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• WYPT # displayed to right of distance when WYPT boxed.

• Three-letter identifier displayed to right of distance when TCN boxed.

• HUD and MPCD distance agree.

• HUD format available on DDI, MPCD, or UFCD (both cockpits).

11. HSI symbology - CHECK on MPCD

a. HDG/TK set switch - SLEW (both cockpits)

• Heading bug moves in correct direction.

• Digital display and bug setting agree.

b. CRS set switch - SLEW (both cockpits)

• Steering arrow rotates in correct direction.

• Digital display and steering arrow agree.

c. TCN bearing and range - CHECK

• Symbol displayed at appropriate position when compared to a waypoint or known landmark.

• Digital display and symbol agree.

12. Standby flight instruments - CHECK (both cockpits)

a. Standby rate of climb indicator

• Indicates ±100 fpm or less during level 1g flight.

• Pointer movement smooth during climbs/descents.

b. Standby attitude reference indicator

(1) Perform a 360° roll right and left

• No gyro tumble.

(2) Perform a loop.

• Gyro indications are smooth thru bullseye.

c. Standby airspeed indicator

• Agrees with HUD.

• Pointer movement is smooth during airspeed changes.

d. Standby altimeter

• Agrees with HUD (accept -100 to 400 feet of error since value is uncorrected by FCC air data

function).

• Pointer and drum movement is smooth and does not hang up during thousand-foot changes.

13. INS/GPS operation - CHECK

a. TCN update - PERFORM

• Proper update mechanization.

• Reject update.

b. DSG update - PERFORM

• Proper update mechanization.

• Reject update.

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c. GPS HERR/VERR - CHECK

• Less than 100 feet inflight (with keyed MAGR).

14. IFF operation - CHECK

• ATC reports valid mode 3 and C.

If/when possible -

a. IFF MASTER switch - EMERG

• ATC reports valid emergency squawk (7700).

15. Radar/HOTAS functionality - CHECK (both cockpits)

a. A/A master mode - CHECK

b. A/G master mode - CHECK

10.5.12 10,000 Feet Checks.

FCS RIG check - 10,000 feet

Only perform if:

• Aircraft symmetrically loaded.

• External/internal wing tank fuel asymmetry less than

300

pounds

a. Autopilot mode - Disengage in 1g flight

b. T/O TRIM button - PUSH (4 seconds minimum)

• Do not retrim laterally or directionally for duration of check.

c. Airspeed - Maintain 300 KCAS

d. Stick - RELEASE from wings level

• Time to roll through 30° AOB must be ≥ 10 seconds.

• Roll rate ≤ 3°second.

e. Repeat steps c and d at 400 KCAS

f. Repeat steps c and d at 500 KCAS

LEF/HDU stall check - 10,000 feet

a. G-warm - PERFORM

• 4g for 90°

• 6g for 90°

• -1g pushover to check for cockpit foreign objects.

b. FCS page - CHECK

• G-LIM value not Xd out.

• No G LIM 7.5G caution.

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c. Speed - Accelerate to 0.9 to 0.93 Mach

d. Roll to 90° AOB, retard the throttles to IDLE, and smoothly pull to g-limiter.

At 25° AOA -

e. Terminate the maneuver.

• No ″abrupt″ rolling tendency.

• No FLAP SCHED caution.

• No BLIN code 256 (channel identifies weak HDU)

HYD system check - 10,000 feet

• May be accomplished in conjunction with the FCS RIG accel and LEF/HDU decel.

a. Stabilize at 350 to 375 KCAS (less than 0.65 Mach).

• HYD pressure is 3,000 psi (+300/-400).

b. Accelerate toward 450 KCAS.

• HYD pressure increases to 5,000 psi (+400/-500) by 420 KCAS.

c. Decelerate towards 300 KCAS.

• HYD pressure returns to 3,000 psi (+300/-400) by 330 KCAS.

Emergency landing gear extension - PERFORM

a. FLAP switch - HALF

b. Slow below 170 KCAS.

c. LG circuit breaker - PULL

• Rear cockpit landing gear UNSAFE light on.

d. LDG GEAR handle - DN

e. LDG GEAR handle - ROTATE 90° CLOCKWISE then PULL TO DETENT

• LDG GEAR handle stays in detent.

• Gear extends within 30 seconds

• APU ACCUM caution displayed.

f. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (until APU ACCUM caution removed - approximately

seconds)

With the LDG GEAR handle outboard (DN position) -

g. LDG GEAR handle - PUSH IN then ROTATE 90° CCW

Pause 5 seconds -

h. LG circuit breaker - RESET

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5. AOA warning tone - CHECK

With gear down and flaps HALF -

a. Increase AOA toward 15°.

• AOA warning tone comes on at 14 ± 0.5°

6. PA throttle transients - 10,000 feet (INDIVIDUALLY)

With gear down, flaps HALF, and at onspeed AOA -

a. Throttle affected engine - IDLE to MAX

• Afterburner lights within 8 seconds.

b. Throttle affected engine - MAX to IDLE, pause 3 seconds, IDLE to MAX

• Afterburner lights within 8 seconds.

• Engine responds smoothly with no stall, stagnation, or flameout.

c. Repeat steps a and b for opposite engine

7. LDG GEAR handle - UP

8. Wheels warning - CHECK

a. Descend below 7,500 feet MSL

b. Reduce airspeed below 175 KCAS.

c. Establish rate of descent greater than 250 fpm.

• Landing gear warning light flashes.

• Landing gear warning tone sounds.

9. FLAPS switch - AUTO

10.5.13 High Altitude (above 30,000 feet).

1. Cabin pressurization - MONITOR

Above 24,500 feet MSL, cabin pressurization shall remain within

psi

differential

actual

altitude. A rule of thumb is altitude x 0.4.

Aircraft Altitude

Cabin Altitude

• Less than 30,000 feet

10,000 to 12,000 feet

• 40,000 feet

15,000 to 17,000 feet

2. Throttle transients - 35,000 ± 2,000 feet (INDIVIDUALLY)

a. ENG ANTI ICE switch - CHECK OFF

b. Airspeed - Maintain 200 to 220 KCAS

c. Throttle affected engine - IDLE to MAX

• Afterburner lights within 12 seconds.

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d. Throttle affected engine - MAX to IDLE, pause 3 seconds, IDLE to MAX

• Afterburner lights within 12 seconds.

• Engine responds smoothly with no stall, stagnation, or flameout.

e. Repeat steps a thru d for opposite engine

10.5.14 10,000 Feet to Landing.

Fuel transfer - CHECK (throughout flight)

With external fuel available -

• External fuel transfers normally.

• Internal tanks fill/stay near full.

With external tanks empty -

• Tank 1 depletes to approximately 1,000 pounds prior to wing tanks depleting.

When wing tanks are empty -

• Tanks 1 and 4 fall in approximately ¼ ratio.

• No FUEL XFER caution.

With fuel in tanks 1 and 4 -

• Feed tanks stay at or near full (2,100 to 2,450 pounds).

RALT operation - CHECK

During descent through 5,000 feet AGL -

• Low altitude warning correctly comes on.

