FM 3-37 PROTECTION (SEPTEMBER 2009) - page 4

 

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FM 3-37 PROTECTION (SEPTEMBER 2009) - page 4

 

 

Appendix D
Operations Process
Operations Security
Risk Management
Activity
Action
Step
• Identify EEFI.
• Identify hazards.
• Analyze adversaries.
• Assess hazards.
PLANNING
• Analyze vulnerabilities.
• Develop controls and
• Assess risk.
make risk decisions.
PREPARATION/
• Apply appropriate
• Implement controls.
EXECUTION
OPSEC measures.
• Supervise and
ASSESSMENT
evaluate.
Figure D-1. Integration of OPSEC
Essential Elements of Friendly Information
D-6. The first element of hazard identification is to identify the EEFI. EEFI is the critical aspect of a
friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit
success of the operation, and, therefore, must be protected from enemy detection. (FM 3-0)
D-7. Identifying EEFI begins with the commander’s initial guidance during mission receipt. The OPSEC
officer recommends initial EEFI if the commander does not name any in the initial guidance. Several
sources can help determine information to recommend as EEFI, such as—
z
Commander’s guidance.
z
Intelligence estimate
(information about the enemy and enemy intelligence intentions and
capabilities).
z
Counterintelligence estimate produced by the G-2 analysis and control element (normally an
appendix to annex B of the OPORD or OPLAN or a tab to the intelligence estimate).
z
Higher headquarters security classification guide for the operation. The security classification
guide identifies classified information and EEFI related to the operation. It consists of sensitive
information since it names (by classification level) the operation’s most sensitive areas.
z
Laws and executive orders that require protection of unclassified controlled information.
D-8. The staff identifies possible EEFI and submits them for command approval. Once approved, the staff
develops OPSEC measures to shield EEFI from enemy collection systems. The EEFI differ from the CCIR;
however, they are on the same level as CCIR since they are approved by the commander and covered in the
base OPORD.
D-9. Facts, assumptions, and essential tasks may reveal EEFI that apply to the operation. In addition, each
COA may have EEFI that apply only to it. As the staff war-games a COA, the G-2 identifies friendly
information that, if known to adversaries, would allow them to counter the COA. The OPSEC officer adds
these elements of information to the EEFI for that COA and records them in the running estimate. Upon
COA approval, the EEFI for the approved COA become part of the EEFI for the operation.
D-10. When identifying EEFI, the OPSEC officer determines how long each element needs protection. Not
all elements of information need protection for the duration of an operation. Some elements need protection
only during specific events; others may not need protection until a branch or sequel is executed. Additional
EEFI may be added during the execution of a COA because of circumstances that were unknown when the
original EEFI were developed.
D-11. After identifying the EEFI, the OPSEC officer analyzes the enemy’s capability and intent to collect
friendly EEFI. The OPSEC officer also determines the enemy’s potential to determine friendly
vulnerabilities.
Enemy Capability and Intent
D-12. The second element of hazard identification is an analysis of the threat, summarized as most
dangerous and most likely. The most dangerous situation occurs when an enemy has the capability
D-2
FM 3-37
30 September 2009
Operations Security
(intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets) and intent to collect data from friendly vulnerabilities
and is able to determine EEFI. The most likely situation stems from how the enemy used its assets during
past operations. The G-2, G-3, and OPSEC officer analyze threat characteristics as part of IPB. Enemy
intentions and collection capabilities are identified by asking the following questions:
z
Who are the adversaries?
z
Who has the intent and capabilities to act against the planned operation?
z
What are probable enemy objectives?
z
What are likely enemy actions against friendly operations?
z
What information do adversaries already know?
z
What collection capabilities do adversaries possess or have access to by financial arrangement,
shared ideologies, or coordinated coalitions or alliances?
z
Which OPSEC indicators can be faked to deceive adversaries?
