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(2)

The populace must have an appreciation for the DDR process and feel

that it will continue to have a reasonable level of security despite the

demobilization of the military on which it may have previously depended.

Effective integration of indigenous security infrastructures and forces:

(1)

This is the lead-in to SSR and thus it is important to identify the elements

of the subject forces to be maintained.

Effective synchronization with offensive, defensive and other stability operations

tasks:

(1)

The tasks undertaken in DDR must be balanced with other demands for

offensive and defensive operations. Ideally, those units committed to the

DDR process will not be expected to assume deliberate offensive

operations.

SECTION 3

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

7A01. GENERAL

DDR needs to be fully planned and addressed within the campaign plan as a specific

operational objective. Actions to support DDR extend throughout the campaign plan and should

be continually assessed as the campaign progresses. The campaign plan should indicate the

point at which DDR will begin and should indicate the various decisive points along the way to

the successful end-state. The major DDR functions operate on a continuum and in support of

one another to be fully effective. They are not necessarily separate and distinct operational

tasks in execution. For example, DDR may be conducted at various times and stages in the

campaign in different regions of a nation.

DDR clearly fits within the framework of the campaign planning approach to achieve

sustainable peace and security within a nation and region. It can be viewed in four stages:

planning; disarmament; demobilization; and reintegration. Although disarmament may be

conducted by lead forces, the other stages may be conducted by follow-on forces. All stages

should be linked in a comprehensive and pervasive plan.

Recognizing the transitions between campaign themes and adapting the DDR plan to

suit the operational environment will be of critical importance. Transition to SSR may occur as a

concurrent activity in the later stages of the DDR plan. Although disarmament and

demobilization can occur rapidly, the extensive requirements for reintegration may be a

protracted activity. Over time, the requirement for military forces support should be reduced to a

minimal requirement for DDR and Stage 4 reintegration may very well be an aspect of SSR.

Cooperation between agencies will be of paramount importance. Political leadership is

essential to providing the planning and resources, the eventual size and shape of future security

forces, and the parallel economic development. Within security parameters, the co-location of

military and political planners is essential for successful harmony in the realization of the DDR

process and should be considered. Unity of effort is required to ensure all organizations are

aware of the requirements and have agreed on the end-states to be achieved. Early liaison and

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coordination within the planning process will be required, as will subsequent formalization of

arrangements at later stages. Coalition forces must be prepared to take a lead role, particularly

if DDR is occurring as part of a larger effort within a major combat campaign theme. Within

other campaigns such as Peace Support or Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN), agencies

such as the United Nations (UN) can be expected to undertake the lead agency responsibilities.

Also of primary importance will be establishing and maintaining relationships with the HN, with

an eye to eventual transition of authority to the HN on meeting the successful end-states of

DDR.

Whether as a lead or supporting agency, military forces will be required to develop a

comprehensive DDR plan, ensuring the DDR end-states are complimentary to the overall

campaign and political end-states.

7A02. STAGE 1—PLANNING

Planning for DDR should commence during Campaign pre-deployment. It should be

identified as a campaign operational objective and decisive points along the appropriate lines of

operation should be identified. It is fundamental for the commander and staff to understand the

end-state conditions as they affect DDR and what responsibilities the force has with respect to

DDR. The DDR planning must reflect campaign plan phases and end-states. It is also crucial

that the commander and staff understand what responsibilities any Follow-on-Force (FOF) has

with respect to DDR, and therefore what DDR responsibilities must be transferred. The

following are key considerations that must be taken into account during the DDR planning

stage:

Analysis of the HN. An assessment of the risk of reversion to conflict should be

considered as part of the early stages of planning:

(1)

the Nation’s martial history of conflicts and underlying causes;

(2)

per capita Gross National Income (GNI) that is present and projected;

(3)

the HN’s or region’s dependency on a few primary commodities exports;

(4)

the present and future political stability situation. This should include

analysis of state structures and history of breakdown of law and order;

(5)

the status of civil and political rights;

(6)

the militarization history and status;

(7)

the ethnic dominance, profile and regional relationships;

(8)

any active regional conflicts; and

(9)

any previous history of the HN with members of the coalition.

Pre-Conditions for Effective DDR Execution. The following pre-conditions

should be considered during the planning stage along with the campaign end-

state conditions so that an effective DDR plan may be developed:

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(1)

Formal peace agreement or surrender or capitulation conditions/terms

established;

(2)

Clear and unambiguous leadership and defined roles for all participants

involved in DDR (Lead nation, regional organization, supporting agencies

or UN leadership);

(3)

Coordination and cooperation among coalition military forces, HN and

other combatant forces, parties to the conflict, non-governmental

organizations (NGO), IO, and UN agencies;

(4)

Financial and other resources for near term, mid term, and long term

DDR actions;

(5)

Personnel expertise and commitment; and

(6)

International and regional support for DDR plan and actions including HN

support.

Broad DDR Planning Considerations and Requirements. Outlined below are

the broad requirements and considerations in developing the DDR plan:

(1)

political framework and/or governmental framework for near term and mid

term support of DDR;

(2)

military support requirements and operational mission requirements;

(3)

economic rebuilding programmes;

(4)

requirement to conduct Information Operations to focus on those

undergoing the process, the local populace and the international

community;

(5)

funding and donor support programmes;

(6)

operational concept for increased security conditions and the Rule of Law

in the near term;

(7)

specific operational plans for the DDR process with supporting tactical

tasks to units;

(8)

NGO and IO agencies that will be in support of the DDR;

(9)

lead agencies, regional organizations, and international organizations

with significant support requirements of the DDR processes;

(10)

integration plan for how the military command will integrate all the actors,

players, and supporters of the DDR plan;

(11)

time line and envisioned military support requirements for the DDR plan

to support refining the force structure of the military command to support

redeployment and deployment planning; and

(12)

consideration for potential PW exchange and/or release.

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7A03. STAGE 2—DISARMAMENT

The disarmament stage may be a fundamental task for the military forces, and as such

may be included as a separate phase in the campaign plan. In other circumstances,

disarmament may be an implied task, which is part of the overall DDR process. Disarmament of

warring parties is an inherently risky operation and therefore the military responsibilities in this

regard must be clearly articulated. A clear disarmament plan must be developed, that includes

the appropriate element of force protection for the disarming party and international personnel,

the possible inclusion of amnesty and incentive programmes as appropriate, and robust

verification measures.

Planners must also consider any requirements to provide security and protection for

those who have disarmed. This will be a consideration should the coalition force be attempting

to apply DDR to two or more formerly opposing forces. Failure to do this may greatly impede the

success of the process.

The following are some planning considerations for the planning and conduct of the

disarmament stage:

Eligibility Criteria. Eligibility criteria for disarmament should be clearly defined.

Some options include:

(1)

Individual. An individual system for disarmament can be effective in

luring individuals away from belligerent groups. It can be considered

aggressive and unfriendly by belligerent commanders.

(2)

Collective. Collective disarmament has proven to be faster and more

efficient, but has allowed commanders to falsify the number of

combatants and/or weapons being turned in.

(3)

Combination of both.

Weapon Systems. The verification and control of weapons systems during all

stages of the disarmament process will be critical for the success of the overall

DDR process. The following are some key considerations for the disarmament

process:

(1)

Types. There will be a need to clarify disarmament procedures for

different weapon systems. Key systems that need to be considered

separately include (not in priority order):

(a)

small arms;

(b)

light weapons;

(c)

heavy weapons;

(d)

armoured vehicles;

(e)

aircraft;

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(f)

naval vessels;

(g)

missiles;

(h)

mines, minefields, or unexploded ordnance; and

(i)

ammunition (including existing ammunition storage magazines).

(2)

Identification and Verification. All weapon systems will need to be

declared by all combatant parties as part of the disarmament process.

These weapon systems will need to be identified by the overseeing

military force and a system for verification will need to be established.

Some options for identification and verification include:

(a)

cantonment;

(b)

use of electronic tag systems;

(c)

safe storage areas;

(d)

destruction or disposal; and

(e)

registration and/or license.

Priority of Disarmament. A priority for disarmament will need to be established

by the lead agency. The priority for disarmament will be based on the

commander’s guidance, and may take into account the following key concerns:

(1)

force protection;

(2)

mission accomplishment;

(3)

end-state;

(4)

parity of disarmament between combatant parties (as appropriate) to

ensure impartiality; and

(5)

re-allocation of weapons and personnel.

Security. Security during the disarmament process will be a critical issue for

those disarming and for those agencies conducting the DDR process. Planners

must take precautions to ensure that the disarmament process does not re-

initiate the conflict. A strong sense of security during the disarmament process

will be critical for force and process credibility and confidence building. Key

issues for security will be:

(1)

security of weapons storage and disposal areas;

(2)

secure transfer of weapons in the Area of Operations (AO) from

disarmament to storage areas, and from storage to disposal areas;

(3)

security presence;

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(4)

inspections/inventory control;

(5)

multiple agency force protection; and

(6)

demining/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).

Disarmament Options. The commander and staff need to explore different

options for conducting disarmament. Plans should consider options for amnesty

and reward programmes.¹⁸⁹ Disarmament options may include:

(1)

centralized disarmament;

(2)

decentralized disarmament; and

(3)

combination of both.

7A04. STAGE 3—DEMOBILIZATION

The demobilization stage includes the selective release of ex-combatants from duty and

return to the civil community. The demobilization stage has a number of considerations,

including:

Economic and Stability Situation. Planners should not immediately assume

that demobilization of a nation’s military forces is the appropriate near term

solution. Based upon the economic and stability situation, it may be prudent to

keep some elements of the forces intact and mobilized because immediate

support at the local level for demobilization actions may be non-existent. Military

forces can have their mission redirected to national support programmes,

infrastructure improvement, and/or public works programmes, etc.

Considerations include the following:

(1)

Funding for continued military employment in support of national

economic and developmental programmes is critical to maintaining a

cohesive force, organization and motivation.

(2)

Disarmament should be accomplished to the degree required to maintain

security requirements.

(3)

Some military units can be retrained for other governmental support

requirements such as local police, security guard elements.

(4)

For large-scale military forces, demobilization plans should be instituted

on a draw down basis commensurate with the economic and stability

situation present within the host nation.

¹⁸⁹ Amnesty programmes must be in line with strategic and operational level plans and cannot be adopted

independently at the tactical level.

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Categories of Military and/or Ex-Combatant Personnel for separation.¹⁹⁰ It is

critical that personnel be separated by categories for demobilization to support

the special needs of high-risk groups that require special support and care.

Outlined below is a start point for this categorization:

(1)

Military personnel with short service, normally conscript (generally

24 months) service. This requires well thought out demobilization

actions but not extensive support and reintegration actions. Many will

have jobs or skills to which they can return.

(2)

Military personnel with longer service, normally professional, career

soldiers (generally, more than 24 months service). This situation

requires full demobilization and supporting actions to ensure full

reintegration and the continuance of follow-on service support and

entitlements. This may possibly include dependent support programmes.

Those soldiers who have been professionalized in the services will

require a planned and phased return to society, to ensure that they have

economic support and jobs. This will help occupy and motivate them and

ideally prevent them from moving to paramilitary or insurgent employ.

(3)

Special status combatants. Some combatants may be harder to

demobilize due to their special status with a previous regime or ideology.

These include political or religious troops, secret police, and so forth.

These types of combatants may require additional security or screening.

Some may be wanted for international war crimes.

(4)

Female combatants. Specific support should be considered for the

demobilization of female combatants and their reintegration and that of

combatant families that may also require support.

(5)

Child combatants. Support for child combatants should be in

accordance with extant international guidelines. These include:

(a)

immediate separation from adult combatants;

(b)

counselling;

(c)

education and vocational training; and

(d)

family reunion.

(6)

Disabled combatants. Support for disable combatants should be based

upon:

(a)

immediate medical attention to save life; and

¹⁹⁰ Military forces may be delineated along the lines of conscripts (usually brought into the military only for

the recent conflict), professional or career soldiers, and irregular forces that may be as much a criminal

element as a military element.

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(b)

planning the transfer of responsibility to another non-military

agency, for the commencement of longer term rehabilitation and

other social services as required.

(7)

Irregular combatants. Demobilization of irregular combatants requires

similar levels of support as for regular combatants. The reintegration of

this group of combatants is critical and must be supportive of job creation

and reinsertion within the community. Training and re-education are

critical components for addressing irregular forces’ reintegration. In an

ideal situation, many of them will have jobs or trades to which they can

return.

7A05. STAGE 4—REINTEGRATION

Reintegration returns military personnel and other selected ex-combatants to a civil

identity within the social, economic, political, and psychological life within the community.

