CANADA. LAND OPERATIONS (ENGLISH, 2008)

Land Operations

(3)

Mobility of the force available for the spoiling attack should be equal to or

exceed that of the adversary force.

(4)

Deep operations may be necessary to ensure the success of the spoiling

attack.

Reserves in the Mobile Defence. If the commander decides to conduct a mobile

defence he will still need to designate a reserve. It may be called upon to carry out any of the

above tasks in order to help the fixing forces shape the battlefield. Attack helicopters may be

ideal for this role. The striking force is then committed to strike a decisive blow.

Commitment of the Reserve. The decision on how and when a reserve is to be

committed is one of the most important a commander must make. Reserves should be located

where they are best able to react when they are required. Routes may need to be planned and

prepared to cover likely deployment options. The commander will designate his decision criteria

to assure the timely commitment of his reserves. These will need to be updated as the battle

progresses and the adversary's intentions become more apparent. When it is committed, the

reserve action may well become the formation’s main effort. The success of the reserve action

is likely to depend upon its timely commitment, mass, surprise, speed and boldness.

765. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE

Preparations. Preparations for the defence should take place concurrently at all levels

and include such important activities as:

reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance within the formation's area of

operations;

planning and shaping the battlefield through the integration of natural and

artificial obstacles;

planning the coordination of direct and indirect fire support;

deciding the employment of AD;

establishing liaison between flanking and subordinate formations;

continuous refinement of the plan by war-gaming, if time permits;

rehearsals of all activities such as battle handover and counter-moves, if time

permits; and

production of intelligence in order to determine the time that the adversary will

attack, his main effort, and locations of his C2 systems.

Deep Operations and Shaping Operations. Considerations:

Throughout the battle, adversary forces in depth will be attacked to prevent or

delay their deployment. Indeed, deep, close and rear operations will be fought

simultaneously and there is a requirement, therefore, for the commander to

assign priorities, particularly for combat support and CSS. Likewise, shaping,

decisive and sustaining operations may be conducted simultaneously.

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The commander must prevent the adversary from concentrating an

unacceptable level of combat power at any given point by pre-emptive,

systematic and sustained attacks on adversary echeloned forces. Adversary

forces not yet in contact will be monitored throughout the commander's area of

interest and engaged throughout the depth of his area of influence. In so doing,

the commander intends not only to destroy and delay the adversary force, but

also to disrupt the adversary commander's plan and seize the initiative. This

attack on the adversary's forces in depth is complementary to both the covering

force and main defence battles. Integration of the available combat support

assets to conduct this disruption requires extensive and continuous coordination

between air and ground commanders, but will yield a significant capability to see

and strike deep targets, and is vital to the successful conduct of deep

operations.

Siting. Battle positions should, whenever possible, be mutually supporting. They

should be sited such that they are hidden from direct adversary observation and fire. The

defender should avoid positions that are easily identifiable and easy to engage, such as forward

edges of woods, isolated villages, and other obvious features. Battle positions should dominate

the local area by direct fire. Such positions provide a framework for mobile forces operating

between them.

Strongpoints. A strongpoint is a fortified battle position. It is essentially a concentration

of direct fire weapons, particularly anti-armour, that cannot be easily overrun or bypassed. The

adversary may defeat a strongpoint, but only with the expenditure of much time and

overwhelming forces. It will be located on a terrain feature critical to the defence, or one that

must be denied to the adversary and can be used to shape or contain the attacker. Extensive

engineer support may be required in the preparation of strongpoints.

Obstacles. Whatever the form of defence, the skilful use of natural and artificial

obstacles will be essential to success. Their purpose is to enhance the tactical commander's

own plans by denying the adversary the freedom of manoeuvre he requires in order to gain and

maintain the initiative. The integration of obstacles with firepower will be used to support the

commander's manoeuvre plan and to shape and restrict the adversary's manoeuvre options.

Artificial obstacles will be used to shape the battlefield. The principles to be observed are:

Barrier control measures must be coordinated at all levels, but subordinate

commanders will confirm detailed siting.

Obstacles must complement and not dictate the design for battle. As such, the

commander's intent for obstacles, that is, to fix, disrupt, turn or block, must be

clearly enunciated.

Wherever possible, obstacles must be covered by direct fire. When this is not

achievable, observers able to call for indirect fire must at least cover them.

Artificial obstacles must not hinder the ability of forces to operate.

Counterattacks and the rearward passage of covering forces must be granted

particular attention.

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Killing Zones. Killing zones are designated by commanders at all levels based upon

their mission and the analysis of the terrain and adversary. They are areas where the terrain,

reinforced with artificial obstacles, allows the defender to fix and destroy adversary forces that

have been forced to concentrate. As such, they are an integral part of the close, deep and rear

battles, and their purpose and location must reflect the commander's plan and the ability of the

terrain to support the shaping of the battlefield, the fixing of the adversary, and the concentration

of the required combat power.

Direct Fire Planning. When planning the layout of a defensive position, direct fire

weapons,¹⁷⁰ particularly those that will defeat an adversary’s armoured force, are the first to be

considered and sited. The remainder of the defensive position is then built around them. The

commander himself must coordinate the plan. The following points should be applied when

siting direct fire assets:

Depth. The various ranges in the family of direct fire weapons provide an

opportunity to have depth in the killing zone with over-lapping arcs of fire. In

addition, so the mobile systems may have multiple engagements against an

attacking force that is not destroyed in the initial engagements, the anti-armour

and support weapon plan should have depth deployment positions on all likely

adversary approaches.

Mutual Support. The anti-armour plan should ensure that a force attacking any

position could be engaged with support weapon direct fire from adjacent and

mutually supporting positions. Thus, the availability of positions for this mutual

support should be a consideration in the selection of battle positions.

Coordination of all weapon systems in battle positions is a constant requirement.

Direct fire weapons are employed in pairs or groups to allow for mutual support

in providing local protection, observation and covering fire, as well as to allow

disengagement and movement. Note that the systems themselves do not have

to be co-located, but the effects they achieve (e.g., beaten zone) should be

paired.

Security. In battalion and BG AOs, mobile direct fire support weapons normally

operate outside of the company battle positions. They must therefore provide

their own local protection and have the ability to react to an adversary. Although

weapon systems have small crews, they do have good surveillance capabilities

and good mobility. Hence, they not only enhance their own protection, but also

contribute to the security of the AO and the forces within it. Direct fire weapon

sections can be used to patrol or picket areas instead of reconnaissance troops.

Their sighting systems, firepower and mobility will allow them to be used as

screen, guard or cover forces. Furthermore, when not manning their battle

positions, mobile direct fire systems should be held back in hides, on suitable

notice-to-move footings.

¹⁷⁰ Direct fire weapons refer to support weapons, including anti-armour weapons. Within the

contemporary operating environment (COE), direct fire weapons will engage a wide array of targets, and

ideally, weapons with an anti-armour capability will also be able to provide other supporting fires, such as

wall breaching.

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Integration of Direct Fire Weapons. Direct fire weapons must be carefully

integrated with all the other means of achieving the destructive effects against

adversary forces. In this way, the integrated use of all weapon systems

enhances the effectiveness of each to produce a greater net effect. For

example, the combination of anti-armour weapons firing into killing zones, with

minefields to canalize and inhibit movement, supported with artillery and mortars

to keep the armour closed down and thus their observation restricted, coupled

with smoke to further reduce their visibility, and with aviation to engage from

unexpected approaches, enhanced by dismounted troops in defensive positions,

produces a significantly better overall effectiveness than the employment of

each system alone. It also degrades the adversary's ability to defeat our

systems that would be vulnerable if employed alone. Short-range direct fire

weapons should be integrated with other weapon systems in battle positions.

Furthermore, direct fire weapons should be integrated into the surveillance and

target acquisition plan both to contribute to observation capability and to receive

information about the location, type and number of targets. Since direct fire

weapons rely greatly upon their redeployment capability, the anti-armour plan

should be coordinated with the barrier and movement plans to ensure they are

compatible.

Concentration. The anti-armour plan should allow for the concentration of

sufficient killing power at the locations and times that provide the greatest

advantages. This must be accomplished without the adversary being able to

detect and counter the concentration. A coordinated plan, secure

communications, covered approaches, speed of movement, good drills and

rapid dispersion are some of the requirements for effective concentration of

direct fire systems. The uses of tank hunting patrols and of helicopter insertion

of dismounted direct fire weapons are means of achieving concentrations at

unexpected places or times. By concentrating selectively on one of the

adversary's critical assets, such as his armoured personnel carriers, his

engineer vehicles or his C2 vehicles, it is most likely that his cohesion will be

degraded.

SECTION 12

FORCES AND TASKS FOR THE DEFENCE

766.

GENERAL

The concept of the defence to be adopted will be influenced to a great extent by the type

of combat forces, armoured or non-armoured, available. The adversary, the terrain and the

weather may in themselves further dictate the number and type of forces to be used. Time may

also be a major factor as non-armoured forces usually require more time than armoured forces

to prepare defensive positions, and unless they are airmobile, more time to move between

them.

767. ARMOURED FORCES

Where the majority of the forces available are armoured, the defence can be conducted

with greater flexibility and full use can be made of mobility. Operations will include defence from

selected positions, delaying actions and counterattacks, all of which can be conducted in

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defensive sectors of greater depth and width than in a defence with non-armoured forces.

Armoured combat troops have a high degree of protection from adversary fire, and

consequently are capable of going into action rapidly and effectively even in a CBRN

environment. This makes them highly suitable for use as reserves.

Armoured forces use defilade positions to strike the adversary in the flank, forcing him to

canalize so that he may be destroyed by the full weight of the firepower of the defence. In

addition, armoured troops can manoeuvre to delay the advance of strong adversary forces and

then immediately change from a mobile to a more static form of action, or to conduct offensive

action. Due to their importance in defence, armoured combat forces will always be primary

targets for adversary air attacks. Skilful use of cover, concealment, dispersion and local air

support can considerably reduce the effect of this threat, and wherever possible, AD forces

should be assigned to cover operations by armoured units.

768. NON-ARMOURED FORCES

Non-armoured forces are capable of staging an effective defence only from prepared

positions, therefore, will be employed primarily in a more static role. Their defensive positions

should make the best use of barriers and be located where the terrain offers scope to employ

the firepower and the full range of their anti-armour weapons. They are, therefore, particularly

suitable for use in close country. The positions selected should be covered from observed fire

for as long as possible, thus enabling them to retain their effectiveness. In most cases, they

must be well supported by armoured and combat support resources.

769. ARMED AVIATION

Air manoeuvre in defensive operations is very similar in character to air manoeuvre in

offensive operations. Helicopters have, however, an important role in defensive operations by

causing early attrition of the adversary in the deep battle and by disrupting, delaying and

shaping the adversary for the close battle. Helicopters can be effectively employed where a

commander does not wish to irrevocably commit ground forces; forward of a reserved

demolition or obstacle for example.

Armed aviation can be effective in closing gaps in a defence plan, possibly in

conjunction with pre-planned joint fires prior to relief by ground forces. Helicopters are also able

to counter adversary activity in the rear area, and in particular, airborne or airmobile forces.

Some helicopters may be equipped for air-to-air combat. Provided weather and visibility

conditions allow, their mobility, firepower and independence from the ground will make them a

useful means for:

operations against adversary penetration;

containment of adversary attacks;

support of counterattacks; and

support of airmobile operations.

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770. ARTILLERY

The artillery commander prepares and executes the fire plan in accordance with the

mission and with his commander’s CONOPS, coordinating artillery fire with the operations of

combat troops, helicopters, air support and with the barrier plan.

In view of its long ranges and the high flexibility of its fire, artillery is a powerful weapon

to assist in neutralizing an adversary attack. In order to be fully effective, however, it must have

the link to sensors that will acquire targets in-depth.

In defence, the tasks of artillery are:

During all phases of the defence, give fire support to troops in contact.

Attack adversary forces in depth before they can be committed to the main

battle.

To coordinate fire support to maximize combat power. Fire support will also be

coordinated with influence activities.

More specific tasks include:

(1)

support of the covering force;

(2)

disruption of adversary preparations for attack;

(3)

separation of attacking adversary tanks from dismounted infantry;

(4)

attacking adversary artillery and forward AD elements;

(5)

covering barriers, gaps and open areas;

(6)

neutralizing or isolating adversary forces that have penetrated the

defensive area and impeding the movement of adversary reserves;

(7)

supporting counterattacking forces;

(8)

assisting in battlefield surveillance and target acquisition;

(9)

as a last resort, defending own gun positions by direct fire; and

(10)

the use of scatterable mines to block adversary approach routes.

771.

AIR SUPPORT

Air ISTAR Operations. Air reconnaissance is extremely important in all phases of the

defence, particularly during the early stages, to help determine the strength and direction of the

adversary advance.

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Counter-air Operations. Counter-air operations are conducted to destroy, disrupt or

limit adversary air power as close to its source as possible and to assist in reducing the air

threat against friendly land forces. Ground forces may aid these operations by suppressing

adversary forward air defences.

Close Air Support. Close air support (CAS) will be vital to a defending force, for both

immediate threats and for those in depth. It is more economical and effective to locate and

attack adversary forces while they are concentrated in depth preparing for an attack or

advancing along LOC, than when they are deployed in the battle area. CAS, if properly planned

however, allows the commander to concentrate fire rapidly on targets in depth and in proximity.

As much pre-planning as possible should occur in order that commanders may determine and

request the exact number of sorties required.

772. SUPPORT HELICOPTERS

In defence reconnaissance, utility and transport helicopters can support ground force

operations through their employment in:

airmobile operations;

C2 tasks;

reconnaissance and target acquisition missions; and

logistic support, including casualty evacuation.

773. AIR DEFENCE

Priorities for the allocation of AD artillery resources will be based upon the commander’s

estimate of the situation. In addition to airspace management, AD artillery will be required to

protect important areas and points. It is normally used to cover the following:

troops in forward areas;

C2 facilities;

supply facilities;

critical assets and vital points;

airfields;

reserve forces; and

demolitions.

774. ENGINEERS

There will seldom, if ever, be sufficient engineer resources to meet all the requirements

of a defence plan. The commander must therefore establish priorities in accordance with the

determination of his main effort, and apply his limited resources as necessary. Engineers will

be assigned a wide range of tasks:

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Counter-mobility Tasks. Counter-mobility tasks serve to disrupt, turn, fix or

block adversary forces. They will be carried out in conjunction with combat

forces and be coordinated with direct and indirect fire weapons to deny the

adversary the mobility he requires and to cause casualties to his attacking

forces. Counter-mobility measures must be covered by fire and closely

coordinated with fire support assets. Counter-mobility tasks include:

(1)

Barriers. The maximum effect is obtained from barriers when as many

minefields and other obstacles as possible are employed in combination,

and when they are kept under surveillance and covered by fire. Barriers

are likely to include the use of natural and man-made obstacles; they

must be coordinated with host nation advisors when appropriate and

comply with Host Nation Agreements. The barrier plan is part of the

overall defence plan that will require continuous adjustment as barriers

are improved and supplemented, as time permits, and as the battle

proceeds. Barrier restricted areas may be declared in order to retain the

required freedom of movement. The restriction may involve time, location

or type of obstacle.

(2)

Demolitions. The system for the control of demolitions must be

conducted in accordance with agreed standards and procedures. The

number of reserved demolitions must be kept to a minimum, as they tie

down large numbers of combat troops as demolition guards and

engineers in firing parties.

Survivability Tasks. The avoidance of detection and destruction will require

frequent movement and rapid terrain preparation (this includes digging and use

of cover, concealment and camouflage to enhance survivability). Survivability

can be enhanced by the use of concealment, deception, dispersion and

fortification. Engineer protection or survivability tasks will include assistance to

other arms in:

(1)

Field Fortifications. Engineer work in this area includes the use of

equipment to assist in the preparation and construction of such

fortifications as trenches, command post shelters, artillery fire positions,

and anti-tank weapon and armoured combat vehicle positions.

Additionally, fields of fire can be cleared for all weapon systems.

Engineers also assist in the construction of strongpoints, which are

heavily fortified positions that cannot be overrun quickly or bypassed

easily by adversary forces.

(2)

Protection of Combat Supplies. Combat supplies should be protected

in particular against blast, shrapnel, incendiaries and CBRN

contamination. By giving advice to the logistic management on the

selection of the most suitable storage sites, the requirements for engineer

support can be considerably reduced.

(3)

Camouflage, Concealment and Deception. Major positions, facilities

and operational sites may require special camouflage stores and

measures that could be undertaken by engineers. Deception measures

often include the use of camouflage, and special engineer deception

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measures can include the construction of dummy positions and decoys,

which must be carefully planned and coordinated within the framework of

the tactical plan and real positions.

Mobility Tasks. During preparations for defensive activities, engineers will

reconnoitre, improve and open routes for use during battle, in preparation for the

withdrawal of covering forces, the main body’s withdrawal, and for the use of

reserve forces and counterattacks. During the main defensive battle itself,

mobility tasks include:

(1)

Routes. The maintenance and improvement of routes will be a major

engineer task as the defensive position is subjected to fire from adversary

artillery and air. This may necessitate the deployment well forward of

assault bridging, trackway and engineer heavy equipment.

(2)

Minefield Gaps and Lanes. Careful coordination will be necessary to

ensure that the required lanes or gaps are left in minefields for the

redeployment of troops.

(3)

Support to Countermoves. Close support engineers will be required in

support of offensive operations to overcome obstacles produced by the

adversary.

(4)

Counterattacks. Gaps must have been left in major obstacles for the

passage of counterattack forces.

Electronic Warfare. EW has the following functions in support of defensive

activities:

(1)

Its primary function will be to continue gathering information on the

adversary and to update information databases. EW resources will thus

concentrate on the provision of vital information on the adversary's:

(a)

intentions;

(b)

grouping, location, and axes of advance of its lead elements, main

body, supporting artillery and engineer units, and forces in depth;

(c)

CBRN delivery means; and

(d)

AD systems.

(2)

As the adversary closes to the MDA, jamming resources will be

concentrated on the neutralization of adversary fire control, and target

acquisition and intelligence gathering systems, while information-

gathering resources continue to provide intelligence and steerage for own

jamming systems.

(3)

EW resources will also attempt to locate adversary jamming assets so

they may be eliminated by physical destruction.

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775. COMMAND AND CONTROL MEASURES IN THE DEFENCE

In planning the defensive operations, commanders should reconnoitre the area of

responsibility or review the terrain analysis before he determines his CONOPS and plans the

layout. Furthermore, he should maintain personal contact with his subordinates. In times of

stress, a visit or a person-to-person conversation will do much to instil confidence and to

impress the commander’s personality upon his command.

Close liaison and good communications are prerequisites to a successful defence. The

following should be noted:

Coordination points will be designated and liaison established at key levels.

In coalition operations, it is particularly important that commanders of

temporarily assigned units make personal contact with their superior

commander as soon as the situation permits. Higher echelons must be

prepared to provide communications detachments to subordinate HQs from

other nations in order to provide a secure communications link.

Before contact is made with the adversary, electronic emissions must be kept to

a minimum. Forces not in contact with the adversary should be on radio silence.

Nevertheless, alternative communications must be maintained at all levels.

In situations in which there is an EW adversary, cable and radio relay

communications are a vital means of communication. After adversary contact

and the relaxation of radio silence, radio communications will become

significant, but traffic should still be kept to a minimum.

The following control measures may be employed in defensive operations:

boundaries and control lines, such as the handover line and phase lines;

fire support coordination measures;

airspace control measures;

coordination points;

barrier restricted areas;

battle positions, blocking positions and assembly areas;

killing zones; and

controlled routes.

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SECTION 13

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN THE DEFENCE

776.

GENERAL

The CSS plan must be flexible. Particular points of note are:

In the defence, it should be possible to preposition stocks and maintenance

resources and to establish medical facilities beforehand, and it is from these

resources that troops may be supported in the first days of combat. In this way,

provision is made for supplies to be available in the event of a surprise

adversary attack. Possible delay in establishing CSS due to the length of LOC

may impose, upon commanders, a special responsibility to exercise economies

until the resupply chain is established.

CSS facilities are usually further to the rear than in offensive operations, both to

avoid interfering with tactical operations and to obtain a degree of protection,

although delivery should be as far forward as possible.

Consideration must be given to the location and security of service support

areas and traffic control within these areas.

Planning must take into account the requirements of a transition to the offence.

Mobility and flexibility in CSS operations must be maintained to support

subsequent counterattack and other offensive operations.

777.

SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS

Specific consideration should be given to the following points:

Rear area security and protection.

The high consumption of ammunition, particularly artillery rounds, may

necessitate special delivery programmes. Bulk ammunition should be delivered

as far forward as possible.

Fuel should be transported, as far as practicable, by pipeline, rail, and road

tanker or by inland waterways.

Repair should be conducted within defensive positions if possible, in order to

minimize movement.

The siting of medical resources, including evacuation facilities, should be as far

forward as is practicable to ensure the rapid treatment and evacuation of

casualties. However, to avoid collateral damage, they should not be located

near to likely targets (e.g., other logistics installations).

Coordination of CSS in multinational operations.

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The location of supplies should emphasize dispersion, good access to supply

routes, and stock levels, and should be conducive to resupply defensive

operations.

The priority of supplies assists in allocating scarce transportation assets.

778. SUMMARY

The defence plan must be carefully conceived to ensure that the adversary’s attack can

be halted and that an opportunity be found to seize the initiative and undertake offensive

operations. The importance of cohesion to the overall effectiveness of the defence is

particularly significant if the defence is to remain viable. The commander must be prepared to

adjust the layout and the manoeuvre plan in order to meet changes in the adversary.

SECTION 14

THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE DELAY

779. PURPOSE AND CONCEPT OF THE DELAY

delaying operation is: “an operation in which a force under pressure trades space for

time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage without, in

principle, becoming decisively engaged.”¹⁷¹ It is usually conducted in advance of a defensive

position in order to give the forces the needed time to prepare the position, mass forces, and to

attrite the advancing adversary forces.

The delaying force commander is normally given a mission of imposing a stated amount

of delay upon the adversary and/or a specific amount of attrition upon the adversary. He may

also be ordered to preserve a specific portion of his own combat power. The delay will often

end with a breaking of contact, a battle handover to an in-place defending force, and a rearward

passage of lines.

The delay is likely to be carried out in less than ideal conditions. The air situation may

well be unfavourable and the initiative will tend to be with the adversary. Nevertheless, in order

to enhance the chances of success, every opportunity should be taken to initiate aggressive

action, to seize the initiative from the adversary, and to force him to adopt a defensive posture.

This type of operation is arguably the most difficult to conduct and needs to be thoroughly

understood by all involved.

Delaying operations can be conducted independently or within other operations,

principally as a prelude to a defensive battle. A covering force can conduct a delay. It is also

possible that enabling activities will be involved, the most likely being a withdrawal and a

rearward passage of lines. It is also conceivable that other enabling activities, such as a

meeting engagement, could occur.

A delaying operation is likely to be conducted in one of the following circumstances:

¹⁷¹ NATO AAP-6.

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as a covering force for defending or withdrawing main bodies;

the advance guard or covering force when encountering superior forces;

an economy of force operation conducted to hold an adversary attack on a less

critical avenue of approach;

a deception measure to set up a counterattack; and

as part of a mobile defence.

780. PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN THE DELAY

In a delay, a commander attempts to inflict heavy losses on the adversary while

preserving the combat power of his own forces. No decision is sought, as the commander is

attempting to gain time. In doing so, he must always determine whether the time to be gained

justifies the reduction of his combat power. The following principles of war are of particular

concern in the delay:

Offensive Action. In order to force the adversary to deploy, to delay him and to

attrite him, offensive action must be taken. It will be required not only to force

the adversary to deploy, but likely will be required to disengage with the

adversary and to cover the withdrawal to subsequent battle positions. The

delaying force should create and seize opportunities for offensive action.

