FM 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance (May 2009) - page 4

 

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FM 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance (May 2009) - page 4

 

 

Cross-Cultural Influencing and Negotiating
Determine Susceptibility
10-31. Susceptibility is the likelihood that the individual or group will be open to persuasion.
Determining susceptibility aids in prioritizing efforts. If susceptibility is moderate to high, then advisors
may not need to focus as much effort as they would if the susceptibility is low. Advisors determine
susceptibility by assessing the strength of the underlying source of the motivation and the perception of the
desired corresponding behavior. The strength of the motivation depends on the perceived risk and the
perceived reward, while the perception of the behavior directly links directly to how consistent the
behavior is with the individual or groups’ values and beliefs.
Perceived Risks and Rewards
10-32. Risks may include the threat of physical harm, financial loss, or disapproval of peers. Rewards
may include financial gain, political power, approval of peers, or increased self-esteem. Risks and rewards
can vary from immediate- to long-term. Immediate risks and rewards are stronger than long-term risks and
rewards. For example, few people will walk a tightrope (immediate risk), but many people smoke (long-
term risk). The higher the perceived rewards and the lower the perceived risks, the more likely the behavior
will occur.
Consistency with Values and Beliefs
10-33. Advisors determine if the desired behavior is consistent with values and beliefs. Generally,
behavior is consistent with the relative moral or ethical, religious, political, and cultural beliefs, values, and
norms. Behavior that is inconsistent or incongruent with values and beliefs often decreases over time.
Alternately, if behavior continues to be incongruent with values and beliefs, then individuals are likely to
justify this behavior by modifying their values and beliefs. The more consistent a desired behavior change
is with the individual’s values and beliefs, the more likely the behavior will occur.
10-34. The lower the susceptibility, the less likely influencing behavior will be successful, which does not
mean that the person cannot still be influenced. The lower the susceptibility, the more conditions will need
to be modified for behavior change to occur.
APPLICATION
10-35. Influencing is a dynamic process. Advisors make a plan before attempting to influence. If one
technique fails, they have to be able to shift to other techniques. Advisors do not need to sit down and write
a plan before attempting to influence people. However, even with apparently positive results, advisors
review their tactics and techniques.
CHECKS
10-36. Advisors check measures of effectiveness, unintended consequences, and second- and third-order
effects. Advisors assess if their influencing is achieving their immediate measures of effectiveness.
However, with every action some unintended consequences may occur or the activity may not prepare
counterparts for more complicated tasks later on.
CROSS-CULTURAL NEGOTIATING
10-37. The principal form of negotiation is likely to be cross-cultural negotiation. Cross-cultural
negotiation brings with it a series of unique challenges and techniques. Culture fundamentally affects
language and behavior. It also significantly impacts the way people handle conflict.
10-38. Negotiations among members of the same culture can be stressful; negotiating with members of
other cultures can be exceedingly difficult. Logically, working with other cultures is a basic skill for the
Soldier and an absolute requirement when acting in an advisory role. Understanding the components,
perspectives, roles, and outcomes will help minimize the difficulty of cross-cultural negotiation. Chapter 4
of TC 31-73 discusses cross-cultural negotiations.
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
10-7
Chapter 10
INFLUENCES ON NEGOTIATIONS
10-39. Cultural differences may lead to a conflict between what the parties expect and what their families
and communities expect. This has an obvious impact on negotiating behavior. Negotiations are influenced
by perceptions, individualism, punctuality and pace, relationship building, and language.
Perceptions
10-40. Most Americans have certain preconceived ideas about people from other cultures. These
perceptions may not be factually based, but they exist and influence negotiations. Similarly, foreign
negotiators have certain perceptions about Americans. Again, these perceptions may not be based on fact,
but they exist. Advisors need to understand how other cultures perceive Americans to appropriately adjust
their negotiating style. Successful advisors find ways to capitalize on the positive preconceptions of their
counterparts and find ways to neutralize the negative preconceptions.
Individualism
10-41. The United States encourages a largely individualistic culture. As such, the typical American
negotiator prefers to enter into negotiations alone or, if required, as part of a very small negotiating team
(two or three people, at most). This behavior is largely a by-product of U.S. culture, which focuses on the
individual, performance, initiative, and accomplishments. Most other cultures of the world place less
emphasis on the individual and more on the group.
Punctuality and Pace
10-42. Americans place a great emphasis on punctuality, viewing it as an indication of an individual’s
basic ability and commitment. However, other cultures emphasize punctuality differently. Some emphasize
punctuality more than Americans. In other cultures, time is considered relative or may not be important at
all.
Relationship Building
10-43. Americans are very competitive during negotiations and are inclined to stress short-term results.
Interpersonal relationships are of minimal importance to American negotiators. Building long-term
relationships only occurs after the successful completion of negotiations.
Language
10-44. U.S. negotiators must be considerate of others’ with respect to language. Even if the counterpart is
fluent in English, they may expect negotiators to speak their language or use an interpreter. Members of
some cultures do not like to speak English as they are very proud of their language. When U.S. negotiator
counterparts do not speak English, they will need an interpreter. Counterparts may also expect American
negotiators to present detailed written proposals in the local language. Many cultures appreciate foreigners
who take the trouble to learn a few simple courtesy words. However, some prefer that foreigners who are
not fluent refrain from using more than a few, basic courtesy words.
ELEMENTS FOR CONDUCTING CROSS-CULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS
10-45. The basic elements common to all negotiations must be applied in ways that allow for the differing
cultures of the participants. Elements that must be considered include opening strategies, directness,
strengthening behaviors, movement, power, face-saving, formal agreements, and mediation.
COMPONENTS OF NEGOTIATING
10-46. Two opposite types of negotiating exist: distributive and integrative. They reflect a philosophy
towards negotiating in general. Distributive negotiating is win-lose while integrative is win-win.
Distributive negotiating involves dividing a fixed amount of a thing to the parties involved. This
10-8
FM 3-07.1
1 May 2009
Cross-Cultural Influencing and Negotiating
negotiation normally involves people who have never had a relationship before. Integrative negotiating
involves joining two parties to achieve something together. Successful negotiations can involve a mix of
both strategies.
10-47. When using distributive negotiating, advisors know the point at which counterparts will walk
away. Advisors push them almost to that point by manipulation and withholding information. The
distributive negotiator believes—
z
The disputants are adversaries and the goal is victory.
z
Fixed resources are divided so one side receives more than the other after making concessions.
z
One person’s interests or position opposes the other’s interests or position.
z
The dominant concern is usually maximizing one’s own interests.
