EA-18G. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008)

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

NOTE

If failure occurs in flaps AUTO,

GAIN ORIDE must be selected to

obtain HALF or FULL flaps setting.

EFFECTS:

FLAP SCHED caution may be displayed.

Autopilot inoperative.

ATC inoperative.

Loss of HUD barometric altitude, airspeed

and vertical velocity.

Loss of IFF altitude reporting.

Loss of FCES light.

Loss of AOA bracket and AOA approach/indexer

lights.

Loss of speedbrake function.

Loss of AOA/yaw rate warning tone.

Loss of air data.

MAD sensor data lost.

Loss of AHRS over temperature detection

Flaps - AUTO:

Degraded flying qualities.

Flaps function with frozen air data values.

Flaps schedule with AOA.

Figure

15-17. FCS Failure Indications and

Flaps - HALF or FULL:

Effects - Channels

2 and 4

Trailing edge flaps 30° or 40°.

Leading edge flaps and rudder toe-in schedule

with AOA.

NWS inoperative.

V-15-27

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

NOTE

FCS status display is shown for a left

stabilator 4 channel failure example.

EFFECTS:

Autopilot inoperative.

Failed stabilator hydraulically driven to 2°

trailing edge up.

Automatic compensation for failed stabilator.

Flaps - AUTO:

Low roll rate in transonic region below 20,000

feet.

Significant roll and yaw coupling may occur

with forward stick inputs when above 1.4

Mach and 30,000 feet.

Reduction in nose-down pitch authority above

10° AOA.

Flaps - HALF:

Nearly normal flying qualities.

Figure

15-22. FCS Failure Indications and

Minor roll-yaw coupling with longitudinal

Effects

stick inputs.

Sudden, but controllable, yaw during rotation

on bolters or touch-and-go.

NOTE

FCS status display is shown for

channels 1 and 2 failure example.

EFFECTS:

FCS caution is not displayed.

No change in flying qualities.

Figure 15-23. FCS Failure Indications and

Effects

V-15-30

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

NOTE

FCS status display is shown for

channels 1 and 4 failure example.

EFFECTS:

Failed leading edge flap frozen.

Autopilot inoperative.

Flaps - AUTO:

Speedbrake function disabled.

Good flap frozen, responds to differential

commands only.

Flaps - HALF or FULL:

Good flap frozen.

Figure 15-32. FCS Failure Indications and

Effects - LEF Channels 1 and 4 or 2 and 3

EFFECTS:

Autopilot inoperative.

Flaps - AUTO:

Flaps schedule as a function of estimated

AOA.

Flaps go to 5°/4° if GAIN ORIDE selected.

Flaps - HALF or FULL/Gear - DOWN:

Nearly normal flying qualities at 8.1° AOA

with GAIN ORIDE selected.

Rudder toe-in disabled.

Loss of AOA bracket and AOA approach/

indexer lights without GAIN ORIDE

selected.

Flaps scheduled based on estimated AOA.

Figure 15-33. FCS Failure Indications and

Effects - AOA Channel 4

V-15-35

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

EFFECTS:

Pitot-static instruments may be inaccurate.

Autopilot inoperative.

Air data blanked from HUD.

Loss of HUD barometric altitude, airspeed, and

vertical velocity.

Standby altimeter may be available.

Flaps - AUTO:

Degraded flying qualities.

Flaps freeze.

Flaps go to 5°/4° if GAIN ORIDE selected.

Flaps - HALF or FULL:

No rudder toe-in.

Flaps freeze.

Flaps go to

21°/30° or

21°/40° if GAIN

ORIDE selected.

Loss of AOA bracket and AOA approach/

indexer lights without GAIN ORIDE

selected.

Figure 15-34. FCS Failure Indications and

Effects

EFFECTS:

NWS caution is also displayed.

Reduced rudder pedal authority.

Lateral stick gives rudder for roll coordination.

Flaps - AUTO:

Trim gives 10° rudder authority.

Flaps - HALF or FULL:

Trim gives 22.5° rudder authority.

NWS inoperative.

Figure 15-35. FCS Failure Indications and

Effects

V-15-36

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Do not select flaps HALF or FULL.

NOTE

If detected by the FCCs, the

indications for a three and four

channel failure are the same. A third

undetected channel failure appears as

a two channel failure.

EFFECTS:

Autopilot inoperative.

ATC inoperative.

Sensitive dynamic pitch characteristics.

Aggressive pitch inputs may result in PIO.

Degraded roll CAS.

Reduced roll damping.

Figure

15-40. FCS Failure Indications and

ASRM inoperative.

Effects

Flaps - AUTO:

Poor dutch roll damping.

Large sideslip with lateral stick.

Degraded roll CAS.

Reduced roll damping.

Flaps - HALF or FULL:

Uncontrollable.

15.17

AILERON HINGE FAILURE - SUSPECTED, INBOARD.

Inboard aileron hinge failure may be suspected if a sudden uncommanded roll-off appears with no

corresponding aural ″Flight Controls, Flight Controls″ alert or associated FCS Xs or BLIN codes. If the

hinge has failed, the affected aileron will not respond normally to commanded inputs. However, the

aileron position indicator on the FCS page will function normally since the affected aileron actuator is

operating properly. In this case, the aileron position indicator on the FCS page will be indicating the

position of the actuator rod and not the aileron surface. The only true indication of this failure is a

visual check of the suspected aileron to determine if it is responding to control inputs.

For a failed hinge condition, the resultant flying qualities will be degraded but adequate for a shore-

based landing. Aircraft response to normal control inputs will be fairly uncoordinated and roll

performance away from the damaged aileron will be reduced. A failed inboard hinge may result in a

condition where wing and aileron oscillations occur, immediately reduce airspeed by decelerating at 1

g without using speedbrake until the oscillations subside.

NOTE

Do not use speedbrake to reduce airspeed. Ailerons contribute to the

integrated speedbrake function and selecting speedbrake with a

damaged aileron may cause roll transients.

V-15-39

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

If ship based, divert to an appropriate airfield. When determining the divert/BINGO profile,

consider the presence of wing or aileron oscillations and their impact on divert airspeed and fuel

management.

The presence of wing or aileron oscillations and the need to slow down

until the oscillations subside may significantly impact the planned

divert/BINGO profile.

Prior to landing, conduct a controllability check. During the controllability check, avoid selecting

flaps - HALF or FULL. Selecting flaps - HALF or FULL will cause significant roll-off into the failed

aileron. Because a hinge failure is undetected by the FCS, normal operation is assumed and aileron

droop will be commanded when flaps HALF or FULL is selected. The damaged aileron is likely to

remain undrooped and result in significant roll-off due to asymmetric aileron droop. For this case, large

stick deflections are required to maintain wings level and significant trim inputs are necessary to

reduce stick forces. Placing the flaps in HALF or FULL may also result in control surface binding if

the damaged aileron interferes with the deflection of the trailing edge flaps (TEF).

Lateral weight asymmetries will aggravate the roll-off and may preclude the aircrew’s ability to zero

the roll-off with trim. Consideration should be given to jettisoning stores to reduce lateral weight

asymmetries and to reduce gross weight for landing.

Execute a FLAPS-AUTO, straight-in approach (on-speed AOA, if controllable) to landing. Trim as

required to reduce lateral stick forces. Cross-check aircraft groundspeed to ensure that it is below safe

tire speed limits and the maximum engagement speed for the arresting gear. If controllability is not in

question, fuel may be dumped to reduce airspeed. However, controllability checks should be completed

at the new (lighter) weight. The aircraft should then be re-trimmed on-speed for wings level and

balanced (ball centered) flight. As the aircraft slows, it will require more directional trim to center the

ball. Flying qualities should be adequate for a normal shore-based FLAPS-AUTO approach to landing.

