FM 3-11 MULTI-SERVICE DOCTRINE FOR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (JULY 2011) - page 3

 

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FM 3-11 MULTI-SERVICE DOCTRINE FOR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (JULY 2011) - page 3

 

 

Appendix A
effects. Military respirators and protective clothing may provide only limited protection against toxic
industrial chemicals and may perform better or worse than similar commercial equipment.
Note. For detailed information on toxic industrial chemical hazard exposure and response,
consult the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine Technical Guide
230, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Publication 2005-149, and the
U.S. Department of Transportation 2008 Emergency Response Guidebook.
A-4. When planning operations in areas where toxic materials may be present, the commander addresses
these potential hazards as part of the intelligence preparation of the operational environment. These hazards
could occur from a massive, deliberate or accidental release from an industrial site or a storage or transport
container. Particular emphasis should be placed on toxic industrial chemicals that produce acute effects
when inhaled because military respirators may not be effective. Commanders must be alert for potential
hazards and must monitor for their release.
A-5. Major rail transport, sea transfer, off-loading facilities, and production facilities may exist adjacent to
or near many military installations. The purposeful release of material from these facilities may adversely
impact military operations and personnel on the installation. The CBRN staff will use the most current
combatant commander-classified toxic industrial chemicals list, the hazardous chemicals list, and site
surveys to determine the priorities for protection against toxic industrial chemicals. Table A-1 identifies the
physiological action and hazard effect of chemical warfare agents and military chemical compounds that
are not considered to be chemical warfare agents.
Table A-1. Chemical hazards and potential employment
Category
Description
Common Agents by Group
A potentially lethal chemical agent that interferes with the
G Agents
transmission of nerve impulses. Listed on Schedule 1,
• Tabun (GA)
Chemical Weapons Convention, and considered key
• Sarin (GB)
WMD threats.
• Soman (GD)
Physiological Action
• Cyclosarin (GF)
Inhalation, ocular, and contact hazards. Nerve agents
V Agents
cause effects by inhibiting the enzyme cholinesterase,
• VX
which is essential to control nerve cells. While the same
• V-sub X (Vx)
effect is caused by organophosphate pesticides, nerve
agents are much more potent and may cause effects
within seconds and death within minutes. This category
Nerve
includes G and V agents that are less volatile (more
persistent) and more toxic than other nerve agents.
Chemical Hazard Effect
Target of Choice:
Persistent. Terrain, material, logistics, and C2
facilities.
Nonpersistent. Personnel.
Target Effects:
Persistent. Operations tempo reduction and mission
degradation; lethal or casualty-producing.
Nonpersistent. Immediate and lethal.
A-2
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Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Hazards
Table A-1. Chemical hazards and potential employment (continued)
Category
Description
Common Agents by Group
A chemical agent that injures the eyes and lungs and
Mustards
burns or blisters the skin. Listed on Schedule 1, Chemical
• Sulfur mustard (H)
Weapons Convention. Sulfur mustards and arsenicals are
• Distilled mustard (HD)
considered key WMD threats. Urticants are considered
• Nitrogen mustard (HN)
possible, but not highly likely, WMD.
• Thickened mustard (HT)
Physiological Action
Arsenicals
Sulfur mustard and arsenicals. Inhalation, ocular,
• Lewisite (L)
and contact hazard. Although sometimes referred to
as mustard gas, these relatively persistent chemical
• Mustard lewisite (HL)
warfare agents cause deoxyribonucleic acid
Urticants
(commonly known as DNA) changes at a cellular
• Phosgene oxime (CX)
level, resulting in delayed (hours) occurrence of
tissue damage to the eyes, lungs, and skin. Low
vapor exposures may only cause eye irritation;
Blister/
higher levels and liquid contact can result in
Vesicant
debilitating, fluid-filled blisters. While referred to as
burns, these effects are not like an acid burn.
Urticants. Inhalation, ocular, and contact hazard.
Not a true vesicant because they do not produce
blisters; instead, contact produces solid lesions and
tissue necrosis. The effect is somewhat similar to a
strong acid reaction.
Chemical Hazard Effect
Target of Choice: Persistent blister; personnel, terrain,
material, logistics, and C2 facilities.
Target Effects: Persistent blister; operations tempo
reduction and mission degradation; lethal or casualty-
producing.
A chemical compound, including the cyanide group, that
Cyanides
affects bodily functions by preventing the normal
• Cyanogen chloride (CK)
utilization of oxygen by body tissues. Also identified as
• Hydrogen cyanide (AC)
priority toxic industrial chemicals.
Other
Physiological Action
• Arsine (SA)
Inhalation hazard. Cyanides prevent the normal
Blood
transfer of oxygen from blood to body tissues. Arsine
causes hemolysis of red blood cells.
Chemical Hazard Effect
Target of Choice: Nonpersistent; personnel.
Target Effects: Nonpersistent; quick-acting casualty agent
that is potentially deadly.
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A-3
Appendix A
Table A-1. Chemical hazards and potential employment (continued)
Category
Description
Common Agents by Group
Agents that attack lung tissue (primarily causing
Phosgene (CG)
pulmonary edema), cause irritation to the eyes, and
Diphosgene (DP)
damage the respiratory tract. Also identified as priority
toxic industrial chemicals.
Physiological Action
Inhalation hazard. These chemicals attack and
damage lung tissue. At high levels, membranes
Choking
swell, lungs become filled with liquid (pulmonary
edema), and death results from the lack of oxygen,
thus choking an unprotected person. Fatalities of
this type are called dry-land drowning.
Chemical Hazard Effect
Target of Choice: Personnel.
Target Effects: Potentially lethal casualty agent.
A chemical agent that produces temporary disabling
Deliriant
conditions. Unlike those caused by riot control agents,
3-quinuclidinyl benzilate
effects can be physical or mental and persist for hours or
(BZ)
days after exposure to the agent has ceased. Not
Stimulant
generally considered likely WMD.
• Amphetamines
Physiological Action
• Cocaine
Incapacitating agents differ from other chemical warfare
• Metrazole
agents in that they are not designed to cause serious,
Depressant
Incapacitant
permanent or lethal effects. They are designed to interfere
• Morphine
with higher functions of the brain (attention, orientation,
judgment) to render individuals incapable of concerted
• Barbituates
efforts in the performance of assigned duties.
• Fentanyls
Chemical Hazard Effect
Psychedelic
• Lysergic acid
Target of Choice: Personnel.
diethylamide (LSD)
Target Effects: The inability to perform any military task
• Phencyclidine (PCP)
effectively.
Less-lethal lachrymatory (tearing) agents produced or
O-hlorobenzylidene (CS)
sold commercially and used by a variety of law
Dibenz (b,f)-1:4-oxazepine
enforcement personnel and military forces. Not
(CR)
considered chemical warfare agents or likely WMD.
Mace or tear gas (CN)
Physiological Action
Bormobenzylcyanide (CA)
Can rapidly produce sensory irritation or disabling
Capsaicin or pepper spray
physical effects that usually disappear within 15 minutes
(OC)
(tear gas) and up to 2 hours (pepper spray). Riot control
Riot Control
agents are of limited toxicity by design; however, some
Agent
are more toxic and/or persistent than others. For example,
Mace® or tear gas and bormobenzylcyanide are
particularly toxic and not in the U.S. military inventory.
Pepper spray is sold with varying potency.
Chemical Hazard Effect
Target of Choice: Personnel.