10-48. Integrative strategies used by advisors include cooperation, sharing information, and mutual
problem solving. The integrative negotiator believes—
z
The disputants are joint problem solvers seeking a wise decision.
z
An understanding of needs will allow resources to be divided and both sides can win.
z
The relationship between the parties is what is critical.
z
The dominant concern is to maximize joint outcomes.
PERSPECTIVES AFFECTING NEGOTIATIONS
10-49. Four perspectives impact negotiations: time, environment, self, and nonverbal communication.
Advisors consider how each party views these conditions when negotiating.
Time
10-50. Some cultures and individuals see time as a micro view. It is all about here and now. Other
cultures and individuals see time in a macro view. Now is a point that bridges the past with the future. For
example, imagine a person with the first scheduled event has a deadline to make an agreement now. The
next scheduled event is 1500 so that person has two hours to come to an agreement. The second person
might agree that they can come to an agreement now; but to the second person, now could be within the
next month or two.
Environment
10-51. Some cultures believe they can impact, if not control, their environment. If something should go
wrong, somebody is to blame. Every accident is preventable. Other cultures believe the environment
impacts the person. Accidents just happen and no one could have done anything about it. One side may be
quite ready to commit to something in the future knowing that nothing stands in the way, while the other
side may be reluctant to talk in certainties of the future knowing that factors beyond their control may
prevent them from fulfilling their commitments.
Self
10-52. In some cultures, when a person makes a mistake, blame can be isolated to that person. In other
cultures, the individual is seen as an element of the group. So a mistake is made not by the individual but
rather the whole group. In negotiations, one might accept a personal slight to get the goal achieved,
whereas the counterpart represents the group and cannot allow shame to fall on them even though one
might accept it personally.
Nonverbal Communication
10-53. Since advisors will often have to work through interpreters, nonverbal communication becomes
more important. Some cultures respect people who mean just what they say and maintain their composure.
Other cultures respect the eloquence in which something is said or the emotion used to convey it. Where
words may be translated improperly, the advisor or counterpart can hear tone and see emotion.
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
10-9
Chapter 10
ROLES OF NEGOTIATION
10-54. When entering a negotiation, advisors must know what their role. The three major roles associated
with negotiation are negotiator, mediator, and arbitrator. Each role has its own tactics or techniques and
separate functions.
Negotiator
10-55. Advisors most often find themselves in the role of a negotiator. A negotiation is the process by
which parties exchange commitments or promises to resolve disagreements and reach a settlement.
Advisors prepare for each negotiation so they will not be at a disadvantage during the negotiation. To
prepare for negotiations advisors examine their options, discover what motivates the parties, list all positive
scenarios, and dispute resolutions.
10-56. Advisors examine their options. They question their goals, the importance of the goals, and the
amount of leverage they have. They determine who is in power and what to do if no agreement is reached.
Advisors uncover what motivates their counterparts. They delve into their counterparts’ underlying needs.
10-57. By listing all the scenarios that satisfy their needs, advisors can maximize the gain for all parties.
Advisors can add features to the scenarios that increase the opportunities for all parties to be satisfied.
When advisors dispute resolutions, they often find some form of compromise. One of the best outcomes of
compromise is when all parties leave the bargaining table satisfied but no single party feels like they have
won or lost the argument. A skilled negotiator should strive to achieve a win-win result.
10-58. The negotiator represents one side and has a vested interest in the outcome of the negotiation. It is
best to avoid situations where there is a conflict of interests. By blindly pushing the coalition agenda, the
advisor could lose the trust of the counterpart. Considerations for a negotiator should include:
z
If the foreign security forces ask the advisor to negotiate for them, they expect the advisor, as
their negotiator, to have their best interests in mind. The coalition may try to use the advisor to
push their agenda and influence rather than negotiate.
z
If the foreign counterparts take illegal action, advisors cannot use commitment techniques. They
need to use some form of compliant technique.
z
If the foreign counterpart is not violating any laws, the advisor should focus on commitment
techniques. Success will not be achieved all at once.
Mediator
10-59. Advisors may find themselves in the role of a mediator. The mediator has three general roles to
perform: facilitator, formulator, and manipulator. Table 10-3 identifies the roles and tactics advisors use.
10-10
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1 May 2009
Cross-Cultural Influencing and Negotiating
Table 10-3. Mediator roles and tactics
Roles
Tactics
Make contact.
Arrange for interaction.
Clarify the situation.
Facilitator
Supply missing information.
Transmit messages between parties.
Ensure all interests are discussed.
Control the pace, formality, and physical environment of
the meetings.
Highlight common interests.
Help parties save face.
Formulator
Keep process focused on the issues.
Make substitutive proposals.
Suggest concessions parties could make.
Keep parties at the table.
Change parties expectations.
Highlight costs of nonagreement.
Reward concessions.
Manipulator
Promise resources.
Threaten the withdrawal of resources.
Offer to verify compliance.
Threaten to withdraw mediation.
Arbitrator
10-60. The foreign security force may try to put the advisor in the position of an arbitrator. An arbitration
is the process by which the parties to a dispute submit their differences to the judgment of an impartial
person or group selected by mutual consent or statutory provision. They want the advisor to decide
between two positions. This is a dangerous position for the advisor. When a win-win solution can be
found, the advisor can improve rapport with both parties, but when it is a win-lose situation, the advisor
could alienate one or both groups.
EXPECTED OUTCOMES OF NEGOTIATION
10-61. The outcome of negotiations sometimes can determine the outcome. Advisors consider the desired
outcome to determine which confrontation preference to use. Negotiation can focuses on physical
outcomes of relationships. How advisors combine their preferences to their focus affects their perceptions
of the outcome.
Confrontation Preferences
10-62. Negotiators will have one of three preferences for confrontation: avoidance, collaboration, or
competition. Those that prefer avoidance will consider accommodation as a viable means to resolve an
issue. Negotiators that prefer collaboration consider compromise as the preferred outcome. Those
negotiators who use competition want to win. Intentionally losing in a negotiation to avoid confrontation
seems counterintuitive; however, it tends to protect the current relationship. Collaboration requires a
mutual respect of the existing relationship, while competition is generally indifferent. It would be fairly
easy to take advantage of a negotiator who prefers to avoid confrontation. At the same time, expecting to
be able to compromise with a highly competitive negotiator may become a point of frustration. For the
competitor, winning may be more important than the deal itself.