Handling characteristics may be degraded such that aircraft response to control stick or throttle inputs

may be coupled in roll, pitch, and yaw. These transient aircraft motions may be annoying, but do not

significantly degrade glideslope and line-up capture.

15.17.1 Suspected Inboard Aileron Hinge Failure Corrective Action.

If failed inboard aileron hinge suspected -

1. Reduce load factor to 1 g.

2. Oppose roll-off with lateral stick, rudder or trim.

If aileron or wing oscillations are present -

3. Airspeed - IMMEDIATELY REDUCE UNTIL OSCILLATIONS SUBSIDE.

DO NOT USE SPEEDBRAKE TO REDUCE AIRSPEED.

If aileron or wing oscillations are present, failure to immediately reduce

airspeed until oscillations cease can result in further structural failure.

V-15-40

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

If no aileron or wing oscillations are present -

3. Airspeed - MAINTAIN AS PRACTICAL

NOTE

Use of speedbrake with a damaged aileron will cause an immediate roll

transient and should be avoided.

4. Use smooth, small control inputs.

5. Land as soon as practical.

If ship based -

6. DIVERT

Bingo profile may be adversely affected due to reduced airspeed neces-

sary for given condition. Allow for a controllability check prior to landing.

For shore-based landing -

7. Perform controllability check with FLAPS AUTO at safe altitude. Trim as required.

8. Verify aircraft groundspeed is less than nose tire and arresting gear groundspeed limits.

9. Execute a straight-in approach with FLAPS AUTO.

10. Make a short field arrestment if situation permits..

15.18

ALQ-99 POD FIRE/MECHANICAL MALFUNCTION

If fire/malfunction exists and presents a hazard to the aircraft -

*1. Jettison affected pod (as necessary)

15.19 ALQ-99 POD RAT FAILURE

If Q99 POD caution and/or both FWD and AFT RESET is indicated on the STORES page -

1. DDI/STORES/SELECT STATION/BOTH (or ALL/RESET) TRANSMITTER - RESET

2. Continue flight if able to reset at least one transmitter on the affected pod(s).

NOTE

If an under-frequency condition exists within the RAT-GEN, the reset

indications may come on while power to the major WRAs has actually

been disconnected. In this case, pressing the resetting stations will not

clear the indication.

V-15-41

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

If RESET does not clear indication -

3. Accelerate aircraft and vary g loading.

Caution must be taken not to exceed available g at high gross weights and

altitudes.

If still unable to clear at least one transmitter RESET with the RESET pushbutton -

4. Affected pod power pushbutton - BOTH/OFF

If vibration is encountered, slow to a minimum safe airspeed. Lowering

the landing gear will help slow down a malfunctioning centerline RAT. If

corrective actions do not reduce vibrations, serious damage to the aircraft

may result.

5. Continue mission if no vibration present and able to visually confirm normal operation, at mission

commander’s discretion.

An ALQ-99 pod failure need not be associated with vibration. It could

also take the form of an electrical fire in the voltage regulator. A visual

check of the malfunctioning pod should be obtained if possible. Refer to

the Selective Stores Jettison procedure if necessary.

V-15-42

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 16

Landing Emergencies

16.1 SINGLE ENGINE FAILURE IN LANDING CONFIGURATION

At MIL power and below, the amount of yaw/roll caused by a single engine failure is minimal, and

the aircraft is easily controllable. If an engine fails with both throttles at MAX power (e.g., waveoff),

a significant amount of yaw/roll can be anticipated due to asymmetric thrust. In this case, timely

rudder pedal inputs (up to FULL) are required. Too much rudder pedal is not harmful, but too little

rudder pedal may cause controllability problems. Therefore, FULL rudder pedal to oppose yaw/roll is

prudent. If lateral stick is also required to oppose roll (worst case), inputs should be limited to

approximately ½ displacement. Lateral stick inputs greater than ½ throw may compromise direc-

tional controllability and result in excessive sideslip buildup. The demand on the rudders may be too

great when trying to balance asymmetric thrust and coordinate the adverse yaw generated by the

ailerons when opposing the tendency of the aircraft to roll into the failed engine. If the rudders are

saturated (surfaces against the stops) and additional adverse yawing moment is generated, sideslip

grows and an adverse yaw departure will result. During single engine operations, restricting lateral

stick inputs to less than ½ throw reduces the potential for an adverse yaw departure.

*1. Throttles - MAX

*2. FLAP switch - HALF

*3. Maintain on-speed AOA and balanced flight.

When single engine with the operating engine at MAX, the possibility of

an adverse yaw departure increases as AOA exceeds on-speed.

4. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing.

16.2 SINGLE ENGINE APPROACH AND LANDING

During a single engine approach and landing, use of the afterburner on the operating engine is not

restricted as long as on-speed AOA is maintained.

When single engine with the operating engine at MAX, the possibility of

an adverse yaw departure increases as AOA exceeds on-speed.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS -

1. Reduce gross weight to minimum practical (48,000 lb max, lower if practical.)

2. Maintain operating engine above 80% RPM during flap and landing gear extension.

V-16-1

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

3. Consider crossbleed to provide HYD 2 pressure to extend the landing gear normally and to

preserve APU accumulator pressure for emergency braking and emergency nosewheel steering.

• Do not crossbleed if engine and/or AMAD related damage is sus-

pected.

• Extended crossbleeding of a failed engine traps feed tank fuel on that

side if the FIRE light has not been pushed, and may result in a

flameout.

• ATS exhaust may blister paint and cause possible door damage on the

aft underside of the fuselage.

• Starting the APU airborne may result in a BALD shutdown due to

ingestion of exhaust gases into the APU ducting.

4. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

5. Plan approach to make turns using shallow bank angle (≤15°)

6. Do not exceed on-speed AOA in turns.

7. Avoid turns into inoperative engine.

LEFT ENGINE FAILED -

1. FLAP switch - HALF

2. LDG GEAR handle - DN

3. Make a normal landing or a precautionary short field arrested landing (if practical).

RIGHT ENGINE FAILED -

1. FLAP switch - HALF

2. Perform Landing Gear Emergency Extension Procedure.

Short field arresting gear available -

3. Make an arrested landing.

Short field arresting gear NOT available and right engine crossbleed NOT desired/required -

3. EMERG BRK handle - VERIFY PULLED TO DETENT (anti-skid is not available)

4. Make a normal landing.

5. Consider disengaging NWS steering with the paddle switch on touchdown to preserve APU

ACCUM pressure for braking and slow-speed nosewheel steering.

6. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pressure.

