Pam 600-25. Training on all aspects of mission operations must be provided to the WMD-CST commander
and staff.
10 December 2007
FM 3-11.22
9-3
Chapter 9
9-16. Key leaders within a WMD-CST are often promoted from previous assignments within the WMD-CST
or WMD-CST program, thus limiting their exposure to other assignments and experiences. Therefore, the
primary focus of training requirements is on providing leaders with a broader knowledge base and additional
experiences. The WMD-CST mission, along with nontraditional skill and equipment sets, requires a specialized
training program for the command team and staff. The commander must address the unique aspects of
developing the highly specialized skills required of WMD-CST leaders. In addition, leader training must also
serve to enhance overall leadership skills and knowledge beyond WMD-CST-specific skills. The training
addresses individual and team requirements and prepares WMD-CST leaders for their next positions.
9-4
FM 3-11.22
10 December 2007
Appendix A
Legal Issues
An Army is a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man. Every change in the rules
which impairs the principle weakens the army.
—General William Tecumseh Sherman
This appendix provides information regarding various legal issues that may arise while
conducting WMD-CST missions or while preparing and training for those missions. The
guidance contained in this appendix is not all-inclusive. It provides a framework to
evaluate specific issues so that the decision maker or supporting staff can better articulate
the issue and request more detailed guidance from the supporting judge advocate.
RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE
A-1. WMD-CST members must know the applicable RUF at an incident site. RUF apply to domestic
operations. The rules of engagement do not apply. In the absence of mission-specific RUF, WMD-CST
members in Title 32 USC status operate under the RUF of the state in which the incident occurs. When in
Title 10 USC status, personnel engaged in law enforcement or security duties are governed by Department of
Defense Directive (DODD) 5210.56. Proper training ensures that unit personnel understand the RUF in
domestic operations.
USE OF WEAPONS
A-2. If authorized, units may deploy to response incidents with their weapons in storage. Subsequently, the
unit may be directed to carry arms by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Attorney General, or the
unit may deploy to a location where weapons are required. The military OSC is responsible for ensuring that
weapons and ammunition are adequately stored and physically secured at the site.
A-3. Military members providing security for stored weapons and ammunition at military facilities during CM
support operations may carry their weapons while performing their normal security duties and must adhere to
the RUF set forth in CJCS CONPLAN 0500-98.
INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE
A-4. A commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all
appropriate actions to defend the unit from a hostile act or the demonstration of hostile intent. Neither these
rules nor the supplemental measures activated to augment these rules limit this inherent right and obligation. At
all times, the requirements of necessity and proportionality, as amplified in the prescribed guidance for the use
of force, form the basis for the judgment of the OSC or individual as to what constitutes an appropriate
response to a particular hostile act or the demonstration of a hostile intent.
A-5. The two elements of self-defense are necessity and proportionality.
Self-defense is used when a hostile act occurs or when a force or terrorists exhibit hostile intent.
The force used to counter a hostile act or a demonstrated hostile intent must be reasonable in
intensity, duration, and magnitude to the perceived or demonstrated threat based on all facts known
to the commander at the time. (See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction [CJCSI]
3121.01B.)
10 December 2007
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A-1
Appendix A
GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF FORCE
A-6. The way a WMD-CST receives rules governing the use of force depends on how it has been called to an
incident, either through its respective state under Title 32 USC or through federalization under Title 10 USC.
When responding under Title 32 USC, the use of force is governed by state law. Other state and local agencies
and, perhaps, nonfederalized NG units—not federal troops—are responsible for law enforcement functions.
The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the nonfederalized NG.
A-7. As a condition of the use of federal property and equipment, NG personnel (in state active-duty status)
must, at a minimum, comply with the following guidelines (unless state law is more restrictive, in which case
NG personnel must comply with state law). The use of force must be restricted to the minimum degree
consistent with mission accomplishment. The use of deadly force can be justified only by extreme necessity. It
is authorized only when all three of the following circumstances occur:
Lesser means have been exhausted or are not available.
The risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not significantly increased by its use.
The purpose of its use consists of one or more of the following:
Self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm (including the defense of other persons).
The prevention of a crime that involves a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm (for
example, the dispersal of a hazardous substance in an inhabited dwelling).
The prevention of the destruction of property vital to public health and safety.