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
10-11
Chapter 10
Negotiation Focus
10-63. Defining whether the negotiation is a win-win situation is not as simple as which side gained the
most from the negotiation. Advisors often focus on physical outcomes whereas diplomats focus on
relationships. Every negotiation varies on which factor is more important. Just as car dealers may accept
less profit on individual services, they gain overall if the customer returns.
Perception of the Outcome
10-64. Comparing confrontation preferences leads to nine potential combinations. If advisors can
determine a participant’s preference—avoidance, collaboration, and competition—and focus, they can
determine how the participant might feel based on the outcome of the negotiation. If one participant is a
collaborator and one is a competitor, then a win-win situation is possible, but neither side will be
completely satisfied with the outcome. The competitors will not have gotten a clear win, and the
collaborators will not have gotten what they considered fair. Subsequently, they will both have some minor
negative feelings toward the other.
10-12
FM 3-07.1
1 May 2009
Appendix A
Army Special Operations Forces Imperatives
This appendix outlines the imperatives for Army special operations forces conducting
security force assistance and foreign internal defense operations. Table A-1 lists these
imperatives.
Table A-1. Army special operations forces imperatives
Imperatives
General Descriptors
Specific Actions
Knowing the U.S. command
Define relationship as partnership or
relationships (military and
augmentation
interagency)
Conduct analysis using ASCOPE
Knowing the population (who, what,
(areas, structures, capabilities,
when, where, why, and how)
organizations, people, events)
Knowing the enemy and other
Analyze the enemy order of battle
Understand the
antigovernment forces (crime,
Operational
Protect the population
militias, gangs)
Environment
Knowing the higher commander’s
intent
Knowing that the press is a part of
the operational environment (news
reports of events reach the U.S.
population quickly )
Identifying the political (and legal)
Include rules of engagement in the
restrictions and implications of
planning and briefs of operations
actions by U.S. and foreign security
Include local government leadership
forces
in operations
Identifying political implications of
Reinforce human rights briefings and
establishing and enforcing rules of
training to all foreign security forces
engagement policy
Prepare all U.S. and foreign security
Identifying short and long term
forces to talk with the press
political implications of security
Prepare information engagements for
force assistance
Recognize
all operations
Political
Understanding the importance of
Anticipate and neutralize the methods
Implications
establishing human rights (critical
enemy forces pass propaganda
for tactical and strategic success)
Acknowledging the effects of public
opinion on the mission locally, in the
United States, and internationally
Understanding that insurgents
conduct operations to have political
effects among the local populace,
external actors, and the U.S. and
multinational civilian public
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
A-1
Appendix A
Imperatives
General Descriptors
Specific Actions
Conducting security force
Include interagency members in
assistance as both a military and an
planning and training as appropriate
interagency effort; taking advantage
Provide assistance to support limited
of the greater impact of collective
agency resources, allowing agencies
efforts
to prioritize their primary roles
Coordinating the scope and
Conduct regular coordination
limitations of each agency’s
Facilitate
meetings with civil agencies to
influence and programs
Interagency
synchronize security efforts
Activities
(as opposed to a purely military
Include host-nation agencies
program)
whenever including U.S. agencies
Obtaining the active cooperation of
the foreign security forces
Including military and civilian
agencies working together for unity
of effort
Avoiding the use of overwhelming
Take civilians into account when
firepower—to prevent alienating the
considering weapons systems and
population and turning them away
techniques for operations
from the host-nation government
Include civilians in risk assessment
Giving training and advice to foreign
during mission planning
security forces based on the
Train and rehearse rules of
mission and threat
engagement and escalation of force
Targeting insurgents, criminal
to prepare Soldiers to react in
activities (lawlessness), or
accordance to policy
subversion—to avoid alienating the
Publicize reasons for use of populace
Engage the Threat
populace
and resource control (for example,
Discriminately
Minimizing the use of force in
curfews protect civilians); avoid
populace and resources control
enemy propaganda or rumors
measures—weighed for potential
dictating the psychological response
gain versus potential cost
of the populace
Ensuring that rules of engagement
Update rules of engagement and
and escalation of force are
escalation of force periodically
balanced between force protection
Rules of engagement or escalation of
and safeguarding civilians
force reflects engaging targets that
are visually verified and not simply
suppressive fire in populated areas
Building up the foreign security
Understand local grievances and
forces and alleviating the root
underlying issues
causes of the current situation over
Interact with all aspects of the
time—not just treating the
population a government to identify
symptoms
root causes
Solving problems in a broader
Ensure the commander’s intent
political, military, social and
remains focused on higher goals and
economic context
policy related to addressing root
Making policies, plans, and
causes, and protecting the local
Consider Long-
operations consistent with national
population
Term Effects
and theater priorities and the
Monitor and update rules of
objectives they support
engagement as local government and
police gain control of rule of law.
Conduct operation that adhere to local
laws as possible
Understand legal and political
constraints (rules of engagement) to
avoid strategic failure while achieving
tactical success
A-2
FM 3-07.1
1 May 2009
Army Special Operations Forces Imperatives
Imperatives
General Descriptors
Specific Actions
Reinforcing and enhancing the
Conduct joint and multinational patrols
legitimacy and credibility of the
and operations.