Friendly Vulnerabilities
D-13. The final element of hazard identification is to determine OPSEC vulnerabilities of an operation or
activity. It has two parts—identify OPSEC indicators and identify OPSEC vulnerabilities.
z
OPSEC indicator. An OPSEC indicator is a friendly detectable action or open-source
information that an enemy can interpret or piece together to derive EEFI. The G-2, G-3, and
OPSEC officer examine all aspects and phases of the operation to find OPSEC indicators. Then,
they compare them with the enemy targeting cycle and collection capabilities, considering these
questions:
„ What OPSEC indicators will friendly forces create during the operation?
„ What OPSEC indicators can the enemy actually collect?
„ What OPSEC indicators will the enemy be able to use to the disadvantage of friendly
forces?
Note. The answers to these questions identify OPSEC vulnerabilities.
z
OPSEC vulnerability. An OPSEC vulnerability is a condition in which friendly actions provide
OPSEC indicators that may be obtained and accurately evaluated by an enemy in time to provide
a basis for effective enemy decisionmaking. An OPSEC vulnerability exists when a threat can
collect information from an OPSEC indicator, correctly analyze the information, make a
decision, and take timely action to degrade friendly operations or place itself in an advantage
over friendly forces. Analyzing OPSEC vulnerabilities continues through all phases of the
operations process.
D-14. An OPSEC officer abides by the following methodology:
z
Examine each part of the operation, in coordination with the intelligence staff and other staff
elements, to find actions or information that will provide indicators in each area
(human
resources, logistics, communications, movement activities, aviation).
z
Compare the identified indicators with threat intelligence collection capabilities. One method is
to develop a mission timeline and identify anything along the timeline that the commander wants
protected.
z
Ensure that participants identify actions along the timeline that must be accomplished for the
mission to be accomplished.
z
Identify which must-be-accomplished actions can be indicators that a threat could use. Compare
each indicator with each threat collection capability. Where there is a match, there is
vulnerability.
D-15. An OPSEC vulnerability is a type of hazard related to EEFI. Unprotected OPSEC vulnerabilities
entail risk. CRM allows the OPSEC officer to integrate risk assessments from OPSEC vulnerabilities with
assessments of other risks. The OPSEC officer records OPSEC vulnerabilities and further analyzes them
during the next step.
30 September 2009
FM 3-37
D-3
Appendix D
STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS
D-16. The OPSEC officer begins hazard assessment by analyzing the OPSEC vulnerabilities identified
during mission analysis and COA development and then identifies possible OPSEC measures for each one.
The OPSEC officer concurrently assesses the risks posed by existing threats and OPSEC vulnerabilities.
This assessment has four parts:
z
Complete a hazard assessment for each OPSEC vulnerability.
z
Select one or more OPSEC measures to counter the OPSEC vulnerability.
z
Determine residual risk for each OPSEC vulnerability.
z
Decide which OPSEC measures to implement.
D-17. Some OPSEC measures may protect more than one OPSEC vulnerability. During assessment, the
OPSEC officer evaluates the sufficiency of standard security measures. This evaluation covers such areas
as personnel, physical, cryptographic, document, special access, and automated information systems
security and may include an OPSEC review. Continuing OPSEC measures in these areas may protect some
OPSEC vulnerabilities.
D-18. The OPSEC officer determines the residual risk for each OPSEC vulnerability after applying the
appropriate OPSEC measures. Residual risk is the level of risk remaining after controls have been
identified and selected for hazards. In this context, OPSEC measures are controls.
Note. See FM 5-19 for more information.
STEP 3. DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS
D-19. Risk assessment drives the development of appropriate controls to mitigate the risk. Planners strive
to develop OPSEC measures that shield OPSEC vulnerabilities and require the fewest resources. The most
desirable OPSEC measures provide the needed protection at the least cost to operational effectiveness.
D-20. OPSEC measures come in three forms:
z
Action control. Action control eliminates indicators or the vulnerability of actions to
exploitation by threat intelligence systems. OPSEC officers select the actions to undertake;
decide whether to execute actions (Weblog restrictions, trash control, mandatory use of secure
communications, OPSEC reviews); and determine the “who,” “when,” “where,” and “how” that
are necessary to accomplish the actions.
z
Countermeasures. Countermeasures disrupt effective threat information gathering or prevent
their recognition of indicators when processing collected materials. OPSEC officers use
diversions, camouflage, concealment, jamming, threats, police powers, and force against threat
information gathering and processing capabilities as countermeasures.
z
Counteranalysis. Counteranalysis is accomplished by using deception techniques, and it
prevents accurate interpretations of indicators during threat analysis of collected materials.
