CANADA. LAND OPERATIONS (ENGLISH, 2008)

Land Operations

conduct of operations;

coordination of fires;

control of movement;

development and maintenance of installations;

terrain management, to include installations;

force protection security;

maintenance of the common operating picture (COP); and

area of intelligence responsibility (AIR).⁵²

When assigning an AO/AOR to a subordinate, the higher commander must ensure that

the subordinate unit or formation has the means to influence the situation in that area in order to

achieve the desired effects and objectives. Higher commanders will often specify constraints,

restraints, and limitations when assigning an AO/AOR to a subordinate. These may be depicted

as graphic control measures or tasks.⁵³

Commanders use graphic control measures to regulate manoeuvre, movement,

airspace, fire support, and other aspects of operations within the AO/AOR. They are also a part

of the combat identification construct. In general, all graphic control measures should be easily

identifiable on the ground. It should also be noted that control measures will shift over time and

should be continually monitored to ensure they reflect tactical requirements. Graphic control

measures are specified in B-GL-331-003/FP-001 Military Symbols for Land Operations.

Many campaigns and operations will present significant geographical challenges. Many

situations and AOs/AORs will not allow for a linear and/or contiguous deployment.

Coordination, cooperation and mutual support between elements may be difficult. Mission

command and the use of well-practised reserves at all levels become increasingly important

under such circumstances. Referring to Figures 4-4 to 4-7, the four recognized types of

AOs/AORs are:

contiguous, linear;

contiguous, non-linear;

non-contiguous, linear; and

non-contiguous, non-linear.

The label of an AO as linear is decided in relation to a located and identifiable adversary.

⁵² NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6), Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2006). Area of

intelligence responsibility (AIR) is defined as: “an area allocated to a commander, in which he is responsible for

the provision of intelligence, within the means at his disposal.”

⁵³ Graphic control measures are used at all echelons and by all Services and are defined as: “a symbol

used on maps and overlays to regulate forces and operational functions.” Refer to B-GL-331-003/FP-001

Military Symbols for Land Operations.

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Factors affecting the assignment of AOs/AORs will vary by mission. Apart from

geography, there are a wide range of factors that must be considered in the delineation and

allocation:

Mission.

Targets and desired effects on those targets.

Capabilities of own troops to create desired effects and conduct required

activities.

Assigned and implied tasks.

Terrain.

Threat.

Time and space (particularly in terms of the size of AO, threat and movement

capabilities).

Cultural boundaries.

Linguistic boundaries.

Political and/or judicial boundaries and social power structures.

Tribal, historic, ethnic and/or religious boundaries.

Need for an economy of force.

Presence of other agencies in the JIMP framework with which cooperation is

planned.

408.

AREAS UNASSIGNED

In non-contiguous AOs there will be areas that are not assigned to subordinate

commanders. An area unassigned is the space not assigned to subordinate units within a

higher headquarters AO/AOR. The commander remains responsible for these areas and for

operations within them. He determines what resources he will assign to monitor these areas

and to conduct activities in them when required. This may be done with reconnaissance forces

in an economy of force concept.

409. AREA OF INFLUENCE

An area of influence (A of I) is defined as: “a geographical area wherein a commander is

directly capable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under

his command or control.”⁵⁴ It is the physical volume of space within which a commander can

directly influence the situation by manoeuvre, fire support systems that are under his command

or control, and through information operations⁵⁵ that affect understanding, perceptions and will

of target audiences.

⁵⁴ NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6), Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2006).

⁵⁵ Information Operations refer solely to influence activities such as public affairs, CIMIC related activities,

profile and posture of forces and PSYOPS.

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The ability to influence, that is, create effects within the area of influence, exists on both

the physical and psychological planes. The physical area of influence is measured by the limit

of the physical effects that a commander may deliver such as the range of his weapon systems

included electronic warfare (EW) means. These are first order effects on the physical plane and

can be termed fires.

The targets and audiences that may be psychologically affected by a commander’s

decisions and activities, that is, psychological effects of influence, may not be physically within

the AO or adjacent geographical area. They may be physically removed from his immediate AO

and local environment and located in another area. For example, activities to undermine or

support a particular ethnic group in the AO may influence the behaviour of other audiences of

the same ethnic group in another region or part of the world. Thus, although effects on the

physical plane will be within the physical boundaries of an area of influence, the effects created

on the psychological plane may be wide ranging in both space and time. It is this linkage to

psychological effects that in many cases will bind tactical level activities to operational

and strategic effects.

The area of influence has different connotations at the tactical, operational, and strategic

levels:

Tactical. At the tactical level, the area of influence includes the physical space

that a commander can influence with the means at his disposal. Operations

within tactical areas of influence are synchronized within the functional

framework through the higher commanders intent and operational plan.

Operational. At the operational level, the area of influence includes the joint

operations area that can be influenced by the military operations within the

entire assigned area. Military operations and activities within operational areas

of influence are synchronized along lines of operation and within a JIMP

framework (particularly across multiple agencies) in order to create supporting

effects and achieve operational objectives and end states.

Strategic. At the strategic level, the area of influence can be global due to the

ability to create psychological effects that are rapidly spread through information

technology.

410. DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR—OPERATIONS IN SPACE AND TIME

Within the battlefield framework, the concept of deep, close, and rear areas⁵⁶ and

operations exist. They describe the placement of forces and the conduct of operations and

activities in terms of space and time. These are described as follows:

Deep Operations. Deep operations are: “operations conducted against forces

or resources not engaged in close operations. They expand the battle area in

time and space, help to shape the close battle, make it difficult for the enemy to

concentrate fighting power without loss, and diminish the coherence and tempo

⁵⁶ Previously, deep, close and rear operations were considered part of the operational framework.

However, they are linked to time and space and thus have been placed under the battlespace framework.

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of his operations.”⁵⁷ Deep operations are those operations conducted at long

range and over a protracted time scale against adversary forces or resources

not currently engaged in close operations. They may be decisive operations,

but in general they will be shaping. For example, a deep target engagement

may reduce the combat effectiveness of the adversary’s reserve force prior to a

main attack. At each level of command, the extent of the deep operations and

related area is dependent upon the commander’s means of acquiring

information and engaging targets. Deep operations include three principle

activities: information operations; surveillance and target acquisition; and

interdiction. They may be conducted on the physical and psychological planes,

the latter seeking to create long term influences in a target audience. This may

include, for example, delivering PSYOPS leaflets to conscripts in enemy reserve

units, or building civil infrastructure so that subsequent generations of a region

are better educated and more stable.

Close Operations. Close operations are: “operations conducted at short range,

in close contact and in the immediate timescale.”⁵⁸ Close operations are those

that involve friendly forces in direct contact with the adversary or operations in

which commanders anticipate direct contact taking place. The means used in

close combat could range from physical destruction with lethal weapons, to

arrest of detainees. They may be shaping, decisive, and even sustaining

operations of forces in contact. Combined arms coordination is the hallmark of

close operations. Close operations will normally occur on the physical plane,

although there may be instances when they will occur on the psychological

plane, independently or in addition to the physical plane. For example, a

firepower demonstration may convince a belligerent commander not to

manoeuvre his forces from a cantonment site, and a medical clinic for the local

populace will immediately engender good will and local support.

Rear Operations. Rear operations are defined as: “operations which establish

and maintain one's own forces in order to generate the freedom of action to

allow for the conduct of close and deep operations.”⁵⁹ Rear operations are the

largely administrative and logistic activities that occur out of contact with

adversary forces, that is, behind the area in which close operations are

occurring. Rear operations require security, particularly in campaigns involving

an asymmetric, non-conventional adversary. In non-contiguous and/or non-

linear battlespaces (that is, in areas with no identifiable rear area), there is a

need to secure the lines of communications and critical centres. Rear area

operations including the security and force protection aspect are normally

sustaining operations (in terms of the effects framework).

Deep and close operations may also be identified in terms of time, for both execution

and planning purposes. Normally, close operations will occur against adversary forces that will

be encountered within 48 hours. Operations against adversaries that will be encountered by the

forward line of troops not before 48 to 72 hours will normally be considered deep operations,

depending upon the level of engagement. When operating to create effects on the

⁵⁷ NATO Allied Administrative Publication 39 (AAP-39), Glossary of Land Military Terms and Definitions.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

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psychological plane, the scope of understanding and employment of the spatial, temporal, and

purpose descriptors must be expanded. Deep operations may be conducted for months to

years before they result in a close operation, if ever at all. For example, operations seeking to

improve a local education system may create immediate support for a campaign, but they will

not provide a result in terms of a cultural shift and social improvement for a number of years.⁶⁰

SECTION 3

THE FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK: OPERATIONAL

FUNCTIONS AND CORE FUNCTIONS

411. GENERAL

Fighting power is applied through functional capabilities and activities. The operational

functions are: Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain. In organizing and applying fighting

power through the operational functions, forces conduct activities known as core functions.

Core functions are: find, fix, and strike, with exploit an implied function. Together, these two

functional groupings comprise the functional framework. The functional framework is effectively

the plan for an operation. It is a framework for manoeuvre of both physical activities (fires)

and influence activities.

412. THE OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS⁶¹

The operational functions describe the functional capabilities of a military force,

regardless of the type of unit or formal operational role. They apply to all levels of warfare, the

tactical, operational, and strategic. The operational functions stem from the intellectual

(doctrine) component, but our realized through the integration of all three components—

physical, moral, and intellectual.

Fighting power is applied through the organization and application of the operational

functions. The relative balance given to each function will dictate the nature of the effects

created. The operational functions operate on both the physical and psychological plans. The

operational functions are listed as: Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain.

413. COMMAND

Command is the operational function that integrates all the operational functions into a

single comprehensive strategic, operational or tactical level concept. It provides vertical and

⁶⁰ Operations under the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia included the distribution of a NATO

forces newspaper for the local population. One edition contained a children’s essay competition that

asked the contestants to describe how they would welcome a child from a different culture or region

moving into their neighbourhood. This was a deep operation, seeking to shape the future generation.

⁶¹ The operational functions (Command, Sense, Act, Shield and Sustain) are proper nouns. Through an

interim period from 1997 to 2001 using six combat functions (command, information operations,

manoeuvre, firepower, protection, and sustainment), they have replaced the common eleven tactical level

orientated combat functions used prior to 1997 (command and control; information systems; intelligence;

electronic warfare; close combat; aviation; fire support; engineer support and mine warfare; nuclear,

biological and chemical warfare; air defence; and, combat service support), and now better speak to

activities and effects on both the physical and psychological planes. All capabilities contained in the

combat functions are inherent to the operational functions. Note, however, that while ABCA has adopted

the five operational functions, in NATO doctrine, the combat functions have been retained.

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horizontal integration through the planning, direction, coordination and control of military forces

and other elements as allocated. It provides the means to unify and integrate the activities of

the other functions in the finding, fixing and striking⁶² of adversaries or other targets.

The central component of the Command function is a philosophy emphasizing the

importance of formulating and communicating the commander’s intent. A thorough

understanding of the intent guides decision-making at all levels, and encourages both initiative

and speed of action. It provides for a unity of purpose and effort on the vertical and horizontal

planes and even between the military and other elements of the JIMP framework.

Command support processes are reliant upon robust communications, good intelligence,

and an effective battle procedure process. Commanders will need the skills to operate in a fast-

paced and highly technical environment while still ensuring personal dominance of the

operations and decision-making process.

414. SENSE

Sense is the operational function that provides the commander with knowledge. This

function integrates those assets that collect information and then provide the analysis to

produce information and knowledge, which is then disseminated. By design, it leverages all

sources of information. Sensor management and fusion must be centralized to gain full

advantage of disparate systems found in the modern battlespace.

This operational function is inherently modular, capable of integrating additional systems

and capabilities at every level: tactical, operational or strategic. The scope of the Sense

function must be broad in order to firstly provide the commander with a broad and deep

knowledge base of the operational environment, and secondly, to assess the effects of activities

across all elements within the environment.

This view of the environment must not only include the physical characteristics of

weather and terrain, but also the broad range of other systems, entities and power structures

that exist and operate in the environment. The interrelated elements and systems of an

environment that must be assessed in the broad knowledge base are the political, military,

economic, social (including aspects of culture and religion), infrastructure, and information.

These elements must not only be assessed by the Sense capabilities, but the effects of our

activities upon them must be predicted to the greatest accuracy possible and then analyzed to

ensure that the desired effects and objectives are being achieved.

415. ACT

Act is the operational function that integrates manoeuvre, firepower, and information

operations (influence activities) to achieve the desired effects. It integrates fires and influence

activities. The synchronization of manoeuvre, firepower, (fires) and influence is at the heart of

manoeuvre warfare and allows the decisive concentration of effects against adversaries, other

targets, and centres of gravity. Fracturing these centres of gravity will dislocate the adversary,

breaking cohesion and the will to resist.

⁶² Find, fix, and strike are the core functions in the application of combat power and are discussed in the

following section.

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Act functions engage a wide variety of targets in addition to an adversary. Information

operations (that is, influence activities) such as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) reconstruction

or PSYOPS may be used to influence target audiences to support a campaign or to convince

elements of an adversary to surrender. Thus, the functions inherent in Act are conducted on the

physical and psychological planes in order to achieve desired effects. It is the complete

combination of fires and influence activities synchronized and harmonized through manoeuvre

and battlespace management.

416. SHIELD

Shield is the operational function that provides for the protection of a force’s survivability

and freedom of action. Shield facilitates the friendly forces’ freedom of action. Shielding, at the

strategic level, particularly in terms of the asymmetric threat to domestic populations, is a joint

function that stretches from the theatre of operations to the domestic population.

At the tactical level, Shield includes protective measures through air defence, counter-

mobility and survivability, such as the construction of defensives and the hardening of

structures.

Shielding will become increasingly difficult as forces operate dynamically and are

dispersed over an extended area in the face of an increased adversary ability to see and strike,

or against a threat that utilizes asymmetric tactics and takes refuge amongst civilian

populations.

The function of Shield also includes force protection measures, which is the

responsibility of all forces and their commanders.

417. SUSTAIN

Sustain is the operational function that integrates strategic, operational and tactical

levels of support to generate and maintain force capability. Sustain ideally takes an anticipatory

approach that enables support services to be provided commensurate with an increased tempo

in manoeuvre operations. Thus, it will move towards an intelligence push system based upon

situational awareness and asset visibility.

The supply-based support system, centred on stockpiling within echelons, may evolve in

certain campaigns to a distribution-based system where supplies are held within a “pipeline” and

delivered on as required basis. The utility and effectiveness of an echelon system will remain

extant.

Sustain function also incorporates health care and welfare systems and procedures.

418. THE SHARED FUNCTIONAL ASPECT

Certain military arms and services are more inclined by the nature of their inherent

capabilities to operate predominately within a single operational function. However, most arms

and services will operate across a number of operational functions. As examples: infantry

forces, in addition to being an Act manoeuvre element, may be assigned a Shield function of

convoy protection; reconnaissance (recce) forces, while mainly employed in a Sense role, may

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be used at times to support manoeuvre with fire or to secure lines of communication; and,

engineers, although mainly employed in Shield functions, will often support the Act function of

manoeuvre.

419. THE CORE FUNCTIONS—FIND, FIX, AND STRIKE

Activities that seek to attack an adversary’s cohesion, or to affect the will of the

adversary and other targets, are executed through three core dynamic functions. These are:

find, fix, and strike. The need to be prepared to exploit is implicit. Finding and fixing the

adversary or any other target will contribute to shaping. Striking and exploiting have the

potential to be decisive.⁶³ The function of fixing should not be limited to the tactical task “fix,” or

confined to defensive operations to protect the force. Defensive or offensive operations

designed to fix the target may set the conditions for offensive action to strike him. Likewise, the

ability of an adversary to conduct information operations and influence elements of a population

may be “fixed” through aggressive PSYOPS and public affairs (PA) activities. These core

functions are normally carried out through the Sense and Act operational functions and their

inherent capabilities.

Where circumstances permit, operations designed primarily to find, fix, or strike the

adversary should be exploited. Operational experience indicates that finding, fixing, striking and

exploiting should be conducted concurrently, or at least through seamless transition achieved

from one to another.

The core functions have wide utility across the continuum of operations in all campaigns.

In a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, non-military and paramilitary adversaries are found

by information gathering by the intelligence services, covert and overt elements of armed forces,

and other government agencies. The uniformed military forces and the police, combined with

diplomatic efforts and information operations, fix the insurgents and their influence on the

populace through a combination of activities that have physical and/or psychological effects,

such as security patrols and leaflets urging locals to report insurgents. Locally raised forces can

also help to find and fix opponents, and have been employed in numerous campaigns to good

effect. Special forces, military and police units, and the legal system contribute to striking

insurgents. Influence activities such as PSYOPS and public affairs may strike at the legitimacy

of insurgents. Exploitation involves taking advantage of a developing situation in accordance

with the superior commander’s intent. In the COIN example, local tactical successes against

insurgents may enable exploitation through the pursuit by military forces. It may be exploited by

PSYOPS and PA messages, and further exploited for long term benefit, through the freedom of

movement for civilian police, government officials and humanitarian workers, and thus allow

these other agencies to begin long term solutions in economic and political development.

420. FIND

Finding the adversary or a potential target is a basic function that endures throughout an

operation and is continually applied and assessed. It includes locating, identifying, tracking, and

assessing the target, be it an adversary or otherwise. Forces may be directed specifically to

fight for information, particularly in the opening stages of an operation. This will normally be a

⁶³ The concepts of shaping and decisive effects are part of the effects framework and are fully discussed

below.

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sound investment when the situation is confused and seemingly chaotic. Whatever its source,

information is never wholly reliable. It should be verified or corroborated with other sources.

A commander cannot know everything. Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and

recce (ISTAR) systems can produce so much information that they could overload a

commander or analyst who tries to assimilate its vast amount, and it becomes a point of friction.

These problems can be overcome by setting clear and succinct priorities for intelligence

gathering, and directing ISTAR elements accordingly. This will be key in the “direction” step of

the intelligence cycle.

Finding demands far more physical and intellectual effort than simply locating the

adversary. A commander is far more likely to succeed if he knows the organization, location,

and strength of an adversary force, its intentions, how it fights, and how it may react to friendly

action. It is equally important to establish where the threat is not located, and to determine what

he is unlikely to do within a given time, as this may provide opportunities for surprise and

exploitation. Receiving information from a wide variety of sources contributes to the quality of

the intelligence picture that helps a commander formulate his plan.

Within the battlespace and environment, the finding function includes identifying and

analyzing those elements, other than an adversary, that affect a situation and may play a role in

realizing the successful conclusion to a campaign. These include key players and elements in

the environment, such as cultural influences, social ties, and religious and political leaders and

clan groups, that may have to be engaged in pursuit of enduring campaign objectives and end

states. The “find” analysis should indicate the role these environmental characteristics,

individuals and groups play in the environment, their aims, and the ways in which they may be

influenced to support the campaign.

In short, a holistic approach must be taken to the “find” function so that all key elements

within the environment are found and analyzed for their role in achieving campaign success.

Although technological means will prove helpful in locating and assessing an adversary

or other target, human analysis and experience is still required to assess likely intentions. It

must be remembered that soldiers and others in contact with the adversary and local populace

are sources of information, and often very accurate sources of information. Thus, key

intelligence needs should be widely disseminated throughout the force, down to the lowest

levels as appropriate, as standing priority information requirements.

421. FIX

To fix an adversary or another target is to deprive it freedom of action. This can be done

by denying the adversary or target his goals, distracting the adversary from his goals, or by

denying him information needed to obtain his goals. This may be done on the either the

physical or psychological plane, or on both. For example, security presence patrols may fix an

insurgent to operating within a limited area while electronic warfare (EW) assets block insurgent

radio messages, yet allow alternative media messages to fix the spread of insurgent

propaganda, thus fixing the insurgent’s ability to influence a population.

Fixing in physical terms involves the use of combat forces to hold ground against an

adversary’s attack, to hold or fix an adversary in one location by firepower and/or manoeuvre, or

to hold vital points by protecting against adversary intervention. Its object is to restrict an

adversary’s freedom of movement and increase our own ability to manoeuvre. The fixing of

manoeuvre forces may be done through a combination of shaping attacks, blocking positions

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and deception, while the use of presence patrols, searches, and vehicle check points will help

fix an insurgent force. Distracting and fixing the adversary is further achieved by embroiling him

in subsidiary actions that divert him from his main purpose.

Deception and surprise is key to fixing adversary manoeuvre forces. Denying the

adversary the opportunity to achieve his goals and putting him in a reactive frame of mind

enhances our freedom of action. Resulting in distraction, this is done by deceiving, luring and

surprising the adversary. When an adversary is deceived, he is certain how to react, but his

decision is wrong. When he is lured, he is invited to take a course of action that will make him

vulnerable. When he is surprised, he becomes uncertain how to react to ambiguous information

until it is too late. Given such uncertainty, the adversary can be forced to cover all options,

thereby dissipating his force and being distracted from his purpose. He is thus fixed.

Fixing on the psychological plane involves disrupting and preventing the adversary’s

ability to influence the understanding and will of other elements in an environment, namely

elements in a population and their leaders. The object is to restrict his manoeuvre on the

psychological plane, that is, in shaping the perceptions, will, and behaviour of others. This is

mainly done through information operations and may include, for example, the issue of timely

media statements explaining the actual facts of an engagement before the adversary can issue

propaganda seeking to undermine friendly force legitimacy.

Physical activities may have secondary effects to fix a target on the psychological plane.

For example, the destruction or jamming of an adversary’s propaganda radio station will remove

a capability and prevent the influence of the local populace.

The fixing of an adversary force will often be planned as a shaping effect in support of a

simultaneous or subsequent decisive action.

Fixing an adversary with manoeuvre operations can quickly consume one’s own fighting

power. Thus, a balance must be struck to ensure that the resources allocated to fixing do not

unnecessarily reduce those required for striking. Likewise, on the psychological plane, the use

of friendly PSYOPS and PA messages to fix those activities of the adversary must not reduce

significantly the ability to produce one’s own messages and the means to influence target

audiences.

422. STRIKE

Striking the adversary is achieved by attack and other offensive activities on the physical

or psychological planes, or ideally, a combination of both. Striking activities may be decisive or

shaping.

Striking in physical terms involves the attack on adversary forces to: seize or capture

ground; destroy equipment, vital points, and installations; kill adversary personnel; or, gain a

position of advantage. The objective is to manoeuvre forces or concentrate and deliver

firepower to gain leverage over an adversary. Success, particularly in critical capabilities or

areas, will lead to secondary psychological effects on the adversary, such as a decrease in

morale and cohesion. Thus, striking activities should be aimed at the adversary’s weak points

in order to gain positions of advantage and undermine his morale and confidence.

To strike and create first order effects on the psychological plane is to attack or engage

a target’s understanding, perception, and will. Much of this striking, be it against an adversary

or some other target group, will be done through information operations, that is, influence

activities. A PSYOPS activity for example, may attack the support of conscripts following a

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lengthy artillery battle that shaped the situation, and thus convince them to flee the battlefield.

While security presence patrols may have fixed an insurgent force in a particular urban centre,

the arrival of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the reconstruction of essential

services may strike to affect the perceptions and will of the local populace and convince them to

support the campaign. Striking an adversary on the psychological plane through influence

activities requires good intelligence, sound analysis, specialist advice, and thorough

coordination.

Ideally, activities strike the adversary simultaneously on the physical and psychological

planes in a complementary fashion. It will involve selective attack upon his key capabilities, his

understanding, and his morale and legitimacy within the environment. This would be a

synchronized combination of fires and influence activities. Thus, striking will combine

manoeuvre forces, special forces, EW, with PSYOPS, PA, CIMIC and other influence activities

to create complementary effects in pursuit of the objective. The adversary should see his key

capabilities destroyed, his position out-manoeuvred and untenable, his ability to command,

control and sustain reduced, and his ability to influence other elements of the environment

including leaders and populations neutralized.

The combination of physical and psychological effects in striking the adversary must be

complementary. If not carefully considered in comprehensive planning and targeting, the

effects of physical activities may undermine those of influence activities generated through

information operations. For example, if PSYOPS is used to convince conscripts or others to

surrender, but manoeuvre forces close too quickly, which does not set the conditions to allow

mass surrender or creates too much collateral damage, the effectiveness of the plan will be

undermined and the legitimacy of the campaign and its forces will be reduced.

423. EXPLOITATION

Exploitation is the seizure of an opportunity to achieve a higher commander’s objective,

or to fulfil part of his intent, directly. Opportunistic exploitation requires action beyond the given

mission. To achieve the overall intent, therefore, it may be necessary to supplant the task

stated in orders. For example, a commander ordered to neutralize an adversary covering the

approaches to his commander’s objective may find an approach that is not covered and simply

move directly to the objective. Opportunities can occur at any time while finding, fixing, or

striking.