Reintegration is a longer-term process that may take years to fully realize. The lead agency will

likely be civilian. Therefore it is likely that although the military forces may assist with the initial

reintegration process, it is more likely that the responsibility for reintegration will be handed over

to another lead agency. Reintegration commences with the reinsertion of the ex-combatants

back into the community, and it is this process that the military forces will likely assist. Military

forces will provide the ongoing framework security, and may be required to assist with other

reintegration aspects such as:

reinsertion back into the local community;

initial local reception and welcome plans;

basic education, training, and peace education;

provision of daily services to discharged military;

system(s) for reintegration into local town and society as whole;

job creation, promotion of economic activities, local development project;

information operations support;

counselling (for both ex-combatants and local communities);

full application of all local community organizations to assist in reintegration; and

programme assessments.

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 7

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

7B01. DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become a general term for a series of reviews,

reforms, and the reconstruction of security forces and structures around the world. Within the

Continuum of Operations, SSR is viewed by the military as one aspect of Stability Operations.

SSR covers a wide spectrum of reform to provide a nation’s security. Comprehensive security

requires the relevant internal state organizations to uphold the Rule of Law in terms of judiciary,

effective policing, as well as the means to maintain territorial integrity by having some form of

armed force. Further, these three strands (Judiciary, Police, Armed Forces) require a security

infrastructure that delineates responsibility, controls and resources for these functions. The

formation of an effective security sector is vital to the long term stability and growth in the

economic and governance areas of a state and potentially the geographic region.

SSR, in its broadest, multi-agency, sense can be defined as:

A stability operation that develops security institutions so that they play an

effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and

internal security¹⁹¹.

SSR is a multi-agency undertaking. In terms of the military’s role, it is classified as a

stability operation. The military will be responsible for the transformation or establishment and

training of Host Nation (HN) armed forces, within the strategic guidelines set for the reformation

of the security sector, and within a permissive environment.

Due to the diverse nature of SSR, the tasks required cannot be left to the military alone

due to the areas of expertise and resources required. However, key to success is that any

reform is conducted ideally within a permissive operational environment. The military may be

required to maintain security and control over an area before indigenous forces are trained and

introduced to take lead responsibility.

Due to the diverse nature of such reform, it is essential that a mutually supporting,

comprehensive approach is adopted utilizing political, economic and military input, guided by a

shared unity of effort, and underpinned by a common information campaign. A clear

requirement for the security sector must be developed from analysis of the threat, historical

precedent, cultural requirements, economic sustainability and most importantly, the aspirations

of the HN. The formation of a security sector is a strategic level task, shaped at the highest

level but ultimately the eventual ownership of any programme must lay with the HN government.

The requirement to conduct SSR might occur at any stage throughout the Spectrum of

Conflict, ranging from post-major combat operations, to requested assistance during peacetime

military engagement. The most demanding situation will occur when the provision of a

permissive environment is paramount and will see the military initially taking the lead. Such a

¹⁹¹Draft definition by Army Terminology Board, Oct 2005. ABCA Coalition draft definition is as

follows: The transformation or establishment of security institutions (Judiciary, Police, Armed Forces)

so that they play an effective, legitimate and accountable role in providing internal and external

security.

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situation is likely to see the military maintaining security and control over regions and potentially

conducting disarmament and demobilization of adversaries as a precursor to reintegration and

potentially SSR.

As the situation allows, the military should concentrate on maintaining security, and

establishing and training indigenous Armed Forces¹⁹² within a comprehensive reform program

where other agencies apply their expertise to other areas of the security sector. As indigenous

forces are trained, validated, their capabilities developed and they are introduced to conduct

operations as necessary, the coalition military will be expected to reduce the level of operations

and supervision.

Due to the diversity of skills and expertise required to reform the whole Security Sector,

planning for SSR must be conducted at the earliest stage of campaign planning, at a strategic

level. This plan must be informed by all instruments of power. This will delineate

responsibilities once the environment allows, allocate resources and ultimately transfer

structural ownership to the HN. Broad guidance for the military contribution to the wide task of

SSR is provided below.

7B02. PRINCIPLES FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The guiding principles for Stability Operations apply to the conduct of the military’s

contribution to SSR. The military must judiciously select and employ forces to create a secure

environment for stability operations to continue unimpaired. During the conduct of stability

operations, military forces retain the ability to resume offensive or defensive operations. Ideally,

those forces conducting the SSR will have this as their sole responsibility; that is, other forces

will be responsible for framework stability operations and other duties.

Long-term consideration is especially important in building HN self-sufficiency. The

campaign planners must understand that the ultimate responsibility for security reform rests with

the HN. The civil-military team provides a temporary capability, capacity and expertise to the

HN.

The principles for Stability Operations, with appropriate amplification specific to SSR as

appropriate, are outlined below in priority order.

A strategically driven campaign plan defining the theme, clear end-state,

objectives, measures of success, and with dedicated resources:

(1)

The Host Nation must identify (with assistance as required) the

requirements, force structures and the design for the new security force.

Desired capabilities of new forces must be clearly identified and

articulated in relation to internal and external threats. They must consider

these threats, as well as local religious, social, economic, and political

factors when developing the military plans to support SSR. Overcoming

the tendency to use an outsider’s frame of reference is important. This

potentially damaging tendency can result in unsuitable equipment,

training and infrastructure for the nation receiving outside assistance and

¹⁹² Dependant on the situation and role required of HN police forces, the military might be involved in

training police forces to a certain extent as well.

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the situation will be unsustainable once the coalition leaves the nation or

region. There is a clear need to respect and understand the views and

interpretations of the HN regarding the design of its security architecture.

(2)

The new force must be a comprehensive professionalized institution that

supports the security needs of the legitimate government and is part of its

overall governmental structure. It must be appropriate for the operational

environment, economically viable and self-sustainable with an appropriate

institutional framework linking it to an overarching democratic system.

(e.g. Ministry of Defence structures, all staff functions and capabilities).

(3)

The campaign force’s initial priority may be to establish security and a

permissive environment. Once this is accomplished the campaign’s focus

progressively switches to the creation and training of indigenous security

forces.

Unity of purpose and coherency of action between the military, political and

civilian agencies:

(1)

Decision points need to be identified as early as possible for the hand-

over of security responsibilities (e.g. border security assumed by newly

established military, followed by civilian authority). This clearly requires

careful co-ordination with the other developing strands of SSR (Judiciary,

Police).

(2)

All agencies and military forces involved must agree to the delineation

and assignment of responsibilities such as political violence, insurgency,

organized crime, and terrorism. This must be based on the resources,

culture, and capabilities that each agency brings to the campaign or

operation.

(3)

Within a coalition, it is preferable that doctrinal coherency is achieved at

all levels from the outset.

Effective synchronisation with offensive, defensive and other stability operations

tasks:

(1)

SSR should be conducted, ideally, within a permissive environment. Units

undergoing reform should not be involved in ongoing operations until they

reach an appropriate level of training. Likewise, when practicable, those

military forces conducting SSR should not be responsible for other tactical

operations.

Imposition of security through a robust posture with threats to stability countered

in a timely manner utilizing precision and the most suitable means:

(1)

The development through the SSR process of physical capabilities must

be complemented by the development of the intellectual facet of the new

security forces. New security forces, both the leadership and the rank and

file, must be made to understand their role in sustaining a democratic and

responsible government and society.

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(2)

While some military forces and other agencies are conducting SSR tasks,

other forces should be responsible for other tactical operations that

stabilize and secure the overall security environment.

(3)

Eventually, indigenous security forces will come to assume responsibility

for security operations. The formal mentoring process and level of co-

operation must be considered and directed. Once indigenous security

forces begin to conduct operations, it will be important that their trainers

and mentors continue to support them, to the point of conducting

combined operations. Forces can be combined even at the lowest tactical

levels.

A position of legitimacy:

(1)

The moral authority for SSR stems from the HN government, and those

forces acting within the Rule of Law.

(2)

The process must be transparent and supported by information

operations to manage, inform and influence internal and international

perceptions. Success must reflect the expectations of the civil populace.

Effective integration of indigenous security infrastructures and forces:

(1)

Newly developed forces must gradually be assigned tactical and

operational responsibilities whilst the training and mentoring process

continues. This reinforces the legitimacy of the process and the HN. It

demonstrates continued moral support for the new security forces by the

military forces conducting the SSR.

7B03.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

General. Sustainable SSR is based on a good capability analysis at the outset. A

capability analysis for the HN security framework and its Armed Forces to be developed under

SSR should include the considerations listed in the following text.

Threats and Operating Environment. The capability analysis should be founded on an

assessment of the types and nature of threats that the HN is likely to face. This will include

external threats to the HN territorial integrity and internal threats that may necessitate the HN

using military force to resolve as required and within the Rule of Law. A determination of the

types of forces required by the HN will also stem from an analysis of the operating environment.

For example, the types of terrain over which the land forces will operate will be a factor in

determining if they are to be predominantly a light, motorized or mechanized force.

Delineation of Responsibility. The delineation of responsibility for security sector

tasks is necessary to identify the roles and capabilities that are appropriate for military forces,

and those that should be the responsibility of other Government Agencies.

Cultural Influences and Factors. An assessment of cultural factors and influences is

necessary to ensure the Armed Forces of the HN will become a mechanism for creating and

maintaining national unity and stability. These considerations will shape the organization and

customs of service for the HN Armed Forces. It is important to ensure that the make up of the

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Armed Forces reflects the cultural composition of the HN. It is also important to account for the

HN historical influences, including those that may have shaped previous iterations and

equipping of the HN Armed Forces. Furthermore, the education and technological sophistication

of the HN population should be considered when determining how the new force is structured

and equipped.

Host Nation Involvement. Capability analysis should be based on the premise that

ultimate responsibility for security reform rests with the HN. There is a clear need to respect

and understand the views and interpretations of the HN regarding the design of its security

architecture, based on its perception of the threat. This will help ensure that the forces

developed under SSR will be enduring, appropriate to the needs of the HN and will enjoy the

trust of the HN government and public.

Sustainability. The long-term ability of the HN to sustain the Armed Forces that will be

developed under SSR, needs to be considered. Continuous dependency by the HN on external

resources to maintain its security forces must be avoided. Therefore, consideration of the

economic capabilities and demands is paramount. This will include fiscal resources, economic

potential, the industrial base and manpower resources. Basically, the SSR process should

create a force that the HN can support with its own resources.

7B04. REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Force Development. The forces and capabilities to be developed will stem from the

capability requirement analysis and will reflect HN aspirations. The various forces within an SSR

programme that the campaign military forces may assist to develop are detailed below.

Military Forces. These should be designed and built to counter external threats

to the host nation and certain types of internal threats based on the analysis of

the potential threats and capability requirements. The following should be noted:

(1)

Forces to be developed may be joint forces and therefore, this portion of

the SSR programme must be undertaken from a joint perspective.

(2)

Within the services, specific disciplines should be used to develop and

train their counterparts in any new force. For instance, military police

should develop and train military police. This provides an appropriate skill

development and a better mentoring process.

(3)

Special Forces may have a limited role to train specific, special

operations skills to indigenous forces, such as VIP protection and hostage

rescue. Line units are best employed to train line units in the developing

security forces. This will create a better mentoring process as nascent

military forces will likely better identify with line troops. Furthermore, the

basic infantry and military skills required of a new force are best instituted

and developed through adherence to a regimented discipline, structure

and hierarchy that is part and parcel of line units.

Police Forces. Internal constabularies are a vital component to a democratic

security framework. Although the military may be initially involved in the

development of civilian police forces, this task should be assumed by appropriate

civilian police forces from any coalition nations as soon as possible. The

application of specific, professional police trainers will create better capabilities,

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support a mentoring process and ensure the force development within a civilian,

democratic framework. It will also ensure a separation of forces between the

military and police. International funding for police forces is generally more

forthcoming if de-linked from armed forces reform.

Other Security Sector Forces. There may be a requirement for the

development of other forces within the security sector construct. This may

include such forces as coast guard and border control forces, if the latter is not

assumed by the police or combined with customs forces. This will depend upon

the situation and the HN requirements. Until specific forces are developed for

specific roles, other security forces may have to assume responsibilities outside

of their domain. For example, until a border security force is established, the

army and air force may have to assume this responsibility. Ideally, such

requirements are synchronized in the overall SSR programme from the outset.