Adversary forces that overreach themselves or expose a flank are particularly

vulnerable. Limited attacks are undertaken when losses or damage can be

inflicted on the adversary with low risk.

Security. The commander must preserve his force throughout the delay, firstly

in order to be capable of causing the required attrition and delay, and secondly,

retain sufficient combat power to fulfil subsequent tasks following the force’s

handover and withdrawal. Thus, security of his force will be a constant concern,

and measures and precautions must be constantly taken to ensure that the

force can break contact and avoid envelopment by the advancing adversary.

781. FUNDAMENTALS OF DELAY OPERATIONS

In addition to the principles of war that merit special consideration, there are several

fundamental elements that must be applied in the planning and conduct of a delay:

Manoeuvre. A delaying force uses manoeuvre so that maximum fire can be

applied at long range to surprise and confuse the adversary and to make him

pause and deploy. Such fire imposes caution and causes casualties without

revealing the disposition of the delaying forces. A delaying force also uses

manoeuvre to disengage and move to new positions when the adversary

concentrates superior combat power.

Balance. The force must be organized so that it can deal with unexpected

situations. This requires a judicious balance amongst those troops maintaining

surveillance, conducting reconnaissance, engaging and delaying the adversary,

withdrawing to new delay positions, and acting as reserves.

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Maintenance of Contact. A delaying force must maintain contact with the

adversary to avoid surprise, estimate his rate of advance and determine his

main point of effort. This can be done by reconnaissance forces, or by target

acquisition means giving real-time information “feeds,” such as unmanned aerial

vehicles.

Use of Terrain. A delaying force must use the terrain to enhance its

engagement, add to its security, and cause the adversary to conduct time-

consuming and costly operations in order to advance. The terrain selected

should have natural or easily improved obstacles that can be used to canalize

the adversary or slow him down. It should also offer good observation and fields

of fire and allow easy disengagement.

Time and Space. A commander should know either the minimum length of time

that he must delay based upon the requirement of friendly forces to prepare

positions, the percentage of adversary forces that must be destroyed, or the

percentage of his force that he must preserve based upon his subsequent tasks.

The area allocated must have sufficient depth to allow for the conduct of

delaying operations; otherwise, the duration of the delay must be shortened, the

strength of the force increased, or risk decisive engagement with the high

potential for losses. A lack of sufficient manoeuvre space may cause the

delaying force to become decisively engaged.

Security and Protection. Security and protection are vital to preserve the force

to allow it to meet its task. They are achieved through concealment,

camouflage, deception, COMSEC, EW, CI, and the protection of bridges,

crossing sites and critical points along axis required for rearward movements.

782.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE DELAY

The delay does not fit neatly into a series of stages. Rather, it comprises a series of

coordinated offensive and defensive actions, each being broken off when the adversary presses

too hard and close to the point where the delaying forces are at risk of being decisively

engaged. Forces manoeuvring to engage the adversary from previously selected positions in

depth, and then disengaging and moving to the next position before the adversary can

concentrate sufficient combat power to overrun or bypass friendly forces, fight the action. High

tempo is particularly significant in delaying actions. The delaying action ends with the final

disengagement and breaking of contact by the delaying force at the handover line. An in-place

force may have to assist in achieving disengagement.

In a delaying operation, a commander faces several conflicting requirements. He

attempts to inflict heavy losses on the adversary, but seeks to preserve the combat power of his

own forces. He attempts to gain time, but seeks to avoid decisive engagement. He must

constantly determine whether the time to be gained justifies the reduction of his combat power.

To make these decisions, he must be told either the minimum length of time that he must delay

the adversary, or the percentage of his force that he must preserve based upon his subsequent

tasks. As stated previously, the area allocated must have sufficient depth to allow delaying

operations to be conducted; otherwise, the duration of the delaying operation must be

shortened, the strength of the force increased, or risk decisive engagement with the high

potential for losses.

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A delaying operation is conducted by a combination of defensive and offensive action.

Initially, a commander establishes contact with the adversary across the front using

reconnaissance elements. At the same time, he prepares a series of delay positions in depth to

the extent that time permits. Depending upon the mission, forces occupying the delaying

positions should be sufficiently strong in combat power to mislead the adversary into believing

that he has encountered the battle positions of a MDA and must be sufficiently strong to cause

the desired delay. In the selection of delaying positions and the organization of the delaying

force, the commander will consider creating opportunities for offensive action.

The delay is conducted through a series of successive battle positions sited to be

mutually supporting. As the adversary pushes the reconnaissance elements back, he is

engaged with maximum fire at long range from elements of the delaying force that manoeuvre in

the first line of delay positions. This fire is applied to surprise and confuse the adversary, to

make him pause and deploy, to impose caution and cause casualties, and to compel him to

make time-consuming and costly preparations for an attack. While the adversary is engaged at

long range, other elements of the delaying force may conduct countermoves, especially against

forces that have overreached themselves or exposed a flank. Limited attacks are undertaken

when losses can be inflicted on the adversary at low risk.

When a decisive engagement is imminent, the commander manoeuvres to disengage or

to fight his way back to the next line of delay positions. Contact is re-assumed by the

reconnaissance elements, which in the meantime have been repositioned for the task, or is

maintained by the forces fighting their way back. Contact must be maintained in order to avoid

surprise, to estimate the adversary's rate of advance, and to determine his main effort.

Crossing sites, particularly bridges, and other critical points along routes or axis required for

rearward movement should be protected.

The same general sequence of activity is repeated until the mission is accomplished. At

the handover line, the delaying force attempts to break contact and the in-place force assumes

responsibility for dealing with the adversary. The in-place force must site itself and task forces

to assist with the delaying force’s breaking of contact.

783. ORGANIZATION OF THE TERRAIN

In the delay, the delineation of the AO is similar to that of the defence. The difference is

the fact that the rear boundary is defined by a handover line where responsibility for the

adversary is passed to another force. Unit and formation frontages will tend to be larger than in

the defence. The commander of the delaying force has to decide which parts of the assigned

AO he will use, which parts he may abandon earlier than others, and which ones need only be

monitored.

Flank boundaries between elements of the delaying force must be clearly delineated, but

elements of the force must be prepared to give mutual support across boundaries. The delay

and the terrain over which it will occur will be broken into a number of battle positions from

which the engagements will occur. The battle positions will be manned on order and will act as

the key control measure for the conduct. They must be mutually supporting. Ideally,

commanders will have time to reconnoitre the battle positions beforehand and plan each

engagement and disengagement in detail.

A delaying force will not only make use of the depth of the area assigned but it will also

attack the adversary in his depth. If there is no opportunity to attack the adversary's flank or

rear, it may be sufficient to position combat troops so that they can engage the adversary along

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his most likely approaches. Gaps must be kept under surveillance and provision must be made

for quick reaction, should the adversary decide to utilize them for his advance.

784. DELAY TACTICS

The commander must take into account that he may not always have a clear picture of

the adversary and that the situation may change frequently and rapidly. He must therefore

ensure that he has a continuous flow of sound and timely intelligence, well-organized

reconnaissance, uninterrupted communications and a strong reserve. By these means, the

commander can ensure that he maintains his freedom of action. He must utilize the forces and

means available to him in such a way that the adversary is repeatedly faced with unexpected

situations. This requires flexibility and agility, as well as strong reliance upon the subordinate

commanders’ capabilities to determine on the spot the most suitable action to be taken.

Combat troops will normally conduct the delay by a combination of techniques, both offensive

and defensive.

The commander will employ a range tactics to impose delay upon the adversary and

preserve his own forces, including the following:

To slow down the adversary's advance by inflicting casualties, which reduce his

offensive capability, in order to gain time for subsequent operations.

To manoeuvre the adversary into areas where he is vulnerable to

attacks/counterattacks, thereby gaining the initiative.

To avoid combat under undesirable conditions.

To determine the adversary's main effort.

The tactical plan must focus on control measures and the effects to be imposed upon

the adversary, be it delay, attrition or both. The plan must include a clearly articulated intent, a

detailed CONOPS, measures to be taken to cover gaps and flanks, and detailed control and

coordination measures. While a main effort is designated, it may change during the delay

depending upon the adversary’s intentions.

SECTION 15

PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THE DELAY

785. PLANNING

Before a commander can make his estimate of the situation for a delay he must be very

clear of the intention of his superior commander and what he wishes to achieve by deploying

the delaying force. Once this is understood he will make his estimate of the situation, develop

his CONOPS and prepare his plan to cover the entire action from initial deployment to its

termination. The CONOPS and the plan will pay particular attention to:

Tasks. The allocation of tasks to the forces available. In the delay, tasks must

reflect the integral firepower and mobility of the forces considered.

Phasing. The separation of the activity into phases, all parts of which must be

completed before another phase can start, where this is necessary.

Indiscriminate use of phasing can unnecessarily slow operations.

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Terrain. The selection of battle positions from which to delay the adversary will

be key to success. The terrain must be selected in order to maximize the long-

range fires and mobility of the delaying elements and to restrict the mobility of

the adversary (e.g., natural choke points, defiles, etc.). Selected terrain should

also facilitate an easy break and withdrawal for the delaying forces.

Barriers. Planning should exploit natural barriers and select best positions for

artificial barriers that will achieve maximum benefit with the least amount of

required work.

Fire Support. The use of long-range fire to inflict early casualties on the

adversary and avoid decisive engagement.

Covering of Gaps. Gaps are a feature of operations. However, commanders

must be aware of their existence and plan to ensure that they do not pose an

unnecessary threat.

Flank Security and Protection. Flank security and protection will be a

constant concern for delaying forces. The commander must try to select

positions that offer natural flank protection, or establish as a minimum, flank

security that will allow early enough notification to allow withdrawal. Flank

protection may be essential to maintain the battle positions that will impose the

required amount of delay upon the adversary.

Deployment in Depth. The force must also be deployed in-depth to counter

penetration between the forward units, and to guard against airborne or

helicopter-borne assaults on defiles and reserved routes.

Control of Fire and Movement. Report and phase lines are used to control the

movement of forces. Orders can be given to fill any gaps or to adjust the lines

should there be a danger of a breakthrough.

Coordination. Careful coordination between adjacent units, including

measures to avoid fratricide.

Demolition Control. The need to carry out demolitions early can hamper the

deployment of friendly forces. It is, therefore, essential that the planning,

particularly for preliminary demolitions, minefield gaps and reserved demolitions,

is closely coordinated with movement and manoeuvre.

Denial Measures. The denial plan will be closely coordinated with host nation

authorities.

Surveillance. The maintenance of surveillance coverage of the entire area of

intelligence responsibility is normally a considerable undertaking that

encompasses imagery, EW and all human collection resources. It requires

careful planning and coordination.

Combat Service Support. The support of highly mobile operations conducted

over considerable distances requires foresight and flexibility.

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The amount of delay to be ordered will depend upon the commander's estimate of the

situation, the requirements for the main defensive position, and the overall objectives and aims.

The duration of the delay to be obtained is then laid down in the mission.

Additionally, or in place of a delay time, the mission may entail a certain percentage of

destruction that must be imposed upon the adversary as part of the delay operation.

SECTION 16

FORCES AND TASKS

786. GENERAL

Given the nature of the delay, the forces best suited to delay operations will be those

that possess integral firepower, protection and mobility. In selecting and grouping the delay

force, the balance between these characteristics will depend upon the type of adversary to be

delayed and the terrain. It will likely require some sort of all-arms grouping with integral long-

range fire support and CSS assets.

All commanders to the lowest level possible will benefit greatly from detailed

reconnaissance of the route to be used and the assigned battle positions from which the delay

will be imposed. Rehearsals will be essential, as will close coordination, particularly for all arms

groups not accustomed to working together.

787. EMPLOYMENT OF MANOEUVRE FORCES

Armoured Forces. Forces composed of tanks, armoured infantry and armoured

reconnaissance elements are highly suitable for delaying operations in most types of terrain.

Their firepower permits them to engage the adversary effectively at long ranges; their mobility

permits them to move quickly between successive positions or to a flank, while the protection

afforded by their vehicles facilitates disengagement. Similarly, their mobility, firepower and

superior communications give them the capability of launching counterattacks when

opportunities exist.

Mechanized or Light Armoured Forces. Mechanized or light armoured forces will be

suitable for delay operations depending upon the adversary faced and the terrain. Their

employment characteristics and CONOPS will be similar to the employment of armoured forces

in the delay; however, they will likely hold their vehicles, depending upon the type of vehicle, to

the rear of their battle positions in order that they do not loose them to adversary direct fire.

They may be forced to engage for shorter periods of time in order to ensure a successful

withdrawal from battle positions. They will likely require extensive barrier plans and intimate

support from armed aviation.

Non-armoured Forces. Non-armoured combat forces only have a limited capability to

carry out delaying operations except in broken, close or built-up terrain with extensive use of

barriers. They will fight from a succession of suitably prepared defensive positions, in each

case forcing the adversary to deploy for a coordinated attack before they withdraw to their next

position. Their lack of protection will demand greater attention to the operations of

disengagement and movement between positions, which should be carried out under cover of

fire support and using routes that are concealed from the adversary. Similarly, non-armoured

troops are not particularly suitable for conducting a fighting withdrawal. However, such an

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activity is feasible against a dismounted adversary in close terrain, which offers cover for

movement and is favourable for ambushes and raids. Non-armoured forces can also participate

in stay-behind operations.

Airmobile Forces. Airmobile forces can be employed in delaying operations although

they face the same restrictions and problems as other non-armoured forces. They are capable,

however, of rapid deployment and redeployment, permitting quick concentration of combat

power at key locations. Similarly, they are capable of rapid dispersal to reduce vulnerability.

They can also be used as a reserve force to permit the commander to commit a larger part of

his other forces to the operation, as well as acting as flank protection. The selection and

reconnaissance of landing and pick-up sites will be essential to their employment.

Airborne Forces. Airborne forces have a more limited capability in delaying operations

than airmobile forces because of their lack of mobility and firepower once on the ground and the

need for assistance in extrication. They can, however, be employed in area interdiction

operations with the aim of preventing or hindering adversary operations in a specific area.

Terrain that is heavily wooded, hilly or dominated by a river or other obstacles, and which

hinders the adversary's off-road mobility, is best suited to this type of operation.

Armed/Attack Aviation. Air manoeuvre in delaying operations is very similar in

character to air manoeuvre in offensive operations. Helicopters play an important role by

disrupting the adversary's progress through the use of rolling ambushes that produce a fluid and

mobile defence throughout the adversary's depth, which will delay and shape the adversary for

the close battle. Armoured attack helicopters can effectively support delaying ground forces by

engaging adversary armour, preferably from the flanks or long range. They may be used to

achieve rapid deployment of the anti-armour defence, including deep attacks to cover the

disengagement of combat forces and to achieve surprise. Helicopters can also be effectively

employed where a commander does not wish to irrevocably commit ground forces to the delay,

such as forward of a reserve demolition or obstacle.

788. EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES

Artillery. Considerations:

Artillery can make a major contribution to delaying operations by striking the

adversary with concentrated fire at maximum range. Its capability to defeat a

wide variety of targets in a short time and to deliver scatterable minefields

should not only be used to inflict casualties and weaken the adversary's

offensive capabilities, but also to create situations which permit aggressive

manoeuvre of combat forces. Interdiction fire against follow-on forces can

restrict the immediate battle to the adversary's committed forces.

Artillery will be key to allowing delaying forces to break contact with the

advancing adversary and to break clean at the handover line.

By providing immediate and accurate support, the artillery can halt the leading

elements of an adversary attack, and by delivering suppressive fire during the

disengagement of friendly forces, it can prevent the adversary from closing with

the delaying force.

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The artillery must be organized and positioned so that it can provide

uninterrupted fire support throughout the delaying operation.

Air. Air operations contribute to overcoming the adversary's initial advantage in freedom

of action in the following ways:

ISTAR. ISTAR operations contribute to identifying the adversary’s strength and

disposition at an early stage, allowing the commander to concentrate his forces

in favourable positions.

Counter-air Operations. It may be necessary to gain local air superiority to

enable delaying forces to move.

Interdiction and Close Air Support. Interdiction and CAS, particularly at

defiles and crossings, can delay, destroy or neutralize adversary follow-on

forces on their approach routes, and thereby assist in gaining time to defeat the

adversary's leading elements. Often, it is only through the employment of

aircraft that adversary penetration through an area or gaps can be delayed until

ground forces can be moved to engage them. CAS in certain situations will

make it possible to create an additional concentration of fire. In this, as with all

forms of tactical air support, close cooperation with all airspace users must be

assured. CAS will also assist in the breaking of contact as forces prepare to

abandon a battle position.

Aviation. Armed or attack aviation can provide intimate support to ground

manoeuvre forces and be key to the destruction of lead adversary armour and

other forces. Reconnaissance, utility and transport helicopters can play an

important part in delaying operations by:

(1)

providing command, control and communications facilities;

(2)

providing reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition;

(3)

moving demolition guards, firing parties and barrier munitions;

(4)

lifting non-mechanized infantry, particularly before the delaying activity

and during their disengagement;

(5)

laying scatterable mines;

(6)

evacuating casualties; and

(7)

moving supplies, spare parts and maintenance working parties.

Air Defence. Delaying activities are likely to be conducted in conditions of an air threat.

Good coordination and close liaison between manoeuvre and AD forces is the key for

successful protection against attacks during delaying operations. Movement through choke

points and the reception of the delaying force are critical. Detailed planning is required to

ensure the timely provision of AD for these actions. There are unlikely to be sufficient AD

resources available to provide adequate cover throughout the AO. Priorities of tasks, therefore,

must be established and redeployment planned to ensure there is effective AD at critical times

and points.

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Engineers. Considerations:

Engineers support delaying operations primarily by preparing barriers including

minefields and demolitions. Situational minefields with a predetermined

effective time in combination with anti-tank weapons contribute decisively to

reducing the adversary's offensive potential. Difficult terrain may make it

necessary to give some priority to improving and maintaining routes for the

manoeuvre of the delaying force.

Engineers are employed on request of the combat forces. They should be given

the maximum time to plan and accomplish their tasks.

The responsibility for barriers must be carefully laid down in orders to include

the detailed arrangements for their security and closure. All delaying forces

must know which gaps through barriers and crossing sites will be kept open for

their use, and the commander responsible for the closure must be clearly

designated.

Engineers will also be required to give advice and help in the preparation of

defensive positions and in the clearance of fields of fire, particularly in built-up

areas.

Armoured engineers should move with the troops closest to the adversary to

undertake route denial, fire demolitions, and lay or scatter mines.

Electronic Warfare. The delaying force should employ EW resources to disrupt and

confuse the advancing adversary; using jamming and deception against reconnaissance

elements, command nets and fire control nets. These actions should be carried out in all

phases of a delay and they may greatly assist in supporting disengagement, counterattacks and

relief of forces. EW resources will continue to provide information on the adversary.

789. COMMAND AND CONTROL MEASURES

In spite of the adverse characteristics of a delaying operation, the frequent and fast

manoeuvre of troops, the frequently changing types of combat, the unclear air situation, and at

least the initial freedom of action of the adversary, the commander must focus on the superior

commander's intent and planned end state. To this end, the following must be noted:

The commander must command his forces so as to maintain a coherent,

cohesive operation. This will require continuous direction to restore critical

situations and to try to gain the initiative. Good communications will be

essential.

There is a requirement for centralized, coordinated planning, but decentralized

control of the execution.

Arrangements must be made by the formations in the rear for the control of the

movement back from the handover line by the delaying elements.

The following control measures may be employed in delay operations:

boundaries and control lines, such as handover lines and phase lines;

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fire support coordination measures;

air space coordination measures;

movement control measures, such as routes and check points;

barrier coordination measures;

battle positions, blocking positions and assembly areas for reserves;

objectives;

timings;

liaison measures; and

denial measures.

790. EXECUTION OF THE DELAY

Reconnaissance. The delaying force requires timely and continuous information about

the adversary. This necessitates the employment of reconnaissance elements that immediately

establishes and maintains contact. These elements should be of sufficient strength that they

cannot be easily brushed aside by the adversary, and that it can provide security through the

conduct of counter-reconnaissance. At the start of hostilities, these forces may be the only

elements on the ground that can provide accurate information to identify adversary activities.

As the battle develops, a part of the reconnaissance element may be used to provide security

and protection of flanks and the gaps between the main elements of the delaying force.

Conduct. The delay should be executed along the following lines:

At the earliest opportunity, the delaying force will engage the adversary, inflicting

casualties by providing maximum fire in combination with mobile actions,

including quick and limited counterattacks against adversary troops who have

overextended themselves or have exposed an open flank. Opportunities are

most likely to occur when the adversary has just crossed an obstacle or is

temporarily separated from his follow-up troops.

Every advantage offered by the terrain should be exploited. The rapid advance

of the adversary, particularly along roads, should be impeded, causing him to

bunch and offer himself as target. Every opportunity must be taken to surprise

him and to ambush him, avoiding becoming decisively engaged, by timely

manoeuvre.

Even if elements of the delaying force are in danger of being overrun, or

seriously outflanked, they will not disengage unless ordered or unless it is in

accordance with the commander’s intent. However, it is an important

responsibility of the commander, through timely disengagement, to prevent parts

of his force from being cut off and destroyed.

The fluid situation prevailing during delaying operations will necessitate constant

and close coordination between adjacent units to ensure that:

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(1)

positions and manoeuvre of own troops is known;

(2)

mutual support of fire is possible;

(3)

beginning and end of specific operations are known; and

(4)

awareness of the situation and probable intention of the adversary are

known.

Disengagement. Troops withdrawing from a position must attempt to break contact

with the adversary. Withdrawing through a position occupied by another unit, or suddenly

breaking off the engagement when the adversary is unable to immediately follow-up, can

achieve this. The important decision is to judge the correct moment when to withdraw from

each position. The withdrawal must not occur too early, as it would result in a failure to achieve

maximum delay; and not too late to risk unnecessary casualties or of being overrun.

Counterattacks may be necessary to achieve disengagement.

Breaking Contact. The final disengagement from the adversary will be the complete

breaking of contact to occur upon the move of the delaying force into an area where another

force takes over responsibility. This is a critical operation, especially if the delaying force

experiences difficulty in breaking clean from the adversary. The overall commander will specify

a handover line. If a defence is following the delaying operation, elements from the defending

force may have to be deployed to assist the delay force in breaking contact. The adversary

should be given as little indication as possible of the intention to break contact. The move back

into the MDA must be planned and coordinated in detail as a rearward passage of lines. The

withdrawing force must provide timely information to in-place force on its planned withdrawal

and on the battle situation. Liaison elements will be detached to the in-place force to identify

withdrawing units as they approach and pass through.

Employment of Reserves. Reserves are important for the maintenance of the

cohesion and continuity of delaying operations, particularly where the adversary has been able

to outflank or to penetrate through gaps between delaying force elements. In order to maintain

flexibility over varying terrain, it will often be necessary to establish local reserves rather than

relying upon one concentrated reserve force. At a lower level, reserves will be minimal or

simply consist of the employment of an element of the force that is not actively engaged. At

higher echelons, forces may be specifically designated as reserves. Tasks for reserves may

include:

Blocking. Containing the adversary in the area where insufficient forces have

previously been deployed.

Counterattacks. Normally, these will have limited objectives. It may be

necessary to use reserves to counterattack into gaps or to achieve the

disengagement of heavily committed forces.

Covering Actions. Reserves may also be used in prepared positions to cover

withdrawing forces to enable them to continue the engagement in more

favourable terrain.

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791. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN THE DELAY

CSS considerations for delaying operations are similar to those for the defence and

include the following:

Support elements and stocks should be echeloned rearward on successive

positions; whenever possible, supplies should be kept mobile. Careful

consideration should be given to the OPLAN before stocks are deployed in pre-

positioned dumps.

The evacuation of supplies and equipment that have been pre-positioned should

be planned as early as possible; those, which cannot be moved, should be

destroyed. Medical support must provide for the rapid evacuation of casualties

to rear area medical facilities. Medical supplies and equipment, in accordance

with the Geneva Conventions, must be marked as such and left in place if they

cannot be evacuated.