• Radar altitude tracks correctly during descent.

• Verify flashing B changes to a solid R when passing through 5,000 feet AGL.

TCN or WYPT course intercept - PERFORM

• Course deviation indicator in HUD corresponds with steering arrow on MPCD.

ILS/ACLS operation - CHECK (if available)

• Proper ILS and/or ACLS indications.

ALQ-99 Pods - OFF

10.5.15 Landing Checks.

1. Landing checklist - COMPLETE

2. ATC approach mode - CHECK

• ATC advisories in HUD when selected.

• Throttles respond correctly.

• Holds onspeed AOA during turns and on approach.

10.5.16 After Landing Checks.

1. Anti-skid system - CHECK

Above 75 KGS on landing -

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a. Brake pedals - Apply full brake pressure

• Anti-skid cycles smoothly.

• No left or right pulling tendencies.

When clear of active runway -

2. Ejection seat SAFE/ARMED handle(s) - SAFE (both cockpits)

3. EJECT MODE handle - NORM (rear cockpit)

4. Landing gear handle mechanical stop - FULLY ENGAGED

5. FLAP switch - AUTO

6. T/O TRIM button - PRESS UNTIL TRIM ADVISORY DISPLAYED

7. Mask(s) - OFF (both cockpits)

8. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF (both cockpits)

9. OBOGS control switch - OFF

10. Canopy - EITHER FULL UP OR FULL DOWN FOR TAXI

10.5.17 Before Engine Shutdown Checks.

1. PARK BRK handle - SET

2. BIT display - RECORD DEGD/FAIL INDICATIONS

3. BIT/HYDRO-MECH page - VERIFY absence of FADEC fault codes

4. Verify radar postflight IBIT is complete.

5. Perform aircraft ERASE as appropriate.

6. RADAR knob - OFF

7. FCS display - RECORD BLIN CODES

8. EFD - RECORD MSP CODES

9. INS - PERFORM POST FLIGHT UPDATE

• Maximum error is 1.5 nm per hour of operating time.

10. INS knob - OFF

11. Standby attitude reference indicator - CAGE (both cockpits)

12. HMD switch - OFF (both cockpits)

13. Sensors, avionics, CVRS, and AEA UFCD avionics - OFF

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14. EXT and INTR lights knobs - OFF (both cockpits)

15. Canopy - CHECK CLEAR/OPEN

16. QDC - DISCONNECTED AND STOWED

10.5.18 Engine Shutdown Checks.

1. Brake accumulator gauge - CONFIRM 3,000 PSI

2. Paddle switch - PRESS (disengage NWS)

3. Confirm 5 minute engine cool down.

4. OBOGS control switch - OFF

5. BLEED AIR knob - OFF

6. Throttle - OFF (alternate sides)

7. Verify proper switching valve operation.

After hydraulic pressure decays through 500 psi -

a. FLAP Switch - FULL

b. If aileron, rudder, or LEF surfaces X and the Xs do not clear after one FCS reset attempt,

maintenance action is required.

c. If one FCS reset attempt was required to reset surfaces Xs, cycle FLAP switch to AUTO then

back to FULL. If Xs reappear, maintenance action is required.

8. FCS page - Verify no channel is completely Xd out.

9. COMM 1 and 2 knobs - OFF (both cockpits)

10. L (R) DDI, HUD, and MPCD knobs - OFF (both cockpits)

11. Other throttle - OFF

When amber FLAPS light illuminates -

12. BATT switch - LEAVE ON

• Battery gauge reads 23 to 24 vdc (nominal).

• Automatic battery cutoff operates at 2 minutes.

13. FCF Profile A - COMPLETE

10.6 FCF CHECKLIST - PROFILE C

1. Perform engine start, taxi, and takeoff IAW NATOPS

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10.6.1 10,000 Feet Checks.

FCS RIG check - 10,000 feet

Only perform if -

• Aircraft symmetrically loaded.

• External/internal wing tank fuel asymmetry less than 300 pounds

a. Autopilot mode - Disengage in 1g flight.

b. T/O TRIM button - PUSH (4 seconds minimum)

• Do not retrim laterally or directionally for duration of check.

c. Airspeed - Maintain 300 KCAS

d. Stick - RELEASE from wings level

• Time to roll through 30° AOB must be ≥

10 seconds.

• Roll rate ≤ 3°second.

e. Repeat steps c and d at 400 KCAS

f. Repeat steps c and d at 500 KCAS

LEF/HDU stall check - 10,000 feet

a. G-warm - PERFORM

• 4g for 90°.

• 6g for 90°.

• -1g pushover to check for cockpit foreign objects.

b. FCS page - CHECK

• G-LIM value not Xd out.

• No G-LIM 7.5G caution.

c. Speed - Accelerate to 0.9 to 0.93 Mach

d. Roll to 90° AOB, retard throttles to IDLE, and smoothly pull to g-limiter.

At 25° AOA -

e. Terminate the maneuver.

• No ″abrupt″ rolling tendency.

• No FLAP SCHED caution.

• No BLIN code 256 (channel identifies weak HDU).

FCF Profile C - COMPLETE

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10.7 FCF CHECKLIST - PROFILE D (REAR COCKPIT)

1. When a profile D is required solely by the reconfiguration of the rear cockpit, perform engine

start, taxi, and takeoff IAW NATOPS.

10.7.1 Preflight Checks.

1. UFCD adapter - VERIFY NOT INSTALLED

10.7.2 Before Taxi Checks.

1. Rudder pedal adjustment - CHECK

• Smooth through full range of travel.

• Locks securely when RUD PED ADJ lever released.

2. Stick and rudder pedals - CYCLE

• No binding through full travel.

3. Throttles - Advance to MIL momentarily. Do not allow engine rpm to exceed

80%.

• No binding or sticking through range of travel.

• No engine shutdowns when pulled to IDLE.

10.7.3 Taxi Checks.

1. Braking system - CHECK

a. Normal brakes - CHECK

• Nominal braking performance at taxi speed.

b. EMERG BRK handle - PULL TO DETENT

• Handle latches securely in detent.

• Nominal braking performance at taxi speed.

c. EMERG BRK handle - NORM

2. Nosewheel steering - CHECK IN HIGH MODE L/R

• NWS responds appropriately in NWS and NWS HI.

• NWS disengages when paddle switch pressed.

10.7.4 Medium Altitude (above 10,000 feet).

1. Flight control damping - CHECK

a. Airspeed - Maintain 300 to 350 KCAS

b. Make small, abrupt pitch, roll, and yaw inputs.

• Aircraft response is appropriate.

• No oscillation tendencies noted.

2. Throttles - CYCLE INTO AB

• Nominal engine response to throttle position.

• Afterburners light off normally and cancel when MIL selected.

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3. COMM switch - CHECK

• Comm switch functions normally.

• Both radios operative in transmit and receive.

4. Speedbrakes - CHECK

a. Speedbrake switch - HOLD AFT

• Speedbrake surfaces extend normally.