Delineation of Roles and Separation of Powers. The roles of the newly developed

security forces will reflect the capabilities for which they have been designed. There may at

times be overlap, particularly in times of emergency or until all planned forces are developed

and established. For example, the army may be responsible for crowd control operations until

the police are ready to assume this responsibility, under the guidance of SSR mentors. There is

a requirement to educate the forces and their political leadership in the appropriate roles for

each element of the security forces. Military forces should be restricted to their role as a force

of last resort (notwithstanding the need to train for Full Spectrum Operations) and their

employment within the constitutional Rule of Law. A clear separation of powers and

responsibilities must be defined and educated from the political and strategic level, downwards.

This hierarchy of application of force provides a framework linking together all aspects of SSR.

Security Force Structure. A holistic, logical approach must be taken to the design and

capability development of the security forces, from the political and strategic levels down to the

tactical level. Whilst it is important that the new security structure have all capabilities and

requirements represented, structures should be kept simple. In planning the security force

structure, the following should be considered:

Political oversight and control in the form of a ministry or department of defence

will be necessary. This is a political, strategic aspect. This must be designed to

link the political direction of the government to strategic direction.

A national military headquarters will have to be established to provide overall

command and translate government and strategic direction to the operational

level. This may be a joint structure.

Depending upon the size and capability requirement, land, navy and air force

national headquarters may be required.

Depending upon the size and capability requirements identified, operational

headquarter(s) may be established. These may be regionally based, capability

based or a combination of the two, depending upon a number of factors.

All staff disciplines may be required at all levels, from strategic to tactical.

The structure of the security forces will have to take into careful consideration the

ethnic and cultural factors that exist.

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The size and structure of tactical units will depend upon a wide-variety of

considerations. Tactical forces must be developed to meet all the operational and

combat functions required, including sustain and shield. The considerations and

factors guiding tactical force size and structures will include the following:

(1)

Capability and role/employment. This may include consideration of the

need for mechanized, medium and light forces. These requirements will

stem from a threat analysis and consideration of the potential operating

environments, such as jungle or mountain.

(2)

Historical lineage and traditions (their positive and negative influences).

(3)

A realistic assessment of resources, including manpower, available in the

near and long term.

(4)

The assessed learning capability of the security force elements and

leadership.

Moral and Intellectual Aspects. The development of the new armed forces cannot be

limited to the physical structures and capabilities. In order to avoid a repetition of historical

problems and sources of past instability, the moral and intellectual realms of a reliable and

politically subordinate security force must be addressed. In short, the proper and accountable

role and conduct of an armed force within a democratic and legitimate architecture must form

the backdrop and context to all other training, and must be a part of the training itself. Forces

conducting SSR must ensure higher standards of deportment and conduct amongst the forces

and their leadership.

Equipment and Resources. An integrated and synchronized plan must be developed

for equipment and resource issues, to include the funding, procurement, allocation and

distribution. This will be a multi-agency task, with the military providing advice and guidance in

terms of realistic requirements and a distribution plan synchronized with individual and collective

training requirements and milestones. Training plans must not only include how to use the

equipment and resources but how to maintain them. Likewise, equipment procurement must

include sustainability plans at the tactical to strategic levels.

Infrastructure. Forces will require suitable infrastructure from the outset of their

development. Best use will be made of existing infrastructure, but resources may have to be

allocated to improve and/or expand them. A plan must be developed for the handover of any

campaign force infrastructure to HN agencies.

Geographical Force Dispositions. Factors that must be considered in deciding

geographical force dispositions will include regional requirements, force role and capabilities,

terrain and existing infrastructure. Other considerations will include differing cultural regions,

tribal ties and historical lines of power and authority.

Recruitment and Selection Policies. Planning for SSR, and indeed, part of

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), must include policies for the

recruitment and selection of future security force personnel. Consideration has to be given to

those who will be placed in the higher levels of command in order to achieve an acceptable

cultural/ethnic balance. Consultations with HN authorities will be required in order to avoid

inaccurate assumptions and unsupportable structures and practices. Former military personnel

and commanders may be incorporated into a new force, once appropriate consideration of all

factors has occurred.

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7B05. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SSR PLAN

The implementation and development plan for the SSR programme should include the

following:

Priorities and synchronization for capability development across all facets of the

security sector and force. These must be:

(1)

agreed upon by HN and the coalition force;

(2)

progressive and balanced between requirements of HN and the

capabilities of the coalition;

(3)

attainable;

(4)

demonstrative of success and able to be disseminated through

information operations; and

(5)

inclusive of training and development at ministry or department level, not

just for formations and units.

Identification of baseline doctrine that:

(1)

reflects capability requirements desired by the HN;

(2)

reflects current or planned equipment for use by HN;

(3)

preferably utilizes existing doctrine, historical linkage or doctrine agreed

between coalition forces and the HN; and

(4)

ensure consistency of doctrine at all levels of training.

Development of training objectives that are:

(1)

appropriate, progressive and realistic;

(2)

achievable in an agreed and/or realistic timeframe and reflective of

experience and education levels; and

(3)

allow for HN forces to continue the training in the future (e.g. train the

trainers).

Identification of measures of effectiveness that:

(1)

begin with an identified set of baseline standards;

(2)

reflect levels of operational capability desired (e.g. small unit v.s.

formation level operations);

(3)

test and evaluate against simulated situations (e.g. exercises);

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(4)

reflect ability to achieve and maintain readiness/preparedness

requirements; and

(5)

reflect ability to administer, maintain and resource the force at all levels.

Identification of resources for training, operations and subsequent maintenance

of the HN force capability:

(1)

identify HN, Coalition and donor resources;

(2)

include governance and due diligence measures/procedures and

processes when planning the use of the resources;

(3)

identify procurement budgeting and resource distribution plan;

(4)

identify infrastructure requirements and transition arrangement for

ownership; and

(5)

future acquisition and maintenance.

Identification and timely tasking of the SSR training elements. This must be

conducted during the planning phase:

(1)

development of the training programme and standards for the training

force prior to their commitment to SSR, including cultural awareness;

(2)

development of a SSR training force command and control structure; and

(3)

allocate and task SSR training elements as appropriate, to reflect their

capability, culture and experience. This should also include suitable

specialists for technical and specialist capability development.

Planning for transition to HN security responsibility at all levels that is progressive

and linked to the measures of effectiveness:

(1)

this should include a period of mentoring, particularly if the conflict is

ongoing;

(2)

handover of responsibilities should be progressive and synchronized with

a measured disengagement plan;

(3)

contingency plans for the re-engagement of SSR forces as required,

should difficulties develop with the new security forces; and

(4)

this should be preceded by, and continually supported by, an Information

Operations campaign.

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CHAPTER 8

INTRODUCTION TO SPECIFIC OPERATIONS AND SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

801. GENERAL

The elements of campaign design and planning, and the principles by which a

commander conducts offensive, defensive and stability operations within any campaign remain

valid and extant regardless of the geographic environment in which the campaign is conducted,

and irrespective of the tactical deployment means utilized. However, the planning and conduct

of campaigns in specific environments and using specific deployment means will require special

consideration, planning and training.

Specific operations that require special consideration, with respect to their integral

strengths and weaknesses, are as follows:

Airmobile operations.

Airborne operations.

Amphibious operations.

Operations by encircled forces.

Certain environments pose specific challenges to the successful conduct of military

operations. They normally stem from the physical nature of the surroundings and require

careful consideration. Ideally, units deployed in such environments will have undergone

extensive training in the specific environment concerned. In-theatre training will be valuable if

possible. Environments requiring special consideration are as follows:

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) contaminated

environments.

Operations in mountains.

Operations in urban areas.

Operations in jungles.

Operations in forests.

Operations in arctic and cold weather conditions.

Operations in deserts and extremely hot conditions.

Despite the special considerations, it must be remembered that operations in urban

areas have become routine in the contemporary operating environment (COE) and thus all

forces deploying should be prepared to, and capable of, conducting full-spectrum operations

(FSO) in both urban and rural terrain.

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SECTION 2

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS

802. AIR AND SEA INSERTIONS—GENERAL

The ability to move forces about the battlefield in a rapid and flexible manner is an

important factor in a commander's development of his plan. Both fixed and rotary wing aircraft

have a major role to play in the deployment of forces. This is particularly true in campaigns that

involve large areas of operation (AOs). Similarly, the deployment of forces from the sea offers a

commander the ability to maximize mobility, flexibility and surprise in the concentration of force.

The nature of airmobile, airborne and amphibious operations is such that they will often become

the focus of attention for the commander and his staff even if they do not constitute the main

effort. It is important, therefore, that they distinguish between the requirement for close

coordination, and the need to keep such operations in perspective in relation to the main effort

and other activities. Similarly, airmobile, airborne and amphibious operations will often attract

undue attention from the adversary who may find himself distracted away from the friendly

force's main effort by such actions. This section examines briefly the employment

considerations for the use of airmobile, airborne and amphibious forces. Detailed planning and

conduct considerations for forces using insertion methods by air or sea will be found in

publications specific to each type of operation.

803. AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS—GENERAL

An airmobile operation is defined as: “an operation in which combat forces and their

equipment manoeuvre about the battlefield by aircraft, to engage in ground combat.”¹⁹³ The

movement of the force is done normally using helicopters, under the control of a land force

commander. It should not be confused with air movement, which is the air transportation of

troops, supplies and equipment, which do not necessarily have either tactical integrity or the

ability to engage in immediate combat.

Airmobile forces may be employed independently or in conjunction with other land

forces. They permit a commander to react quickly to a threat over his whole AO. The threat

they pose may cause the adversary to protect important installations and key terrain in his rear

areas, which would be difficult to attack by land movement alone.

804. THREAT

In addition to the normal threat faced by land forces, airmobile forces may expect a

threat from adversary air defences, both from the ground and from the air. There is also a

threat from electronic warfare (EW), particularly jamming. Usually, airmobile operations are

executed in undefended or lightly defended areas. Operations in adversary-controlled areas

may be very difficult, and in some cases, impossible against a well-prepared adversary with

sophisticated air defence (AD) systems.

¹⁹³ NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

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805. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

Airmobile forces may be organized as follows:

A formation or unit that has organic aircrafts in a sufficient quantity to enable it to

undertake airmobile operations without requiring the assistance of additional

aviation forces. This is an airmobile formation.

A formation or unit that has insufficient organic aviation assets and thus requires

reinforcement. Some joint training may be required with these newly allotted

aviation forces to make the formation truly airmobile.

A formation or unit that has no organic aviation forces and which must have the

necessary forces allotted to it before it can undertake airmobile operations. A

major consideration in this case is the requirement for joint training before the

commitment of the force.

Any combat arms should be able to undertake airmobile operations, but some units will

require more preparatory training than others. Light forces, in accordance with their definition,

and by virtue of their concept of employment, equipment tables and routine training, are ideally

suited for airmobile operations.

An airmobile force is capable of the following:

Attacking from any direction, striking objectives in otherwise inaccessible areas,

over-flying barriers, and bypassing adversary positions, to achieve surprise.

Rapidly deploying and redeploying, permitting quick concentration of combat

power at key locations. Similarly, they are capable of rapid dispersal to reduce

vulnerability.

Giving the commander the ability to reinforce or relieve his forces quickly and

over long distances.

Enabling the commander, under certain circumstances, to commit a larger part

of his force while relying upon a small airmobile reserve.

Conducting operations independent of a ground line of communication.

806.

TASKS

An airmobile force may be assigned various tasks, to include the following:

To seize and retain key terrain, including defiles, bridges and crossing sites.

To overcome obstacles.

To conduct raids.

To engage or destroy air delivered adversary forces and guerrilla forces.

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To exploit the effects of nuclear weapons.

To conduct reconnaissance missions.

To conduct security missions, such as providing a screen on possible adversary

approaches or as a rear area security force.

To support deception operations.

To block or to assist in the containment of adversary penetrations.

To reinforce encircled forces.

To insert or extract long-range patrols.

807. LIMITATIONS

Airmobile operations are vulnerable to a number of threats and conditions and thus may

be limited in their application by any of the following factors:

Weather conditions.

Vulnerability to adversary fire and the effects of nuclear, biological and chemical

weapons, particularly between assembly and take-off and during approach and

landing.

Vulnerability during air movement to adversary AD, including aircraft.

Local air superiority in the objective area.

Inadequate suppression of adversary ground fire and AD weapons, including the

related command and control (C2) systems along the flight route.

Type and quantity of supporting weapons and other heavy equipment, including

vehicles that can be airlifted. Not only are the aviation assets vulnerable, but

also the forces once landed will lack firepower and protection if facing

mechanized or well armed adversary forces.

Difficulties in maintaining the flow of supply, including the need for an early link-

up by ground forces or safe air resupply.

808. PLANNING

An airmobile operation is planned in the reverse order of its execution. The planning

sequence consists of:

The Ground Tactical Plan. The ground tactical plan covers the employment of

the assault force and support units once they have landed.