Maintenance should be concentrated on the equipment required to conduct

delaying operations and withdrawal. Unserviceable equipment that cannot be

repaired immediately should be evacuated to rear areas. Recovery vehicles

should be positioned at critical locations to keep routes open.

Transportation priorities should be given to the movement of combat troops and

their supplies, the movement of material used to impede the adversary, and the

evacuation of casualties and repairable equipment.

A major consideration is to sequence and coordinate the movement of CSS to ensure

that the delaying force has continuity of support. After crossing the handover line the delaying

force will often need to be refurbished.

792. SUMMARY

To delay is a common tactic to gain time. It is a difficult operation to undertake,

particularly over a wide area with limited assets available to carry it out. Every opportunity must

be taken, however, to seize the initiative from the adversary and to force him to proceed with

caution and endure attrition, thus slowing him and achieving the time required to prepare the

main defensive position.

SECTION 17

STABILITY OPERATIONS

793. DEFINITION AND PURPOSE

Stability operations are defined as “tactical operations conducted by military forces in

conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore and establish a climate of order within

which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved.”¹⁷²

¹⁷² Army Terminology Panel approved October 2005.

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The fundamental premise underpinning the continuum of operations (see Chapter 3) is

that military forces are likely to be simultaneously engaged in a range of tactical activities—

offensive, defensive, and stability. Together, they constitute the range of military tactical

operations that will be conducted by military forces within a campaign.

Long term security and stability are impossible without meeting the immediate needs of

local populations, such as the provision of essential services, humanitarian aid and responsible

governmental institutions. Thus, there is an enormous role for other elements of the JIMP

framework to assume these lines of operations on the path to operational and strategic

objectives and end states. This will involve a combination of governments, regional

organizations, multilateral bodies, international institutions and non-governmental organizations

(NGOs). There is therefore the requirement for these disparate organizations to define

responsibilities, to develop a shared understanding, reduce redundancy, maximize resources

and synchronize activities, all within a single campaign, to achieve a strategic objective and end

state. In short, they must be linked by a unifying theme. The application of an effects-based

approach at all planning levels will identify the operational objectives, the effects through which

they are realized, and the tactical tasks needed to create those effects.

Multi-agency involvement in campaigns is impossible without adequate security and the

provision of a permissive environment for their operation and freedom to work. A lack of

security will hamper and even preclude the activities of those lines of operation conducted by

other agencies: humanitarian work; infrastructure reconstruction and development; economic

development; and governmental development. This required security is provided by military

operations.

The purpose of stability operations¹⁷³ is to establish and maintain the conditions for

normal civic activity and responsible government. It provides the security and control over

areas to allow this development and the freedom of manoeuvre for other elements of the JIMP

framework to bring lasting security, particularly for local governments and populations. The

security and control provide freedom of manoeuvre for a local populace so that normal civil

activities such as local markets may take place.

In certain campaigns or at the early stages of many campaigns, the military may be the

only organization capable of operating in the security environment. Yet the need for

reconstruction, humanitarian aid, policing and other such activities will exist. Thus, the military

may have to assume initial tactical responsibility, with their existing organization, for some lines

of operation that are best conducted by civilian organizations. It is therefore essential that such

situations are planned, force packaged, trained for in advance, and coordinated with other

agencies so that initial military efforts are complementary to longer term plans.

In due course, these responsibilities should be assumed by other elements of the JIMP

framework best suited to conduct them. Even if military forces first initiate these lines of

operation and constituent activities, their planning and design should be done in conjunction

with those other agencies that will eventually assume responsibility for them. This will ensure a

unifying theme and overall guidance, and allow the initial military efforts to be complementary to

later efforts by other JIMP elements.

¹⁷³ It must be remembered that the term “stability operations” does not describe a campaign theme. It is,

however, the group of tactical operations that will predominate in such campaigns as peace support and

counter-insurgency. Even during major combat operations, there will be a requirement to undertake

some stability operations.

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Stability activities will create effects on the moral and physical planes. The delivery of

humanitarian aid, the reconstruction of essential services and the provision of public safety

through framework patrols will not only create physical effects, but will improve the confidence

and security of the populace, and thus their acceptance of the military forces and their mission.

Stability operations and their associated tactical activities will play a role in all campaign

themes, even in major combat. For example, following a major offensive, there will be a need to

establish security for a local civilian populace, stop any looting and provide emergency

humanitarian relief. The import and emphasis placed upon stability operations will vary with the

campaign and within each campaign. Stability operations will drive the predominant tactical

activities within the campaign themes short of major combat.

10.

The military should be engaged at all levels at the earliest stage possible of both the

planning and conduct of the campaign in order to ensure that a security vacuum is not allowed

to develop. Therefore, at the tactical level the military must, in cooperation with other agencies,

conduct planning to ensure that security is enforced and maintained through a balance of

tactical activities relevant to the adversary. Failure to do this opens a window of opportunity for

destabilizing elements to disrupt progress towards the strategic end state that underpins the

campaign.

11.

The development and maintenance of a safe, secure and stable environment remains

the underlying reason to conduct stability operations.

794. STABILITY OPERATIONS—TACTICAL ACTIVITIES

A comprehensive approach will be applied to campaigns to include all elements of the

JIMP framework, working within a unifying theme, to consider and address the full range of

influences and factors in a destabilized environment. The military strategic end state is likely to

aim to promote and maintain a safe and secure environment. Stability operations are

conducted throughout all campaigns in conjunction with offensive and defensive operations. In

achieving order, security and control, the range of operations is likely to involve both coercive

and cooperative actions.

Stability operations include a wide range of tactical activities. The chief activity relates to

security and control so that the military and other agencies may freely operate and undertake

additional activities, and so that civilian populaces and local governments are free to undertake

the normal activities of a civic society. It will allow the other instruments of power—diplomatic

and economic—to predominate. In short, the tactical activities all seek to set the conditions for

good governance and long-term stability.

Stability operations consist of the following tactical activities:

Security and Control. The provision of general security and control allows the

civilian populace and other elements of the JIMP framework the freedom and

safety to conduct normal civic activities and to build institutions that support a

lasting stability.

Support to Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration. This activity,

referred to as DDR, involves the standing down of former combat forces and

their reintegration to civil society or a newly structured military force. It will

require the involvement of a range of agencies and ideally will include

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programmes to avoid the creation of a large mass of unemployed, possibly

embittered, former soldiers. Military forces will have a key role in assisting and

securing the process. It is important to note that the DDR process may only

apply to a portion of a military (e.g., conscripts), while the remainder may

undergo security sector reform (SSR).

Support to Security Sector Reform. SSR is a key aspect for the long-term

stability and development of a nation. It is the reformation of the various

elements of a nation’s security sector, and like DDR, will involve a multi-agency

approach with other governmental and international agencies dealing with the

judiciary and police forces. The military will have a key role in

reforming/developing the nation’s military capabilities.

Support to Civilian Infrastructure and Governance. Ideally, the

reconstruction of essential services and the provision of governance will fall to

JIMP agencies other than the military. In the early stages of a campaign, the

military may have to fill the void until the security situation improves.

Additionally though, the military may wish to pursue some of these tasks,

particularly on the tactical levels, in order to engender ongoing support from

local populaces, that is, create effects on the moral plane.

Assistance to Other Agencies. At times, military forces may choose to, or be

required to, provide assistance to other agencies. These are likely to be “P”

elements of the JIMP framework, to include NGOs, public volunteer

organizations (PVOs), and international commercial organizations. The

provision of such assistance should be done with the aim of creating desired

effects on both the physical and moral planes.

These tactical activities are realized through a series of tactical tasks, which are

discussed in detail further on in this chapter.

795. PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

Although all the principles of war may be applied to the conduct of stability operations,

the following are of particular relevance:

Cooperation. Stability operations will likely be carried out in conjunction with

other agencies in the JIMP framework, and often in direct support to them. A

spirit of cooperation will be vital and should be done in line with the unifying

theme that brings all lines of operation towards the desired objectives and end

state. Because the non-military members of the other agencies will likely have

little understanding of military means and methods, the onus will be on the

military commander to ensure sound cooperation between military and civilian

agencies, particularly when along a shared line of operation.

Security. The conduct of stability operations will see military elements working

amongst civilian populations, likely in urban areas, at the lowest tactical levels,

spread thinly over vast AOs. They are vulnerable, as are other elements of the

JIMP framework. Stability operations, particularly those requiring the assistance

of non-military agencies, must be conducted in an environment that is

reasonably safe from attack. This security framework may be imposed through

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a robust posture, with adversaries against stability countered in a timely manner

utilizing precision and the most suitable means. In many campaigns, such as

peace support or COIN, the fundamental of “minimum use of force” must still be

followed. Furthermore, the need for security must be balanced with the need to

work amongst populations, collect information and conduct info ops.

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. A strategically driven campaign plan

defining the theme, clear end state, objectives, measures of success, expected

tactical operations, and dedicated resources will be needed to ensure that the

aim is clearly identified from the outset and can be maintained throughout the

campaign. The campaign plan should identify the types of stability operations

envisioned to help reach the operational objectives. Training and required

resources to undertake these activities will be identified.

Economy of Effort. Stability operations, particularly the need to provide a

continuous framework security presence and the defence of vital areas, are

demanding in terms of personnel and time. Best efforts must be made to

reduce tasks and allow other agencies to assume them whenever possible.

796.

FUNDAMENTALS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

The fundamentals for the conduct of stability operations are:

Unity of Purpose. It is vital that all military and non-military agencies working in

the theatre are linked in unity of purpose and coherency of action. This should

exist between military, political and civilian agencies. Ideally, it will be

articulated in the commander’s intent by way of a unifying theme. It should

reflect the comprehensive approach taken to create the desired effects on the

moral and physical planes, working towards the operational objectives. The

conditions and mindsets for this unity must be established at the outset of

campaign planning.

Effective Synchronization with other Tactical Operations. Stability

operations must be effectively synchronized and integrated with offensive and

defensive operations. Efforts and resources will shift as required during the

campaign in order to reach the desired end state. An imbalance of resources

towards one type of tactical operation will preclude long-term success. For

example, a continual attempt to engage insurgents in a COIN, while ignoring the

root causes of the insurgency and the needs of the populace, will lead to

campaign failure. Likewise, the poor synchronization of tactical operations will

jeopardize overall success. For example, the failure to quickly repair collateral

damage following offensive actions will lose public support for the campaign.

Legitimacy. Stability operations must be taken from a position of legitimacy.

The operations must be legitimate in terms of meeting justifiable campaign

objectives, and they must be seen to be legitimate by the local populace. A

well-planned info op will be required to support this position.

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Effective Coordination and Synchronization of Indigenous Security

Infrastructures and Forces. Ideally, many tactical stability operations will be

conducted in conjunction with local security forces. This will add to the

legitimacy of the operations and the military forces; add to the legitimacy of the

local security forces (if they are not completely supported by the local populace);

and, act as a training venue for the indigenous forces. This synchronization and

coordination with indigenous security forces, the reason for it and the limitations

to it, and the limit of their capabilities must be understood at the lowest levels.¹⁷⁴

Even if the indigenous forces cannot complete the tasks to the same standard

as the campaigning forces, the long-term effects of giving them ownership of the

tasks will be more important.

797. TACTICAL TASKS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

Each of the tactical activities that constitute stability operations will be comprised of a

wide variety of tactical tasks that can be assigned at the unit and subunit level. Just as the

attack within offensive operations will be realized through tactical tasks (e.g., destroy, secure,

support by fire, etc.), the conduct of stability operations will be realized through a collection of

associated tactical tasks. By way of illustration, Figure 7-9 offers a breakdown of the three

categories of operations and links them to their parallel tactical operations and tasks. The list of

tactical tasks is not all encompassing.

¹⁷⁴ In many cases, the indigenous security forces will be operating in conjunction with sections and

platoons. The commanders, therefore, must understand the reasons for the joint operations and the

limitations and capabilities of the local security forces, including OPSEC concerns.

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Tactical Ops

Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops

Stability Ops

Attack Attack by Fire

Defence

Security and Control

Operation

Raid Ambush

Delay

Support to

s consist

Demobilization,

of tactical

Exploitation

Disarmament and

activities

Reintegration (DDR)

Pursuit

Support to Security

Tactical Activities

Break-out

Sector Reform (SSR)

Feint

Support to Civilian

Infrastructure and

Demonstration

Governance

Assistance to other

Activities are

Agencies

realized

through the

Destroy

Block

Cordon and Search

assignment of

tasks and

Seize

Occupy

Observe/Monitor

effects.

Secure

Counterattack

Vehicle Check Points

Support by Fire

Guard

Framework Patrols

Tactical Tasks and Effects

Fix

Humanitarian Aid

Delivery

(Not Inclusive List)

Retain

Train Indigenous

Security Forces

Notes:

Security and control refers to the establishment of a safe and secure environment, in which other non-

military agencies may operate and assist in the operational and strategic objectives.

Support to civilian infrastructure and governance will see military forces, at least initially, conducting tasks

that (re)build civilian infrastructure, and conduct or assist with certain aspects of governance, such as provision of

health care, rules of enforcement and humanitarian aid.

Assistance to other agencies refers to military assistance to specific agencies, helping them to reach

operational objectives. For example, military forces may be allocated to assist election organizers with security and

logistical support.

Mission statements relating to stability activities and tasks will use the transient verb “conduct” to assign

the activity, such as “...will conduct security and control in order to…”. This would then be allocated as tactical tasks

and effects to subordinates, such as vehicle check points (VCPs), framework patrols, etc. At the lower tactical

levels, the tactical tasks may only appear in the mission statement, but again continue to use the verb “conduct,”

such as, “…will conduct framework patrols in order to…,” or “…will conduct humanitarian aid delivery in order to…”.

In this manner, they are similar to mission statements for enabling operations. See B-GL-331-002/FP-000 Staff

Duties in the Field for further details.

Figure 7-9: Tactical Operations, Activities and Constituent Tasks and Effects

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The various tactical tasks that constitute stability operations will apply to more than one

type of operation. For example, a rifle company will use vehicle check points (VCPs) in

controlling civilian movement in the search for insurgents and will employ them when providing

security for civic elections.

The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for the tactical tasks will vary and are

published in other doctrine. The tactical tasks are often planned and conducted using the

principles from offensive and defensive operations. For example, a VCP is planned and sited

using the principles of the defence, such as depth and mutual support. The manner in which

stability operations and their associated tasks are conducted will be a command decision based

upon the assessment of the general situation, level of adversary, and most importantly, the

effect ultimately required.

It is the results that these types of tactical tasks have on the development of security that

is vital to transitioning between campaign themes. The sensible domination and control of

areas provides reassurance to populations when seen to be legitimate and conducted in an

impartial manner. All operations will be supported by info ops, thus internally and externally

reinforcing the legitimacy and providing acceptance of the operation.

798. SECURITY AND CONTROL

During a campaign, military forces will be responsible for the provision of an overall

security framework in which other agencies and the public may operate. This will require the

military to conduct tactical operations that will provide security and control over routes and

areas. This will help stabilize the security situation and allow for the normalcy of daily civic

activities. Indigenous security forces may be able to assist.

An aspect of a secure environment may be the requirement to exercise a degree of

control over an indigenous population, their security forces or former warring factions. This may

be conducted by tactical measures such as checkpoints, curfews, movement restrictions and

the like.

This security framework is manpower intensive and sees military forces conducting low-

level tactical operations in a virtually pervasive sense, while maintaining the ability to react

quickly to adversaries against the stability of the situation, normally by use of reserves, possibly

as a quick reaction force (QRF).

The requirement to provide general security and control will decrease as operations are

undertaken and the causes of instability are defeated, disrupted, dislocated or solved. In terms

of removing physical adversaries against stability, the situation will likely improve initially during

daylight hours, but security during hours of darkness will take more effort.

The conduct of control and security tasks is an excellent opportunity for the collection of

HUMINT since soldiers are likely in constant contact with the civilian populace. All efforts

should be made to transfer responsibility for maintaining security to the indigenous security

forces as they become available and competent. This will reduce dependency and support the

legitimacy of such forces. A period of transition will likely be required with forces mentoring

indigenous forces through joint operations.

Security and control operations will require the tactical tasks tabled at Figure

7-10, and supported by relevant TTP.

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Tactical Tasks:

Framework Patrolling

Separation of Hostile Forces

Security

Route Control (Vehicle Check Point [VCPs])

Observation

and Control

Curfew

Cordon and Search

Crowd Confrontation Operations (CCO)

Enforcement of Restricted

Areas

Figure 7-10: Tactical Tasks for Security and Control (Not an all-inclusive List)

799. SUPPORT TO DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

The DDR of armed elements—be they formal military forces, gangs, para-military

militias, etc.—will rely upon strategic direction and detailed OPLANs. It will be a multi-agency

endeavour, but the military forces will have a key role to play, particularly in the early stages.

The DDR process may apply to military, police and para-military forces, but most likely and most

immediately to illegitimate factions such as insurgent groups, criminal gangs, private armies and

the like.

In many instances, established military forces should not go through a DDR process as

they provide a source of recognized security or control for a populace. Although conscripts

called up for a particular conflict may undergo the DDR process, the standing army of a nation

should likely go through a process of reform (i.e., SSR).

DDR is discussed more fully in Annex A. In general, military forces supporting a DDR

process can expect to undertake some or all of the tasks tabled at Figure 7-11. Other partners

within the JIMP environment will be responsible for long-term reintegration of the former

combatants.

Tactical Tasks:

Disarmament of security forces, militias and/or illegally armed groups.

Weapons collection and accounting.

Support to

DDR

Weapons destruction.

Protection, escort and transportation of demobilized personnel.

Assistance in the selection of a new security service.

Figure 7-11: Tactical Tasks for Support to DDR (Not an all-inclusive List)

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7100. SUPPORT TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

SSR flows from strategic direction and will require an operational level plan that will

incorporate the roles of multiple agencies addressing the various aspects of the entire security

sector. It will include, but is not limited to, the future military forces to be developed, policing,

penal and judiciary reform, border security, customs control, and other such aspects of the

overall security structure. The military will have a supporting role in some undertakings and a

lead role in others, specifically in the training and organization of new military forces.

SSR is discussed more fully in Annex B. In general, military forces supporting an SSR

process can expect to undertake some or all of the tasks tabled at Figure 7-12.

Tactical Tasks:

Selection and recruitment of future security force personnel.

Support to SSR

Allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure.

Training, mentoring and transfer of responsibility to indigenous military,

and in the short term, other security forces such as police and border

guards.

Figure 7-12: Tactical Tasks for Support to SSR (Not an All-Inclusive List)

SECTION 18

SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE¹⁷⁵

7101. GENERAL

Depending upon the situation and the adversary, military forces may be required to

undertake tactical tasks to support civilian infrastructure and governance. These are effectively

information operations tasks, in that they seek to influence the populace by providing long-

term benefit and stability. They will help ensure that the local populace remains supportive of

the military campaign and detract from the growth of dissatisfaction with, and resistance to, the

campaign itself. Commanders and their staff are responsible for identifying and assessing the

infrastructure and governance requirements, and they are enabled through civil-military

cooperation (CIMIC) resources.

These tactical activities may include reconstruction of essential civil services and

infrastructures (or even construction if they did not exist in the first place), such as the provision

of water sources, essential medical assistance, and repairs to roads, ports and airports.

¹⁷⁵ Governance is defined as the “action or manner of governing.” To govern is defined as “control of the

laws and affairs of a state, organisation or community” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10^th Ed). Governance

is sometimes referred to as “nation building” although the term governance should be used.

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In terms of governance, military forces may be required to fill, temporarily, a void in

certain areas of civil governance. For example, military forces may have to assume low-level

economic development, school establishment and management, border security, the

management of essential health services and key humanitarian aid. Governance may be

defined in the broadest sense and include aspects of economic institutions (both public and

private) and educational institutions.

Initially, military forces may be the only agency able to work in the security situation. In

such a case, very limited infrastructure and governance activities can be undertaken and will

focus on life-essential services, such as the delivery of humanitarian aid and the provision of

clean water. In other circumstances, civilian agencies may be available to assume some

operations, but may well be supporting an overall military lead.

As the security situation improves and non-military agencies and departments arrive and

are capable of assuming and expanding infrastructure and governance activities, the military

forces move to a supporting role. As the situation continues to improve, the demand for military

resources and security will decline and other agencies and departments will assume most, and

ideally all, of these infrastructure and governance activities. It must be remembered that even

when other agencies and departments begin to assume responsibilities and governance, they

may not bring sufficient resources and personnel. Thus, the military may continue to provide

infrastructure and governance until sufficient personnel and resources are imported, or are

developed domestically.

7102. SUPPORT TO INFRASTRUCTURE

Support to infrastructure includes the initial restoration of essential services and facilities.

Although it will be undertaken to varying degrees by all arms, it is primarily the domain of military

engineers and medical services. Support to infrastructure may be conducted for two reasons.

Firstly, they may be done in support of our own troops, such as route and airfield repair to enable

mobility, or the provision of street lighting to help minimize troop levels needed to maintain security at

night. Secondly, they are conducted to improve the quality of life of the local population and thus

create beneficial effects on the moral and physical planes for the local population and other agencies.

The former will assist short-term tactical support; however, the latter reason will support long-term

success and stability, and thus operational and strategic end states.

Effects may include helping to “fix” the population and influence its support for the

mission and the mandate. This can be done through such means as the provision of safe

drinking water at specified locations, the delivery of humanitarian aid, the restoration of electrical

power, and minimizing political problems through the avoidance of humanitarian disasters.

Initial restoration to infrastructure may be temporary and improvised, in advance of a more

permanent solution by contractors or others in the JIMP framework, in the medium or longer

term. In general, military forces providing support to infrastructure restoration can expect to

undertake some or all of the tasks tabled at Figure 7-13.

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Tactical Tasks for Infrastructure Restoration:

Provision of mobility on roads, railways and waterways.

Restoration of airfields, harbours and ports.

Provision of essential water, fuel and power.

Support to Infrastructure

& Governance

Restoration of essential health and public buildings and

services; including sewage and waste.

Limited medical assistance/advice.

Enabling of humanitarian aid.

Securing key national infrastructure.

Figure 7-13: Tactical Tasks for Support to Infrastructure Restoration (Not an all-inclusive List)

Support to infrastructure tasks may include the preparation of an emergency

infrastructure plan and the securing and safeguarding of discrete national infrastructure assets,

such as oilfields, which will be vital to the economic viability of the nation.

Infrastructure restoration will be costly in terms of resources and manpower. Wherever

security allows, maximum use should be made of the skills and knowledge of local workers and

contractors in restoring and running local infrastructure in order to ease the burden on the

military, as well as in helping to develop the local economy.

Such tactical activities will not only be planned at the operational level, but will be

conducted at the lower tactical levels as well. Units and subunits will undertake low-level tasks,

such as repairs to school well pumps or repairs to a local orphanage, not only for the altruistic

reasons, but also for the sake of engendering support amongst the local officials and populace.

The provision of CIMIC funds at the tactical level will benefit this practice.

Ultimately, support to infrastructure will contribute to the longer-term campaign

objectives of allowing the nation to recover and become self-sustaining in terms of stability.

TACTICAL LEVEL SUPPORT TO INFRASTRUCTURE RESTORATION—

OP HALO 2004

During operations in Haiti in early 2004, 8 Regiment, USMC undertook garbage removal

from the main MSRs [main supply routes] of Port au Prince. The main reason for the

task was to clear the MRSs for the mobility of the coalition forces. Secondarily,

however, it assisted the local population and helped return the situation to its normal

conditions. Although the regiment used its own resources, it also contracted local trucks

and workers, and provided security for them. The task was conducted only during the

hours of darkness, which avoided upsetting the daytime activities of the local populace

and provided an additional security presence at night.