• SPD BRK light on when surfaces not fully retracted.

b. Speedbrake switch - RELEASE

• Speedbrake surfaces retract fully.

In front cockpit -

c. Speedbrake switch - HOLD AFT

• Speedbrake surfaces extend normally.

In rear cockpit -

d. Speedbrake switch - HOLD FWD

• Speedbrake surfaces retract (rear cockpit override).

e. Speedbrake switches - RELEASE

5. Radar/HOTAS functionality - CHECK

a. A/A master mode - CHECK

b. A/G master mode - CHECK

6. FCF Profile D COMPLETE

10.8 FCF CHECKLIST - PROFILE E

1. Perform engine start, taxi, and takeoff IAW NATOPS.

10.8.1 10,000 Feet Checks.

1. Emergency landing gear extension - PERFORM

a. FLAP switch - HALF

b. Slow below 170 KCAS

c. LG circuit breaker - PULL

• Rear cockpit landing gear UNSAFE light on.

d. LDG GEAR handle - DN

e. LDG GEAR handle - ROTATE 90° CLOCKWISE then PULL TO DETENT

• LDG GEAR handle stays in detent.

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CHAPTER 11

Flight Characteristics

NOTE

The information provided in this chapter is based on F/A−18 E/F and

limited EA−18G flight testing. In some cases, specific F/A−18 E/F

flight test results are provided. The limited EA−18G flight testing did

not show significant differences in flight characteristics from the

F/A−18 E/F.

11.1 HANDLING QUALITIES.

The flight control system (FCS) is designed to present handling qualities that provide virtually

carefree maneuvering of the aircraft throughout most of the flight envelope. A thorough understanding

of these flight characteristics along with the details of the flight control system described in Chapter

2 and the operating limitations detailed in Chapter 4, allows the pilot to safely and effectively exploit

the full capabilities of the airplane.

11.1.1 Flight Control Mode Effects on Handling Qualities. Handling qualities are dependent on

which mode the flight control system is operating. FCS mode is determined primarily by the FLAP

switch position: power approach (PA) mode with the FLAP switch in HALF or FULL or up/auto (UA)

mode with the FLAP switch in AUTO. However, if airspeed is above approximately 240 KCAS, the

flight controls switches to, or remains in, UA mode regardless of FLAP switch position. FCS control

laws are also designed to minimize transients when switching flight control modes.

11.1.2 Handling Qualities with Flaps HALF or FULL. The FCS employs full-time AOA and pitch rate

feedback with flaps HALF or FULL. Therefore, longitudinal trim is required to maintain constant

AOA and/or airspeed. Once trimmed to an AOA, the aircraft tends to remain at that AOA until

changed by longitudinal stick or trim. The stick force gradient with AOA is constant up to 12° AOA

and does not vary with aircraft gross weight or center of gravity. Above 12° AOA, increased AOA

feedback increases stick forces as an artificial stall warning cue. Handling qualities are excellent up to

the 14° AOA limit. Maximum AOA at full aft stick with flaps HALF or FULL is approximately 25°

AOA. However, due to degraded handling qualities and reduced departure resistance above 15° AOA,

particularly with abrupt inputs, flight at greater than 14° AOA with flaps HALF or FULL is

prohibited.

The FCS provides good lateral directional control of the aircraft. The rolling surface to rudder

interconnect (RSRI) function along with sideslip and sideslip rate feedback are used to coordinate

lateral inputs, reducing pilot workload by allowing feet-on-floor maneuvering for most situations.

11.1.2.1 Stalls with Flaps HALF or FULL. The aircraft does not exhibit a classic stall break with flaps

HALF or FULL and both configurations are very departure resistant up to the 14° AOA limit for

normal two-engine operation, even with symmetric and asymmetric store loadings (see Single Engine

Operation). Roll and yaw control remain positive up to the 14° AOA limit in either flap setting but is

better above 10° AOA with flaps HALF. With flaps FULL, a distinct longitudinal buffet is felt at or

above 11 to 12° AOA which serves as a stall warning cue. This buffet tends to be more pronounced at

heavier gross weights and with wing tank loadings but does not adversely affect climb performance or

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handling qualities. Above the AOA limit, uncontrollable roll-offs are possible in either flap setting,

particularly with high lateral weight asymmetry store loadings. An intermittent warning tone will

sound beginning at 14° AOA with an increasing beep frequency as AOA increases up to full aft stick.

11.1.2.2 Takeoff and Landing. Low gain nosewheel steering (NWS) incorporates yaw rate feedback

to stabilize directional control during the takeoff and landing roll. Maintaining runway position

without NWS using differential braking alone may be difficult. Crosswinds have minimal effect on

takeoff characteristics and only a small amount of lateral stick into the wind is required to keep the

wings level during the takeoff roll. Nosewheel lift-off speeds are dependent on CG location and aircraft

gross weight. At nominal and forward CG locations, the airplane requires aft stick to effect rotation.

Premature aft stick application during the takeoff roll can result in early nosewheel lift-off and

potential over-rotation, particularly with aft CG.

• Pitch attitudes in excess of 10° during takeoff rotation may result in

ground contact between engine exhaust nozzles and/or stabilators.

• With combinations of heavy gross weight, forward CG, high density

altitudes and late takeoff rotation, ground speed can exceed the

maximum nose gear tire speed of 195 knots ground speed (see

NATOPS performance charts).

Additionally, landing gear speed limits can be easily exceeded during shallow climbs after takeoff

with MAX power.

With large lateral weight asymmetries, there is a slight tendency to yaw into the heavy wing during

the initial ground roll and again during the takeoff rotation. Otherwise, takeoff characteristics are very

similar to symmetric store loadings. Directional trim may be required after takeoff for balanced flight

with store asymmetries. A small lateral-directional transient may occur during configuration changes

from flaps HALF to AUTO or from flaps AUTO to HALF. The lateral transient occurs since TEFs are

deflected differentially for lateral control with flaps AUTO and the additional lateral control results in

an associated directional transient due to the rolling-surface-to-rudder interconnect.

Normal approach and landing characteristics are excellent; with good speed stability and solid

lateral-directional handling qualities. With crosswinds, a wings-level crabbed approach with removal of

half the crab angle just prior to touchdown minimizes deviations from runway heading and landing

gear side loads during landings. Touchdown in a full crab angle results in an uncomfortable roll

opposite the crab angle and upwind drift, requiring large rudder pedal inputs to align the aircraft with

the runway. Likewise, removing the crab angle entirely results in downwind drift and directional

transients after touchdown. A wing down, top rudder approach results in excessive bank angle and is

not recommended.

With flaps HALF or FULL, handling qualities with large lateral weight asymmetries are virtually

identical to those with symmetric loadings; however, landing with crosswinds from the heavy wing side

results in less roll away from the wind at touchdown. With large lateral asymmetries, the aircraft will

fly with the heavy wing forward. Upon landing the aircraft will yaw into the heavy wing as the aircraft

straightens to its ground track. Once airborne on a touch and go or bolter, the aircraft will yaw away

from the heavy wing as the aircraft trims to a heavy wing forward position. Regardless of wind

conditions, the aircraft tends to yaw away from the heavy wing during periods of heavy braking but the

yaw is easily countered with a small rudder pedal input.