Target Effects: Short-term inability to perform tasks
effectively.
A-4
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Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Hazards
Table A-1. Chemical hazards and potential employment (continued)
Category
Description
Common Agents by Group
Previously referred to as “vomiting agents” although their
Chlorine (CI)
primary effect is irritation of the lungs and respiratory
Adamsite (DM)
tract. Chlorine is considered a chemical warfare agent
Diphenylchloroarsine (DA)
due to its prominent intentional use during World War I. It
Diphenylcyanoarsine (DC)
was also used in 2007 to intentionally cause harm during
conflicts in Iraq. Because of its toxicity and wide
commercial availability, chlorine is a priority, acutely toxic
industrial chemical. It is not considered to be a likely
WMD
Physiological Action
Lung/
Chlorine. Primarily lung irritants; highly volatile and
Respiratory
acutely toxic via inhalation.
Irritant
All others. The irritation effects (cough; burning in
nose, throat, and chest) are slightly delayed
(minutes) after exposure and can be followed with
systemic effects such as headaches, vomiting, and
diarrhea.
Chemical Hazard Effect
Target of Choice: Personnel.
Target Effects: Intended purpose is to penetrate the
canister, forcing personnel to remove their masks and be
exposed to more toxic materials.
Generated or projected particulants. Smoke and
Hexachloroethane (HC)
obscurants have long been employed by the military as a
White phosphorous (WP)
means of concealing battlefield targets. Smoke is an
Red phosphorous (RP)
aerosol that owes its ability to obscure to its composition
Fog oil smoke
of many small particles suspended in the air. These
particles scatter or absorb the light, reducing visibility.
Titanium tetrachloride (FM)
smoke
Physiological Action
Signaling smoke
Smoke/
Most smokes are not hazardous in the concentrations that
Obscurant
are useful for obscurant purposes. However, high
concentrations and long durations in smoke may be
hazardous to the eyes and respiratory tract.
Hazard Effect
Target of Choice: Personnel, terrain, infrastructure, and
buildings.
Target Effects: To conceal or obscure targets.
BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS
A-6. Biological agents are dispersed or employed as pathogens or toxins that cause disease in personnel,
animals, and plants. Pathogens require an incubation period to establish themselves in the body of a host
and produce disease symptoms. The onset of visible symptoms may occur days or weeks after exposure.
Some toxins can remain active for extended periods in the natural environment. This stability creates a
persistent transfer hazard. Unlike chemical, radiological, and nuclear hazards, biological hazards are
unpredictable; and it is difficult to classify the extent of the hazard.
A-7. The operational considerations for biological agents are—
z
Dissemination. Biological agents may be dispersed or deposited as aerosols, liquid droplets, or
dry powders. Live microorganisms usually grow in a moist environment; therefore, these agents
may be disseminated in a liquid medium as wet aerosols. However, microbiological materials
may also be stored and released in more stable powder mediums. In general, agents dispersed as
dry powder will survive longer than those dispersed as wet aerosols.
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A-5
Appendix A
z
Persistency. The persistency of biological agents varies greatly and depends on specific agent
characteristics and environmental conditions. These conditions include solar
(ultraviolet)
radiation, relative humidity, wind speed, and temperature gradient. Ultraviolet light accelerates
the decay of most biological agents. However, encapsulation or genetic engineering may protect
agents from natural decay and increase their persistency.
z
Immunization. All personnel must have current immunizations for the diseases known to exist
in the area where they are operating. Commanders must review the intelligence threat and
identify the biological warfare agents that are posing a threat in the current operational
environment. The knowledge of short- and long-term exposure effects of these biological
warfare agents is key because physiological symptoms may be indicators of biological hazards,
especially if accompanied by illness that is not due to a natural epidemic. Table A-2 outlines the
classification of biological agents.
Table A-2. Biological agents
Group
Description
Class
Description
Pathogens are also referred to as
Bacteria are microorganisms that
“infectious agents.” The primary
are capable of reproduction
biological warfare pathogens are
outside living cells. They may be
disease-causing bacteria, viruses,
found in almost any environment.
and rickettsia. These broad
Bacteria enter the body through
Bacteria
categories or classes include a
the lungs or digestive tract and will
variety of microorganisms that may
multiply and possibly incapacitate
be free-living or require host cells to
the host if proper treatment is not
replicate and persist. They enter the
provided. They often respond to
body through the lungs, digestive
antibiotics.
tract, skin, or mucous membranes of
Rickettsia are bacteria that are
body openings. Once they enter the
unable to multiply unless they are
body, they multiply and overcome the
inside a living cell. Most rickettsia
body’s natural defenses. Pathogens
Rickettsia
spread via insect vector.
are naturally occurring, and outbreaks
of disease may occur spontaneously
in specific regions of the world.
Pathogens
Certain pathogens, but not all of
them, may spread between people.
Viruses replicate inside a cell and
take over the cellular metabolism,
causing it to produce additional
viruses instead of normal cellular
activity. After producing hundreds
to thousands of virus particles, the
host cell is often destroyed as
these particles are released (a
Virus
process known as lysis). Viruses
are much smaller than bacteria,
ranging from 0.02-0.2 microns,
and normally do not respond to
antibiotics. Certain viruses may
respond to antiviral compounds,
but there are few of these
available.
A-6
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Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Hazards
Table A-2. Biological agents (continued)
Group
Description
Class
Description
Toxins are essentially chemical
Neurotoxins disrupt nerve
poisons that are produced by, or
impulses. Like nerve agents,
extracted from, living organisms
Neurotoxin
neurotoxins may cause paralysis
(bacteria, fungi, animals). Some
or convulsive seizures that lead to
microbial toxins are only released or
coma and death.
created once the microorganism has
Cytotoxins destroy cells by
been internalized/metabolized in the
disrupting cell respiration and
human body. Toxins exert their lethal
metabolism. They may cause
or incapacitating effects by interfering
vomiting, diarrhea, choking,
with certain cell and tissue functions.
Toxin
blistering, radiation-like
They can produce a wide variety of
symptoms, weakness, coma, and
signs and symptoms that are often
death.
similar to those associated with
Cytotoxin
exposure to chemical agents. While
toxins cannot spread from person to
person, their toxicity can be much
greater than that of nerve agent VX,
the most toxic chemical warfare
agent. Botulinium is considered one
of the most toxic substances known.
RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS
A-8. The Services are responsible for enforcing precautions and establishing tactics, techniques, and
procedures for handling conventional munitions that employ radioactive materials, such as depleted
uranium. This includes enforcing standards that protect personnel against alpha particle inhalation and
ingestion and external beta, gamma, and neutron exposure. In addition, dangerous levels of radiation can
result from damaged industrial radiation hazard areas. Due to the downwind hazards that such damage can
produce, avoidance is the most effective individual and unit protective measure against industrial radiation
hazards.
NUCLEAR HAZARDS
A-9. The severity of nuclear hazards depends on the weapon yield, emission spectrum, and distance to the
target. Residual radiation effects are due to emissions (typically, alphas, betas, and low-energy gammas)
from fission fragments
(heavy atom products produced during fission) and activated environmental
materials (material that absorbs radiation and become radioactive itself). Collectively, these sources are
called fallout. Table A-3, page A-8, shows the typical effects of nuclear weapons.
Note. See Multiservice Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance for more information on nuclear hazards.
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A-7
Appendix A
Table A-3. Nuclear weapons effects
Source
Target Effects
Blast
Crushes, deforms, tumbles, shocks, and creates missiles and
obstacles.