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The Landing Plan. The landing plan covers the introduction of the airmobile

force into the objective area at the right time and place and in the proper

sequence to execute the ground tactical plan.

The Air Movement Plan. The air movement plan consists of the flight route

and the air movement table. It also includes information concerning the flight

formation, altitudes and speeds, weather, fuel, maximum load capacity, radius of

action and procedures for airspace control, AD and tactical air support.

The Loading Plan. The loading plan identifies the pick-up zone, provides

guidance for its establishment and control specifies the priority of landing and

states the order of march of troops, supplies and equipment to the pick-up zone.

The Staging Plan. The staging plan details the control area(s) and provides

guidance on the repositioning of the units, supplies, and equipment required.

Airmobile forces can be moved rapidly over long distances and can therefore be used as

a very flexible reserve or manoeuvre force in their own right. The types and numbers of

available helicopters will determine the tasks that they can undertake. Indirect fire support will

be required from any artillery within range and combat service support (CSS) for periods longer

than 48 hours must be supplied by the host formation. Airmobile operations require rapid joint

planning by the ground and air forces involved together with comprehensive and well

understood operating procedures.

SECTION 3

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

809. GENERAL

An airborne operation is defined as: “an operation involving the movement of combat

forces and their logistic support into an objective area by air.”¹⁹⁴ Airborne forces are specifically

organized, equipped and trained for delivery by airdrop or air landing or a combination of both

into an area in order to carry out operations. Note that these operations are only feasible under

conditions of local air superiority. The success of such operations is dependent upon strict

security in order to achieve surprise. Note that the term “airborne” refers to parachute or fixed

wing air transported delivery as opposed to tactical aviation mobility.

Airborne forces provide a commander with flexibility by virtue of their reach and

responsiveness, and they permit him to operate throughout his AO. They may be initiated either

independently, or in conjunction with the forces operating on the ground. The nature of their

role is such that once on the ground they are lightly equipped with only limited means of fire

support and mobility. Their capability to sustain operations after the initial assault is therefore

governed by the ability either to resupply, probably by air, or to link-up with them on the ground.

If this is not possible, they will need to be extracted.

Although the COE sees few circumstances when a large-scale airborne operation is

required, parachute operations remain a viable tactical option. Troops may be delivered to

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

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remote areas within a large AO by parachute, and they and those delivered by other means,

may be resupplied by parachute, particularly when distances and asymmetric threats combine

to make ground operations difficult. The effectiveness of parachute operations is improved with

modern means of aerial precision and these should be employed whenever possible.

810.

CAPABILITIES

Airborne forces offer the commander the following capabilities:

Rapid deployment over considerable distances, crossing obstacles and difficult

terrain in the process. They can be tools for deep operations, potentially

capable of striking at an adversary's centre of gravity (COG).

Achievement of surprise, particularly as the adversary cannot easily predict the

AO.

Theatre entry assault (like amphibious forces), having been launched out of

theatre from the home base or from an interim forward mounting base.

Employability as light infantry forces, and are particularly well suited to doing so

in environments characterized by close terrain.

A psychological effect on the adversary and on the mind of the adversary’s

commander, by virtue of their element of surprise and the speed and depth to

which they may operate. This will far outweigh their actual physical capability.

This capability may force an opponent to concentrate far more on his own rear

operations than he might otherwise wish to do.

811.

TYPES OF OPERATION

Airborne forces can be employed to carry out one of three types of operation:

Seize and Hold Operations. Airborne forces may be required to seize and

hold objectives until either reinforced or relieved by other forces.

Interdiction Operations. Interdiction¹⁹⁵ operations are intended to dislocate or

disrupt adversary operations in a specific area. Terrain that hinders the

adversary’s off-road mobility (i.e., featuring wooded areas, hills, rivers or other

obstacles) is best suited to this type of operation.

Airborne Raids. The airborne raid is a tactical, operational or strategic level

operation, normally of short duration and is characterized by its boldness of

concept and execution. They fulfil the same purpose as dismounted raids: to

destroy adversary installations or positions; to capture adversary personnel; or

to harass or disrupt adversary operations. Because of difficulties of control and

CSS, such operations are usually limited in size.

¹⁹⁵ “Air interdiction” has recently changed to plainly read “interdiction.” NATO AAP-6 defines the former in

air power terms only.

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812.

TASKS

In conducting any airborne operations, airborne forces may be given the following tasks:

The seizure and retention of key terrain until link-up with ground forces.

The capture of airfields and beaches to form airheads and bridgeheads.

The collection of information in adversary controlled territory.

The conduct of raids on headquarters (HQ), fire support positions, lines of

communications (LOC), administrative and CSS installations. This will serve to

create a sense of insecurity in the adversary's rear areas.

The reinforcement of encircled forces.

The conduct of an attack on the rear of adversary positions, or cut off of his

reserves in combination with offensive action by other ground forces.

The coverage of a flank or possible adversary approach route.

As a reserve to counter adversary deep operations in friendly rear areas.

813.

LIMITATIONS AND VULNERABILITIES

Due to their light nature and mode of delivery, airborne operations will be subject to a

number of limitations and vulnerabilities:

Transport aircraft are vulnerable to adversary fire, both en route to the objective

and in the landing/drop zone itself. They may be further restricted by poor

weather conditions. Local air superiority will be essential and adversary ground-

based AD will need to be neutralized or suppressed.

After landing, airborne forces have limited mobility, organic fire support and

combat support, and they may require time to organize and reach full combat

effectiveness.

Reinforcement, redeployment or extraction may be considerably more difficult

than with other ground forces.

Air resupply may be subject to disruption. There are particular difficulties in

maintaining logistic balance in an operation that crosses the forward line of own

troops (FLOT). It is difficult to sustain a force via an air bridge, particularly with

respect to bulk fuel and ammunition.

814.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION

Planning for an airborne operation is best carried out in the reverse order of execution:

The Ground Tactical Plan. The ground tactical plan details missions and

objectives, and sets out the type, strength and organization of combat forces

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and support required to accomplish the assigned mission. For most operations

it also designates the AO, other reconnaissance and security forces,

boundaries, and provides for a reserve.

The Landing Plan. The landing plan, in conjunction with the ground tactical

plan, indicates the sequence, the method of delivery, locations of drop/landing

zones, and the assembling of the different components of the airborne force and

materiel in the objective area.

The Air Movement Plan. The air movement plan, in conjunction with the

landing plan, includes detailed information concerning the air movement of all

airborne forces from the departure airfields to the drop/landing zones.

The Loading Plan. The loading plan is based upon the likely requirements in

the landing plan and establishes the priority of loading.

The Staging Plan. The staging plan is based upon the requirements of the air

movement plan. It deals with the problems of dispersion of the airborne forces

in the area of the departure airfields, and also covers the briefing and

preparation of the units for the forthcoming operation.

In planning for air delivery of combat supplies, only the necessary steps are followed.

An airborne operation generally falls into four interrelated stages:

Mounting. This includes all activities from receipt of the warning order until

loaded aircraft take off on the operation. During this stage, joint planning is

completed, intelligence is analyzed, stringent security measures are maintained,

troops, equipment and supplies are assembled and marshalled, and aircrafts

are loaded.

Air Movement. This stage begins with the take-off of loaded aircraft and ends

with delivery of the force to the drop/landing zone.

Assault. The assault stage covers the assault landing of the force on the drop

zone/landing zone, assembly, securing the objective and reorganization.

Subsequent Operations. By the very nature of airborne operations, the

initiative is seized. The force should seek to maintain this advantage while

operating in adversary territory although any subsequent operations must be in

accordance with the commander's overall plan.

SECTION 4

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

815.

GENERAL

An amphibious operation is defined as: “a military operation launched from the sea by a

naval and landing force embarked in ships or craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the

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landing force ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile.”¹⁹⁶

Amphibious forces constitute a major force multiplier, as the adversary must commit a

significantly greater number of forces to secure coastlines and all other possible entry points.

Once committed, however, this force multiplier capability is much reduced.

Amphibious operations exploit the element of surprise and capitalize upon adversary

weaknesses. Mobility, flexibility and current intelligence are fundamental requirements. This is

achieved through the application of the required type and degree of force at the most

advantageous locations at the most opportune times. This may require the amphibious force to

pause for an unspecified time before landings take place, and immediately before and during

landings, it may need to switch direction rapidly in order to achieve surprise, mask its real

objective, or simply capitalize on its tactical mobility.

Amphibious operations may be used as an enabling process to seize an entry point for

the landing of heavier follow-on forces, in support of other land operations, in support of wider

maritime operations, or as an independent operation. The landings and subsequent operations

can be supported by the ships of the amphibious task force without the use of fixed installations

such as ports and airfields. It can also be sustained by its shipping and integral CSS

organization until such time as it transfers to a land command, and draws its support from there.

816.

CAPABILITIES AND TYPES OF OPERATION

Amphibious forces are capable of carrying out four principal types of operation:

Amphibious Assault. This is the principal type of amphibious operation and

involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. The

requirement to be able to create a rapid build-up of combat power ashore

accounts for the organizational and technical differences between amphibious

and land warfare.

Amphibious Raid. The raid is a landing from the sea onto a hostile shore,

involving a swift incursion into, or temporary occupation of, an objective followed

by a planned withdrawal. Raids may be conducted to:

(1)

Inflict loss or damage.

(2)

Obtain information.

(3)

Create a diversion.

(4)

Capture or evacuate individuals or equipment.

Amphibious Withdrawal. This is the withdrawal of forces by sea in naval ships

or crafts from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

Amphibious Demonstration. An amphibious landing may be conducted to

deceive the adversary to force him take up positions that will put him at a

disadvantage and dislocate his combat power.

¹⁹⁶ NATO AAP-6.

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817.

PLANNING AND CONDUCT SEQUENCE

An amphibious operation will normally be conducted in the following sequence:

Planning. The planning stage covers the period from the issue of the initiating

directive to embarkation. Although planning continues throughout the

subsequent stages, it is necessary to identify command relationships at this

stage because there are significant changes in command relationships in the

other stages.

Embarkation. The embarkation stage is the period during which the forces

embark and are allocated to ships with their equipment and supplies.

Rehearsal. The rehearsal stage is the period when plans are rehearsed for the

purpose of:

(1)

Testing the adequacy of the plan, the timing and the combat readiness of

participating forces.

(2)

Ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans.

(3)

Testing communications.

Movement. The movement stage is the period during which the amphibious

force moves to the AO. This move may be made via staging and/or rendezvous

areas.

Assault. The assault phase is the period between the arrival of the major

assault forces of the amphibious force in the AO and the accomplishment of

their mission. Once the force has landed, normal doctrine for offensive

operations comes into play.

818.

TERMINATION

The termination of the amphibious operation is predicated on the accomplishment of the

mission of the amphibious task force. This is usually once the force is firmly established ashore.

The landing force will then become involved in subsequent land operations.

The landing force is regarded as being firmly established ashore when, in the opinion of

the land component commander:

The beachhead is secure.

Sufficient combat and supporting forces have been established ashore to

ensure the continuous landing of troops and materiel required for subsequent

operations.

Command, communications and supporting arms coordination facilities have

been established ashore.

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The land component commander has stated that he is ready to assume the

responsibility for subsequent operations.

Even if the landing force assumes follow-on operations once firmly landed, the

amphibious task force may be required to continue to support the force. CSS may be retained

on board and pushed forward as required. Additionally, the overall C2 of the operation may

remain afloat. This may be the case in a limited intervention campaign such as a non-

combatant evacuation operation (NEO).

819. CONCLUSION

Amphibious operations require joint planning and execution. Amphibious forces can be

moved long distances and with all necessary ground support. Movement by sea is slow when

compared to movement by air, but the amphibious force can be transported together, and

arrives as a formed unit capable of immediately conducting combined arms operations.

Amphibious forces may also be used to bolster political intent and demonstrate capability while

awaiting the decision to carry out the operation.

SECTION 5

OPERATIONS BY ENCIRCLED FORCES

820. GENERAL

The adversary may encircle a force during either offensive or defensive operations. This

situation restricts the freedom of action of the commander of the encircled force and that of his

superior commander. It threatens the destruction of the force for it is highly vulnerable to

attacks from any direction and resupply is difficult or impossible. Short of surrender, a

reinforcement (followed by a link-up and possibly withdrawal) or breakout is the only options.

The prime concern of commanders is the preservation of combat effectiveness, particularly the

maintenance of morale. A high standard of leadership is demanded.

Once a force is encircled, the immediate responsibility of the superior commander is to

decide if its mission should be changed. His decision is based upon an estimate of how long

the force can fight on its own, the importance of its mission and the resources he has available

to assist it. He must decide if the encircled force should defend (and await relief) or breakout.