The detention or the prevention of escape of a person who, during the detention or in the act of
escape, presents a clear threat of loss of life or serious bodily harm to another person.
A-8. When activated under Title 10 USC, the use of force in federal active-duty status is governed by DOD or
federal directives or as determined on a case-by-case basis for specific missions by the lead federal agency
(LFA). In all cases, the use of force provided by the LFA should be reviewed by the appropriate DOD legal
office or judge advocate general (JAG) for applicability and legality.
A-9. The responsibility for providing security for DOD personnel, equipment, and military sites during CM
operations rests with local law enforcement authorities. DOD personnel, however, retain the right to take
appropriate actions in self-defense if threatened during CM operations.
Note. See CJCSI 3125.01 and CJCS CONPLAN 0500-98 for more guidance on RUF for WMD-
CSTs activated under Title 10 USC.
MARITIME OPERATIONS
A-10. WMD-CSTs operating in areas adjacent to bodies of water on the U.S. border should seek detailed
guidance from their supporting judge advocate to identify limitations in their abilities to respond, whether in
Title 32 USC or Title 10 USC status. The United States makes maritime claim to three identified zones: The
territorial waters around the United States extend out 12 nautical miles, and the United States also claims a
contiguous zone and an exclusive economic zone that extend out 24 and 200 nautical miles, respectively.
A-2
FM 3-11.22
10 December 2007
Appendix B
Decontamination
Even in theory the gas mask is a dreadful thing. It stands for one’s first flash of insight into
man’s measureless malignity against man.
—Reginald Farrer
The Void of War, 1918
Decontamination is the reduction or removal of CBRN contamination from persons and
equipment by physical or chemical processes. Emergency response and WMD-CST
personnel can independently or collectively implement technical and emergency
decontamination and verification procedures to ensure that contamination is not spread to
cold-zone operations. The WMD-CST commander appoints an officer in charge
(OIC)/noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of the decontamination line, which
should be manned by two to four individuals as the situation warrants. All contaminated
equipment is decontaminated or properly packaged for disposal before leaving the site.
The degree of decontamination or method of packaging is determined by the WMD-CST
commander and the IC. The WMD-CST decontamination site is established to
reduce/remove and localize CBR contamination from team members, exteriors of
CBRNE sample containers, detection and identification equipment, and decontamination
site equipment. All personnel, equipment, and apparatus exiting the hot zone should be
considered contaminated and should, therefore, be decontaminated. The decision to
implement all or part of a decontamination plan should be based on a field analysis of the
hazards and risks involved. This analysis generally consists of referring to technical
reference sources to determine the general hazards (reactivity, flammability, toxicity) and
then evaluating the relative risks.
PLANNING
B-1. The WMD-CST does not have a dedicated decontamination section; however, it has an organic/internal
personnel and equipment decontamination capability. WMD-CSTs can provide limited decontamination
support to emergency responders. The amount and extent of support provided is contingent on the supplies
available and the duration of the needed support. The WMD-CST can also provide limited decontamination line
augmentation and advice on decontamination to emergency responders. The WMD-CST does not have the
capability to perform mass casualty decontamination.
B-2. The entire process of decontamination should be directed toward the confinement of the contaminant
within the hot zone and the decontamination corridor to maintain the safety and health of response personnel,
the public, and the surrounding environment.
B-3. Although decontamination is typically performed following site entry, the determination of proper
decontamination methods and procedures must be considered before and during the incident as part of the
overall incident planning and the hazard and risk evaluation process. Entry into the hot zone should not be
attempted until appropriate decontamination methods are determined and established based on the hazards
present.
10 December 2007
FM 3-11.22
B-1
Appendix B
B-4. Before initiating decontamination, the following questions should be considered:
Can decontamination be conducted safely (visibility, access, waste management)?
Are existing resources adequate and immediately available to perform decontamination of personnel
and equipment? If not, where can they be obtained and how long will it take to get them?
What agents are to be decontaminated?
What are the existing and forecast meteorological conditions
(wind direction, wind speed,
temperature)?
What is the terrain type?
What verification methods are to be used? Does this need to be coordinated with other
federal/state/local responders?
B-5. Physical removal is the most important principle in decontamination. It generally involves the physical
removal of a contaminant from a contaminated person or object and the containment of the contaminant for
appropriate disposal. While these methods can reduce the concentration of the contaminant, the chemical
properties are usually unchanged. Examples of physical decontamination methods include the following:
Absorption.