Thermal radiation
Causes fires, burns, and eye damage.
Electromagnetic pulse and
Causes permanent or temporary impairment of electrical, electro-
high-altitude, electromagnetic
optical, and electronic equipment.
pulse
Transient radiation
Affects electronics systems and associated circuitry, including radios
and computers. Through a high-altitude, low-yield surface or a near-
surface (low-air) burst, transient radiation may reach targets that are
not damaged by blast and thermal radiation.
Ionizing radiation
Can destroy human cells and lead to severe illness or death due to
acute radiation doses from initial or residual radiation. Intense
ionizing can damage objects, including optical, mechanical, and
electronic components by altering their physical properties.
Potassium iodine
May be used to protect the thyroid from radioactive iodine in the
event of an accident or attack at a nuclear power plant or another
nuclear attack, especially where volatile radionuclides (which contain
significant amounts of iodine 131) are released into the environment.
Fallout
Can remain at lethal levels for extended periods of time. Ionizing
radiation and electromagnetic pulse produce residual radiation.
Radioactive material dispersal creates widespread hazards and limits
military operations.
A-8
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Appendix B
Treaties and Agreements
The proliferation environment is dynamic, and proliferation activities are influencing
the CWMD agenda. Alone, the United States cannot prevent the proliferation of
CBRN capabilities, but we have achieved significant reductions by supporting
international policies and participating in international agreements and treaties and
multilateral initiatives. For example, because illicit trafficking in CBRN materials
represents a serious threat to the security of individual states and the international
community, treaties such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Chemical
Weapons Convention have been established to provide international standards by
which the global community can gauge and address the activities of potential
proliferators. The Armed Forces of the United States support these policies and
strategies within their respective roles and functions. They plan and conduct
operations to overcome complex simultaneous challenges involving adversaries who
may be armed with CBRN weapons and pose threats to homeland security and
CONUS and OCONUS military forces and installations. While any given threat or
operation may be focused in a particular overseas region, the adversary may have the
motivation and means to extend the conflict to other regions, including U.S. territory.
This appendix contains brief descriptions of treaties, legal statutes, and policy
strictures on the proliferation, testing, possession, and employment of CBRN
weapons.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
B-1. Arms control and nonproliferation treaties and regimes establish global norms against
the
proliferation of WMD precursors, weapons, their means of delivery, and weapons-manufacturing
equipment. Currently, there are 187 state parties that are members of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. The Chemical
Weapons Convention does not prohibit the production, processing, consumption, or trade of related
chemicals for peaceful purposes; but it does establish a verification regime to ensure that such activities are
consistent with the objective and purpose of the treaty.
B-2. The Chemical Weapons Convention is enforced through the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons, which ensures that all state parties adhere to the articles of the convention and follow
the constraints outlined in the articles. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons monitors
elimination operations or the transformation of chemical production facilities and chemical weapons
stockpiles.
B-3. The Chemical Weapons Convention is the first multilateral arms control and nonproliferation treaty
to widely affect the private sector. Although the United States does not manufacture chemical weapons and
is in the process of destroying its stockpile, it does produce, process, consume, export, and import a number
of dual-use toxic chemicals and precursors that can be used to produce chemical weapons. The U.S.
companies who are engaged in activities involving these chemicals may be required to submit declarations
and/or reports to the Bureau of Industry and Security and may be subject to inspection by the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In addition, trade in certain chemicals with states who are not
party to the Chemical Weapons Convention may be prohibited or subject to an export license and/or end-
use certificate.
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B-1
Appendix B
B-4. The Chemical Weapons Convention lists 24 articles that all state parties must follow and declare to
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Table B-1 lists the articles included in the
Chemical Weapons Convention. Figure B-2, page B-3, provides key excerpts from selected articles to
demonstrate the validity and strength of the convention as an important tool for the enforcement of the
nonproliferation of WMD and WMD elimination.
Note. For more information, see the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Web
site at
<http://www.opcw.org/> or the Chemical Weapons Convention
Web
site
at
Table B-1. Articles of the Chemical Weapons Convention
Article
Title
Article I
General Obligations
Article II
Definitions and Criteria
Article III
Declarations
Article IV
Chemical Weapons
Article V
Chemical Weapons Production Facilities
Article VI
Activities not Prohibited Under This Convention
Article VII
National Implementation Measures
Article VIII
The Organization
Article IX
Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding
Article X
Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Weapons
Article XI
Economic and Technological Development
Article XII
Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure
Compliance, including Sanctions
Article XIII
Relation to Other International Agreements
Article XIV
Settlement of Disputes
Article XV
Amendments
Article XVI
Duration and Withdrawal
Article XVII
Status of the Annexes
Article XVIII
Signature
Article XIX
Ratification
Article XX
Accession
Article XXI
Entry into Force
Article XXII
Reservations
Article XXIII
Depositary
Article XXIV
Authentic Text
B-2
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Treaties and Agreements
ARTICLE I. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or
indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State
Party under this Convention.
ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. “Chemical Weapons” means the following, together or separately:
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic
properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result
of the employment of such munitions and devices;
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions
and devices specified in subparagraph (b).
2. “Toxic Chemical” means:
Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of
their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in
munitions or elsewhere.
(For the purpose of implementing this Convention, toxic chemicals which have been identified for the
application of verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.)
3. “Precursor” means:
Any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic
chemical. This includes any key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system.
(For the purpose of implementing this Convention, precursors which have been identified for the
application of verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.)
ARTICLE IV. CHEMICAL WEAPONS
3. All locations at which chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 are stored or destroyed shall be
subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, in
accordance with Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex.
4. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under Article III, paragraph 1 (a), has been
submitted, provide access to chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 for the purpose of systematic
verification of the declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State Party shall not remove
any of these chemical weapons, except to a chemical weapons destruction facility. It shall provide
access to such chemical weapons, for the purpose of systematic on-site verification.
5. Each State Party shall provide access to any chemical weapons destruction facilities and their
storage areas, that it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control,
for the purpose of systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site
instruments.
Figure B-2. Chemical Weapons Convention extracts
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B-3
Appendix B
ARTICLE V. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES
1. The provisions of this Article and the detailed procedures for its implementation shall apply to any
and all chemical weapons production facilities owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located
in any place under its jurisdiction or control.
4. Each State Party shall cease immediately all activity at chemical weapons production facilities
specified in paragraph 1, except activity required for closure.
5. No State Party shall construct any new chemical weapons production facilities or modify any existing
facilities for the purpose of chemical weapons production or for any other activity prohibited under this
Convention.
8. Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 and
related facilities and equipment, pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with an agreed
rate and sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as “order of destruction”). Such destruction
shall begin not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it, and shall finish not later
than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A State Party is not precluded from destroying
such facilities at a faster rate.
11. Each State Party, during the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, shall assign the
highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each State Party
shall destroy chemical weapons production facilities in accordance with its national standards for safety
and emissions.
14. The chemical weapons production facility shall be converted in such a manner that the converted
facility is not more capable of being reconverted into a chemical weapons production facility than any
other facility used for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful
purposes not involving chemicals listed in Schedule 1.
ARTICLE X. ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS
1. For the purposes of this Article, “Assistance” means the coordination and delivery to States Parties of
protection against chemical weapons, including, inter alia, the following: detection equipment and alarm
systems; protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes and
treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State Party to conduct
research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection against chemical
weapons, for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of
protection against chemical weapons.