foreign security forces and
Ensure information engagement is
government
common in all operations and
Gaining trust and credibility to
contributes to maintaining credibility
ensure advisors and U.S. forces
Ensure Legitimacy
Engage the media with the host nation
obtain legitimacy with the local
of Special
to inform as well as to justify actions
population
Operations
Focus on what the population
Obtaining legitimacy in theater, in
considers the root causes, not the
the United States, and
U.S. perspective
internationally to ensure ongoing
Develop long-term solutions to restore
support
or improve basic services with host-
nation leadership
Considering the psychological
All operations are developed,
effects of all operations (such as
analyzed and executed with
populace and resources control
information engagement
measures, combat operations, and
Anticipate and
Continue to gauge the psychological
civic action)
Control
effects with the local population, local
Psychological
Avoiding negative psychological
government, and security forces as
Effects
effects that can negate tactical
well as the enemy (propaganda and
victories
interrogation)
Appreciating the power of people’s
perceptions versus reality
Teaching host-nation forces to plan
Conduct training of foreign security
instead of giving them tasks
forces only to teach basics
Supporting U.S. efforts enhancing
Transition to mentor or advisor
the legitimacy and credibility of the
relationship during planning and
host-nation government and foreign
operations to encourage the host-
security forces
nation to take the lead
Balancing control and pressure on
Use discretion when advising
foreign security forces to ensure
counterparts as not to embarrass
they conduct successful tactical
foreign security forces leadership
Apply Capabilities
operations and accomplish
Indirectly
Use host-nation methods whenever
missions
possible
Fulfilling primary role to advise,
train, and help foreign security
forces take the lead and stabilize
the host nation
Influencing a foreign security force
without commanding it; not
accepting a lack of effort or a high
level of corruption
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
A-3
Appendix A
Imperatives
General Descriptors
Specific Actions
Considering the complex and
Continue to refine and train on battle
irregular environment
drills and contingencies
Planning to use the full range of
Develop an understanding of skills
capabilities
and abilities of the members of the
unit and community
Anticipating that an operational
environment may dictate a change
Elicit the input of foreign security
of rules of engagement or type of
forces on how to address situations to
Develop Multiple
operations
widen the options beyond
Options
conventional techniques
Ensuring foreign security forces are
capable of shifting from one option
Include government agencies, special
to another before and during
operations forces, nongovernmental
mission execution
organizations, local police, and the
host-nation government to develop
additional methods or options for
solving problems
Avoiding advising and training
Understand and utilize the equipment
foreign security forces in techniques
and manpower present in the foreign
and procedures beyond their
security forces unit’s inventory
capabilities to sustain
Assess the capabilities of foreign
Modifying tactics, techniques, and
security forces for leadership, training,
procedures; training; operations;
sustainment (logistics, administration,
and sustainment to fit the culture,
and equipment), and ongoing
education, and technological
development of a professional
Ensure Long-Term
Sustainment
capability of the foreign security
security force
forces
Recognize the programs that are
Developing host-nation sustainment
durable, consistent, and sustainable
before handing over economic,
by the host nation
social, political, military, and
Do not begin programs beyond the
security initiatives and projects
economic or technological capacity of
Avoiding host-nation dependency
the host nation
on U.S.-funded programs
Ensuring detailed, near real-time,
Ensure host nation forces are
all-source tactical intelligence
conducting operations using accurate,
products support all activities and
real-time intelligence
programs
Establish priority of effort when
Ensuring detailed and
identifying intelligence requirements
comprehensive intelligence on all
Assist foreign security forces to
aspects of the operational
prioritize and focus
environment and its internal
counterintelligence on the
dynamics support operations
commander’s critical information
Ensuring human intelligence, urban
requirement to receive timely and
recon, and internal security
specific intelligence
Provide Sufficient
elements assess internal threats,
Assess other organizations that
Intelligence
warn the government, and take
impede the rule of law and
action to penetrate and neutralize
government functions (such as gangs,
instability
criminals, smugglers, militias,
Considering aspects of the society
mercenaries, drug lords, and
not directly related to the tactical
narcoterrorists)
combat situation when assessing
the enemy threat
Using information from intelligence
assets to advise, train, and help
foreign security forces counterparts
and ease interagency efforts
A-4
FM 3-07.1
1 May 2009
Army Special Operations Forces Imperatives
Imperatives
General Descriptors
Specific Actions
• Maintaining unity of effort and
• Encourage combined planning,
avoiding compartmentalizing key
preparation, and operations with
security forces from planning and
foreign security forces’ military, police,
intelligence contingencies even
and governmental units
when security concerns exist
• Resolve conflicting demands on
• Avoiding either excessive or
mission planning and execution
Balance Security
insufficient security
• Employ measures to mitigate risk of
and
• Anticipating reasons foreign
operations security instead of
Synchronization
security forces may not provide
dismissing the host-nation
intelligence, such as lack of internal
government, police, or military needed
security or lack of U.S. intelligence
for the overall effort
support
• Strive to gain the trust of the local
population to gain the most human
intelligence and support from the
foreign security forces
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
A-5
Appendix B
Legal Considerations
GENERAL LEGAL BASIS
B-1. Law and policy govern the actions of U.S. forces in all military operations, including security force
assistance. For U.S. forces to conduct operations, a legal basis must exist. This legal basis profoundly
influences many aspects of an operation. It affects the rules of engagement, how U.S. forces organize and
train foreign forces, the authority to spend funds to benefit the host nation, and the authority of U.S. forces
to detain and interrogate. Under the Constitution of the United States, the President is the Commander in
Chief of U.S. forces. Therefore, orders issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense to a combatant
commander provide the starting point in determining the legal basis. Laws are legislation passed by
Congress and signed into law by the President and treaties to which the United States is party. Policies are
executive orders, departmental directives and regulations, and other authoritative statements issued by
government officials. This appendix summarizes some of the laws and policies that bear upon U.S. military
operations in support of security force assistance. This summary does not replace a consultation with the
unit’s supporting staff judge advocate.
LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE
B-2. If the Secretary of State requests and the Secretary of Defense approves, U.S. forces can participate
in security force assistance. The request and approval can go through standing statutory authorities in Title
22, U.S. Code. Title 22 contains the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
and other laws. It authorizes security assistance, developmental assistance, security force assistance and
other forms of bilateral aid.
B-3. The request and approval for security force assistance might also occur under various provisions in
Title 10, U.S. Code. Title 10 authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises,
and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the
host nation. In such situations, U.S. forces may be granted status as administrative and technical personnel
based on a status-of-forces agreement or an exchange of letters with the host nation. This cooperation and
assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It
does not include direct involvement in operations. Assistance to police by U.S. forces is permitted but,
generally, Department of Defense (DOD) does not serve as the lead government department. Without
receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. forces may be
authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve security assistance.
EXISTING UNITED STATES LAW
B-4. The Constitution divides the power to wage war between the executive and legislative branches of
government. Under Article I, Congress holds the power to declare war; to raise and support armies; to
provide and maintain a navy; and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying out those responsibilities.
Balancing that legislative empowerment, Article II vests the executive power in the President and makes
the President the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. This bifurcation of the war powers created an
area in which the coordinate political branches of government exercise concurrent authority over decisions
relating to the use of Armed Forces overseas as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.
B-5. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Article VI) states, in part, that all treaties made by the
United States are the supreme law of the land. Therefore, ratified treaties, such as the United Nations
(U.N.) Charter (see paragraphs B-7 through B-8) and the Geneva Conventions, create legal obligations on
U.S. forces regarding their ability to perform various types of missions and functions.
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
B-1
Appendix B
B-6. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 ensures the collective judgment of both the executive and
legislative branches to deploy U.S. forces by requiring consultation of and reports to Congress, in any of
the following circumstances:
z
Introduction of troops into actual hostilities.
z
Introduction of troops, equipped for combat, into a foreign country.
z
Greatly enlarging the number of troops, equipped for combat, in a foreign country.