V-16-2

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Once stopped or clear of runway -

7. Do not taxi.

Short field arresting gear NOT available and right engine crossbleed IS desired/required -

If APU ACCUM caution light on (i.e., landing gear emergency extended) -

3. Recharge the APU accumulator.

a. Left throttle - ADVANCE to 80%rpm minimum

b. ENG CRANK switch - R

When HYD 2 pressure restored -

c. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (until 10 seconds after APU ACCUM

caution removed -

approximately 30 seconds total)

d. ENG CRANK switch - OFF

With APU ACCUM caution off -

4. APU switch - ON (READY light on within 30 seconds)

5. ENG CRANK switch - R

When HYD 2 pressure restored -

6. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (until 10 seconds after APU ACCUM caution removed - approxi-

mately 40 seconds total)

7. EMERG BRK handle - VERIFY RESET

8. Make a normal landing using normal brakes with antiskid

Once stopped or clear of runway -

9. Do not taxi

16.3 SINGLE ENGINE WAVEOFF/BOLTER

During single engine waveoff or bolter, best single engine rate of climb occurs at or near on-speed

AOA regardless of configuration, lateral weight asymmetry, or gross weight. Due to asymmetric thrust

effects, up to full rudder pedal may be required to oppose yaw/roll. If required, coordinated lateral

stick should be used to maintain wings level.

1. Throttles - MAX

2. Maintain on-speed AOA and balanced flight.

V-16-3

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

3. Climb, then accelerate to a safe altitude/airspeed.

16.4 FORCED LANDING

The aircraft is not designed to land on an unprepared surface. If a suitable landing site is not

available, perform a controlled ejection.

16.5 LANDING GEAR UNSAFE/FAILS TO EXTEND

A landing gear position of three down and locked is indicated by three steady green position lights

in either cockpit with the landing gear warning light and warning tone out. See figures 16-3 and 16-4.

If the LEFT or RIGHT landing gear position indicator is flashing, and the landing gear warning light

and warning tone are on, refer to PLANING LINK FAILURE.

If the landing gear warning light and warning tone are out -

1. AOA indexer lights - CONFIRM ON

2. INTR LT MODE switch - CHECK DAY

3. Landing gear position lights - CHECK FLUSH

4. LT TEST switch - TEST

If bulb(s) test bad -

5. It is safe to assume the landing gear is down and locked.

6. Get a visual inspection (if practical).

D The approach lights should be illuminated if the landing gear is down and locked.

7. Landing gear may be raised as necessary to conserve fuel.

8. Make a normal landing.

If the landing gear warning light and warning tone are on -

1. AOA indexer lights - CONFIRM OUT

2. LT TEST switch - TEST

D Verify that all 3 position lights and the landing gear warning light are on.

3. LDG GEAR handle - CHECK FULL DN (DO NOT CYCLE)

4. LG circuit breaker - CHECK IN

5. Get a visual inspection (if practical).

D If one or more landing gear indicates unsafe, a visual inspection can only confirm general

position and obvious damage.

D There is no external indication of a locked landing gear.

V-16-4

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Perform the following in order until 3 down and locked -

6. LG circuit breaker - CYCLE

7. Perform Landing Gear Emergency Extension Procedure.

8. Perform positive and negative g maneuvers and gently roll and yaw aircraft to obtain safe gear

indication.

If HYD 2A is operative and any gear still unsafe -

9. LDG GEAR handle - PUSH IN then ROTATE 90° CCW

10. LDG GEAR handle - UP (DOWNLOCK ORIDE if required)

11. If all gear up and locked, consider selective jettison of unwanted stores.

D Selective jettison can only be performed with LDG GEAR handle UP and all landing gear up

and locked.

12. LDG GEAR handle - DN

13. Perform Landing Gear Emergency Extension Procedure.

14. Perform positive and negative g maneuvers and gently roll and yaw aircraft to attempt to drive

the unsafe gear down and locked.

If any gear still indicates unsafe -

15. Refer to Landing Gear Malfunction - Landing Guide chart.

If at any time landing gear indicates three down and locked -

16. LDG GEAR handle - DO NOT CYCLE

17. Make minimum sink rate short field arrested landing (if available).

18. Pin the landing gear after landing.

16.6 LANDING GEAR EMERGENCY EXTENSION

1. Consider selective jettison of unwanted stores.

D Selective jettison can only be performed with LDG GEAR handle UP and all landing gear up

and locked.

2. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL

3. Slow below 170 KCAS.

4. LDG GEAR handle - DN

If LDG GEAR handle cannot be moved to the DN position -

5. LG circuit breaker - PULL

V-16-5

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

With LDG GEAR handle DN or UP (DN preferred) -

6. LDG GEAR handle - ROTATE 90° CLOCKWISE then PULL TO DETENT

7. Verify three down and locked.

8. Make a short field arrestment (if practical)

NOTE

If the landing gear was emergency extended with the LDG GEAR

handle in the UP position, the landing gear warning light remains on

with the gear down and locked.

9. EMERG BRK handle - PULL TO DETENT (Anti-skid is not available)

If the forward pressure reducer valve is failed, normal gear extension and

normal braking will be inoperative. If emergency gear extension was

required to achieve three down and locked with a good HYD 2A system,

emergency brakes should be selected prior to landing. If the landing gear

was emergency extended with a good HYD 2A system, emergency brakes

should be selected, as failure of normal braking is anticipated.

If HYD 2B is operative -

10. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (until 10 seconds after APU ACCUM caution removed -

approximately 30 seconds total)

V-16-6

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

16.7 PLANING LINK FAILURE

With the landing gear down and locked, a planing link failure is indicated by a flashing LEFT or

RIGHT landing gear position light, illumination of the landing gear warning light, and annunciation

of the landing gear warning tone.

• A planing link failure may cause a sudden swerve on touchdown in the

direction of the failed gear.

• Planing link failure can be annunciated until after touchdown and may

provide little to no pilot reaction time between initial annunciation

and a violent yaw/swerve. Therefore, if a flyaway airspeed is available,

pilots should be prepared to make the decision to execute the Go

Around procedure immediately at initial planing link failure annun-

ciation.

Planing link failure indications that are momentary or disappear after

initial activation may be indicative of an actual planing link failure.

If detected after touchdown and flyaway airspeed available -

*1. Go Around

If flyaway airspeed not available -

*1. Select emergency brakes (if appropriate).

*2. HOOK handle - DOWN (if required)

If detected airborne, or following go around -

1. LDG GEAR handle - DO NOT CYCLE

2. ANTI SKID switch - OFF

If arresting gear available -

3. Make a fly-in short field arrestment with LSO assistance (if available).

If arresting gear not available -

3. Make a minimum sink rate landing.

4. Consider touchdown on good gear side of runway.

V-16-12

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

5. Avoid braking until as slow as practical or until needed to prevent loss of directional control.

6. Brake using the good gear and maintain directional control with NWS.

7. Use symmetrical braking only if necessary to avoid departing the runway.

• Use of symmetrical wheel brakes with a planing link failure may cause

a sudden swerve in the direction of the failed gear.

• The ability to maintain directional control with braking on the

appropriate side, NWS, and rudder will rapidly decrease as the aircraft

decelerates on rollout.

• Lateral asymmetry on the failed side may aggravate severity of

yaw/swerve in the direction of failed gear.

8. Do not taxi once stopped.

16.8 ARRESTMENT - FIELD

Maximum engaging speeds, gross weights, and off-center distances are listed in the Field Arresting

Gear Data charts, figure 16-5.

16.8.1 Arresting Gear Types. Field arresting gear includes anchor chain, water squeezer, and Morest

types. All types require arresting hook engagement with a crossdeck pendant cable rigged across the

runway. Arresting gear location varies as follows:

• SHORT FIELD - Located 1,500 to 2,000 feet past the approach end of the runway. May require

a request and slight delay to rig.

• MIDFIELD - Located near the halfway point of the runway. May require a request to rig for the

desired direction.

• LONG FIELD or ABORT - Located 1,500 to 2,000 feet short of the departure end of the runway.

Usually rigged for immediate use.