Figure B-2. Chemical Weapons Convention extracts (continued)
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
B-5. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, more commonly known as the
Biological Weapons Convention, bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, and retention
of microbial or other biological agents or toxins in types and quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment, and means of
delivery that are designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. Currently,
there are 171 state parties who are signatories to the Biological Weapons Convention, with 155 ratifications
and accessions.
B-4
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Treaties and Agreements
B-6. The Biological Weapons Convention entered into force on 26 March 1975, reaffirming the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 that prohibits the use of bacterial poisonous gases and liquids during warfare conflicts and
maintains strict compliance. The Biological Weapons Convention text is shown in figure B-3.
Note. For a complete list of articles and state parties and additional information, see the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Web site at <http://www.opbw.org/>.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on Their Destruction
Signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.
Entered into force on 26 March 1975.
Depositaries: UK, US and Soviet governments.
The States Parties to this Convention,
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament,
including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the
prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons
and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and
conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to
mitigating the horrors of war,
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply
strictly with them,
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the
principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925,
Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the
international atmosphere,
Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the United Nations,
Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures,
such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,
Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a
first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the
development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that
end,
Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents
and toxins being used as weapons,
Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared
to minimize this risk,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or
otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in
armed conflict.
Figure B-3. Biological Weapons Convention text
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Appendix B
Article II
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible
but not later than nine months after entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment
and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction
or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to
protect populations and the environment.
Article III
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly,
and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to
manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified
in article I of this Convention.
Article IV
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary
measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents,
toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of
such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.
Article V
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems
which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.
Consultation and Cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international
procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.
Article VI
(1) Any State Party to this convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations
deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United
Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its
consideration by the Security Council.
(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the
Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis
of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention
of the results of the investigation.
Article VII
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United
Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such
Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.
Article VIII
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed
by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.
Article IX
Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons
and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on
effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction,
and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the
production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.
Figure B-3. Biological Weapons Convention text (continued)
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Article X
(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do
so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to
the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for
prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.
(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or
technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful
bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) and toxins
and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
Article XI
Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State
Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention
and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.
Article XII
Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the
Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties
to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to
assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions
concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new
scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.
Article XIII
(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties
to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include
a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Article XIV
(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention
before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may accede to it at any time.
(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments
of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the
Depositary Governments.
(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two
Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.
(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of
this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each
signature, the date of deposit or each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of entry into force of
this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.
(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of
the United Nations.
Article XV
This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall
be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding states.
Figure B-3. Biological Weapons Convention text (continued)
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Appendix B
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
B-7. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons aims to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons and weapons technology, to foster the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of
disarmament. The treaty establishes a safeguard system under the responsibility of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, which also plays a central role under the treaty in areas of technology transfer for peaceful
purposes. Figure B-4 lists key excerpts from this treaty.
Note. For a full list of all 15 articles , see the International Atomic Energy Agency Web site at
ARTICLE I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such
weapons or explosive devices.
ARTICLE II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer
or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices.
ARTICLE III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an
agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with
the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or
special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility
or is outside any such facility.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b)
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special
fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.
Figure B-4. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons extracts
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY
B-8. A comprehensive test ban treaty is the cornerstone of the international regime on the nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons and the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. The test ban will constrain the
development and qualitative improvement of current nuclear weapons and the development of new nuclear
weapons. It also mandates a broad, thorough monitoring regime with an intrusive verification regime that
permits on-site inspections if treaty breaches are suspected. The comprehensive test ban treaty prohibits all
nuclear explosions for military or civilian purposes in all environments. The treaty opened for signature in
New York on 24 September 1996; it was signed by 71 states, including five of the eight states that were
nuclear-capable at that time.
B-9. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization has
oversight of the treaty and is responsible for establishing the global verification regime. The verification
regime consists of an international monitoring system that is supported by an international data center. The
monitoring system comprises a network of 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories that
monitor the earth for the evidence of nuclear explosions.
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B-10. At the time of this publication, the treaty has been signed by 180 states and ratified by 146. The
United States has signed the treaty, but has not ratified it. There is an ongoing debate of whether or not the
United States should ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty.
Note. For current information on the number of signatories and ratifications, see the
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Web
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
B-11. The Proliferation Security Initiative is a global initiative that is aimed at stopping shipments of
WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The initiative was announced by President
George W. Bush on 31 May 2003 in response to the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction, which was issued in December 2002. That strategy recognizes the need for more robust tools
to defeat the worldwide proliferation of WMD and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where
greater focus will be placed.
B-12. In September
2003,
11 countries agreed to and published the Interdiction Principles for the
Proliferation Security Initiative. This set of principles identifies specific steps for effectively interdicting
WMD shipments and preventing proliferation facilitators from engaging in this deadly trade. Participation
in the Proliferation Security Initiative is voluntary, and support for the Proliferation Security Initiative is an
acknowledgment of the need for stronger measures to defeat proliferators through cooperation with other
countries.
B-13. The Proliferation Security Initiative is a set of activities, not a formal treaty-based organization. It is
best understood as a set of partnerships that establishes the basis for cooperation on specific activities when
the need arises. It does not create formal obligations for participating states, but does represent a political
commitment to establish best practices to stop proliferation-related shipments.
B-14. The goal of the Proliferation Security Initiative is to create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive
approach to preventing proliferation to or from nation-states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern.
Actions will be taken in support of the Proliferation Security Initiative, consistent with national legal
authorities and relevant international laws and frameworks. The Proliferation Security Initiative seeks to
use existing authorities—national and international—to defeat proliferation.
B-15. The Proliferation Security Initiative focuses on establishing greater coordination among its partner
states and promoting readiness to act effectively when a particular action is needed. Actual interdictions
will likely involve only a few Proliferation Security Initiative participants with geographic and operational
access to a particular Proliferation Security Initiative target of opportunity. Interdiction training exercises
and other operational efforts will help states work together in a more cooperative, coordinated, and
effective manner to stop, search, and seize shipments.
Note. For more information about the Proliferation Security Initiative, see the U.S. Department
of State’s Web site at <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm>.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AGREEMENTS
B-16. NATO is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe who are committed to fulfilling
the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed on 4 April 1949. NATO provides a forum in which
the United States, Canada, and European countries can consult together on security issues of common
concern and take joint action in addressing them.
B-17. NATO’s military structure is a multinational force planning, organization, and command system. It
provides joint planning, training, exercising, and operations under the command of NATO’s strategic
commanders. As the nature of threats change, NATO is reorienting its defense capabilities toward today’s
threats by adapting its forces and developing new, multinational approaches to deal with terrorism, failed
states, and other security threats such as WMD. All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after
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Appendix B
discussion and consultation among member countries. Consensus decisionmaking means that there is no
voting at NATO; consultations continue until a decision is reached that is acceptable to everyone.
B-18. Extensive efforts are made to improve cooperation and to eliminate duplication in the research,
development, production, procurement, and logistics support of defense systems, primarily through the use
of STANAGs. Standardization makes a vital contribution to the combined operational effectiveness of the
military forces of the alliance and enables the exploitation of opportunities to make better use of economic
resources. STANAGs are developed and promulgated by the NATO Military Agency for Standardization in
conjunction with the Conference of National Armaments directors and other authorities concerned.