Striking the adversary is intended to achieve the purpose of the mission. To turn

success into a greater achievement, one needs the audacity and determination to seize fleeting

opportunities. Exploitation relies upon offensive action, surprise and flexibility, along with a

commander’s initiative and understanding of his superior’s intent. It should be supported by the

concept and philosophy of mission command.

Recce is a key enabler for exploitation. Recce should be extensive, expansive, and

continuous in order to find the opportunities for exploitation. Where recce forces are not strong

enough to strike, they fix the threat, limiting his freedom of manoeuvre and permitting him to be

struck by other elements. Recce forces should be prepared to lead any exploitation.

In seeking to tactically exploit a situation, commanders must keep in mind that tactical

exploitation may have to be delayed or even sacrificed in order to support the overall

operational objective. For example, forces may have to permit a fleeing adversary to escape in

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order to secure an area or a populace affected by the recent engagement, thus supporting the

operational objective of safeguarding the populace, preventing lawlessness, or securing vital

sites.

Exploitation may occur on the psychological plane through influence activities of

information operations. A successful attack against an adversary’s position may be exploited

through PSYOPS and PA messages that undermine the public image and capability and

legitimacy of the adversary and his supporters. Any such information operations messages

must be carefully crafted so that they do not appear to be gloating or exaggerated.

424. COMBINING THE CORE FUNCTIONS AT ALL LEVELS AND ACROSS AGENCIES

Conflict includes the constant interaction of the core functions to find, fix, and strike on

both the physical and psychological planes. They are not effective in isolation and must be

coordinated by commanders. Although the capabilities employed may vary, these functions

apply equally from section through to multinational joint forces. Finally, conduct of the core

functions may be executed through other agencies in conjunction with military forces. Other

security forces, the judiciary, and even agencies for reconstruction and development can fix and

strike, not only an adversary and his capabilities, but also fix and strike the factors that motivate

the adversary and allow him to influence others and engender support from a populace. For

example, while security forces are fixing an insurgent force physically, his influence over the

grievances of a population may be defeated through social and economic improvements.

SECTION 4

THE EFFECTS FRAMEWORK:

SHAPING, DECISIVE, AND SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

425. GENERAL

The effects framework is used to describe and link tactical operations through the

commander’s scheme of manoeuvre. The framework refers to the conduct of operations and

their related results, and may be used at all levels of command to conceive the conduct of

operations. It is the tool by which a commander may synchronize the activities of his forces, in

the AO, by purpose over time and space. Hence, it is the arrangement of effects in the

battlespace.

The effects framework provides a means of conceiving and articulating activities by

purpose. The activities may be described in terms of purpose as: shaping, decisive, or

sustaining.

Concepts of the effects framework, like those of the battlespace framework, should be

described in relation to decisive points and lines of operation. For example, along a line of

operation, there will be a number of shaping and decisive operations the lead to decisive points

and progress along the line of operation. It must be remembered that the concept of shaping,

decisive, and sustaining applies to both the physical plane and psychological plane.

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426. DECISIVE, SHAPING, AND SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

Every tactical operation has one of three purposes: decisive, shaping, or sustaining.

The commander will define and express his intent⁶⁴ and his scheme of manoeuvre in terms of

decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. This framework allows formations and units to

understand the relationship of their missions and tasks to those of other formations and units

through the synchronization of all operations contributing to the higher mission.

Decisive, shaping, and sustaining are defined as:

Decisive Operations. Decisive operations are those activities that will directly

achieve the commander’s intent. Decisive operations conclusively determine

the outcome of operations or battles. There is only one decisive activity for any

operation or battle. During phased operations, the main effort can change

phase by phase, but there remains only one decisive operation. When the

decisive operation is launched it should become the main effort.

Shaping Operations. Shaping operations are those activities that favourably

shape the adversary and battlespace for the decisive operation. They make an

adversary or other target vulnerable to attack or another decisive action, and

help dictate the time and place for decisive actions. Shaping operations can be

phased to occur prior to, or simultaneous with, the decisive operation. Success

of shaping operations is measured by the creation of specific desired effects that

set the conditions for the decisive operation. Shaping operations can take time

to have an effect, particularly if they are conducted as activities and effects on

the psychological plane.

Sustaining Operations. Sustaining operations are those operations that

ensure that the force has adequate resources to project fighting power

throughout and beyond the accomplishment of the decisive operation and any

following exploitation. They include combat service support (CSS), force

protection, establishment and protection of operating bases, and support for and

protection of civilians and civilian establishments. They must be focussed to

support the commander’s intent and follow his main effort. Unity of command is

essential to coordinate the many functions of sustaining operations. The

concept of sustaining operations may be extended to include the sustainment of

support and legitimacy of a campaign from the local populace.

Identification of the main effort is a key component and aspect of the concept of

operations within an operational order. Within the framework of shaping, sustaining, and

decisive operations, commanders designate and shift the main effort.

⁶⁴ For more detail regarding the commander’s intent, see B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command. Note that the

intent does not include a lengthy, detailed method or scheme of manoeuvre. The intent may be

described by a single descriptor that details the effect to be created.

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SECTION 5

INTEGRATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL

FRAMEWORKS: BATTLESPACE, FUNCTIONAL, AND EFFECTS FRAMEWORKS

427. GENERAL

The three frameworks—battlespace, functional and effects—are combined in the

operational plan and scheme of manoeuvre to link the following:

Arrangement of resources and command and control in the environment

(battlespace framework).

Arrangement of activities in the environment (functional framework).

Arrangement of effects in the environment (effects framework).

The functional framework is the arrangement of activities in the environment. It

incorporates the operational functions (Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain) and their

constituent elements, along with the core functions (find, fix, and strike) in a coordinated

fashion, or in other words, into an operational plan. It balances and arranges the application of

fighting power through these functions. The functional framework links the battlespace

framework to the effects framework. In other words, it links the troops, units, and resources to

the planned and organized effects, through the activities that are to be conducted by the

resources to achieve those effects. Thus, the functional framework will have some forces

manoeuvring, thus striking and exploiting, some providing fire support, thus fixing, some

conducting an intelligence function, thus finding, some resupplying, and some protecting. The

effects created by these activities will be shaping, decisive or sustaining, and are

organized as an effects framework.

The integration of the frameworks occurs at all levels from operational design to

operational and tactical level planning. These three frameworks together reflect the model for

the application of fighting power. See Figure 4-8.

These conceptual frameworks apply to both the physical and psychological planes in a

simultaneous and complementary fashion. Just as the battlespace will include the social and

political structures and populations within defined areas, the elements of the functional

framework can be applied on the psychological plane to target audiences in order to create the

desired outcomes of the effects framework. For example, based upon the operational

objectives of a campaign, a particular group within a battlespace along with their aims can be

identified (sense and find functions) and then can be fixed (undermined or supported depending

upon their aims) by the application of forces or resources to influence them, and thus shaping

that aspect of the situation. In another example, both preparatory fires and PSYOPS will shape

the enemy commander and troops before a deliberate attack to strike them in a decisive

operation. Likewise, presence patrols to stop adversary interference within a populated area

may shape the situation, before decisive CIMIC activities take place to re-establish essential

services.

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Figure 4-8: Integration of the Organizational Frameworks

SECTION 6

THE ELEMENTS OF INTEGRATION OF THE FRAMEWORKS

428. GENERAL

Fighting power is applied in activities through the integration of the operational and core

functions. The balance in emphasis placed in an operational plan on the various activities and

forces will change over time and will dictate the nature of an operation at any given time. The

operational functions are integrated carefully to maximize fighting power in the execution of the

core functions. Operational and core functions are integrated in time and space through the

designation of a main effort and the use of synchronization and tempo.

429. MAIN EFFORT

The main effort is defined as: a concentration of forces or means, in a particular area

and time, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision.⁶⁵ The main effort is the activity

that the commander considers crucial to the success of his mission at that time. Designation of

a main effort is a clear and simple method of enabling the commander to direct the desired

weight of his fighting power to one purpose. By focussing his efforts to strike hard at one of the

adversary’s weak points or critical vulnerabilities, it can overthrow the adversary who may be, in

total strength, more powerful.

Commanders will weight the main effort to ensure its success. The most common

means of weighting the main effort is to allocate additional assets to the main effort

(e.g., surveillance, fires, manoeuvre support, recce, sustainment, etc.)

The statement of main effort in orders allows a subordinate commander to focus his

activities and resources on the commander's aim, while giving him flexibility in achieving it. It is

not a point on a map. The main effort is the activity the commander wants to use to achieve a

decision. It should be qualified by location, time, and the force(s) directly involved. For ease of

⁶⁵ NATO Allied Administrative Publication 39 (AAP-39), Glossary of Land Military Terms and Definitions.

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comprehension, the designated force is referred to as being “on the main effort.” Designation

of the main effort helps to ensure that in the absence of detailed orders commanders can still

act decisively within the framework of the higher commander’s intent, while clearly

understanding the priority of effort.

There may be a different main effort for different phases of an operation. Initially, for

example, the main effort may be fixing the threat as part of a deep operation, using part of the

force. It may then switch to striking the threat in a close operation, involving the main body.

Although the main effort for supporting forces must always reinforce the main effort of the unit or

formation they are supporting, they will not necessarily coincide. For example, the main effort

for sustainment forces may be the establishment of forward bases to support a subsequent

exploitation of tactical success by forces currently out of contact.

The commander can reinforce his main effort through narrowing the AO, grouping extra

combat power on the main effort, allocating priority for firepower, sustainment, mobility or

information operations support, and planning options for reserve forces to support the main

effort. Once defined at one level, main efforts should be designated at every subordinate level.

430. SYNCHRONIZATION

Synchronization is defined as: “the arrangement of military actions in time, space and

purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.”⁶⁶ It is used

to overload the adversary commander and his ability to suitably react. He is attacked or

threatened from so many angles at once that he is denied the ability to concentrate on one

problem at a time or to establish priorities. Facing menacing dilemmas about how and where to

react, he is torn in different directions. Even if not totally paralysed, he finds it hard to respond

coherently and in a timely manner.

If the effect is repeated simultaneously against enough levels of command, a cumulative

effect on cohesion is felt throughout the adversary. His problems are compounded so that the

response to one form of attack makes him vulnerable to others, or it exacerbates a different

problem. In this way, the commander can, in the words of the US Civil War General William T.

Sherman, put the enemy on the horns of a dilemma.” For example, the adversary may have his

use of the electromagnetic spectrum curtailed, and he may be attacked simultaneously using

firepower from artillery and the air at ranges he is unable to match. When this is synchronized

with the manoeuvre of friendly forces, the adversary can be forced into a position from which he

can neither fight effectively nor escape.

Synchronization is not useful for its own sake, but should be seen through the eyes of

the adversary and judged by its effect on his actions. Over-control to achieve synchronization

can stifle initiative and interfere with the desired tempo of operations.

Synchronization of activities on both the physical and psychological planes is essential

to ensure that activities and effects are complementary, reinforcing and supportive of long-term

objectives. For example, a tactical ground manoeuvre success against an adversary in a

populated urban area must be quickly followed by emergency aid to support the local

population, additional troops to secure and reassure the population, and an immediate

restoration of essential services in order to maintain the support of that local populace and

legitimacy of the campaign.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

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431. TEMPO

Tempo is defined as: the rate of military action relative to the enemy.⁶⁷ Tempo consists

of three elements: speed of decision, speed of execution, and the speed of transition from one

activity to another. Tempo reflects the competitive nature of operations. The commander

adjusts his tempo to ensure that he acts and reacts faster then the adversary. The commander

may also have to measure and adjust his tempo to ensure that he can continue to support and

sustain elements of his force.

The tempo of operations may not always occur in very short periods of time. In certain

campaigns, such as a COIN, tempo may be considered over an extended period of time.

Tempo relates to the temporal integration of the operational and core functions to

maximize combat power. Within tempo, the ability to reconstitute quickly is paramount.

Therefore, forces should be organized to achieve a high tempo of operations by grouping, when

necessary, at each level of command for independent action to the greatest extent possible.

The ability to group and regroup quickly as required will enhance tempo.

Tempo seeks to keep the adversary off balance by posing new and different threats, so

that the situation the adversary believes he is facing is repeatedly changed and his responses

are inappropriate. This can be done by speeding up or by slowing down, or changing the type

of activity. It can also be achieved not only by attacking the adversary, but also by attacking his

plan and his decision-action cycle.

IMPORTANCE OF TEMPO IN CAMPAIGN PLANNING

During the “Hundred Days” campaign of WW 1, the Canadian Corps found that after the

first day of a successful attack, the infantry outran the artillery support; communications

could not be maintained; and tank support faded resulting in erosion of physical

cohesion. The lack of artillery support led to high casualties against the deep German

defence as the attack slowly ground to a halt. In response to this, commanders decided

to slow the tempo of the attack by inserting a pre-planned 4-6 hour delay to bring up

artillery and tanks, re-establish communications and conduct re-supply and battle

procedure. In this way the Canadians, and not the enemy, dictated the tempo of

operations and were therefore able to preserve the cohesion of the attack and retain the

initiative.

Tempo applies to activities across both the physical and psychological planes. Just as a

manoeuvre unit commander will try to achieve key terrain before the enemy can achieve it and

therefore create other threats to the adversary, a commander will seek to create better and

more timely effects through CIMIC, PSYOPS and media messages, all synchronized with one

another.

In all forms of conflict, each party assesses the situation, decides and acts, then

reassesses to see what effect his actions have had. This is a decision-action cycle. This is the

competitive nature of operations and he who consistently completes the cycle faster gains an

advantage that increases with each repetition. The adversary’s actions become less and less

appropriate to the real situation until he loses the cohesion needed to continue to fight. The

adversary should be made to see that his situation is not only deteriorating, but also doing so at

an ever-increasing and unstoppable rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, resulting in

erosion of the adversary’s will to resist.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

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Decentralization of decision-making authority consistent with the commander’s intent

can also be used to increase tempo. This allows decisions to be made quickly and at the lowest

practical level. If observations need to be passed up the chain of command before a decision is

made, and the orders transmitted back down the chain, the decision-action cycle is going to be

slow. This is true for both the physical and psychological planes. For example, a commander

given the executive authority to issue PSYOPS messages within set parameters, but without the

need to refer the message to higher echelons, can react quickly to an adversary’s propaganda.

Clear, simple and short orders that clearly state the mission, the commander’s intent,

and the main effort can also help increase tempo. Well-known and understood doctrine and

practised standing operating procedures will greatly assist in the transmission, understanding,

and execution of orders. However, they should not be used to restrict initiative, but viewed as

multipurpose tools that can be adapted to changing circumstances.

Tempo can be increased by avoiding battle unless absolutely necessary, consistent with

the commander’s intent. Preparation, conduct, and recovery from battle all consume valuable

time and disrupt the tempo of friendly forces. The aim should be to give battle only when

success contributes directly to the operational end state, and the conditions to achieve success

have been established.

The soundest strategy in any campaign is to postpone battle, and the soundest tactics to

postpone attack, until the moral dislocation of the enemy renders the delivery of a

decisive blow practicable.

Sir Basil Liddell-Hart

10.

Above all, to operate at a quicker tempo than the threat, the friction, chaos and

uncertainty of the battlefield must be accepted. Fluidity of operations should be embraced as

the norm.

11.

To avoid having the adversary cut inside the commander's decision-action cycle,

patterns and formulas are to be avoided. The adversary should not be able to predict friendly

actions and adapt his responses accordingly. New, imaginative, quick, and unexpected

solutions are always required.

432. SUMMARY

Fighting power is the essence of a military force. It is founded upon three components—

conceptual, physical, moral—that are applied through the integration of three organizational

frameworks: battlespace framework, functional framework, and effects framework. The

elements of these frameworks are integrated through main effort, synchronization, and tempo.

Lastly, fighting power uses the core functions of find, fix, and strike to conduct activities to

achieve effects on the physical and psychological planes with respect to the capabilities,

understanding, perceptions, will, and the behaviour of various elements, individuals, groups,

and systems in the environment.

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CHAPTER 5

THE APPLICATION OF COMBAT POWER

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

501. GENERAL

Military capabilities and combat power are applied as part of a campaign plan in order to

reach operational objectives and to achieve a desired end state. In planning the campaign, the

application of capabilities must be considered with the aim of reaching enduring objectives and

end states that address the root causes of a conflict. While the application of violence against

an adversary will always be the purview of the military and other security forces, it must be done

in combination with a range of activities and other agencies to reach those enduring outcomes.

Combat power and capabilities are applied in a harmonized and complementary manner

across all levels of command in order to achieve operational objectives, and in turn, strategic

end states. It is applied through a comprehensive approach that sees the cooperative

engagement, by all elements of power and agencies, of a wide variety of targets and systems

that influence the environment and are key to achieving the overall end state and lasting

solutions. Planning focuses on identifying and articulating desired effects that will lead to the

required objectives and end states. Activities are then directed through plans to create those

desired effects.

Activities that lead to enduring end states are created by a wide range of agencies, in

addition to military forces, and together they address a wide range of systems and entities that

affect the environment and the conclusion of the campaign. Thus, the concept of a target is

greatly expanded to include any individual, element, adversary, system, or group that is

engaged with activity.

The military working in harmonisation and synchronization with other elements of power

and agencies is a comprehensive approach. For its part, the land force uses a wide range of

capabilities to create desired effects. This includes physical activities that create obvious

physical effects on a target’s capability and thus affects the target’s behaviour. It also includes

activities that seek to influence a target to have psychological affects on understanding,

perception, and in turn will ultimately affect behaviour. Often these will seek to influence target

audiences other than an adversary to support operations, objectives, and end states. Thus,

capabilities and activities are applied on both the physical and psychological planes.

The land force conducts its operations using an effect-based philosophy and process

that ensures tactical level activities are linked, through the effects they produce, to operational

objectives and the desired end state. This is supported through a manoeuvrist approach and

the philosophy of mission command.

This chapter will explain in detail the substance of each of these concepts and how,

when applied in unison, they apply combat power in a holistic, comprehensive, and

complementary fashion that leads to enduring end states.

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In order to understand the concepts discussed herein, it is necessary to discipline the

use of the term “effects.” Effects are defined as: “changes as a result or consequence of

actions, circumstances or other causes.” ⁶⁸ An effect is the consequence of one or more

activities that contributes to one or more objectives. In short, an effect is a result of an activity.

Effects are the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, result, or consequence that

results from military or non-military activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

They occur on the physical and psychological planes. While understanding this, it must be

remembered that an effect may be caused by inaction as well. For example, the failure to

protect a civilian populace from exploitation or targeting will result in a loss of legitimacy and

loss of popular support for the mission and force. At the tactical level, activities normally

constitute tactical level operations and are assigned in mission statements and tasks. In

simplest terms, an effect is a result, be it physical or psychological, of an activity or a

series of activities.

SECTION 2

PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES (FIRES), INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES,

AND EFFECTS ON THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PLANES

502. GENERAL

The object of conflict is the imposition of one's will on an opponent and to alter the

opponent’s behaviour. The organized application of violence by physical force against a target’s

capability is one means to that end and may be seen as a traditional application of combat

power. However, other activities may be undertaken that engage and affect an opponent’s or

another’s will to fight or to support a particular activity. These may include, for example,

psychological operations in the form of flyers aimed at convincing enemy conscripts to dessert

or to convince a population not to support an insurgent element. Thus, there is a combination of

physical activities and influence activities that may be undertaken in the prosecution of conflict.

Seen from this perspective, activities and their effects exist on two planes, the physical

and the psychological, and activities fall into two categories, physical activities and

influence activities.

503. THE PHYSICAL PLANE

The physical plane comprises the physical objects, actions and effects in the

battlespace. It includes military forces, the electromagnetic spectrum, civilian populations,

armed factions, logistical resources and infrastructure, as well as geography, oceanography,

and meteorology.

On the physical plane, conflict is often a clash between armed combatants. Activities on

the physical plane and their direct effects are tangible and measurable. The physical plane and

related activities have the following attributes:

⁶⁸ UK Joint Doctrine Note 7/06 Incorporating and Extending the UK Military Effects-Based Approach.

Definition proposed to Army Terminology Panel September 2007.

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Each party in a conflict expends quantities of ammunition and other combat

supplies, and each is supported by the industrial and economic power of their

respective sides.

Activities and effects on the physical plane can generally be easily observed,

understood, estimated, and measured with a degree of certainty over a short

time period. Of primary concern are the material support requirements for

manoeuvre and firepower. It is on this plane that the science of conflict

predominates, including those activities directly subject to the laws of physics,

chemistry, and like disciplines.

504. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PLANE

The psychological plane constitutes the perception, understanding, motivation,

conviction, emotions, commitment, and ultimately the will of individuals and groups. It may be

referred to as the moral plane or cognitive plane.⁶⁹ It represents the will that changes

behaviour and enables individuals to overcome fear and adversity, as well as the cohesion that

holds them together. It includes psychological aspects such as belief in a cause, indoctrination

and judgement, as well as emotive responses such as patriotism, ethnicity, religious zeal, and

esprit de corps. It also involves issues of self-interest.

On the psychological plane, activities create first order effects on the perceptions,

understanding, will, and ultimately the behaviour of target audiences. It may include a struggle

between opposing wills or a struggle for moral and intellectual support from a target audience.

These are difficult to grasp and quantify. They are manifest in such intangibles as the resolve of

adversaries, the support for a leader, the cohesion of a group, the willingness of a population to

support a movement or idea, to name but a few. It also includes the manner in which forces,

their commanders, other individuals, or various groups perceive and understand an environment

and situation.

Activities on the psychological plane and their resulting effects may seek to: undermine

an adversary’s cohesion and will (e.g., PSYOPS); influence a commander’s perception of a

situation (e.g., deception); affect the perceptions and understanding of a populace and their

leaders (e.g., the profile of forces and CIMIC projects to gain campaign legitimacy); and, inform

a general public (public affairs). These activities may be termed influence activities, for they

have first order effects on the psychological plane.

The psychological plane and related activities have the following attributes:

Targets on the psychological plane will include more than simply an adversary.

The target or target audience may include adversaries, their commanders, other

individuals particularly leaders in a population, systems, and groups of people

within the environment.

⁶⁹ Moral plane and psychological plan may be used interchangeably as long as their use speaks to

affecting a target’s perception, will, and in turn behaviour and actions. The use of the term “moral plane”

and its concepts of right and wrong may cause some conceptual or intellectual challenges when dealing

with different cultures, societies, and groups. The cognitive plane refers to knowledge and understanding

but in terms of logic only. Psychological refers to understanding and perceptions based on both logic and

emotion.

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Activities and effects on the psychological plane should follow a targeting

process identical to that used for activities on the physical plane. Targeting for

each should be done simultaneously to ensure activities and effects are

comprehensive and complementary.

Activities on the psychological plane are more difficult and require the greater

investment in combat development and training. On this plane, the quality of

military leadership, the morale of the fighting troops, and their cohesion and

sense of purpose, are of primary importance. Secondly, intuitive judgement is

required to affect a target’s understanding and will. Here, the art of conflict is

dominant.

Activities and their effects on the psychological plane may have subsequent

effects on the physical plane. For example, leaflets convincing adversary

conscripts to dessert will lesson the physical combat power of adversary

forces.⁷⁰ These are second order effects.

505. PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES—FIRES

Physical activities are those tangible undertakings that consume resources and produce

immediate, first order effects on the physical plane through force. They will focus on the

physical destruction, attrition, disruption, or denial of those things essential to adversaries

through the application of lethal and non-lethal fires and manoeuvre throughout the depth of the

joint operations area. They include all physical activities such as electronic warfare (EW).

Physical activities affect capability in order to affect an adversary’s behaviour.

Physical activities may be termed fires. Fires are defined as: “the physical means

deliberately used to create or support the realization of physical effects as first order effects.

Note: They include lethal and non-lethal systems.” ⁷¹

The goal of applying fires is to affect a target’s behaviour through physically affecting his

capability as a first order effect. It contributes to the defeat of opposing forces.

Fires should be planned and conducted so that they also have second order effects on

the psychological plane, in terms of undermining will and shattering cohesion by denying the

adversary the physical means or opportunities needed to achieve his objective. Thus, fires

should aim to create first order effects on the physical plane, and second order effects on the

psychological plane. These latter effects may prove to be decisive. For example, an artillery

attack will reduce an adversary’s capability and affect his behaviour, and thus it has an effect on

the physical plane. It may have a secondary effect on the psychological plane by reducing the

morale and will of the adversary, and thus affect his behaviour.

⁷⁰ Although much has been written regarding elements on an “informational plane,” this level of existence

has yet to be truly identified and defined as being distinct from either the physical or psychological

planes. Information that exists on information systems, on computer systems, or even in the form of

electrons belongs to the physical plane, for it can be blocked, destroyed, or otherwise physically altered.