D-21. The OPSEC officer develops proposed OPSEC measures based on the hazard assessment. The cell
compares the residual risk with the risk posed by the OPSEC vulnerability if the OPSEC measure is not
executed. The difference forms an estimate of the benefit gained from the OPSEC measure. In deciding
which OPSEC measures to recommend, staffs consider questions such as—
z
What is the cost in terms of combat power if an OPSEC measure is employed?
z
Does the cost jeopardize mission success? The OPSEC officer may recommend a no-measures
alternative if cost outweighs the risk.
z
What is the risk to mission success if an OPSEC measure is not executed?
z
What is the risk to mission success if an OPSEC measure fails?
D-22. The OPSEC officer coordinates OPSEC measures as they are developed to minimize redundancy and
ensure that they do not create new OPSEC indicators. The OPSEC officer double-checks these factors
during the COA analysis. Coordination requirements may include—
z
Determining the effects of some OPSEC measures on public affairs operations.
z
Obtaining guidance on the termination of OPSEC measures.
D-4
FM 3-37
30 September 2009
Operations Security
z
Obtaining guidance on the declassification and public release of OPSEC-related activities.
z
Obtaining administrative and logistics support for OPSEC tasks.
z
Establishing OPSEC coordination and C2 measures.
z
Establishing assessment (monitoring and evaluation) mechanisms.
z
Submitting requests for information to support the assessment of protection tasks and systems.
z
Conducting OPSEC checks.
z
Arranging input for after-action reviews.
z
Arranging support of OPSEC-related communications requirements.
STEP 4. IMPLEMENT CONTROLS
D-23. The OPSEC officer submits appropriate OPSEC measures for command approval. These measures
may entail significant expenditures of time, resources, or personnel. Commanders normally approve
OPSEC measures during the COA approval. Approved OPSEC measures become OPSEC tasks. The
OPSEC officer determines the MOEs and MOPs for the OPSEC tasks, ensures that the OPLAN or OPORD
includes them, and arranges to assess them throughout preparation and execution. The G-3 directs the
execution of OPSEC measures through warning orders, OPORDs, or fragmentary orders.
D-24. After the commander approves OPSEC measures, the OPSEC officer monitors their implementation
and evaluates their MOP and MOE. The OPSEC officer adjusts measures, if necessary, based on this
assessment. The OPSEC officer coordinates the monitoring of OPSEC measures with the G-2 and
counterintelligence staffs so that the measures receive appropriate priority. Monitoring may generate
information requests, and the OPSEC officer passes these requests to the G-2 for inclusion in the collection
plan. Some requests may become priority information requirements.
D-25. Commanders continuously maintain OPSEC. Assessing OPSEC measures includes collecting lessons
learned. Most lessons arise while monitoring the execution of OPSEC measures, but others arise from an
evaluation of a completed operation or program.
STEP 5. SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE
D-26. OPSEC measures are supervised and evaluated continuously throughout the operations process.
Protection cell members stay alert for OPSEC indicators in their functional areas that may result in OPSEC
vulnerabilities. Continuous assessment contributes to refining OPSEC products.
Operations Security Review
D-27. The OPSEC review evaluates information or visual products to protect EEFI. A reviewed product
may be, but is not limited to, memorandums, e-mails, articles, academic papers, videos, briefings, contracts,
news releases, technical documents, plans, orders, responses to the Freedom of Information Act, Privacy
Act requests, Web pages, weblogs, or other visual or electronic media. ARs require the OPSEC officer to
review products related to U.S. government or military operations and other supporting programs before
release in the public domain. An OPSEC review is normally conducted with a public affairs review for the
release of official information to the public.
D-28. All staff sections review documents and automated information system logs to protect sensitive
information. SOPs should state which documents (news releases, Web pages, responses to Freedom of
Information Act and Privacy Act requests) automatically go to the OPSEC officer for review. They should
also provide standards for protecting, storing, and handling sensitive information and information systems.