B-19. The implementation of STANAGs helps countries achieve required levels of interoperability; better
accomplish their common strategic, operational, and tactical tasks; understand and execute command
procedures; and employ techniques and materiel more efficiently.
B-20. The principal forum for the elaboration of standardization policy is the NATO Standardization
Organization, which aims to incorporate standardization as an integral part of alliance planning and acts as
a coordinator between senior NATO bodies addressing standardization requirements. The NATO
Standardization Organization comprises the NATO Committee for Standardization, NATO Standardization
Staff Group, and NATO Standardization Agency. The NATO Standardization Organization’s role is to
enhance interoperability and contribute to the ability of alliance forces to train, exercise, and operate
effectively, together and with the forces of partner countries and other non-NATO countries, in the
execution of their assigned tasks.
Note. For current information on STANAGs, visit the NATO Web site at <http://www.nato.int/
docu/standard.htm>.
QUADRIPARTITE STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT
B-21. The American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies’ Program has been in place
since 1947 and is instrumental to ensuring interoperability and commonality of equipment among the
program’s forces. In terms of nonproliferation to combat WMD, counterproliferation to combat WMD, and
consequence management, gathering and sharing information and intelligence among strategically located
member states clearly supports the three pillars of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Today, the focus of the program is on interoperability—the ability of alliance forces, and
when appropriate, forces of partner and other nations, to train, exercise, and operate effectively together in
the execution of assigned missions and tasks.
B-22. The mission of the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Program is to optimize
interoperability through cooperation and collaboration in the continuous pursuit of standardization and
mutual understanding in order to integrate the capabilities of the program armies in multinational
operations. The benefits are being realized through enormous cost savings in all of the armies and in the
increased operational readiness rates for deployed military personnel. Although this effort has been aimed
at interoperability and commonality among the armies, several activities that originated under the
Quadripartite Working Group have been expanded to include interoperability among all NATO nations.
Note. For more information, see the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Program
AIR AND SPACE INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL
B-23. The Air and Space Interoperability Council, formed in 1948 and previously known as the Air
Standardization Coordinating Committee, is an active and productive international organization that works
for the air forces of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States of
America. Its principal objective is to ensure that member nations are able to fight side by side as airmen in
joint and multinational operations. The Air and Space Interoperability Council objectives are achieved by
the standardization of doctrine, operational procedures, material, and equipment. The council also
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Treaties and Agreements
exchanges technical information and arranges the free loan of equipment between member nations for test
and evaluation purposes. The results of these tests are usually distributed to all member nations.
Note. For more information, see the Air and Space Interoperability Council Web site at
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND HERBICIDES
B-24. Since the end of the Cold War, conflicts have become increasingly intrastate, and civilians and
combatants have become far more intermixed. In order to be prepared for the full spectrum of conflict, the
U.S. military and law enforcement officers must be equipped and trained to deal with nonstate actors and
their tactics. The pressure to do this in a humane way logically leads to a desire for nonlethal weapons. The
development and use of nonlethal weapons is a legitimate approach to this new security environment and
military structure. Chemical-derived riot control agents represent one type of nonlethal weapon.
B-25. Commanders must clearly understand the appropriate uses of riot control agents and herbicides,
especially in light of their classification under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Combatant
commanders must be aware of the views of states that are party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and
anticipate the potential impact of the use of riot control agents and herbicides by U.S. forces. The Chemical
Weapons Convention states that the use of riot control agents is acceptable for law enforcement activities.
The definition of law enforcement should mean domestic law enforcement within the recognized, sovereign
borders of a country and activities undertaken in conjunction with a United Nations mandate. In other
words, riot control agents should only be used in a state’s own jurisdiction, unless otherwise deemed
permissible by the United Nations. All other use must be deemed an act of warfare, which is specifically
prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention. The use of riot control agents is not limited or restricted
under other conditions, such as training and peacetime riot control around U.S. bases and installations.
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND HERBICIDES POLICY
B-26. The global community classifies riot control agents as chemical agents that are prohibited under the
terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention
in April 1997; however, we do not consider riot control agents to be chemical agents. The United States
maintained this position consistently throughout Chemical Weapons Convention negotiations, and our
position is understood by the global community. The use of herbicides in war or military combat operations
is also prohibited and requires Presidential approval for domestic use to control vegetation on U.S. bases
and installations and around immediate defensive perimeters.
B-27. A riot control agent is any chemical not listed in a schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans
sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of
exposure. The point that a riot control agent must be classified as a chemical is not included in the
schedules published by the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons. These schedules essentially classify chemicals according to their toxicity and dual-use
applicability in order to prevent their use as weapons. For example, a Schedule 1 chemical is toxic and has
little to no industrial application, whereas a Schedule 3 chemical can be weaponized and has a broad
peaceful application.
B-28. The United States renounces the first use of riot control agents in war except when they are used
defensively to save lives. The use of riot control agents is not governed by the same policy as chemical
agents. Riot control agents are not used to injure or kill, and their effects are short-lived; consequently,
situations arise when using them is more appropriate than using conventional weapons.
B-29. The United States also renounces the first use of herbicides in war except when they are used to
control vegetation on U.S. bases and installations. Herbicides can also be used around the immediate
defensive perimeters to clear observation and fields of fire. They have the potential to destroy food
production and defoliate large areas.
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Appendix B
B-30. Presidential Executive Order 11850 (figure B-5) prescribes policy for the use of chemical herbicides
and riot control agents. Commanders should consult their legal advisors on the implementation of this
policy on a case-by-case basis.
Executive Order 11850—Renunciation of certain uses in war of chemical herbicides and riot control
agents
The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides in war except use, under
regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or
around their immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive
military modes to save lives such as:
(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control,
to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian
casualties can be reduced or avoided.
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and
passengers, and escaping prisoners.
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys
from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations.
I have determined that the provisions and procedures prescribed by this Order are necessary to ensure
proper implementation and observance of such national policy.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by
the Constitution and laws of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed
Forces of the United States of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless
such use has Presidential approval, in advance.
Section 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to
ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United
States.
(Signed)
GERALD R. FORD
President of the United States
8 April 1975
Figure B-5. Executive Order 11850
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Appendix C
Basic Standards of Proficiency
Service commanders and their staffs at the tactical level must be capable of surviving
CBRN attacks and continuing operations in hazardous conditions. This appendix
discusses the basic standards of proficiency delineated in STANAG
2150 for
individuals, selected personnel, CBRN staff, commanders, and organizations. This
appendix also discusses the medical CBRN training requirements established in 2004
under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.
Note. This appendix is the implementation of standards of proficiency as it reads in
STANAG 2150.
BASIC STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR INDIVIDUALS
C-1. Individuals must be trained in the concepts of CBRN defense in order to survive a CBRN-related
attack and contribute to the survivability and operating proficiency of the organization in a CBRN
environment. Individual standards of proficiency include basic—
z
Survival standards. Survival standards are those that the individual must master in order to
survive a CBRN attack.
z
Operating standards. Operating standards are those that the individual must master in order to
contribute to the continued operation of the organization as a whole under CBRN conditions.
C-2. Service members receive initial CBRN defense training upon entering military service and receive
refresher training at regular intervals thereafter. DOD support personnel receive basic survival training and
the training necessary to support commanders and sustain in a CBRN environment.
C-3. Table C-1, page C-2, provides the basic survival and operating standards for military personnel and
DOD support personnel who must perform under CBRN conditions.
Note. Additional information may be found in Service-specific regulations and publications.