Information that resides in an individual’s mind or in the collective opinion of a group of people, and thus

affects their perceptions, will, and behaviour, exists on the psychological plane. They too can be altered,

but through activities that seek to influence.

⁷¹ Approved by Army Terminology Panel, May 2007.

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Non-lethal fires may be used against non-adversaries, such as crowd confrontation

measures against violent demonstrators in order to maintain security and public order.

Destruction may be pursued to undermine an adversary's ability to conduct operations,

but is often most effective when it is used to damage the adversary's morale, and increase his

feelings of fear, desperation and hopelessness. That is, fires are most effective when they

create significant second order effects on the psychological plane. Thus, fires affect an

adversary’s behaviour by attacking capability as a first order, and by affecting perception and

will, and ultimately behaviour as a second order. This is the essence of the manoeuvrist

approach to operations, that is, the shaping of understanding, the undermining of will, and the

shattering of cohesion as the ideal result of fires.

Physical destruction may not in itself lead to success. The destruction, for example, of a

large number of insurgents will not solve the underlying causes of an insurgency and may

create new recruits to the movement. This would be a physical activity that leads to an

undesired second order effect. Additionally, targeting the adversary could cause unnecessary

collateral damage that in turn undermines the support of a neutral populace and the legitimacy

of a campaign, and creates new opposition. Success criteria that rely on destruction must take

into account the risk to public and political support that protracted and inconclusive battles and

engagements entail. Therefore, physical destruction of the adversary by itself is not a wholly

reliable means of achieving lasting success, even when it is aimed at secondary effects on the

psychological plane against the enemy’s will and behaviour.

506. INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

An influence activity is defined as: “an activity designed to affect the character or

behaviour of a person or a group as a first order effect. Note: It affects understanding,

perceptions and will, with the aim of affecting behaviour in a desired manner.”⁷²

Influence Activity seeks to predispose, persuade, convince, deter, disrupt, compel or

coerce target audiences to adopt a particular course of action or to assist, encourage and

reassure those that are following a desired course of action.

Since defeating an adversary by fires and their related effects alone has limitations and

rarely leads to an enduring end state in many campaigns, land operations doctrine also

encompasses activities that seek to create a direct, first order effect of influencing target

audiences. These influence activities affect perception, understanding, and thus will, and

ultimately behaviour of the target or target audience. Consequently, influence activities create

first order effects on the psychological plane. In some cases, influence activities may create

second order effects on the physical plane. For example, psychological leaflets that convince

conscripts to flee an enemy position will, as a second order, reduce the combat power of the

enemy.

Influence activities may be physical based psychological activities such as a feint or

demonstration to deceive an enemy commander, a firepower demonstration to dissuade a

former belligerent from violating a cease-fire, or the construction of infrastructure to engender

support and stability amongst a local population. They will include physical demonstrations of

commitment and credibility as reflected in civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) projects, such as the

reconstruction of infrastructure and social development, which are meant to demonstrate

⁷² Army Terminology Panel approved May 2007.

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campaign legitimacy and gain support from political/social leaders and local populations. Even

though these examples have a physical aspect to them, they create a first order effect of

influencing perceptions and will.

Psychological activities may be non-physical psychological activities. They use or

affect information to create perceptions, understanding and will, and behaviour. By way of

example, they include: the use of flyers and radio messages to convince adversary conscripts to

surrender, or to convince locals not to join an insurgency; the manner in which soldiers are

directed to behave and dress during security patrols in order to develop support and trust

amongst a populace; and, the release of media statements in order to provide information and

generate understanding by the public audiences.

The key to employing influence activities is to decide the effect that is to be created.

Commanders must understand and select the influence effects that they wish to create and then

assign the activities required to create them. A wide range of activities will be used to influence

a target. In the main, influence activities include the following:

Deception. Deception may be applied to adversary commanders and forces in

order to affect their perception of the threat and intent.

Psychological Operations. Psychological operations (PSYOPS) use

controlled messages to influence understanding, perceptions and will of targeted

groups and individuals. Note that PSYOPS should never deceive or spread

untruths, otherwise it will loose credibility and undermine campaign legitimacy.

Civil-Military Cooperation. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is realized

through support to reconstruction of public services, social infrastructure,

creation of governance, and social development activities.

Presence, Profile and Posture. The presence, profile, and posture of troops in

contact with a local populace will send a specific message. The manner (an

obvious sign of commitment) in which troops interact with a local populace will

send an important message to this audience, which will either undermine or

engender support. The message may change over time from one of serious

intent to one of approachable information collector.

Public Affairs. Public Affairs (PA) is an influence activity in that PA activity

facilitates the flow of information to various audiences through the media with

the effect that information is provided and understanding is enhanced. Public

affairs must not be directly associated with PSYOPS activities. ⁷³

Influence activities focus on promoting perceptions, attitudes, and understanding that

influence will and affect the behaviour of governments, organizations, groups and individuals to

support the achievement of the objective and ultimately the end state.

⁷³ PA must not be associated with PSYOPs, although messages must be coordinated through an Info

Ops forum such as an IOCC. The main difference between PA and PSYOPS is that PA does not control

the medium, of its messages while PSYOPS does.

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The target array or audiences for influence activities are wide in scope. They may be

elements of the adversary, such as weak-willed conscripts that can be encouraged to flee the

battlefield. Or possibly, they may include individual power holders, religious leaders, and

segments of a populace that could influence perceptions and gain support for the campaign and

its objectives. Such is the case in counter-insurgency (COIN) and peace support operations.

They may also include allies and friendly troops in order to counter adversary propaganda and

biased media coverage.⁷⁴ In short, these target audiences will include adversary, friendly, and

neutral individuals and groups.

In creating influence, selected activities convey information as well as physical evidence

and indications to target groups and individuals, with the aim of influencing their emotions,

attitudes, motives, perceptions, reasoning, and ultimately their will and behaviour. Although

influence activities are conducted on the psychological plane only, they may have secondary

results on the physical plane. For example, flyers that convince enemy conscripts to flee will

have the first order psychological effect of causing them to flee, and the second order effect on

the physical plane of reducing the adversary commander’s combat power. Moreover, it will

likely have a third order effect on the psychological plane of undermining the commander’s

confidence.

10.

The need to influence a target audience may be key to the long-term success of a

mission. For example, key to success in a COIN campaign is the need to separate the

insurgents from physical and moral support of the populace, and gain and maintain the support

of the populace for the campaign. Commanders at the lowest levels must be made to

understand the importance of such influence activities and the effects, positive and negative,

that may be gained from them. The conduct of individual soldiers will influence the perceptions

and support of local populations, and most notably, one incident of poor conduct can rapidly

undermine, in an exponential manner, many positive influences.

11.

Influence activities may be applied across the spectrum of conflict in any campaign.

Some examples are given as follows:

A demonstration by forces supported by false radio traffic will affect the enemy

commander’s perception, influence him to incorrectly identify the main effort,

and move his forces away from the true intended area of attack, thus affecting

his behaviour, and secondly, his capabilities.

A firepower demonstration during a peace support campaign may convince a

belligerent commander not to manoeuvre his forces.

PSYOPS may be used in the form of a public radio station to bring accurate

news to a local populace and to encourage their support for a COIN campaign.

CIMIC activities may assist in civil reconstruction to engender moral support

from a government and its populace, and to enhance the perception of the

campaign and its legitimacy amongst a local populace.

⁷⁴ Although forces would unlikely use psychological operations on their own troops, they may launch

internal public affairs campaigns to counter biased media reports and adversary propaganda.

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PA messages may be issued to counter enemy propaganda, and to ensure local

and international understanding and support for the campaign and its

operations.

12.

Influence activities may be conducted to create their own independent effects, or they

may be conducted to support physical activities. For example, prior to a deliberate attack on an

enemy position, PSYOPS flyers may be dropped informing enemy soldiers of the means to

surrender and giving a promise of fair treatment.

13.

Influence activities are a key part of full-spectrum operations (FSO). Influence activities

are also a key component of information operations (see Section 4). Given their nature, their

scope, the necessary resources, and the timeframe required, much of influence activities,

particularly those related to CIMIC, will be created in conjunction with other agencies within the

joint, inter-agency, multinational, public (JIMP)⁷⁵ framework.

14.

In order to understand what activities are required to create influences and thus the

desired psychological effects and behaviour, a commander must understand the target

audience and the cultural and environmental influences, habits, motivations, and practices that

all affect the target’s psychological reasoning. In simple terms, he must understand how the

target audience thinks and reacts, and avoid making assumptions or predictions based upon his

own cultural viewpoint. Unless the target audience is properly considered, unintended negative

effects⁷⁶ may occur and do enormous damage to the campaign, and great effort must be made

to avoid them. For example, the firepower demonstration conducted to convince a belligerent

commander not to manoeuvre his forces may only serve to embarrass him in front of his

supporters, and thus cause him to actually manoeuvre his forces. Likewise, activities taken to

instil fear or dissuasion in a target audience may only create hatred instead.⁷⁷ During planning

and war-gaming processes, staff should play the role of target audiences in order to view the

plans from the standpoint of the intended target so that likely reactions may be gauged and

considered. Cultural and political experts will assist in such assessments.

15.

The concept of conducting activities to influence understanding and perceptions is not a

new concept, and has been colloquially articulated in the concept of winning hearts and minds,

or more correctly, minds and hearts, in which perceptions and understanding are influenced

(minds) in order to create a particular will and behaviour (hearts).

⁷⁵ Joint, inter-agency, multinational public framework incorporates all actors whose power and influence

will be involved in reaching the strategic end state. They involve joint forces, allies, other governmental

departments and agencies, indigenous agencies and departments, non-governmental organizations

(NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and private enterprises. See Chapter 2.

⁷⁶ Unintended effects can be positive or negative.

⁷⁷ An observation from the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Joint Urban Warrior 2005 seminar war

game noted that when insurgents are killed or captured, local media coverage should be maximized to

dissuade members of the local populace from joining the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. However,

consideration of the issue would lead one to believe that such a tactic could probably instil hatred, vice

fear, in many members of the local population, and thus undermine support for the campaign and even

encourage more to join the insurgents.

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507. THE INTERACTION AND BALANCE OF ACTIVITIES ON THE TWO PLANES:

COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS

As discussed above, military forces will conduct a combination of fires and influence

activities with resulting effects on the physical and psychological planes. Whereas, the fires and

their effects on the physical plane may be quantified with some measure of effectiveness,

influence activities and effects on the psychological plane are difficult to quantify and measure.

Notwithstanding the difficulty in assessing effects on the psychological plane, it is ultimately in

many campaigns that these effects will achieve the lasting objectives and end state. An

adversary force with a strong will and moral fibre may continue to fight even asymmetrically

once its material forces have been depleted; however, they will not continue to fight effectively

once their morale and will have been destroyed or motivations removed.

Even when an adversary force is defeated in a physical sense, lasting peace will not

result unless there is a moral will to support it and the means for sustaining it. Thus, much effort

from the military and from other agencies will be expended seeking those lasting effects. Firstly,

there will be a great deal of influence activity to engender support for the campaign and its

objectives. Secondly, there will be much activity by the military, but ideally by other agencies, to

build institutions and capabilities amongst the indigenous society to secure lasting stability and

peace.

This comprehensive construct can be summarized as follows:

Fires will help defeat an adversary through destruction of his capability on the

physical plane. This will alter his behaviour for he cannot do what he wishes,

and support the campaign objectives. Well-planned physical activities that

destroy or threaten capability will, as a second order effect, alter the perceptions

and will of an enemy and thus affect his behaviour.

Influence activities will have a first order effect on the psychological plane that

will influence perceptions, affect will, and thus the behaviour of a target

audience that will include individuals and groups, be they friendly, adversarial or

neutral. When aimed at leaders and local populaces, they may seek to

engender support for a campaign and its long-term objectives. Some influence

activities will have a second order effect on the physical plane, such as a

situation in which PSYOPS have convinced conscripts to flee, thus reducing the

fighting power of the adversary, or when deception causes the adversary

commander to dislocate his reserve force.

Many of the influence activities will be undertaken by agencies other than the

military, but ideally in close cooperation with the military. These will seek to

create the support, institutions, and capabilities for long-term stability and peace.

Therefore, physical and influence activities with first and second order effects on the

physical and psychological planes are conducted together to alter a target’s behaviour, and to

reach operational objectives. This is illustrated in the Figure 5-1 below.

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Figure 5-1: Simultaneous Conduct of Physical Activities (Fires)

and Influence Activities and Their Effects

The conduct of physical and influence activities are planned, targeted, and conducted

simultaneously in a holistic, complementary fashion. Just as physical activities are conducted

and effects created through manoeuvre on the physical plane, influence activities are

conducted and effects created through a form of manoeuvre⁷⁸ on the psychological plane.

Thus, just as a commander may wish to manoeuvre his forces to reach a piece of key terrain

and threaten the adversary’s position before the adversary reaches it, that same commander

may wish to issue a media statement, launch a PSYOPS message, or build emergency

infrastructure in a village before the adversary issues a propaganda statement, issues a false

media message, or intimidates the local population into giving support. Thus, a commander

creates desired effects through simultaneous manoeuvre on both planes. Together, they may

be considered comprehensive operations.

⁷⁸ There are a number of definitions within NATO for manoeuvre, the most common of which is:

“Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to

achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.” When

considering a concept of manoeuvre on the psychological plane, one must accept a colloquial meaning

for the word, but retain the idea of gaining a position of advantage.

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Comprehensive operations are defined as: “the deliberate use and orchestration of

the full range of available capabilities and activities to realize desired effects.”⁷⁹ In many ways,

this may be considered another conceptualisation for full-spectrum operations, but with the

focus on the effects, or the reason for their conduct. Fires and influence activities are planned,

targeted and conducted in a simultaneous and complementary fashion. They are organized and

coordinated through manoeuvre and battlespace management. (See Figure 5-2.)

Figure 5-2: Comprehensive Operations: Physical Activities and Influence Activities Conducted

Through Manoeuvre and Battlespace Management

The balance between the two types of activities and resulting effects will be dictated by

the campaign theme, the principles by which the campaign is conducted, and the objectives

desired by the commander. For example, while a major combat campaign against a

conventional adversary will require mainly fires supported by some influence activities, such as

deception and PSYOPS, a COIN campaign may require only enough fires to neutralize the

insurgents while the military and other agencies work to gain the confidence and support of the

local populace through influence activities, such as infrastructure and economic development.

The coordination as to time and space of the application of physical and influence

activities is accomplished through synchronized manoeuvre, on the physical and psychological

planes, and battlespace management.

The application of the full range of capabilities to achieve desired objectives may be

summarised and mapped out in a logical sequence. Objectives and desired effects are the

basis for planning and will dictate the types of activities to be undertaken by allocated

capabilities and resources. (See Figure 5-3.) Note that the commander and staff planners must

always consider the second order effects of activities.

⁷⁹ Army Terminology Panel approved May 2007.

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Figure 5-3: Application of Capabilities to Create Effects on the Physical and Psychological Planes

508. DEFINING SUCCESS THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF COMBAT POWER

APPLICATION OF ACTIVITIES TO DEFEAT AN ADVERSARY

To attack the adversary’s will to resist, an understanding of the nature of human will is

necessary. When an individual faces combat, the primary responses are to fight, flee, or

surrender. In most cases, an attack on the adversary's will to fight should be accompanied

by measures that encourage the adversary to surrender or flee. This can be accomplished

not only through fear generated by violent physical action such as massive firepower, but

also by surprising him with unexpected threats. It can also be supported by influence

activities such as the advertisement of fair treatment for prisoners and wounded, showing

respect for the law of armed conflict, offering honourable surrender terms, or pursuing other

methods that legitimize and encourage his surrender. If desirable, flight can be

encouraged by offering an open avenue of escape, such as when dispersing a riot.

An individual's will to resist is built on internal influences, those of the group, and those of

the leader. Internal influences include personal motivation and emotions, such as hatred or

revenge that motivate the individual to continue fighting even if alone. Often more

dominant are the influences of the small group. Battlefield studies have shown that the

primary reason individuals fight is the feeling of group loyalty or the fear of letting down

other members of the group. The individual, and in fact the group, are also affected by the

influence of leaders who can provide motivation and compulsion to fight and legitimize the

efforts of individuals. These individuals may be moral centres of gravity.

It is difficult to alter strongly held personal beliefs, and closely-knit small groups are difficult

to break up. Therefore, efforts aimed at attacking the adversary’s will to fight should focus

on two areas. The first is to attack the leaders' will to fight and the second is to disrupt the

bonds between larger groups, and shattering the links between leaders and followers. In

other words, the preferred method of attacking the will to fight is to render the adversary

incapable of resisting by shattering the physical and moral cohesion of his force. This may

be done by through overwhelming fires, and in part, through influence activities that attack

perception, legitimacy, understanding, and thus will of the adversary.

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In order to reach the desired lasting end state and thus the successful conclusion of a

campaign, a number of agencies will be involved in addition to the military. This will ensure that

all the elements of an environment that led to military intervention are addressed in order to

establish a lasting stability and peace.

The primary roles of the military will to be to employ its monopoly on force, and to

counter threats of violence and military power posed by an adversary. The object of the use of

force or threat of force is to impose the force’s will upon specific targets. In many campaigns,

military capabilities will be employed to neutralize an enemy threat to allow other agencies to

undertake their activities in a secure environment, which will address long-term solutions to the

situation. In addition to this, military capabilities, in conjunction with those of other agencies and

elements, will be used to create effects and support objectives in relation to a local populace

and the supported government. For example, military forces may be used to build infrastructure

or to support other agencies in such efforts. These will be done to create a better, more stable

environment, and to engender support and stability from a populace and local authority; that is,

they will create effects on the psychological plane. Thus, the campaign will employ a

comprehensive approach that uses fires to deal with an enemy or potential adversary, and

influence activities to create campaign legitimacy and engender support from a government or

population, in a harmonized, complementary fashion, all in order to create enduring solutions to

a crisis or situation.

Success is measured against predetermined criteria that support the decided end state.

The end state is the result that must be achieved at the end of a campaign to conclude the

conflict on favourable terms. The end state will likely have political, diplomatic, economic and

social/psychological, as well as military aspects, and hence will require a multi-agency,

comprehensive approach.

In military terms, victory in a campaign may not see the outright surrender of an

opposing force. Rather than a pure military victory, the end state may often be defined in terms

such as reconciliation, acceptance of the status quo, or agreement to a peace plan. In many

campaigns such as a COIN, there may be no outright victory, but only a concession by the

insurgents to pursue peaceful means to reach their political goals, or the development of an

indigenous capability (physically and intellectually) to deal decisively with the insurgency on

their own. Success, in short, will occur through activities and effects on both the physical and

psychological planes.

SECTION 3

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO OPERATIONS

509. GENERAL

Environments and battlespaces are complex and consist of a variety of players and

entities that can be considered as interrelated systems that influence one another and the

overall environment. They may be grouped together under the headings of political, military,

economic, social (including culture and religion), infrastructure, and information (PMESII).

Campaigns occur in complex situations that involve, to one degree or another, elements

of these systems: local populations; urban areas; complicated social and political structures;

informal, traditional power structures; and, extensive, interrelated problems that led to the need

for military intervention. The various systems and elements of an environment are affected by

the region’s history and culture. These must be understood if the environment and its

constituent elements are to be understood and engaged effectively.

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In order to reach successful and enduring outcomes, campaigns will have to deal with

these interrelated systems and various players of the battlespace. This of course will require

more than the application of military capabilities. Given the breadth of issues, and systems

involved, along with the root causes and standing grievances that led to a crisis, a successful

outcome in many campaigns will require the application of a wide array of agencies, elements of

power and capabilities. Thus the military will work in concert with these other agencies to reach

a successful conclusion. This multi-agency, coordinated method that addresses all issues and

systems in the environment—military and non-military—may be termed a comprehensive

approach.

510. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

The comprehensive approach⁸⁰ is defined as: “the application of commonly understood

principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring

outcomes within a particular environment. Note: The comprehensive approach brings together

all the elements of power and other agencies needed to create enduring solutions to a

campaign.” ⁸¹

The comprehensive approach is an overarching philosophy for the conduct of a

campaign. It recognises that crisis situations and their surrounding environments are

complicated and that an enduring solution cannot be reached by military forces alone, but

requires the use of a wide range of powers exercised through a variety of departments and

agencies in order to solve the root causes and aggravating grievances that led to the crisis. A

comprehensive approach seeks to incorporate all the elements of power and agencies, and

harmonize them, their capabilities, and their activities, in order to work to address the elements

and complexities present in an environment, and reach enduring strategic and operational end

states. Thus, it brings together all elements of power and applies them to engage all

systems within the environment.

The comprehensive approach to campaigns and operations begins at the strategic level

through the JIMP framework and sees the military, other elements of power, and other agencies

working within a unifying theme to reach a common end state. In this way, the root causes of a

crisis and the various systems within the environment that will influence the outcome are

engaged to create operational objectives that build to the end state.

It does not mean to imply that a military authority is in overall charge of a campaign, but

only seeks to ensure that military activities, effects, and objectives lead to the strategic end state

and are complementary to those of any lead agency and other elements of power and agencies.

A number of command structures or cooperative committee systems may be used to realise the

comprehensive approach.⁸² This approach brings together not only other government agencies,

but also other organizations, be they international, private or indigenous.

⁸⁰ Some NATO allies describe the same concept with slightly different terminology. The United Kingdom

uses Comprehensive Approach; however, others, such as the United States, use Whole of Government

Approach, Integrated Operations and Unified Action to describe generally the same concept or aspects of

the comprehensive approach.

⁸¹ Army Terminology Panel approved May 2007.

⁸² For a more detailed discussion on possible command and cooperation structures across different

agencies, see B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations.

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The comprehensive approach consists of three elements:

Unifying Theme. In striving towards a strategic end state, the lead agency

should issue a unifying theme that is focused on long-term outcomes and end

states. For the military, this should be pervasive throughout the campaign plan.

It should be developed in the commander’s visualization of the campaign and

articulated in his intent.

Collaborative Working. An effort is made to harmonize the activities, effects

and objectives of all the elements of power in the JIMP framework so that all

efforts are complementary and integrated towards common objectives and end

states. This may occur under formal or informal arrangements.

Comprehensive Response. The activities and effects of all the elements of

power are to be applied in a holistic approach to the situation to all the relevant

elements, systems, and entities that are at work in the environment. This

includes political, military, civil and economic facets to an environment, along

with any other identified influences and systems. Furthermore, there occurs

continuous assessment as to how campaign activities will affect each of these

systems and entities, and how they will in turn affect one another as progress is

made towards the end state. This comprehensive response includes the

military’s role and the conduct of its comprehensive operations, that is, the

combination of fires and influence, guided by the unifying theme and operational

objectives. All activities at the lower operational and tactical levels of command

should reflect the comprehensive approach and it some cases see cooperation

between other agencies and the military at the subunit level. Many of the

influence activities under comprehensive operations may be conducted in

conjunction with other agencies.

Between the operational and tactical level, the comprehensive approach is realized as

comprehensive operations. Here, tactical level fires are planned and conducted in a

complementary fashion with influence activities across all elements of power in order to create

the desired effects supporting operational objectives. Many of the influence activities,

particularly those related to reconstruction, governance, and security sector reform (SSR), will

be best conducted by other agencies with the military in support. (See Figure 5-4.)

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Figure 5-4: Comprehensive Operations Supporting a Comprehensive Approach

While the military will focus on security and defeating, or at least neutralizing, an

adversary, other elements of power and agencies will address those elements and systems of

the environment that ensure lasting security for a populace—the political, social and economic

elements. Although this is done to meet the long-term objectives of a campaign, it is also

undertaken to ensure support from local populations and leaders who are likely key to long-term

success and stability.

Thus, the campaign will consist of a number of operational objectives spanning all of

these areas, which in turn can be grouped into a number of lines or thematic grouping of

operations, such as security, economic/development, political, and social, to name some

possibilities. A good number of these lines of operation and their objectives will be best pursued

by non-military agencies. The military may be the lead or supported agency in some areas,

such as security. The military will be a supporting agency in other lines of operation, such as

reconstruction.

During the early stages of a campaign, the security situation may only allow for the

military to undertake all aspects of the campaign. Hence, the military may undertake the initial

reconstruction, economic and political development, and the reform of security services (many

of these will be classified as Stability Operations—see Chapter 3). Once the security situation

improves, other agencies should be able to assume the lead in these non-martial

responsibilities. Eventually, the campaign may reach such a state that the military’s role will be

reduced to a minimum and indigenous forces will be able to handle any residual threat to

security. Indeed, the requirement for the military may end before the overall campaign is

complete.

10.