B-7. The President is required to make such reports within 48 hours of the triggering event, detailing—
z
The circumstances necessitating introduction or enlargement of troops.
z
The constitutional or legislative authority upon which he bases his action.
z
The estimated scope and duration of the deployment or combat action.
B-8. Since the War Powers Resolution was passed over the veto of President Nixon, no President has
either conceded its constitutionality or complied fully with its mandates.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES
B-9. The U.N. Charter became effective on 24 October 1945 after being ratified by the United States and
a majority of other signatories. The U.N. Charter mandates that all member states resolve their international
disputes peacefully. It requires that member states refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force. The U.N. Charter also provides that all nations have the right to use self-defense to combat
acts of aggression against them until such time as the Security Council takes action.
B-10. The U.N. Charter provides the essential framework of authority for the use of force, effectively
defining the foundations for a modern jus ad bellum. Inherent in its principles are the requirements for
necessity, proportionality, and timeliness. Necessity involves considering—
z
The exhaustion or ineffectiveness of peaceful means of resolution.
z
The nature of coercion applied by the aggressor State.
z
The objectives of each party.
z
The likelihood of effective community intervention.
B-11. Proportionality refers to limiting force in magnitude, scope, and duration to that which is reasonably
necessary to counter a threat or attack. Timeliness refers to situations in which the delay of a response to an
attack or the threat of attack attenuates the immediacy of the threat and the necessity to use force in self-
defense.
B-12. U.S. forces obey the law of war. The law of war is a body of international treaties and customs,
recognized by the United States as binding. It regulates the conduct of hostilities and protects
noncombatants. The main law-of-war protections come from The Hague and Geneva Conventions. They
apply at the tactical and operational levels and are summarized in ten rules shown in table B-1.
Table B-1. Summary of the law-of-war rules
• Fight only enemy combatants.
• Do not harm enemies who surrender; disarm them and turn them over to the chain of
command.
• Do not kill or torture detainees.
• Collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
• Do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.
• Destroy no more than the mission requires.
• Treat all civilians humanely.
• Do not steal; respect private property and possessions.
• Do one’s best to prevent violations of the law of war.
• Report all violations of the law of war to superiors.
B-2
FM 3-07.1
1 May 2009
Legal Considerations
B-13. During security force assistance operations, commanders must be aware of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and the status of insurgents under the laws of the host nation. One article contained in
all four of the Geneva Conventions—Common Article 3—is specifically intended to apply to internal
armed conflicts:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or
any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited
at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture; (b) Taking of hostages; (c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) The passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian
body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the
Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present
Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status
of the Parties to the Conflict.
HOST-NATION LAW AND STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENTS
B-14. After considering the type of baseline protections represented by fundamental human rights law, the
military leader must be advised in regard to the other bodies of law that leader should integrate into
planning and execution. This includes consideration of host-nation law. Because of the nature of most
noninternational armed conflict missions, commanders and staffs must understand the technical and
pragmatic significance of host-nation law within the area of operations. Although in theory, understanding
the application of host-nation law during military operations is perhaps the simplest component, in practice
it is perhaps the most difficult.
B-15. Judge advocates must recognize the difference between understanding the technical applicability of
host-nation law and that law’s application to control the conduct of U.S. forces during operations. In short,
the significance of host-nation law declines in proportion to the movement of the operation toward violent
conflict. Judge advocates should understand that U.S. forces enter other nations with a legal status that
exists anywhere along a notional legal spectrum.
B-16. Judge advocates and planners must be familiar with any status-of-forces agreements or status-of-
mission agreements that may be applicable. In any given country, there may be agreements short of status-
of-forces agreements, such as diplomatic notes, on point. Relevant international documents affecting
military operations may be difficult to locate. Several sources are available for locating applicable
international agreements governing the status of U.S. forces or affecting military operations. Department of
State (DOS) publications, such as Treaties in Force, contain unclassified international agreements. Both
the relevant geographic combatant command’s legal office and the defense attaché or military assistance
group at the embassy normally have access to host-nation or international agreements impacting a military
operation.
B-17. Status-of-forces and other forms of agreements frequently exist. They are essentially contractual
agreements or treaties between two or more nations that establish the legal status of military personnel in
foreign countries. Topics that are usually covered in a status-of-forces agreement include criminal and civil
jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries. In the absence of an agreement or some other
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
B-3
Appendix B
arrangement with the host nation, DOD personnel in foreign countries may be subject to its laws.
Commanders ensure that all personnel understand status of U.S. forces in the area of operations and are
trained accordingly.
LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE
MISSIONS
B-18. U.S. law and regulation play a key role in establishing the parameters by which military forces may
conduct security force assistance missions. These parameters tend to constitute constraints on the activities
of military units. They range from the rules of engagement in combat situations to the ability to spend
government funds in furtherance of a training or support mission.
GENERAL PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO POLICE
B-19. Historically, DOD is not the lead government department for assisting foreign governments. DOS is
the lead when U.S. forces provide security assistance—military training, equipment, and defense articles
and services—to host-nation governments. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specifically prohibits
assistance to foreign police forces except within specific exceptions and under a Presidential directive.
When providing assistance to training, DOS provides the lead role in police assistance through its Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The President, however, may delegate this role to
other agencies. This was done in 2004, when the President signed a decision directive granting the
commander, United States Central Command, authority to train and equip Iraqi police.
TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES
B-20. All training and equipping of foreign security forces are specifically authorized. U.S. laws require
Congress to authorize expenditures for training and equipping foreign forces. The laws of the United States
also require DOS to verify that the host nation receiving the assistance is not in violation of human rights.
The Secretary of Defense may authorize deployed U.S. forces to train or advise host-nation security forces
as part of the mission. In this case, DOD personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations provide an
incidental benefit to those security forces. Numerous other programs to assist foreign forces are paid for
with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Consultation with a staff judge advocate or legal
advisor early in the planning ensures the availability of funds for missions to train and equip foreign forces.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
B-21. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-02). Often these directives are specific to the operation. If
there are no operation-specific rules of engagement, U.S. forces apply standing rules of engagement. When
operating with a multinational force, commanders must coordinate the rules of engagement thoroughly.