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Appendix C
Table C-1. Individual standards of proficiency
Basic Survival Standards
Recognize indications of a possible CBRN attack or unintentional release, and take appropriate protective
action.
Recognize and give CBRN alarms and signals.
Recognize indications of a chemical, biological, or radiological hazard; and take appropriate protective
action according to associated standing operating procedures.
Properly don, seat, clear, and check a respirator or protective mask within 9 seconds and complete the
adjustment and/or attachment of the hood (if available) within 6 seconds (for a total of fifteen 15 seconds)
following an alarm or recognition of a chemical or biological attack.
Properly don protective clothing, and properly perform assigned missions.
Take appropriate protective measures against thermal radiation (light, flash, and heat), blast wave, and
nuclear radiation effects of a nuclear explosion.
Complete the immediate individual decontamination drill, and follow procedures for the removal of
contaminated CBRN individual protective equipment.
Recognize contaminated casualties, and perform first aid (self-aid and buddy aid).
Practice good personal health and hygiene as a protective measure against the spread of disease.
Basic Operating Standards
Maintain CBRN individual protective equipment in a high state of serviceability at all times.
Be proficient in taking specific actions required to maintain operating efficiency before, during, and after a
CBRN attack in order to mitigate the effects of CBRN weapons.
Recognize or detect chemical-agent contamination; and perform immediate decontamination of self,
clothing, personal equipment, individual weapon and position, vehicles, and crew-served equipment.
Recognize standard marking signs that indicate areas with chemical, biological, or radiological
contamination.
Cross or bypass marked CBRN-contaminated areas with minimum personal danger.
Demonstrate proficiency in performing primary military duties, to include the use of crew/personal
weapon(s), while wearing individual protective equipment for extended periods.
Be familiar with decontamination procedures that are specific to the branch of military service.
Be familiar with the principles of collective protection, including passage through contamination control
areas. (For detailed application, see STANAG 2515.)
Demonstrate familiarity with available equipment, such as dosimeters and chemical and biological
detection and monitoring equipment.
ADDITIONAL STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR SELECTED
PERSONNEL
C-4. To accomplish operational tasks beyond the scope of mere survival, selected personnel require
training in addition to that required for individuals, but less than that required for specialists. Additional
training supports leadership activities and such tasks as CBRN monitoring, survey, reconnaissance, and
contamination control. Personnel who require additional training include the following:
z
Aircrews, rescue and survival personnel, and ground personnel are required to know the correct
use of their CBRN ensemble, CBRN protection for air personnel, and donning and doffing the
equipment as outlined in STANAGs 2515 and 3497.
z
All military personnel are required to have knowledge appropriate to their rank and operational
role in addition to the previously identified individual requirements.
z
All DOD civilian staff and support personnel are required to have the necessary knowledge,
skills, and abilities appropriate to their position or duties in support of the tactical command.
C-5. Table C-2 identifies additional standards of proficiency for selected personnel. These are in addition
to the basic standards outlined above.
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Basic Standards of Proficiency
Table C-2. Additional standards of proficiency for selected personnel
Additional Standards for CBRN Monitoring, Survey, and Reconnaissance Personnel
Perform operational decontamination of supplies, equipment, and areas for which they are responsible in
the performance of their primary duties.
Operate and maintain assigned decontamination equipment.
Establish and operate a personnel decontamination station, where applicable.
Take measures before an attack to prevent contamination and after an attack to avoid the spread of
contamination.
Operate and maintain CBRN specialist equipment that is applicable to the task.
Recognize CBRN attacks and unintentional releases, and fully understand organizational procedures for
implementing warnings and providing protection.
Detect and identify CBRN contamination, and organize and conduct CBRN-related monitoring and survey
operations.
Monitor personnel, food, drinking water, and equipment for CBRN contamination and the effectiveness of
decontamination measures.
Collect samples of suspected biological contamination and forward them as directed.
Collect samples of liquid or solid chemical agents.
Mark CBRN-contaminated areas, equipment, and supplies with standard marking signs in accordance
with STANAG 2002 (not applicable to Navy afloat).
Provide data for the compilation of CBRN reports in accordance with STANAG 2103.
Operate detection and survey equipment to recognize and detect hazards resulting from unintentional
releases.
Demonstrate the ability to perform the duties of a CBRN sentry or observer.
Additional Standards for Officers and Noncommissioned Officers
Deploy CBRN sentries or observers and detection devices.
Understand CBRN monitoring, survey, and reconnaissance procedures.
Understand survival procedures before, during, and after a CBRN attack or friendly nuclear strike.
Have knowledge of CBRN downwind hazards.
Have knowledge of radiation dose control, exposure rules, and record keeping.
Understand general protective values of material against radiation, including the selection of buildings
and construction of shelters.
Have knowledge of contamination control.
Understand the role of the military to support other authorities following a CBRN attack or unintentional
release, and assist in managing the consequences of such an event.
ADDITIONAL STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR CHEMICAL,
BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE
SPECIALISTS
C-6. Additional training is required for officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian support personnel whose
primary duties are concerned with the planning, coordination, supervision, and conduct of unit CBRN
defense activities. These personnel should receive formal training that meets the requirements consistent
with those duties.
C-7. The following are CBRN defense specialists:
z
Command CBRN defense officers, enlisted personnel, and DOD civilian support personnel
(including private contractors) who are assigned to full-time duty in CBRN defense. Such
personnel will normally perform duties in organizations that are above the level of company,
squadron, or Service-equivalent unit.
1 July 2011
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
C-3
Appendix C
z
Unit CBRN defense officers, enlisted personnel, and DOD civilians
(including private
contractors) assigned on an additional-duty basis to form the CBRN control party. These
personnel should be at the company, squadron, task unit, or service-equivalent level, but may be
at a higher level, depending on the organizational structure.
C-8. Table C-3 identifies additional standards of proficiency for CBRN defense specialists. These are in
addition to the standards outlined in previous paragraphs that apply according to their rank and function.
Table C-3. Additional standards of proficiency for CBRN defense specialists
Additional Standards for Officers, Enlisted Personnel, and Civilian Staff with CBRN Primary Duties
Assist commanders in providing policy and guidance to lower echelons in all matters pertaining to the
development of a CBRN capability.
Plan, conduct, and monitor CBRN training within the command.
Evaluate the capability of lower echelons to survive a CBRN attack and continue operations in a CBRN
environment.
Keep abreast of new tactics, techniques, and procedures for CBRN defense.
Act as an advisor to the commander on all matters pertaining to the CBRN defense of subordinate
units/formations. When augmented, be responsible for the CBRN warning and reporting system.
Recommend the employment of special CBRN elements/units, if available.
Operate and use automated systems for calculations and data processing, where appropriate. If an
automated system is not available, personnel in CBRN centers must be able to perform the same tasks
manually.
Act as an advisor to commanders on all matters pertaining to CBRN cooperation with units/agencies of
other nations.
Additional Standards for Unit CBRN Defense Officers and Enlisted Personnel
Provide technical assistance to commanders and staffs on CBRN training and operations.
Provide CBRN training to achieve basic operating standards of proficiency for individuals and the unit.
Plan and supervise the CBRN training aspects of operational training exercises and maneuvers.
Supervise the preparation of unit CBRN standing operating procedures, and adapt them to existing plans
of other units as required.
Determine (by dosimetry or calculation, as appropriate) the total dose and time of stay in, or transit
through, radiological-contaminated areas to avoid exceeding the command operational exposure guide.