The campaign design may involve a formal unified structure with a lead agency and

commander, and all agencies, be they military or civil, working within a single chain of

command. Such constructs are ideal and work to ensure excellent harmony and cooperation

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between agencies. However, such situations will be rare.⁸³ Usually, informal arrangements will

have to be designed in order to ensure that all agencies work in a complementary manner

toward the attainment of agreed objectives and end states. Often there will be a major onus on

the military commander to ensure that genuine, cooperative and collaborative working

environments are developed between the military and other agencies, be they national,

international, local or unaligned non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Participants must

work proactively by sharing their understanding of the situations, and conduct planning and

activities on the basis of agreed favourable outcomes in the short, medium and long term.

Hence, the comprehensive approach will rely as much upon personal relationships as upon

formal arrangements.

11.

Processes and structures may need to be adapted to reflect specific circumstances and

situations. For example, a military headquarters (HQ) may have to accommodate the interface

with non-military organizations and take the lead in coordinating objectives and efforts. The

comprehensive approach must also consider actors and agencies beyond the government, such

as NGOs, international organizations (IOs), local agencies and leaders, and others, all of which

conduct activity and pursue objectives that have a bearing on the successful conclusion of the

campaign.

12.

By its very nature, the comprehensive approach should begin at the strategic level

where all the elements of power can be brought together for collaborative planning and

execution. Although the comprehensive approach begins at the strategic level, it should be

viewed and implemented pervasively throughout all levels of command. Hence, it will be

envisioned, designed, and ideally empowered, at the strategic level in order create strategic end

states, but implemented and practised at both the operational and tactical level.

13.

At the operational level, commanders will endeavour to ensure a holistic and

complementary integration of military and non-military agencies in order to address all systems

and elements within the environment, thus creating physical and psychological effects that

support operational objectives. This comprehensive approach should be replicated as

appropriate at the tactical level where unit and even subunit commanders will work with other

agencies to create effects that support enduring objectives.

14.

Through this comprehensive approach, the influence activities that create enduring

effects on the psychological plane will be created by both the military and other agencies. This

comprehensive approach uses all instruments of power to address all the systems—and the

groups in individuals that comprise them—that influence an environment and the root causes for

the crisis and campaign. Activities within an environment must be considered against more

than simply an adversary. All systems—PMESII—within the environment must be identified and

considered in terms of their power structures, interrelationships and influences on the desired

objectives and end states. Activities planned and taken by all agencies including the military

must be considered in terms of their effects on each of these systems in relation to the desired

outcomes. Only in this comprehensive manner—using multiple agencies in addition to

the military to address all the systems and elements in an environment—will long term

solutions to campaigns be reached.

⁸³ Despite the rarity of such situations, examples of successful models include the British campaign in the

1950s/1960s Malaya, and the Australian experience in 2003 the Solomon Islands.

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15.

Although an environment may be described as a collection of systems, they consist of

people—groups and individuals—who influence the situation and one another. These groups

will co-exist either peacefully or in competition with each other based upon religious, ethnic,

political, ideological, or clan/tribal lines. Human perceptions of issues of economy and security

will affect the behaviour and thinking of the population. Cultural factors are dynamic and

present both obstacles and opportunities. Knowing the groups, what relationships exist

between them, how they relate to the infrastructure, and how each group will respond to an

activity, is critical to success. Such information will be a key aspect to the broad knowledge

base formed through intelligence collection and assessment.

16.

In general, four principles should be considered in applying a comprehensive

approach:

A Proactive Approach. Ad hoc relationships formed at short notice in

response to a developing crisis prove problematic, and although at times

unavoidable, do not produce the best results in the shortest order and prove

difficult in overcoming prejudices and previously held misconceptions. Rather, a

comprehensive approach should be supported by standing agreements and

strong personal and institutional relationships and early, shared analysis of an

environment and battlespace.

Shared Understanding. A shared understanding of the strengths, limitations,

aims, and cultures of each element within the comprehensive approach will

allow a harmonized and complementary application of capabilities. Secondly, a

shared understanding of the operating environment and the threats to lasting

stability and security will again help ensure a harmonized and complementary

approach to the campaign across the various elements of power.

Outcome or End-state-based Thinking. The unifying theme should serve to

focus the elements within the comprehensive approach and ensure that

activities conducted by all agencies are based and judged upon the

achievement of progress towards the agreed objectives and end state. Each

undertaking by an element of power should be considered against how it might

further progress towards the shared end state.

Collaborative Working. The comprehensive approach demands that military

and non-military institutions—be they national or indigenous—work together with

trust, transparency, and personal investment in order to be successful. This

must be fostered at all levels. While some elements and their leaders,

particularly those not familiar with the military, will not be comfortable with a

collaborative or highly cooperative relationship, effort must be made to insure

that, at the very least, a coordinated and de-conflicted coexistence is

established, vice a mutually exclusive relationship. In such circumstances, the

onus may fall upon the military commander to foster and engender, through a

dynamic, engaging and generous personality, an atmosphere of cooperation.

17.

It should be noted that the levels of authority, experience, technical ability and

understanding of the personnel within these, largely civilian, organizations might not always

correspond to that of the land force. This will inevitably introduce frictions and uncertainties,

which may exacerbate personality and institutional difficulties. Nor will a formal command

relationship always exist between military and non-military agencies. The commander has a

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key role to play in harmonizing these relationships. When collaboration is achieved, significant

advantages will include:

More accurate, shared situational awareness.

Easier identification of, and agreement about, outcomes.

Earlier identification of emerging opportunities as an operation progresses.

Improved capacity for mitigating undesirable consequences.

More efficient use of resources.

Increased legitimacy for the campaign and its conduct.

18.

Ideally, the comprehensive approach is applied pervasively in both spirit and practice so

that even tactical level commanders understand the need to work with other agencies, take

active measures to encourage it, and understand the effects that must be created to help realize

the objectives.

SECTION 4

AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS

511. GENERAL

Focus on end states and supporting objectives will be required to ensure appropriate

activities are undertaken to build towards those objectives. Lasting solutions will demand that

the root causes across all relevant systems will be addressed and therefore objectives and the

activities through which they are realised must consider and address all aspects of the

environment—political, military, social and economic. Furthermore, long-term success and

stability will only occur with the support of the majority of an indigenous population. To the end,

the Land Force follows an effects-based approach (EBA) in the planning, conduct, and

execution of campaigns and operations.

An effects-based approach ensures that comprehensive operations—the combination of

fires and influence activities—are planned and conducted in order to directly support operational

objectives. It ensures the military’s role within a comprehensive approach is harmonised with

the shared end state and contributes to, rather than undermines, the operational objectives, end

state and campaign legitimacy.

An effects-based approach to operations is defined as: “EBA is the way of thinking

and specific processes, integrated in both the physical and psychological plane, that focus on

outcomes (effects) rather than activities to enable both the integration and effectiveness of the

military contribution within a comprehensive approach and the realisation of operational and

strategic outcomes. The EBA process is the organization of activities to achieve planned,

desired and measurable effects that will realize objectives and ultimately meet the mission end

state.”

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512. PHILOSOPHY AND PURPOSE

The philosophy behind an effects-based approach to operations stems from the

premise and belief that successful campaigns require the holistic application of all instruments

of power on both the physical and psychological planes. Thus, the military must work in a unity

of purpose, and ideally effort, with other instruments of power and agencies in order to achieve

enduring solutions to both the symptoms and root causes of a situation requiring intervention.

Additionally, it focuses on creating end states and supporting objectives before

consideration of lower level military activities. The purpose of an effects-based approach to

operations is to ensure that military operations and activities create the required effects in

support of enduring operational and strategic objectives and end states, in harmony with other

instruments of power, and in relation to all aspects of the environment.

Consequently, it considers the whole environment and the influence that each system

has on the environment and the crisis at hand. It recognizes that the environment and its

elements are complex, interrelated, unpredictable and adaptive, and that they require constant

assessment and analysis in order to properly develop a plan and conduct operations in support

of the desired outcomes. The systems of the environment are focused on people, as individuals

and groups. This approach recognizes that enduring outcomes will require the support of

populations and their constituent groups.

Based upon an understanding of the environment and the desired campaign outcomes,

an effects-based approach links end states and objectives to activities that create planned,

supporting effects (results) on both the physical and psychological planes. In order to ensure

that the right activities are creating the planned effects in support of the desired objectives and

end states, constant assessment and analysis and subsequent adjusting are required.

In short, an effects-based approach addresses the situation as a whole and decides end

states and objectives in order to determine the required activities and effects on the physical

and psychological planes. Commanders must assess and plan the effects they wish to create,

through activities not only on the capability of an enemy (physical plane), but on the

perceptions, understanding, will (psychological plane), and ultimately behaviour of all elements

in the environment, namely individuals and groups. The effects-based approach sees all such

activities—fires and influence activities—planned and executed together, in harmony with other

agencies and instruments of power, and applied across the entire environment. It sees

comprehensive operations supporting a comprehensive approach.

This effects-based approach does not introduce an entirely new method of conducting

campaigns and operations. It builds upon and provides a better articulation for extant concepts

such as mission command, the manoeuvrist approach, and a commander’s intuition, to improve

upon operational design and campaign execution at all levels of command in order to address

all aspects of an environment and to reach successful, enduring end states. It ensures that

individuals at all levels understand the context of their operations, are aware of the effects of

their activities, intended and unintended, and have the necessary guidance to contribute to the

desired objectives.

As a general construct, the effects-based approach to operations may be summarized

as follows:

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A crisis that requires military intervention occurs in a complex environment

affected by a range of systems, made up of groups and individuals.

A lasting solution must address the root causes of the crisis. Thus, a number of

facets of the environment must be engaged: political, economic, social, and civil.

This is best done through the military working in harmony with other agencies

and elements of power—diplomatic, civil, and economic. These may be

governmental, domestic, non-governmental, and/or private agencies.

Campaigns are best planned with a focus on end states and supporting

objectives. These are realized through the assignment and conduct of activities,

which create effects (results) that support the objectives. These effects must

undergo constant assessment and analysis to ensure that the activities are

indeed leading to the desired objectives. Activities are conducted by all the

elements of power.

Because the environment and its systems are comprised of individuals and

groups, their support is necessary for enduring end states. Thus, the military

must understand that it functions and creates effects on two planes: the physical

and the psychological through a combination of fires and influence activities.

It is a philosophy supported by methodology, and is merely an improvement to previous

doctrine and concepts.

In order to properly apply effects there is a requirement for an analytical approach, to the

greatest extent possible, using the coordinated application of the full range of military and non-

military capabilities, to undertake activities and create effects in support of objectives and

enduring end states. These effects are assessed and adjusted against predetermined

measures of effectiveness, which ask the question, “Are we doing the right things to create the

desired effects?” The effects, in turn, lead to objectives in achieving the desired end state.

Adjusting the effects and the activities used to create those effects, based upon the assessment

feedback, is vital to achieving campaign success.

10.

In planning operations and articulating outcomes, commanders must clearly understand

and express the following: the end state; the conditions needed to achieve it, that is, the

objective(s); the effect(s) required to achieve the objective(s); and those activities required to

create the effect(s) (see Figure 5-5.). Thus, in execution, activities are conducted to create

desired effects that realize objectives, which in turn, support desired end states. This should be

applied to all systems and facets of the environment. (See Figure 5-6.)

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513. PRINCIPLES

The application of an effects-based approach should be guided by the following

principles:

Long-term View. Commanders and planners must take a long-term view of the

campaign and the situation to deal with the symptoms, and more importantly,

the underlying causes of the conflict and crisis. The solution to the root causes

will usually take a long time to create and secure. It is important that political

leaders understand this requirement as well. Ideally, this long-term approach

will be shared by other elements of power that will be required, perhaps longer

than the military element, to provide lasting solutions.

Whole Environment. It must be realized that the environment in which a

situation and conflict occurs is complex, adaptive, and often unpredictable. The

environment must be viewed holistically, and the influence of all systems and

actors with respect to resolving the conflict must be assessed and considered in

planning. The interrelated nature of the environment in which the adversary,

neutral, and friendly elements interact must be considered. Commanders must

comprehend the relationships between activities and effects, particularly in

relation to the elements and systems of the environment. The systems in the

environment consist of individuals and groups, and this demands engagement

on both the physical and psychological planes.

Focus on End State. Planning must focus on strategic end state and

objectives, and operational objectives and the conditions needed to realize

them. Activities that lead to the objectives through the effects they cause should

be planned last.

Collaboration. All levels of command must work to create complementary

effects that work towards operational objectives. Even lower levels of command

must understand the effects, both desired and undesired, that their activities will

create in terms of achieving or undermining the objectives and end state.

Complementary Application of the Instruments of Power. In order to reach

agreed objectives and end states, military activities must be harmonized with the

contributions of different instruments of power and agencies within the

battlespace and the environment. Planning and execution must be done within

the context of a comprehensive approach that brings together all elements of

power in a unity of purpose.

Continuous Analysis and Assessment. Continuous analysis and assessment

must be done in a holistic, iterative fashion to deepen the understanding of the

environment and to modify the plan and execution as necessary to reach the

operational objectives. Staff and commanders must continually assess the

effectiveness of activities in creating the desired effects, and adapt accordingly.

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514. KEY ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS

An effects based-approach to operations acknowledges that conflicts and campaigns in

the operating environment involve a wide variety of sources and issues and require that

operational objectives address all facets concerned. To this end, a wide range of capabilities

and activities are required in order to influence and affect systems and actors, including the

indigenous population, in order to realise operational objectives.

In order to implement an effects-based approach, the following are key elements are

required:

Knowledge Base. An effects-based approach to operations is predicated on a

sound understanding of the battlespace and the actors, factors, and influences

within it. Information and intelligence collection must be expanded in order to

incorporate and assess the various elements and entities that interrelate within

an environment—the political, military, economic, social (including culture and

religion), infrastructure, and information entities⁸⁴ (PMESII). This knowledge

base requires continuous analysis, in particular the manner in which the groups

and individuals who comprise these systems will react to our activities and

objectives.

Comprehensive Approach. A comprehensive approach recognizes that more

than the military element of power is required to address the root causes of a

conflict and to establish enduring end states. It seeks to incorporate all the

elements of power working to reach the strategic end state and harmonize them,

their capabilities, and their activities. In doing so, it considers and addresses all

the systems and influences within an environment that may have in impact upon

long-term stability, and this is manifested in a range of lines or groupings of

operation. The military may have the lead in many of these initially, but over

time, should pass the lead to other elements of power in non-military lines of

operation. The comprehensive approach comprises a unifying theme,

collaborative working, and a comprehensive response.

Long Term Campaign Plan Focused on End State and Objectives. The

campaign plan must take a long-term view and focus on the desired end state

and operational objectives. It should encompass and be developed with all the

elements of power required to address all facets of the crisis and its causes, and

to reach an enduring end state. The campaign will identify the supporting

effects required for each objective. Only then should the activities of the military

and other agencies be decided. The campaign plan is implemented through the

continual issue of operational plans and orders that assess and adjust the

implementation of the campaign on a regular basis to reflect progress made or

frustrations encountered.

⁸⁴ The environment is often referred to as a collection of systems, identified by the acronym PMESII.

While all the elements represented by PMESII certainly exist within a society or environment, and they do

interrelate and affect one another, it is believed that there are too many variables, including individual

personalities, to allow a scientific “systems approach” to constantly and accurately predict exactly how

they will react.

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Measures of Effectiveness.⁸⁵ A measure of effectiveness is defined as: “a

criterion used to evaluate how a task has affected selected system behaviour or

capabilities over time.”⁸⁶ Measures of effectiveness indicate whether the right

things are being done in order to create the desired effects. They are generally

subjective and depend upon the situation and campaign. They are used to

confirm that the correct activities are being undertaken and to adjust activities as

necessary to achieve desired objectives.

Application of an effects-based approach to operations simply expands upon the

current operational planning process and campaign prosecution in order to

incorporate a broader scope of information, elements of power, capabilities,

application, and assessment, all in order to reach enduring operational and

strategic end states in complex environments.

515. UNDERSTANDING EFFECTS

General. To succeed in a complex environment, commanders must recognize that the

activities they undertake will create effects that cannot be viewed in isolation. Applying physical

force requires a precise ability to find, fix, and strike targets, while at the same time avoiding

unintended consequences that may be counter-productive, such as collateral damage. Many

campaigns require military commanders to consider activities in relation to more than simply an

enemy force. Success in a complex environment requires that they understand the creation of

effects and the range of elements and systems within the environment that affect the successful

conclusion of a campaign.

End States and Objectives. At all levels, activities create effects that support desired

objectives and build towards end states:

Strategic End State. The strategic end state is the desired situation derived

from policy direction. It is realized by the achievement of strategic objectives. A

strategic end state will be multi-faceted, and a military objective and its end

state—successful completion of the military contribution to strategic objectives—

will only be a part of it.

Strategic Objective. A strategic objective is a constituent of the desired

strategic end state realized through the aggregation of agreed circumstances

and conditions, generally specific to a particular element of power. Once all

objectives are realized, the strategic end state will have been achieved.

Military Operational End State. The military operational end state is the

desired and enduring military situation (within the joint operations area) derived

from strategic direction brought about by the campaign, which contributes to the

achievement of the strategic objectives and takes into account the end state and

objectives of the other instruments of power. It may be reached before the

overall strategic end state. Upon achieving it, the military involvement in a

campaign may cease or be reduced substantially.

⁸⁵ Measures of effectiveness are done in conjunction with measures of performance. The latter measures

task accomplishment, that is, an assessment of whether or not the activity was done right.

⁸⁶ Definition developed by the Army Terminology Panel, May 2006.

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Operational Objective. An operational objective is a constituent of the desired

operational end state realized through the aggregation of one or a number of

interrelated effects and circumstances.⁸⁷ It may be described as a decisive

condition for the realization of the operational end state. Operational objectives

may be delivered by elements of power other than the military. Operational

objectives may be grouped into thematic lines of operation.

Supporting Effect or Decisive Point. A supporting effect is a constituent part

of an operational objective. It is a change brought about by the interplay of

deliberate activities and dynamic circumstances that contribute to an operational

objective. Supporting effects are created by activities and link a range of

activities in time, space, and/or purpose. Using the taxonomy developed for

campaign planning in a major combat campaign, one may view supporting

effects as decisive points, for they build to the achievement of operational

objectives. The traditional definition of decisive points will have to be broadened

in order to conceive decisive points as being situations developed in time and

space that lead to the attainment of operational objectives.⁸⁸

Tactical End State. A tactical end state is the tactical situation once a tactical

mission, this is, activity, has been completed. For each specific mission, it is

described in the concept of operations paragraph of the tactical order.

Tactical Objective. A tactical objective is a constituent part of the tactical end

state and the immediate aim of a tactical mission as described by the mission

statement. They result from the achievement of a tactical effect (result) or group

of effects resulting from tactical activities.

Effects. Effects are changes as a result or consequence of actions, circumstances or

other causes. Simply put, an effect is a result of an activity. An effect may be a physical or

psychological result of an activity or series of activities, which may be conducted by a military or

non-military (other agency) element. Effects can be categorized as follows:

Direct Effects. Direct effects are the first order consequence of activities (e.g.,

weapons employment results, populace informed through leaflets, etc.),

unaltered by intervening events or mechanisms. They are usually immediate

and easily recognizable. Direct effects occur within the same system or group

engaged.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ It should be noted that some influences would not be within the purview of the operational commander

to deliver, even if they may be necessary for the desired end state.

⁸⁸ NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 defines decisive points as: “A point from which a hostile or

friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information

environment.” In order to be termed to refer to a supporting effect, the concept must be expanded to

include a set of circumstances and perceptions that support an operational objective rather than simply a

geographical point.

⁸⁹ The term “engaged” does not mean to imply physical engagement with weapons systems only.

Depending upon the target, the means, and the desired effect, it may mean engagement with PSYOPS,

public affairs, or any other influence activity that will create an effect on the psychological plane.

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Indirect Effects. Indirect effects are the consequences of an activity that are

removed in time or purpose from the initial point of application and target. They

occur in a target or system that was not the object of the activity. For example,

if a successful attack on a village occupied by insurgents convinces insurgents

in another village to withdrawal, the latter is an indirect effect. Indirect effects

may be difficult to recognize.

Intended and Unintended Effects. Intended effects are those that are planned

in relation to the activities conducted and support the desired objective. They

may be direct or indirect. Unintended effects are those that were not foreseen

and/or desired by the related activities. They too, may be direct or indirect. If

they are undesired, they will likely undermine the attainment of the objective.

Second, Third, and Subsequent Order Effects. Second order and

subsequent effects are consequences of a first order effect. As an example,

dropping leaflets has the direct effect of causing enemy soldiers to desert. The

intended second order effect is that the enemy’s fighting power is reduced or

becomes ineffective, and a third order effect is that the enemy commander

looses confidence and morale. Note that these subsequent effects cross

between the psychological and physical planes.

Activities. Once the desired supporting effects have been decided, such as seizure of

key terrain or the creation of a trained indigenous security force, activities that will create the

effects may be issued to lower echelons. This is done through the creation of operation plans

(OPLANs) and the issue of corresponding operation orders (OPORDs). Activities are tactical

level undertakings, that is, missions assigned to formations and units and are realized through

tactical tasks and effects. In line with the continuum of operations construct, activities are

classified as offensive, defensive, stability, or enabling. The construct of a mission statement

clearly articulates the tactical level effects that are required by an activity.⁹⁰

Unpredictability of Effects. Note that effects are at times caused by circumstances

that are beyond the foresight or control of a military commander, and result from the

unpredictable dynamics of environmental systems and the individuals who comprise them.

Thus, in such situations, an effects-based approach demands that a commander simply work

through the situation and mitigate the unavoidable unforeseen undesired effects. Not all effects

can be foreseen and therefore best efforts must be made to war game through operational

plans in order to reduce uncertainty and avoid undesired outcomes.

⁹⁰ For example, in the mission statement, “A Company will attack to seize Objective DOG by 1300 hours

in order to secure a line of departure for B Company,” the activity is to “attack” (often not stated in a

mission statement) and the first and second order effects are to “seize” and “secure.” Thus, the objective

is a secure line of departure and conditions to support B Company. The tactical end state will see A Coy

prepared to support B Coy and its forward passage of lines. See B-GL-331-002/FP-000, Staff Duties in

the Field, for more details.

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SECTION 5

APPLYING AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH

516. GENERAL

The concept and basic construct of an effects-based approach is applicable to all levels

of command, including the tactical. At the operational level, an effects-based approach provides

essential structure to the commander’s intuitive process so that operational design and

campaign planning are conducted logically, linking the end state through objectives and effects,

to corresponding activities.

While the term “objective” has commonly been used to refer to a physical object against

which action is taken, in an effects-based approach an objective may be something far more

abstract, such as a set of conditions or circumstances that must be created, such as an

independent, self-sustaining and responsive security apparatus. It should be considered as a

goal to be attained or a decision condition to be created.

Commanders and soldiers at all levels must appreciate and understand the effects that

are required to meet their immediate superior’s intent and the overall objectives, and then

undertake the activities that will create the desired effects. Secondly, they must realize that

their activities will affect all systems in the environment and the people who comprise them, and

that their activities will therefore result in effects on the psychological plane. Ideally, these are

planned and will support the operational objectives.

517. TACTICAL LEVEL APPLICATION OF AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH

At the tactical level, the standard orders process and the principle of mission command

will remain relevant. The desired “effect” of a mission statement is issued in the tactical task

(often as a first order effect, e.g., “seize”) and in the purpose of the tactical task (in order to…),

which may be a second order effect.⁹¹ Mission command allows a subordinate commander to

assume tasks in support of achieving the desired effects and objectives. Indeed, an effects-

based approach helps to more clearly define the commander’s intent and to focus the force on

achieving it.

The principles underlying the manoeuvrist approach remain appropriate at all levels and

are reinforced by an effects-based approach. As discussed earlier, fires and influence activities

are planned and conducted together and are enabled through simultaneous manoeuvre on the

physical and psychological planes, and through battlespace management. The effects-based

approach is applied at the tactical level through the manoeuvrist approach, with activities

occurring simultaneously on the physical and psychological planes and organized

through battlespace management and manoeuvre (in time and space). This combination of

fires and influence activities to create desired complementary effects on both planes is

comprehensive operations.

⁹¹ For a more detailed discussion on the construction of a mission statement, see B-GL-331-002/FP-000,

Staff Duties in the Field.

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The models of an effects-based approach, with planned activities creating desired

effects that build to objectives and end states, may be applied to the simultaneous execution of

fires and influence activities coordinated and enabled through manoeuvre and battlespace

management. (See Figure 5-7.) Note that the planning process begins with the desired end

state and flows through selected objectives, supporting effects, required activities and allocated

capabilities.