Extracted from the Op HALO After-Action Report of I Coy, 2 RCR

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7103. SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

Military expertise may be sought to support various governance activities. In the early

stages of a campaign the military may be the only agency capable of assuming such

responsibility due to its innate ability to operate in a non-permissive environment, to assist in

planning and management, and to provide communications, command and leadership. Indeed,

certain campaigns may require a distinct line of operation dealing with governance. This type of

stability activity is difficult to categorize and will depend upon the situation and the requirements.

Ideally, planning and the conduct of governance related tasks will be done in conjunction with

those other JIMP agencies that hold an expertise in these areas.

Governance operations provide leadership and management for basic public services

while helping to develop an effective, participatory local public management capacity.

Governance operations at the local level set the conditions for national-level projects and the

transition to other agencies, and ultimately, to civil authority.

Specifically, governance involves a unique set of public management tasks and

competencies that do not normally reside within a conventional military organization. They

require blending interagency capabilities through integrated civil-military planning, supported by

effective societal intelligence.¹⁷⁶ The introduction of competent civilian agencies to assume

governance tasks should be done as early as possible.

Requirements for interim governance by military forces may include the following:

commercial support and economic institutions (e.g., establishment of local

markets, banks and village business cooperatives);

public transportation nodes, such as ports and airports;

management of essential services and industries;

educational institutions and infrastructure;

public civil service institutions, to include refuse, health, customs, media, etc.;

political institutions, particularly at the local, municipal level, such as a mayor’s

office and support staff;

humanitarian assistance and aid distribution;

enabling political negotiation at local level;

providing pan-agency C2 framework;

rule of law implementation, specifically policing duties against criminal activity

and border control; and

support to elections.

¹⁷⁶ Major Troy Thomas, US Air Force, “Governance Operations in Future Conflict,” Military Review

(January-February 2006).

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It is unlikely that the military will completely run these institutions, but it will have to

assume a leadership, organizational and mentoring role for the local populace employed in such

institutions.

7104. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR SUPPORT TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND

GOVERNANCE

Ideally, the requirement for support to infrastructure and governance will be foreseen in

the campaign planning process. In conducting such operations, the military must ensure:

That the operations be planned and conducted within the available resources

and that appropriate priorities and additional requirements are identified.

That they are planned within the JIMP framework to be in concert with the

agencies that will assume ultimate responsibility.

That they not encourage a dependency. They should be conducted with a view

to enabling the domestic populace to take control of the activity.

That promises are not made that cannot be kept or that are significantly delayed

in their fulfilment. This will only undermine the campaign, undermine the

population’s support for the campaign and cause great resentment, even to the

point of creating active resistance to the campaign.

Infrastructure and governance activities can be better realized through a unified

command structure; that is, with all agencies working to a single commander. In the earliest

stages, this single commander may be a military authority. As civilian authorities arrive and

assume responsibilities, overall command may be passed to a civilian agency lead, and then

ideally to a domestic lead.

During Op IRAQI FREEDOM, a US Army Battalion commander assumed the role of

interim major of the city of NAJAF. During this period, the commander was placed within

two chains of command: his military chain of command and the command of the Central

Provisional Authority (CPA). At times, orders were contradictory and caused conflict and

confusion. Ideally, a single chain of command would have existed. The transition plan

would have ideally seen the military commander hand-over the mayor responsibilities to

a CPA authority, and then to a domestic authority, who would, along with subordinate

civilians, have undergone a mentoring process with the CPA.

Taken from USMC Joint Urban Warrior Conference, 03 April 2006

7105. ASSISTANCE TO OTHER AGENCIES

Within the JIMP framework, there will be agencies operating that may require military

assistance. This assistance may include the provision of transport and security to select NGOs

or other such assistance to their operations. This assistance must be clearly linked to the info

ops being conducted concurrently to ensure a unified message and effect are created. They

must be inline with operational and strategic objectives. They also provide additional

opportunity for information collection and the development of situational awareness.

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7106. PLANNING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS AS PART OF CAMPAIGN PLANNING

Planning for any campaign must give consideration to the requirement to conduct

stability operations. The emphasis given will depend upon the type of campaign envisioned, but

it must be remembered that even major combat will see a requirement for stability operations

that will only grow over time.

In planning, lines of operation will be formulated that will consist mainly of stability

activities and their constituent tasks. These lines of operation will be shared between military

and civilian forces, with ideally, the latter assuming complete responsibility in due course for

these lines of operation. Thus, it is vital that these other elements of the JIMP framework be

involved in the planning from the outset.

Planning will require careful analysis to define the nature of the problem and the

remedial action to be taken. The population’s needs in various areas should be considered¹⁷⁷

and other agencies will be of great assistance in ascertaining those needs. The challenge in

effecting lasting changes to improve stability in these circumstances further reinforces the

requirement for a harmonized response, coordinated between the political, economic, military,

security sector, and the potential plethora of supporting agencies from the international arena.

Coordinated activities to improve the security and control of a state are likely to be similar

whether disruptive influences have developed or not. Such activities are conducted within a

context dominated by the following factors, which should be considered in the planning process:

the environment (e.g., urban, rural, urban/rural interface, infrastructure, media);

the adversary (e.g., lack of law and order, any insurgents’ aims, capabilities and

degree of support from the population);

the political situation (e.g., stable, fluid, transitional, democratic);

historical and social linkages (including past alliances, religion, demographics

and economic dependency);

the cultural norms (e.g., the education or employment of women in some

societies may be more of a destabilizing rather than stabilizing effect).;

the economic and social situation (e.g., full employment, acceptable standard of

living, or poor conditions providing fertile ground for the recruitment of activists);

and

the security environment (e.g., active, effective and respected civil police,

functioning judiciary and penal system).

Consideration of the above factors will identify areas where external support will be

required to assist in the restoration of stability in pursuance of the strategic end state. Such

analysis will provide guidance on the cultural aspects relevant to operations at all levels, and will

provide direction for information and intelligence strategies and operations.

¹⁷⁷ While this is a complicated analysis, consideration of Maslow’s theory might be a suitable start point.

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During the targeting process consideration should be given to the degree to which

infrastructure may be affected and a careful review should be conducted to:

Avoid, where possible, targeting infrastructure that will be required to restore the

nation.

Minimize the long-term damage to any infrastructure that must be targeted in

order to achieve the required effect during offensive or defensive operations.

Protect infrastructure that may be vulnerable to other adversaries, yet will be

required to restore the nation.

The level of instability will relate to the adversary, conventional or unconventional, and

potentially include disorder, criminality, acts of terrorism, and the existence or development of

an insurgency. Consideration of the state of the existing political situation and indigenous

security apparatus will determine the need for the application of military forces. This will dictate

the task organization of the military component and the initial lead instrument determining

whether the military are supported or in a supporting role.

Consideration should be given during the planning process to those tasks that will be

conducted within the JIMP framework when the security situation allows. This will ensure the

correct allocation of responsibilities and funding to assist in future plans for transition. For

example, the provision of initial medical assistance without a guarantee of another organization

eventually accepting responsibility may see a dependency develop which would have an

adverse effect on the disengagement of the military. The consideration of responsibility and

plans for transfer of responsibility is a vital planning consideration at all levels of command

requiring close liaison between agencies.

As with all operations the situation must be constantly monitored and assessed, and

measures of effectiveness employed to determine where, when and how progress is being

made. Security and control are easily affected by adversarial forces, or by the general attitude

and reaction of the population to events or a perceived overly aggressive posture by military

forces. Situational changes will require re-evaluation and potentially significant changes in

posture, force level and type of operations and tactics.

Finally, planners must remember that promises made to civilian populations and their

governments, in terms of support and infrastructure development, that are not kept will only lead

to resentment and even hostility to the campaign. Early and continuous commitment of

resources to stability operations will be vital to securing a lasting security.

SECTION 19

APPLICATION OF STABILITY OPERATIONS IN CAMPAIGNS

7107. MAJOR COMBAT CAMPAIGNS

The majority of operations conducted in a campaign where major combat is the

predominant theme, are likely to be a combination of offensive and defensive. In the

achievement of success in a major combat phase, strategic planning will consider the

pursuance of those subsequent objectives leading eventually to “stability.” To that end, major

combat operations may be planned with a view to minimizing civilian casualties and damage

that will require later reconstruction; however, these considerations must not detract from the

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achievement of the combat objectives. Stability operations, planned for at the operational level

and anticipated and conducted at the tactical level, should therefore, be conducted primarily

after success of the offensive operations, and must be considered during the planning process

from the outset.

Stability operations planned and conducted at the operational and tactical level during

major combat will simply sow the seeds of transition towards the strategic end state. Effective

stability operations will produce positive results, upon which success can be built, rather than

antagonize populations and create adversarial feelings.

The manner in which seized areas are controlled is vital to providing an initial feeling of

legitimized security to a population. This does not mean that future offensive operations are not

mounted if the need arises, or that strict controlling methods such as segregation or curfew are

not applied. But, if such measures are implemented, then the populace should consider them

as legitimate control measures put in place for sound reasons. They will have to be supported

by sound info ops.

Furthermore, it is vital that the basic expectations of the populace be met, such as

security of criminal activities and emergency humanitarian aid. Failure to meet basic

expectations will only undermine support and legitimacy and frustrate long-term goals.

The DDR of prisoners and detainees is another function that immediately follows

offensive success. The manner in which defeated soldiers are treated can have significant

effect. Bad treatment, or simply failing to deal with them efficiently, could produce willing

insurgents in the future and discredit the security force. Proper treatment initially and eventual

reintegration could be the precursor stage for future SSR activity. Particular care must be taken

when dealing with civilian suspects. Poor treatment may polarize large segments of the

population into passive or active resistance.

While civil reconstruction is unlikely during major combat operations it is probable that

limited activities such as humanitarian assistance may be conducted. It also facilitates the

coordination of effort between agencies, brings credit to the military forces and supports

effective information operations.

Effective stability operations within major combat enable a defeated adversary, if

required, to be effectively disarmed, with a view to their eventual reintegration. Furthermore,

they should ensure that the population within the area secured understand the legitimacy of the

action, appreciate the levels of security provided and have hope for future development.

7108. COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS

In an insurgency, the focus for tactical level operations will be to support a COIN

campaign theme in line with the appropriate principles. In order to separate the insurgent from

his support, insurgents should be denied information, logistics, recruits, safe bases and popular

support. This can be achieved through physical separation and developing governmental

control from a firm base through a series of expanding secure areas. Stability operations,

supported by info ops, will assist in isolating the insurgent on both the physical and moral

planes.

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Neutralizing the insurgent is key to a successful COIN campaign, particularly the

neutralization of the insurgent leadership. Methods include killing, capturing, demoralizing,

deterring and promoting desertions. Stability operations, particularly as control and security

activities, will pre-empt, disrupt and dislocate the insurgent and his operations.

While offensive operations may have a significant impact on insurgents, real success in

a COIN will be achieved through a predominance of stability operations. The continued

prosecution of stability operations to improve security by control of areas and routes, the

development of indigenous security forces by investment in SSR, and the initiation of

improvement by reconstruction and governance activities, will enhance legitimacy and support

efforts to isolate any insurgents. The opportunities for offensive action in a COIN must be

balanced against the need to maintain an acceptable level of security and individual freedoms

for the population.

The fundamental of “minimum use of force” must be respected. Furthermore, during an

insurgency the interest of the national and international media will be sharply focussed,

reinforcing the requirement for operations to be legitimate. The application of stability

operations will assist in both these concerns.

7109. PEACE SUPPORT CAMPAIGNS

Stability operations will play a key role in a peace support campaign, and apart from

some force protection activities, may be the only tactical operations undertaken. However, the

ability, real and perceived, of military forces to switch to effective offensive operations will be

vital to ensuring the continuance of the peace process and a permissive environment. Military

presence can act as a deterrent to potential destabilizing elements, and if required, can be

employed in support of other security sector agencies if in existence, or in isolation, should the

need develop. Military presence will continue to provide security and confidence that

encourages participation in political and social activity.

In addition to providing the overarching security framework, the military may have a role

to play in ensuring that any emerging (indigenous) military force is properly organized and

trained. This falls within the requirement of SSR and the military should prepare for this

throughout any demobilization and disarmament process. The reintegration aspect of DDR is

the future employment of demobilized soldiers either into the security sector or back into a

regenerated civilian economy. All such operations will require a comprehensive approach

incorporating various JIMP agencies in addition to military forces.

While most military forces should not normally be expected to take on major rebuilding

tasks due to lack of civil engineering experience and resources, this does not preclude the

military from becoming involved in civil-military projects that utilize expertise and adds legitimacy

to their continued presence. This has relevance at both the tactical and operational levels.

Further, the military organizational, logistic and communications resources are often essential to

providing an overarching C2 framework for the initial stages of inter-agency coordination.

Most peace support campaigns will see a wide range of JIMP agencies operating

throughout the battlespace, particularly as the campaigns mature. Apart from working together

in a comprehensive approach to bringing lasting peace to a region, the military forces will be

expected to undertake the defence of other JIMP agencies should the security situation

deteriorate.

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Having achieved an enduring permissive environment where political and civilian

agencies can continue to contribute to the enduring tasks to bolster both political and economic

stability, the military presence can be reduced or withdrawn.

7110. PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

Peacetime military engagement (PME) can vary from the permanent presence of

personnel in a training and advisory role to infrequent joint exercises or liaison. Given the

overall security situation in such campaigns, other stability activities such as infrastructure and

governance development will likely be conducted by other members of the JIMP framework.

Permanent positioning of forces and embedding personnel in training or advisory roles

allows a close level of observation and influence over the military. Further, the commitment of

forces through permanent posting or joint exercise sends a positive message to the population.

It demonstrates continued interest in both their national and regional stability.

7111. LIMITED INTERVENTION

The military’s deployment for a limited intervention may require little or even no conduct

of stability operations, or may be solely dedicated to stability operations. This will depend

entirely upon the type of mission undertaken and the objectives.

A mission, such as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), will only focus on

securing an expatriate population for evacuation from a particular region. It may involve

emergency aid, including medical assistance, but will be very limited in both scope and duration.

Other missions, such as a disaster relief mission, will consist mainly of stability operations,

including emergency food and water delivery, rescue of victims from dangerous situations, and

the construction of temporary accommodations. Coordination with civilian agencies and NGOs

will be a key feature of most limited interventions.

7112. FORCE EMPLOYMENT FOR STABILITY ACTIVITIES

It is anticipated that stability activities will occur at the same time as offensive and

defensive combat activities. Hence, while one element of a unit or formation is conducting

offensive or defensive activities, other elements may be conducting stability activities, such as

the distribution of emergency humanitarian aid to, or providing security and stopping looting

amongst, those recently freed from an adversary occupation.

All military forces will be employed in the conduct of stability activities. Combat forces

not immediately involved in offensive or defensive activities can expect to undertake emergency

stability activities (e.g., local security, distribution of humanitarian aid) in order to support overall

objectives. These may occur immediately following the completion of offensive or defensive

activities, or they may be carried out independently should there be no requirement for the other

tactical activities at that given point in time.

No military force should expect to deploy to a campaign and conduct only stability

activities. Even during campaigns, such as low-threat peace support campaigns in which there

is not a great expectation of a requirement for offensive, defensive and enabling activities, and

the main effort is on stability activities, military forces must be prepared to conduct offensive and

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defensive activities. The nature of the campaign may unexpectedly change and a threat to the

forces or indigenous population may require the conduct of increased defensive and even

offensive activities.

SECTION 20

ALLOCATION OF MILITARY FORCES TO STABILITY ACTIVITIES

7113. GENERAL

All forces can expect to be employed in the conduct of stability activities, but no military

force should be structured and trained only for the conduct of stability activities. They must be

prepared and capable of conducting FSO and their role in offensive and defensive activities, be

it combat, combat support or CSS. However, some forces are more suited to the conduct of

certain aspects of stability activities (e.g., engineers for reconstruction).

In planning and execution, stability activities must be considered, planned and targeted

using the same processes and with the same operations staff as for offensive and defensive

activities. There will, of course, be additional requirements when planning stability activities to

conduct liaison and cooperation with other agencies and local authorities.

7114. FORCE EMPLOYMENT IN STABILITY ACTIVITIES

Certain types of forces, particularly those specialized in construction and material

management and support to infrastructure, will be in high demand during those campaigns that

require large scale stability activities. There will be a heavy reliance upon the ability to repair

and reconstruct, and even construct, services and facilities for indigenous populations and their

local authorities.

Despite the requirement for specialist forces, combat and combat support forces will still

play a valuable role in stability activities. The majority of tasks for the creation of local security

and control will fall to combat and combat support forces. However, combat and combat

support forces may assume low-level reconstruction tasks within their AO and provide

manpower to support specialists in the conduct of larger scale reconstruction tasks. It should be

remembered that combat units deployed amongst indigenous populations will be a good source

of information regarding the expectations and requirements of different sectors of the local

environment.

As security situations improve, other non-military agencies will assume responsibilities

and military forces should expect to work in cooperation with such agencies in the conduct of

stability activities.

Land force units may be employed along the following lines to execute stability activities:

Combat Forces. Combat forces can perform a range of functions in support of

stability activities:

(1)

Security and control over areas and routes, and for the security and

stability of indigenous populations, will be a common responsibility for

combat forces not employed in offensive or defensive activities. Such

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security provides manoeuvre capability for other agencies and local

authorities.

(2)

Non-infantry forces such as armour, combat engineers or artillery may be

employed in dismounted infantry-type roles should their core capabilities

not be required at any given time. They will assist in meeting the demand

for troop concentrations in such activities as security in an urban area.

(3)

They may provide point security for other forces conducing stability

activities such as local security for a medical clinic held to assist the local

population.

(4)

They may undertake low-level reconstruction projects such as assisting a

local school to rebuild. Although such undertakings do not make

enormous differences in the overall situation and welfare of an indigenous

population, they do support the info ops objectives of providing legitimacy

and support for the campaign.

(5)

Tasks will be assigned in support of the SSR and DDR processes. This

could include the provision of security to disarming former combatants

(particularly those who have disarmed before other former combatants),

control of demobilized weapons and equipment, and the provision of

training teams, mentors and advisors for the reform and development of

indigenous military and security forces.

(6)

Security and assistance for other agencies, such as convoy escort for

humanitarian NGOs and assistance in the conduct of elections.

Combat Support Forces. Combat support elements can assume a large range

of stability activities. Some of their unique skill sets make them suitable for

specific requirements:

(1)

Engineer forces can expect to play a major role in stability activities, and

in particular, in reconstruction tasks to include:

(a)

airports and airfields;

(b)

seaports;

(c)

repairs and maintenance to municipal services such as water

supply and electricity;

(d)

road repair and construction;

(e)

emergency supply of potable water using integral resources;

(f)

infrastructure construction such as the building or repair of

schools;

(g)

training and mentoring of local security forces in the conduct of

engineer related tasks; and

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(h)

leading mine, improvised explosive device (IED), and unexploded

explosive ordnance (UXO) clearance teams, and training and

monitoring indigenous forces or others in this role.

(2)

Communications and signals units will support stability activities through a

number of means, but their expertise in communication nodes and links

may be exploited to assist indigenous populations with the establishment

of local communications networks.

Combat Service Support Forces. The integral capabilities of CSS units will

render them valuable to the conduct of a wide range of stability activities. The

contribution of these forces will be most valuable in the info ops goals,

specifically in terms of engendering support from the local populations and their

leaders, and in influencing their opinions and actions. CSS units will support

stability activities along the following lines:

(1)

Assistance in the delivery of humanitarian aid.

(2)

Security and control in the rear areas or in areas around their own

operating bases.

(3)

Training and mentoring of indigenous CSS forces and of their HQ CSS

staff.

(4)

Military police will assist with local control and security duties, and will

assist in the training and mentoring of indigenous security forces,

particularly civilian police and military police. Ideally, the training of

civilian constabularies can be passed to other agencies specifically

qualified for such roles.

(5)

Assist with civilian transport routes and control measures, including air

traffic control and support to harbour operations.

(6)

Medical units may provide emergency medical care for an indigenous

population, and conduct clinics for the population. Such interactions with

the local populace and the favourable conditions they create are good

opportunities for HUMINT teams to exploit in terms of cultivating casual

contacts and information.

(7)

Other CSS units will provide advice and expertise in the governance of

local institutions, such as hospitals, schools and other governmental

services. Military officials may even hold positions of governmental

authority until local authorities are prepared to install their own leaders.

CIMIC Advisor/Commander. Staff conversant in CIMIC matters or CIMIC

element commanders will provide the liaison and cooperation function that will

support and enable many of the stability activities. Supported by the intelligence

staff, they will enable stability activities in the following manner:

(1)

identify the local leaders and power holders, and advise on linkages in

power structures;

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(2)

coordinate infrastructure and governance requirements with the local

auhtorities;

(3)

assess needs independent of the claims of local authorities;

(4)

recommend priorities for the conduct of stability activities in terms of

reconstruction and governance;

(5)

gather information regarding potential threats;

(6)

identify and assess other agencies including NGOs and IOs in the area,

and their capabilities and requirements for military support and protection;

and

(7)

facilitate coordination with NGOs and IOs, and help ensure

complementary activities and tasks are being conducted.

PSYOPS Advisor/Commander. Staff officers and PSYOPS element

commanders should be able to support and enhance the conduct of stability

activities. They will, for example, implement public announcements regarding

the activities and will advertise their benefits to indigenous populations through

various media means.

Targeting Cell. The planning and targeting processes for stability activities are

done concurrently with those for all other tactical activities in a holistic,

comprehensive manner, and by the same staff and commanders in the pursuit

of the objectives. For example, if an offensive activity such as an attack is

planned in an area in which civilians live, and in which a valuable natural

resource is located, the plans for the attack must be considered along with the

plans to provide aid and security for the civilian population, and with the plans to

immediately remediate any damage done by a withdrawing adversary (such as

fires caused to oil wells).

7115.

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION IN BUILDING INDIGENOUS CAPACITY

General. In order to facilitate the building of indigenous capability, particularly through

interim governance and restoration of essential services, there will be a significant requirement

for close cooperation with the civil agencies within the AO.

Civil-military Organizations. In order to coordinate the activities of the military and

other agencies, commanders may either be directed to form or assist in the formation of civil-

military bodies, or they may create an ad hoc organization. Depending upon the campaign and

local situation, these civil-military groupings will aim to build indigenous capacity in infrastructure

and civil institutions. The lead of such bodies will be dependent upon the situation. It may be

military, it may be civil, or it may simply be a cooperative structure.

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SECTION 21

COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR STABILITY ACTIVITIES

7116. GENERAL

The command and control of forces as they conduct stability activities will differ little from

any other activity. The allocation of tasks will result from the same sort of planning and estimate

process, albeit the tasks will obviously differ.

Notwithstanding the altruistic reasons that may exist for the conduct of stability activities,

they are planned and conducted with the aim of creating effects on the moral plane; that is, they

seek to influence individuals and groups to think and act in a particular manner, namely to

support the campaign and to reject support to the adversary.

During the conduct of stability activities, commanders must ensure that due

consideration is given to the prevailing threat and that the stability activities themselves will

likely be targeted when faced with an unconventional threat. The massing of civilians at certain

stability activities, such as the conduct of a medical clinic, will present an attractive target to

some adversaries. Therefore, planning for stability activities must always include consideration

of the need for local security and intelligence assessment.

7117. UNIFIED COMMAND AND COORDINATION

Successful, long term stability activities that meet the expectations and eventual

demands of an indigenous population will only be met through the work of non-military agencies

who have the expertise, resources, funding and ultimate mandate for such activities. While the

military forces may begin stability activities at the outset of a campaign, all effort must be made

to quickly encourage and incorporate non-military agencies into the campaign plan.

While the responsibility for certain stability activities, such as security and control and

training of indigenous military forces will always remain the remit of military forces, other stability

activities, such as infrastructure development and governance activities (e.g., judiciary reform,

hospital management, etc.), will best be conducted by other, non-military agencies. The military

may continue to support and assist, but responsibility for their conduct must be passed as

quickly as possible.