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11.1.3 Flaps AUTO Handling Qualities. The FCS control laws create handling qualities that are

slightly different from aircraft with conventional flight control systems. The most apparent charac-

teristics are the neutral speed stability at low AOA and the excellent maneuverability at high AOA.

Neutral speed stability occurs since the FCS automatically attempts to keep the aircraft in 1g, zero

pitch rate flight. This has the effect of eliminating the need for frequent longitudinal trim adjustments,

lowering pilot workload for most tasks; however, some tasks are made slightly more difficult. For

example, during large airspeed changes, the aircraft may initially appear to be slightly out of trim for

a few seconds until FCS re-establishes 1g flight. Since pitch trim biases the FCS away from 1g flight,

any pitch trim used during large airspeed changes must be removed within a few seconds of

establishing the new airspeed and only adds workload. Additionally, during climbs or dives, a small but

constant forward stick force is required to maintain a constant pitch attitude and load factor. Again,

if pitch trim is used to eliminate these stick forces, additional short trim inputs will be required to

re-establish

1g flight, further increasing pilot workload. Another task with a slightly increased

workload is the instrument penetration/approach where neutral speed stability may cause difficulty in

maintaining a desired airspeed.

The longitudinal handling qualities are excellent with good pitch rate and damping that combine to

allow very aggressive maneuvering. FCS control laws modify aircraft response to stick inputs, creating

the effect of changing stick forces to provide pilot cueing in maneuvering flight. Actual stick forces for

a given stick displacement do not change with flight condition. Full forward and aft stick requires a 20-

pound push and 37-pound pull, respectively. At high airspeeds, the FCS is a g-command system

requiring 3.5 pounds of stick force per g. At medium airspeeds, the FCS acts as a hybrid pitch rate and

g-command system. Pitch rate feedback is used to increase apparent stick force per g as a cue of

decaying airspeed and available load factor. At low airspeed, the FCS is primarily an AOA command

system using AOA feedback above 22° to provide increasing stick force with increasing AOA. The

maximum commanded AOA is approximately 45° to 50° at full aft stick. Combined with the capability

to command high AOA is the ability to generate high nose-down pitch rates with large forward stick to

rapidly reduce AOA, particularly below approximately

200 KCAS. This nose-down pitch rate

capability is further enhanced as airspeed decreases to 150 KCAS. When airspeed is below 150 KCAS

and longitudinal stick is pushed far forward (greater than 1.7 inches), up to full stabilator, maximum

rudder flare-out, and LEX spoiler are commanded to rapidly get the aircraft nose moving down. This

FCS feature was added to enable pilots to rapidly reduce AOA when at low airspeed and high AOA for

quick nose repositioning. To maintain departure resistance, the enhanced nose-down pitch rate

capability is reduced when lateral stick is deflected more than one inch.

The g-limiter function in the FCS limits commanded load factor under most flight conditions to the

symmetric load limit (N_zREF) based on gross weight below 57,400 pounds gross weight. Above 57,400

pounds, N_zREF is held constant at 5.5g even though the allowable load factor may be below N_zREF

(refer to g-limiter).

NOTE

Above 57,405 pounds gross weight, an over-g will occur if the pilot

solely relies on the g-limiter.

Very abrupt full aft stick commands with aft CG conditions can beat the g-limiter and cause a

positive over-g (811 MSP code). Likewise, very abrupt pushes can result in a negative over-g (925 MSP

code). Care should be taken during all abrupt maneuvers. During positive rolling maneuvers, the

g-limiter also reduces commanded load factor to 80% of N_zREF. This feature can also be defeated with

abrupt lateral stick inputs at elevated-g. Abrupt full lateral stick inputs at N_zREF may result in an

aircraft overstress without setting an 811 or 925 over-g MSP code.

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Another flight characteristic related to g-limiter performance occurs during very high bleed rate

turns where even with full aft stick, load factor may be slightly less than N_zREF. This can happen when

the aircraft decelerates much faster than the FCS can position the stabilators to maintain N_zREF.

Additionally, during elevated-g maneuvering at transonic flight conditions, the g-limiter unloads the

aircraft (and N_zREF) by as much as 1.0 to 1.7g. This feature helps prevent an aircraft overstress that

could result from the classic aerodynamic phenomenon known as ‘‘transonic pitch-up’’ experienced

during elevated-g decelerations at transonic flight conditions.

At low angles of attack, the aircraft is extremely smooth with little sensation of changing airspeed

or Mach. However, at transonic flight conditions, the aircraft may exhibit a mild buffet, which is more

pronounced with empty wing pylons or interdiction loadings but is almost nonexistent with clean

wings. Buffet begins at approximately 0.88M, subsides by 0.95M, and presents a sensation much like

riding on a ″gravel road″. Airframe buffet is also noticeable in the cockpit while maneuvering at tactical

speeds between approximately 6° and 11° AOA. At low altitudes, this AOA range begins at

approximately 6 g but at high altitude begins at 2g to 3g. Above this AOA range, the buffet sensation

at the cockpit subsides slightly but is still apparent in the airframe. Although this buffet at elevated-g

is present in all configurations, it is most apparent with empty wing pylons at transonic flight

conditions. Additionally, persistent but bounded wing rock or roll-off may occur at some flight

conditions if the maneuvers linger in the 8 to 13° AOA range. Formation flight in the buffet AOA region

also exhibits a slightly higher workload. When carrying inboard fuel tanks or ALQ-99 pods with

ALQ-99 pods midboard, mild Nz transients may occur in 1-g flight from 0.92 to 0.94M.

The speedbrake function provides very good deceleration capability at subsonic flight conditions.

Deploying the speedbrake function results in a small nose-up transient; a small nose-down transient

during retraction. These transients still allow the speedbrake function to be used comfortably during

formation flight. With speedbrake function fully deployed, the aircraft may feel sloppy in the yaw axis

during large rudder pedal inputs due to one rudder stalling. With lateral weight asymmetries, a small

sideforce may also be apparent when deploying the speedbrake function. At most supersonic flight

conditions up to 1.5 Mach number, the spoilers are the only active speedbrake surface due to limited

effectiveness of the other surfaces. Deceleration capability is still adequate with throttles at IDLE; with

one exception. When less than MIL thrust is selected above 1.23 Mach number, the engine fan speed

lockup feature (to prevent engine inlet instability) maintains MIL thrust levels, which has the side

effect of limiting deceleration capability until fan speed lockup deactivates at 1.18 Mach number.