• OVERRUN - Located shortly past the departure end of runway. Usually rigged for immediate

use.

A field may have none, all, or any combination of these arresting gear types. Knowing the type,

location, and compatibility with the aircraft of the installed gear is mandatory. Knowing the local

policy for rigging installed gear is also required.

Wrong direction engagement of chain-type arresting gear can severely

damage the aircraft.

V-16-13

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

16.8.2 Arrestment Decision. The decision to take an arrested landing is dependent on the emergency

situation. In an emergency, use all available means to determine the status of the aircraft (instruments,

other aircraft, LSO, RDO, tower or other ground personnel). Typically, emergencies related to the loss

of the utility hydraulic system (e.g., loss of normal brakes and NWS), or to questionable braking, or

directional control (e.g., planing link failure, blown tire, or brake problem) dictate making an arrested

landing. If in doubt, a precautionary arrested landing is always prudent. If fuel is streaming, a field

arrested landing is not recommended due to the high probability that sparks and heat from the hook

may ignite the fuel.

Once the decision to arrest has been made, determine the best available arresting gear type and

location. Notify the control tower as far in advance as possible and give estimated time to landing in

minutes. Unrigged gear may require 10 to 20 minutes to rig. If winds are light and the emergency

situation dictates, the tower may request an arrested landing on an off-duty runway to retain the

capability to launch and recover other aircraft. If unfamiliar with arresting gear location, consider

making a practice pass.

Engage arresting gear on runway centerline, in the three-point attitude, as slow as practical, and with

feet off the brakes until engagement. After arrestment, common sense and conditions determine

whether to keep engines running or to shut down the engines and evacuate the aircraft.

16.8.3 Arrestment - Short Field. Make a short field arrested landing for anticipated directional

control or brake problems or if minimum rollout is desired. If available, request LSO assistance. The

LSO should have radio communications and be stationed near the touchdown point.

Inform the LSO of the intended touchdown point, if other than immediately before the gear. Lower

the hook before starting the approach and, if possible, get a positive hook down check.

Determine maximum engagement speed at the expected landing gross weight (see figure 16-5). Final

approach speed depends on flap setting and the specific emergency. If required, adjust gross weight to

minimize approach speed. A constant glideslope approach to touchdown is allowed (mirror or fresnel

lens if available). Plan the approach to touchdown on centerline at or just before the arresting wire. If

the required approach speed is in excess of maximum engaging speed, land short, select IDLE power,

and decelerate into the gear. Be prepared for nose gear tire failure above 195 KGS or main gear tire

failure above 210 KGS. Plan for a long field arrestment, if maximum short field engaging speed cannot

be met. If landing at or below maximum engaging speed, maintain approach power until arrestment is

assured. After engagement, retard the throttles to IDLE. Use moderate braking, if available, during

deceleration to prevent aircraft from two-blocking the arresting gear at higher engagement speeds or

gross weights. Secure engines and evacuate the aircraft, if required. If the wire is missed, waveoff

immediately.

16.8.4 Arrestment - Long Field. Make a long field arrestment when there is a stopping problem (e.g.,

aborted takeoff or loss of brakes with no loss of directional control, etc.). If possible, go around and

make a short field arrestment. Lower the hook in time for it to fully extend before engagement

(normally 1,000 feet prior to the arresting gear). Line up on runway centerline. If possible, inform the

control tower of intention to engage the long field gear, so that aircraft landing behind can be waved

off. Do not delay a decision to go around based solely on the availability of long field gear.

16.9 BARRICADE ARRESTMENT

If a barricade arrestment is required, the LSOs will give a detailed briefing of barricade procedures.

1. Burn down or dump fuel as required to obtain the lowest gross weight feasible.

V-16-14

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

2. External ordnance - JETTISON

3. External fuel tanks - JETTISON EXCEPT AS NOTED IN LANDING GEAR MALFUNCTION

- LANDING GUIDE - CARRIER LANDING

NOTE

Barricade engagement with installed AIM-120 and/or AIM-9 missiles is

not recommended. AIM-120 missiles may separate and AIM-9 missiles

will probably separate from the aircraft. Inability to jettison/fire these

missiles does not preclude successful barricade engagement. Barricade

may be engaged with empty external tanks if tanks cannot be

jettisoned. When live ordnance cannot be jettisoned, barricade

engagement should only be attempted with all landing gear down.

4. Fly an on-speed, on-glideslope, on-centerline approach with zero drift all the way to touchdown.

When ″Cut-Cut″ called by LSOs -

5. Throttles - OFF

When aircraft motion ceases -

6. EGRESS

16.10 CV RECOVERY MATRIX

See figure 16-6 for the CV recovery matrix.

V-16-15

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

AIRCRAFT GROSS WEIGHT (x 1,000 POUNDS)

MAXI-

MUM

LANDING

ABORTED TAKEOFF (3)

OFF-

TYPE OF

CENTER

ARRESTING GEAR

ENGAGE-

50.6

MENT

(FEET)

MAXIMUM ENGAGING SPEED (Knots Groundspeed) (1)

E-28 (2)

170

156

138

130

M-21

150

145

140

130

125

120

115

M-31

158

120

150

BAK-9

160

158

148

138

128

BAK-12 (4)

160

150

132

(4)

DUAL BAK-12 (5)

160

BAK-13

160

156

138

130

NOTE

(1) Maximum engaging speed limited by arresting gear capacity, except where noted.

(2) Also for the E-28 systems at Keflavik and Bermuda (standard installations or with 920 foot tapes).

(3) Data provided in aborted takeoff column may be used for emergency high gross weight arrestment.

(4) Standard BAK-12 limits are based on 150 foot span, 1 inch cross deck pendant, 40,000 pound weight setting,

and 950 foot runout. No information available regarding applicability to other configurations. BAK-12

engaging speed limit is 96 knots at 59,000 pounds. Due to runout limitations, it is recommended this gear not

be engaged at weights greater than 59,000 pounds.

(5) Dual BAK-12 limits are based on 150 to 300 foot span, 1-1/4 inch cross deck pendant, 50,000 pound weight

setting, and 1,200 foot runout. No information available regarding applicability to other configurations.

For E-28 or BAK-13 arresting gear systems, two-blocking can occur at

aircraft weights above 50,000 pounds and at engaging speeds above 130

knots. Moderate braking should be utilized during deceleration, if avail-

able, to aid in stopping the forward motion of the aircraft and prevent an

aircraft with idle power from slowly pulling the gear to a two-block

position. If a two-block occurs and aircraft travel reverses, engine thrust

should be applied judiciously to minimize aircraft walkback. Brakes, if

available, should not be utilized during aircraft walkback, as they may

induce the aircraft to tip back onto the exhaust nozzles.

Figure 16-5. Field Arresting Gear Data (Sheet 1 of 2)

V-16-16

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FOR E-5 CHAIN EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR

ARRESTING

LANDING or ABORTED

ABORTED TAKEOFF

GEAR

TAKEOFF UP TO 44,000 LB

TAKEOFF UP TO 50,600 LB

50,700 to

66,000 LB

RATING

STD Chain

Heavy Chain

STD Chain

Heavy Chain

STD Chain

Heavy Chain

E-5

E-5-1

E-5

E-5-1

E-5

E-5-1

E-5

E-5-1

E-5

E-5-1

E-5

E-5-1

E-5-2

E-5-3

E-5-2

E-5-3

E-5-2

E-5-3

E-5-2

E-5-3

E-5-2

E-5-3

E-5-2

E-5-3

FEET of CHAIN

MAXIMUM ENGAGING SPEED (Knots Groundspeed)

300-349

350-399

400-449

450-499

500-549

550-599

600-649

650-699

101

700-749

109

102

750-799

101

118

110

800-849

107

127

101

119

104

850-899

114

136

107

127

112

900-949

120

145

114

135

102

119

950-999

127

150

154

120

144

108

127

1000-1049

133

150

163

126

150

153

113

134

1050-1099

139

150

165

132

150

161

119

142

1100

146

150

165

138

150

165

125

149

NOTE

• Maximum engaging speed for E-5 chain gear is limited by arresting gear capacity.