Figure 5-7: Comprehensive Operations: Fires and Influence Activities Organised Through

Manoeuvre and Battlespace Management

It is important to note that activities on the physical plane may have an impact on the

psychological plane and vice versa. This emphasizes the need to understand both the first and

subsequent orders of effect, and to be aware of the possibility of undesired effects and the need

to work to avoid them. For example, while an assault on an insurgent element in village X has a

first order effect on the physical plane of the destruction of that force, the second order effect on

the psychological plane is the increase in security of the local populace and the increase in their

confidence and sense of legitimacy of the campaign. If, however, the attack resulted in civilian

deaths and significant destruction, then the undesired effects on the psychological plane will be

the loss of support for the campaign amongst the local populace, possibly better recruiting for

the insurgents, and a perceived loss of legitimacy for the campaign.

The degree of risk acceptance imposed upon the commander, or that which he accepts,

will in some cases determine the types of activities the commander will apply to achieve his

desired end state. For example, the best means to defeat an opposing actor in area X may be

to improve the economic conditions of the local population. However, the risk to agencies that

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can best affect this may be too high at that time. Therefore, offensive activities aimed at the

opposing force may have to precede actions by other agencies. In making this decision, the

commander must weigh the potential adverse effect of any collateral damage in conducting

offensive activities against the risk of casualties amongst the other agencies should they be

employed first. The sequencing and synchronization of activities and effects will be critical to

the overall attainment of operational objectives.

518. OPERATIONAL LEVEL APPLICATION OF THE EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH

The effects-based approach is applied as a process at the operational level in order to

ensure that the military acts in harmony with the other elements of power, and that all assigned

activities support, through their effects, the operational objectives and end state. In campaign

planning, it ensures that the tactical level activities assigned through OPPLANs support the

operational objectives.

In operational design, the commander must reflect the comprehensive approach ideally

begun at the strategic level, and incorporate to the greatest extent possible military activities

with those of the other elements of power. In operational design, the commander and staff will

assess the environment and identify what is needed to support the strategic end state.

Commanders must then identify the operational end state and the conditions or objectives

needed to create it, that is, the operational objectives.

Once the operational objectives are determined, such as a self-sustaining security

apparatus, the supporting effects required for each objective may be chosen, such as Militia B

defeated or police training re-established. Once the supporting effects have been identified,

they may be realized through tactical activities assigned to the component commands by means

of OPLANS and OPORDs. (See Figure 5-8.)

Although the construct of activities creating effects that lead to objectives is applicable at

all levels of command, the link between its application at operational and tactical levels is

through allocated missions in OPLANs and OPORDs. At the joint and operational level, the

following outline process will be applied:

An operational end state will be identified.

Operational objectives that support the end state will be identified. These are

more than geographical or physical objectives, but may be a set of conditions or

circumstances to be created. Once identified, they may be grouped into

thematic lines of operation, such as “security environment” or “governance.”

Supporting effects will be articulated that once created, will help realize these

objectives. These supporting effects may be considered decisive points⁹² on

the way to reaching or achieving operational objectives.

⁹² Within NATO Allied Administrative Publication, decisive points are defined as: “a point from which a

hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the

information environment.” This idea must be expanded to see a decisive point as a conceptual point to

reach in progress towards reaching or creating an operational objective.

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The activities required to create these supporting effects will be identified and

considered in light of ongoing factors analysis.

Supporting effects and their corresponding activities will be articulated and

allocated to component commands (e.g., to the land component of the joint

force) in the form of OPLANs and OPORDs.

The OPLANs will be executed through a series of activities assigned to

subordinate elements of the component command.

Continuous assessment and analysis will allow activities and effects to be

assessed, so that subsequent OPLANs will ensure that activities and supporting

effects better meet the objectives.

Throughout this planning process, a focus must be placed upon the key centres of

gravity within the environment and situation at hand. They will inform and shape the

development of end state, operational objectives and decisive points/supporting effects, and

even activities, depending upon the level being considered. For example, if the enemy’s

armoured reserve is an operational centre of gravity, an operational objective may be its

neutralisation so that it cannot manoeuvre; thus, a supporting effect of fixing may be allocated to

air and artillery attacks (activities). Likewise, if an operational objective is enduring security

situation in area X, a supporting effect may be the deterrence of a particular militia. This may be

created through a combination of fires and influence activities such as PSYOPS and

reconstruction to address grievances of the militia leadership.

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Figure 5-8: The Effects-based Approach Applied to Operational Campaign Planning

The operational objectives and supporting effects will apply to a range of elements of

power and agencies. Some will be the sole remit of the military, while some will be the sole

remit of other elements of power that only need the secure environment provided by the military

in order to operate and meet their objectives. Others will require a combination of elements and

agencies in order to be successful. Operational objectives may be grouped into thematic lines

of operation. Within these groupings, the military may be in a supporting or a supported role

depending upon the nature of the objectives and supporting effects.

Good commanders have intuitively understood and applied a wide range of effects

against all the elements in an environment that impact the overall objective. The Land Force

effects-based approach is exercised through a number of means:

The adoption of campaign themes as articulated in the continuum of operations

that acts to focus operations on long-term outcomes and end states. The

campaign theme, along with the guiding principles for that particular type of

campaign, inform the commander as to the balance required between physical

activities and influence activities, that is, between effects on the physical plane

and effects on the psychological plane.

The JIMP framework that harnesses the efforts and capabilities of other players

within the operating environment in order to reach common end states.

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Consideration of all the systems or entities that exist in a complex environment

that impact upon the overall situation and successful conclusion to the

campaign. These systems and entities, or at least their general classifications

along with the role they play in achieving enduring out comes, will help identify

thematic lines of operation for the campaign (e.g., economic development).

Targeting considers the entire range of targets and target audiences within an

environment, and plans their engagement using the full range of capabilities and

activities, that is, comprehensive operations, to create complementary effects on

the physical and psychological planes. The targeting of fires and influence

activities together may be viewed as comprehensive targeting. It should

encompass all elements of power and agencies involved.

The adoption of measures of effectiveness that allow for the continuous

assessments of progress across a wider range of campaign lines of operation.

With these tools, the commander conducts his operations in a more comprehensive manner

using the full resources available across the full breath of lines of operation.

This concept of comprehensiveness in all aspects of the plan and its execution enables

commanders to more effectively address all aspects and influences of their battlespace and

environment by incorporating, in a synchronized and complementary fashion, operations on

both the psychological and physical planes to reach objectives and an enduring end state.

SECTION 6

EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH AS PART OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND CAMPAIGN

PLANNING

519. GENERAL

In incorporating an effects-based approach to the extent that operational outcomes can

be translated into coherent tactical activity, an effects-based approach is complementary to

existing procedures, terminology, and practice at all levels of command. The significance of the

commander’s unifying theme provides the focus for the operational design and resulting

campaign plan.

The application of an effects-based approach is pervasive at all levels throughout the

planning and execution of operations, from the campaign plan downwards. An effects-based

approach to campaigns and operations provides a better focus and measurable progress. It

provides just enough structure and process to the commander’s intuitive operational design and

planning to ensure that tangible products are produced, end states and objectives are

considered before activities, and the eventual activities link directly to desired objectives and

end states.

Operational art, intuition, and command continue to have a major part to play, especially

in uncertain conditions and in those situations where there is a compelling need to act. In all

circumstances, operational freedom of action will be preserved and this is necessary for there

will always be gaps in knowledge, and a commander’s intuition will still be required. Indeed,

regardless of the lengths to which commanders and staff may go to anticipate all the actions

and reactions of the systems in an environment, there remain too many variables, not the least

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of which are individual personalities and motives, to allow an accurate prediction of all cause-

and-effect relationships. Thus, a commander’s intuition and responsiveness to the unforeseen

will remain key to successful operations and campaigns.

Terminology for campaign design will remain extant, but the application of it will have to

be conceptually expanded. The steps involved in an effects-based approach are the same as

those in any operational design and the operational planning process, however, the scope of

these planning processes will need to be broadened beyond a focus on the enemy to fully

encompass all the disparate, yet inter-connected systems and players pertinent to the situation.

In other words, the planning will focus on enduring outcomes and operational objectives over

the medium to long-term and involving all agencies and elements of power, vice focusing on

short-term activities only.⁹³

An effects-based approach to operational design and campaign planning will see the

longer-term view taken by planners with a focus on enduring outcomes. While the strategic

direction gives the long-term perspective, the campaign plan will provide the medium-term

framework focusing on operational end states, constituent operational objectives, and the

supporting effects required to reach the operational objectives.

The near-term to medium-term timeframe is covered through OPLANS and OPORDs,

developed through the operational planning process. These OPPLANS and their OPORDs

detail the activities that create the desired supporting effects. These undergo continuous

assessment and analysis through measures of effectiveness (MoEs) and situational awareness.

They are adjusted regularly (e.g., every six months) to ensure that the activities and their effects

are leading to operational objectives and end states. Likewise, as the campaign progresses,

adjustments may have to be made to the campaign plan.

Success in an effect-based approach to a campaign will likely be created through the

application of more than just the military element of power. The comprehensive approach that

begins at the strategic level is also exercised at the operational level, with all elements of power

and various agencies within the environment—military, security, international, coalition,

domestic, local—coming together, ideally in both planning and execution, to create the

objectives for an enduring end state. Note that their timelines for involvement may differ from

that of the military, but all agencies should be involved in planning from the outset.

(See

Figure 5-9.)

⁹³ An effects-based approach to operations does not replace operational design or the operational

planning process, but enhancing them by understanding the various environmental systems that will

influence the campaign, using all agencies required to address the causes of the campaign and ensures

that tactical activities are logically linked to operational objectives.

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Figure 5-9: An Effects-based Approach Applied to Operational Design and Campaign Planning

SECTION 7

ASSESSMENT—MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

520. GENERAL

Assessment is a key component in an effects-based approach and in the achievement of

enduring end states. Only through continuous assessment and analysis will commanders know

if they are conducting the correct activities in the correct manner to achieve the desired effects

and thus reach the desired objectives. Assessment and analysis that continually provides

feedback allows the commander and staff to adjust their plans and orders to ensure progress is

made towards a successful conclusion.

Assessment and analysis remains the responsibility of intelligence staffs, however,

resources and time must be dedicated to assessing the effect of operations on all systems and

entities within an environment. Assessment of the effects on the psychological plane takes time

to measure, and changes may be incremental and occur over an extended period of time. (See

Figure 5-10.)

During planning, the means of assessment and analysis are decided. The means of

assessment are classified as follows:

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Measure of Performance. A measure of performance (MoP) is defined as: “a

criterion used to evaluate the accomplishment of a task.”⁹⁴ They ask the

question, “Are we doing the things (activities) right?” MoPs are tied to task and

task assessment. It assesses the quality of the conduct of the task itself, for

example, the conduct of an artillery fire mission or the conduct of a framework

security patrol.

Measure of Effectiveness. A measure of effectiveness (MoE) is defined as: “a

criterion used to evaluate how a task has affected system behaviour or

capabilities over time.”⁹⁵ They ask the question, “Are we doing the right things,

to create the desired effects?” MoEs are tied to effects and effects assessment.

Even if activities are done correctly and MoPs indicate successful completion of those

activities, it will be for nought in terms of achieving objectives if those activities are not creating

the desired effects necessary to realize objectives. Indeed, it may be detrimental to the overall

attainment of objectives. The requirement of both types of assessment leads to the requirement

to establish a deliberate process designed to assess progress in the:

Accomplishment of activities.

Creation of desired results/effects.

Achievement of operational objectives.

Attainment of end state conditions.

⁹⁴ Definition developed by the Army Terminology Panel, May 2006.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

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Figure 5-10: Application of the Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness

521. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE AND THEIR SELECTION

MoPs are objective and relatively straightforward in their selection and application. They

remain the responsibility of commanders in assessing the performance of their subordinates.

Selection of MoPs is based upon battle task standards where applicable. MoPs are selected

based upon three principles: they must be objective; they must be measurable; and, they must

be directly linked to the activity.

MoPs apply to fires and influence activities and the same considerations apply in both

cases. MoPs refer to the mechanisms of planning and execution. They assess how a task or

activity was planned and completed. In the case of fires, MoPs may include: reaction times;

accuracy of fire; performance of the technical equipment and ammunition; correct identification

and assessment of target; and, suitability of engagement means, to name a few. In terms of

MoPs for an influence activity, the same criteria may be used. In the case of a PSYOPS activity

for example, the criteria may include: reaction time for the message and product crafting, and

approval; correct identification of the target individual or audience; accuracy of the message;

and, suitability of the message and engagement means, such as the correct dialect and

broadcast range. MoPs are generally the purview of a commander to assess.

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522. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND THEIR SELECTION

MoEs refer to the desired effects and whether or not the activities conducted have

created those effects, that is, results. They apply to both fires and influence activities.

With respect to effects on the physical plane, MoEs remain relatively obvious. An attack

may have been conducted well, but if it failed to seize the assigned objective or failed to achieve

its purpose, then the MoEs were not met and the activity failed.

In influence activities and effects on the psychological plane, MoEs are applied to

activities and the resulting changes in understanding, perception, the will, and the resulting

behaviour of the target audience. Given all of the individual and environmental variables in the

human decision-making process, developing MoEs for influence activities and effects on the

psychological plane may be one of the most daunting intellectual tasks facing a commander.

Influence activities seek to work through external and internal filters in order to affect

understanding and will. These filters are often culturally and socially based. Hence, the

planning and conduct of these activities is an art requiring the commander’s subjective feel for

their effect. The results of these influence activities require as defined a set of indicators as

possible in order to detect changes in perceptions, understanding, attitudes, and behaviours.

These indicators need to account for the effect of cultural and environmental influences.

In applying MoEs to the desired effects, it is vital that the correct activities be assessed.

If for example, a joint fires strike is tasked to destroy 50% of an enemy armour reserve in order

to preclude a counter-attack, and despite a higher than 50% destruction rate the counter-attack

still occurs, the MoEs must be applied to the joint fires strike—which was effective in the first

order effect—and to the planning and assessment process that calculated the insufficient

requirement of 50% destruction to preclude the counter-attack—which was not effective.

MoEs will vary significantly between missions and even within missions. Commanders

must clearly state the end state and ideally any milestones on the path to that end state. MoEs,

using whatever means are most appropriate, measure and indicate progress in the target

audience towards that end state. MoEs must be tailored to the specifics of not only the overall

change desired, but to the environment, and in particular, the commander’s battlespace.

Because of the intangible factors involved and the subjective nature of influencing, the

MoEs will almost certainly be subjective, and because behaviour influence is the aim, they

require a significant amount of time to determine effectiveness. Therefore, they must be

assessed as a set routine to attempt to recognize changes, trends and slight, yet significant

indicators. The commander exercises judgement as to when an adjustment or change to an

activity against a target must be made in reaction to the measured effectiveness.

A simple example may illustrate the application of MoPs and MoEs. During a COIN or

peace support campaign, military presence patrols may be conducted in order to increase public

security, return the society to normal activities, and engender support for the campaign amongst

the populace. MoPs may be applied to the conduct of the patrols to assess their planning,

timeliness, efficiency, and conduct of drills. MoEs assess the creation of the desired effects,

and in this example, the criteria may include: a decrease in crime; an increase in local market

activity; the reaction of locals to the presence of the soldiers; the flow of information and

intelligence from local sources to patrols and other elements; and, the stated opinions of the

local populace in informal and formal surveys.

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In order to overcome the difficulties in their selection and application, some basic

principles exist that can aid in the development of useful MoEs:

Causality.⁹⁶ A definitive cause and effect relationship must be established

between the activity and the effect attempting to be measured. Given the

cultural and other variables present, there has to be a reasonable likelihood that

the planned activity will create the desired effect. Secondly, commanders and

staff must be able to assess any other extant factors that may be causing the

effect other than their own activities. Likewise, they must ascertain if the

measured effect is merely coincidental.

Quantifiable.⁹⁷ A MoE that can be counted helps to remove some of the

subjectivity that plagues MoEs on the psychological plane. Quantification allows

accurate trend measurement.⁹⁸

Observable and Attributable. When drafting MoEs, consideration should be

given to the possibility that all of the variables influencing an activity and change

in behaviour cannot be observed. The MoEs must be able to recognize a trend

or change and confirm the connection or attribution to the activity. For example,

if the presence or absence of negative graffiti is being used as an informal

indicator of support for a campaign and military force in an urban area,

observers will ideally be able to ascertain: its timing, that is, when it was done;

its attribution to a particular group (e.g., political, criminal, military); their motive

and whether it represents a minority or majority viewpoint; its attribution in terms

of cause, particularly if it appears as a reaction to a specific event or action; and,

its location in relation to the cultural makeup of the local environment.

Correlated to Effects, Objectives and End States. Just as activities are

planned to lead to specific effects and objectives within a line of operation,

MoEs should be selected to correlate to the achievement of each effect and be

reflective of the level of employment. The strategic and operational levels

require measures that occur throughout the length of a campaign and many

MoEs at the operational and tactical level will measure the incremental progress

through effects and objectives.

Flexibility. Although MoEs should be drafted at the planning stage, they should

remain under regular review and commanders must be prepared to adjust them

as required. They must evolve as a mission progresses, particularly as the

consequence of their activities leads to the attainment of operational effects.

⁹⁶ For a detailed discussion of causality see William S. Murray, “A Will to Measure,” Parameters, Vol. 31,

No. 3, Autumn 2001: 134-147.

⁹⁷ The quantifiable, observable, and timeliness principles are adapted from LtCol. David Grohoski, Steven

Seybert, and Marc Romanych, “Measures of Effectiveness in the Information Environment,” Military

Intelligence Professional Bulletin Vol. 29, No. 3, July-September 2003: 12-16.

⁹⁸ Colonel Ralph Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Commander’s Perspective on Information

Operations,” Military Review May-June 2006: 13-32. For example, during a tour in Iraq, 2 BCT,

1^st Armored Division monitored and counted local and international media coverage of events in 2 BCT’s

area of operations as an MoE. This allowed positive and negative trends to be identified, which

contributed to discerning the effectiveness of ongoing activities.

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Similarly, MoEs are likely not transferable from mission to mission. Even if a

mission takes place in the same AO, the passage of time will force

reconsideration of MoEs previously employed.

Collection. The commander must possess the capabilities to collect the

intelligence necessary to apply a MoE and provide the direction and guidance to

do so. Plans must be made to collect and assess MoEs through all units in the

AO as part of the G2 information collection plan. Collection may be assisted by

other agencies, however, without a formal command relationship, this may have

to be done informally. Notwithstanding, other non-military agencies may prove

to be an effective gauge of progress in creating desired perceptions and will in a

target audience. For example, increased cooperation with NGOs or other

government departments (OGDs) may indicate a greater acceptance of the

campaign.

Relativity. Improvements sought in a given environment must be relative to the

specific environment and to what is considered normal for that particular

environment and culture. Expectations for situational improvement must be

reasonable given the starting state and the normal state of that particular

environment. Improvements to a situation that will make it relatively normal for

that environment may come quickly; however, systemic improvements in

absolute terms may require cultural or social changes over a very long period of

time. Expectations for change and the related MoEs should be set as

incremental milestones so that improvement could be measured and

demonstrated as tangible progress over time. For example, a decrease in

criminal activity must be initially compared with the normal levels for the

environment that existed before the security situation demanded military

intervention.

Developing appropriate MoEs to assess effects on the psychological plane is a very

difficult task. Willpower, perceptions, and beliefs are all less-than-completely-tangible variables

that defy simple measurement. Observing and measuring trends is one of the surest ways of

gauging a target audience’s attitude. Trends, however, require a definable baseline and this will

be difficult to identify. Assessment in terms of MoE should be considered as part of the

targeting process.

SECTION 8

THE KNOWLEDGE BASE AND THE SPECTRUM OF RELATIVE INTEREST

523. GENERAL

An environment consists of a number of systems and other elements, each of which will

play a role to one extent or another in shaping and affecting the campaign and its outcomes. As

discussed above, a broad knowledge base that defines and analyzes all the elements, actors,

and systems within an environment that may influence the outcomes, is a key aspect of an

effects-based approach to operations.

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Noted earlier in the chapter, it must be remembered that the systems, often described as

political, military, economic, social (including culture and religion), infrastructure, and information

(PMESII), may be complicated to understand, but they consist of people, in groups and as

individuals. Therefore, each system may be affected physically and psychologically through the

activities of the campaign. In many campaigns, success will require the support or acceptance

of the campaign conduct and outcomes by the majority of the individuals within these

environmental systems.

In order to understand the environment, its constituent systems, individuals and groups,

a broad knowledge base regarding the environment and its systems must be established. This

knowledge base must analyze each element of the society, along with the key members of each

element, and understand the role they play in the environment, their aims in relation to the

campaign and overall success, and the influence they have on other systems within the

environment. Only in this way, will the commander know what, who, and how to engage within

the campaign to move towards the desired objectives and end state.

The systems or elements of each environment comprise the nation or society at hand.

As illustrated in Figure 5-11, they may be viewed as strands of a single rope that are closely

intertwined. Each strand must be considered individually and as part of a greater whole. Its

relationship with the other strands and the overall campaign end state must be assessed. At

the centre of each strand or system is the history and culture of the society that has helped

shape the strands. This must be understood and appreciated in terms of its influence on the

perceptions, understanding, and actions of the members of the society. It will affect how

individuals and groups view and interpret the campaign’s activities.

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Figure 5-11: The Complexities of an Environment and Battlespace

Only through a knowledge base that analyzes all these systems in the context of history

and culture will a commander be able to effectively engage targets on the psychological plane

within the society/environment to create the desired effects. The overall campaign and the

engagement of all such systems are conducted through a comprehensive approach that uses

all elements of power and multiple agencies in addition to the military to engage and create

effects across all systems of the environment.

An effects-based approach is predicated on a sound understanding of the battlespace

and the actors and influences within it, that is, on a sound knowledge base. The knowledge

base facilitates an effects-based approach to campaigns and operations.

The development of the knowledge base will take time and must be guided by an

intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process designed for the complexity of the

operating environment, and that includes modifying the way a campaign planner and tactical

commanders look at the adversary and all other factors, systems, and entities that affect the

environment and a successful conclusion to the campaign. Hence, it requires a broader

classification of all the actors, which range from the adversary through hostile and neutral to

friendly forces and allies within the battlespace, as they relate to the interests and objectives of

the friendly force. This has been labelled the spectrum of relative interest, and where these

actors fit along the spectrum in relation to the desired end state will weigh heavily on the

commander’s consideration of what activities and effects he will apply to modify their position

and align them with his interests. (See Figure 5-12.) Some of these effects will be physical, but

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many others, specifically those seeking to engender support from the target, will be

psychological effects. They are all targets or target audiences for engagement, either on the

physical plane, the psychological plane, or both.⁹⁹

This approach requires a cultural understanding and stems in part from the need to

engender support from local populations and to engage other elements of an environment. In

order to support this approach, the knowledge base must gain insight into the psychological

plane and the intent, motivations, and relationships of elements in the battlespace in order to out

manoeuvre them or to move them, through an effect of influence to a position of acceptance,

cooperation, or even support. The assessment and analysis that leads to this categorization

supports the targeting process, for each of the audiences on the spectrum of relative interest is

assessed with respect to how they may be influenced and moved to a position of support or

acceptance.

Figure 5-12: The Spectrum of Relative Interest

Each of the groups within an environment may be plotted along the spectrum of relative

interest, and an assessment may be made as to what activities are required to either maintain

their support or to move them to a position of support, that is, to produce psychological effects

on their perceptions, understanding and will, in support of the end states of the campaign.

⁹⁹ With respect to the term “targets,” a broader understanding the term must be used. Targets will include

adversary elements, friendly and allied elements, and neutral audiences. Nothing nefarious is meant by

the term, but it should be viewed in the sense of a business advertisement “targeting” a particular

audience. Thus, all target engagements are considered together in a complementary and comprehensive

fashion.

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10.

This approach must also recognize the paradigm shift in information acquisition. In

major combat operations, a significant part of the information required to establish

understanding by the commander might flow from national or higher echelon sources.

However, in peace support and COIN campaigns—campaigns in which the support of the

populace is crucial for success—this shifts towards an information flow model that is more

bottom-up, with soldiers in direct contact as the key source of information. In many such

circumstances, actionable intelligence regarding adversary targets and the motivations for their

support will come from contact with the local populace. Furthermore, such contact will provide

useful input for MoEs, particularly in terms of gauging the reaction of the local populace to the

campaign’s activities and conduct. Thus, an understanding and application of an effects-based

approach down to the lower tactical levels is critical to its overall success.

11.

This approach is also supported by the use of experts and advisors to the commander.

Just as commanders have used political advisors to help steer campaigns in the past, they may

also use advisors in the other environmental systems, particularly cultural, in order to better

understand the society and its constituent groups and individuals. Additionally, it must be

remembered that the need to influence an element or social group within an environment may

be done indirectly. Messages will be better received and more effective in terms of influencing

perceptions, understanding and will, if the messages are delivered through proxies, who are

trusted leaders within the society.