Lateral-directional handling qualities are also excellent, particularly at high AOA. Roll rates and roll

damping combine to provide very agile roll control. The FCS attempts to maintain consistent roll

response throughout the 1g flight envelope. Additionally, rolling surface to rudder interconnects

coordinate lateral inputs, reducing pilot workload by allowing feet on the floor maneuvering under

most circumstances. Maximum roll rates are in the 200 to 225°/second range with clean wings and

approximately 130 to 150°/second with wing tanks and/or air-to-ground stores. Flight tests with wing

tank loadings demonstrated a very localized drop in maximum roll rate of approximately 50°/second

at 0.92 to 0.93 Mach number, most notably at 20,000 feet. The FCS reduces maximum roll rate by 40

to 60°/second at high subsonic airspeeds and low altitudes (approximately 0.90 Mach number below

10,000 ft), due to structural load concerns. For additional structural loads concerns during negative-g

rolls, maximum roll rate capability is reduced to approximately 60 to 80°/second above approximately

550 KCAS.

The most obvious lateral-directional characteristic is the excellent maneuverability at high AOA as

a direct result of specific FCS high AOA control laws. At 25° AOA and above, rudder pedal deflections

no longer provide yaw control inputs but instead act entirely as a roll control (identical to lateral stick

input) by commanding aileron and differential stabilator with the RSRI commanding the required

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rudder deflection for roll coordination. Rudder pedal inputs are summed with lateral stick inputs and

this combined input is limited to a value equal to a full lateral stick input. Therefore, applying pedal

opposite to lateral stick cancels lateral stick inputs proportional to the pedal input, i.e. full opposite

pedal cancels a full lateral stick command resulting in zero roll rate. Between 13° and 25° AOA, rudder

pedal deflections gradually change from pure yaw controllers to pure roll controllers. This method of

control provides enhanced departure resistance at high AOA.

Some traditional yaw control with rudder pedal is returned at low airspeed and high AOA only when

the pilot applies lateral stick and rudder in the same direction. This feature is effective only at

airspeeds below 225 KCAS and between 25° and 40° AOA. During flight tests, the most effective

pirouette initiation was found at approximately 200 KCAS and 35° AOA. Enabling this feature outside

of these conditions would compromise departure resistance. When this feature is enabled, the sum of

lateral stick and rudder pedal command is no longer limited to a value equal to a full lateral stick input.

The excess roll command is fed to the directional axis to command sideslip. For example, adding full

rudder pedal with a full lateral stick input provides a maximum roll and yaw command. Alternatively,

adding lateral stick to an existing full rudder pedal input has the same effect. The resulting aircraft

motion is a highly controllable nose-high to nose-low reversal.

Small lateral trim variances may occur without significant changes in airspeed, AOA, or Mach

number. These variances result from small changes in internal or external wing tank fuel asymmetry

and may require more frequent lateral trim inputs. Lateral trim changes may also be required as flight

conditions change with asymmetric store loadings or if one or more flight control surfaces are slightly

out of rig. Additionally, small sideslip excursions (1 to 3°) are common during steep climbs and

descents, even with symmetric store loadings. These excursions are non-oscillatory in nature and are

controllable with minimal rudder pedal inputs.

In general, flying qualities are also very good with large lateral weight asymmetries. The aircraft

tends to roll toward the heavy wing at elevated g such as during a pull off target during an air-to-ground

attack; away from the heavy wing at negative g. In each case, the roll is easily countered with lateral

stick. Additionally, roll coordination may be slightly degraded with large lateral stick inputs and may

require rudder pedal to maintain balanced flight. At high AOA, the aircraft tends to yaw away from the

heavy wing. Yaw-off should be expected above 25° AOA. Opposite rudder pedal may be required to

maintain controlled flight.

11.2 DEFENSIVE COMBAT MANEUVERING.

11.2.1 Over-the-Top Maneuvering. The aircraft exhibits excellent slow speed over-the-top maneu-

verability. Aft stick is required near the top of looping maneuvers to keep the nose tracking until the

nose is below the horizon and airspeed is increasing. If aft stick is not maintained, AOA feedback

results in nose-down stabilator which eventually reduces AOA below 22°. Once below 22° AOA, neutral

longitudinal stick results in an inverted, nose-high attitude with only a small amount of pitch rate as

the FCS attempts to maintain 1g. If airspeed is allowed to decay in this attitude, or is insufficient to

complete the maneuver, a tailslide may result (see Departure Characteristics).

11.2.2 Slow Speed Maneuvering. The excellent controllability and maneuverability at high AOA

provided by FCS control laws result in very precise nose pointing at extremely low airspeeds. When

large and abrupt heading reversals are required during offensive or defensive maneuvering at high AOA

and low airspeed, two features discussed earlier allow the pilot to accelerate aircraft motion without

compromising departure resistance. The first is the enhanced nose-down pitch rate capability below

200 KCAS which allows very rapid nose-down pitch pointing to acquire the target at the end of a flat

scissors engagement or to rapidly reduce AOA to maximize energy addition. The second is the

″pirouette″ turning capability at high AOA and low airspeed which allows very rapid and controllable

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nose-high to nose-low heading reversals. These two features combine to significantly enhance

maneuverability at high AOA, allowing the pilot to quickly bring the nose to bear on air-to-air

opponents.

11.3 OCF - OUT-OF-CONTROL FLIGHT

11.3.1 Departure Resistance. A departure is defined by aircraft motion that is contrary to flight

control inputs. Flight test has shown the aircraft is very resistant to departure from controlled flight

with symmetric loadings. No departure tendencies were found for single-axis control inputs and for the

majority of multi-axis inputs. A few departure tendencies exist with multi-axis inputs, but these were

usually found to occur beyond the 360° bank angle change limitation (two exceptions are described in

11.3.2.1). Nose high, slow speed maneuvers that result in insufficient maneuvering airspeed or a

tailslide will cause a departure. Overall, the aircraft is very departure resistant when flown within

NATOPS limits. Additionally, clean and multiple store loadings (including aft CG), have shown no

self-sustaining falling leaf mode. For all known departure modes, following NATOPS out-of-control

(OCF) recovery procedures results in rapid recovery.

11.3.2 Departure Characteristics. The typical departure occurs as a yaw divergence (nose-slice)

followed by an uncommanded roll in the same direction. Usually, a departure is preceded by a buildup

in sideforce. This sideforce is often accompanied by ″vortex rumble″ generated from excessive sideslip.

″Vortex rumble″ may not be noticeable during aggressive maneuvering; therefore, excessive sideforce

provides the most reliable departure warning cue. The initial phase of the departure is not particularly

violent or disorienting unless it occurs at high airspeed or Mach number. The yaw rate warning tone

may not provide sufficient departure warning. Post-departure gyrations self-recover with controls

released. Application of controls during post-departure gyrations may delay recovery.

11.3.2.1 Maneuvering within NATOPS Limits. There are three typical departure cases found for

flight within NATOPS limits.

1. Forward corner inputs below 300 KCAS.

Lateral stick and/or pedal combined with forward inputs at low airspeed may cause a departure prior

to reaching 360° bank angle change limit if AOA transitions from positive to zero or negative during

the roll. The departure is characterized by a dwell at 0 g, followed by a sideslip build-up and

subsequent moderate yaw rate spike (40 to 50 °/sec) and AOA increase. Subtle differences in roll rate

and nose-down pitch rates being generated by such inputs make it difficult to predict whether a

departure or favorable (faster than normal) roll rates will occur.

Lateral stick and/or pedal combined with forward inputs at low airspeed

may cause a departure.