FISCAL LAW CONSIDERATIONS
B-22. In security force assistance missions, like all operations, commanders require specific authority to
expend funds normally found in the annual DOD appropriations act. As a general rule, operation and
maintenance funds may not be used for security force assistance missions. In recent years, Congress
appropriated additional funds to commanders for conducting more complex stability operations that were
not typically covered by operation and maintenance funds. Examples include the Commander’s Emergency
Response Program
(CERP), the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, and
Commander’s Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction.
B-23. DOS has the primary responsibility, authority, and funding to conduct foreign assistance on behalf of
the U.S. government. Foreign assistance encompasses any and all assistance to a foreign nation, including
security assistance (assistance to the internal police forces and military forces of the foreign nation),
development assistance (assistance to the foreign government in projects that will assist the development of
B-4
FM 3-07.1
1 May 2009
Legal Considerations
the foreign economy or their political institutions), and humanitarian assistance (direct assistance to the
population of a foreign nation). The legal authority for DOS to conduct foreign assistance is found in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
B-24. There are two exceptions to the general rule requiring the use of Title 22 funds for foreign
assistance. The first exception is for interoperability, safety, and familiarization training. DOD may fund
the training (as opposed to goods and services) of foreign militaries with operation and maintenance dollars
only when the purpose of the training is to enhance interoperability, familiarization, and safety training.
Operation and maintenance funds may not be used for security force assistance training. This exception
applies only to interoperability training. The second exception is congressional appropriation or
authorization to conduct security foreign assistance. This exception allows DOD to fund foreign assistance
operations if Congress has provided a specific appropriation or authorization to execute the mission.
CONSTRAINTS ON FUNDING
B-25. The Foreign Operations Appropriation Act (an annual DOS appropriations act) was enacted in 1997.
Known as the Leahy Amendment, it prohibits the U.S. government from providing funds to a unit of the
security forces of a foreign country if DOS has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross
violations of human rights. The Leahy Amendment contains additional constraints on government funding
of security force assistance missions. The law restricts funding until the Secretary of State determines and
reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members
of the security forces unit to justice.
B-26. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. The United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22. Provisions
of Title 10 may also authorize amounts of money for these purposes. Standing funding authorities are
narrowly defined and generally require advance coordination within DOD and DOS.
B-27. Effective foreign forces need training and equipment. U.S. laws require Congress to authorize such
expenditures. U.S. laws also require DOS to verify that the host nation receiving the assistance is not in
violation of human rights.
FUNDING AUTHORIZATION FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE
B-28. All training and equipping of foreign security forces must be specifically authorized. Military and
civilian personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations should typically provide only an incidental
benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and
services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose.
Examples include the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund. Moreover, the
President must give specific authority to DOD for its role in training and equipping foreign security forces.
In May of 2004, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36 that made the
commander, U.S. Central Command, under policy guidance from the chief of mission, responsible for
coordinating all U.S. government efforts to organize, train, and equip Iraqi Security Forces, including
police. Absent such a directive, DOD lacks authority to take the lead in assisting a host nation to train and
equip its security forces.
KEY SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FUNDING PROGRAMS
B-29. Congress has appropriated funds to allow DOS to conduct its foreign assistance mission, including
the following activities:
z
Foreign Military Financing Program.
z
International Military Education and Training Program.
z
Economic Support Fund.
z
Peacekeeping operations.
z
Antiterrorism assistance.
z
Global humanitarian demining.
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
B-5
Appendix B
z
Refugee assistance.
z
Personnel details.
B-30. DOS administers the following programs but no funds are appropriated to sustain them:
z
Foreign Military Sales Program.
z
Foreign Military Lease Program.
z
Economy Act Security Assistance.
z
U.S. Government Commodities and Services Program.
z
Direct Commercial Sales Program.
B-31. Additional special support created by law for the foreign assistance mission includes—
z
Excess defense articles.
z
Presidential drawdowns.
B-32. DOS directly, or indirectly through USAID, finances numerous development assistance activities to
address the following needs:
z
Rule of law.
z
Governance.
z
Agriculture and nutrition.
z
Population control.
z
Health.
z
Education.
z
Energy.
z
Environment improvement.
B-33. CERP (see paragraph B-19) is an example of a targeted humanitarian assistance fund program.
CERP’s primary purpose is to enable military commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and
reconstruction requirements within their fields of interest by carrying out programs that will immediately
assist the host-nation populace. CERP was originally funded with seized Iraqi assets, but Congress later
appropriated U.S. funds for the purpose. CERP is not applicable to missions outside Iraq and Afghanistan.
Future missions, though, may have similar funding sources established to facilitate a humanitarian
assistance mission. Commanders consult with the servicing judge advocate to determine the availability of
funds.
B-6
FM 3-07.1
1 May 2009
Appendix C
Information Engagement
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
C-1. Information shapes a commander’s operational environment at every level. Twenty-first century
conflicts occur in operational environments with instant communication. Because information systems are
everywhere and exposure to news and opinion media is pervasive, an individual’s words and actions can
have immediate operational and strategic implications. Gaining and maintaining the trust of key publics has
never been more important. Army forces conduct operations in the public eye and must maintain public
confidence by being consistent in word and deed.
C-2. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do
the same (JP 3-13). Advisors build partner capacity in this mission area. Advisors ensure that host-nation
counterparts integrate information superiority into operations as carefully as fires, maneuver, protection,
and sustainment. Army information tasks contribute to information superiority. Information tasks are used
to shape the operational environment (see FM 3-0). The information tasks are—
z
Information engagement.
z
Command and control warfare.
z
Information protection.
z
Operations security.
z
Military deception.
C-3. Advisors prioritize the five information tasks based on the host nation’s capabilities and strengths.
This appendix discusses some information engagement capabilities that advisors can expect to employ
while conducting security force assistance, as well as considerations when working with the media. For a
further discussion of the other information tasks, see FM 3-0.
INFORMATION ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITIES
C-4. Information engagement is the integrated employment of public affairs to inform U.S. and friendly
audiences; psychological operations, combat camera, and U.S. government strategic communications and
defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign audiences; and leader
and Soldier engagements to support both efforts (FM 3-0).
C-5. In general, advisors focus on information engagement because land operations occur among civilian
populations. Advisors can have a significant impact by focusing on this task. Advisors work with host-
nation counterparts to communicate information to the populace, build their trust and confidence in
friendly forces, promote popular support for friendly operations, and positively influence public
perceptions and behavior. Advisors integrate information engagement throughout the operations process.
C-6. Advisors ensure host-nation counterparts focus their information engagement activities on achieving
desired effects locally. However, land operations always occur in a regional and even global context.