SECTION 9

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

524. INTRODUCTION

Information operations (Info Ops) are defined as: “coordinated actions to create desired

effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other

approved parties in support of overall objectives by affecting their information, information-

based processes and systems while exploiting and protecting one’s own.¹⁰⁰”

Info Ops are not an operation unto itself. Rather, the doctrinal construct is a coordinated

collection of capabilities related to maximizing the use of information while at the same time

denying it to the adversary. It includes a wide range of activities, both physical and cognitive.

They seek to affect the understanding, will and/or capabilities and ultimately behaviour of a

target or target audience. Thus, Info Ops include a wide range of activities spanning, for

example, from physical attacks against enemy command posts, to building schools, to issuing

media statements, to running a public radio station, all in order to affect information, capability,

perceptions, will, and ultimately behaviour.

Info Ops doctrine has developed to include a wide and disparate collection of

capabilities, linked by a concept of information control and exploitation. It was motivated by

¹⁰⁰ NATO Allied Administrative Publication 3.10 (AAP-3.10) Allied Joint Doctrine for Information

Operations, ratified by NATO nations in 2007. This definition is ideal for Canadian Land forces concept of

information operations construct. Note; the Information Operations Policy for CF International Operations

defines Information Operations as “actions taken in support of national objectives that influence an

adversary’s decision makers by affecting others information and/or information systems while exploiting

and protecting one’s own information and/or information systems and those of our friends and allies.”

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rapid technological advances in information processes, but lacked a fathering and guiding

holistic philosophy and set of principles. Reconsideration of the doctrine has allowed it to be

refined and disciplined, with the focus on those activities that influence understanding,

perceptions, and affect motivations and behaviours.¹⁰¹

This section outlines the broad Info Ops doctrine generally accepted across the NATO

alliance in order to place it in the perspective of coalition operations. While this section will

embrace the Counter Command Activity (CCA) and Information Protection Activity (IPA)

components of Info Ops Doctrine¹⁰², the main focus of land Info Ops is Influence Activity. This

new construct is the doctrinal construct for Canadian Land forces.

525. CORE ACTIVITY AREAS

Info Ops are conducted in three core activity areas: influence activity, which is the

primary means of influencing will; counter-command activity, which counters information and

command related capability; and, information protection activity, which safeguards friendly

information, thereby inhibiting an adversary’s understanding. It is important to note that CCA,

IPA and IA are not necessarily stove piped as the arrows in Figure 5-13 portray. Rather, there

can be crossover effects for an activity. For example; CCA will certainly affect capability by

destroying an adversary’s communications, however, it will certainly degrade his situational

awareness (understanding) and as a consequence likely undermine his morale.(See

Figure 5-13.) These are summarised as follows:

Influence Activity. Influence activity comprises any activity for which the

primary purpose is to influence the understanding, perception and will of the

target audience, be it friendly or hostile. It may include a wide range of diverse

activities such as demonstrative fires to indicate intent and the use of a

PSYOPS radio station to inform a local audience of the legitimacy of a

campaign. In either case, its first order effects are psychological. Influence

activities may be stand-alone activities seeking a particular effect, or they may

be supporting other activities. In short, these activities affect the information,

understanding and perception of adversaries and others, and thus affect their

will and behaviour in order to facilitate friendly force objectives.

Counter-command Activity. Counter-command activity (CCA) seeks to

physically alter an adversary’s command and control (C2) capability. It affects

the flow of information to and from a decision-maker, thereby affecting

understanding or influencing will. CCA seeks, within rules of engagements

(ROE), to disrupt, degrade, usurp, deny, deceive, or destroy an adversary’s

information, command, propaganda, and associated systems, processes and

networks through kinetic or non kinetic activities. In targeting such systems,

commanders must assess the secondary and long-term effects as well foresee

and mitigate unintended negative effects.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ The ABCA Armies’ Program Capability Group Act, Information Operations Project Team paper,

October 2006.

¹⁰² Both CCA and IPA are frequently referred to collectively as the elements of Information Warfare to

obtain battlspace Information Superiority.

¹⁰³ Long-term effects may include the removal of a command and control system that will be required by

coalition forces later, or by civilian populations.

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Information Protection Activity. Information protection activity (IPA)

comprises any activity that prevents an adversary from gaining information

relating to friendly operations. IPA includes operations security (OPSEC),

counter-intelligence (CI), information security (INFOSEC), and counter-

intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (C-ISTAR).

The C-ISTAR function includes the technical and non-technical elements of an

adversary’s information gathering capability, and may include preventing a third

party from receiving or relaying essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).

In short, these activities deny the adversary information and thus affect his

understanding and capabilities.

Figure 5-13: Three Core Activity Areas for Information Operations¹⁰⁴

526. KEY ACTIVITIES WITHIN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Info Ops coordinates activity and is not a capability in its own right. The three core Info

Ops activity areas can make use of all or any capability or activity that can exert influence, affect

understanding, protect one’s own information, or have a counter-command effect against an

adversary. However, there are several capabilities, tools, and techniques that form the basis of

most Info Ops activity. They include PSYOPS, presence, posture and profile (PPP), OPSEC,

INFOSEC, deception, electronic warfare (EW), physical destruction, and computer network

operations (CNO). Clearly, many of these tools and techniques, such as physical destruction,

have a much wider application than Info Ops, but can be drawn upon by Info Ops. It is

important to note that only when tools and techniques are used directly to influence will, affect

understanding, or affect a decision-maker’s command, control, communications, computer,

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability, they can be deemed part of

Info Ops activity. Furthermore, the activities are conducted based upon the desired effect. Not

every campaign will utilize all the tools available.

¹⁰⁴ This has been taken from Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3-10 (Study Draft 5 May 2003) NATO

Information Operations Doctrine.

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Note that the first five key activities are those influence activities that create first order

effects on the psychological plane. The remainder are those physical activities that concern

counter-command activities or information protection activities, that is, they have first order

effects on the physical plane:¹⁰⁵

(See Figure 5-14.) Coordination of the following critical

components of Info Ops is crucial to the successful implementation of the commander’s

objectives. The coordination venue is normally the Information Operations Coordination Cell.

Psychological Operations. The primary purpose of PSYOPS is to influence

the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour of selected individuals or groups in

accordance with Info Ops objectives. Unlike public affairs (PA), PSYOPS

retains direct control over contents and dissemination, and focuses on a specific

audience(s). Effective PSYOPS requires timely provision of resources, analysis,

and planning. PSYOPS products will utilize a wide variety of means including

print, radio, television, loudspeakers, face-to-face contact, the Internet, faxes,

text messaging, pagers, and mobile telephones.

Presence, Posture, and Profile. The appearance, presence and attitude of a

force and its soldiers may have significant impact on perceptions and attitudes,

particularly on neutral or potentially adversarial audiences. This PPP concept is

applicable at all command levels, and all elements of the force contribute to it. It

seeks to send or support a message by means of the manner in which troops

deal with the populace, and thus create a perception that supports that overall

objective. For example, the decision to wear berets instead of combat helmets

and body armour can make a considerable difference to the perceptions of both

the adversary and local people. The public profile of commanders at all levels

will impact on perceptions; therefore, the public role of the commander must be

carefully analyzed and opportunities used to transmit key messages.

Commanders must understand and assess the attendant risk, which

accompanies any decision regarding posture and profile, against the need to

send a particular message.

Civil-military Cooperation. CIMIC¹⁰⁶ is a coordination and liaison function that

facilitates operations in relation to civil authorities and non-military organizations.

CIMIC has moved from supporting operations under a G9 function, to being

operations, that is, conducting activities that deliver an effect in support of

objectives. CIMIC and the related activities (e.g., reconstruction, governance

development, etc.) are considered influence activities because of their ability to

inform, demonstrate, influence, and persuade. Thus, CIMIC and its resulting

activities are a key aspect of Info Ops. They provide information in the form of

physical evidence of psychological issues such as commitment and situational

improvement, and thus engender support from target audiences. CIMIC related

activities, therefore, need to be coordinated within the overall operational plan in

¹⁰⁵ Even those activities that deal with information protection, electronic warfare, and computer networks

are classified as physical activities, for they use physical means that have primarily but not exclusively

physical effects.

¹⁰⁶ Civil-military cooperation is defined as: “the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission,

between commanders and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as

international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.” (NATO Allied Administrative

Publication 6 [AAP-6], Glossary of Terms and Definitions [2006]).

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terms of impacts upon civil audiences and their leaders, in order to ensure that

activities work to support overall objectives.

Public Information. The aim of PA or media operations is to protect the

credibility and legitimacy of operations and promote widespread understanding,

through the ensured distribution of truthful information, thereby gaining support

for military operations while not compromising EEFI. PA is a capability within a

unit and formation that delivers the effect of information provided and

understanding. It communicates and facilitates information to audiences

through the medium of local, national, and international media and other

communication means. PA is an activity that has an effect on the psychological

plan for it creates understanding in audiences. Hence, PA is a key aspect of the

operational plan. PA staff may work under the G3 and G5 to plan and conduct

operations; the PA officer and imagery technicians operate in the battlespace,

indeed, manoeuvre on the psychological plane in order to create this effect of

understanding. To avoid giving the false impression that the media are being

manipulated in any way, a distinction must be maintained between PSYOPS

and PA.¹⁰⁷

Deception. Deception involves measures designed to mislead adversaries by

manipulation, distortion or falsification. Operational Deception may be a

complex art, which demands considerable effort, a high level of security and

coordination, and a sound understanding of an adversary's way of thinking.

Operational Deception must be used sparingly and usually is used only once

decisively during a campaign, otherwise it will seriously undermine the credibility

of all subsequent Influence Activities. The aforementioned restriction should not

preclude the use of tactical deception, which includes basic measures such as

camouflage (e.g., measures taken to make an armoured vehicle blend into a

tree line). Operational Deception is normally used to dislocate the attention and

fighting power of an adversary, but may be used as part of information

protection, that is, to conceal friendly force intentions and capabilities.

Operational Deception will likely use a combination of physical means (e.g., a

feint or demonstration) supported by other information cues such as false radio

traffic.¹⁰⁸

Physical Destruction. Physical attacks on an adversary’s C2 systems will

affect the capability of an adversary, and thus, his understanding, perception

and behaviour. It should also be remembered that the use of force in certain

situations sends a strong psychological message, and consequently, will have

significant psychological impact as a second order effect. Carefully applied

force can play a major role in coercion and deterrence and in reducing an

adversary’s ability to exercise command. In using physical destruction, it must

¹⁰⁷ In order to counter adversary propaganda and biased media reporting, internal public affairs may be

required.

¹⁰⁸ A classic historical example of Operational Deception was Operation during World War II, which

deceived the German forces into believing that the imminent allied invasion would take place at Calais

vice the intended landing in Normandy. Thus diverting considerable amount of German combat capability

away form Normandy.

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be remembered that undue collateral damage and unnecessary casualties will

have an adverse effect on public support. This must be considered, particularly

if the enemy is using civilian infrastructure to support his C2 requirements. If

physical destruction is required to achieve the desired effect, the commander

must consider and balance the potentially negative impact that it may cause with

the expected benefits, keeping in mind that negative impacts generally outlast,

in people’s memory, positive impacts.

Operations Security. OPSEC is used to identify and protect information that is

critical to the success of the campaign, described as essential elements of

friendly information (EEFI).¹⁰⁹ It aims to deny the identified EEFI to the

adversary decision-maker, thereby affecting understanding and capability. EEFI

will need to be protected throughout its lifecycle. Adversarial understanding and

capability are targeted to maintain the security of EEFI, using a combination of

passive and active techniques. It will include a wide range of physical activities

including counter-reconnaissance patrols, clearing patrols, and security

measures for HQ positions.

Information Security. The goal of information security INFOSEC is to protect

the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information through a variety of

procedural, technical, and administrative controls. INFOSEC includes a range

of measures that are applied on a routine basis under the auspices of security

policy to protect information. INFOSEC includes elements of physical security,

such as personnel and document security, and information assurance (IA). IA

includes a range of electronic techniques, such as computer network defence

and communications security (COMSEC) incorporating emission control

(EMCON), defensive monitoring and technical inspection techniques, counter-

eavesdropping, limited electronic sweeps and vulnerability analysis.

Electronic Warfare. EW¹¹⁰ has wide application in military operations. The

effect of EW activity can be temporary or permanent and it has the potential to

minimize the use of force, hence, avoiding unnecessary casualties and collateral

damage. EW will be used to affect critical information of the adversary or the

systems by which it is transmitted. Electronic attack enables CCA and attacks

on information technology (IT). It also supports influence activity by enabling

deception and PSYOPS, including broadcasts to target audiences. Conversely,

EW can be used to defend systems and information. Electronic defence, in

conjunction with spectrum management, contributes by helping to counter an

adversary’s CCA and protecting friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Lastly, it has the capability to provide MOE feedback and adversary Info Ops

messaging to Info Ops.

¹⁰⁹ EEFI is defined as: “critical aspects of a friendly force that, if known by the adversary, would

subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore must be

protected from adversary detection.” (Army Terminology Panel)

¹¹⁰ EW is defined as: “Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search

for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic

energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and

actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.” (AAP-6).

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Computer Network Operations. The opportunity for, and effectiveness of,

CNO is proportional to the adversary’s dependence upon IT. CNO comprises

attack, exploitation, and defence:

(1)

Computer Network Attack. Computer network attack (CNA) includes

the means to attack computer systems. Software and hardware

vulnerabilities allow computers, storage devices, and networking

equipments to be attacked through insertion of malicious codes, such as

viruses, or through more subtle manipulation of data, all in order to affect

the understanding and ultimately the actions of the adversary.

(2)

Computer Network Exploitation. Computer network exploitation (CNE)

supports Info Ops by the ability to get information about computers and

computer networks, and the adversary, by gaining access to hosted

information and the ability to make use of the information and the

computers and computer network itself.

(3)

Computer Network Defence. The purpose of computer network

defence (CND) is to protect against adversary CNA and CNE. CND is

action taken to protect against disruption, denial, theft, degradation, or

destruction of information resident in computers and computer networks,

or of the computers and networks. CND is essential to maintain

decision-making capability and confidence.

Figure 5-14: Key Info Ops Activities

527. TARGETS FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Based upon the above, the activities listed under Info Ops may be classified as either:

influence activities; counter-command activities; or as information protection activities. Influence

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activities create effects amongst target audiences on the psychological plane in order to

influence understanding, perception, attitudes, will, and behaviour. Activities classified as either

counter-command activities or information protection activities are physical activities that create

effects primarily on the physical plane.¹¹¹

Targets for Info Ops may thus be grouped in accordance with the following table:

Influence Activities:

Counter-command Activities and

Information Protection Activities:

Targets on the Psychological Plane

Targets on the Physical Plane

Human:

Links:

Political leaders

Couriers and dispatch riders

Religious and social leaders

Land line

Groups of a population, such as

Radio and other informational

tribes or clans

links

Adversary leaders/commanders

Nodes:

Adversary troops and sub-groups

C2 Centres and command posts

such as conscripts

Physical plant, including radios,

Friendly troops and allies to

computers and other information

counter adversary propaganda

processing means

Satellites

Figure 5-15: Targets for Information Operations

528. INFLUENCE ACTIVITY

Influence Activities are meant to influence and affect understanding, perceptions and

will, cannot be considered separately from other operations, for they themselves are operations,

that is, they are tactical activities undertaken to create desired effects. The deception of an

enemy commander, the use of flyers to convince conscripts to flee, the building of civilian

infrastructure to take support away from an insurgency and win the support of a populace, and

other such activities seeking psychological effects are all tactical activities that must be

conceived, planned, and targeted as part of an overall plan, simultaneous with and

complementary to fires. Like physical activities, they may be classified in the functional and

effects frameworks and described by their effects of shaping, decisive, or sustaining.

¹¹¹ Although some debate has occurred regarding the “information plane,” and some segments of allied

doctrine refer to such a level of existence, all elements that may be considered under such a description

actually fall to either the physical or psychological planes. Information itself exists on the physical plane if

it can be attacked or physically affected (e.g., attacked, blocked by EW, etc.), or on the psychological

plane if it rests in an individual’s mind and thus affects perception and behaviour.

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As stated earlier land forces must be utilize the full spectrum of Info Ops, which includes

CCA, IPA and IA. However, the main effort of Land Ops Info Ops is the Influence Activity

spectrum. Accordingly, the following outline shall be considered the Influence Activity construct

for Canadian Land forces:

Influence Activities consist of: PSYOPS; presence, profile and posture;

deception; CIMIC; and PA. These influence activities create first order effects

on the psychological plane. Other activities may be conducted for the purposes

of influencing a target audience, and thus may be considered Influence

Activities, so long as their first order effect is on the psychological plane.

The following is a description Influence Activities: “coordinated activities to

create desired psychological effects on the understanding, perception, attitudes

and will of adversaries, potential adversaries and other approved parties in

support of overall objectives.”

112

Influence Activities are to be considered operations just as fires, such as an

attack or a defence, are considered operations. Influence Activities are to be

planned, targeted, and executed in conjunction with any other activity in a

complementary and holistic fashion. Info Ops staff, led by a G3 Info Ops senior

officer, are to be completely integrated into G3 and G5 staff branches and

element commanders, and the Info Ops capabilities (PSYOPS, CIMIC, PA

detachments, teams, etc) are to be considered line elements.

In formation HQs, the G3 and G5 staff branches may contain specialist staff

for operations and planning in such areas as PSYOPS, CIMIC, and PA. All

staff functions other than the G3 or G5 support and enable operations, but

do not conduct them. Thus, with Info Ops considered “operations,” no

specific staff branch other than the G3 or G5 have Info Ops responsibilities.

Staffs who have Info Ops responsibilities (PSYOPS, deception, CIMIC, and

PA) will come under the G3 and G5 branches for operations and planning

respectively but coordinated by the G3/G5 Info Ops senior officer. The G9

CIMIC staff branch, if used, is for purely liaison functions.¹¹³ In some HQs,

depending upon size, there may only be a G3/G5 Info Ops officer. He will

coordinate the planning and operations of all Info Ops activities, taking

advice from the various Info Ops related elements (team or detachment)

commanders.

The PSYOPS, CIMIC and PA element commanders will be considered line

commanders. They and their capabilities (teams and detachments) will be

considered line elements, with their activities and effects occurring on the

psychological plane. Specialist advice to the commander in the constituent

areas of Info Ops will either be through the G3/G5 Info Ops Senior officer.

¹¹² Army Terminology Panel approved May 2007.

¹¹³ When the G9 CIMIC branch was created, CIMIC functions supported operations in a major combat

construct. It concerned itself with support to offensive and defensive operations, such as liaison for

refugee control and the acquisition of civilian equipment for military purposes. However, with CIMIC

assuming a responsibility to actually conduct operations, mainly stability operations, then its planning and

operations must come under the G5/G3 staff branches, and the CIMIC detachment commanders must be

considered line unit commanders.

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At the lower tactical levels, such as battle group (BG), the detachment

commander may fulfil multiple roles, akin to the responsibilities of an anti-

armour platoon commander. Thus, the detachment commander will advise

the commanding officer, assist the staff with planning and orders, and then

command and manoeuvre his detachment or element.

Influence activities are to be conceived, planned and conducted in unison

with fires. In some ways they will be shaping, such as the issue of PSYOPS

flyers to enemy forces just prior to an assault, encouraging them to

surrender, or the conduct of a feint to deceive the enemy. In other aspects,

they may be decisive, such as the re-establishment of key infrastructure to

secure the support of a populace.

Influence activities, that is, those activities conducted to create first order effects on

the psychological plane, must be planned, coordinated and executed in conjunction and

harmony with fires. (See Figure 5-16)

Figure 5-16: Information Operations as Part of Comprehensive Operations

Info Ops, that is, influence activities, and fires, along with their respective constituent

activities are all organised in a complementary fashion together through manoeuvre and

battlespace management. (See Figure 5-17.)

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Figure 5-17: Constituent Activities of Influence Activities and Fires

Although all units may play a role in creating influences (e.g., the posture of troops

conducting security presence patrolling or the use of EW to create deception), the manoeuvre

units for specific influence and psychological effects, that is, for manoeuvre on the

psychological plane, may be considered PSYOPS elements, CIMIC units and resources, and

PA teams. Manoeuvre on both planes must be considered together in the creation of

complementary effects and achievement of tactical and operational objectives. ¹¹⁴

529. INFORMATION OPERATIONS PHILOSOPHY¹¹⁵

Land forces conduct activities to create effects in order to achieve assigned objectives.

Info Ops incorporate influence activities that focus on achieving a psychological effect on

individuals and groups by affecting their understanding, perception, will, and behaviour.

Although they create effects on the psychological plane, they are considered operations in the

same context as activities that create effects on the physical plane. They may be classified

using the same taxonomy: offensive, defensive, stability, and enabling. They are conceived,

planned and conducted simultaneously with activities that create physical effects, that is, fires.

Together, they may be considered comprehensive operations that consider the whole

environment. As operations, they come under the direct responsibility of the commander. This

is fundamental to an effects-based approach to operations and a comprehensive approach to

operations.

¹¹⁴ The formal concept of manoeuvre (movement supported by fire) must be expanded here to include the

obtainment of a position of advantage on the psychological plane. For example, forces may wish to issue

a public affairs statement before the adversary issues a propaganda message, thus gaining an advantage

in time over the adversary.

¹¹⁵ All doctrinal concepts begin with a philosophy, then broaden to a set of guiding principles, and then

develop as practices and procedures.

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Failure to incorporate fires and influence activities together, that is, effects on both the

physical and psychological planes, will preclude the conduct of full-spectrum operations (FSO).

Many of the effects sought by influence activities will be beyond the capability and

capacity of military forces, at least for an extended period. Thus, the military will seek to

conduct influence activities within the JIMP framework so that activities, such as reconstruction

and economic development and the long-term solutions to a conflict, may be fully realized

through those elements of power best suited to conduct them.

530. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS

As discussed earlier, target types on the psychological plane can be defined along a

spectrum of relative interest as it relates to achieving the end state. This spectrum can be

broadly broken down into any number of groups that may be generally described along the

following lines: the adversaries; the inactive hostile; the unsupportive; the neutral; the friendly

but uncommitted; the supportive; and, allies. The boundaries between these groups may be

blurred. Each group may be influenced in different ways using different activities. The amount

of effort and type of activity needed to influence them will depend upon the situation, the relative

size of the target audience, the disposition of the audience on the spectrum (i.e., supportive to

hostile), and the importance of ensuring popular support for the success of the campaign.

The actual influence activity undertaken as part of Info Ops may fall under any of the

three tactical operations: offensive, defensive, and stability. Although activities such as CIMIC

will be classified as stability operations, deception through feints and demonstrations are part of

offensive operations, and a PSYOPS message may be incorporated into the defensive battle.

With regard to creating the effect of influencing the understanding, perceptions, and will

of target audiences, Info Ops activities may be viewed as being either of an offensive nature or

of a defensive nature. Info Ops will seek to defend or sustain the support of those target

audiences that are supportive of the campaign. These may be considered defensive Info Ops.

On the other hand, some Info Ops will seek to create an influence on target audiences that are

not supportive of a campaign. The activities may seek to persuade them towards, or dissuade

them away from, a particular behaviour or course of action. Info Ops activities against these

target audiences may be considered offensive Info Ops. (See Figure 5-18.)

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Figure 5-18: Offensive and Defensive Information Operations

531. PRINCIPLES IN THE APPLICATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

As with all types of military activities, information operations should be planned and

conducted based upon certain key principles:

Commander’s Direction and Personal Involvement. The commander’s

personal involvement drives Info Ops and exercises control over all Info Ops

activity, through the G3, within a framework of timely decision-making and

consultation up and down the chain of command. Without the clear guidance of

the commander’s unifying theme and intent, the Info Ops effort will lack focus

and not achieve the desired effects in harmony with other activities.

Close Coordination and Sequencing. The very nature of Info Ops and the

large, diverse target set means that there needs to be very close integration,

vertically and horizontally, within a command in terms of creating

complementary effects in support of common objectives. Contradictory

messages or inaccurate information will undermine credibility and legitimacy. All

Info Ops plans and activities must be closely coordinated in relation to other

activities throughout the echelons and ideally across multiple agencies. This is

the responsibility of the commander, assisted by targeting staff, advisors, and

subordinate commanders.

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Accurate Intelligence and Information. Successful Info Ops must be founded

upon good intelligence support and the development of a deep and broad

knowledge base in which all elements, systems, and entities within an

environment may be assessed. This intelligence must include timely, accurate,

and relevant information about potential adversaries, the other approved parties,

and the operating environment. Assessment must be made with respect to how

targets will view, interpret, or perceive activities. The Info Ops staff and element

commanders should work closely with the intelligence staff to define

requirements necessary to plan, execute, and assess the effectiveness of Info

Ops. IPB should include analysis of human factors—culture, religion,

languages, etc.—decision-making infrastructure and power structures. As

intelligence staff are closely involved in battle damage estimates on the physical

plane, so too must they be closely involved in measures of effectiveness on the

psychological plane.