This is part of the comprehensive approach in which all agencies work in harmony and in

a complementary fashion to achieve common objectives and a common end state. This

comprehensive approach can be better realized through a unified command structure; that is,

with all agencies, military and non-military, working to a single commander. In the earliest

stages, this single commander may be a military authority. As civilian authorities arrive and

assume responsibilities, overall command may be passed to a civilian agency lead, and then

ideally to an indigenous lead.

Such a unified command structure will take some time to develop and in many

campaigns it never will materialize. However, the underlying philosophy of cooperation in

achieving complementary and reinforcing effects to realize shared objectives can still be

practised. The onus may rest with military commanders who through their personal intervention

facilitate the maximum amount of interagency cooperation possible to ensure that activities are

coordinated and complementary. Additionally, efforts may have to be made in situations in

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which NGOs or other agencies have little experience with or understanding of military

operations, and may even distrust the military’s intent.

Much of this relationship development, even done informally, will be facilitated through

CIMIC staff cells. Joint coordination centres for interagency cooperation and coordination may

be established so that best use may be made of available resources, and military forces may be

made aware of the security concerns of non-military agencies.

Such cooperation should prove to provide much valuable information and intelligence to

military planners regarding the overall security situation, the adversary’s intentions and

influences, power structures within the indigenous population, and the opinions and attitudes of

the local populace.

7118. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are the criteria used to determine if activities

conducted are creating the desired effects. It tells commanders if they are doing the right things

to achieve the desired objectives and end state. They are the real measure of progress in terms

of moving the campaign to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.

MOE must be carefully selected and regularly assessed in order to ascertain the value of

time and resource intensive stability activities. For example, if military forces are conducting

security and control related activities in order to allow a civilian populace to return to normal

civic routine, commanders must ensure that an assessment is continually done to ensure that

this effect is being achieved through the issued tasks. For example, if local markets open and

remain open without attacks, then the effect has been achieved. Should the same markets

close at night for fear of attacks, the commander must adjust his plan to conduct more security

activities during the hours of darkness.

MOE are subjective for the most part and will vary with each situation and desired effect.

7119. TRANSITION OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

The transition between campaign themes is difficult to determine with precision. As

adversaries are defeated or causes for instability addressed, levels of violence and instability

should decrease and campaign themes should transition appropriately. This shift should be

reflected in less of a requirement for offensive and defensive operations and an increase in

opportunity and need for stability operations.

Stability operations themselves will assist in moving a campaign down the spectrum of

conflict, and thus improve the overall security situation. As the situation becomes more

permissive, military forces will reduce offensive operations and defensive operations to the

maintenance of security. Such a reduction of offence and defensive operations will see stability

operations expand and the increased sharing of those stability operations with other agencies.

This should include support to reconstruction and governance, DDR, SSR and overall control

and security. Eventually, civilian and governmental agencies and indigenous security forces will

assume the majority of stability activities. See Figure 7-14.

The decrease in violence and the creation of stability will allow other agencies to assume

an increased portion of stability operations and to expand nation-building activities. The

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planning and conduct of all military reconstruction and assistance to other agencies must

consider the manner in which military activity is complementary to future civilian work, and must

plan for handover to those other JIMP members. As this occurs with improved security, military

involvement and support should decrease.

Figure 7-14: Transition of Stability Operations Between Campaign Themes

SECTION 22

ENABLING OPERATIONS

7120. GENERAL

Enabling operations link other operations and support the transition between different

types of tactical activities. They may be conducted to make or break contact with the adversary

or they may be conducted out of contact. An enabling activity is never carried out in its own

right. Its execution must lead to the active prosecution of another type of tactical operation.

The successful and rapid execution of these activities relies upon such factors as the devolution

of decision-making, the co-location of HQ, liaison and a simple plan.

The effective execution of enabling activities will help ensure the following:

the ability to make a transition between phases without a loss in tempo;

the forces taking over the battle having the most up-to-date information;

fluid movement;

fire control so as to use all weapons to further the aim and to avoid fratricide;

and

quick regrouping.

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Enabling operations consist of the following activities:

reconnaissance;

security;

advance to contact;

tactical movement;¹⁷⁸

meeting engagement;

link-up;

withdrawal;

retirement; and

relief of troops in combat and encircled forces.

7121. RECONNAISSANCE

Reconnaissance operations are those activities undertaken to obtain information about

the adversary, terrain, or the indigenous population of a particular area. Area, point and route

reconnaissance are common tasks.

Doctrine concerning the conduct of reconnaissance activities is contained in a wide

range of supporting publications. Tasking of reconnaissance forces must be done with care.

They normally execute their missions while planning is ongoing for the forthcoming mission and

are then re-tasked to support follow-on missions with little or no opportunity for recovery.

The employment of reconnaissance forces must be closely tied to the intelligence cycle.

Key is the rapid dissemination of information gained, particularly to those units in contact or

potential contact.

7122. SECURITY

Security operations provide early and accurate warning of the adversary’s dispositions

and operations. Depending upon their mission and structure, they may provide an element of

protection for a main body force or gain time for the preparation of other deliberate operations.

Security operations are normally conducted as part of a larger enabling operation or in support

of another type of tactical operations such as the defence.

Security operations consist of screen, guard and cover, and are defined as follows:

¹⁷⁸ Tactical movement refers to the movement of forces from one location to another, but is not an

advance to contact. Although moving forces do not expect contact, they move in a tactical fashion that

ensures they are prepared to counter and defeat any contacts.

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Screen Force. A screen force is defined as: “a security element whose primary

task is to observe, identify and report information and which only fights in self-

defence.¹⁷⁹” A screen force will normally consist of reconnaissance elements,

possibly supported by indirect and tactical air fire support controllers. It will be

key to finding the adversary for subsequent fixing and striking. A flank screen

may also provide security¹⁸⁰ for a main body against a flanking or surprise

attack.

Guard Force. A guard force is defined as: “a security element whose primary

task is to protect the main force by fighting to gain time, while also observing

and reporting information.”¹⁸¹ Apart from gaining time for the commitment of the

main body, the guard force, depending upon the circumstances, may contribute

to the attrition of an adversary, may conduct counter-reconnaissance tasks, or

may fix an adversary element for striking by the main force. Guard forces may

also deploy to the flank of a main body to provide protection.

Covering Force. A covering force is defined as: “a force operating apart from a

main body for the purpose of intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing and

deceiving the enemy before he can attack the covered force.”¹⁸² Based upon

the definition and the intent of deploying a covering force, the force must consist

of enough combat power to meet the commander’s intent. A covering force may

be required to fight a delay battle in support of a main defensive position.

The composition of any security force will be determined by its mission and the intent

that the commander has in terms of effects to be created by its commitment.

SECTION 23

ADVANCE TO CONTACT

7123. PURPOSE

The advance to contact seeks to gain or re-establish contact with an adversary under

the most favourable conditions. To achieve this, forces may be employed in both supporting

security and reconnaissance missions. The advance to contact is normally executed in

preparation for a subsequent offensive operation and therefore ends when the main force is

positioned for the subsequent operation. The mission assigned to the main force will determine

subsequent operations. This may also be determined from the posture of the main body when

contact is made with the adversary.

¹⁷⁹ NATO AAP-6. A second definition provided by AAP-6: “any body or detachment of troops that

provides security for a larger force by observation, reconnaissance, attack, or defence, or by any

combination of these methods.” Either definition may be applied depending upon the circumstances and

commander’s intent.

¹⁸⁰ There is a key difference between security and protection. A force that is providing security will only

be able to give warning of an adversary’s activity. It can do little to pre-empt or disrupt it. A force that is

tasked to provide protection must be able to alert the main body to the adversary, and must be capable of

defeating or disrupting the adversary force long enough for the main force to take appropriate action.

¹⁸¹ NATO AAP-6.

¹⁸² Ibid.

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By advancing to contact, the force seizes and maintains the initiative. The operation

may involve destroying or forcing the withdrawal of an adversary’s elements and seizing ground

of tactical importance.

7124. CONDUCT

Planning. The primary consideration in planning for an advance to contact is

anticipating actions that may occur during the operation and the requirements for manoeuvre

and fire support when contact is made. Contingency plans should be issued prior to

commencement that anticipate possible contact and required actions. During the advance to

contact, the commander will need to analyze the situation continually using current reports and

intelligence from all sources. The mission, particularly the anticipated employment of combat

forces, dictates the positions of units and groupings in the formation. CSS units are integrated

with the movement of combat forces to provide support but without interfering with tactical

movement.

Situational Awareness. While reconnaissance forces and other ISTAR capabilities

(such as forward deployed UAVs) will provide a good deal of situational awareness, the

advance to contact will never be conducted with full situational awareness. This is particularly

true in close terrain and situations involving unconventional adversaries. The commander will

adjust plans such as the speed of advance and formations used, depending upon the level of

awareness provided, the adversary, and the overall amount of risk he is willing to accept.

Scheme of Manoeuvre. The commander will task, array and commit his forces as

demanded by his assessment of the situation:

Covering Force Action. The advance to contact will be led by a covering force

that normally contains reconnaissance forces. The covering force will assist in

finding the adversary and other information to support subsequent fixing and

striking. Whenever possible, the axis of advance should be given in the most

general terms to the leading elements. The axis of advance should be allowed

to develop as the battle unfolds so that success can be exploited. Possible

tasks of the covering force may include the following:

(1)

Locate and determine the strength of the adversary’s positions.

(2)

Find and exploit gaps so as to provide information on possible routes for

enveloping or bypassing action by the main body.

(3)

Obtain information on routes, obstacles, terrain conditions affecting

movement, as well as civilian population distributions.

(4)

Conduct deep penetration either to disrupt adversary communications

and logistic units or possibly to seize a crossing site, in particular a bridge

or defile. Integral engineer support will be required to “make safe” and

remove any demolitions on the crossing, and the main force must follow

very quickly.

(5)

Provide security for the advance guard and main body by conducting

counter-reconnaissance.

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(6)

Support subsequent operations such as an attack by securing lines of

departure, identifying attack positions and fire bases, etc.

Advance Guard and Main Body. An advance guard may be deployed to

provide additional security for the main body, to counter unexpected situations

and to fix adversary forces for subsequent striking by the main body. The

tactical handling of the advance guard and the main body will depend upon the

number of routes available. The rate of advance will vary across the front and

will depend upon the terrain, the location and strength of adversary positions

and the possibility of bypassing the opposition. Advances through urban areas

will be particularly slow if advancing across a wide frontage or using an urban

saturation technique.¹⁸³ The grouping within the main body must be sufficiently

flexible to allow elements to:

(1)

Assume the advance guard role.

(2)

Change direction or route of any of the elements of the main body either

to bypass adversary positions or to take advantage of better routes.

(3)

Deal with the adversary that has been bypassed or is holding up the main

force.

Flank Guards and Rearguards. The deployment of the flank guards and

rearguards will depend upon the assessment of the adversary. Flank guards

normally travel on routes parallel to the route of the main body, moving either

continuously or by successive or alternating bounds to occupy key positions on

the flanks. In some situations, flank protection may be provided by a flanking

formation. Armoured reconnaissance units are suitable for flank protection of

the advancing force by moving on a route parallel to the main axis of advance,

or by picketing likely adversary approach routes. These reconnaissance forces

are unlikely to be able to deal with a strong adversary force, but will give early

warning of an adversary approach, which can then be dealt with by reserves.

Attack or armed helicopters are particularly effective in this instance. Mobile AD

units are particularly effective against the helicopter adversary. The rearguard

follows the main body.

Action on Contact. On contact, speed of manoeuvre and initiative may

overcome the adversary before he can react. The sequence of action on

contact may be as follows:

(1)

Within its capabilities, the covering force destroys adversary forces that

can interfere with the movement of the main body and pickets or blocks

those that it cannot destroy. It should be prepared to handover quickly to

the advance guard and to resume its assigned tasks.

¹⁸³ For a detailed discussion of tactical operations in an urban terrain, see B-GL-322-008-FP-001 Urban

Operations—A Tactical Guide to Urban Operations.

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(2)

The covering force should develop the adversary picture and inform the

commander of the main body of terrain that will support a subsequent

offensive action, such as positions for attack and the fire base.

(3)

Elements of the advance guard or of the main body may be committed to

reduce pockets of resistance contained or bypassed by the covering

force.

(4)

Any elements of the covering force tasked with containing such pockets

initially are relieved as rapidly as possible and rejoin the covering force to

avoid dissipating its strength.

(5)

The commander monitors the progress of the leading and engaged

combat forces and anticipates their requirements. When resistance is

encountered, he commits forces from the main body in order to maintain

the momentum of the advance.

Maintenance of Momentum and Subsequent Actions. It is of the utmost

importance that the momentum of the advance be maintained. Whenever

possible, adversary positions should be outflanked. The commander must lay

down whether they are to be bypassed and cleared by follow-up forces, or to be

taken by the leading elements. A commander may well decide that a hasty

attack by troops in contact is to his advantage, while another part of the force

continues the advance. In either case, if the adversary established a continuous

front and the strength and width of his positions preclude an outflanking move,

an attack may be mounted to force a gap.

Bypassing Policy. The bypassing policy must be carefully considered and

clearly specified. It will always be extremely difficult to determine the exact

strength of a position, and much will depend upon accurate reconnaissance and

intelligence.

Routes. Once routes have been opened it may be necessary to employ forces

to ensure their security, particularly if small pockets of adversary have been

bypassed and remain to the rear of friendly forces. If possible, routes used for

logistic traffic should be kept separate from those used by combat forces.

These routes are especially vulnerable to adversary action and require security

against land and air attack. CSS assets may require planned convoy security

particularly when dealing with a non-contiguous battlespace and an

unconventional adversary.

Airmobile and Airborne Forces. Airmobile or airborne forces achieve surprise

and maintain momentum by being deployed ahead of the covering force to seize

key terrain, including defiles, bridges and crossing sites, and to overcome

obstacles. The ground force can then link up with them and continue the

advance without the need to undertake an operation that may slow the

momentum of the advance. Such forces must not be deployed too far ahead

and against targets that they are unable to overcome, as they may be lost

before assistance arrives, and momentum will suffer.

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Transition to Other Operations. The advance to contact ends either when the

intended posture is achieved or when adversary action requires the deployment

and the coordinated effort of the main body.

7125. COMBAT SUPPORT IN AN ADVANCE

Artillery. Immediate and effective fire support will enable the force to engage the

adversary, retaining freedom of action to bypass or to attack. A heavy volume of fire will reduce

the need to deploy troops in contact with the adversary. As the nature of the advance to contact

is one of sustained movement, a high degree of fire support coordination is required. Artillery,

mortars and ships providing naval gunfire must move in such a way that maximum support is

available at all times. Forward observers must accompany leading elements and units on

exposed flanks.

Air and Close Air Support. Tactical air support is required in the advance to contact to:

assist in protecting advancing units from adversary air attack;

provide information and intelligence about the adversary;

provide close air support to supplement artillery, particularly when it is not

possible to concentrate its fire; and

interdict adversary units attempting to withdraw or reinforce.

Aviation. Helicopter support is used mainly for the following purposes:

surveillance and reconnaissance;

flank protection;

exercise of command and control;

seizure of critical points and key terrain features; and

resupply and medical evacuation.

Air Defence. AD weapons must keep up with the advance. To achieve this, ground

based AD must have a priority for road movement. Likely tasks will include the protection of

vulnerable points on the route and cover for critical operations such as an attack, river crossing

or breaching operation.

Engineers. The main role of engineers in the advance is to open and maintain routes

using specialist engineer equipment. They also have the tasks of assisting the leading troops to

overcome obstacles and to clear mines, and of helping in the protection of the flanks.

Engineers and their heavy equipment should be positioned so that they can be deployed quickly

when required. An engineer reconnaissance element must move with the leading troops and

engineer resources may have to be well forward.

Electronic Warfare. Emphasis will be placed on the employment of passive EW

(intercept and direction finding) resources in order to detect and locate the adversary.

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7126. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AN ADVANCE

Commanders should move well forward so that they can quickly influence the battle and

make the most of fleeting opportunities. Distances and rapid movement will strain normal

command arrangements. Command posts will be on the move, particularly at lower levels, as

follows:

As the main body normally moves on radio silence the problem of maintaining

coordination along the routes will require special arrangements and may also

cause a restriction on the use of AD assets.

Special arrangements may be required to provide additional radios for relay

purposes.

Extensive use will have to be made of liaison elements.

Coordination with supporting air forces will present special problems.

The command responsibilities for each route and for traffic control must be

established.

Traffic control systems should be able to:

(1)

easily rearrange the order of march on routes allocated;

(2)

improve measures to keep routes open; amd

(3)

assist in regulating the flow of traffic to help units reach their destinations

in a timely manner.

The command relationship between the various elements of the force must be

established beforehand.

7127.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN AN ADVANCE

CSS must provide for the requirements of the advance and for the anticipated

requirements of any subsequent mission. The support problem in the advance is that of

sustaining forces that are moving and thus extending the supply lines. Because there will

seldom be sufficient transport, a careful calculation of anticipated requirements must be made

and priorities established.

At the start of the operation, units should be as self-contained as possible and

arrangements made so that they can be refuelled during the move. Engineer stores for bridging

and route repair are likely to be a large transport commitment. It is important that maintenance

and recovery resources and traffic control are deployed to keep routes open and assist units.

Medical units should move with the force and be able to provide immediate treatment

during movement. When contact is made with the adversary they should rapidly establish

second line (Role 2) medical facilities. As the LOC may become extended, helicopters should

be available for the evacuation of high priority casualties.

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7128. TACTICAL MOVEMENT

Tactical movement is an enabling activity that involves tactical movement between

locations by combat and other forces, without the expectation or seeking of adversary contact,

albeit prepared for contact.

It differs from an advance to contact in that forces conducting the march are prepared to

counter adversary activities, but are not expecting nor seeking to make contact en route.

Forces moving from one location to conduct other tactical activities, such as stability

activities in a given area, may use tactical movement. It is generally used in non-linear, non-

contiguous battlespaces in which the adversary is unlikely to be located in a fixed location.

During the march, forces do not actively seek contact but are prepared for adversary contact.

The greatest threats to forces on the march will be ambushes and IEDs.

Movement is done tactically and schemes of manoeuvre and the use of security

activities will reflect the tactical situation and adversary’s profile.

The conduct and planning considerations for the advance to contact may be applied to

the planning and conduct of tactical movement. Given the possibility of contact during the

march, the commander will assess the need for the security of the force throughout the activity,

and will take the necessary precautions, such as the deployment of security forces and the

clearing of defiles and danger areas.

SECTION 24

MEETING ENGAGEMENT

7129. PURPOSE

The meeting engagement is a combat action that may occur when opposing forces seek

to fulfil their mission by offensive action. It will often occur during an advance to contact and

can easily lead to a hasty attack. In offensive, defensive or delaying operations it will often mark

a moment of transition in that the outcome may well decide the nature of subsequent

operations. For theses reasons, a meeting engagement is described as a transitional phase.

Even when the main part of a force is attacking, defending or delaying, individual elements may

find themselves in situations that have the characteristics of a meeting engagement.

The meeting engagement differs from the advance to contact in that it occurs

unexpectedly, whereas in the advance to contact the commander is deliberately seeking to

establish contact with the adversary.

A meeting engagement may occur in various circumstances:

When a force that is moving makes contact with an adversary about whom the

friendly force has little or no information.

When both sides become aware of the each other and decide to attack without

delay in an attempt to obtain positional advantage, gain ground of tactical

importance, maintain momentum, or assert dominance over the other.

When one force deploys hastily for defence while the other attempts to prevent it

from doing so.

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7130. CONDUCT

It will not be possible to plan in detail for a meeting engagement. However, a force that

is properly deployed in accordance with recognized tactical principles will be poised to react to

most situations. Meeting engagements will invariably force a commander to reconsider and

often adjust his plans. The basic principle is to seize and retain the initiative. This will give the

commander the freedom of action he needs, whether to accomplish his mission as he originally

intended or to change his plan to suit the new situation. High tempo is at a premium and

success depends, to a large extent, upon the speed of reaction of the commander and his

forces. The commander can then decide how to develop the meeting engagement into a

subsequent offensive or defensive action.

While commanders can make no firm plans, they should make use of the IPB process.

In particular, they should study the terrain and the map to deduce areas that are favourable to a

meeting engagement. Additionally, they should take particular note of the latest situation or

intelligence reports and assessments concentrating on likely adversary capabilities, objectives,

and avenues of advance, movement, and natural obstacles.

Meeting engagements are such that there will not normally be enough time for a

complete battle procedure to take place as the two opposing forces close. Assuming a

reasonable balance of forces, victory will go to the side with the higher tempo. The commander,

who reacts more quickly, strikes the first blow and keeps the adversary off balance. In the

planning stage, this implies careful reconnaissance, balanced grouping, forward command, and

responsive indirect fire support on call. Planning in this type of battle should never be so

detailed as to lead a commander into a preconceived course of action, as a plan is not a

substitute for initiative and bold leadership that overturn material superiority.

The commander whose forces make contact with the adversary in a meeting

engagement must immediately decide how he wants to fight the battle. In deciding on a course

of action he must not lose sight of his original mission and of his superior commander’s intent.

On the other hand, he must not shirk his responsibility to act independently. He must notify his

superior commander immediately of his decision.

One of the commander's first tasks in a meeting engagement is to determine the

adversary's strengths and dispositions. In particular, he should ascertain the situation on the

adversary's flanks. The identification of, and an attack on an assailable flank, will generally

disclose the adversary's dispositions more rapidly than a frontal attack, and will give more

opportunity for tactical surprise and decisive results.

Often, it may not be immediately possible to use all the forces that the commander may

wish to deploy. In this case, he must establish an order of priority for deployment early in the

operation. Throughout the operation, he must keep a clear picture of the location and status of

all elements of his force.

The commander’s decision on how to continue a meeting engagement should, wherever

possible, be based upon his personal assessment of the situation. However, he must not

sacrifice valuable time to obtain detailed information. He must realize that he is in a race with

the adversary commander for time and space. It is, therefore, extremely important that before

the operation starts the commander evaluates possible routes for movement and assesses any

area of terrain that may be useful, and that he keeps these in mind while his force is moving.

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The speed of reaction and considerable firepower of armed/attack helicopters, allows the

force to be committed very quickly against the adversary in a meeting engagement. In

particular, early deployment of reconnaissance and AH in a combat, as opposed to a combat

support role, will nearly always give a commander an advantage.

7131. COMBAT SUPPORT IN A MEETING ENGAGEMENT

Artillery. The amount of initial fire support available to the forces that become involved

in a meeting engagement depends upon the organization for movement laid down by the

commander. It is, therefore, particularly important that there is fire support available to support

the leading elements of a moving force. Forward artillery observers must be allocated to the

leading elements of a combat force. A meeting engagement is also an ideal situation in which

to make use of scatterable mines to restrict the adversary’s freedom of manoeuvre.

Air Defence. AD weapons should be positioned along adversary air avenues of

approach to over-watch forces on the move. Adversary ground forces will often be supported

by armed helicopters, or they may approach under air cover, or by air transport.

Engineer. The rapid deployment of engineers can be crucial in transitional phases of

the battle. Engineer reconnaissance must be well forward, as must armoured engineers.

Combat engineers must be readily available for mobility or counter mobility tasks. An

appropriate and quick employment of engineer equipments can ensure freedom of movement

and deny it to the adversary. Engineer planning of scatterable mines, for example, can provide

responsive counter-mobility support if the assets are available.

Electronic Warfare. EW (intercept and direction finding) resources will provide

additional information on the adversary. Once battle is joined, jamming of adversary C2 and fire

support communications will assist the commander in achieving his aim.

7132. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A MEETING ENGAGEMENT

A meeting engagement will create a number of challenges for a commander in terms of

command and control:

Initially, he will have little intelligence on the strength, location and intention of

the adversary. It may even be necessary for him to confirm the locations of his

own forces. Immediate and clear situation reports from lower commanders are

essential to allow him to make his plan.