• Off center engagement into an E-5 system must not exceed 25% of the runway span.

• Before making an E-5 arrestment, confirm the type and chain length of installed gear (tower or

FLIP IFR Supplement) to ensure the corresponding maximum engaging speed is not exceeded.

Figure 16-5. Field Arresting Gear Data (Sheet 2 of 2)

V-16-17

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

NATOPS pages NFM-000/

Malfunction

Pull Fwd

Next Avail

Normal

Divert

Notes

500

ENGINES

Bleed Warning

V-12-3, -4/E54, E55

1, 2, 5

Engine Fire

V-12-5/E56

1, 2, 5

Single Engine

V-16-1/E30

1, 2, 5

L/R STALL

V-12-31/E94

1, 2, 5

L/R ENG

V-12-17/E74

1, 2, 5

L/R ATS

V-12-9/E64

Dual BLD OFF (both bleed warn lts out)

V-12-12/E67

L/R BOOST LO

V-12-13/E68

L/R OIL PR

V-12-29/E91

1, 2

L/R AMAD PR

V-12-7/E61

FUEL

Fuselage Fuel Leak

V-15-4/E6

DUMP OPEN

V-12-16/E73

FUEL LO

V-12-20/E80

L/R FUEL INLT

V-12-19/E80

1, 5

L/R FUEL HOT

V-12-19/E79

FUEL XFER

V-12-21/E81

L/R THERMAL

V-12-32/E96

1, 5

HYDRAULIC

HYD 1A/1B or 2A/2B

V-12-49, -51/E117, E119

2, 5

APU ACCUM

V-12-8/E62

BRK ACCUM

V-12-13/E69

HYD1/2 HOT

V-12-53/E123

1, 2, 5

Single HYD Circuit

V-12-48/E117

2, 5

HYD 1A/2B

V-12-50/E120

Triple Circuit Failures

V-12-52/E122

ELECTRICAL

Dual Gen Failure

V-12-22/V-15-9/E11, E82

4, 8

V-12-22/V-15-11, -12/E14,

Single Gen Failure

E15, E82

Dual T/R Failure

V-15-8, -10/E8

2, 5, 8, 11

L/R DC FAIL

V-12-14/E72

CAUT DEGD

V-12-13/E70

FCS

AHRS Four Channel Failure

V-12-37/E101

AHRS 1/2 Channel Failure

V-12-36/E100

FCS HOT

V-12-42/E107

FLAPS OFF (LEF Fail)

V-12-43/E108

FLAPS OFF (TEF Fail)

V-12-44/E110

FLAP SCHED

V-12-45/E112

FC AIR DAT

V-12-41/E106

Loss Of Any Control Surface

V-12-35/E99

FCES

V-12-35/E99

MISCELLANEOUS

BAY FIRE

V-12-11/E66

BAY DISCH

V-12-11/E66

Blown tire

V-14-4/E19

Birdstrike

TBD

L BAR

V-12-6/E58

Remove CDP 1

and 4

Planing Link

V-16-9/E16

SDC Failure

I-2-166/ -

Refer to Figure 16-2. Land-

Landing Gear

V-16-7/E26

ing Gear Malfunction -

Landing Guide

OBOGS DEGD

V-12-28/E90

AV AIR HOT

V-12-10/E65

NOTES:

1. Aircraft will be flying a half flap straight-in. Approach speed will be higher, therefore wind over deck requirements will increase. Consult applicable ARB

for details. Possibility of malfunction affecting other engine. Make sure all possible effort is made to recover aircraft immediately.

2. Aircraft may require a tow out of the landing area.

3. Immediate tanking required if any delay in recovery exists.

4. Pilot will be unable to fold wings upon landing.

5. For HYD 2A or Dual T/R failure, landing gear will be emergency extended and aircraft will be committed to a dirty bingo if unable to recover. Consider

bingo options before extending landing gear.

6. Problem could be symptomatic of a fuel leak. If so, immediate recovery is required.

7. Approximately 4400 pounds of fuel will be available in the engine feed tanks.

8. If battery gauge reads 24 volts, the essential bus is being powered by the aircraft battery and 4 to 7 minutes of flight remains.

9. Aircraft will be flying straight-in approach. If half-flap approach required, approach speed will be higher. Consult applicable ARB for WOD requirements.

10. Aircraft will be flying 10° AOA full or half flap straight-in approach. Approach speed will be higher; therefore, wind over deck requirements will increase.

Recovery WOD should be kept as close as possible to ARB recommendations.

11. Unable to transfer external fuel. Consider divert or jettison of external tanks.

Figure 16-6. CV Recovery Matrix

V-16-18

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 17

Ejection

17.1 EJECTION

The ejection seat must be used to escape from the aircraft in flight. If the canopy fails to jettison

during the ejection sequence, the seat will eject through the canopy.

17.1.1 Ejection Seat Restrictions. During ejection seat development and testing, the SJU-17B(V)

2/A, and 9/A NACES seats were qualified for use by aviators with nude weights from 136 to 245. The

minimum and maximum nude body weights allowed by OPNAVINST 3710.7 Series for those on

aviation duty are 100 pounds and 235 pounds, respectively. Therefore, a gap exists between the ejection

seat certified weight range and the weights of the current aviator population.

• Operation of the ejection seat by personnel weighing less than the

qualified minimum nude weight, or more than the maximum qualified

weight (noted above), subjects the occupant to increased risk of injury.

• An increased risk of severe injury or death during parachute landing fall

(PLF) exists with surface winds exceeding 25 knots. High surface winds

contribute directly to total landing velocity. When time permits, select

parachute steering and turn into the wind to reduce landing velocity.

• Pilots should be trained in additional ejection risks associated with

JHMCS. Ejection with JHMCS may cause severe or fatal injury.

The ejection seat catapult was designed for the qualified weight range only. Ejection seat stability

is directly related to occupant restraint. All occupants should be properly restrained in the seat by the

torso harness for optimum performance and minimum injury risk. Inertial reel performance may be

degraded for occupants outside of the certified weight range

17.1.1.1 Injury Risks - Nude Weight Less than 136 Pounds. Lighter weight occupants are subject to

a higher risk of injury due to the following factors:

1. Excessive pull back during inertial reel retraction.

2. Poor positioning during ejection.

3. Greater acceleration during catapult firing.

4. Higher parachute opening shock during ejections near the upper end of Mode 1 (approaching 300

KCAS).

V-17-1

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

5. Seat instability during drogue deployment during ejections above 300 KCAS.

Lighter weight aircrew have greater risk of neck injury during ejection

while using the JHMCS configuration. Minimum nude aircrew weight

authorized to fly with the JHMCS helmet system is 136 pounds. Aircrew

weighing less than the authorized minimum nude weight are restricted

from flying with the JHMCS helmet system.