When corrective action is necessary, such as an OPSEC assessment or review, the OPSEC officer provides
recommendations to the appropriate staff officer.
30 September 2009
FM 3-37
D-5
Appendix D
Operations Security Assessment
D-29. OPSEC assessments monitor an operation to determine the unit’s overall OPSEC posture. They
evaluate compliance of subordinate organizations with the OPSEC program, plan, or guidance. OPSEC
officers conduct OPSEC assessments and submit results and recommendations to the commander. They
normally assess the—
z
Identification of EEFI.
z
Unit personnel knowledge of EEFI.
z
Unit personnel knowledge of the collection threat.
z
OPSEC measures in place to protect identified critical information.
D-30. The following are some questions that OPSEC officers should ask to determine the status of OPSEC
in the command:
z
How often did subordinate commanders change daily movement plans?
z
How many times did commanders conduct similar attack patterns consecutively?
z
How many elements of EEFI were covered by two or more OPSEC measures?
z
How many collection efforts were targeted against EEFI?
z
How vulnerable was the friendly plan?
z
How many friendly OPSEC vulnerabilities were exploited by threat action?
z
How many times did threat detection disrupt friendly operations?
z
How many support facilities were protected from threat observation?
z
How many friendly operational movements were observed by threat overhead surveillance?
z
How often did OPSEC and deception planners coordinate actions?
z
How many OPSEC measures were selected based on the vulnerability analysis?
z
How many times did OPSEC planners have access to compartmented planning efforts?
z
How many times was OPSEC guidance received from higher headquarters?
z
Was the timing or location of routine actions changed at least weekly?
z
How many units were equipped with antisurveillance sensor and sensor jamming devices?
Operations Security Survey
D-31. The OPSEC officer completes the OPSEC survey in coordination with other staff members. This
survey determines if the command adequately protects EEFI. It analyzes the conduct of the operation to
identify sources of information, what the command discloses, and what can be derived from the
information. It aims to identify unprotected OPSEC vulnerabilities and helps the commander assess
OPSEC measures and adjust them if necessary.
D-32. Effective OPSEC surveys are resource-intensive and require careful planning, thorough data
collection, and thoughtful analysis. The OPSEC officer conducts surveys only when deemed necessary by
the commander and may execute an informal assessment to determine if a complete OPSEC survey is
needed.
Note. See AR 530-1 for more information.
Operations Security Estimate
D-33. The OPSEC officer maintains a running estimate to help supervise and evaluate OPSEC. A running
estimate is a staff section’s continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the
current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if future operations are
supportable. (FM 3-0)
D-6
FM 3-37
30 September 2009
Operations Security
D-34. The OPSEC estimate contains up-to-date, OPSEC-related information; and the OPSEC officer
updates it continuously throughout the operation. In a time-constrained environment, a current OPSEC
estimate may be the only readily available source of OPSEC-related information. The OPSEC estimate
contains—
z
Probable threat picture of friendly forces.
z
Threat collection capabilities.
z
Current EEFI.
z
OPSEC indicators.
z
OPSEC measures in effect.
z
Contemplated OPSEC measures.
30 September 2009
FM 3-37
D-7
Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions and other
selected terms. Terms for which FM 3-37 is the proponent manual (the authority) are
marked with an asterisk (*).
SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AA&E
arms, ammunition, and explosives
AC2
airspace command and control
ACP
air control point
ACR
Armored Cavalry Regiment
ADAM
air defense airspace management
ADW
air defense warning
AMD
air and missile defense
AML
area medical laboratory
AO
area of operations
AR
Army regulation
ARNG
Army National Guard
ARNGUS
Army National Guard of the United States
AT
antiterrorism
attn
attention
BAE
brigade aviation element
BCCS
battlefield command and control system
BCT
brigade combat team
BHL
battle handover line
C
confidential
C2
command and control
CA
civil affairs
CAIP
critical asset identification process
CAL
critical asset list
CARVER
criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and
recognizability
CAT
category
CBRN
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
CBT
combat
CCIR
commander’s critical information requirements
CIS
constant surveillance service (single noncleared driver)
30 September 2009
FM 3-37
Glossary-1
Glossary
CJCSI
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CMO
civil-military operations
CND
computer network defense
COA
course of action
CONUS
continental United States
CRM
composite risk management
CSC
convoy support center
CU
see you
DA
Department of the Army
DAL
defended asset list
DCIP
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
DDP
dual driver protective service (dual interim cleared drivers)
DISN
Defense Information Systems Network
DIV
division
DOD
Department of Defense
DODD
Department of Defense directive
DODI
Department of Defense instruction
DOS
Department of State
DP
decision point
DSCA
defense support of civil authorities
EA
engagement area
E. coli
Escherichia coli
EEFI
essential elements of friendly information
ENY
enemy
EO
explosive ordnance
EOD
explosive ordnance disposal
EXC
exclusive use of the vehicles
FEBA
forward edge of the battle area
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHP
force health protection
FM
field manual
FMI
field manual interim
FOB
forward operating base
FPCON
force protection condition
G
guard
G-2
assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3
assistant chief of staff, operations
G-5
assistant chief of staff, civil affairs
G-6
assistant chief of staff, signal
G-7
assistant chief of staff, information engagement
G-9
assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
Glossary-2
FM 3-37
30 September 2009
Glossary
HRP
high-risk personnel
IDN
initial distribution number
IE
information engagement
IED
improvised explosive device
IFF
identification, friend or foe
inc
incorporated
INFOCON
information operations condition
IPB
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISG
isolated Soldier guidance
ISR
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J3
Operations Directorate
JCOB
joint contingency operations base
JFIRE
A pocket-size, quick-reference guide for requesting fire support in
accordance with approved joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JP
joint publication
LRA
local reproduction authorized
ltd
limited
MANSCEN
Maneuver Support Center
MCG
mobile command group
MDMP
military decisionmaking process
MEB
maneuver enhancement brigade
METT-TC
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations
MND-B
multinational division-Baghdad
MOE
measure of effectiveness
MOP
measure of performance
MOPP
mission-oriented protective posture
MP
military police
MSHARPP
mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population, and
proximity
MSR
main supply route
NA
not applicable
NAI
named area of interest
NASAMS
Norweigian Advanced, Surface-to-Air Missile System
NDMS
National Disaster Medical System
NETOPS
network operations
NGO
nongovernmental organization
OAKOC
observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and
cover and concealment
OCONUS
outside the continental United States
OE
operational environment
OPLAN
operation plan
30 September 2009
FM 3-37
Glossary-3
Glossary
OPORD
operation order
OPSEC
operations security
P
pilferable
PATRIOT
Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept of Target
PIR
priorirty intelligence requirements
PL
phase line
PMESII-PT
political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical
environment, and time
PR
personnel recovery
PSS
protective security service (secret cleared drivers)
PVNTMED
preventive medicine
ROE
rules of engagement
RSO&I
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RSP
render-safe procedures
S
secret; screen
S-3
operations staff officer
S-4
logistics staff officer
S-6
signal staff officer
SATCOM
satellite communications
SEV
security escort vehicle service
SOP
standing operating procedure
SNS
satellite navigation system
SPT
support
STRATCOM
Strategic Command
SUST
sustainment
TAC
tactical
TCF
tactical combat force
TCP
traffic control post
TIM
toxic industrial material
TLP
troop-leading procedures
TOC
tactical operations center
TPS
transportation protective services
TRP
target reference point
TTP
tactics, techniques, and procedures
U
unclassified
UFC
unified facilities criteria
U.S.
United States
USAR
U.S. Army Reserve
USCENTCOM
U.S. Central Command
USNORTHCOM
U.S. Northern Command
UXO
unexploded ordnance
Glossary-4
FM 3-37
30 September 2009
Glossary
VA
vulnerability assessment
WFF
warfighting function
WMD
weapons of mass destruction
SECTION II - TERMS
*base camp
An evolving military facility that supports the military operations of a deployed unit and provides the
necessary support and services for sustained operations.
*critical asset list
A prioritized list of assets that should be protected; it is normally identified by the phase of an
operation and approved by the commander.