The HQ may be on the move, and therefore, its effectiveness may be restricted.

The staff may be dispersed or the commander separated from them.

Characteristically, units will be moving in radio silence and it will take time to

activate communications between HQs.

If a meeting engagement is likely, therefore, it is vital that commanders are well

forward and able to speak to each other, even if their HQs temporarily cannot.

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7133. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN A MEETING ENGAGEMENT

CSS must enable the commander to seize and maintain the initiative and must be

capable of responding quickly to the rapid changes in plans. Because of the limited information

available when a meeting engagement occurs CSS commanders must be ready for the

unexpected. Ensuring that combat supplies and materiel levels are maintained at the maximum

practical level is one means of achieving this readiness.

In a meeting engagement, speed is the major criterion and CSS planning is

subordinated to achieving that. At the level above that which is in contact, CSS should

concentrate on directing its efforts on the formation or unit involved both during and after the

battle. This may include:

ammunition for the battle if there is time, and certainly after reorganization;

refuelling after reorganization;

move forward of medical support and the development of a casualty evacuation

plan;

ensuring maximum availability of equipment during the engagement and in

preparation for subsequent operation; and

planning for the recovery of battle-winning equipments.

SECTION 25

LINK-UP

7134. PURPOSE

Link-up is conducted to join two friendly forces in adversary-controlled territory. It may

therefore be necessary to destroy the adversary between these forces before a link-up is

established. It is followed by another operation such as a forward passage of lines, a

withdrawal or a relief. Both forces may be moving towards one another, or one may be

stationary or encircled. They may have the same or different missions. A link-up operation

could occur under the following circumstances:

A link-up between two forces engaged in converging attacks may take place

when each force captures adjacent objectives, thus completing encirclement.

A link-up with encircled or cut-off forces may take place on the perimeter of the

defensive position established by that force. When the link-up is combined with

a breakout action, it may take place at another designated objective. The

encircled force should try to breakout, or at least mount some form of

diversionary action in order to ease the task of the relieving force by diverting

the adversary’s attention.

A link-up operation with an air delivered or infiltrated force may take place on the

perimeter of its defensive position. In this case, the link-up is normally followed

by a passage of lines or by a relief of the forces involved.

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7135. CONDUCT

The requirement for the link-up may be part of the CONOPS from the outset.

Alternatively, a link-up may become necessary in the course of an operation and must be

planned as the situation develops. In any event, details of the plans must be passed to all

concerned in due time, without undermining security.

Link-up operations are generally offensive in nature. The requirements of the link-up as

well as those of the subsequent mission will determine the size and composition of the force.

The mission to carry out a link-up operation should always be given in the context of a

subsequent mission for the forces involved. It will normally state the location where the link-up

will take place. Frequently, a time will be stipulated for the link-up.

When planning a link-up operation, particular attention should be paid to:

the coordination of manoeuvre forces involved;

command relationships;

communications; and

control measures.

Link-up operations may occur when one force is moving to link-up with a stationary force

or when both forces are moving. The following planning and execution considerations and

procedures apply:

A major consideration in this type of activity is speed in establishing the link-up

in order to reduce the possibility of adversary reaction and to minimize the

period of vulnerability.

For the moving force in a link-up, the operation may involve deliberate attacks,

or if circumstances permit, the more rapid movement of an advance to contact

deployment.

Ground link-up points must be coordinated at locations where the axis of

advance of the moving force intersects with the security elements of the

stationary force.

Restrictive fire control measures are required to coordinate fire from the

converging forces.

During the last phase of the link-up operation the speed of advance of the forces

must be carefully controlled; reconnaissance elements must seek to establish

contact with the other force as early as possible, and additional information will

be obtained to confirm/adjust earlier plans.

When the link-up is made, the moving force may join the stationary force or pass

through or around and continue to attack the adversary. If they join to continue

activities, a single commander for the overall force must be designated.

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Subsequent activities must be launched as quickly as possible to exploit the

success achieved by the link-up.

Primary and alternative link-up points are established on the boundaries where

the two forces are expected to converge.

As they move closer to one another, the need for positive control to avoid

incidents of fratricide is important and must be coordinated to ensure that the

adversary does not escape between the two forces.

The leading elements of each force should monitor a common radio net.

7136. DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT DURING A LINK-UP

To avoid losses, fire control must be carefully exercised until a link-up has been

achieved. Link-up forces will use normal fire control measures. Specific coordination must be

established, however, for any phase when the fire of one force may affect the operations of the

other.

Particular attention must be given to the control of CAS/AH in the link-up area between

the forces as they approach.

7137. ENGINEERS

In link-up operations, it is critical to provide mobility support to the forces that are moving

to link-up. Clearing of routes and adversary barriers is essential for the timely completion of the

operation.

7138. ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Employment of EW must be carefully coordinated in order to avoid mutual interference

and duplication of tasks.

7139. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A LINK-UP

The convergence of friendly forces in the area of the link-up may present particular

problems that require the appointment of a single commander in the area. This procedure will

also be normal when there is a significant difference in the size of the two forces taking part in

the operation. Where this is the case, this commander must be designated beforehand and in

sufficient time to allow for concerted action to be planned. The time or conditions under which

command is assumed must be clearly stated.

The following control measures require emphasis:

axis of advance or boundaries for the link-up;

objectives to be held and/or to be captured by each of the forces taking part;

the locations where contact between the two forces will be established;

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the timings of the operation for the forces involved; and

fire coordination lines to avoid fratricide, particularly as the two forces are

converging.

Liaison between the forces taking part and with the overall commander is very important.

Communications in these circumstances can normally be maintained by radio only. The

majority of detail for liaison and communications will be laid down in the overall commander’s

plan; where that is not possible, these arrangements must be judiciously expedited on the

initiative of the two forces carrying out the link-up operation. The measures include:

liaison teams;

passwords and visual identification signs;

measures for combat identification;

report lines and reference points; and

contact frequencies, radio authentication procedures and codes.

7140. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT DURING A LINK-UP

Apart from taking account of the requirements of the link-up force itself, the commander

has to consider the need to provide CSS for the force with which it is intended to link-up. In

principle, CSS considerations are generally the same as those for offensive operations.

7141. LINK-UP OF A MOVING FORCE WITH A STATIONARY FORCE

In an operation where one force is moving to link-up with a stationary force, the following

planning procedures apply:

A major consideration in this type of operation is speed in establishing the link-

up to reduce the possibility of adversary reaction and to minimize the period of

vulnerability.

Ground link-up points must be coordinated at locations where the axis of

advance of the moving force intersects with the security elements of the

stationary force.

A restrictive fire line (RFL) is required to coordinate fire from the converging

forces.

For the moving force in a link-up, the operation may involve deliberate attacks,

or if circumstances permit, the more rapid movement of an advance to contact.

When the link-up is made, the moving force may join the stationary force or pass

through or around and continue to attack the adversary. If they join up to

continue operations, a single commander for the overall force must be

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designated. Subsequent operations must be launched as quickly as possible to

exploit the success achieved by the link-up.

7142. LINK-UP OF TWO MOVING UNITS

Link-up between two moving forces is a difficult operation to successfully conduct and is

normally undertaken to complete the encirclement of an adversary force. Primary and

alternative link-up points are established on the boundaries where the two forces are expected

to converge. During the last phase of the link-up operation, reconnaissance elements must

seek to establish contact with the other force as early as possible, and additional information will

be obtained to confirm/adjust earlier plans. As they move closer to one another, the need for

positive control to avoid incidents of fratricide is important and must be coordinated to ensure

that the adversary does not escape between the two forces. Leading elements of each force

should monitor a common radio net.

SECTION 26

WITHDRAWAL

7143. PURPOSE

A withdrawal occurs when a force disengages from an adversary force in accordance

with the will of its commander. It seeks to disengage its combat forces from the adversary

although contact may be maintained through other means such as indirect fire, reconnaissance

or surveillance. The withdrawal may be followed by another specific operation such the defence

in a new location.

The order to withdraw will not normally be given by the commander without the

agreement or direction of his superior commander. A withdrawal may be undertaken for the

following reasons:

If the objective of the operation cannot be achieved and the force is faced with

defeat.

The objective is achieved and there is no further requirement to maintain

contact.

To avoid battle in unfavourable tactical conditions.

To draw the adversary into an unfavourable posture, for example, to extend his

LOC.

To conform to the movements of adjacent friendly forces.

To allow for the use of the force or parts of the force elsewhere.

For CSS reasons; that is, the force can no longer be sustained.

The withdrawal should be conducted so as to minimize adversary interference and

preserve fighting power. The ability to move rapidly to offensive or defensive operations should

always be retained.

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The withdrawal will take place either in or out of contact with the adversary. Whichever

the case, the commander's primary concerns in planning and conduct will be:

to disengage;

to retain an intact frontline by the deployment of strong covering troops;

to safeguard withdrawal routes; and

to maintain balance throughout the operation.

Success will depend upon the maintenance of morale, tight control and secrecy. A

commander must also be ready to take the offensive if the opportunity arises, albeit with only

limited objectives.

The commander's mission will normally be to disengage his force. If the mission is the

deliberate intention of a higher commander, the mission will be included in a complete OPORD.

If, on the other hand, the decision has been forced upon the commander by highly unfavourable

circumstances, the order to withdraw may contain nothing more than the authority to do so and

give only minimal direction.

The scheme of manoeuvre must be simple and normal organizations should be retained

as far as possible. Regrouping during the operation should be avoided. Particular attention

should also be paid to:

surprise and deception, possibly including noise coverage by artillery;

maximum use of cover and concealment to achieve protection; and

allocation of routes and an appropriate movement control system.

7144. ORGANIZATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL

A withdrawing force should normally be organized into:

a protective element that covers the withdrawal; and

a main body protecting itself with advance, rear and flank guards.

The withdrawing force’s subsequent mission will have an influence on its organization

and on the sequence of the withdrawal. Depending upon the subsequent tasks, there will likely

be a requirement to send an advance party, often under the command of a second-in-

command, in order to conduct the reconnaissance and planning for the next task.

Forces not required for immediate operations, including CSS elements and the

wounded, should be moved out early to keep routes clear and allow for a rapid withdrawal.

7145. PLANNING

The commander’s estimate of the situation should consider:

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The distance to be moved.

The weather/ground conditions and the degree and duration of darkness. To

maintain secrecy, achieve surprise and reduce casualties from the air,

withdrawals are generally better carried out at night, although, against an

adversary with a good surveillance capability, darkness will not hide movement.

Bad weather conditions, however, such as heavy rain, mist or fog, may enable a

withdrawal to be carried out effectively by day. Difficult ground conditions may

make a withdrawal in daylight the only practical way to avoid loss of control.

Possibilities of impeding the adversary’s mobility, particularly by barriers.

Adversary ground strength.

The situation on both flanks.

The mobility of the force.

The air situation.

CSS.

The scheme of manoeuvre must cover the entire operation. It must be simple and

normal organizations should be retained as far as possible. Regrouping during the activity

should be avoided. Particular attention should also be paid to:

The plan being simple to permit flexibility.

Grouping for the withdrawal remaining the same, if possible, throughout the

operation.

Surprise and deception, possibly including noise coverage by artillery.

The maximum use of cover and concealment to achieve protection.

Allocation of routes and an appropriate traffic control system.

The withdrawal is coordinated and controlled through key timings:

The time at which thinning-out may occur.

The time until when the position must be denied. This is the main coordinating

timing of the withdrawal plan.

The time to be clear of the current position.

The time to be clear of any specific coordination line. This will be needed for the

coordination of supporting fires; and

The time by which the subsequent task (such as manning a new defensive

position) is to be completed.

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The preparation of demolitions and other obstacles along the withdrawal routes must be

carried out as early as possible. This is particularly important for preliminary demolitions, which

must be carefully coordinated with the plan for the withdrawing force. The preparation of denial

measures should be carried out as soon as possible and their execution carefully coordinated

with the plan for the withdrawing force.

Along boundaries, the appropriate higher-level commander should coordinate the

preparation of denial measures. Execution should be carried out carefully and in accordance

with the plan of the withdrawing force. The higher commander will make the final decision on

the execution of any denial measures after consultation with adjacent commanders.

A withdrawal will either be conducted directly to a new main position, or indirectly

through one or more intermediate positions. The decision to use intermediate positions will

depend upon the distance, the strength of the force, the state of the adversary and the delay

required to prepare the new position. In this case, a rearward passage of lines will be required

in order to check the adversary at the intermediate position.

Considerations when planning and selecting intermediate positions are:

They must be strong enough to force the adversary to deploy early and to

undertake time consuming preparations for an attack. This will mean selecting

positions that incorporate natural obstacles and deploying long range direct and

indirect weapon systems.

They should be far enough from one position to the other to force the attacker to

move his artillery each time to engage.

The time before which there will be no rearward movement except for normal

traffic and reconnaissance parties.

The time up to which the position has to be denied to the adversary.

The time at which troops may start thinning-out equipment and supplies to the

rear.

The time by which all troops will be clear of a line behind the position. This will

be needed for the coordination of supporting fires.

7146. CONDUCT—SCHEME OF MANOEUVRE AND SEQUENCE OF WITHDRAWAL

Based upon the timings issued in the superior’s orders (for such activities as thinning-

out, time the position must be denied, and time for the crossing of any coordination lines), the

sequence for the withdrawal from a position may be:

Reconnaissance parties move back and all non-essential vehicles and

equipment are cleared from the position.

Covering forces take up station behind the position and reserves move to the

appropriate locations.

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Troops on the position withdraw through the covering troops. By night, when

surprise is easier to achieve and a commander considers a disengagement

possible, rear elements should pull out first leaving those forces deployed

forward until later. Where disengagement is not possible, forward troops will

move first covered by those in depth.

The task of the protective force is to prevent the adversary from engaging the

main body.

The main body withdraws on order. At the lower tactical levels, the plan must

include a staggered withdrawal of one element moving while covered by another

element until a clean break with any adversary has been achieved.

As soon as the main body has disengaged and is at a safe distance, the

protective elements start their disengagement, although they could remain in

their original position until the adversary attacks in force, so as to achieve the

maximum deception and delay. If the adversary launches a strong attack, they

will continue their protective task with a delaying operation. If the distance to be

moved is great and the adversary is expected to react quickly, a portion of the

protective force may occupy a number of intermediate defensive positions in the

rear of the position being abandoned before the withdrawal of the main body.

If the protective element is not able to disengage or to prevent the adversary

from closing in on the main body, it must either be reinforced by elements from

the main body, or the overall commander must commit the majority, or all, of this

force. In this event, the withdrawal must be resumed at the earliest possible

time. If the protective element has disengaged, it will follow the main body and

continue to provide security. In this case, it will maintain surveillance of the

adversary until ordered to break contact completely or until this task is taken

over by another force.

This sequence is repeated at each intermediate position. The withdrawal is

terminated when a force is ready to assume its next task.

7147.

COMBAT SUPPORT IN THE WITHDRAWAL

Artillery. Artillery must be organized and deployed so that it can cover the entire

operation. Long-range artillery will be withdrawn early and placed far enough back so that it can

cover the withdrawal. Artillery elements remaining with the protective elements will endeavour

to maintain the previous fire support cover for as long as possible.

Air Support. Air interdiction and CAS may play an important part in harassing the

adversary following up the withdrawal or attempting to bypass the withdrawal forces. CAS will

be particularly useful, especially where withdrawing artillery causes a reduction of, or

interruption to, indirect fire support. Forward air controllers (FACs) will be required with the

protective element. Defensive counter air (AD) effort may be needed for protection against

adversary ground attack aircraft.

Aviation. Transport helicopters can enhance the speed with which withdrawal

operations can be carried out. Helicopters in a reconnaissance role may be used to observe

adversary activity during the withdrawal. Helicopters can also be used to extract stay-behind

forces. Armed/attack aviation may be used to provide a covering force to assist with

disengagement and a delay of any advancing adversary.

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Air Defence. There are unlikely to be sufficient organic AD resources available to

provide comprehensive cover throughout the AO, so priorities of tasks must be established.

The deployment plan of AD units should ensure that they are effective at critical periods to cover

locations where the withdrawing forces are likely to be particularly vulnerable, or areas that the

adversary may select as landing sites for air delivered forces.

Engineers. Engineers will be heavily committed in the withdrawal. Many will be used in

preparing a new defensive position to which forces are withdrawing. Some, however, may

remain to assist with the withdrawal in the following ways:

Mobility. Withdrawal routes must be cleared and maintained. The main body

and rear echelon elements are assisted in breaching unforeseen obstacles and

crossing restrictive terrain.

Counter-mobility. Demolitions and obstacles are prepared to delay adversary

forces near the withdrawing forces.

Electronic Warfare. EW assets will be particularly useful in executing the deception

plan, as well as in disrupting adversary C2 communications.

7148. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A WITHDRAWAL

Control measures of particular importance in the withdrawal are:

liaison elements;

routes/axes;

report/phase lines;

traffic control measures;

check points; and

timings as required for critical phases or sequences.

The purpose of the operation must be understood by the whole force in order to maintain

morale. During the withdrawal, every opportunity should be taken to maintain morale.

Good communications are vital, and the policy for radio and electronic silence must be

clearly stated. Communications links, methods of operation and density of communications

traffic should remain unchanged for as long as possible to avoid disclosing, to the adversary,

the intention to disengage. The creation of radio traffic by forces remaining in contact will add to

the overall deception of the adversary. Elements, which have disengaged from the adversary,

will normally be ordered to keep radio silence.

7149. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN THE WITHDRAWAL

General. The CSS plan should ensure that the requirements of the withdrawing force

are met and that useful materiel, particularly fuel, does not fall into the adversary’s hands. It

may take considerable time to evacuate stocks. The supply of ammunition to protective

elements and artillery must be guaranteed.

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Planning Considerations. The adversary must be denied the use of the military

equipment and supplies of own forces, other than medical equipment and supplies (see para

460). Maintenance is to be concentrated on the readiness of materiel required to conduct the

operation. Recovery equipment is to be marshalled at critical locations to keep routes open and

to recover all materiel possible.

Supply. Before rearward movement begins, the forward stocks will be reduced by

stopping forward supply, and when possible, back-loading any unnecessary forward stocks.

Mobile distribution points should be established to meet urgent needs and changes in the

OPLAN. Losses of equipment may exceed normal wastage rates and special arrangements for

replacements may have to be made.

Medical. Primary concern should be given to the evacuation of casualties. Visible

evidence that casualty evacuation is operating effectively will help maintain morale.

Military Denial of Equipment and Stocks. This must be coordinated with the timings

used in the OPLAN so that tactical security is not prejudiced. The plan should provide for the

denial of any equipment or dumps that cannot be back-loaded. However, under the Geneva

Conventions it is not permitted for medical equipment to be destroyed.

Traffic Control. To expedite rearward movement military police may be deployed at

critical junctions and potential defiles.

7150. RETIREMENT

A retirement is different from a withdrawal. It is a movement away from the adversary by

a force out of contact with the adversary. It is completed in generally the same manner as a

withdrawal, however, since the force is out of contact, it is unlikely that there will be a

requirement for a robust covering force.

SECTION 27

RELIEF

7151. PURPOSE

When combat activities are taken over by one force from another, this is referred to as

the conduct of relief operations. Relief operations are undertaken when forces:

are unable to continue with their mission;

are required for operations in another area;

have accomplished their mission;

are due for rotation to avoid exhaustion; and

are not suitable to accomplish the new task.

The types of relief are as follows:

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Relief in Place. A relief in place (RIP) is a relief in which all or part of a force is

replaced in a sector by an incoming unit. In certain circumstances, the force

being relieved may be encircled by adversary forces and unable to breakout.

Forward Passage of Lines. A forward passage of lines is a relief in which a

force advances or attacks through another that is in contact with the adversary.

Rearward Passages of Lines. A rearward passage of lines is a relief in which

a force effecting a movement to the rear passes through the sector of a unit

occupying a defensive position. Normally, a delay force would be expected to

conduct a rearward passage of lines.

A relief is normally undertaken in order to sustain the overall level of combat power.

Inherent is the transfer of operational responsibility for a combat mission. The requirement is

that this transfer should take place while maintaining the required level of operational capability.

Commanders normally co-locate to affect the handover.

The commander’s intentions, the type of operation the force has been engaged in, the

type of adversary force involved, and its anticipated course of action will determine the mission.

During any relief, there is a period when congestion increases the vulnerability of the

forces involved. The possibility of confusion is inherent, as two parallel command systems will

be operating in one area at the same time. The complexity should not be underestimated, but

by contrast, the beneficial and possibly decisive effects to be gained from successful

synchronization of the combat power of both forces should not be forgotten.

7152. INTEROPERABILITY

It is quite possible that a relief operation will involve forces of different nationalities. In

this instance, the following additional points should be considered:

dissimilar unit organizations may require special adjustments in some areas,

particularly during an RIP;

control of fire support may require special liaison;

language difficulties may require the increased use of guides/interpreters; and

special communications arrangements may be required including additional

liaison teams and communications detachments.

7153. GENERAL PLANNING FOR A RELIEF

In planning for any relief, the following should be considered:

Security and Protection. The intention to conduct a relief must be concealed

from the adversary. Deception measures should include the continuation of

normal patterns of activity. Additional protection may be required due to the

increased vulnerability during such operations.

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Early Liaison. Close cooperation and coordination are required at all levels

and at an early stage between the troops in position and those that are moving.

As much detailed reconnaissance as the tactical situation allows must be made

by the incoming force.

Allocation of Routes for Movement. Incoming and outgoing forces should,

where possible, be allocated separate routes.

Allocation of Areas. This will include the allocation of areas for staging and

deployment, including areas for artillery.

Timings. The detailed timing of the operation will be made within the guidelines

set by the overall commander.

Fire Support. The in-place force will always provide fire support for the moving force.

7154. RELIEF IN PLACE

Circumstances. An RIP is normally conducted in defensive operations and may occur

in the following circumstances:

when the existing force is depleted or exhausted and needs to be replaced;

when troops of one capability or role need to be replaced by troops of a different

role; and

for routine rotation of troops.

Mission Transfer. The incoming force normally assumes the mission of the relieved

force, usually within the same boundaries, and at least initially, with a similar disposition,

assuming the types of formation are the same. The transfer should take place without a loss in

operational capability.

Planning. Once begun, all RIP operations take place as quickly as possible. Where

possible, the operations should take place at night or during periods of reduced visibility.

Detailed planning and preparation for an RIP is preferable if the operation is to be conducted

successfully. The incoming force should conduct a thorough reconnaissance if time permits. If

time is limited, the RIP is planned and executed from oral or FRAGOs. The liaison personnel

are left by the outgoing formation to assist with the coordination. Personnel from combat,

combat support and CSS units remain with the incoming force until barrier, fire support,

counterattack and CSS plans are coordinated.

Timings. The detailed timings of the operation will be made within the guidelines set by

the superior commander commencing with a timely warning order. Ideally, sufficient time must

be allowed at all levels for detailed handovers of essential information including:

current tactical situation and intelligence assessment;

current OPORDs and OPLANs, including the deception plan;

organization of the area and location of facilities and routes;

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CSS plan;

sequence of the RIP;

location of other units that will not be replaced;

timings, particularly the time of the transfer of command; and

details of the intelligence collection plan and location of sources where

appropriate.

Execution. After the planning is completed at formation level, execution can be

decentralized. The RIP then consists of a series of relief operations conducted by formations

and monitored by the respective superior HQ:

The RIP depends essentially upon the time available and the local conditions. It

can take place simultaneously over the entire width of the sector, or it can be

decentralized and staggered across the formation with regard to time and place.

If forces are relieved simultaneously over the entire width, a shorter time is

required, but the readiness of the defence is considerably reduced and the

adversary is more likely to be able to detect the higher level of movement. By

contrast, a relief staggered with regard to time and place takes longer, but a

larger element of the outgoing forces is combat ready at all times and

concealment is easier.