17.1.1.2 Injury Risks - Nude Weight Greater than 245 Pounds. Heavier weight occupants are

subject to a higher risk of injury due to the following factors:

1. Poor positioning during ejection due to insufficient pull back during inertial reel retraction.

2. Insufficient altitude to clear the aircraft tail structure.

3. Insufficient altitude for full parachute inflation in zero/zero cases or at extremely low altitude/

airspeed.

4. Higher descent rates during parachute landing.

17.1.1.3 Airspeed during Ejection. Ejection analysis shows:

1. Optimum speed for ejection is 250 KCAS and below.

2. Between 250 and 600 KCAS, appreciable forces are exerted on the body, making ejection more

hazardous.

3. Above 600 KCAS, excessive forces are exerted on the body making ejection extremely hazardous.

When possible, slow the aircraft before ejection to reduce the forces on the body.

Never actuate the manual override handle in flight, as ejection would then be impossible and the

aircrew would be unrestrained during landing. When the manual override handle is actuated, the

ejection seat SAFE/ARMED handle is rotated to the SAFE position, the aircrew is released from the

seat, and the harness cannot be reconnected.

If the seat becomes unlocked and slides partially up the rails, ejection

and/or parachute deployment is still possible but the ejection handle

must be pulled, followed by activation of the manual override handle.

Under these circumstances, low altitude ejection capabilities are compro-

mised.

Whenever possible, ejection airspeed should be limited to a maximum of 400 KCAS when flying with

the JHMCS helmet system.

V-17-2

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

The JHMCS configuration can contribute to increased neck loads during

ejection, particularly at moderate to high speeds. Generally, neck loads

increase as ejection airspeed increases and may cause severe or fatal

injury. Aircrews should eject at the lowest possible airspeed to minimize

neck and injury loads.

NOTE

Aircrew will brief system peculiarities and potential injury from out of

position and high speed ejections prior to each flight when using

A/A24A-56 JHMCS lightweight HGU-55 A/P helmet.

17.1.2 Low Altitude Ejection. The minimum altitude required for a successful ejection is dependent

on sink rate, airspeed and bank angle, and airspeed and dive angle. The effects of sink rate are shown

in figure 17-1. The effects of airspeed and bank angle are shown in figure 17-2. The effects of airspeed

and dive angle are shown in figure 17-3.

The decision to eject at low altitude must be based on these factors to ensure a successful ejection.

Additionally, ejection seat trajectory is improved if the aircraft is zoomed to a higher altitude prior to

ejection initiation. The additional altitude increases time available for seat separation and parachute

deployment. However, do not delay the decision to eject if the aircraft is nose-down and cannot be

leveled.

With wings level and no sink rate, ejection is feasible within the following parameters:

1. Ground level - zero airspeed.

2. Surface to 50,000 feet MSL - 600 KCAS maximum.

Ejection at low altitude allows only a matter of seconds to prepare for landing. Over water, inflation

of the LPU is the most important step to be accomplished. Release of the parachute quick-release

fittings as the feet contact the water is the second most important step to prevent entanglement in the

parachute shroud lines.

When ejection is in the immediate vicinity of the carrier, parachute entanglement combined with

wake and associated turbulence can rapidly pull a survivor under. The deployed seat survival kit may

contribute to shroud line entanglement. Be prepared to cut shroud lines if the parachute is dragging

the survivor.

The crashed aircraft may release large quantities of jet fuel and fumes which could hamper breathing

and/or create a fire hazard. If jet fuel is present, do not use a flare marker. The emergency oxygen

system may be invaluable in this case. If emergency oxygen is required, do not discard the survival kit,

as this terminates the availability of emergency oxygen. However, totally discarding the survival kit

may be appropriate after considering weather, sea conditions, and rescue potential.

V-17-3

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Low altitude ejection may result in parachute canopy disintegration due

to the aircraft impact fireball.

The variety and complexity of conditions encountered during the “time critical” actions following a

low altitude, overwater ejection make it impossible to formulate procedures to cover every contingency.

17.1.3 High Altitude Ejection. The basic low altitude procedure is applicable to high altitude

ejection. The zoom is useful to slow the aircraft to a safer ejection speed or to provide more time and

glide distance if immediate ejection is not necessary. If the aircraft is descending out of control, eject

by 6,000 feet AGL. Even if under control, do not delay ejection below 2,000 feet AGL. Head the aircraft

toward an unpopulated area, if possible.

17.1.4 Ejection Procedures. See figure 17-4.

17.2 DITCHING

In the event ejection has failed and the aircraft must be ditched, see figure 17-5.

17.3 SEAWATER ENTRY

If downed in seawater, SEAWARS releases the parachute canopy within 2 seconds. However, if able,

manually unlock each canopy release immediately on seawater entry. The SEAWARS does not operate

in freshwater.

V-17-4

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

SJU-17

Ejection Preparations

EJECTION INJURIES AND BODY POSITIONING

THESE PROPER BODY POSITIONS

MUST BE TAKEN TO PREVENT INJURIES

1. Press head firmly against headrest.

5. Press buttocks firmly against the seat back.

2. Elevate chin slightly (10°).

6. Place thighs flat against seat.

3. Press shoulders and back firmly against seat.

7. Press outside of thighs against side of seat.

4. Hold elbows and arms firmly towards sides.

8. Place heels firmly on deck, toes on rudder pedals.

If ejection occurs without QDC properly stowed in QMB, death will

probably result from neck injury.

EJECTION INITIATION

There are two acceptable methods for ejection initiation; the two-hand grip and the

single-hand grip.

Two-hand method -

1. Grip the ejection handle with the thumb and at least two fingers of each hand, palms

toward body.

Keep elbows close to body.

Single-hand method -

1. Grip handle with the strong hand, palm toward body. Grip wrist of strong hand with

other hand, palm toward body. Keep elbows close to body.

Both methods -

2. Pull handle sharply up and toward abdomen, keeping elbows in. Ensure handle

pulled to end of travel. Continue holding handle until seat/man separation.

NOTE

In low altitude situations, a one-handed method, using one hand to initiate

ejection and the other to maintain the aircraft in the safe operating envelope of

the ejection seat, may be required. If firing the seat by this method, particular

attention must be paid to maintaining proper body position.

Figure 17-4. Ejection Procedures (Sheet 5 of 13)

V-17-12

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

The aircraft should be ditched only when ejection has failed.

DUTIES BEFORE IMPACT

1. Make radio distress call.

8. Oxygen mask - TIGHTEN

2. IFF - EMERGENCY

9. Lower seat, assume position for ditching

3. External stores - JETTISON

(feet on rudder pedals, knees flexed).

4. Landing gear - UP

10. Shoulder Harness - LOCK

5. Flaps - DOWN

11. Canopy - JETTISON

6. Arresting Hook - DOWN

12. Fly parallel to swell pattern.

7. Visor - DOWN

13. Attempt to touch down along wave crest.

14. Throttles - OFF BEFORE IMPACT

DUTIES AFTER IMPACT

1. Manual override handle - PRESS BUTTON AND ROTATE AFT AND UP

2. Shoulder harness - RELEASE

3. Emergency oxygen - ACTIVATE

NOTE

In the event of under water egress, it is possible to survive underwater with

oxygen equipment until escape can be made.

4. Stand straight up without twisting to release survival kit sticker clips from the seat.

If the cockpit has flooded, the LPU may have inflated due to the FLU-8 water

activated automatic inflation device. If so, care must be taken during exit to avoid

catching the lobes causing entanglement or LPU damage.