2. Lateral stick with pedal and forward stick at high altitude and supersonic speeds.

This input is predicted to cause a departure that could result in aircraft damage. This departure is

possible at supersonic airspeed above 40,000 ft MSL and within 360° of bank angle change.

3. Tailslides and over-the-top maneuvering with insufficient airspeed.

NATOPS prohibits zero airspeed tailslides and intentional departures or spins. The obvious

consequence of over-the-top maneuvering with insufficient airspeed is departure from controlled

flight. In general, tailslides that are purely vertical induce departures that are benign and quick to

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recover. Tailslides with large yaw angle (nose vertical but 3 to 9 line off the horizon) or over-the-top

maneuvering with sizable bank angle and insufficient airspeed usually result in a ″sideslide″ type

motion. The resulting sideslide departure motion is similar to vertical but typically is accompanied

by an abrupt roll snap before the aircraft settles nose low. If the sideslide motion yields excessive

gravity-induced sideslip at relatively slow airspeed (<90 KCAS), the resulting yawing motion from

the growing aerodynamic forces can quickly develop into a spin. If the aircraft falls inverted, then the

AOA will simultaneously build negative and may result in an inverted spin. Inverted spins from

sideslides are slower to recover than upright sideslide recoveries.

11.3.2.2 Maneuvering Outside of NATOPS Limits.

NOTE

The following describe the known departure characteristics of the

aircraft if flown outside of the NATOPS limits.

11.3.2.2.1 Exceeding 360° Roll Limit. Certain airspeed and control input combinations held for

greater than the NATOPS bank angle change limit of 360° can lead to departures. Lateral stick with

pedal and forward stick from high g near 300 KCAS may result in a severe departure, with yaw rates

reaching above 100°/sec a possibility. Another severe departure is possible when slowly pulling aft stick

(less than 1 inch/sec) while rolling with a full lateral stick input below 210 KCAS, if initiated near 1 g.

This departure can generate yaw rates briefly in excess of 120°/sec and negative g spikes from -2 to -3

g. Each of these departures was found only to occur when controls were held beyond the 360° bank

angle change limit.

11.3.2.2.2 Exceeding Asymmetric Loading AOA Limits. Exceeding NATOPS limits for asymmetric

store loadings can also lead to departures. Aggressive longitudinal maneuvers that result in AOA

beyond NATOPS limits can lead to a benign departure that begins as a slow roll toward the heavy wing

and yaw away from the heavy wing that cannot be controlled with lateral stick or rudder pedal.

Recovery is immediate as soon as AOA is reduced to within limits. Large sideslips create a greater risk

of a more violent departure. At higher speeds, aggressive maneuvering at elevated-g above AOA limits

can result in sudden departures with little or no warning. If limits are exceeded and a departure does

occur, post departure gyrations rapidly transition to an upright spin away from the heavy wing.

Recovery from this type of departure has been demonstrated with up to a 24,000 ft-lb lateral weight

asymmetry following NATOPS OCF recovery procedures (see Spin Characteristics).

11.3.2.3 Maneuvering with Flight Control System Failures. Continued maneuvering with flight

control system failures such as surfaces failed off (X’s in all channels of that actuator), air data, or other

sensor failures can also lead to departure. The flight control system is designed to provide adequate

flying qualities with actuator and other FCS failures as long as AOA and load factor are maintained

within NATOPS limits. In the event of FCS failures, reducing AOA and load factor to wings level 1 g

flight as soon as possible minimizes the possibility of a departure. If a departure does occur, following

OCF procedures results in the most rapid recovery.

11.3.3 Spin Characteristics. Entry into a spin is rare for a symmetrically loaded aircraft. On a few

occasions, moderate yaw rate spins have developed from departures experiencing large gravity-induced

sideslip excursions (e.g. sideslips or nose-high slow airspeed flight while banked near 90°). If AOA is

simultaneously negative, the spin will be inverted.

For high lateral weight asymmetry loadings, the aircraft is extremely departure resistant within

NATOPS AOA limits. Exceeding AOA limits for high lateral weight asymmetries will most likely result

in an upright spin away from the heavy wing. Spin recoveries for less common upright spins into the

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heavy wing, and inverted spins, can be delayed due to the oscillatory nature of the spin. Spin recovery

has been extensively proven for lateral asymmetries up to 14,000 ft-lb for both spins into and away

from the heavy wing with positive recoveries demonstrated in all cases.

Spin characteristics and recovery with asymmetries greater than 14,000 ft-lb have not been fully

tested. A departure with 24,000 ft-lb of asymmetry resulted in a high yaw rate spin (greater than

100°/sec) within 3 to 5 seconds. Recovery occurred within two to three turns and about 10,000 feet of

altitude loss after applying NATOPS OCF recovery procedures. High yaw rate spins typically result in

longitudinal accelerations at the pilot seat as high as -3.5 g (eyeballs out). Consequently, accomplishing

spin recovery procedures can be difficult with an unlocked seat harness.

Spin recovery is straightforward and reliable if the OCF procedures are followed and sufficient

altitude remains. If a spin is encountered (Spin recovery display on the DDI), recovery occurs very

shortly after initiating NATOPS OCF recovery procedures, particularly from inverted spins. Recovery

from spins with high lateral weight asymmetry may require an additional turn or two.

Selection of manual spin recovery mode (SPIN switch in RCVY) seri-

ously degrades controllability, prevents recovery from any departure or

spin, and is prohibited.

NOTE

During highly oscillatory spins or spins that transform from upright to

inverted or from inverted to upright, the spin recovery display may

disappear momentarily.

11.4 DEGRADED MODE HANDLING QUALITIES.

The reliability of the FCS is very high and when failures do occur, usually occur singly. No single

electrical failure affects flying qualities and multiple FCS failures are required to degrade flying

qualities. Depending on which combination of failures has occurred, flying qualities may be consider-

ably degraded. Degraded flying qualities associated with some of the more serious or more common

FCS failures are described here. Appropriate corrective action is presented in the Warning/Caution/

Advisory Displays, figure 12-1.

11.4.1 Single Engine Operation.

11.4.1.1 Flaps AUTO. Engine failure or shutdown with flaps AUTO results in no degradation in

handling qualities under most circumstances at low AOA. A small amount of yaw trim may be required

to counter asymmetric thrust effects. At high AOA, engine failure results in a yaw toward the failed

engine that is controllable by quickly reducing AOA and countering the yaw with rudder. During hard

maneuvering, a slight degradation in handling qualities may be noticeable at less than 1.0 Mach

between approximately 400 to 500 KCAS where the hydraulic system normally operates at 5,000 psi.

At these conditions 5,000 psi operation is inhibited by the FCS to maintain a windmill air-start

capability. When 5,000 psi operation is inhibited, flying qualities may be degraded during aggressive

maneuvers since there may not be enough hydraulic power to fully deflect numerous flight control

surfaces. A reduction in departure resistance can also be expected anytime normal 5,000 psi hydraulic

system operation is inhibited.