Combat support troops should not be relieved at the same time as combat

troops.

In general, night and limited visibility will be exploited for the relief, particularly

when close to the adversary. If possible, the advance parties of the incoming

unit will conduct a reconnaissance in daylight. If this is not possible, or if the

incoming unit needs assistance from the outgoing unit to quickly familiarize itself

with the local conditions, rear parties of the relieved unit will carry out the

orientation.

Communications links must be maintained, unaltered if possible, for the entire

duration of the relief.

CSS troops of the outgoing unit will be sent back as early as practicable. Pre-

positioned common user bulk supplies and barrier materiel will normally be

taken over by the incoming unit.

The relief then consists of a series of relief activities conducted by formations

and monitored by respective superior HQs. Once the relief has started,

commanders and staffs are concerned with:

(1)

timings and the movement of formations and units;

(2)

coordination of transportation resources;

(3)

movement control;

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(4)

current activities;

(5)

having constant surveillance and intelligence collection capability;

(6)

having a coordinated AD plan involving air, aviation, AD and all arms AD

resources; and

(7)

the availability and notice to move of reserves.

Route Allocation. Careful route planning and movement control are essential to avoid

congestion. The movement control plan must be simple in concept, but in sufficient detail to

ensure that it meets the aim. Movements in opposite directions will be conducted on separate

roads and tracks if possible, and lateral movements will be avoided. Where possible, incoming

and outgoing formations and units should make shared use of transport allocated for the

operation.

Defence Plan Review. The assumption of responsibility for an existing defensive

position and barrier may force the new commander to fight the previous commanders plan,

unless significant adjustments are made. A full review of the barrier plan, fire support plan and

manoeuvre plan must be conducted to ensure that the new commander's intent may be met.

7155. RELIEF OF ENCIRCLED FORCES

The purpose of relieving encircled forces is to break through adversary positions to

reach an encircled force, thus restoring its freedom of action. In such a situation, it is unlikely

that the encircled force will have the combat power necessary to breakout of the encirclement,

even with support from another force. The break through will result from a deliberate attack,

followed by a link-up operation with the in-place, encircled force, and then the relief.

7156. EXTENDED RELIEF IN PLACE

During campaigns that are short of major combat (such as peace support operations and

COIN campaigns), an RIP being conducted between units or formations may be conducted over

an extended period of time. They still follow the same procedures and principles, but will

require additional time for incoming commanders to learn and understand the complexities of

the AO, such as its key political leaders, persons of influence, power structures, aims and

desires of local populations and tribes, cultural habits, and conventional and unconventional

adversaries. In short, the RIP will include a handover of the knowledge base that considers all

aspects of the AO that influence the achievement of the operational and strategic end states.

Incoming commanders must gain an understanding of the end states and objectives

sought, and the current lines of operation driving towards those objectives. During the period of

relief, they will be able to reflect upon the prosecution of these lines of operation and begin to

make an assessment as to how they may be adjusted if necessary.

Much of the information that will support an RIP may be passed to the incoming/moving

force by the in-place force during the period leading up to the relief as part of the battle

procedure of the incoming force. The in-place force can also dispatch trainers and advisors to

the relieving force in order to assist in their battle procedure and training.

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7157. FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

Purpose. During a forward passage of lines, a moving force passes through an in-place

force in order to assume the latter’s mission or a new mission. The force in contact (in-place

force) remains in place and must provide the advancing force with as much assistance as

possible including tactical and logistical support. A forward passage of lines will be used when:

An attack is to be continued with fresh or more suitable forces.

A moving force is required to pass through an area held by another force, such

as a bridgehead or crossing site.

The advancing force has to take possession of suitable terrain in order to

continue the battle.

Planning. The planning procedures for a forward passage of lines are similar to those

for an RIP, although less physical reconnaissance may occur. The plans for the moving force

take priority. Upon receipt of the warning order, the commander and staff of the moving force

establish liaison with the in-place force. The moving formation/unit will normally co-locate its

tactical or main HQ with that of the in-place force. All levels of command should exchange

liaison personnel.

Responsibilities. Responsibilities for the various planning requirements will be split

between the different HQs involved in the operation. They are detailed below. The list is not

exhaustive and any given operation may require a different allocation of responsibilities:

Controlling Headquarters:

(1)

Overall plan including timings, control lines, routes and rendezvous

points.

(2)

Arrangements for liaison, reconnaissance and advance parties.

(3)

Fire support coordination including tactical air support.

(4)

Deception plans, including emission control (EMCON) and EW, and

restriction on forward reconnaissance.

(5)

Movement.

(6)

Airspace control measures and coordination of AD.

(7)

CSS including criteria for handover of equipment, combat supplies and

medical support.

In-place Force:

(1)

Intelligence, including adversary dispositions and topographical

information. This will also include information concerning the local

populace, key figures, attitudes, aims, intentions and power structures.

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(2)

Coordination of reconnaissance.

(3)

Liaison where required. Normally the moving force provides liaison to the

in-place force.

(4)

Security of the line of departure (LD) of the moving force. Selection of the

LD should be done in line with the plans of the moving force.

(5)

Selection, security and maintenance of routes and movement control.

(6)

Allocation of terrain for the moving force, such as harbours, hides and

waiting areas.

(7)

Provision of AD cover, essentially up to the LD, and desirably, forward of

it.

(8)

Guides.

(9)

Fire support until the pre-H hour fire plan starts. Thereafter, the provision

of fire support while still in range. Ideally, the in-place force will be able to

position assets to support the moving force across the LD.

(10)

Forward replenishment, especially fuel, after the move forward and before

the commitment of the moving force.

Moving Force:

(1)

Provision of a HQ, to be co-located with the HQ of the in-place force.

There should be representatives from the staff, and artillery and engineer

advisors.

(2)

Timings for the move forward and control of movement.

(3)

Agreement with the existing force over the provision of terrain, especially

for gun areas, concentration/assembly areas and attack positions.

(4)

Liaison officers to subordinate HQs or units of the in-place force.

(5)

Assistance with movement control.

Timings. The detailed timings of the operation will be made within the guidelines set by

the superior commander commencing with a timely warning order. Time must be allowed for:

planning, initially at force level and then at subordinate levels;

movement and co-location of command elements;

movement of reconnaissance, advance and combat support elements;

battle procedure; and

movement of the main body.

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Scheme of Manoeuvre. The following guidelines apply:

General. The moving force will take advantage of the security provided by the

in-place force to deploy for the attack. The entire movement from the rear

through the in-place force should be completed as a single fluid movement in

order to avoid congestion. The indirect fire support elements of the attacking

force may be deployed in the in-place force's area prior to the arrival of the

manoeuvre force.

Grouping. Whenever possible, regrouping should be carried out before the

move forward. Regrouping in a forward assembly area should be avoided. The

moving force will be organized so that the mission can be carried out/continued

after the passage of lines.

Order of March. The order of march will generally be reconnaissance

elements, followed by combat support units, which may have to move early in

order to support the move of the combat units, followed by combat units. The

combat support elements may initially lead and deploy amongst the in-place

force to support the crossing of the LD and the launch of the moving force.

Forward Assembly Area. A forward assembly area may be necessary for the

replenishment of vehicles, rest for crews and any final orders on regrouping.

7158.

REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

Purpose. The rearward passage of lines is an operation in which one force passes

through the static position of an in-place force. It normally passes back, rearward from the

direction of orientation, through a defensive position. Although there may appear to be little

difference between this operation and a withdrawal, the distinction is that in a rearward passage

of lines a force passes through another, whereas in a withdrawal this does not happen. A

rearward passage of lines may occur for various reasons including the following:

As the final phase of a delaying operation in which the moving force has

completed the delay, breaks clean from adversary contact and passes through

an in-place force manning a defensive position.

As a means of changing the type of force facing the adversary.

When terrain can be abandoned.

As a means of relieving a force unable to continue with its mission.

As part of a withdrawal operation. Forces withdrawing may have to conduct a

rearward passage of lines when moving back through new or intermediate

positions manned by other forces.

Planning. The planning procedures of forward and rearward passage of lines are

similar although movement to the rear is likely to be more difficult because:

The desire for speed and lack of troops will make detailed liaison,

reconnaissance and recognition of friendly troops difficult.

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If the moving force has been in action, its soldiers and units will be tired and

possibly disorganized.

The adversary may be pressing the moving force hard, trying to overtake or cut

it off from withdrawing.

Responsibilities. The planning responsibilities of the various HQs are:

Controlling Headquarters. The orders for the passage of lines issued by the

controlling HQ will determine, as a rule:

(1)

The location of the crossing areas or points.

(2)

Task organization and mission of the in-place force in relation to support

for the moving force and for subsequent tasks and intentions.

(3)

The time by which the force's defences are to be ready.

(4)

Control lines (including the handover line), areas at which the moving

force will assemble or deploy, and the allocation of sufficient routes for

the moving force.

(5)

The responsibility for the closure and activation of barriers.

(6)

The passage of command for the conduct of operations and new

command relationships.

(7)

Communications, identification and recognition signals.

(8)

The subsequent employment of the moving force.

Moving Forces and In-place Forces:

(1)

Plans must be coordinated for fire in support of the moving force. If

necessary, the in-place force must occupy gun positions forward of their

main position in order to give maximum coverage and help guarantee a

clean break for the moving force from adversary contact. In any event,

the in-place force will be prepared to provide fire support for the moving

force.

(2)

The in-place force must physically show all obstacles, and the routes and

gaps through them, to the moving force. They must also be prepared to

provide guides and movement control.

(3)

Control of movement to the rear of the handover line is the responsibility

of the in-place force. The number of routes back should be considered

against the requirements for dispersion and the need to close routes to

improve the effectiveness of barriers.

(4)

The moving force requires information about routes, obstacles and fire

support, whereas the in-place force requires information on the

adversary.

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(5)

The moving force provides liaison detachments at all crossing sites that

will see elements of the moving force coming through the in-place force.

(6)

Planning must include mutually agreed recognition measures for day and

night. This must include passwords, visual and audio signals, and the

exchange of liaison personnel.

(7)

There should be checkpoints for the moving force to enable tight

movement control to be exercised and to inform commanders of when the

passage of lines is complete. If possible to avoid congestion, there

should be no pause by the moving force in the forward areas.

Scheme of Manoeuvre. The following guidelines apply:

The moving force must be prepared to disengage from the adversary, and move

through the in-place force to a new concentration or deployment. Movement

should be at night or in conditions of poor visibility if at all possible. Before the

operation starts, casualties, non-essential vehicles, equipment and supplies

should be evacuated early so that routes are kept clear for the movement of the

main force.

The first elements to move will normally be CSS units that must clear the

forward area at an early stage. Vulnerability to adversary attack is reduced by

selecting areas or points of passage that permit the moving formation to pass

around the flanks of the formation in position and by designating release points

well to the rear of these positions. The moving formation must have priority on

an adequate number of roads and facilities to ensure its rapid movement

through the defended area.

The in-place force must be deployed so that it can carry out its task when it

assumes responsibility for the continuation of the mission. It must ensure that

its elements in location to cover the handover line are of sufficient strength to

conduct a temporary defence and to hold open crossing sites, passages and

other defiles until the rearward passage of lines is completed.

Protective elements in position must be of sufficient strength to conduct a

temporary defence until the rearward passage of lines is completed.

It may be necessary for elements of the moving force to be placed under

operational control (OPCON) of the in-place force to deal with a critical situation

caused by adversary action. Additionally, it must facilitate the disengagement of

the moving force by providing routes, guides and traffic control.

The movement across the handover line, where responsibility changes, must be

without interruption.

The commander of the moving force is responsible for identifying the last of his

forces as it passes through the in-place force, and for reporting his force clear to

his formation’s commander and to the in-place force's commander.

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7159. COMBAT SUPPORT IN A RELIEF OPERATION

Artillery. Firing positions of incoming artillery should be sited so that further

redeployment is not necessary. They should not be in positions that have already been located

by the adversary. In a forward passage of lines, the fire support units of the outgoing force

should not normally redeploy as long as they can provide support from their positions.

Air. Local air superiority will reduce the vulnerability of the forces during periods when

congestion cannot be avoided on the ground. For RIP operations, there will be situations where

CAS could assist the successful completion of operations.

Aviation. Helicopters may be required to save time in the deployment of liaison and

reconnaissance parties. Otherwise, they are used in their normal operational role.

Engineers. Whether conducting a forward or rearward passage, the in-place force has

the responsibility to provide mobility for the passing unit along cleared routes or corridors

through its sector. Creating lanes through the in-place units’ obstacles requires permission from

the force commander who is in command of both the stationery and moving forces. Tasks will

include:

Relief in Place. Assistance with survivability tasks and the takeover of the

existing barrier plan.

Forward Passage of Lines. Opening and maintaining routes, including the

crossing of obstacles.

Rearward Passage of Lines. The maintenance of routes and counter-mobility

tasks, including the closure of routes and the destruction of crossing points to

impede the adversary.

Air Defence. The unavoidable concentration of units during relief operations will

increase vulnerability to air attack. This may require the adjustment of the AD posture.

Electronic Warfare. EW assets will support the deception plan, as well as continuing to

provide information on adversary locations and intentions.

CBRN Defence. CBRN defence units will monitor units passing to the rear for

contamination and to conduct decontamination operations to prevent the spread of

contamination.

SECTION 28

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A RELIEF OPERATION

7160. RESPONSIBILITIES

Relief in Place. The outgoing commander is responsible for the defence of the sector

until command passes. The moment when command is to pass is determined by mutual

agreement between the two formation/unit commanders within the overall direction of the

superior commander. Both commanders should be co-located throughout the operation.

Following the passing of command, the incoming commander will assume the appropriate

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control of all elements of the outgoing unit that have not yet been relieved. The change of

command will be reported to the overall commander.

Forward Passage of Lines. The overall C2 of the operation should be with the superior

HQs of the forces involved. Normally, the commander of the incoming forces assumes

responsibility for the conduct of the operation beyond the LD at the time the attack begins.

Rearward Passage of Lines. The following responsibilities apply:

The movement control of elements of the outgoing force will be in accordance

with the higher commander’s direction and will normally be the responsibility of

the incoming force.

The actual transfer of responsibility will normally be agreed between the two

commanders executing the operation. This can be carried out most effectively if

they are co-located. Where appropriate, as the operation progresses lower level

commanders may also be co-located.

The incoming commander reports the change of responsibility.

The commander of the outgoing force will report when the rearward passage of

his forces is completed.

During a rearward passage of lines, liaison is to be established from the

outgoing (moving) to the incoming (in-place) force.

7161.

COORDINATION

In general, the higher HQ directing a relief operation will stipulate the following details:

the time frame in which the operation is to be conducted;

designation of control lines and routes;

arrangement for liaison, reconnaissance and advance parties;

fire support;

tactical air support of land operations;

deception plans;

airspace control means;

AD; and

CSS including criteria for handover of equipment and combat supplies.

7162.

COMMUNICATIONS

In order to conceal the presence of another force from the adversary, the

communications plan must support the deception plan.

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The communications plan should include all those details that the two involved forces

will require for coordinated operations. Equipment incompatibility will have to be overcome

through the use of liaison teams.

7163. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN A RELIEF OPERATION

During a relief operation, the in-place force should assist, whenever possible, with

casualty evacuation, traffic control, vehicle recovery, fuel and ammunition. A force taking over

responsibility for further operations should be fully replenished.

The higher commander may direct that the outgoing force handover stocks that are not

required for their subsequent mission. Stocks must be checked for interoperability prior to any

such operations as this may influence the plan.

CSS units may have to move early to be in location upon arrival of the combat forces.

Alternatively, if CSS units are following, plans will have to take account of a reduction or

discontinuity in sustainment; in both cases logistic coordination is essential.

Conclusion. A rearward passage of lines is difficult to execute well. If the forces are

not well balanced and well supported, an alert adversary may be able to outflank or overrun

formations and units, or severely disrupt operations by the use of nuclear or chemical means.

Careful planning and reconnaissance and clear directives and orders will be necessary to

ensure that the operation proceeds smoothly. C2 must be of the highest order if confusion and

casualties are to be minimized. Early liaison by those in authority is crucial. The plan for the

changeover of command must be clear and known to both formations.

SECTION 29

CROSSING AND BREACHING OF OBSTACLES

7164. INTRODUCTION

An obstacle is a natural or man-made restriction to movement that will normally require

special equipment or munitions to overcome it. A coordinated series of obstacles is known as a

barrier. The crossing and breaching of obstacles is considered an enabling operation.

However, it involves a large variety of tactical tasks that are offensive in nature.

Forces require an ability to cross obstacles in order to continue movement in support of

operations. Although crossings normally occur during offensive operations, they may also be

necessary during defensive or delaying operations. They can occur throughout the combat

zone and along LOC further to the rear. Often they involve a passage of lines.

7165. TYPES OF OBSTACLES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

Inland Areas of Water or Waterways:

Areas of water are normally obstacles after the destruction of fixed bridges.

Detours are not normally possible.

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The need for crossing operations can normally be foreseen from existing

geographical data and confirmed by ISTAR assets.

Assault boats and some other types of vehicles may cross without engineer

assistance.

Crossing difficulty will depend upon climatic and terrain conditions.

Minefields:

Normally cause attrition.

Are covered by observation and fire.

Detours/bypassing may be possible.

The need for a breach may not be anticipated.

Normally engineer assistance is required for a breach.

Other Obstacles:

Rough, soft or marshy ground, terrain covered by deep snow.

Craters and ditches.

Vertical steps and slopes.

Contaminated areas.

Abatis, extended wire entanglements, debris, including collateral damage from

the effects of weapons.

Existing and reinforcing obstacles including craters, mines, landfalls and

avalanches. Bypass will almost always be difficult or impossible.

Artificially induced flooding and inundation.

7166.

TYPES OF CROSSING AND BREACHING

Hasty Crossing/Breaching. A hasty crossing/breaching takes place from the line of

march, with little preparation, using resources immediately available. The intent of conducting

such an operation is to execute a crossing before the adversary has the opportunity to fully

prepare his defensive position.

Deliberate Crossing/Breaching. A deliberate crossing/breaching requires thorough

reconnaissance, detailed planning, extensive preparations, rehearsals, and heavy or special

engineer equipment. It is conducted because of the complexity of the obstacle, or when a hasty

crossing/breaching has failed.

Assault Breaching. This type of breaching operation provides a force with the mobility

it needs to gain a foothold in an adversary defence and to exploit success by continuing the

assault through the objective. The assault breach allows a force to penetrate an adversary's

protective obstacles and destroy the defender comprehensively.

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Covert Breaching. The covert breach is a special breaching operation used by

dismounted forces in conjunction with an infiltration during limited visibility. It is carried out

silently to achieve surprise and to minimize casualties.

SECTION 30

GENERAL PLANNING CONCEPTS AND FACTORS

7167. CONCEPT

Any obstacle can be overcome given sufficient resources and time. A commander

should aim to seize a crossing site or minefield lane or gap intact, or to conduct a hasty

crossing/breaching of the obstacle before the adversary has time to react.

Bypassing an obstacle is often more expeditious, even if forces have to travel greater

distances. On the other hand, bypassing an obstacle may comply with the intentions of the

adversary.

If obstacles cannot be bypassed, it may be useful to overcome them in places where the

adversary does not expect it. Combined with deception measures, it may be possible to

surprise the adversary and to avoid losses.

The movement of troops and equipment across the obstacle and their deployment on

the far side must be strictly controlled to maintain momentum, avoid congestion, provide

flexibility and establish sufficient force to defeat any adversary counter-action.

Limited visibility creates favourable conditions for overcoming obstacles while impeding

observed adversary fire. The protective effect of limited visibility may be reduced by modern

surveillance and fire control means, while our use of night vision aids allows for use of periods

of limited visibility with an advantage; speed, situational awareness and ability to conduct

operations may be greatly improved.

If the obstacle is defended, successful breaching must be proceeded by the suppression

of adversary fire, obscuration of the adversary or screening friendly movement, and securing the

breach/crossing site by either fire or force as necessary.

7168. PLANNING FACTORS

The following factors are applicable to all crossing and breaching operations:

Adequate and timely intelligence and reconnaissance will:

(1)

Confirm the existence and nature of any obstacles.

(2)

Assist the commander’s decision to bypass or mount a hasty or deliberate

operation. From this decision, the requirement for any deployment of

engineer equipment and other forces will be established.

Effective movement control measures including timings.

Maximum use of deception to achieve surprise.

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Adequate AD and fire support, particularly tactical air support and counter-

battery fire.

Adequate CBRN defence measures must be undertaken.

Adequate logistics support for clearing/breaching the obstacle.

SECTION 31

CONDUCT OF WATER CROSSING OPERATIONS

7169. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

General. Water crossing procedures are fully described in various publications and

reference should be made to them.¹⁸⁴

Phases. Once the near side of the obstacle has been secured, a crossing of a water

obstacle is be done in three phases:

Assault. To gain a lodgement on the far side of the obstacle. This phase is not

required for an unopposed crossing.

Build-up. To extend the lodgement into a bridgehead.

Consolidation. To establish a firm base within the bridgehead from which to

breakout and continue the overall operation.

Crossing Sites. If possible, crossings should be conducted on a broad front with

multiple crossing sites. Areas selected for the crossing of obstacles should have, either

naturally or through engineer development, the following features:

A suitable number of crossing sites, with alternatives, which are dispersed to

reduce vulnerability and to provide flexibility. The number of crossing sites

established is normally twice that required by the desired traffic flow. This is

necessary, as time does not normally allow other sites to be started, should the

initial ones fail. In addition, the threat may dictate moving to another site.

Cover from observation.

Routes to and from crossing sites, to include lateral routes that have the

required load classification and capacity.

Waiting areas that provide cover for units and subunits.

Sufficient space for the establishment of a bridgehead.

Locations for elements providing support by direct fire and observed indirect fire.

¹⁸⁴ NATO standards and procedures for the conduct of water crossing operations are contained in

Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2395.

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Assembly areas located some distance from the obstacle where forces wait to

move to the crossing site. The assembly areas need to be dispersed, have

good routes to the crossing sites, and good cover and concealment.

Selection of a Bridgehead. The bridgehead is secured on the far (adversary) side of

the obstacle by the assault crossing forces. In selecting areas for the establishment of a

bridgehead, the following should be considered:

Defensible terrain of sufficient extent that the adversary cannot seriously

interfere with the crossing. The bridgehead should be sited so as to remove all

adversaries from positions of direct fire and observation onto the crossing site

and bridgehead area.

Sufficient crossing and movement facilities to avoid congestion.

A base for the continuation of the overall operation.

Crossing Area. The tactical commander—generally the commander of a brigade or

higher formation—will order a crossing area only if the tactical situation or the nature of the

obstacle requires it. The depth of the crossing area is normally not very great. However, its

depth will depend upon the size of the obstacle and the terrain. The area’s near and far

boundaries should be positioned within the closest lateral routes approximately 3 km from the

water, or on easily recognizable terrain features that run parallel to the obstacle. There may be

a number of crossing locations, or sites, within the crossing area.

Equipment Reserve. Selected items of equipment must be held in reserve, ready for

short notice replacement or to maintain crossing sites and equipment. Once a crossing is

completed, equipment must be recovered for reuse or replaced with permanent equipment as

soon as possible.

Liaison. The tactical commander must keep the engineer commander informed of his

intentions and plans. Thus, the engineer commander is able to make his estimate of the

situation and advise on the resources available, the number and location of suitable crossing

sites, the assistance needed from other elements, and the time required for preliminary work.

Additionally, this allows the crossing area commander and the crossing site commander to

operate away from each other in times of reduced communications or changes in the situation

or threat.

7170. EXECUTION

Forces and Tasks. Normally a force conducting a crossing must pass through an in-

place force that has cleared and secured the near side of the obstacle. A crossing force

consists of a bridgehead force and a breakout force:

In-place Force. The in-place force secures the near or friendly side of the

obstacle in order to support a forward passage of lines and the assault onto the

far side of the obstacle. It provides fire and other support to the bridgehead

force during the crossing. Within its area, it has normal responsibilities

regarding security, including defence of the obstacle and the home bank (near

or friendly side).