Therefore, local information engagement activities must support and complement higher headquarters
information engagement activities, host-nation and U.S. government strategic communications guidance
(when available), and broader host-nation and U.S. government policy where applicable.
C-7. Three information engagement capabilities deserve particular attention as the advisor can directly
influence them. These are public affairs, combat camera, and leader and Soldier engagements.
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
C-1
Appendix C
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
C-8. First, public affairs can have a profound and lasting effect on public perceptions of operational
success or failure. This effect may have strategic consequences, even when related to tactical operations.
Therefore, advisors ensure that public affairs efforts are integrated at tactical, operational, and strategic
levels. (See paragraphs C-10 through C-20 for more information to help advisors working directly with the
media.)
COMBAT CAMERA
C-9. Second, combat camera is used to document a wide range of tactical and operational successes and to
counter enemy propaganda. If there is no dedicated host-nation combat-camera capability, the advisor
recommends that a host-nation soldier be designated, equipped, and trained for this function. If that is not
possible, the advisor should obtain a digital camera and, if necessary, photograph relevant host-nation
activities personally. Positive photographs can have a tremendous benefit, and digital photos are easily
taken and transmitted.
LEADER AND SOLDIER ENGAGEMENTS
C-10. Third, leader and Soldier engagements are a fundamental and highly effective method to influence
people. They involve face-to-face interaction by leaders and Soldiers to influence the perceptions of the
local populace. Military leaders engage key communicators and civilian leaders (often referred to as key
leaders) through carefully planned meetings. Examples of key leaders include local tribal elders, elected or
appointed officials, military and police commanders, and nongovernmental organization leaders.
WORKING WITH THE MEDIA
C-11. The appropriate public affairs officer normally manages media contacts. However, this is not always
possible. A deployed advisor team seldom has a public affairs officer representative.
C-12. Occasions may arise when the host-nation press wants to question advisors. Even if an advisor team
lacks a public affairs officer representative, advisors must avoid refusing to speak to the media. Apparent
refusal to speak with accredited members of the media, for whatever reason, may inadvertently create
strong negative impressions with strategic implications. Therefore, advisor teams designate a media
spokesperson and keep this individual well informed. This individual coordinates media contacts for the
advisor team. This individual ensures that official, published public affairs officer guidance and command
policies regarding media relations, including anonymity and operations security, are observed. The
following paragraphs provide general media relations guidance for advisor teams.
ENHANCING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MEDIA
C-13. Advisors strive to convey a positive impression and enhance relationships between the media and the
military. If deemed acceptable within the public affairs guidance and command policies, the advisor team’s
designated media spokesperson—
z
Maintains a list of reliable reporters and editors that cover operations in the team’s operational
area and keeps them informed of significant activities.
z
Answers media inquiries promptly, accurately, and courteously.
z
Finds out reporters’ deadlines and uses them to the friendly force’s advantage.
z
Stresses the human aspects of a story that readers, viewers, or listeners can identify with,
including the negative impact of opposing operations on the people.
z
Points out how advisors and host-nation counterparts are working to address the needs of the
unfortunate.
z
Encourages the media to observe constructive work the host nation and advisors are doing and
to interview them about their efforts.
z
Identifies a location in advance for the press to take photos and videos.
C-2
FM 3-07.1
1 May 2009
Information Engagement
CORRECTING PUBLIC MISCONCEPTIONS
C-14. If information is withheld, journalists often fall back on speculation. Such speculation is usually
inaccurate. However, it is often near enough to the truth that it is easily accepted by large sections of the
public and possibly by established governments. In addition, partisan sources may find it advantageous to
leak part of a story to the press to build up public support for their position. On occasion, such activities
can grow into fully orchestrated press campaigns.
C-15. With modern satellites and communications technology, media are able to distribute reports and
photographs extremely quickly. Incidents, sometimes fabricated or slanted toward a partisan viewpoint,
may be aired in living rooms across the globe the same day.
C-16. However, advisors and host-nation counterparts frequently can correct public misconceptions and
provide accuracy, adequate context, and proper characterization promptly. They can turn a potential
liability into a major advantage by remaining prepared to coordinate and communicate with the media.
They can take advantage of the media’s powerful and far-reaching ability to communicate with critical
audiences.
C-17. If the media report inaccurate or damaging information, advisors use caution in deciding on a course
of action. Advisors (usually through the team’s designated media spokesperson) inform their chain of
command. Advisors consider the following questions:
z
Is it important enough to correct or is it a detail that—in the long term—is not really important?
z
How damaging is the charge, criticism, or error? Will a correction simply give greater visibility
to an unfavorable point of view?
z
Is a correction worth a restatement of the entire problem to new audiences who did not read or
see it the first time?
z
Is it possible to target only the audience originally exposed to the story?
z
Can significant gain result from pointing out an error?
C-18. When incorrect or misleading information is released to the public through host-nation government
or media sources, the advisor team determines a course of action appropriate to the situation. It must
include a plan to ensure that relevant host-nation government officials and media recognize the inaccuracy
of the information. This may prevent future incidents. Operational and combat experience since 2001
shows that in the struggle for information superiority, friendly forces must be candid and honest.
Additionally, they must not allow lies disseminated by enemies to stand unchallenged, particularly in areas
of great international interest.
INTERVIEWS WITH ADVISOR TEAM MEMBERS
C-19. Advisor teams sometimes arrange for media interviews with selected advisor team members.
Properly conducted interviews can support the mission and even improve morale. When preparing for an
interview, the team’s designated spokesperson—
z
Provides all team members with a single and simple theme to convey to the press, sometimes in
the form of a mission narrative (a succinct account of the mission as a whole, explained
consistently with the host nation’s cultural view).
z
Conducts rehearsals in front of video cameras, using mock interviews to practice
communication of the theme.
z
Selects interviewees based on their understanding of the theme covered, not their comfort level
in front of a reporter. (Shyness is a normal trait that may add a human touch to a sensitive
situation.)
C-20. If an advisor team member does not know the answer to a reporter’s question, the individual should
attempt to find out and get back to the reporter or refer the reporter to an appropriate source. This may
establish the team as a helpful information source and develop a relationship for future balanced coverage.
C-21. Communicating with the media is the most difficult aspect of information engagement. Anything
advisors say or do publicly can impact the mission. Therefore, advisors ensure consistency with national
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
C-3
Appendix C
policy, professionalism, and clear communication. Advisors must know and follow the policies of the
geographic combatant commander, the American Embassy, and the appropriate public affairs officer
regarding media interviews. Additionally, advisors follow the specific guidelines shown in table C-1.