He must also decide if it should do so alone or with additional support, particularly fire support.

A breakout operation may be done in combination with a supporting attack and/or a link-up.

821. DEFENCE

General. As soon as a force is encircled, a commander and his superior must take

action, including: establishing communications and a command structure; organizing defensive

sectors and fire support; constituting a reserve; and reorganizing and consolidating CSS

elements. In the absence of direction from the superior commander, the senior officer present

takes command of the force and establishes a command structure. If the superior commander

does not provide additional resources, or if there are no communications between the two

commanders, the commander of the encircled force organizes the defence using his own

resources.

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Planning. A commander selects a defence area based upon the terrain, the troops

available and the original or revised mission. He plans his defence so that: surveillance is

established to cover the entire perimeter; reconnaissance provides information on adversary

activity and intent; forces are assigned to cover likely adversary approaches; a relatively strong

mobile reserve is available to reinforce threatened sectors; and fire support from inside and

outside the perimeter is coordinated. The following matters require specific attention:

Fire Support. There must be a single artillery commander responsible for fire

support. Firing positions for elements within the perimeter are selected to

enable fire to all parts of the perimeter. Fire support from outside the

encirclement is coordinated with that from within. A superior commander may

have to deploy some fire support elements further forward than is normal.

Often, close air support (CAS) and tactical aviation are the only means by which

he can provide fire support. To do this, he may have to deploy additional

forward air controllers (FACs) to support the encircled force.

Air Defence. The limited manoeuvre space of encircled forces makes them

particularly vulnerable to air attack, and consequently, they are unusually reliant

upon AD. Reserves should be given high priority for coverage. A superior

commander may be able to compensate for deficiencies in AD capabilities by

arranging for air support and by providing the encircled forces support from

outside the encirclement.

Engineer Support. The normal tasks for engineers apply, but with particular

emphasis on counter-mobility and protective digging. A greater proportion of

engineers may have to be earmarked to deal with unforeseen threats.

Conduct. A commander must react immediately with defensive fire and reserves to

block and contain any significant penetration. It may be difficult to identify the adversary's main

effort, but any serious threat to the cohesion of the defence must be blocked to prevent the

piecemeal destruction of the force. A commander may have to shrink his perimeter

progressively to prolong his defence.

822. BREAKOUT OPERATIONS

General. A breakout occurs when an encircled force creates an opening in adversary

lines and extricates itself to join with friendly forces. In this operation, it is essential to maintain

momentum while retaining the integrity of the force. Normally, a superior commander orders a

breakout. If no communications exist between the superior commander and the commander of

the encircled force, the latter makes his decision to breakout based upon his superior's intent.

Organization. The breakout force is organized to provide: an assault element to create

and maintain the opening; a security element to provide protection and deception on the

perimeter; and security elements to cover the front, flanks and rear of the main body while it is

moving. If it is impossible for the force to fight its way out, breakout by stealth (i.e., ex-filtration)

is the only remaining option. Usually in this situation, the force is organized into small elements

that move on separate routes to join with friendly forces.

Planning. The responsibility for planning a breakout rests with the commander of the

encircled force. Any activities by outside forces in support of the breakout must be in response

to his plan. Planning is similar to that for a deliberate attack. A commander must plan the

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activities of regrouping, deception, assault, and subsequent movement to join friendly forces

and conduct a link-up. The main body must move protected by advance and flank guards or

screens, and a rearguard. The security elements on the perimeter disengage last and may be

tasked as the rearguard in the final stage. The following matters require particular attention:

Point of Break-out. The point of breakout must be selected in relation to the

adversary's disposition, routes for subsequent movement, and the next mission

of the force.

Breakout Routes. The most direct routes may not be the best. Adversary

weaknesses must be exploited and attempts made to avoid him by the use of

less direct routes, difficult terrain and periods of reduced visibility. Advance and

flank guards or screens provide information on adversary locations. The

number of routes used depends upon the terrain, location of the adversary, size

and composition of the force, and fire support available. The number of routes

available to an armoured force is likely less than those for a non-armoured

force. Use of a single route simplifies C2 and provides depth for any

subsequent attack, thereby maintaining momentum. On the other hand, if the

lead elements are stopped, there is a danger of the following elements

concentrating and presenting a large target with open flanks. Although the use

of more than one route may complicate C2, it offers protection through

dispersion and greater flexibility. If there are lateral routes, units can be shifted

from blocked routes to maintain momentum. Normally, it is preferable to have at

least one alternative route.

Fire Support. There are times when organic fire support is limited due to

movement, particularly just after the breakout opening is established and the

main body starts moving. There may be a need for increased fire support,

including CAS and tactical aviation support, from outside the encircled force.

Engineer Support. Engineer support is required to breach adversary obstacles

and to clear or breach lanes in friendly obstacles. Some engineer resources

should be in the rearguard to carry out counter-mobility tasks. They can also

assist in the denial of equipment and supplies through their destruction.

Aviation Support. If helicopters cannot extract the entire force, any limited

support available may be used to position forces on key terrain along breakout

routes to act as security forces. Aviation fire support may be critical to support

the initial attack at the breakout point, to provide flank protection of the main

body, and to prevent adversary manoeuvre. Ideally, it will be placed under the

tactical control (TACON) of the encircled force.

Combat Service Support Elements. CSS elements are grouped with combat

and combat support elements within the main body for their own protection and

for immediate resupply as required.

Conduct. A breakout is conducted as a deliberate attack, followed by movement, with

the overall objectives of avoiding the adversary and joining friendly forces. A breakout by

stealth is conducted similarly to an infiltration.

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SECTION 6

SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR

DEFENCE

823. GENERAL

Although the threat from CBRN elements has diminished in the COE, there are nations

and organizations that have or desire and may acquire CBRN related weapons. Accordingly,

operations must be planned and conducted against a background of the risk of the employment

of such weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against our forces. Additionally, across the whole

spectrum of conflict, there may be a risk of release of harmful substances from damaged

industrial plants or reactors as a result of accidental or unlawful action. Our forces must,

therefore, be able to defend against conventional attacks, and must also be able to conduct

sustained operations over protracted periods of CBRN environments resulting from the use of

WMDs or from the release of toxic industrial hazards. This will require commanders to assess

the threat and take effective defence measures to meet it.

824. FUNDAMENTALS OF CBRN DEFENCE

The following fundamentals form the basis for CBRN defence. These measures

interrelate and must be considered together to minimize the effects from such threats:

Hazard Avoidance. Hazard avoidance consists of the policies, doctrine,

equipment and procedures necessary to detect, identify, warn, report and

predict the hazards associated with CBRN weapons and toxic industrial

hazards, to enable personnel to survive and continue to operate in a

contaminated environment.

Protection. Protection consists of the policies, doctrine, equipment and

procedures necessary to provide individual, collective and casualty protection

and medical countermeasures to enable personnel to survive and continue to

operate in a contaminated environment.

Contamination Control. Contamination control consists of the policies,

doctrine, equipment and procedures necessary to control the spread of

contamination and decontamination to remove or reduce the hazard.

825. FACTORS FOR PLANNING

The application of the fundamentals will be dependent upon several factors. No single

solution can be automatically applied to every situation anticipated in the CBRN threat

environment. Each commander must assess the following factors in determining the proper

course of action:

Assigned mission.

Identification of the type, degree and persistency of the hazard.

Influence of weather and terrain on the hazard.

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Impact of casualties and equipment damage on the unit’s ability to accomplish

its mission.

Effect of operations in partial or full CBRN protection on morale and physical

capability of personnel.

The time required and available to react to a nuclear, biological and chemical

attack or toxic industrial hazards release.

Estimate of effort necessary to eliminate or reduce the contamination hazard.

Capabilities of the unit itself, or availability of specialized nuclear, biological and

chemical unit assistance for hazard reduction.

Vulnerability to and probability of follow-on CBRN attacks or deliberate or

accidental toxic industrial hazards releases.

Exploitation by the adversary of conventional forces immediately following

CBRN attacks or the deliberate release of toxic industrial hazards.

826. HAZARD AVOIDANCE

Hazard avoidance refers to those pre-attack and post-attack actions leading to individual

and collective measures taken to detect, identify, avoid, and minimize the aspects of immediate

and residual CBRN hazards. It is the primary means of defence and will reduce and sometimes

eliminate the need for protection and decontamination. The following should be considered in

developing a hazard avoidance plan:

Intelligence. Intelligence must be capable of identifying a risk or threat,

including delivery systems and political and military intentions.

Adopting Passive Defensive Measures. Our forces will implement passive

defensive measures to include deception, camouflage, position selection related

to risks, communications security (COMSEC), and tone down of materials and

infrastructure. Dispersion, use of shelters and protective covers and

concealment will be continuously exercised.

Adopting a Protective Posture. The normal protective measures for a given

threat level are given in standing operating procedures (SOP). These may be

modified on the judgement of the commander.

Detecting, Identifying and Marking the Contaminated Areas. Capabilities to

detect, identify, and mark contaminated areas are required by each organization

to provide timely alarms and warnings of CBRN hazards to avoid unnecessary

exposure to such hazards. Advance warning is a vital component of hazard

avoidance. Each unit and even subunit, depending upon the tactical situation

and threat, should conduct its own CBRN reconnaissance to detect, locate and

identify hazards. Armoured reconnaissance units conduct specialized CBRN

reconnaissance and survey to locate and mark contaminated areas. They

supplement reconnaissance efforts of unit nuclear, biological and chemical

survey teams and perform these tasks for forces not possessing an organic

reconnaissance capability.

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Warning and Reporting. Operations and intelligence personnel and

appropriate levels of command should report CBRN activity and reconnaissance

information by automated systems as a standard, continuous function.

Specialist staff should form part of HQ when necessary to provide technical

assistance in the analysis of data. NATO standard formats and procedures for

reporting apply.

Relocating or Rerouting to an Uncontaminated Area. Movement of forces to

an uncontaminated area may be necessary to minimize continued exposure to

residual CBRN hazards. If the hazard were non-persistent (e.g., blood agent),

the unit can continue its mission in place and maintain its protective posture, as

the hazard should dissipate within minutes. If the hazard were semi-persistent

or persistent (e.g., nuclear fallout, suspected biological agents, or liquid

chemical agents), the unit would maintain its protective posture, minimize further

exposure to the hazard and continue its mission. The commander would rapidly

analyze the situation to determine when relocation to a clean alternative position

is possible. The unit or formation should, however, relocate to a clean position

as soon as possible after the end of the current mission. Normally, a unit cannot

be expected to fight dirty for more than 24 hours with an upper limit of 36 hours.

To prevent the spread of contamination to the alternative position, such

movement should include at least the operational decontamination of personnel

and equipment prior to occupying the new position.

827.

PROTECTION

Prior to the arrival of a CBRN hazard, commanders should evaluate the vulnerability of

their unit. It must include an assessment of both attack and industrial contamination. Based

upon this analysis, mitigation techniques and appropriate levels of individual and collective

protection should be established. Individual and collective protection enhances survivability, so

individuals must be trained and equipped to defend themselves against the immediate and

residual effects of CBRN weapons and toxic industrial hazards, and to perform their duties while

fully encapsulated. Medical countermeasures must be put into effect before the threat is

realized.

Protection will be both individual and collective. Individual protection comes from

prophylactic or preventive compounds (e.g., immunizations, medications) as well as other pre-

treatment measures (e.g., skin barrier sprays or repellents) and from individual respiratory

protection systems, protective clothing, antidotes, and decontamination kits. Collective

protection in land operations is limited to essential functions that must continue unhindered in a

CBRN environment. Well-constructed fighting positions and bunkers provide excellent

protection against all the effects of a nuclear detonation. Prepared positions and rooms inside

buildings may have their biological, chemical and toxic industrial hazards protection capabilities

enhanced quickly by adding simplified specialized systems.

828. CONTAMINATION CONTROL

Contamination control consists of those measures taken before, during and after a

CBRN release to limit the spread of contamination and avoid putting other individuals,

equipment and areas at risk.

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Decontamination is the process of making any person, object or area safe by absorbing,

destroying, making harmless or removing toxic industrial hazards, biological or chemical agents,

or removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. Decontamination aims at: minimizing

casualties and saving lives (immediate decontamination); sustaining operations and reducing

the contact hazard and limiting its spread (operational decontamination); and, reducing or

eliminating the need for individual protective equipment (thorough decontamination). The three

categories of decontamination are defined as follows:

Immediate. Decontamination carried out by individuals upon becoming

contaminated, to save life and minimize casualties. This may include some

decontamination of personal clothing and/or equipment.