Centralized Planning and Decentralized Execution. Due to the requirement

for close coordination of Info Ops activity, the principle of centralized planning

and decentralized execution applies to Info Ops at all command levels.

However, centralized execution may be required for certain types of targeted

information activities when all involved force elements are required to adhere

rigidly to a plan, or when strategic assets are used. The approval level and

process for PSYOPS messages must be as low and as streamlined as possible

to ensure messages are timely and relevant to the environment at hand. Ideally

the approval level should be vested with the Info Ops Officer who can ensure

that the task force commander’s arcs of fire are adhered to and all influence

messages are synchronized while providing timely approval.

Comprehensive and Integrated Planning and Targeting. At the operational

level, planning and targeting starts with a detailed understanding of the

operational environment, its constituent systems and entities, and the

commander’s objectives. Commanders and staff identify the Info Ops effects

required to achieve the desired objectives and a range of activities that, when

integrated into the overall OPLAN, will achieve those effects. It is important to

realize that any element of targeting activity may influence a range of target

audiences and create unintended effects. The targeting staff, therefore, has to

analyze the impact of such activity and propose appropriate measures to avoid

or mitigate negative unintended effects. Info Ops planning and targeting must

not be done separately from the planning and targeting of physical activities and

effects, but in conjunction with them so that the effects are complementary.

Thus, Info Ops staff is attributed to the G3 and G5 staff branches. Ideally, the

fires officer and the Info Ops officer would synchronize and execute physical

and psychological effects through a targeting venue after a comprehensive and

integrated planning process.

Early Involvement and Timely Preparation. Info Ops planning must start

early because both planning and execution take time and results can be slow to

emerge. Hence, a commander’s intent and direction must be viewed right from

the start in relation to Info Ops capabilities and maintained throughout the

planning process. Planning and targeting staff and advisors need to be fully

involved in the planning process to integrate Info Ops into the overall plan.

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Monitoring and Effects Assessment. The successful prosecution of Info Ops

relies upon continuous monitoring and assessment of the short and long-term

effects of interrelated activities. This is achieved by the collection of all-source

intelligence and other feedback on the Info Ops activities. MoEs must be

included in the Info Ops plan and are integrated in the intelligence collection

activities.

Establishing and Maintaining Credibility. In order for Info Ops to be

successful in creating effects on the psychological plane, the source of the Info

Ops must have significant credibility in the eyes of the target audience. This

credibility must be built on a foundation of truthful messages from all of the

influence enablers. Over time target audiences will come to rely on these

messages as an accurate source of information. In this context, influence

enablers will be able to leverage the truth through synchronized messages to

achieve the desired effects. The credibility of a force may have to be

established in a planned, incremental fashion and will take time. If lacking

credibility, a force will require the engagement of indigenous proxies such as

social or religious leaders, who have established credibility with target

audiences, in order to spread the desired messages.

Timely Counter-information Operations. Even the most effective Info Ops

plans will be frustrated in execution if deliberate activities are not taken to

counter the Info Ops actions of the adversary and neutral parties. With respect

to influence activities, the advent of real-time communications technologies

forces the commander to constantly observe and counter the enemy’s attempts

to influence target audiences, locally and internationally. There are numerous

examples, from Kosovo to Lebanon to Afghanistan, of a militarily weaker

opponent effectively conducting an Info Ops campaign that has influenced

foreign and indigenous populations. Failure to adequately counter the contrived

story in a timely and credible fashion can undermine not only a public’s morale,

but it can also bolster an adversary’s popularity, and rally public opinion against

the campaign. Info Ops planning must dedicate resources to monitoring

adversary Info Ops and remain flexible enough to counter erroneous

information. Timeliness is paramount, and in terms of PA, the first side to get

their story out into the public domain often holds the public high ground.

532.

TARGET AUDIENCE FILTERS AND INNATE PERCEPTIONS: EXTERNAL

INFLUENCES AND INTERNAL PERCEPTIONS

To create effects on target audiences in terms of understanding, perceptions, will, and

behaviour, there is a need to understand the target audiences on the psychological plane and the

filters through which a message to the target will pass.¹¹⁶ This includes the external influences, such

as culture and religion, and individual internal perceptions, such as personal biases, through which

they view and interpret activities. Understanding of these filters helps to determine the activities

needed to create the desired effects and the manner in which they should be conducted. This is far

more difficult on the psychological plane than on the physical plane.

¹¹⁶ On the psychological plane, targets are people, either individuals or groups. They include national and

regional leaders, military commanders, social and religious leaders, troops, and segments of a

population.

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It is important to appreciate that targets on the psychological plane will act according to

their own interests, shaped by perspectives and values, which may be significantly different

from one’s own. As well, every activity on the psychological plane will have a different response

time and a different set of information filters that can (potentially) alter the interpretation of the

message (see Figure 5-16 below). These filters will differ with each situation and target, and will

be a result of the target’s external influences and internalized individual traits and perceptions.

Commanders and planners, with the help of cultural advisors, must understand the

manner in which these filters will affect the target’s interpretation of the planned activity. Once

this understanding is gained to the greatest extent possible, then activities may be conducted,

avoided, or conducted in a certain manner or by a certain element so that the desired message

is sent and the desired influence or effect is gained.

INFORMATION FILTERS

Collective External Influences:

Individual Internal Perceptions:

Cultural Bias and Values

Values

Social Pressures

Beliefs

Family

Experiences

Religious Institution and Constructs

Hopes

Media

Emotions

Group Dynamics

Government Institutions

Political Influences

Decision-making Processes

o Individual

o Group

Figure 5-19: Information Filters for a Target: Individual and Collective

External filter variables include culture, society, family, media, government institutions,

and decision-making processes.¹¹⁷ External filters, therefore, include variables that limit

behaviour to what is socially, culturally, and legally acceptable, informed by information sources

such as media, government, group, and informal communications networks. Individual internal

filter variables include personal values, beliefs, hopes, fears, and experiences. Without an

understanding of these filters and their effects, messages or activities may provoke unintended

actions.

Additionally, a decision-making process may be unique to an individual or group. What

appears to be a rational process to one person may seem irrational to another. The rationale

may have a cultural or religious basis, or it may be unique to that one particular personality trait.

¹¹⁷ Randal A. Dragon, Wielding the Cyber Sword: Exploiting the Power of Information Operations (Carlisle

PA: US Army War College, March 2001) 11.

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All the filters modify information input to the target audience. Targeting must be

sophisticated enough to understand and manipulate, or at least work through, these variables to

achieve the desired effect on the intended target. They are a key consideration for Red

Teaming¹¹⁸ during the planning and war gaming process. Activities seeking to influence must

specifically focus on what and how the target perceives something within the environment, and

be adjusted to suit it to achieve the desired effect. For example, a message delivered or an

action taken by a military leader in a society distrustful of those in uniform may not be effective.

However, the same message delivered by a religious leader or a civilian of similar cultural

background may gain the desired effect. Therefore, significant effort should focus on altering

the environment or influencing perception through means specifically tailored to the

environment. The impact of influence activities is their ultimate effect on decision-making

processes.¹¹⁹

Care must be taken in deciding the activities to be undertaken to create desired effects.

For example, measures taken to intimidate may simply result in animosity and hatred by the

leaders or local populations. Such reactions will be difficult to gauge, but a study of both

external and internal filters may help predict and mitigate such reactions.

In order for commanders and staff to plan activities to create the desired effects, it is

important that they make use of cultural advisors and experts. Just as commanders have

employed political advisors (POLADs) in the past, they must consider the employment of

experts in social, cultural and economic fields as well.

533. THE MESSAGES AND MESSENGERS

Info Ops is based in influencing by sending a message by means of some sort of

messenger. Not only will the message be judged, but the target audience will judge the chosen

messenger as well. How the target audience perceives the messenger will affect how they

perceive and accept the message. The following points should be considered with regard to the

way Info Ops are conducted:¹²⁰

Influencing a target audience requires “delivering the goods” not simply sending

the message. Thus, if a promise is made, it must be kept. If a message is sent,

it must be fulfilled.

Cultural awareness is vital, and the adversary often has more cultural credibility.

Ideally, key individuals or groups within a target audience receive the message,

accept it, and then deliver it or spread it through the larger audience. This will

add credibility to the message.

Maintain message discipline and do not be thrown off by erratic media reports.

In short, the message has to be sustained to be believed and must be

consistent over time and across different levels of command and across

different activities.

¹¹⁸ Red Teaming is utilized to provide counter-intuitive or counter-factual perspectives in campaign

analysis and war gaming, regarding the reactions of neutrals, aligned and non-aligned actors, as well as

the traditional focus on the adversary.

¹¹⁹ Adopted from Dragon, Wielding the Cyber Sword: Exploiting the Power of Information Operations, 18.

¹²⁰ Adapted from Professor Dennis Murphy, Information Operations and Winning the Peace: Wilding the

Information Element of Power in the Global War on Terrorism, (Carlisle PA: US Army War College,

Centre for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper, Vol. 14-05, December 2005).

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A central strategic theme is essential, however, subordinate themes and

messages (and deeds that reflect the message content) must be categorized,

assigned, and tracked against different target audiences. In the ubiquitous

media environment at least two cultures must be addressed: that of the

adversary/indigenous population, and that of committed friendly forces.

Mounting casualties puts additional stress on troops and may lead to mistakes

in conducting Info Ops. They must be anticipated and handled proactively.

Risks may have to be taken in order to support messages and to keep them

constant.

Whichever news story breaks first will be pre-eminent, at least initially; therefore,

publicize anything that highlights the legitimacy to the campaign.

OFFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS: OP ARCHER, AFGHANISTAN, 2006

A crucial component of COIN efforts in Afghanistan is persuading local populations that

the authority of the Central government is legitimate and that the role of coalition forces is

one of security, not occupation. Islam plays a pivotal role in Afghan culture and society.

Furthermore, tribal and village elders occupy a central cultural and religious leadership

position in Afghan society and power structures. Thus, offensive information operations

in Afghanistan must target tribal and village elders while being mindful of the role of Islam

in the day-to-day lives of the local populace.

In the spring of 2006 the CF incorporated a Muslim imam who is also a member of the CF

in select meetings with village and tribal leaders. Through recitation of Koranic verse and

Islamic prayers, the military imam used religious language to persuade Afghans that the

Taliban do not hold the moral high ground, that the Islamic government in Kabul is worthy

of support, and that the Western forces in their midst are not occupiers, but operate with

the goal of establishing security and peace within the parameters of an Islamic society.

The unique use of an imam to influence societal and religious leaders in Afghanistan by

the CF is a superb example of an offensive information operation conducted on the

psychological plane. Undermining Taliban claims of moral superiority based on religious

piety was assessed by many as a critical step in defeating the insurgency, particularly in

the Taliban’s former strongholds in Southern Afghanistan.

Source: Graeme Smith, The Globe and Mail 12 June 2006: A13.

Note. It should also be noted that the CF imam in this case was of Turkish decent.

Before his insertion into operations with local leaders occurred, an assessment would

have been necessary regarding the views of local Afghans with respect to those of

Turkish heritage in order to confirm that the target audience would receive the message

in a positive light.

534. ASSESSMENT—MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS

As with any military activity, the results of Info Ops are assessed using MoPs—are

things done right—and MoEs—are the right things being done—to create the desired effects?

MoPs for Info Ops refer to the mechanisms of planning and implementation. They can

be viewed in the same manner as the delivery of indirect fire: reaction times, quality of product,

correct identification and assessment of target, and suitability of engagement means, to name a

few.

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MoEs refer to the desired effects and whether or not the activities conducted have

created those effects, that is, modified will and behaviour. Many MoEs will be subjective and

take a considerable amount of time to measure. The results of these influence activities require

as defined a set of indicators as possible, in order to detect changes in perceptions, attitudes,

and behaviours. Some attempt may be made to use quantifiable MoEs. For example, if

activities have been undertaken to increase the population’s sense of security, measurements

may be used to evaluate an increase in the number of locals on the streets at night, or the level

of activity at the local market. Other measures may be more subjective and seek to ascertain

attitudes directly. Thus, the level of interaction of locals with soldiers on patrol and a survey of

their attitudes may be used as MoEs.

Deliberate procedures may be undertaken to apply and analyze MoEs. At other times,

MoEs may be standing information requirements (IRs) issued to patrols and other elements of

the forces, such as, “What is the reaction of locals in area X to the presence of patrols and is

there a change over time?” The intuition of commanders at all levels will play a role in creating

MoEs based upon their daily interactions with leaders and those in daily contact with the

populace.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS: OP ARCHER, AFGHANISTAN, 2006

The absence of domestic or international support for a mission can undermine both the legitimacy of a

mission as well as the morale of CF personnel. Therefore, one of the tasks in-theatre commanders may

be called upon to undertake is the education of the domestic and international publics, most likely through

the media. It may become necessary to clarify policy or inform the public about a mission or a specific

component of that mission in order to explain its reasoning and to bolster support for the desired end-

state.

One of the dilemmas that confronted the Canadian government and military from the outset of operations

in Afghanistan was the disposition and disposal of enemy personnel captured during combat. The typical

foe encountered by the CF in Afghanistan does not meet the definition of “members of armed forces” as

established by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in that most do not carry arms openly, do not abide

international laws and customs of war, and are not readily identifiable by the wearing of a uniform or

distinctive insignia.

On 18 December 2005 the Government of Canada signed an agreement with the Government of

Afghanistan concerning the transfer of enemy captured in Afghanistan by the CF. Five months later,

Ottawa declared that captured al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters would not be afforded formal PW status as

defined by the 1949 conventions.

This policy, combined with concerns that detainees transferred to Afghan custody would not always be

treated in accordance with international human rights standards, caused the Canadian media, some

experts, and members of the general public to express concern that Canada’s policies abrogated

international law.

Despite declarations in parliament and in the media by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence,

Brigadier-General David Fraser, Commander Multi-National Brigade for Regional Command South in

Afghanistan, felt compelled to clarify government policy by granting an interview to a member of the

Canadian media only days after the detainee policy was announced. Brigadier Fraser covered all

aspects of the Canadian detainee policy to include: the role of the Afghan government; the fact that the

spirit of the 1949 Conventions was to be followed in dealing with detainees; and, the role of respected

international organisations such as the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] to oversee the

handling. All this reinforced that Canadian policy conformed to international law.

The actions of General Fraser involved a complex legal, policy, and moral issue, targeted both the

undecided and friendly components of the influence spectrum, and simultaneously emphasised the

sovereignty of the nascent democratic government of Afghanistan.

Sources:

Paul Koring, “Troops Told Geneva Rules Don’t Apply,” The Globe and Mail 31 May 2006.

Graeme Smith, “General Defends Detainee Policy,” The Globe and Mail 3 June 2006.

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The assessment and analysis of MoEs is a G2 staff branch function. Certain Info Ops

elements, particularly PSYOPS, will have their own analysis teams. If deemed appropriate,

these may be incorporated into G2 and intelligence staffs in order to collate assessment and

share analysis tools.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, BAGHDAD,

IRAQ 2003-2004

To be effective, offensive Info Ops must target an appropriate audience, be focused on a

limited number of themes, and be timely. Technology allows almost immediate diffusion of

information and minutes can make a difference in countering or pre-empting enemy Info

Ops.

Colonel Ralph Baker, USA, commanded the 2^nd Brigade Combat Team of the 1^st Armored

Division in 2003-2004. 2 BCT’s AO encompassed the Karkh and Karada districts of

Baghdad. The operational environment in this AO was extremely complex, given that the

resident population is an amalgam of Shiite, Sunni, Christian, secular business and

academic elites, and the diplomatic district of the Iraqi capital. Moreover, the AO

encompassed Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Kaddamiya, where a sizable pro-Baathist

element continued to lurk. A final complicating variable was the rumour-centric nature of

Iraqi society.

Once it became apparent that US forces were facing a full-blown insurgency, Col. Baker

quickly realized that “IO (sic) is critical to successfully combating an insurgency. It fights

with words, symbols, and ideas, and it operates under the same dynamics as all combat

operations.” The greatest problem facing 2 BCT with regards to Info Ops was that the

insurgents consistently dominated activities on the psychological plane, successfully

shaping the environment before US elements could respond. Without fail, the various

insurgent groups were able to engage the most important mediums (television & internet)

through the most important media outlets in a rapid and effective manner, often before US

or coalition Info Ops teams could even begin to respond.

The Info Ops staff of 2 BCT took a number of steps to rectify the Info Ops deficiency in the

AO. In the first place, three broad categories of Iraqi citizens were identified to lend greater

focus to targeting. The groups were: those who would never accept the coalition’s

presence; those who accepted the coalition’s presence; and, “the vast majority of Iraqi’s who

were undecided.” It was this last group that was the specific target of the majority of 2 BCT

Info Ops, firstly because those in this group were generally more susceptible to influence,

and secondly, because a successful insurgency only requires the acquiescence of a

population, not outright support. A final group that was targeted was 2 BCT’s own

personnel, who were at times demoralized by “inaccurate [and] slanted news” from US

media outlets.

Once targets were identified and prioritised, two broad themes were adopted to focus the

information and messages that were critical to a successful mission outcome: discredit

insurgents and terrorists, and highlight the economic, political, social, and security efforts of

the coalition forces. Next, synchronization of all available brigade Info Ops assets was

pursued to end counter-productive and often conflicting messages (Info Ops fratricide).

Specific groups of targets within the “undecided” category of Iraqis were identified so that

they would in turn spread the message. These groups were the local and international

media, local imams and religious leaders, tribal and clan leaders, governmental officials, and

university and lower-level school leadership. This last point is particularly important, for it is

far more effective that someone from the target audience spread the desired message

because it is much more likely to be accepted and trusted.

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Finally, 2 BCT identified a number of measures of effectiveness (MoE) by which the

progress of brigade Info Ops could be evaluated. The MoEs are necessarily subjective and

lack rigorous quantification. Given that Info Ops on the psychological plane seek to

influence people’s attitudes, this should not be surprising. Nevertheless, some MoE is

required. For 2 BCT, these included the number of accurate/positive stories published or

aired by all media sources, the number of negative press, the number of tips provided by the

local populace, the “wave” factor (who and how many local residents waved to coalition

troops during patrols), observance of the tone of graffiti in the AO, the tenor of sermons at

local mosques, and the willingness of the local populace to openly work with coalition forces.

Although lacking an effective Info Ops doctrine, Col. Baker and his brigade Info Ops team

quickly developed an effective plan to counter and pre-empt enemy Info Ops.

Understanding that an effective Info Ops plan was critical to a successful COIN operation,

Baker and 2 BCT rapidly implemented Info Ops doctrine that enabled the tactical leader, by

providing a clear commander’s intent and end state goals. From their experiences, Col.

Baker drew a number of essential observations relevant to all Info Ops:

Info Ops must tailor themes and messages to a specific target.

The press must be engaged; you have no influence if you do not talk to them.

Credibility and the ability to improve the quality of life of the local residents is directly

related.

Developing trust and confidence between your forces and local residents should be a

primary Info Ops goal. Hence, messages must be based on the truth.

Commander’s vision and intent must be clear and concise.

Messages must be few, simple, and repetitive.

Source: Colonel Ralph Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Commander’s Perspective On

Information Operations,” Military Review May-June 2006: 13-32.

SECTION 10

MANOEUVRE WARFARE

535. MANOEUVRE DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION

The concept of manoeuvre warfare is defined as:

A war fighting philosophy and approach to operations that seeks to defeat the

enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an

effective, coordinated whole—rather than by destroying him physically through

incremental attrition.

(NATO Allied Administrative Publication 39 [AAP-39],

Glossary of Land Military Terms and Definitions).¹²¹

Manoeuvre warfare is often referred to as the manoeuvrist approach. It is realized

through the following activities and effects against an adversary:

¹²¹ The manoeuvrist approach is defined in similar manner in other NATO sources, such as Allied Joint

Publication 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (Ratification draft May 2007): “An approach to

operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an

attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality, is combined with a

resolute determination to succeed.”

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shaping understanding;

attacking and undermining will; and

shattering cohesion.

Cohesion is seen as the glue that solidifies individual and group will under the command

of leaders. Cohesion allows military forces to endure hardship and retain the physical and

moral strength to continue fighting to accomplish their mission.

This manoeuvrist approach¹²² to operations seeks to attack the adversary’s will to fight,

and thus undermine and even shatter his cohesion, usually but not necessarily, by avoiding

trials of strength and targeting the adversary’s vulnerabilities or weakness. An adversary’s will,

and thus cohesion, may also be affected by the shaping of his understanding. For example, if

the adversary’s C2 ability is neutralized, he will fail to understand his environment, or he will

misunderstand his environment and thus lose his will and cohesion. Likewise, if conscripts are

convinced to surrender or flee, the will and cohesion of the entire adversary force are affected.

As a result, the focus is to defeat the threat by shattering its moral and physical

cohesion, his ability to fight as an effective coordinated whole, rather than by destroying him

physically through incremental attrition. It is equally applicable to all types of campaigns from

peace support through major combat.

The manoeuvrist approach is not only applied through physical activities (fires) that

effect will and cohesion as second order effects. It is also applied through psychological

activities that may affect the will and cohesion as first order effects. That it, it is applied through

a combination of fires and influence activities. For example, PSYOPS radio messages to a

defending adversary may encourage conscripts to flee the battlefield, thus affecting the enemy’s

cohesion directly. Deception through a demonstration of forces and false radio traffic will

confuse the enemy and undermine his confidence, will, and cohesion. The manoeuvrist

approach is therefore conducted simultaneously on the physical and psychological

planes in a complementary fashion. For example, just as a commander may wish to reach a

piece of vital ground in order to make the enemy’s defence untenable, and thus undermine the

enemy’s will and cohesion, the same commander may wish to issue highly effective PSYOPS

messages to undermine conscripts, provide emergency aid to locals suffering occupation, and

issue accurate and timely PA statements, all in order to out-manoeuvre the enemy in time,

space and influence.

The manoeuvrist approach traditionally incorporates three core activities and effects:

shaping understanding, undermining will, and shattering cohesion. In applying the manoeuvrist

approach to both the physical and psychological planes, a wider conceptualization must occur.

In understanding this application, it must be remembered that when applied to certain target

audiences, such as a friendly, neutral or unsupportive audience, activities may be undertaken to

inform, assist understanding, and shape perceptions, but in an effort to strengthen will and

¹²² The manoeuvrist approach must not be confused with tactical or operational “manoeuvre,” which is an

element of the Act operational function and is defined as: “employment of forces on the battlefield through

movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the

enemy in order to accomplish the mission.” (AAP-6).

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enhance cohesion (particularly of campaign supporters). It sees the idea of manoeuvring, in

competition with the adversary and others, on both the physical and psychological planes and

applied to a wider range of targets other than simply adversaries. Thus, for example, a COIN

campaign plan may envision attacking key insurgent strongholds in order to undermine his will

and cohesion (i.e., manoeuvrist approach on the physical plane) while providing better

economic and social development for the local populace, and advertising these activities quickly

in the local media (i.e., manoeuvre on the psychological plane to shape understanding and

engender support from the populace). (See Figure 5-20.)

In many campaigns, the manoeuvrist approach is applied in dealing with a wide array of

targets that includes more than simply an adversary. There will be individuals and groups who

support the campaign, those who are neutral or undecided, those who oppose the campaign,

and those who are even hostile to it. In all cases, influence activities (i.e., manoeuvre on the

psychological plane) will be applied against these targets to shape understanding. (See Figure

5-20.) In some cases though, particularly for those groups that support the campaign, the aim

of the activities will be to strengthen will and reinforce cohesion. This will likely be achieved

through defensive Info Ops. Such activities can be summarized as follows:

Against an adversary and his supporters, the manoeuvrist approach uses fires

and influence activities (and thus effects on the physical and psychological

planes) to shape understanding and attack will and shatter cohesion.

With respect to other target audiences, particularly those who support or

potentially support the campaign, the manoeuvrist approach uses influence

activities and their psychological effects to shape understanding, strengthen will,

and reinforce cohesion.

Activities with respect to all target audiences are planned and conducted

simultaneously, with a common objective in mind, so that activities seeking to

shatter the will and cohesion of an adversary, do not negatively affect the will

and cohesion of those groups that support the campaign. Thus, while attacking

an adversary, the legitimacy of the campaign must be maintained in the eyes of

the supporters and potential supporters.

Depending upon the campaign theme, it may be possible to influence some of

the adversaries and opponents to become supporters of the campaign. This will

necessitate activities that address the root causes of the crisis and conflict itself,

the complementary application of activities on the physical and psychological

planes, and the considered and judicious use of physical violence.