Brushing and scraping.
Isolation and disposal.
Washing.
B-6. Chemical decontamination methods are used on equipment and generally involve changing the
contaminant through some type of chemical reaction to render the contaminant less harmful. Chemical methods
destroy or neutralize the agent. Examples of chemical methods include the following:
Adsorption.
Chemical degradation/neutralization.
Disinfection or sterilization.
Solidification.
B-7. If contact with a contaminant can be controlled, the risk of exposure is reduced and the need for
decontamination is minimized. The following actions can prevent or reduce contamination:
Adopting work practices that minimize contact with hazardous substances.
Using limited-use or disposable protective clothing and equipment.
Implementing appropriate traffic management systems to reduce the opportunity for vehicular cross
contamination.
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
B-8. Determine the physical and chemical compatibility of decontamination solutions before using them. Any
decontamination method that permeates, degrades, damages, or otherwise impairs the safe function of PPE or
endangers the wearer should not be used.
B-9. During PPE doffing, carefully remove clothing and equipment so that the outer surfaces do not touch or
make contact with the wearer’s skin. After removing equipment harnesses, continue through the
decontamination process. Containerize and identify protective equipment for HAZMAT disposal according to
established procedures. Ensure that personnel are decontaminated before they cross the liquid control line.
B-10. Water or other solutions used during decontamination must be confined, collected, and containerized for
proper disposal. The WMD-CST must coordinate with the ICS to identify hazardous waste containerization and
disposal methods.
B-2
FM 3-11.22
10 December 2007
Decontamination
B-11. Decontamination methods vary in their effectiveness depending on the substance. If decontamination
does not appear to be effective, select and implement a different method. Determining the effectiveness of
decontamination during field operations is based on the following:
Contamination levels are reduced as personnel move through the decontamination corridor.
Contamination is confined to the hot zone.
Contamination is reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
Contamination is reduced to a level that is adequately safe for unprotected personnel, the public, and
the surrounding environment.
B-12. Methods that may be useful in assessing the effectiveness of decontamination include—
Visual observation (stains, discolorations, corrosive effects).
Monitoring devices (photo ionization detector [PID], improved chemical-agent monitor [ICAM],
radiac meter detector tube, pH paper strip).
Wipe samples.
B-13. Personnel assigned to the decontamination team wear the appropriate level of PPE. PPE can be upgraded
or downgraded as additional information is obtained concerning the type of HAZMAT involved, the degree of
the hazard, and the probability of exposure of WMD-CST personnel.
B-14. Personnel who may have been exposed to an agent are provided with as much information as possible
about the delayed health effects of the HAZMAT involved in the incident. If necessary, schedule follow-up
examinations with medical personnel. Update medical and exposure records as soon as the mission allows. For
more information regarding the decontamination process and cleanup, see FM 3-11.5.
10 December 2007
FM 3-11.22
B-3
Appendix C
Modeling
You press the button, we do the rest.
—Eastman Kodak™ Company
This appendix provides guidance on the employment of hazard modeling capabilities
organic to the WMD-CST. The proper application of the WMD-CST hazard modeling
capabilities is a combat multiplier that allows commanders to visualize response areas in
a dynamic way. The products of this capability form a substantial portion of the WMD-
CST preoperational, operational, and postoperational plans and documentation.
CAPABILITIES
C-1. Technology has changed military mapping, data collection, and mission planning processes. As
computers, software, and accessibility have grown, new methods of map making and terrain analysis have been
developed.
C-2. When creating a COP, all response operations information is referenced to a common foundation of
geospatial information (GI). GI refers to the homogeneous geolayers that represent the earth’s surface in the
form of points, lines, polygons, and raster imagery. Geospatial information and services (GI&S) involve
collecting, storing, disseminating, and manipulating this type of information. GI&S aid in visualizing AIs to
plan and execute operations, navigate, and manage logistics effectively. GI&S support planning and have an
important role in the full range of military operations; commanders should not conduct response operations
without up-to-date GI.