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11.4.1.2 Flaps HALF or FULL. Single engine minimum control speed (Vmc) is defined as the

minimum airspeed required to maintain controlled flight with one engine operating. Vmc airspeeds

were determined at 14° AOA for catapult launches, and 12° AOA for all other circumstances. Vmc

airspeed varies depending on AOA, lateral asymmetry, altitude, and day temperature. For an engine

failure off the catapult, 14° AOA provides the best compromise between arresting rate of descent off

the bow and controllability (increased AOA helps arrest sink but also reduces lateral-directional

controllability). In all cases, once control is established (and sink is stopped), allow the aircraft to

accelerate to on-speed to provide the best flyaway handling qualities. When an engine fails in flaps

HALF or FULL, the first perceptible aircraft motion is a yaw toward the failed engine. The rudders are

the primary flight control surface used to counter the yaw caused by the operating engine. Use rudder

to coordinate flight. Using too little rudder pedal may not counter yaw and may cause controllability

problems. In addition to yawing into the failed engine, the aircraft also tends to roll into the failed

engine. The natural pilot reaction is to oppose the roll with lateral stick, but the resulting differential

aileron deflection generates adverse yaw and increases the demand on the rudders to maintain

directional control. As AOA increases above 10° AOA, the aircraft becomes less directionally stable and

rudder control effectiveness deteriorates. In this instance, the rudders may become saturated (surfaces

against the stops). When saturated, the rudders cannot counter any additional adverse yaw, resulting

in an increase in sideslip and the potential for an adverse yaw departure. If airspeed is too slow, the

rudders cannot generate enough control power to oppose the yaw toward the failed engine.

For some situations, controllability alone will not guarantee flyaway (e.g., excessive rate of descent),

but may only ensure controllability for a long enough period of time to complete the requisite

immediate action procedures and make a timely ejection decision, if warranted.

It is recommended aircrew perform a familiarization check of aircraft response to control and

throttle inputs, including a maximum power waveoff maneuver, prior to attempting a shipboard

landing.

When single engine with the operating engine at MAX, the possibility of

an adverse yaw departure increases as AOA exceeds on-speed.

NOTE

• In straight and level flight, a small amount of lateral and/or directional

trim is required to maintain balanced flight.

• Loss of either HYD 1 or HYD 2 due to engine failure or hydraulic

pump failure does not effect flight control with flaps AUTO; however,

failure of either HYD 1 or HYD 2 with flaps in HALF or FULL may

cause uncommanded but controllable yaw and roll transients as the

switching valves cycle. These yaw and roll transients may last 3 to 6

seconds.

• To prevent repeated switching valve cycling, avoid stabilized flight

where engine windmill rpm results in hydraulic pressure fluctuations

between 800 and 2,000 psi.

11.4.1.3 Single Engine Waveoff. Refer to Chapter 16, paragraphs 16.1 and 16.3.

11.4.2 Leading Edge Flap Asymmetry. Leading edge flap asymmetries can occur when one of the

LEF hydraulic drive units (HDU) stalls/fails or the mechanical interconnect between the inboard and

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outboard LEF surfaces fails. The most common LEF asymmetry results from a weak LEF HDU that

stalls

(stops moving due to aerodynamic loading) during abrupt longitudinal maneuvers at high

airspeed and low altitude. When this happens, a roll-off away from the failing HDU as AOA or g is

increased followed by an abrupt roll-off in the opposite direction is typical. Failure detection logic in

the FCS software is designed to provide advanced warning of a LEF asymmetry; however, during

extremely abrupt maneuvers, an HDU stall may not be detected in time to allow the pilot to abandon

the maneuver and avoid a large roll transient. The FCS software uses two specific monitors to detect

weak LEF HDUs. The first monitor results in a FLAP SCHED caution accompanied with BLIN 256.

It sets and holds the FLAP SCHED caution for 6 seconds following the HDU stall. The second monitor

results in a FLAP SCHED caution accompanied by a BLIN 537. When accompanied by a BLIN 537,

the FLAP SCHED caution is displayed only as long as the failing HDU condition exists (e.g., when

AOA >12°).

Avoid high-g maneuvers at low altitude if an HDU stall has been detected during the flight (BLIN

256 or 537 on the FCS status page) even if the FLAP SCHED caution has cleared. BLINs 256 and 537

indicate a weak/failing HDU that may result in very large roll transients and/or over-g during high-g

maneuvers.

11.4.2.1 LEF Failure Landing Handling Qualities (Symmetric or Asymmetric). With a LEF failure,

the LEF symmetric commands are frozen when the FLAP switch is set to AUTO; however, differential

LEF and TEF continue to be commanded. With the FLAP switch set to HALF or FULL, the LEF

commands are frozen while the TEF and aileron droop commands follow the normal schedules for flaps

HALF or FULL. Shore based and ship based flight tests were conducted with LEF frozen at both

symmetric and asymmetric (up to 34°/5° LEF split) deflections. Straight in, on-speed approaches in

flaps HALF are recommended for all frozen symmetric or asymmetric LEF configurations. General

flying qualities, as well as waveoff and T&G performance are acceptable for all LEF configurations.

Light to moderate buffet is present in most of the LEF configurations, especially for AOA greater

than on-speed. The buffet is more pronounced with LEF deflections significantly less than the normal

scheduled positions. Selecting flaps FULL with small LEF deflections results in higher buffet levels at

lower AOAs than with the FLAP switch set to HALF. Noticeable buffet is normal near on-speed

conditions with either HALF or FULL flaps for the degraded LEF condition, but may be uncomfort-

able during maneuvering. Maintaining on-speed or slightly fast approach AOA (to minimize buffet)

results in the best flying qualities for any off-schedule symmetric or asymmetric (left/right) LEF

configuration. Where practical, flying slightly fast (6-7° AOA) minimizes exposure to the buffet. For

carrier landings, the tendency to fly the approach in a ″fast″ condition should be avoided because the

recovery WOD requirements are based on the on-speed approach airspeed. Flying a ″fast″ approach

may result in aircraft and/or arresting gear overstress upon arrestment.

Small (1-3°) roll oscillations due to buffet can be expected but are easily controllable with small

lateral inputs. Roll and line up control are not significantly different than normal scheduled positions.

The aircraft rolls faster into the lesser-deflected LEF and slower when rolling away from the

lesser-deflected LEF. Roll-off may also be experienced with AOA/pitch attitude changes. As AOA

decreases, the aircraft rolls away from the lesser-deflected LEF and as AOA increases, the aircraft rolls

into the lesser-deflected LEF. Lateral stick and/or trim easily counters this roll-off tendency. A small

roll off will occur with airspeed changes during a waveoff or bolter but are easily controlled with small

lateral stick inputs.