Table C-1. Specific guidelines for media interviews
Maintain a friendly, yet professional attitude.
Remain positive, greet interviewers, and welcome questions. (This is difficult under
stressful or tragic conditions; however, a calm, mature appearance earns respect from
audiences.)
Use language that is clear and easy to understand.
Avoid military jargon or terminology that others can misinterpret.
Never enter an interview unprepared.
Prepare notes and study them carefully; use facts to back up statements.
Ensure the facts supporting their position are up to date and come to mind easily.
Anticipate possible questions and think about various responses.
Rehearse before interviews on location if possible and, if time permits, role-play tough
questions.
Learn and use reporters’ names.
Research interviewers’ organizations, including—
„ The organizations’ views or views they defend.
„ Their underlying motivations.
„ How members of the organizations previously conducted interviews.
Keep the interests of the local nationals or other beneficiaries of the mission at the
forefront.
Avoid talking from the point of view of U.S. interests.
Finish answering one question before answering another if two or more questions are
asked at the same time.
Avoid speculation and give only factual information that can be verified.
Use caution in quoting statistics as such data may be easily disputed or reinterpreted.
Avoid repeating a question that contains incorrect information or inflammatory language
(this may result in a misquotation).
Strive to tell the truth.
Avoid saying no comment. (It gives the appearance the advisor has something to hide.)
If unsure of something, admit it rather than mistakenly lie.
If questioned about another agency’s activities, refer to that agency for comment.
Do not speak for other organizations.
Avoid exaggeration or claims that cannot be backed up.
Refuse all off-the-record discussions.
Expect any statement they make to be quoted publicly.
Avoid criticizing other groups or organizations, and avoid committing information
fratricide.
Remind reporters that photographing recognizable dead Soldiers, charts, maps, supply
depots, or electronic warfare assets is off limits.
Remind reporters that their personal security is not a primary military concern.
Remain objective and calm.
Demonstrate conduct befitting a representative the U.S. government
Never give personal opinions and beliefs.
Avoid reacting emotionally when interviewers appear skeptical or hostile.
Maintain focus on the mission.
C-4
FM 3-07.1
1 May 2009
Glossary
SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ABCA
American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies
Program
AR
Army regulation
BCT
brigade combat team
CCIR
commander’s critical information requirement
CERP
Commander’s Emergency Response Program
COA
course of action
COIST
company intelligence support team
DA
Department of the Army
DOD
Department of Defense
DODD
Department of Defense directive
DOS
Department of State
DOTMLPF
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, facilities
FM
field manual
FSF
foreign security forces
IDAD
internal defense and development
ISR
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
JP
joint publication
METT-TC
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations (mission variables)
MTT
military transition team
NSPD
national security Presidential directive
PIR
priority intelligence requirement
S-2
intelligence staff officer
S-3
operations staff officer
S-4
logistics staff officer
SFA
security force assistance
TC
training circular
UN
United Nations
US
United States
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
Glossary-1
Glossary
SECTION II - TERMS
foreign internal defense
(joint) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs
taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and
insurgency. (JP 3-05)
foreign military sales
(joint) That portion of United States security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from
the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that
the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. (JP 1-02)
*foreign security forces
Forces, including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border
police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel, that provide
security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization’s
mission.
host nation
(joint) A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or
NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 3-57)
humanitarian and civic assistance
(joint) Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with
military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States
Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions
is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country;
(2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of
basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance
must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local
populace. (JP 3-57)
internal defense and development
(joint) The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic,
social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. (JP 3-07.1)
international military education and training
(joint) Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a
nonreimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and
contractors. Instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational
publications; and media of all kinds. (JP 1-02)
security assistance
(joint) Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States
provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or
cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 3-57)
security force assistance
The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in
support of legitimate authority. (FM 3-07)
security sector reform
The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it
provides safety, security, and justice. (FM 3-07)
Glossary-2
FM 3-07.1
1 May 2009
References
Field manuals and selected joint publications are listed by new number followed by
old number.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
FM 1-02 (101-5-1). Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpcapstonepubs.htm.>
DOD 5105.38-M. Security Assistance Management Manual. 3 October 2003.
DODD 3000.05. Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations. 28 November 2005.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 September 2006.
JP 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 December 2003.
JP 3-07.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
30 April 2004.
JP 3-07.4. Joint Counterdrug Operations. 13 June 2007.
JP 3-57. Civil-Military Operations. 8 July 2008.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: <http://www.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/
Active_FM.html>. Army regulations are produced only in electronic media. Most are available online:
AR 11-31. Army International Security Cooperation Policy. 24 October 2007.
AR 12-1. Security Assistance, International Logistics, Training, and Technical Assistance Support
Policy and Responsibilities. 24 January 2000.
FM 3-0. Operations. 27 February 2008.
FM 3-05.137. Army Special Operations Forces Foreign Internal Defense. 30 June 2008.
FM 3-05.202 (FM 31-20-3). Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations. 2 February 2007.
FM 3-07. Stability Operations. 6 October 2008.
FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency. 15 December 2006.
FM 3-34.400 (FM 5-104). General Engineering. 9 December 2008.
FM 4-0 (100-10). Combat Service Support. 29 August 2003.
FM 4-02 (FM 8-10). Force Health Protection in a Global Environment. 13 February 2003.
1 May 2009
FM 3-07.1
References-1
References
FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.
FM 6-22 (22-100). Army Leadership. 12 October 2006.
FM 7-0. Training for Full Spectrum Operations. 12 December 2008.
FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009.
TC 31-73. Special Forces Advisor Guide. 2 July 2008.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
National Defense Strategy of 2008. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008.
<www.defenselink.mil/news/2008 National Defense Strategy.pdf>
National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
National Security Strategy of 2006. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006.
Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006.
Armed Forces. Title 10, U.S. Code. <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/federal/uscode.php >
Arms Export Control Act of 1976. <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide.php >
Foreign Relations and Intercourse. Title 22, U.S. Code.
Foreign Operations Appropriation Act of 1997. <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide.php >
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide.php >
National Security Presidential Directive 36. “United States Government Operations in Iraq.”
11 May 2004.
Charter of the United Nations. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ >
War Powers Act of 1973. <http://www.thecre.com/fedlaw/legal22/warpow.htm.>
OUTSIDE RECOMMENDED READING
von Steuben, Friedrick Wilhelm. Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United
States. Philadelphia: Styner and Cist, 1779.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
None
REFERENCED FORMS
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms
References-2
FM 3-07.1
1 May 2009

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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