Operational. Decontamination carried out by the individual and/or a unit,

restricted to specific parts of operationally essential equipment, materiel and/or

working areas, in order to minimize contact and transfer hazards and to sustain

operations. This may include decontamination of the individual beyond the

scope of immediate decontamination, as well as decontamination of mission

essential spares and limited terrain decontamination.

Thorough. Decontamination carried out by a unit, with or without external

support, to reduce contamination on personnel, equipment, materiel, and/or

working areas to the lowest possible levels to permit the partial or total removal

of individual protective equipment and to maintain operations with minimum

degradation. This may include terrain decontamination beyond the scope of

operational decontamination.

829. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

Residual contamination poses as great a problem to CSS organizations as to combat

forces. CSS planning and defence systems must address all aspects associated with

operations in a CBRN contaminated environment. These include:

Requirements, priorities and procedures for decontamination and evacuation of

materiel at supply, maintenance, and personnel support sites.

Resupply of expended detection equipment, protective clothing,

decontaminants, and medical supplies.

Evacuation priorities, decontamination, and treatment of nuclear, biological and

chemical casualties or conventional patients who have been contaminated with

chemical/biological agents, toxic industrial contaminants (TIC), or radioactive

particles.

Decontamination of food and water sources for human consumption.

Graves registration procedures for moving, decontaminating and marking

hazard contaminated remains.

Movement of both personnel and organizational replacements through

contaminated areas.

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Measures to reduce the impact of the hazard environment on civil-military

cooperation efforts (i.e., the use of civilian resources/logistics).

Procedures for handling mass casualties.

830. MEDICAL SUPPORT

The medical support system must provide for the evacuation and management of

casualties in a CBRN environment. Unit medical personnel will conduct initial medical triage to

determine the extent of injury and treatment necessary. These medical personnel will

recommend a course of action to the commander to include the need for decontamination,

treatment, return to duty, or evacuation.

Decontamination will normally be the responsibility of the parent unit prior to evacuation

in the medical evacuation chain. Patients will continue to wear their protective clothing during

evacuation and at intermediate medical treatment facilities unless it must be removed for

decontamination purposes or emergency treatment. The chemical agent, patient, protective

wrap (casualty bag) should be used for the further transportation of clean or decontaminated

patients who have had their protective clothing removed.

The medical treatment facilities for casualties in a CBRN environment will provide

separate areas and control procedures for the required medical care, while controlling

contamination.

SECTION 7

URBAN OPERATIONS

831. GENERAL

Within the COE, military forces must be prepared to conduct FSO in dense, urban areas

as a normal practice. Operations in urban areas follow the same principles as all other

operations, but there are certain limitations and characteristics that must be considered in

planning and execution.

832. CHARACTERISTICS

Operations in built-up areas are characterized by:

Three-dimensional aspect to operations, at street level, on rooftops and in

buildings, and underground in sewers and subway systems.

Restricted fields of fire and observation and thus the limitation on employing

weapons to their maximum effective ranges.

Protection, cover and concealment for troops and equipment from view and from

fire.

Restricted space for manoeuvre, particularly for mechanized units, but

increased possibilities for infiltration and bypassing.

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Increased demand for manpower. Urban operations, be they offensive,

defensive or stability, are manpower intensive due to the interaction with the

local population, the high level of casualties, and the three-dimensional density

of the terrain.

Difficulty in locating adversary fire and activities. This is particularly so for an

adversary that hides amongst a local population.

Close-quarter combat including the increased vulnerability of vehicles to short-

range attack and the limitations this imposes upon the employment of weapons

at their maximum effective ranges.

Restricted vehicle movement and requirement for intimate support for all

vehicles.

The presence of a civilian population, which can very seriously limit military

actions and whose support may be lost due to collateral damage.

Difficulties in command, control and communications due to the close terrain

and its physical density.

Prolonged effects of CBRN related weapons and threat from planned targeting

or collateral damage of toxic industrial areas.

Effects of devastation, including effects on the moral plane on both friendly and

neutral elements.

Increased threat from mines and booby traps.

Higher rates of consumption of ammunition and combat supplies.

Increased reliance upon sound, human intelligence.

Requirement for high levels of initiative and quality leadership in order to

overcome the physical and moral challenges of urban operations.

833.

PLANNING

All aspects of FSO conducted in urban areas are manpower intensive, due in part to the

requirement to deal with the local population and due to the density of the terrain.

The nature of the terrain forces planning to be centralized, but the conduct of operations

to be decentralized, with a significant emphasis made on initiative, low level leadership and

sound, detailed coordination. Control measures assume an increased importance and the

tempo of an operation, particularly offensive, must be controlled and possibly slowed to maintain

firm control and avoid undesirable collateral damage and the engagement of friendly forces.

Operations in urban areas will very in scale. Some may be pervasive and attempt to

apply combat power throughout the entire urban centre. This will be the case in very large-

scale operations, such as a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign focused on controlling urban

centres, and large-scale offensive operations, such as the clearing of a large adversary force

from a major city. Other operations in built-up areas may be much smaller in scale, such as the

capture of only key nodes in a large city, or the capture of small hamlets or farm complexes in

mainly rural areas.

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Regardless of the scale, planning for operations in built-up areas must always consider

the presence of civilians in the objective areas. Measures must be taken to minimize collateral

damage and to avoid civilian casualties, even if this means a slowing of the operational tempo

and even an increased risk to friendly casualties. Plans must be made for the immediate

conduct of stability operations simultaneous with and following offensive and defensive

operations. This will include emergency humanitarian aid, control of movement, anti-looting

measures, and the restoration of essential services. Military forces may be required to conduct

emergency repairs to infrastructure damaged or burned by withdrawing adversary forces. This

may include a need to fight fires.

834. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The sequence for tactical offensive operations in a built-up area remains applicable to

offensive operations at any level, be it a brigade assault on a sector of a large city, to a platoon

or section clearing a building or farm complex. The sequence consists of the following stages:

Investment or isolation. The objective to be seized must be isolated from

reinforcement and dominated to the greatest extent possible. Reconnaissance

forces and direct fire assets are best suited to the task.

Break-in. The aim of this stage is to assault and seize a foothold in the built-up

area. The infantry, supported by integral fire support, engineers, additional

direct fire assets (e.g., armour) and indirect fire normally conducts the break-in.

Securing objectives. This stage of the operation should be launched from the

foothold secured by the break-in. The aim is to secure objectives that provide a

firm base from which to launch an assault on the next objective, or to unhinge

the adversary's defence. Objectives should be seized that allow the force to

dominate approaches to defeat any counterattack and to support the movement

of other forces.

Clearance. This stage is a methodical clearance of the whole area of the

operation. The aim is to clear all remaining adversary from the area. As

securing objectives is paramount, this task may be carried out by follow-up

troops. Infantry, supported by direct fire assets and engineers will be the main

troops to conduct this stage. The clearance may be conducted in a linear,

contiguous fashion, or may be delayed until key nodes throughout the urban

area have been seized and the adversary’s overall defensive plan unhinged,

thus undermining the will of the adversary forces being cleared.

Consolidation. In general terms, the consolidation is no different from that of

any other offensive operation. Preparations must be made to consolidate

successes and to defeat any counterattack. The consolidation may include the

requirement to undertake stability operations to relieve the plight of civilians

remaining in the area, and to prevent instability and lawlessness for which

military forces may be eventually blamed if not prevented. Consolidation is also

a time to collect vital information from local inhabitants regarding remaining

adversary dispositions, booby traps left behind and the need for follow-on

stability operations.

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835. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

At the higher tactical and formation levels, defensive operations are conducted in a

number of stages. Activities may ebb and flow across these stages as attackers are repelled

and areas are recaptured. The sequence consists of the following stages:

The Perimeter Force Battle. The perimeter force consists of mutually

supporting posts (i.e., temporary fighting positions) on the perimeter of the urban

area that prevents the adversary from bypassing the defensive area. They

provide updated information and begin the destruction of the adversary forces.

They withdraw or shift when they can no longer influence the battle and the

adversary commits to an assault.

The Disruption Force Battle. A mobile and coordinated force disrupts the

adversary assault as it attempts to break-in, establish a foothold and clear

immediate objectives. The force and its tactics cause attrition, delay, disruption,

and draw the adversary towards selected killing zones.

The Main Defence Area Battle. The main defence area (MDA) is based upon

a series of defended localities with mutually supporting strongpoints sited in

depth and with the aim of defeating the adversary in selected killing zones. A

local reserve should be designated in each sector or area. This battle should

consist of aggressive, offensive tactics with counterattacks at all levels

preventing the adversary from grouping or regrouping, and from encircling any

defended localities.

Reserve. As in any defensive operation, a central, mobile reserve (combined

arms) is essential.

836.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

In line with the construct of FSO and the realities of the COE, forces will be expected to

conduct stability operations simultaneously with offensive and defensive operations. Forces at

the lowest tactical level, even those well forward in the battle, may be expected to do so. For

example, a platoon consolidating an initial objective may be required to provide emergency first

aid to civilians, extinguish fires, and control the movement of civilians attempting to flee the

area.

Tactical level commanders and their troops must be able to quickly change between

tactical profile levels and use of force. Forces having just engaged and defeated an adversary

force must be able to quickly shift, physically and mentally, to assisting or controlling local

inhabitants, and to distinguish between threats and non-threats in confusing circumstances.

In conducting these activities, care must be taken to avoid allowing combatants to hide

or escape amongst the civilian population.

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SECTION 8

OPERATIONS IN FORESTS

837. GENERAL

The close terrain and density featured in heavily forested areas has an obvious and

significant effect on tactical level operations. The term “forests” will be used to describe

expanses of terrain which are completely covered by forests or where the majority of the area is

wooded and where vehicle movement is largely restricted to roads, clearings and fire breaks,

necessitating different tactics to those employed in more open terrain.

838. CHARACTERISTICS

Operations in forests have characteristics that are similar in many ways, due to the

density of the terrain, to operations in built-up areas:

Fields of observation and fire are limited, and therefore, fighting often takes

place at short range.

The tempo of operations is greatly reduced.

Protection, cover and concealment for troops and equipment from view and from

fire.

Restricted space for manoeuvre, particularly for mechanized units, but

increased possibilities for infiltration and bypassing.

Threat of fire during periods of dry weather.

Difficulty in locating adversary fire and activities. This is particularly so for an

adversary that hides amongst a local population.

Close-quarter combat including the increased vulnerability of vehicles to short-

range attack and the limitations this imposes upon the employment of weapons

at their maximum effective ranges.

Restricted vehicle movement and the requirement for intimate support for all

vehicles. The size of trees will dictate the ability to move armoured vehicles

through the forested areas.

Higher rates of consumption of ammunition and other combat supplies.

Difficulties in command, control and communications.

Limited visibility will have psychological effect on the troops who are employed

in operations in forests for extended periods of time.

Forested areas have the effect of splitting up and canalizing an attack force. They

favour troops engaged in defence or delay. Characteristically, the battle will be a series of

isolated small unit actions. The maintenance of a cohesive posture will be extremely expensive

in troops; commanders may find it necessary to accept gaps. Because of the excellent

concealment for operations, there are increased opportunities to envelop, infiltrate and ambush,

and a small force can have an influence on the battle out of proportion to its size.

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The nature of forested areas makes them effective for use in delaying operations. Also,

unlike open terrain, they provide good opportunities to employ non-armoured forces.

839. TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Given the nature and characteristics of forested areas, offensive and defensive

operations in forests are conducted in the same manner as those operations in built-up areas,

following the same methods and stages. The requirement for stability operations will likely be

much less given the lack of a civilian populace in forested areas.

SECTION 9

OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINS

840. GENERAL

Mountainous terrain is characterized by a marked difference in elevation with steep

slopes and valleys over an extended area. Weather conditions will also vary considerably over

a small area. It may include built-up areas and plains between mountain ridges, plateaus,

passes and the mountainsides themselves.

841. CHARACTERISTICS

The important characteristics of mountainous areas with respect to military operations

include the following:

Sharp differences in elevation provide excellent observation or may totally mask

large areas of ground. Mutual support will be difficult and at times impossible.

Mechanized forces will be limited in mobility and manoeuvre. The ability to

reinforce rapidly will be greatly limited.

The structure of the terrain will normally be such that it will follow a distinctive

pattern or grain with the road and track network tending to follow the drainage

pattern. This will have a major impact upon manoeuvre, as the bulk of the

forces will be forced to operate with the grain of the country.

The road network will be limited, and cross-country movement in the higher

regions will frequently be extremely difficult or impossible. The roads will be

dominated by high ground, often covered with vegetation; hence, there will exist

innumerable places for ambush.