5. Abandon aircraft.

6. If the LPU has not automatically inflated - INFLATE

7. Deploy survival kit and inflate life raft.

Should aircraft be abandoned under water, exhale while ascending to the surface to

prevent bursting of lungs due to pressure differential between lungs and outside of

body.

Figure 17-5. Ditching Procedures

V-17-21 (Reverse Blank)

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 18

Immediate Action

18.1 GENERAL

This chapter contains only immediate action items. It is intended for review only and does not

contain any steps which are not immediate action nor does it contain notes, cautions, warnings, or

explanatory matter associated with particular procedures.

18.2 APU FIRE LIGHT

GROUND

*1. Throttles - OFF

IN FLIGHT or on GROUND

*2. APU FIRE light - PUSH

*3. FIRE EXTGH READY light - PUSH

18.3 DUAL L BLEED and R BLEED WARNING LIGHTS//L/R ATS CAUTION

*1. Throttles - Minimum practical

*2. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*3. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

*4. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

18.4 SINGLE L BLEED or R BLEED WARNING LIGHT

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

*2. BLEED AIR knob - L OFF or R OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

If light still on, do the following in order until the light goes out -

*3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

*4. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*5. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

*6. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

V-18-1

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

18.5 FIRE LIGHT

GROUND

*1. Throttles - OFF

*2. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

*3. FIRE EXTGH READY light - PUSH AND HOLD UNTIL DISCH LIGHT COMES ON (5

sec.

max.)

IN FLIGHT

Dual FIRE lights -

*1. Throttles - Minimum practical

Single FIRE light or Dual when side confirmed -

*2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

*3. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

*4. FIRE EXTGH READY light - PUSH AND HOLD UNTIL DISCH LIGHT COMES ON (5

sec.

max.)

*5. HOOK handle - DOWN

18.6 ENGINE CAUTIONS

L/R EGT HIGH, L/R ENG, L/R ENG VIB, L/R FLAMEOUT, L/R OIL HOT,

L/R OIL PR, L/R OVRSPD, and L/R STALL

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

18.7 L/R FUEL INLT CAUTION

*1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

*2. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

18.8 HYD1 (2) HOT CAUTION

*1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

18.9 OBOGS DEGD CAUTION//HYPOXIA/LOW MASK FLOW//LOSS OF CABIN

PRESSURIZATION/CABIN CAUTION LIGHT BELOW 47,000 FEET

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

V-18-2

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

18.10 HOT START

If EGT climbs rapidly through 750°C -

*1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

18.11 BRAKE FAILURE/EMERGENCY BRAKES

*1. Brakes - RELEASE

*2. EMERG BRK handle - PULL TO DETENT

*3. Brakes - APPLY gradually

18.12 EMERGENCY CATAPULT FLYAWAY

If flyaway airspeed available -

*1. Throttles - MAX

*2. Rudder pedal - FULL AGAINST YAW/ROLL

*3. EMERG JETT button - PUSH

*4. Maintain 10° to 12° pitch attitude with W symbol.

D Do not exceed 14° AOA (AOA tone).

If unable to arrest yaw/roll or stop settle -

*5. Eject.

18.13 ABORT

*1. Throttles - IDLE

*2. Speedbrake - AS DESIRED

*3. Brakes - APPLY

*4. Stick - AFT below 100 knots (if required)

*5. HOOK handle - DOWN (if required)

18.14 LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL DURING TAKEOFF OR LANDING/ PLANING LINK

FAILURE

If detected after touchdown and flyaway airspeed available -

*1. Go Around.

If flyaway airspeed not available -

*1. Select emergency brakes (if appropriate).

*2. HOOK handle - DOWN (if required)

V-18-3

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

18.15 COCKPIT SMOKE, FUMES, OR FIRE

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

*4. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

18.16 OCF RECOVERY

*1. Controls - RELEASE, FEET OFF RUDDERS, SPEEDBRAKE IN

If still out of control -

*2. Throttles - IDLE

*3. Altitude, AOA, airspeed, and yaw rate - CHECK

If command arrow present -

*4. Lateral stick - FULL WITH ARROW

When command arrow removed -

*5. Lateral stick - SMOOTHLY NEUTRAL

When recovery indicated by AOA and yaw rate tones removed, side forces subsided, and

airspeed accelerating above 180 KCAS -

*6. Recover.

Passing 6,000 feet AGL, dive recovery not initiated -

*7. Eject.

18.17 SINGLE ENGINE FAILURE IN LANDING CONFIGURATION

*1. Throttles - MAX

*2. FLAP switch - HALF

*3. Maintain on-speed AOA and balanced flight.

18.18

POD FIRE/MECHANICAL MALFUNCTION

If fire/malfunction exists and presents a hazard to the aircraft -

*1. Jettison affected pod (as necessary)

V-18-4

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 19

Instrument Flight

19.1 INSTRUMENT FLIGHT

19.1.1 Before Takeoff. If instrument flight is expected immediately following takeoff, thoroughly

check navigation equipment and crosscheck the HUD and standby flight instruments. If flight in icing

conditions is anticipated, perform an engine anti-ice detector test (ENG ANTI ICE switch to TEST).

If icing conditions are anticipated immediately after takeoff, place the ENG and PITOT ANTI ICE

switches to ON just prior to takeoff roll.

19.1.2 Inflight. During instrument flight, particularly in icing conditions, frequently crosscheck

standby flight instruments to verify that the primary systems are functioning normally. A slowly

flashing velocity vector indicates that the INS is providing valid attitude information but the FCC air

data functions are the source for the velocity vector.

19.1.3 Approaches.

19.1.3.1 Descent. If fuel conservation is of concern, an enroute descent should be flown at 250 KCAS

and IDLE power. Advancing the throttles slightly to ‘‘pucker’’ the nozzles reduces drag and results in

a slightly more efficient descent.

19.1.3.2 Holding. Fly the holding pattern as directed/depicted. For maximum endurance, maintain

approximately 225 to 250 KCAS between 15,000 and 25,000 feet MSL. Total fuel flow should be

approximately 4,000 pph.

19.1.3.3 Non-Precision. The navigation aids available provide excellent position keeping capability

with multiple redundancy and steering cues. INS offset data can be used to provide accurate steering

to a TACAN IAF and the CRS select option can be used to obtain a visual reference on the MPCD and

to provide steering cues on the HUD.

Penetration should be flown at 250 KCAS and approximately 75% N₂ rpm with the speedbrake as

required to control descent rate. Dirty up at 10 nm from touchdown.

19.1.3.4 Precision Approaches. The downwind leg should be flown at 230 to 250 KCAS with gear UP

and flaps AUTO. Transition to the landing configuration when directed or no later than 6 nmi from

touchdown. To begin descent, lower the velocity vector to approximately -3° and maintain onspeed

AOA. Small changes in velocity vector placement can be used to control glideslope. Set the RALT at

decision height and be prepared for missed approach.

19.2 DEGRADED SYSTEMS

If the INS fails, the ATT switch should be placed to STBY.

VI-19-1

(Reverse Blank)

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 20

Extreme Weather Procedures

20.1 ICE AND RAIN

Before flight, check with the weather service for the location of the freezing level and probable icing

conditions. Flight through known or suspected icing conditions should be avoided, if possible, to

prevent engine FOD from ice ingestion.