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Bridgehead Force. The bridgehead force consists of an assault echelon and

a main body. Its mission is to seize or to control ground in order to permit the

continuous embarkation, landing or crossing of troops and materiel. It will also

provide the manoeuvre space needed for subsequent operations:

(1)

The assault echelon is tasked to gain the lodgement, normally seizing

intermediate objectives. This must be done so as to prevent adversary

ground observation and direct fire onto the obstacle, and thus allow

crossing sites and equipment to be prepared and operated with minimum

interference to bring the main body and breakout force to the far side.

(2)

The main body of the bridgehead force conducts the build-up, including

the seizure of the objectives on the bridgehead line, and consolidation.

Within its area, the bridgehead force has normal responsibilities for

security, including the defence of the far side of the obstacle.

Breakout Force. The breakout force is tasked with the continuation of the

operation. In some situations this may be an additional task for the bridgehead

force.

Assault Phase. Once the near bank is secured, and plans for the assault crossing and

preparatory movements completed, the bridgehead force may commence the conduct of the

assault phase.

The assault echelon of the bridgehead force establishes a lodgement on the

far side of the obstacle to eliminate adversary direct fire and observation of the

crossing sites. The lodgement is achieved either by:

(1)

infiltration;

(2)

boating, swimming, fording or snorkelling a force; or

(3)

air lifting.

At H-hour, the assault echelon crosses the LD, which is normally the near bank,

and proceeds across the obstacle. Fire and other support are provided by

elements of the in-place force on the near side of the obstacle. Normally this

support includes direct and indirect fire support and the protection of crossing

sites from air attack and from attacks along the obstacle by divers, sabotage

squads, vessels, mines or drifting objects.

Build-up Phase. The build-up phase is achieved as follows:

Once the assault echelon is across the obstacle and secure on the objectives,

the tactical commander orders the crossing area into effect. Engineers

complete their preparation of crossing sites and means, and movement control

elements complete their deployment and control the move of the main body

across the obstacle, in accordance with the crossing plan.

The crossing area organization must be flexible, for once the adversary detects

a crossing site, it is extremely vulnerable. Equipment, such as bridging, may

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have to be dispersed at short notice and alternative means and sites may have

to be used. In some cases, it may be necessary to split a bridge into rafts, or

alternatively, use smoke to obscure the site.

Once across the obstacle, the lead elements of the main body pass through or

around the assault echelon and carry on to secure the final objectives in the

bridgehead. Once these have been secured, the bridgehead is established.

Consolidation Phase. This phase is an extension of the build-up phase. Adversary

pockets of resistance are eliminated and the remainder of the main body and assault elements

of the breakout force are moved across the obstacle. Crossing sites are improved and

preparations are made for the breakout and the continuation of the overall operation, which

must be resumed as quickly as possible.

7171. WATER CROSSINGS AS PART OF THE DELAY BATTLE

During a delay battle, there may be a requirement to withdraw back across a water

obstacle once the required amount of delay has been imposed. The delaying force will, once

the delay objective has been reached, cross back over an obstacle and conduct a rearward

passage of lines with a friendly force on the home bank, likely manning a deliberate defensive

position. This home bank or in-place force will support the delaying force in breaking contact

with the adversary as follows:

Preliminary Withdrawal and Rearward Passage of Lines. During a delay

battle, those units and forces not required to actually conduct the delay should

be withdrawn over the crossing as early as possible. Maximum use should be

made during this phase of existing bridges (if these are available) as directed by

the tactical commander. Bridges or ferries may be ordered as part of the

withdrawal plan.

Delaying Battle and Withdrawal of Delaying Force. Once the desired delay

has been imposed or the delaying force is ordered to do so, the delaying force

with break contact with the advancing adversary, withdraw and cross the

obstacle to conduct a rearward passage of lines. The forces engaged on the

adversary bank are withdrawn under cover of supporting fire from armoured and

infantry elements on the home bank. The tactical commander would coordinate

his phase. The rate of crossing is dependent upon the pressure from the

adversary: the commander may risk employing all the crossing means available

concentrating on those bridges which are best concealed. By the end of this

phase, all bridges should, if possible, have been withdrawn or dismantled, or

destroyed.

Withdrawal Phase. During this phase, obstacles to movement on either side of

the crossing are improved or activated. The last vehicles are withdrawn by

ferries or on pontoons, or by swimming or snorkelling (if the river bed and banks

are suitable). An infantry screen supported by artillery and mortars provides

protection. The last troops are transported by boat, helicopter or any available

means.

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7172. COMBAT SUPPORT IN AN OBSTACLE CROSSING

Artillery Support. Artillery and mortars are usually positioned so that they can provide

continuous support during all phases of a crossing. The primary task of both these weapons is

to provide supporting fire to troops in the bridgehead. They should also mask adversary

observation of the crossing sites and employ counter-battery fire to neutralize adversary forces

defending the obstacle. Deception fire can also be used in order to draw the adversary’s

attention away from the actual crossing site.

Air. As it may be possible to achieve only local air superiority for a limited period, the

time and location of the crossing must be carefully coordinated with air support.

Aviation. Helicopter forces could have much to contribute to obstacle crossing, as

armed/attack helicopters and other helicopters can be used to secure the approach to the

obstacle during the assault phase. AH also provide the commander with additional and flexible

fire support.

Air Defence. Forces conducting a crossing present a particularly attractive target to the

adversary. Although each force is responsible for its own AD, special arrangements may be

made for the actual crossing sites, and the routes to them, because of their importance.

Engineer Support. Nearly all crossings require engineer support. The main task of the

engineers is to enable the bridgehead force to cross the obstacle. As a secondary task, they

may be required to prepare obstacles to protect the flanks of the crossing force. Usually most

personnel and equipment committed to both of these tasks are drawn from forces not involved

in the crossing or subsequent operations, as these forces require their own engineers for the

assault and tasks in and beyond the bridgehead. Operations may be restricted by the amount

of specialized crossing equipment available. Additionally, engineers are required to support the

follow-on forces.

Electronic Warfare. EW support to crossing operations will be based initially on

passive measures to aid intelligence gathering. Electronic deception and jamming may be used

to support the main operation.

7173. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN AN OBSTACLE CROSSING

Replenishment. The assault echelon commander should ensure that his force is self-

sufficient in combat supplies, as during the assault phase his force will be temporarily separated

from its full CSS. Provision should be made for emergency replenishment, possibly by

helicopter. Within the crossing plan, it is important that ammunition and fuel replenishment

vehicles cross early to ensure timely replenishment.

Repair and Recovery. Repair and recovery resources must be included in the

movement control plan to ensure that routes, particularly at defiles and crossing sites, are kept

open. Resources should be positioned on both sides of crossing sites. Special consideration

must be given to the arrangements for the repair and recovery of vehicles in the process of

crossing the obstacle.

Medical. The movement control plan must include medical arrangements, particularly

for the evacuation of casualties. Medical facilities with casualty evacuation assets should be

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established each side of the water obstacle crossing, and there may be a need to deploy a

medical holding facility on the other side of the obstacle. Aviation is particularly useful in this

situation.

Provost. Traffic control will be vital at crossing points and defiles to prevent them from

being congested with static and exposed vehicles.

7174. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AN OBSTACLE CROSSING

The need for a clear command organization, which plans and executes a complete but

simple crossing plan, is paramount in all water crossing operations. The controlling HQ must

provide a flexible organization and make the best use of the resources available to react to any

changes in the crossing flow and the tactical situation.

The basic requirements for control are:

a crossing control organization with clearly defined responsibilities;

a movement control organization; and

a command and control communications network.

7175. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE COMMANDER OF THE OBSTACLE CROSSING

The commander has overall responsibility for C2 of the crossing operation and will issue

the Crossing Plan:

In certain areas, particularly in rear areas, the commander may be a national

territorial area commander, not part of the NATO, UN or coalition command

chain. In operating the movement control net, he exercises control for the

movement of deploying formations based upon priorities.

In areas in which tactical operations are occurring, the commander is normally

the overall tactical commander. His task is to guarantee the movement of any

unit/formation in or through his area of responsibility. He will likely exercise

OPCON for this particular operation.

7176. DIRECTION

The commander may select, determine and allocate the following:

crossing areas;

crossing sites;

assembly and waiting areas; and

deployment routes.

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The commander may also issue special instructions for the crossing and times, and if

necessary, the organization of convoys.

7177. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS

The commander for a major crossing operation may form a special controlling HQ, at

which the following elements will be represented:

movement control; and

engineers.

It may also be necessary to have the following represented:

logistics;

communications and EW; and

liaison elements from the crossing formation/units.

For major crossings, a Crossing Area HQ and several Crossing Site HQs may be

required.

7178. ENGINEER COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

Each level of command in an obstacle crossing operation will have an engineer who is

responsible for the technical aspects of executing the crossing.

Engineer commanders are responsible at their respective levels of command for:

giving advice on all engineer matters;

ensuring that there is an adequate communications network for engineers

involved in the operation; and

assigning crossing site commanders.

7179. CROSSING SITE COMMANDER AND HEADQUARTERS

The Crossing Site Commander is normally an engineer appointed by the appropriate

level of command who will normally provide the crossing site HQ. The Crossing Site

Commander has the following responsibilities:

to develop and maintain the crossing site including entrances and exits;

to construct, operate and maintain the means of crossing;

movement across the water at his or her crossing site, including the giving of

orders to troops during the crossing;

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advice to the Waiting Area Controller on movement to his or her crossing site;

and

all technical aspects of maintaining the survivability of his or her crossing site

and crossing equipment.

7180. CROSSING FORMATIONS AND UNITS

When a force is required to conduct a move that is controlled and supported by another

authority (e.g., a Command or Nation), it is mandatory for this force to liaise as early as possible

at its respective level of command within that authority. The purpose of this liaison is to

exchange relevant documents and to be briefed on:

the movement control organization;

organization and procedures of any water crossings;

reporting details for movement and for water crossings; and

status of convoy commanders and drivers of isolated vehicles.

7181.

CROSSING PLAN

The crossing plan should include the following items:

tactical situation;

commander's intentions, special directives and any arrangements for delegating

control;

protection, security, reaction to adversary attacks, and instructions for denying

the crossing;

designation of crossing sites, alternative crossing sites, and routes leading to

and from them;

the grouping and tasks for the engineers;

the boundaries of the crossing area;

the movement control plan, to include routes to and from the obstacle, lateral

routes, movement control posts and waiting areas;

a crossing schedule that provides a timetable for the crossing as well as:

(1)

movement credits per unit; and

(2)

priorities for the crossing.

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any limitations such as the capacity, speed and military load classification

(MLC); and

nicknames for each crossing site.

The detailed layout of an obstacle crossing area and sites is illustrated in Figure 7-15.

Figure 7-15: A Schematic Diagram of a Divisional Crossing Plan

Notes:

1. The tactical commander will normally be at the crossing control organization HQ, which is co-

located with the Movement Control HQ. This is represented as the Divisional HQ.

2. The commander may deploy forward to the Crossing Area HQ.

3. Crossing site HQs are not shown.

SECTION 32

CONDUCT OF BREACHING OPERATIONS

7182. GENERAL

The breaching of a minefield or other man-made obstacles and barrier plans will be

conducted in a manner similar to that of the deliberate crossing of a water obstacle.

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7183. PLANNING

Seizure of minefield lanes intact or any opportunity for a hasty breaching must be

exploited. If this fails, a deliberate breaching will be necessary.

For breaching to have a reasonable chance of success the minimum information

required is the minefield depth, its front and rear edges, and details of adversary weapons

covering the minefield.

The aim must always be to breach paths and lanes through adversary minefields from

the very beginning in order to enable dismounted infantry and combat vehicles to cross the

barrier. Whether paths may be prepared in advance will depend upon the situation, terrain, type

of barrier and breaching equipment available. Paths are to be enlarged rapidly to form lanes.

As many lanes as possible should be breached. As a minimum, two breaches should be

attempted.

7184. EXECUTION

For adversary obstacles, reconnaissance should include, if possible, the breaching of a

patrol path or lane through the minefield.

If the adversary situation allows, dismounted troops cross the minefield and establish a

lodgement on the far side, although this may not always be possible. In either case, it is

necessary to form a breaching force to open lanes for the personnel and vehicles of the assault

echelon.

If friendly forces have prepared the minefield, it is crossed using existing gaps or lanes,

or newly breached lanes.

Once lanes are open, traffic control posts at both ends of the lanes are required. In

addition, recovery posts will be established at the approaches to all lanes, and occasionally, on

both sides of the minefield.

With the assault echelon across the minefield and secure, engineers complete their

preparation of breaching sites to include marking. Movement control elements complete their

deployment to control the movement of the main body across the minefield. Complete

clearance of barriers requires a considerable amount of time and resources. Therefore, usually

complete clearance can only be justified if operationally necessary.

7185. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN BREACHING OPERATIONS

Similar considerations to those required for water crossings apply. The scale of support

for breaching operations tends to be lower than that for water crossing.

7186. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF BREACHING OPERATIONS

The level of command is likely to be lower than for water crossing. Minefield breaching

may involve a number of independent simultaneous actions each with its own commander,

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whereas water crossing is a centralized operation. The breaching commander is the

commander who has the tactical responsibility for operations in that area.

7187. CONDUCT OF OTHER OBSTACLE CROSSING

Considerations. The considerations that apply to the conduct of other obstacle

crossings are the same as those for water crossing operations and minefield breaching. The

major difference is normally one of scale. Therefore, the crossing of other types of obstacles is

conducted at lower tactical levels. Nevertheless, the tactical commander must ensure the

appropriate engineer support is available to maintain his mobility.

SECTION 33

CONCLUDING THE CAMPAIGN

7188. GENERAL

Military operations are conducted in accordance with the strategic objectives and end

state. Knowing when to end a campaign and how to preserve the end state are vital aspects of

operational art. Since campaigns are conducted for political aims, it is only successful when

such aims, or end states, are achieved. Success within the battlespace does not always lead to

success in conflict. Ensuring that it does requires the close collaboration of political and military

leaders and clearly understood strategic goals.

In many campaigns, the achievement of the strategic aims will also require close

collaboration with other members of the joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP)

framework. In some cases, a military end state will be reached before the ultimate strategic end

state is realized. Consequently, the non-military elements of the JIMP framework may continue

the work while the military scales back its participation and eventually withdraws. The timing

and method of transition from military forces to non-military forces and elements will require

careful consideration and planning as part of the operational art.

It is always possible that for political, diplomatic or economic reasons the campaign may

be terminated before the originally envisaged military end state and strategic end state are

reached. The commander must consider the consequences of a premature termination and

advise his superiors of the long-term ramifications from his perspective.

7189. CAMPAIGN TRANSITION AND CONCLUSION

Rarely will forces fight a major conflict and then withdraw from the theatre. Military

forces may be the only source of stability in the area and may have to restore communications

facilities, essential services, and provide humanitarian relief. The operational commander may

have to be the conduit for negotiations with the belligerent political and military leaders as part

of the initial conflict termination process. Although many of these tasks may have occurred

during major conflict as part of full-spectrum operations (FSO) within the continuum of

operations, the military, following major combat, will come to focus on such stability activities.

Thus, a campaign involving major combat will likely transition to a campaign of peace support

until such time as a new government is firmly established, new security forces are prepared to

assume duties, and immediate humanitarian needs are satisfied.

Rarely will the transition between campaign themes occur simultaneously throughout a

theatre of operations. It will likely be much more phased; with one area of a theatre transiting to

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focus on stability operations while other areas of the theatre remain focused on major combat.

Anticipation and appropriate planning during earlier stages will smooth the transition during the

critical period immediately after the fighting ends. Planning should also consider the use of

information operations (info ops), especially civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), public affairs (PA)

and psychological operations (PSYOPS), to assist in the transition to post-conflict activities and

the cementing of operational and strategic objectives.

Despite the fact that military forces are well suited to the conduct of stability operations,

the conclusion of a campaign and the attainment of the military end state will only be achieved

through the handover of many of these responsibilities to civilian agencies and other members

of the JIMP framework.

In an ideal situation, the responsibilities of a military force will eventually reduce to those

that only a military force can accomplish, such as framework security where necessary and the

training of newly formed indigenous security forces. See Figure 7-14.

The transition of stability operations activities to civilian and other governmental

agencies may be a slow and difficult process depending upon the situation. It may not be

uniform throughout a theatre or across all functions. For example, some governmental

agencies may be prepared to assume a role creating a new indigenous government and civil

service immediately following major combat or while an insurgency is ongoing, but non-

governmental organizations (NGOs) or international organizations (IOs) may not be willing to

assume responsibilities until the overall level of violence is lowered and a level of lasting stability

has been created. In such cases, the military may have to continue to fulfil certain stability

operation activities.

In other situations, the military may be able to handover most stability operations to other

agencies, but will still be required to maintain a significant presence to ensure a framework of

security, even if the majority of destabilizing influences have dissipated. Continuous efforts

should be made under security sector reform (SSR) to create competent indigenous security

forces capable of defeating possible adversaries to security and stability.

Ideally, a campaign will reach a military end state when the necessity for combat

operations has ceased, all stability operations have been turned over to civilian or other

governmental agencies, and the indigenous security forces are capable of dealing with any

current or near term adversaries to stability.

7190. REDEPLOYMENT

At the campaign's end, the operational commander must consider the redeployment of

the force. Redeployment should not be considered as a final activity, but merely as a transition

to future operations. Formation and unit integrity should be maintained during redeployment

whenever possible, and the commander should always keep in mind the reconstitution process

for the next operation. This will include finalization of post operation reports and submission of

observations as potential lessons learned.

Consideration must also be made for the reintroduction of troops into a peaceful society

and domestic setting following their service in war-torn areas where they witnessed widespread

pain, suffering and death. The efforts spent to build and preserve cohesion within a force prior

to and during operations must be continued after redeployment. Commanders at all levels are

responsible for the successful integration of their troops into post-conflict routine.

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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 7

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OPERATIONS

SECTION 1

DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process is often undertaken

following a major combat campaign or as part of a campaign to secure a failing state or region.

It is effectively, the dismembering of a military force and its return to other aspects of society

(which may include to a certain extent, integration with a newly formed military force). Note that

in many instances, a standing army should be allowed to remain intact, as a potential force for

stability in a developing nation. Conscripts may be demobilized, but many elements of a

standing army and other legitimate security forces may move straight to a reform process.

DDR is a multi-agency undertaking and will likely be a significant operational objective of

a campaign plan. The military forces’ involvement is classified as a type of stability operation

and the military will likely be assigned specific tactical tasks to assist in the DDR process.

DDR is defined as:

A stability operation that involves the handing over of arms and equipment,

the disbanding of military structures, and the return to civilian life of military and

paramilitary personnel. Note: This process marks the beginning of long-term

transformation processes, demilitarizing economies, communities and lives.¹⁸⁵

The end-state of this process is the enhancement of peace, security, stability, and

economic growth, at the regional, national, and local levels. At the completion of DDR, former

combatants are fully reintegrated into mainstream society and conditions are set for successful

peace building and Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The constituent parts of the DDR process are defined as follows:

Disarmament. Disarmament is the controlled process of taking weapons away

from military forces. (Demilitarization and disarmament usually take place within

the framework of demobilization operations).¹⁸⁶

Demobilization. Demobilization consists of those operations that are

undertaken by a Coalition Task Force to reduce the number of factions’ forces

and their equipment in the area of operations to the level as agreed in the peace

agreement.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ New draft definition submitted for Army Terminology Panel approval May 06. It is somewhat narrower

than the draft ABCA Armies Programme draft definition: A series of major operational tasks that occur

following a conflict, peace support campaign, or national crisis that move a standing military, paramilitary,

and other combatant forces from an active combatant status to a state of reintegration into the community

¹⁸⁶ AJP 3.4.1 Glossary

¹⁸⁷ AJP 3.4.1 Glossary. At times, there may not be a formal peace agreement in place.

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Reintegration. Reintegration is the process of returning former combatants and

other selected non-combatants to a civilian identity within the social, economic,

political, and psychological life within the community. ¹⁸⁸

The DDR plan may be a key aspect within the overall campaign plan to realizing the

desired end-state. Its success necessitates a comprehensive approach. DDR is a multi-agency

function with the military conducting many of the tactical tasks in support of it, along with other

agencies. It will include a number of decisive points relating to various issues, including military,

political, economic, security and communications. Coordination and cooperation amongst

relevant organizations is therefore a fundamental requirement.

Coalition forces should be prepared to accept lead agency role, especially in the initial

stages. It is highly likely that they will support another lead agency in the DDR process. Military

forces are not normally resourced and structured to complete the entire DDR process. Initially,

the military will likely take the lead, beginning with such basic aspects as Prisoner of War (PW)

handling. Eventually, particularly at the point of reintegration, other agencies will assume the

lead whilst military forces provide the security framework.

Key to success will be the support of the host nation (HN) or newly established regime.

Early recognition of roles, responsibilities and tasks will not only contribute to the mission

success and the achievement of operational end-states, it will also assist in the transition of

authority from the military, Coalition or Lead Agency to HN resources. In this respect, military

forces will play a key role, as a critical precursor for the conduct of DDR (dependant as it is on

inter-agency involvement and non-military effort), requires the establishment and maintenance

of a permissive security environment

Support to the DDR process is a key aspect in the conduct of stability operations. For

example, effective stability operations (in this case DDR) within the context of MCO enable a

defeated enemy, if required, to be effectively disarmed, with a view taken towards their eventual

reintegration. Furthermore, they should ensure that the population within the area secured

understands the legitimacy of the action, have appreciated the levels of security provided and

have hope for future development. In the achievement of such success in a major combat

phase, strategic planning will consider the pursuance of those subsequent objectives leading

eventually to ‘stability’. This reinforces the requirement to plan early and in harmony with

campaign objectives.

SECTION 2

PRINCIPLES

The guiding principles for Stability Operations apply to the successful conduct of DDR.

These principles, with appropriate amplification specific to DDR as appropriate, are outlined

below in priority order:

A strategically driven Campaign Plan defining the theme, clear end-state,

objectives, measures of success, and with dedicated resources:

¹⁸⁸ This description was developed within ABCA Armies Programme March 2006. Note that some

selected members of the demobilized military may be returned to a newly formed military.

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(1)

Political will and tangible economic support for reintegration is required.

Soldiers who have been demobilized should not be returning to their

communities with no hope for employment or support.

(2)

The overall DDR and its ways and means should be supported by

information operations to encourage voluntary compliance.

(3)

There should be sufficient means of incentive for disarmament and

reintegration.

(4)

There should be credible levels of expectation for both the DDR agencies

and for those personnel being demobilized.

(5)

There must be perseverance through the resolute and persistent pursuit

of objectives (which may be of a longer-term social, economic and

political nature).

Unity of purpose and coherency of action between the military, political and

civilian agencies:

(1)

The military will likely take a lead role at the outset of disarmament and

demobilization.

(2)

Supporting plans (e.g. economic) must be realistic, progressive and

achievable, with a clear delineation of responsibilities.

(3)

Reintegration is the desired end-state and therefore must be planned

from the outset, including other agencies—diplomatic/political,

economic—that need to clearly articulate their desired end-state.

(4)

The initial reintegration may include basic work in support of

reconstruction projects that will assist both economic stimulus and re-

establishment of societal structures.

(5)

The plan must be supported by the HN authority.

A position of legitimacy:

(1)

It is vital that the DDR process has the advertised support of the HN and

respected members of the civil society. The process must be transparent

and supported by information operations.

(2)

Flexibility at the operational and tactical levels is needed in successfully

supporting the change management process.

(3)

Success must reflect the expectations of the civil populace.

Imposition of security through a robust posture with threats to stability countered

in a timely manner utilizing precision and the most suitable means:

(1)

This security will extend to the protection of other agency personnel and

equipment.

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