*critical asset security
The protection and security of personnel and physical assets and/or information analyzed and deemed
essential to the operation and success of the mission and the required resources for protection.
*defended asset list
A listing of those assets from the critical asset list, prioritized by the commander, to be defended with
the resources available.
*fratricide
The unintentional killing of friendly personnel by friendly firepower.
*operational area security
A form of active security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and
actions within an area of operations.
*operations security measures
Methods and means to gain and maintain essential secrecy about essential elements of friendly
information.
*protection
(Army) The preservation of the effectiveness of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel,
equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the
boundaries of a given operational area.
protection
(Joint) 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and
nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within
or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. 2. In space usage, active and passive defensive
measures to ensure that United States and friendly space systems perform as designed by seeking to
overcome an adversary’s attempts to negate them and to minimize damage if negation is attempted. (JP
3-11)
30 September 2009
FM 3-37
Glossary-5
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30 September 2009
References
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Title 5, United States Code, Section 552.
Title 5, United States Code, Section 552a.
Title 10, United States Code.
Title 10, United States Code. Section 331-335.
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1385.
Title 32, United States Code.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. DA forms are available on the
Army Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil). DD forms are available on the OSD web site
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DD Form 1833. Isolated Personnel Report (LRA).
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
AR 75-15. (O)Policy for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 22 February 2005.
AR 525-13. (O)Antiterrorism. 11 September 2008.
AR 530-1. (O)Operations Security (OPSEC). 19 April 2007.
FM 1. The Army. 14 June 2005.
FM 3-05.40. Civil Affairs Operations. 29 September 2006.
FM 3-34.170. Engineer Reconnaissance. 25 March 2008.
FM 3-52. Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone. 1 August 2002.
FM 3-100.4. Environmental Considerations in Military Operations. 15 June 2000.
FM 4-02. Force Health Protection in a Global Environment. 13 February 2003.
FM 4-30.51. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures. 13 July 2006.
FM 5-0. Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005.
FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.
FMI 2-01.301. Specific Tactics, techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield. 31 March 2009.
FMI 3-01.50. Air Defense and Airspace Management Cell Operations. 27 February 2007.
FMI 5-0.1. The Operations Process. 31 March 2006.
STRATCOM Directive 527-1. Operations, Planning, and Command and Control: Department of
Defense (DOD) Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) System Procedures.
27 January 2006.
TC 1-400. Brigade Aviation Element Handbook. 27 April 2006.
JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
DOD O-2000.12-H. (O)DOD Antiterrorism Handbook. 1 February 2004.
DOD 3020.45-V1. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP): DOD Mission-Based Critical
Asset Identification Process (CAIP). 24 October 2008.
30 September 2009
FM 3-37
References-3
References
DOD 3020.45-V2. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP): DCIP Remediation Planning.
28 October 2008.
DODI 2000.16. DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards. 2 October 2006.
DODI 3020.45. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management. 21 April 2008.
GTA 90-01-010. (O)Joint Contingency Operations Base (JCOB) Force Protection Handbook. October
2007.
JP 3-07.2. (O)Antiterrorism. 14 April 2006.
JP 3-13.3. Operations Security. 29 June 2006.
UFC 4-010-01. DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings. 8 October 2003.
UFC 4-010-02. DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff Distances for Buildings. 8 October 2003.
UFC 4-022-01. Security Engineering: Entry Control Facilities/Access Control Points. 25 May 2005.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Darley, William M. “Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Information Operations.” Joint Force
Quarterly. January 2006.
Hawley, John K., PhD. “PATRIOT Fratricides: The Human Dimension Lessons of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.” Air Defense Artillery. January-March 2006.
Riehn, Richard K. 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. New York: Penguin Classics, 1982. Published in Pelican Classics,
1968. This translation published by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd 1908. Von Krieg, published
1832.
Wong, Leonard and Gerras, Stephen. CU @ The FOB: How the Forward Operating Base is Changing
the Life of Combat Soldiers. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ >. March 2006.
Zucchino, David. Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad. New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 2004.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These readings contain relevant supplemental information.
Army Directive 2008-02. Army Protection. 9 April 2008.
References-4
FM 3-37
30 September 2009

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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