Prepare fallout prediction patterns, and perform the tasks of the CBRN warning and reporting system
(may be assigned to meteorological, operational, and/or navigational officers).
Plan CBRN reconnaissance, and advise commanders on the best routes to cross or bypass a CBRN
contaminated area.
Plan and coordinate decontamination within the unit, and advise the commander.
Maintain records of the unit’s radiation exposure.
Estimate downwind hazards for chemical and biological attacks and unintentional releases.
Report CBRN data to the next higher headquarters, and perform the CBRN reporting and warning tasks.
Operate and use data processing devices; and where appropriate, possess a basic knowledge of the
structure of programs used in CBRN warning and reporting.
Identify the hazards related to risks of low-level radiation, unintentional releases, and toxic industrial
material.
Make contingency plans for units facing CBRN and toxic industrial material hazards (including low-level
radiation and unintentional releases).
Act as an advisor to the commander on all matters pertaining to CBRN and toxic industrial material
hazards (including low-level radiation and unintentional releases).
C-4
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
1 July 2011
Basic Standards of Proficiency
ADDITIONAL STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR MEDICAL
PERSONNEL
C-9. Medical personnel protect themselves, patients, and medical facilities against exposure to CBRN
agents (CBRN defense) and, in accordance with the latest developments in science and technology, carry
out the measures necessary to maintain and restore the health of personnel exposed to CBRN environments
(CBRN medical defense).
C-10. Table C-4 identifies additional standards of proficiency that are required for medical personnel.
These are in addition to the standards outlined in previous paragraphs that apply according to their rank and
function.
Table C-4. Additional standards of proficiency for medical personnel
Additional Standards for Medical Personnel
Effectively protect casualties in a CBRN scenario during first aid, triage, resuscitative and emergency
treatment, holding, evacuation, and hospital treatment.
Act in a way that medical material, vehicles, and facilities are provided an optimum of protection against
CBRN hazards.
Be familiar with fielded collective protection systems for facilities and vehicles, if appropriate.
Possess good knowledge of the acute symptoms of CBRN injuries and their specific countermeasures
and potential side effects.
Possess good knowledge of decontamination procedures for CBRN-contaminated patients.
Additional Standards for Trained Medical Officers and Noncommissioned Officers
Have specialized knowledge in contamination control procedures for CBRN-contaminated patients and
associated equipment (radiac monitor and chemical-agent monitor) (selected medical personnel).
Have task-oriented, specialized knowledge of the diagnosis and treatment of CBRN injuries and the
detection and identification of chemical and biological agents and radiation (medical personnel assigned
to perform special CBRN medical defense tasks during missions [anesthesiologists, surgeons, internists,
microbiologists, food chemists]).
Be able to convert scientific expert reports into clear advice to the commander (staff and command
surgeons).
Have knowledge of the acute and long-term health effects of CBRN hazards in the deployment area and
resulting consecutive medical support requirements (personnel with scientific background).
Have knowledge of the risk benefit balance from wearing individual protective equipment and prophylactic
medical CBRN countermeasures (personnel with scientific background).
Standards for Action Before, During, and After an Operation
Establish an inventory of CBRN hazards and infectious endemic diseases in the deployment area and
establish the resulting medical support requirements in relation to countermeasures.
Document and register the position of personnel during possible exposures and the level of protection
from that exposure.
Coordinate investigations of unusual sickness and fatalities in situations involving CBRN hazards and
endemic diseases directed at the verification.
Conduct outbreak management in the case of highly contagious diseases in a biological scenario.
Conduct postconflict surveillance for illnesses and follow-up in exposed or potentially exposed forces.
ADDITIONAL STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR COMMANDERS
C-11. Commanders are required to have knowledge and competence in CBRN defense beyond the scope of
that demonstrated by individual personnel, but not to the degree required for CBRN defense specialists.
Commanders, with the assistance of their CBRN defense specialists, should be aware of hazards arising
from CBRN attacks and/or unintentional releases in order to plan and conduct operations under the
influence of such hazards. All commanders should also consider the risks associated with toxic industrial
material and low-level radiation.
1 July 2011
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
C-5
Appendix C
C-12. Table C-5 identifies additional standards of proficiency required for commanders.
Table C-5. Additional standards of proficiency for commanders
Understand the principles of CBRN defense.
Know the defense organization and the CBRN equipment available.
Assess the capabilities of unit CBRN forces.
Assess the effects of CBRN munitions on unit/formation, especially on operations to be conducted.
Issue orders and take measures depending on the situation and mission.
Plan operations while taking into account the CBRN threat and the readiness of units for operations in a
CBRN environment.
Estimate the effects of wearing CBRN individual protective equipment for an extended period of time, and
understand what measures can be taken to mitigate those effects on combat effectiveness and the well-
being of forces.
Be familiar with available medical prophylactic countermeasures.
Be familiar with the integration of CBRN training in exercises.
Understand the risks of toxic industrial radiological material, particularly the effects of low-level radiation.
Understand the risks of toxic industrial chemicals.
Understand the risks of toxic industrial biological agents.
STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR ORGANIZATIONS
C-13. Each organization must be able to accomplish their mission in a CBRN or unintentional-release
environment. Planning and training for this capability will include the preparation of a CBRN standing
operating procedure and frequent exercises to ensure familiarity in the application of the standing operating
procedure.
C-14. Table C-6 identifies the basic standards of proficiency for organizations.
Table C-6. Basic standards of proficiency for organizations
Take immediate and corrective action upon the warning of an imminent CBRN attack, chemical or biological
agent, or radiological fallout.
Determine the presence and nature of CBRN hazards in the unit’s area, and take effective measures to
mitigate the effects of a CBRN attack to the extent possible.
Properly use unit CBRN protection equipment and supplies, and maintain them in a high state of
serviceability and readiness.
Enforce a high order of health, hygiene, and sanitation to minimize the spread of disease.
Maintain a degree of protection that is appropriate to the risk, while continuing to conduct the primary
mission of the unit.
Perform necessary decontamination of supplies, equipment, and areas.
Cross, bypass, or function in contaminated areas with minimum loss of efficiency, decontaminating where
necessary.
Operate efficiently over an extended period of time (to be determined by the commander based on such
factors as weather conditions and equipment specifications) with personnel in full protective equipment that
includes a protective mask.
Report nuclear detonations, chemical and biological attacks, unintentional releases, and associated hazards
and hazard areas.
C-6
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
1 July 2011
Source Notes
1-4
Albright, David and Hinderstein, Corey,
“The A.Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and
Implications for Nonproliferation Efforts,” Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6, July 2006.
4-3
Russell, James A., “WMD Proliferation and Conventional Counterforce: The Case of Iraq,” Strategic
Insights, Volume I, Issue 5, July 2002.