The important built-up areas will be concentrated in the valleys.

The higher elevation will typically be exposed rock and any digging will be time

consuming, requiring specialized equipment.

The weather is normally unstable and changes very rapidly.

Given the terrain and the likely focus on dismounted operations, there will be a

significant reliance upon aviation assets for insertion and resupply.

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Operations in mountainous areas are likely to be more exhausting for the troops,

particularly for dismounted troops, when moving. Careful consideration must be

made regarding the level of combat supplies that must be carried, with respect

to the planned threat and the ability to quickly resupply.

In many mountainous areas, there is forest cover, particularly on lower slopes.

Communications are difficult due to screening.

Success in operations in mountains is usually achieved by the forces that gain control of

key terrain, such as mountain and ridge tops, valley outlets, mountain passes, defiles and

routes. Some of these will have a canalizing effect and can be controlled by forces on

dominating heights around them. The battle for the heights will, therefore, be the governing

factor in operations in mountains. Accordingly, they will be likely objectives in an attack and will

be the key terrain upon which the defence will be based. Due to the restricted mobility of

ground vehicles, the use of helicopters for tactical mobility, reconnaissance, resupply and

evacuation may have decisive importance.

Campaigns in mountains that focus upon peace support or COIN operations will likely

focus forces and resources on the small, scattered villages or other urban centres. This will

place an emphasis on subunit level operations with a strong reserve held to reinforce and to

control unassigned areas. Influence and control can then be spread out to the more remote

areas between the centres.

842. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Due to the nature of the terrain, self-contained task organizations may be required for

effective and decisive offensive operations that can be achieved without the requirement for

additional support or reinforcement. The forces required will be relatively greater than in

operations on level terrain in order to overcome the advantages enjoyed by the defender in

mountainous areas. The ability of the commander to influence the battle will be enhanced if he

has a centralized reserve that can be moved quickly, ideally by aviation.

Plans for offensive operations should be based upon seizing the dominant terrain

features as objectives. Early in the battle, particular effort may be necessary to capture vantage

points for observation.

The attacker is likely to meet the strongest resistance on the few available routes. He

should avoid attacking the adversary from the front and obtain access to these routes by

envelopment. Engineers will likely be well forward in the order of march to quickly clear

obstacles, which given the nature of the terrain are easier for the adversary to create, and will

be more effective than on open terrain.

843. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The defence will be more static in nature and characteristically be conducted in a

number of isolated actions. The advantages that the terrain offers the defender may allow for

an extension of the normal defensive sector width. It will be difficult for the defender to change

the main effort.

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Points to consider in planning and conducting defensive operations in mountainous

areas are as follows:

Dominant terrain provides the defender with good observation and firing

positions, but it will be difficult to achieve a completely cohesive position.

There may be areas that seem to be impassable or extremely difficult for ground

forces to use, however, the ability of an adversary to overcome such obstacles

should never be underestimated.

The scarcity of roads places restrictions on the employment of tanks or other

combat vehicles, and makes them vulnerable.

At smaller unit levels, a defender can deceive the adversary as to his exact

strength, purpose and dispositions. Signature weapons such as machine guns

can be used to indicate false positions forward of a main position, thus causing

the adversary to expose flanks in their manoeuvre.

It is difficult to move reserves quickly unless helicopter lift can be used. In such

situations, they become vulnerable to weather conditions and all arms AD by the

adversary.

The rocky ground in many mountainous areas will force defences to be

constructed vertically, vice dug into the ground. This may require additional

time.

The close terrain and limited, easily dominated routes will be an advantage to forces

conducting delay operations. However, flank security/protection and continuous surveillance

are essential to prevent adversary infiltration or bypassing. Close coordination is required to

prevent portions of the delaying force from being cut-off.

844. STABILITY OPERATIONS

Units conducting stability operations in support of a campaign occurring in mountainous

terrain will focus on the semi-rural villages, towns and hamlets likely scattered throughout the

area. Given the likely remoteness of these areas, infrastructure needs will likely be of a fairly

basic nature such as basic medical aid, basic school supplies, fresh water pumps and electrical

supply. Significant effects can be gained on the moral plane by providing those basic aspects of

governance and infrastructure that are often missing from remote rural population clusters.

SECTION 10

OPERATIONS IN ARCTIC AND COLD WEATHER CONDITIONS

845. GENERAL

Operations in arctic and cold weather conditions demand special techniques, training

and equipment. The cold, the usual remoteness of the regions, ice and snow and the lack of

mobility combine to create challenges and conditions that need special consideration in

planning and execution.

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846. CHARACTERISTICS

The important characteristics of arctic and cold weather conditions with respect to

military operations include the following:

In arctic areas, long hours of daylight in the summer and long nights in winter.

Extreme cold in winter, which will hamper operations and equipment, and which

will affect the mind as well as the body.

Snow and snow cover in winter.

High winds that increase the wind chill factor and may seriously reduce visibility.

In large parts of northern areas, there is a scarcity or total absence of road and

rail networks. In winter, cross-country vehicles will offer increased mobility, but

for much of the arctic summer, ground movement, other than with specialized

vehicles, may be impossible.

The local resources available will be extremely limited due to a lack of populated

areas.

The disrupting effects of natural phenomena on communications, such as

aurora effects with atmospheric static.

While some areas may be forested much of the area will be without tree cover.

During arctic winter conditions, the weather is normally unpredictable and may

change rapidly.

Degradation and reduced effectiveness of vehicles, weapons and equipment,

especially batteries, engines, and petroleum and oil products.

Construction and maintenance of shelters and utilities for troops and equipment

will be crucial.

847.

CONCEPTS FOR PLANNING AND EXECUTION

Forces operating in arctic/cold weather conditions should be capable of operating

effectively in all types of operations provided they have received relevant and extensive training.

It should be understood, however, that the execution of these would be more difficult than in

temperate conditions. The critical aspect of operations in arctic winter or extreme cold weather

conditions is that a force must be able to live and survive in the environment if it is to operate

effectively. Success will depend, to a large extent, upon adequate training and equipment.

Operations in arctic/cold weather conditions require a greater proportion of support units

to maintain operational capability. Small units will normally fight these operations in a dispersed

manner. Task organizations suitable for the entire operation should be established at the

outset. It will be difficult to adjust these subsequently.

In extreme cold, practically every task requires more time to execute, and allowance for

this must be made in planning. Individual preparation for an operation requires great attention

to details, such as clothing and equipment. Personnel operating in these conditions require

additional time for rest and an increased intake of high calorie foods.

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Because of the limited local resources in the Arctic, forces are even more dependent

upon their LOC than in the temperate zone. Severing its LOC and denying it the use of

alternative routes or means of supply may defeat an adversary force.

Under winter conditions, it is impossible to dig into frozen ground, permafrost or ice

without specialized equipment or explosives. Over much of the area there will be little tree

cover for concealment. Defensive positions may have to be built up, above the ground and this

will require additional time and resources.

848. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

During the planning and conduct of offensive operations, the following should be

considered:

In extreme cold, separating adversary units from their CSS elements will greatly

reduce their effectiveness.

Manoeuvre may at times be restricted by difficulties of weather and terrain.

Due to widely dispersed zones of action, frequently flanks and rear areas will be

lightly protected and present excellent opportunities to outflank or cut-off the

adversary.

Heavily falling snow, blizzards and fog may present excellent opportunities for

surprise attack.

While waterways, lakes and marshes are normally obstacles to an offensive

operation, when frozen, they cease to be obstacles and may provide good

avenues of approach, even for heavy equipment.

In arctic summer conditions, ground movement may be seriously hindered or

even become impossible due to the water/mud/swamp conditions.

There are only short periods of daylight in the arctic winter and this means that

movement in conditions of low visibility will become the rule rather than the exception. To

achieve surprise, envelopment and infiltration will be frequently used, taking advantage of gaps

between adversary positions.

After seizing an objective there must be immediate consolidation. The assaulting

dismounted troops may be exhausted, overheated and sweating from the exertion of the attack,

and provision must be made to prevent them from becoming “cold” casualties.

849. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

During the planning and conduct of defensive operations, including the delay, the

following should be considered:

Frequently, the limited number of troops committed will make it impossible to

maintain a cohesive posture. Units must, therefore, be prepared to fight in

isolation with all round defence or to move to alternative positions.

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Airmobile forces will be particularly valuable in delaying operations.

Seasonal changes will affect defensive positions (e.g., man-made obstacles

may be made useless by heavy or melting snow).

Because of the time taken and the special techniques involved to create

obstacles on adversary approaches, greater reliance will have to be placed

upon other combat support elements in delaying and deterring the adversary.

As there will be gaps in the defence, the adversary will be able to infiltrate

elements that may attack support facilities and LOC. Special attention will,

therefore, have to be paid to the security of LOC and to the flanks.

Once deployed, adjustments to forces will be difficult.

Where the defender is unable to maintain his mobility, troops will be obliged to fight from

their initial position, conducting the defence from isolated locations. The deployment of

observation posts may be necessary to monitor the gaps between positions and act as the

prompt for the timely deployment of reserves. Restrictions to mobility and the resultant

slowness of reaction time may necessitate the decentralization of reserves.

During delay operations, particular emphasis must be given to advance preparations of

any planned position, and rearward movement. Troops should destroy any abandoned shelters

that could otherwise be used by the adversary.

850. MOBILITY AND COUNTER-MOBILITY

On frozen ground, with minimal snow cover, units can achieve excellent mobility.

Marginally frozen soils, tundra, and thin frozen crust rapidly breakdown under traffic, reducing

mobility. Engineer snow removal may be critical during heavy snowfalls. Float bridging and

rafting operations are difficult or impossible across frozen rivers and streams. Ice bridges may

be constructed at temperatures below -12⁰C. Countermine operations are different in winter

environments due to frozen mine fuses and the loss of mine detector effectiveness.

If a thaw occurs, many areas of previously solid ground will be unusable by vehicles. Ice

routes over waterways may be closed by demolitions or artillery. More time must be allowed for

preparation of obstacle systems in cold temperature. Arming conventional mines is difficult in

freezing weather. Minefields emplaced before a snow cover forms can become neutralized by

snow, depending upon the snow’s depth and density.

SECTION 11

OPERATIONS IN DESERT AND EXTREMELY HOT CONDITIONS

851. GENERAL

Operations in desert and extremely hot weather conditions demand special techniques,

training and equipment. The extreme heat, the large distances, the open ground and the

general lack of inhabited areas provide opportunities and challenges for forces and must be

considered in planning and execution.

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852. CHARACTERISTICS

The important characteristics of desert and extremely hot conditions affecting military

operations are as follows:

Troops operating in these conditions must be physically, mentally and

professionally prepared to meet the challenge. They must also be acclimatized

before starting robust operations.

Desert and extremely hot weather condition areas are similar in terms of

environment and temperature, but differ in vegetation and terrain structure.

Deserts are arid, barren regions and vary from high mountains to tracts of sand

and salt marshes incapable of supporting normal life due to lack of fresh water.

Populated areas are widely dispersed and centred on sources of water. Few

roads and railways exist.

In deserts, temperatures can be extreme in summer rising to between 50⁰C

(122^oF) and 70^oC (158^oF), and in winter falling to -45^oC. The diurnal range may

exceed 20⁰C.

Extremely hot weather and desert can affect the normal movement of combat

vehicles and the operation of weapons and communications systems. High

ambient temperatures have significant adverse affects upon rotary wing aircraft

lift performance, resulting in reduced troop/cargo payloads.

In desert, visibility is often excellent allowing good observation and long fields of

fire. Vegetation is poor in the desert, and generally, camouflage will be by

artificial means. A moving unit is more likely to be seen due to the dust created.

On the rare occasions that rain falls, it is normally torrential. Flash floods occur

and areas of dried-up watercourses (wadis) are very dangerous in these

conditions.

Desert winds can achieve hurricane force. Dust and sand suspended within

them can make life almost intolerable, movement and maintenance very difficult

and can severely restrict visibility.

In desert operations, manoeuvre units tend to consume greater quantities of

combat supplies and spare parts than in temperate climates. Routine

maintenance checks and servicing will also become much more important.

Water supply is very important due to the lack of water sources and increased

consumption.

In the desert, operations will be conducted by armoured and mechanized forces, and on

occasions, airmobile and air-landed forces. Operations are likely to take place over a very large

area and may principally be battles of manoeuvre with the aim of concentrating sufficient forces

to defeat the adversary. The ability to fight in such conditions will depend upon what is

logistically possible.