Prolonged flight in icing conditions is an emergency situation. Flight duration which allows a

noticeable accumulation of ice (more than 3/8 inch) on the LEFs constitutes prolonged flight. Ice forms

rapidly on the inlet lip and, if allowed to accumulate, can be drawn into the engine causing compressor

stalls and/or major FOD. Severe icing conditions can result in rapid ice accumulation in a very short

time. An INLET ICE caution should serve as a warning to take action to avoid further ice

accumulation.

If icing is anticipated or encountered -

1. Perform an engine anti-ice detector test (ENG ANTI ICE - TEST) to verify proper detector

operation.

20.1.1 Ground Operation.

If ambient temperature between 0 and 7°C -

1. Minimize engine operation above IDLE to reduce the potential for ice accumulation on the engine

inlet lips. Inlet lip icing can occur at these conditions without the INLET ICE caution.

If visible moisture exists (rain, fog) and the temperature is 45°F (7°C) or less -

1. ENG ANTI ICE switch - ON (after engine start)

2. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - ON (after taxi but prior to takeoff)

If an INLET ICE caution appears prior to takeoff -

1. Do not takeoff. Return to the line and have the engines inspected for possible FOD.

20.1.2 Inflight.

If icing is anticipated or encountered -

1. Enter the clouds at the last possible moment. If on top, descend rapidly.

2. ENG ANTI ICE switch - ON

3. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - ON

VI-20-1

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Figure 20-1. Icing Danger Zone

If no ice is visible on the LEFs -

4. Airspeed - Increase until INLET TEMP is at least +5°C (+10°C preferred) on ENG format (if

possible).

5. Climb or descend out of icing danger zone (figure 20-1).

Monitor INLET TEMP and Mach. If time and fuel permit, climb to a safe altitude. Altitudes

above about 25,000 feet or ambient temperatures below -30°C generally prevent ice formation

since the water droplets are frozen and do not adhere. Descend only if sure that ambient

temperature is well above freezing at a safe altitude below.

When clear of icing conditions -

6. ENG ANTI ICE switch - OFF

If ice is visible on the LEFs -

4. Throttles - Reduce below 80% N₂ rpm (if possible). Avoid throttle transients above 90% N₂ rpm.

5. Airspeed - Maintain above 250 KCAS.

6. AOA - Maintain less than 6° (if possible) to prevent ice accumulation on underside of LEX.

7. Avoid abrupt maneuvers and bank angles over 20°.

8. Descend rapidly below the freezing level.

VI-20-2

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

For landing -

9. WINDSHIELD switch - ANTI ICE or RAIN (as required)

The ANTI-ICE position should be used as required to clear the windshield of ice and/or visible

moisture.

Do not operate the windshield anti-ice/rain removal system on a dry

windshield. If a WDSHLD HOT caution appears, place the WIND-

SHIELD switch to OFF immediately to prevent heat damage to the

windshield.

10. Reduce airspeed and lower the landing gear at the last possible moment (minimizes ice

accumulation on the gear).

If a missed approach is necessary -

11. Slowly advance throttles to the minimum power required for a safe waveoff.

12. Raise landing gear and flaps as soon as possible.

Post-flight -

13. Report all icing encounters (INLET ICE caution) on VID MAF to ensure the engine is inspected

for FOD before the next flight.

20.1.3 Landing in Heavy Rain. Refer to the Wet Runway Landings section in chapter 7.

If landing in heavy rain -

1. WINDSHIELD switch - RAIN

Do not operate the windshield anti-ice/rain removal system on a dry

windshield. If a WDSHLD HOT caution appears, place the WIND-

SHIELD switch to OFF immediately after landing to prevent heat

damage to the windshield.

For wet (standing water) runway conditions -

2. Reduce gross weight to minimum practical.

3. ANTI-SKID switch - VERIFY ON (shore based)

4. Land onspeed or slightly slow with the power reduced to IDLE as soon as possible.

If directional control is comfortable after touchdown -

5. Use maximum antiskid braking to minimize landing distance.

VI-20-3

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 21

Hot Weather Procedures

21.1 GENERAL

On the ground, the avionics ground cooling fan should provide adequate avionics cooling up to an

ambient temperature of approximately 103°F. Inflight, the ECS controller should provide adequate

avionics cooling at all conditions.

With outside air temperature greater than 103°F, fuel recirculation through the heat exchangers

during ground operations may be insufficient at IDLE RPM to keep engine and AMAD oil temperature

within limits. Increasing the affected engine rpm increases circulation and should clear an OIL HOT

caution within 20 seconds (normal operating system).

Under adverse conditions (i.e. hot, heavy, and forward CG), takeoff speeds may be significantly

higher than those seen at nominal conditions. Knowing the aircraft predicted takeoff performance

should prevent a high speed abort in what is a normally functioning aircraft.

21.2 GROUND OPERATIONS

If OAT is approaching or is above 103°F -

1. Non-essential avionics equipment (radar, TCN, IFF, etc.) ON and BIT then OFF (if required)

2. Consider increasing one engine at or above 74% N₂ rpm (if possible)

3. ENG format - Monitor ENG OIL TEMP (149°C) and AMAD OIL TEMP (88°C)

4. Avionics equipment - ON JUST PRIOR TO TAKEOFF

If AV AIR HOT or L or R OIL HOT cautions appear -

5. Perform the appropriate caution corrective action procedures.

The AV AIR HOT caution corrective action procedures should remove the caution if the ECS system

is operating normally. If the caution cannot be cleared with the ECS MODE switch in AUTO,

maintenance action is required.

21.3 INFLIGHT

At nominal ambient conditions, the aircraft fuel system should provide adequate cooling for the

FADECs and subsystem accessories. With extremely hot ambient conditions, feed tank fuel tempera-

tures can approach the 59°C inflight limit. During low altitude flight in hot conditions, particularly

with a low fuel state, an L or R FUEL HOT caution may appear. If sufficient cooling is unavailable,

the L or R OIL HOT cautions may also appear.

If OAT is approaching or is above 103°F -

1. Monitor feed tank fuel temperatures.

VI-21-1

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

If the L or R FUEL HOT or OIL HOT cautions appear -

2. Perform the appropriate corrective action procedures.

3. Land as soon as practical.

21.4 DESCENT/RECOVERY

The windshield may fog rapidly under conditions of very high aircraft descent rates and high

humidity. In such conditions, consider preheating the windshield by placing the DEFOG handle to

HIGH. If possible, the maximum comfortable cockpit temperature should be maintained to aid in

windshield defog.

If OAT is approaching or is above 103°F -

1. Consider turning off non-essential avionics equipment before entering the landing pattern.

21.5 AFTER LANDING

During ground operations with fuel temperatures above 40°C, the LCS pump and ground cooling fan

are commanded on regardless of RADAR knob position to provide ram air cooling for the fuel system.

Placing the RADAR knob to OFF postflight removes the radar as a heat source, aids LCS/fuel cooling,

and should extend ground operating time.

Once clear of the runway -

1. Avionics equipment - OFF

2. RADAR knob - OFF

If line shutdown -

3. Canopy - LEAVE OPEN

If hotpits -

3. Monitor feed tank fuel temperatures.

NOTE

The ground L or R FUEL HOT caution thresholds are 79°C with less

than 5,000 pounds of fuel and 59°C with more than 5,000 pounds of

fuel.

If feed tank fuel temperatures are approaching limits -

4. Consider shutting down the left engine (significantly reduces the heat load).

If a L or R FUEL HOT caution appears -

5. Perform the corrective action items.

VI-21-2

ORIGINAL

EA-18G. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008) - page 9