1 July 2011
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
Source Notes-1
Glossary
SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AFB
air force base
AFDD
Air Force doctrine document
AFH
Air Force handbook
AFI
Air Force instruction
AFMAN
Air Force manual
AFPAM
Air Force pamphlet
AFPD
Air Force policy directive
AFRRI
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute
AFTTP
Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AMedP
allied medical publication
AT
antiterrorism
ATP
allied tactical publication
attn
attention
C2
command and control
CBRN
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CDD
capabilities development directorate
CJCS
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
COLPRO
collective protection
CONUS
continental United States
CWMD
combating weapons of mass destruction
DA
Department of the Army
DC
District of Columbia
DCB
doctrine control branch
DHHS
Department of Health and Human Services
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DOD
Department of Defense
DODD
Department of Defense directive
DODI
Department of Defense instruction
DSN
Defense Switched Network
EM
emergency management
FCM
foreign consequence management
FL
Florida
FM
field manual
FMI
field manual interim
FOUO
for official use only
GAO
General Accounting Office
1 July 2011
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
Glossary-1
Glossary
HSPD
Homeland Security Presidential directive
ID
initial distribution
IDN
initial distribution number
IMR
individual medical readiness
JP
joint publication
MANSCEN
Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
MCCDC
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCDP
Marine Corps doctrine publication
MCRP
Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP
Marine Corps warfighting publication
MID
Marine air-ground task force integration division
MILSTRAP
military standard transaction reporting and accounting procedures
MILSTRIP
military standard requisitioning and issue procedures
MO
Missouri
MOPP
mission-oriented protective posture
MTTP
multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVAIR
Naval Aviation Command
NAVMED
Naval Medical Command
NAVSUP
Naval supply
NBC
nuclear, biological, and chemical
NBCC
nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association
NIOSH
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NSC
National Security Council
NTRP
Navy tactical reference publication
NTTP
Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NWP
Navy warfare publication
OCONUS
outside the continental United States
OEH
occupational and environmental health
OPNAVIST
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations instruction
PDD
Presidential decision directive
RI
Rhode Island
SOH
safety and occupational health
STANAG
standardization agreement
TG
technical guide
UNSCR
United Nations Security Council resolution
USA
U.S. Army
USACHPPM
U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine
USAF
U.S. Air Force
USAMRICD
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense
Glossary-2
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
1 July 2011
Glossary
USAMRIID
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases
USMC
U.S. Marine Corps
USN
U.S. Navy
VA
Virginia
vol
volume
WMD
weapons of mass destruction
SECTION II - TERMS
*chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear active defense
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear active defense comprises measures taken to defeat an
attack with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons by employing actions to divert,
neutralize, or destroy those weapons or their means of delivery while en route to their target.
*chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management consists of actions taken to
plan, prepare, respond to, and recover from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents
that require force and resource allocation beyond passive defense capabilities.
*chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations include the employment of tactical
capabilities that counter the entire range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and
hazards through weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention; weapons of mass destruction
counterforce;chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense;and chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear consequence management activities. Chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear operations support operational and strategic objectives to combat weapons of mass destruction
and operate safely in a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment.
*chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear responders
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear responders are Department of Defense military and
civilian personnel who are trained to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
incidents and certified to operate safely at the awareness, operations, technician, or installation level
according to Section 120, Part 1910, Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations and National Fire
Protection Association 472.
*chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats include the intentional employment of, or intent
to employ, weapons or improvised devices to produce chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
hazards.
*emergency management
Emergency management, as a subset of incident management, concerns the coordination and
integration of activities that are necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for,
protect against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of
terrorism, or other manmade disasters.
*weapons of mass destruction counterforce
Weapons of mass destruction counterforce is a tactical objective to defeat the full range of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats before they can be employed as weapons.
*weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention
Weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention is the employment of tactical level capabilities
to support operational and strategic nonproliferation objectives of combating weapons of mass
destruction.
1 July 2011
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
Glossary-3
References
SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
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1 July 2011
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
References-1
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MULTI-SERVICE
ATTP 3-11.36/MCRP 3-37B/NTTP 3-11.34/AFTTP(I) 3-20.70. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Apects of Command and
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Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance. 2
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Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection. 2 June 2003.
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Procedures for Installation CBRN Defense. 6 November 2007.
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Procedures for Biological Surveillance. 4 October 2004.
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Procedures for Health Service Support in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
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FM 4-02.283/NTRP 4-02.21/ARMAN 44-161(I)/MCRP 4-11.1B. Treatment of Nuclear and
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Agent Casualties. 17 July 2000.
ARMY
DA Pamphlet 40-11. Preventive Medicine. 22 July 2005.
FM 3-07. Stability Operations. 6 October 2008.
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FM 4-02. Force Health Protection in a Global Environment. 13 February 2003.
FM 4-02.2. Medical Evacuation. 8 May 2007.
FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009.
FM 8-42. Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations. 27 October 1997.
FMI 2-01.301. Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield. 31 March 2009.
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U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense, <http://chemdef.apgea.army.mil/>.
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, <http://www.usamriid.army.mil/>.
U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency,
References-2
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
1 July 2011
References
AIR FORCE
AFDD 2-10. Homeland Operations. 21 March 2006.
AFDD 3-10, Force Protection, 9 November 2004.
AFH 10-222V3. Civil Engineer Guide to Expeditionary Force Protection. 1 May 2008.
AFH 10-2502. USAF Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat Planning and Response Handbook.
30 October 2001.
AFI 10-404. Base Support and Expeditionary Site Planning. 9 March 2004.
AFI 10-2501. Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations.
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AFI 31-101. Integrated Defense (FOUO). 8 October 2009.
AFI 34-242. Mortuary Affairs Program. 2 April 2008.
AFMAN 10-2602. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Conventional (NBCC) Defense Operations and
Standards. 29 May 2003.
AFMAN 32-4005. Personnel Protection and Attack Actions. 30 October 2001.
AFPAM 10-219V2. Civil Engineer Disaster and Attack Preparations. 9 June 2008.
AFPAM 10-219V3. Civil Engineer Disaster and Attack Recovery Procedures. 9 June 2008.
AFPD 10-25. Emergency Management. 26 September 2007.
AFPD 10-26. Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations.
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MCDP 1-0. Marine Corps Operations. 27 September 2001.
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NAVY
NAVSUP P-409. MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP Desk Guide. 9 May 2003.
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STANAG 2002 (Edition 10). Warning Signs for the Marking of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Contamination. 28 March 2006.
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(ATP-45C). 1 December 2005.
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1 July 2011
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
References-3
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Executive Order 12148, Federal Emergency Management, <http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12148.html>.
Executive Order 12656. Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities,
Federal Management Emergency Agency, <http://www.fema.gov/>.
References-4
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
1 July 2011
References
GAO-03-15, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD Deployments
through Domestic Seaports <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0315.pdf>, 22 October 2002.
HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html>, 28
February 2003.
HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
HSPD-8, National Preparedness <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html>, 17 December 2003.
Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative,
International Atomic Energy Agency, <http://www.iaea.org/>.
International Counterproliferation Program,
Medical Management of Radiological Casualties Handbook (Second Edition), Armed Forces
Radiobiology Research Institute,
National Incident Management System, <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf>,
18 December 2008.
National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
National Response Framework <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf>, January 2008.
Naval Medical Research Center, <http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmrc/Pages/index.htm>.
NFPA 472: Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass
Destruction Incidents. 2008 Edition,
NIOSH Publication 2005-149, NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards,
North Atlantic Treating Organization, <http://www.nato.int/>.
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, <http://www.opcw.org/>.
PDD 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm>, 21 June 1995.
PDD 62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization,
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for Congress, <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21293.pdf>, 24 January 2005.
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <http://www.dhs.gov/>.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. Unless otherwise indicated, DA
Forms can be downloaded from the APD Homepage, http://www.apd.army.mil/.
DA Form 12-99-R. Initial Distribution (ID) Requirements for Publications.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
1 July 2011
FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42
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