C-3. Ultimately, GI&S combine the resources of national and commercial capabilities to assist the WMD-CST
community in its mission to identify, assess, advise, and assist the IC. The WMD-CST modeler using GI&S can
provide the commander with a clear understanding of the current situation (in relation to the terrorist threat and
the local geography) and provide a vision for the end state (which represents mission accomplishment). The
modeler molds GI into map products; tactical decision aids; user-defined, topographic analysis products or data
sets; and precise geodetic positioning products. These products can then be digitally transmitted or graphically
displayed to enhance visualization before and during a response mission.
MINIMUM OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
C-4. The hazard modeler must ensure that adequate preparation has been completed to properly support a
WMD-CST mission. As part of the preoperational checks, the modeler ensures that all assigned hardware,
software, and pertinent licenses are maintained and up to date. Without an accurate, up-to-date hazard
prediction and assessment capability and associated documentation, confidence in the modeling products is
questionable. The Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) and the ArcGIS™ come with their
own data layers; this national-level data should only be used for general purposes. State and local spatial data
are more accurate and up to date; however, caution should be exercised when using this data. The modeler must
ensure that all layers used meet or exceed national geodetic standards outlined by the Federal Geographic Data
Committee. The following are critical preoperational requirements:
Hardware. Modeling requires a computer capable of storing, manipulating, and displaying large
volumes of spatial information. Such computing capability must be able to evolve with the constant
flux of information technology.
Software. GI&S software is designed to store, manage, and manipulate geospatial information.
Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) software is the foundation software used by the
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WMD-CST; other extensions may be needed to perform the geoprocessing requirements of the
WMD-CST.
License. The modeler manages all necessary licenses. The following is a sample list of potential
licenses managed:
ESRI, ArcGIS™.
Consequence assessment tool set.
Areal location of hazardous atmosphere.
HPAC.
Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN)/Joint Effects Model (JEM).
Geodatabase. The modeler requires current and relevant spatially enabled data, all of which can be
obtained by various sensors, local government, national resources, intelligence assets, and
reconnaissance. Foundation data layers consist of—
Transportation.
Hydrology.
Political boundaries.
Census data.
Critical infrastructure.
Air photo or satellite imagery.
Digital elevation.
Plumes generated.
Data dictionary or metadata. A metadata record is a file of information which captures the basic
characteristics of an information resource. It represents the who, what, when, where, why, and how
of the resource. Geospatial metadata is used to document geographic digital resources such as GI
files, geospatial databases, and earth imagery. When building a geodatabase, the modeler must
maintain a written record of the layers collected and stored on the server. The record contains the
following mandatory information:
Title.
Originator of the layer.
Date the layer was created.
Resolution of the information.
Format (raster, vector, imagery).
POC.
PREOPERATIONAL PHASE
C-5. Preoperational activities of the hazard modeler make up a large portion of the assessment performed by
the WMD-CST. Preoperational response planning and the integration of information into larger response plans
revolves around gathering detailed information about potential response areas, analyzing the data, determining
the most likely occurrences (accidental or planned), and determining likely WMD-CST responses. These steps
parallel the doctrinal IPB process. Exercising the process makes the WMD-CST more aware of its operational
environment and prepares it for the operational phase.
OPERATIONAL PHASE
C-6. During the operational phase, the modeler conducts the following functions:
Collection of geointelligence pertaining to the event and its location. The modeler uses the data
stored in the geodatabase generated in the predeployment phase to assist in creating a COP. One of
the most important issues is to obtain the geocoordinates of the site. The modeler uses this data to
begin generation of plume models for vulnerability analyses and site characterization.
Creation of strip maps to the site location. These maps identify the preliminary plume direction and
indicate approach restrictions based on potential air quality hazards.
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Collection of information by any means available (cellular phone, wireless internet, ERG) while en
route to the site. The information collected is used to streamline the required plume models.
Adjustment of the plume models based on new information. It is recommended that the NMSO
validate the plume models prior to releasing the information to the ICP.
Determination of an evacuation route for all members of the WMD-CST in the event of a wind
change. To facilitate force protection, strip maps showing evacuation routes must be made available.
Maintenance of updated plume models. Additional information from the suspected area of
contamination allows the modeler to further improve plume models.
Deployment of an on-site weather station for real-time weather information. The internet is used to
monitor larger weather patterns.
Creation of a COP of deployed forces and their distribution—including staging areas—on the
incident site.
POSTOPERATIONAL PHASE
C-7. In the postoperational phase, the modeler functions as a central POC for operational information flow.
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