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Figure 5-20: Manoeuvrist Approach Applied to Adversaries and Supporters on Physical and

Psychological Planes

The manoeuvrist approach is most effective when applied against a conventional

adversary. In some campaigns, such as a COIN, involving a fanatical insurgent movement, the

manoeuvrist approach in terms of fires will have little effect. No amount of force or threat of

force will convince the core insurgents to surrender, or to break their will and cohesion. Indeed,

martyrdom becomes an ideal situation for them and only acts to stiffen their resolve. In such

cases, the manoeuvrist approach on the psychological plane will be the only real manner in

which to realize an enduring outcome. The majority of the populace and the less fanatical

members of the adversary must be persuaded through influence activities not to support the

insurgency. Thus, activities must counter adversary propaganda and media operations; they

must build legitimacy and confidence in the campaign; and they must address the root causes

of any reason for support to be given to the adversary. Eventually, the adversary will become

so isolated that he cannot operate effectively in the environment, and his appeal to any group or

system will be removed.

SECTION 11

APPROACHES TO ATTACKING WILL AND COHESION

536. GENERAL

Attacking the adversary’s cohesion, on both the physical and psychological planes, is

the key to manoeuvre warfare. It is done using both fires and influence activities. There are

three approaches to attacking will and cohesion, in order of preference: pre-emption,

dislocation, and disruption.

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537. PRE-EMPTION

To pre-empt the adversary is to seize an opportunity, often fleeting, before he does, and

deny him an advantageous course of action. Pre-emption relies upon surprise above all, and

requires good intelligence and an ability to understand and anticipate the adversary’s actions.

Its success lies in the speed with which the situation can subsequently be exploited. The

purpose of pre-emptive action is to prevent the adversary from gaining his objective or

establishing his influence. Pre-emption is used to produce a sufficient and suitably located

threat to the adversary that: causes confusion and doubt; destroys confidence by foiling his

plans; and, makes his intended course of action irrelevant. Pre-emption denies initiative to the

adversary.

Whether offensive or defensive, pre-emption demands a keen awareness of time and a

willingness to take calculated risks that offer a high payoff. These risks may be reduced with

the benefit of intelligence derived from real-time sensors that provide a more accurate

assessment of the adversary’s true situation. Pre-emption can also be achieved by allowing

subordinates at all levels the initiative, consistent with the commander’s intent, to seize

opportunities as they arise. This applies to activities on both the physical and psychological

planes.

Establishing air superiority or establishing control of the electromagnetic spectrum at the

start of operations can achieve pre-emption. On the psychological plane, the threat can be pre-

empted by use of a proactive PA programme. This may also include actions to secure the

support or neutrality of third parties before the adversary can do so.

538. DISLOCATION

To dislocate the adversary is to deny him the ability to bring his strength to bear. Its

purpose is much wider than disruption, and goes beyond the frustration of the adversary's

plans. Its purpose is to render the strength of elements of the force irrelevant. It seeks to avoid

fighting the adversary on his terms. This is done by avoiding and neutralizing his strengths so

they cannot be used effectively. A dislocating move is usually supported by actions to distract

the adversary and fix his attention.

It is through ‘distraction’ of the commander’s mind that the distraction of his forces follows.

The loss of freedom of action is the sequel to the loss of his freedom of conception.

Captain Liddell-Hart

Envelopments or deep penetrations into the operational depth of an adversary, even by

small military forces, may cause dislocation of adversary elements by attacking reserves, lines

of communications, and C2 networks.

In terms of influence activities, deception can be used to lure the adversary into making

incorrect deployments, inappropriate use of reserves, and inadequate preparations for

operations. Furthermore, on the psychological plane, actions may be taken to dislocate the

influence of the adversary amongst a local populace if this is a key aspect of the campaign. The

adversary’s means of propaganda may be shut down, or his psychological hold on a populace

may be dislocated through friendly force actions that address the root causes of the conflict and

remove the motivations for supporting the adversary, so that a moral superiority may be seen

with the campaigning forces.

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539. DISRUPTION

To disrupt is to attack the adversary selectively to break apart and throw into confusion

the assets that are critical to the employment and coherence of his fighting power. It is a

deliberate act that requires sound intelligence. The purpose is to rupture the integrity of the

adversary's fighting power and reduce it to less than the total of its constituent parts. Identifying

and locating the most critical assets may not be easy. Key strategic and military targets might

include command centres, high-value base facilities, air defence systems, weapons of mass

destruction, choke points, and critical logistics and industrial facilities. These can be disrupted

by getting into the adversary’s lines of communication, seizing or neutralizing what is important

to him, surprising and deceiving him, presenting him with unexpected situations, using

PSYOPS, and attacking his plans and preparations.

In many campaigns, such as a COIN, it will be important to disrupt the influence and

intimidation that the adversaries have over a populace or sector of the populace. This must be

done early. It may be accomplished, at least initially, through simply establishing a continuous

presence of troops amongst the populace in order to protect them and increase their sense of

security. It should be complemented by influence activities that encourage support for the

campaign and undermine the legitimacy and capability of the adversary. In time, this disruption

will offer opportunities to dislocate the adversary from the populace by taking actions that

demonstrate the legitimacy of the campaign and address the root causes of the conflict.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

OPERATION OVERLORD, 6 JUNE 1944

During the initial stages of the landings in Normandy, the Allies' main fear was a rapid

and concentrated German counter-attack before the beachhead was secured. Actions

were taken to break the cohesion of the German response by pre-emption, disruption,

and dislocation.

Pre-emption

Allied troops were parachuted into German rear areas and on the flanks of the landings

to seize bridges and other points vital to both sides. This denied mobility to the German

troops moving to repel the invaders. At the same time, Ranger and Commando units

were employed to seize key emplacements that dominated the landings.

Dislocation

Part of Operation OVERLORD was the construction of the First United States Army

Group (FUSAG) under Gen George S. Patton. This army, an elaborate fake, helped

deceive the Germans into believing that the Normandy landings were a feint. The plan

used a minimal number of Allied troops to hold German reserves in the Pas de Calais

region. This dislocated the main component of the Axis reserves so that their full

strength was not brought to bear against the Allied invasion.

Disruption

French resistance forces, carefully coordinated with Operation OVERLORD, destroyed

key portions of the railway net in France. At the same time, Allied air forces bombed

other targets on the lines of communications. This disrupted the German transport

system, and damaged the ability of the Axis commanders to redeploy their forces to

meet the Allied invasion, and to supply their forces in the field.

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540. APPLICATION OF MANOEUVRE DOCTRINE: MAINTAINING COHESION AND

ATTACKING THE ADVERSARY’S COHESION

Cohesion is unity and it is derived from all three components of fighting power: the

physical, the intellectual, and the moral. It is the quality that binds together constituent parts of

a military organization and brings a measure of quality to its fighting power. With a cohesive

force, a commander can maintain unity of effort in imposing his will on the adversary or other

target audiences. Cohesion comprises the general identification with a common aim or purpose

(conceptual component), the means to concentrate force in a coordinated and timely manner

(physical component) and the maintenance of high morale (moral component). Cohesion

reflects the unity of effort in the force. It includes the influence of a commander's intent

focussed at a common objective, the motivation and esprit de corps of the force, and also the

physical components necessary to integrate and apply combat power. Cohesion, therefore, has

both moral and physical components.

A breakdown in cohesion will lead to isolation, fear, confusion, and a loss of the will to

fight. The adversary will be unable to apply his full combat power and his component parts can

be defeated in detail. Ideally, the result is an adversary made up of a collection of individuals

and small groups lacking motivation, direction, and purpose. This loose collection can be more

easily defeated since its ability to fight effectively as a force has been eliminated.

Although a focus on attacking the adversary’s will and cohesion is vital for a successful

campaign, a commander must also focus on building and maintaining the will and cohesion of

his own force, both the physical and moral cohesion. Additionally, many campaigns will focus

on maintaining the will and cohesion of elements that are required to support the campaign,

mainly key groups within the environment’s populace.

Manoeuvre warfare plays as much upon the adversary’s will to fight and his ability to

react to a changing situation, as upon his material ability to do so. It is an approach through

fires and influence activities that emphasizes an indirect and direct targeting of the adversary’s

will and cohesion, rather than simply his physical component. It requires a flexible and positive

attitude of mind by commanders who must seek opportunities to exploit adversary

vulnerabilities, both physically and psychological ly, while maximizing their own strengths. The

focus is the adversary’s centre(s) of gravity, the source of his freedom of action, physical

strength or will to fight, and how best to attack, neutralize, or destroy it. It focuses on objectives

and end states rather than actions and their immediate physical results.

The physical application of violence is still critical, but is conducted selectively. Rather

than conducting an operation as a toe-to-toe slugging match between two boxers, it should be

fought like a bullfight where a stronger opponent can be worn down, confused, and disoriented

by the picadors and the elusive and flexible cape of the matador until the latter delivers the final

blow with a thrust to the heart.

Physical cohesion can be attacked by separating commanders from their subordinates

by severing, disrupting, or jamming communications, attacking lines of communications,

destroying elements of the force, and interfering with control measures.

To attack the adversary’s moral cohesion, components of the adversary force should be

isolated from their C2. Opposing commanders should be cut off from their sources of

information. The lack of information will force bad decisions and cause a loss of credibility,

motivation, and the will to fight for a “losing” commander. This creates a lack of faith in

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adversary leaders, so that their effectiveness and competence, as well as the legitimacy of their

cause, will come into question. This takes away the adversary’s sense of purpose and induces

fear. The ultimate goal is to produce panic and paralysis by presenting the adversary with

sudden, unexpected and dangerous change, or a series of such changes to which he cannot

adjust.

The adversary’s cohesion may also be directly attacked on the psychological plane by

undermining his moral justification and his legitimacy, in his own eyes, and in the eyes of

potential supporters. The cohesion may be attacked directly through PSYOPS and PA

operations that attack the legitimacy of the adversary, his leaders and his cause, and his

influence over the populace. The target audience for such activities will be supporters of the

adversary, his own members, and potential supporters.

Breaking the adversary's cohesion, however, may only be a temporary or transitory

effect, and the adversary could regroup and recover if pressure is not maintained. Where

physical and moral cohesion is shattered and resistance continues, such as by fanatical

individuals or groups, physical destruction may be the only alternative. This, however, should

be seen as a last resort. In the end it may be enough to simply make such fanatics irrelevant

and completely isolated, both physically and morally.

10.

Operations under a manoeuvrist approach should be dynamic and multi-dimensional. It

requires a balance between mass, time, and space across both the physical and psychological

planes. By speed of action, commanders attempt to pre-empt adversary plans, dislocate

adversary forces, and disrupt their movement and their means of C2. Combat forces are pitted

against the adversary's strength only if this is required to hold and neutralize the adversary’s

forces, or to set up the conditions for decisive action against a critical vulnerability. Normally,

combat power is directed against adversary weakness, particularly any vulnerabilities in his

cohesion.

11.

Where possible, existing weak points are exploited. Failing that, they must be created.

Weak points may be physical, for example, an undefended boundary or approach. They may

also be less tangible, such as vulnerability in passage of information. They are often produced

when an adversary is over-extended or suffering the effects of a high tempo of operations.

They may exist on the psychological plane, such as the adversary’s inability to claim legitimacy

or to represent all groups of the environment’s populace. Exploiting weak points requires agility,

flexibility and anticipation, and low-level freedom of action.

12.

Tactical battles are not an end in of themselves, but only a building block within the

framework of a larger campaign that uses surprise, deception, manoeuvre, and firepower to

break the adversary's will to fight, primarily through attacking moral and physical cohesion.

13.

The concepts of manoeuvre warfare apply equally to activities and effects on the

psychological plane. The effects should shape an adversary’s understanding, undermine his

will, and shatter his cohesion. Manoeuvre through information operations, for example, may

undermine the support that an insurgent or belligerent military commander receives from the

local populace or media. This, in turn, will affect the adversary’s will and cohesion.

14.

At the same time, manoeuvre on the psychological plane must seek to reinforce the will

and cohesion of those groups that support the campaign and oppose the adversary. This

includes activities undertaken to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt adversary propaganda aimed

at the local populace, the international media, and one’s own troops. This is vitally important in

campaigns that rely upon the will of the majority of a populace or a particular group for success.

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15.

Activities, be they fires or influence activities, must be done in a complementary fashion

with all other activities. Operations are planned and targeted together in a harmonized,

simultaneous fashion. For example, actions taken to defeat an adversary must be planned with

an understanding as to how the actions will be interpreted by those elements of the populace

whose support is required.

16.

In summary, combat power must be applied through activities, with a view to shattering

the adversary’s moral and physical cohesion, while bolstering that of the allies and neutral

elements. In order to accomplish this, activities must be undertaken on both the physical and

psychological planes in a complementary and synchronized fashion. Commanders manoeuvre

simultaneously against a wide range of targets on both the physical and psychological planes.

Much of the manoeuvre on the psychological plane will be conducted through Info Ops that

seek to influence target audiences and create desired psychological effects. This psychological

manoeuvre will be used to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the Info Ops and psychological

manoeuvre of the adversary.

17.

All forms of manoeuvre, physical and psychological, are considered operations and are

therefore the direct responsibility of the commander and his G3 staff branch. The commander

will strike the correct balance between fires and influence activities, that is, between manoeuvre

on the two planes based upon the campaign theme, its guiding principles, and the need to

create effects that will realize enduring objectives and end states.

18.

In keeping with this concept, it must be remembered that the manner and principles by

which tactical activities are conducted, should not violate the overarching principles of the

campaign. For example, an attack on an insurgent stronghold may follow the principles of

offensive operations, but its conduct should not contradict the principles of a COIN campaign.

Any collateral damage resulting from such an attack, for example, must be minimized or

repaired immediately in order to maintain the support of the local population. This combination

of fires and influence activities, applied to all targets and target audiences, is comprehensive

operations.

541. ENABLERS FOR THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

The manoeuvrist approach to operations is enabled through:

A comprehensive and effects-based approach to operations that provides a

unifying theme and purpose, expressed as the commander’s intent to all the

elements in a JIMP framework, to address all the threats and consider all

influences faced in the operating environment (political, military, economic,

social, etc.) and a clear articulation of the end state and the objectives required

to realize that end state.

Identification of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the adversary and his

supporters.

Identification of the vulnerabilities of the campaign and its supporters or neutral

parties to the adversary’s influence activities (propaganda).

Identification of the adversary’s centre(s) of gravity and its/their relative

importance to reaching the desired end state.

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The commander’s ability to conceptualize and direct the harmonization of the

operational functions in order to apply combat power on both the psychological

and physical planes in a mutually complementary and supporting manner.

Comprehensive targeting that considers the complementary and synchronized

application of fires and influence activities.

Mission command.

A unity of effort across all forces and agencies created through the shared

understanding of superior commanders’ intent, two levels higher.

542. PRINCIPLES OF MANOEUVRE WARFARE

Manoeuvre warfare is a mindset for applying combat power and the resources to defeat

adversaries, build and reinforce the cohesion of the campaign, and address sources of conflict.

There is no prescribed formula, however, certain principles can provide guidance:

Concentrate on the Adversary’s Vulnerabilities. With the objective being to

attack the adversary’s will to fight and cohesion, activities and their effects

should be planned against vulnerabilities, vice strengths. Plans should focus on

exploiting the adversary's vulnerabilities and not on seizing and holding the

ground. The purist application of manoeuvre warfare is to disarm or neutralize

an adversary before the fight. Vulnerabilities must be identified and attacked on

the psychological plane as well, mainly through aggressive Info Ops, in order to

sow seeds of doubt and discord amongst the adversary and his supporters.

Mission Type Orders. Mission type orders focus on the effects to be achieved.

This involves de-centralizing decision-making and letting decisions be taken at

the lowest possible level. It is essential that commanders know and fully

understand their commander’s intent two levels up. Subordinates must

understand what is on their commander's mind, his vision of the battlefield, and

what end state is desired. Mission orders allow commanders, at all levels, to

react to situations and to capitalize on opportunities as they arise. The

commander directs and controls his operation through clear intent, tasks and

desired effects, rather than detailed supervision and control measures or

restrictions.

Agility. Agility enables a commander to seize the initiative and dictate the

course of operations that is acting quicker than the adversary can react.

Eventually, the adversary is overcome by events, and his cohesion and ability to

influence the situation are destroyed. Agility is the liability of the commander to

change faster than the adversary can anticipate. Quickness and intellectual

acuity are the keys to effective agility. Commanders must be quick to make

good decisions and to exploit developments on both the physical and

psychological planes. Commanders and units must be able to respond quickly

to physical and psychological developments. Just as a unit will move to exploit

a sudden gap on the battlefield before the adversary can reposition to close it, a

commander must be quick to exploit through Info Ops a public relations error

made by an insurgent force. Getting inside the adversary's decision cycle is the

essence of tempo. Well-rehearsed battle drills and standing operating

procedures enhance the agility of a formation. Agility also allows a commander

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to quickly counter the adversary’s Info Ops and his attempts to undermine the

legitimacy of, and support for, the campaign.

Focus on Main Effort. The main effort focuses combat power and resources

on the vital element of the plan and allows subordinates to make decisions that

will support the commander's intent without constantly seeking advice. This

way, the commander is successful in achieving his goal and each subordinate

ensures his actions support the main effort. It is the focus of all, generally

expressed in terms of a particular friendly unit, activity or effect. While each unit

is granted the freedom to operate independently, everyone serves the ultimate

goal, which unifies their efforts. In certain campaigns, the main effort may be

focused on influence activities in the psychological plane, while activities on the

physical plane are supporting and may seek only to maintain a secure

environment for other elements and forces.

Exploit Tactical Opportunities. Commanders continually assess the situation

(mission analysis) and then exercise the necessary freedom of action to be able

to react to changes more quickly than the adversary. Reserves are created,

correctly positioned and grouped to exploit situations that have been formed by

shaping the battle to conform to friendly concepts of operations.

Act Boldly and Decisively. Commanders at all levels should be able to deal

with uncertainty and act with audacity, initiative, and inventiveness in order to

seize fleeting opportunities within their higher commanders' intent. They not

only accept confusion and disorder, they generate it for the adversary. Failure

to make a decision surrenders the initiative to the adversary. Risk is calculated,

understood and accepted. In doing so, commanders must keep in the foremost

of their minds the overall objective. It must be remembered that at times tactical

success may have to be sacrificed in order to meet or maintain the overarching

operational objective.

Command from a Position to Influence the Main Effort. Commanders place

themselves where they can influence the main effort and ensure that the desired

effects are created to realize the desired objectives. If the main effort of a

campaign rests with influence activities that seek to engender security and

support from a populace, then the commander must position himself to influence

the unity of effort between all the available elements of power and within the

local populace.

SECTION 12

MISSION COMMAND

543.

DEFINITION AND TENETS

Mission command is defined as “The philosophy of command that promotes unity of

effort, the duty and authority to act, and initiative to subordinate commanders.”¹²³

¹²³ For this definition and a full discussion of mission command, see B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command.

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Mission command focuses on decentralised command and is intended for situations that

are complex, dynamic and adversarial. It allows for and accepts that the successful application

of surprise, shock and high operational tempo against an adversary is best executed through

rapid and timely decision-making at all levels of command in response to the unexpected or

fortuitous occurrence of both threats and opportunities.

Mission command supports an effects-based approach to operations as applied to

activities on both the physical and psychological planes. An objective may be reached through

fires, influence activities, or through a combination of both. While the term objective has

commonly been used to refer to a physical object against which action is taken, in an effects-

based approach an objective may be something far more abstract, particularly if it is on the

psychological plane or a set of circumstances or conditions to be created.

Mission command underpins manoeuvre warfare and the effects-based approach with

three tenets:

The importance of understanding a superior commander’s intent.

A clear responsibility on the part of subordinates to fulfil that intent.

Timely decision making.

While subordinates must exercise initiative under mission command, it is imperative that

they understand the higher-level objectives that must be obtained and the influence, positive or

negative, that their actions will have on the attainment of those objectives. There is little sense

in commanders achieving short-term tactical success, even if it supports the immediate

objectives of his superior, if it will undermine the legitimacy of the campaign and the

achievement of operational objectives and end state.

544. CREATING A MISSION COMMAND ATMOSPHERE

Under the mission command philosophy, commanders must:

Give orders in a manner that ensures that subordinates understand intent, their

own tasks, and the context of those tasks.

Tell subordinates what effect(s) they are to achieve by their tasks and the

reason why or purpose, which may be a second order effect or objective.

Examples include: “seize in order to…”or“ conduct security patrols in order to…”.

Provide those orders and tasks within the context of a unity of effort that is

shared horizontally and vertically within the formation, and across other

elements of power. This reflects a pervasive comprehensive approach.

Ensure subordinate commanders, as appropriate, understand the operational

objectives applicable to their line of operation and the overarching campaign

principles, both of which their tactical activities should not undermine or violate.

Allocate appropriate resources to carry out missions and tasks.

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Use a minimum of control measures so as not to limit unnecessarily the freedom

of action of subordinates.

Allow subordinates to decide within their delegated freedom of action how best

to achieve their missions, tasks, and planned effects.

Mission command applies to activities on both the physical and psychological planes. At

its essence is freedom of action, trust, and confidence. When all else goes awry and

subordinates cannot obtain new direction for the changing situation, they can always use the

commander’s clearly stated intent, with the desired effect and end state, to guide their decisions

and actions.

545. UNITY OF EFFORT AND COMMON INTENT

Balanced against the tenets of freedom of action and decentralized decision-making is

the requirement to harmonize all activities and effects within a unity of effort. Unity of effort is

vital for a force as it harmonizes the actions of the constituent elements of force, at times both

military and non-military.

Unity of effort stems from a number of interrelated means: the commander’s ability to

articulate a unifying theme through clear intent and mission statements; the use of common

doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures; a common language of command; a high standard

of collective training and teamwork; and the designation of main effort.¹²⁴ In short, together they

generate a common understanding across a force, and indeed, across other elements of power

as well, and harmonize and coordinate their actions, particularly at times of confusion and

disorientation.

Within an operation, unity of effort is enhanced when subordinates understand the

intentions of their immediate superiors and of those two levels up. This vertical integration

allows subordinates to nest their own plans and activities within those of their superiors. The

unity of effort shared amongst subordinates gives horizontal integration and allows subordinates

to understand how their missions interact with those of others. A well-established unity of effort

also supports the manoeuvrist approach to operations.

Ideally, unity of effort is shared through the commander’s unifying theme with other

elements of power so that all together they may address the root causes of a crisis, engender

support and commitment from indigenous populations, and create enduring end states.

Unity of effort is largely based upon a commander’s explicit (stated) intent. It is

understood in the context of a common doctrine, language and training. However, complete

unity of effort and mission command implementation must be based upon the establishment and

maintenance of common intent: the sum of shared explicit intent as expressed in a

commander’s verbal or written statement, plus operationally relevant shared implicit intent.

Implicit intent is understood through a web of shared connotations, that is, a common

understanding of doctrine, shared values and beliefs (culture), and social norms and

¹²⁴ Main effort is defined as: a concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander

seeks to bring about a decision. (B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command). It works to achieve a unity of effort

across all subordinate and supporting forces and maximizes combat power.

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CHAPTER 6

THE PLANNING OF LAND OPERATIONS

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

601. GENERAL

Land operations are planned and conducted in accordance with doctrinal principles in

order to fulfil strategic and operational end states. They are realized through the conduct of

tactical level activities that create effects to meet the operational objectives and end states.

It must be stressed that operations involve much more than opposing military forces.

Although there will remain a requirement for combat operations that only military forces are

capable of conducting, objectives will be met in many campaigns through a wide array of

activities, involving the joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) framework, that is,

both military and non-military elements.

This chapter will develop the understanding of the planning and execution of land

operations by explaining the process of operational design, planning and battle procedure.

602. CAMPAIGN AUTHORITY

The authority of a force, whether military or a force consisting of multiple agencies, to

conduct a campaign is reflected in the perceived legitimacy of the force, its mission, the manner

in which the force conducts itself, and the manner in which it delivers expectations. A campaign

will generally have campaign legitimacy, and thus authority, if the population most directly

affected by the campaign supports it. In many campaigns, ultimate success will rest upon the

establishment and maintenance of popular support, and in turn, campaign legitimacy and

authority.

Campaign authority is defined as: “the total perceived public legitimacy and authority of a

force to conduct a campaign. Note: It is measured through four criteria: perceived mandate; the

manner in which it is prosecuted; the consent of affected parties; and the management and

satisfaction of the expectations of the affected parties and other audiences. It may be

measured at international, national, regional and local levels.” 125

The perceived campaign authority may be illustrated through relative measurement of

the four criteria.

(See Figure 6-1.) Changes over time may also be indicated.

¹²⁵ Army Terminology Panel approved May 2007.

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