Forces employed in desert terrain have long fields of fire and observation. In most

deserts, the scarcity of large areas of defensible terrain may force the adversary to leave at

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least one flank open to attack by manoeuvre forces, tactical air forces and artillery fire, or mobile

reserves. Large numbers of mines (ground and aerial delivered) may be used to enhance

effectiveness of defensive positions. Additionally, the capability to communicate and to perform

intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) tasks may be

improved owing to improved lines of sight.

853. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Attacks launched in desert and hot weather conditions will require comprehensive plans.

In most deserts, the scarcity of large areas of defensible terrain means that the adversary flanks

may be vulnerable. The attacking force should seek an exposed flank and attempt to

manoeuvre around it into the adversary rear before the adversary can react and block the

envelopment with mobile reserves. Successful offensive operations depend upon bold, rapid

manoeuvre, seeking a vulnerable adversary flank.

In the desert, a moving unit is more vulnerable due to the lack of concealment.

Therefore, reconnaissance forces should be deployed well ahead of the main body. Similarly,

flank and rear security/protection are essential.

Close cooperation between ground and air elements is essential. Desert terrain is

suitable for all operations as it allows broad envelopment and encirclement with armoured,

mechanized and helicopter units. The disadvantages caused by the limited concealment can be

decreased by surprise, rapid movement, suitable deployment of troops, communications

security and deception techniques.

854. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The important defensive areas are ports, key logistic installations, roads, railways, water

pumping stations, airfields, wells, mountain passes, and key terrain. In desert conditions, it is

rare to find positions where both open flanks of the defended area can be protected by natural

obstacles. Therefore, aggressive manoeuvre at all levels is the best way to destroy large

numbers of adversary without being destroyed in the process.

In delaying operations, good fields of fire allow engagement at the maximum effective

ranges of direct fire weapons systems, and therefore disengagement before the adversary can

begin to close on the defender’s position. However, dust clouds raised by a moving force may

make it necessary to disengage under cover of smoke and darkness. Even a sand storm can

be used to advantage. Field artillery, aircraft and aviation can also be used to allow a ground

manoeuvre unit to disengage and move rapidly to the next position. The problem of accurate

navigation and the possibility of the adversary approaching from an unexpected direction

require that attention must be paid to communications, the identification of vehicles, routes and

the coordination of movement.

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SECTION 12

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

855. GENERAL

Outside of Canada, it is most likely that Canadian military forces will work within a

multinational force. A single component or a joint force may be deployed within a multinational

chain of command. Although the term “multinational” refers to ad hoc arrangements,

deployments abroad will rarely fall within the exclusive construct of a formal, standing alliance.

An alliance may take the lead command of a joint force deployment, but for each campaign, a

multinational force will likely be formed. Multinational operations bring great advantages to any

campaign, including shared risk and greater combat power through multinational forces;

however they also introduce specific challenges.

856. UNITY OF EFFORT AND COHESION

Successful multinational operations require unity of effort. It is unlikely that all the

nations in the multinational force will share exactly the same strategic goals. To complicate this,

the military contingents participating in a multinational operation, although under tactical

(TACON) or operational control (OPCON) of the multinational force commander, are ultimately

responsible to their own national chain of command. In this environment, friction will occur,

detracting from unity of effort. To diminish this, the member nations must agree to mutually

attainable military objectives, in particular those regarding resolution or termination of the

conflict.

Unity of effort in multinational operations is built upon consensus. This unity requires a

clear recognition and understanding of other nations’ capabilities and perceptions, as well as

concessions to accommodate them as appropriate. Compromise will inevitably be required if

consensus is to be achieved. Nations may reassess their objectives, both political and military,

as the conflict progresses. Therefore, strategic and operational commanders must be

concerned with maintenance of consensus throughout campaign design, planning, and

execution.

The cohesion of the multinational force may be its COG and could be targeted by the

adversary. Appropriate military and diplomatic efforts may be required to maintain solidarity.

ATTACKING AND DEFENDING MULTINATIONAL COHESION

During the first Persian Gulf War, Iraq launched SCUD attacks into Israel hoping for

reprisals that would alienate the Arab members of the multinational force and erode

cohesion. Aggressive joint and multinational military actions, including “SCUD hunting,”

and the deployment of PATRIOT missiles to Israel, demonstrated that multinational

diplomatic efforts were successful in retaining the cohesion of the force.

During the multinational operations in Iraq following major combat, insurgents bombed

trains in Spain days prior to the Spanish national elections, killing over 200 civilians. The

effect was to cause an anti-multinational political party to win the election, and in turn, to

withdraw Spanish forces from the US led multinational.

The solidarity of the multinational force may be a critical vulnerability, but it is also a key

to the legitimacy and public support of the force’s actions. Efforts to maintain the consensus are

extremely important, but this should not unnecessarily distort the actions of the multinational

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force commander. If all participating nations clearly understand the stated military objectives

and have trust and confidence in their leaders, unity of effort can be sustained. Building

cohesion and teamwork and establishing trust before, during, and after the battles and

campaign are vital to success. Canadian commanders and staffs can greatly assist in

maintaining cohesion in multinational operations by acting as a bridge between the dominant

and smaller partners. To preserve this special status, it may be necessary to maintain an

independence of thought from the lead nation of the multinational force.

SECTION 13

CHALLENGES IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

857. CULTURAL AND LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES

A multinational force may be formed from nations with different cultures, language, moral

and ethical values, and incompatible social and economic outlooks. Sources of national pride

and cultural sensitivities will vary widely, yet the multinational force commander must

accommodate them. Differences in work ethic, standards of living, religion, and discipline affect

the way nations approach campaigns.

Difficulties in language differences will have to be accommodated and additional time

and resources must be allowed for staff and commanders to absorb and action both written and

verbal communications.

858. STANDARDIZATION OF DOCTRINE

Standardization or at least harmonization of SOP, tactics, techniques and procedures

(TTP), and doctrine in general will be difficult and will take time to realize. This is particularly

true for capabilities that are shared across nations, such as information operations (info ops) or

reconnaissance. Assistance may be found in the use of accepted multinational procedures and

the issue and use of multinational handbooks.¹⁹⁷

859. EQUIPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

Difficulties such as incompatible communications and differences in the cross-country

mobility of vehicles should be expected and considered and accommodated in planning.

Shared cryptology and secure communications systems will be difficult and will require national

approvals. These should be sought at the earliest possible time. Forces may have to provide

communications detachments between subordinate and superior HQs in order to facilitate

communications between different national contingents.

As well, certain multinational units may have some systems similar to that of the

adversary, making measures to avoid fratricide vital. International standardization efforts in

peacetime under the auspices of NATO or other international organizations (IOs) will also

greatly increase interoperability of equipment, ammunition, doctrine and procedures.

¹⁹⁷ Such handbooks include the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’

Standardization Programme (ABCA) Coalition Operations Handbook.

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Certain national contingents may deploy with limitations placed upon them in terms of

capabilities and roles/functions to be assumed. These limitations or restrictions, often imposed

by home governments, must be considered at the forefront of campaign planning. Within these

limitations, suitable roles and functions for these forces must be found that will continue to

support the overall effort.

860. INTELLIGENCE

National restrictions on intelligence sources and methods may prevent some intelligence

from being shared amongst members of the multinational force. Such intelligence information

should be provided as much as possible by sanitizing it to separate it from the sources and

methods used to obtain it. Special arrangements should be considered for developing,

communicating, and using intelligence information within the multinational force. Whenever

possible, these arrangements should be agreed and exercised well before operations

commence.

861. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Not only will intentions for employment differ amongst national contingents, but also

rules of engagement (ROE) will vary. The ROE of any lead nation or national element with

which Canadian elements will work must be studied in order to understand employment

limitations, and to avoid areas of potential conflict or the creation of undesired or unintended

effects.

862. CANADIAN ASPECTS OF MULTINATIONAL CAMPAIGN DESIGN AND PLANNING

In multinational operations there will be multinational strategic objectives, as well as

corresponding Canadian strategic objectives and limitations that may affect the employment of

Canadian troops. Canadian commanders must ensure that they understand the Canadian

strategic direction within the context of the multinational force strategic objectives. Therefore, it

is essential for the operational commander to keep the government informed of all pertinent

aspects of operations. This will foster trust and mutual understanding between the military and

the government to ensure adequate support for operations.

863. COMMAND IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

In any multinational operation there will be both multinational and national chains of

command. Lines of responsibility and limitations must be clearly delineated and good

communication, including the early warning of pending operations, will be essential to ensure

that national chains of command may be advised and consulted if necessary.

The multinational force commander will discuss specific issues with national

commanders on a bilateral basis as part of the planning process and throughout the campaign.

In this way, they can avoid competition, detect problems early, and in particular, be made aware

of any national concerns or sensitivities. This allows the multinational force HQ to produce

plans that will be acceptable well in advance and to coordinate activities to achieve unity of

effort. National contingent commanders, although operating at the operational level, will have

influence over tactical level plans and activities, but this should be restricted to their national

interests or politically imposed limitations.

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Command and control may be exercised in multinational operations either through a

multinational headquarters or through that of a lead nation. Longstanding alliances such as

NATO, where the countries have common procedures, tend to use a multinational HQ, as do

international organizations such as the UN. Multinational HQs are most effective when well-

established command procedures have been developed and practised, and a consistent quality

of staff is available. The lead nation concept recognizes that one nation will be assigned the

lead role and its C2 system will predominate. This method contributes to unity of effort and can

avoid duplication and confusion.

864. NATIONAL COMMANDS

The national dimension in multinational operations is a key factor. This is particularly

true with the realization that the senior national commander of each contingent within a

multinational force, irrespective of his rank or the size of his nation's military contribution, will be

effectively commanding at the operational level from a national perspective.

In all cases when elements of the Canadian Forces operate as part of a multinational

force, a Canadian national commander will be designated. The Canadian national commander

provides the interface between the employed forces (normally the tactical level) and the

strategic level (Chief of the Defence Staff and national/joint staff) to ensure national prerogatives

are not usurped and that support is effective. The national commander's role will be to: provide

administrative support to the Canadian contingent of the multinational force; to liaise with the

multinational force HQ concerning the employment of Canadian forces; and to monitor the

employment of Canadian elements to ensure that it is in line with Canadian strategic and

operational objectives.

A national HQ, known as the National Command Element (NCE), will normally be

established in the theatre of operations to provide national C2 and the commander with the

facilities and resources to accomplish these roles. A second line support element, or National

Support Element (NSE), may also be established in a theatre to provide various levels and

types of support. These levels and natures of support will differ with each campaign and will

depend upon the support provided by multinational partners and lead nations.

The Canadian national commander may be responsible for the coordination with other

elements of the joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) environment and their

interplay with the multinational HQ. This will include the establishment of liaison with Canadian

diplomatic representatives in the theatre of operations.

The Canadian national commander is generally delegated operational command

(OPCOM) over Canadian forces participating in a multinational operation. The national

commander may then transfer operational control (OPCON) of the force to the multinational

force commander. In certain cases, for example in NATO operations, the national commander

may transfer OPCOM. In either case, the national HQ will not normally have the capability to

plan, organize and conduct major operations, which will generally be the responsibility of the

multinational HQ. However, the national HQ may be required to step-up to one capable of

planning and conducting major activities, such as withdrawal operations, if required.

The relationship between the NCE and the command of our forces allocated to

multinational coalition formations will be dependent upon the situation. However, once forces

are allocated to a coalition formation, the NCE should not presume to exercise minute-to-minute

control of them.

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If a Canadian contribution to a multinational force is of a joint nature, the NCE will be

designated a joint HQ.

At times, the NCE may assume a role within the multinational chain of command and be

tasked with a specific multinational responsibility or area of responsibility. In such a situation, all

Canadian elements may remain under the NCE commander and not need be allocated OPCOM

or OPCON to a multinational commander. Specific staff positions may still be required within

this HQ to deal with Canadian only issues (e.g., certain G1 staff).

865. LIAISON

Proactive and robust liaison is essential to developing and maintaining unity of effort in

multinational operations. Liaison officers are the lubricant that reduces internal friction in the

multinational military machine. Effective liaison fosters understanding of missions, concepts,

doctrine and procedures, provides for the accurate and timely transfer of vital information, and

enhances the mutual trust, respect and confidence that are important in maintaining cohesion.

Liaison officers must be selected with care and will often require specialized training. If they do

not speak the language of the force to which they are attached, a competent interpreter should

accompany them.

866. CONCLUSION

Nations build multinational forces and alliances on mutual trust, understanding and

dependence, which bind the multinational force together. Teamwork and shared respect are

essential to the successful conduct of multinational operations. Members of the multinational

force should work with their partners to exploit the unique capabilities of the various national

forces available.

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