Glideslope control degradations are more pronounced with LEF deflections significantly less than

the normal scheduled positions. The addition of wing stores will further degrade glideslope control as

a result of additional drag. The aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and smaller in

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magnitude than normal flap configurations. Therefore, compared to normal flap configurations, larger,

longer and more anticipatory power corrections are required to effect a glideslope change. Power

corrections translate to an airspeed change first before a rate of descent change is noticed. The delay

in aircraft response coupled with the larger throttle inputs leads to the tendency to over−control the

glideslope. The technique of applying power and waiting for a glideslope change will lead to larger

glideslope deviations. Anticipatory throttle inputs are key to controlling glideslope. The sluggish power

response also degrades waveoff performance slightly. When operating shipboard, the waveoff window

for all LEF failure conditions should be moved farther out and the LSOs should be made aware of the

degraded glideslope performance. Upon bolter/waveoff, climb−out attitude will appear flatter than

normal. The LSOs and PRIFLY personnel should monitor rate of climb as the primary indication of

bolter/waveoff performance. It is recommended aircrew perform a familiarization check of aircraft

response to control and throttle inputs, including a waveoff maneuver, prior to attempting a shipboard

landing.

11.4.3 Trailing Edge Flap Failure. TEF failures may be caused by an actuator failure (mechanical or

three-four channel failure) or by a dual HYD 1A/2B circuit failure. TEF actuators continue to operate

following two channel failures. If a TEF actuator is shutdown, the surface is hydraulically or

aerodynamically driven to 5° TED and locked. If the left to right TEF asymmetry exceeds 6°, the

opposite TEF fails off and is also driven to 5° TED and locked.

11.4.3.1 TEF Failure Landing Handling Qualities. Shore based and ship based flight tests have been

conducted with the TEF in the failed position of 5° TED. Straight in, 10° AOA approaches in flaps

HALF or FULL are recommended for TEF failures. Pitch, roll, and line up control are similar to those

for normal approaches. Approach speeds will be high and every attempt should be made to reduce gross

weight. If shore based, consideration should be given to making an arrested landing taking into account

maximum arresting gear engagement speed and nose tire limit.

With this failure, approach drag is reduced and approach power settings are less than normal. This

results in slower engine response to throttle changes compared to normal HALF or FULL flap

approaches. Flying a slightly slow approach (10° AOA) reduces approach speed and increases approach

power setting slightly. Flying qualities at 10° AOA are similar or improved over those observed at

on-speed AOA. The aircraft easily trims to and maintains 10°AOA. Glideslope maintenance will

dominate the approach task and the tendency is to relax AOA maintenance. The 10° AOA approach

reduces WOD requirements by approximately 12 to 16 KCAS and improves approach flying qualities.

When operating at the ship, the recovery WOD should be kept as close as possible to the Aircraft

Recovery Bulletin recommendations. Due to the large difference between WOD requirements at

on−speed and 10° AOA, it is imperative that AOA be maintained at 10°. The sight picture behind the

ship is altered, but the field of view over the nose is not degraded.

Slower engine response to throttle changes may result in excessive sink

rates under high WOD conditions. The recovery WOD should be kept as

close as possible to the Aircraft Recovery Bulletin recommendations.

The aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and smaller in magnitude than for normal TEF

configurations. TEF failures require larger, longer, and more anticipatory power corrections to effect

a glideslope change. There is a tendency to over control the power due to the low approach power

setting and the longer time to effect a change. Power corrections translate to an airspeed change first

before a rate of descent change is noticed. Aggressive, well−timed, and anticipatory throttle inputs are

required for glideslope control. The technique of applying power and waiting for a glideslope change

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will lead to larger glideslope deviations. Waveoff performance is degraded for TEF failure approaches.

The waveoff technique is the same as normal flap configurations; apply power, maintain AOA until

positive rate of climb is achieved, and capture 10° pitch attitude for the climb−out. Time to achieve

positive rate of climb is slower than for normal TEF configurations. At the ship, the waveoff window

for a TEF failure condition should be moved farther out. The LSOs should be aware of degraded

waveoff and glideslope performance. Upon bolter/waveoff, climb−out attitude will appear flatter than

normal. The LSOs and PRIFLY personnel should monitor rate of climb as the primary indication of

bolter/waveoff performance. It is recommended aircrew perform a familiarization check of aircraft

response to control and throttle inputs, including a waveoff maneuver, prior to attempting a shipboard

landing.

11.4.4 Stabilator Failure. Since there is no mechanical reversion mode of the flight controls, the FCS

control laws automatically reconfigure in each axis to allow continued flight in the event of a single

stabilator failure. This failure mode, known as stabilator reconfiguration, or STAB RECON, is

designed to compensate for the loss of the contribution of the failed stabilator to pitch and roll control.

This is accomplished by disabling differential stabilator commands and using the other rolling surfaces

to counter the roll and yaw moments produced when the remaining stabilator responds to pitch axis

commands. Flight tests demonstrated excellent handling qualities with a stabilator failed off during

maneuvering flight and aerial refueling. The pitch axis is slightly sluggish, maximum roll rate is

noticeably lower, and roll coordination is slightly degraded.

In flaps AUTO, with a failed stabilator, maximum roll rate is extremely

low in the transonic region below 20,000 feet, especially when rolling away

from the failed side. Significant roll and yaw coupling may occur with

forward stick inputs at Mach >1.4 and altitude >30,000 feet.

The degradation in roll coordination is characterized as a small amount of sideforce during lateral

inputs with flaps AUTO and noticeable sideslip with flaps HALF. Configuration changes exhibit a

slight roll toward the failed stabilator when transitioning from flaps AUTO to flaps HALF; away from

the failed stabilator when transitioning from flaps HALF to flaps AUTO. Flight tests demonstrated

that flight with a stabilator failed in flaps HALF was degraded due to adverse yaw with lateral stick

inputs during normal approaches, waveoffs, bolters or flared landings. Roll performance at high gross

weights was sluggish and required larger lateral inputs to achieve desired roll rates. A small but

controllable yaw away from the failed stabilator is apparent at touchdown during field landings.

Additionally, pitch stick inputs during field landing roll-out complicate directional control and should

be avoided.

Extending the speedbrake may produce uncommanded roll into the failed stabilator. The uncom-

manded roll is more pronounced at low speed flight conditions due to the reduced aileron effectiveness

at the large trailing edge up aileron deflections commanded by the speedbrake function. The roll can

be balanced with lateral stick deflection.

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In flaps AUTO, with a failed stabilator, nose down pitching moment capability is degraded at low to

moderate airspeeds, especially for aft center of gravity and heavy wing store loadings. A safe level of

nose down pitch capability is available for flight below 10° angle of attack.

In flaps AUTO, with a failed stabilator, do not exceed 10° AOA due to

reduced nose down pitch authority.

Carrier based flight tests (STAB RECON/flaps HALF) demonstrated that carrier approaches were

controllable and were characterized by slightly degraded flying qualities which required increased pilot

attention to the landing task. Roll performance at high gross weights was sluggish and required larger

lateral inputs to achieve desired roll rates. Slight rolling and/or yawing motions were apparent when

making longitudinal inputs. Multiple small lateral inputs were required to maintain a centered

approach. During a bolter, the aircraft yawed into the good stabilator when the flight control system

deflected the good stabilator trailing edge up (TEU) in preparation for aircraft nose down rotation.

The yaw was sudden and pronounced, but could be controlled with rudder to counter the yawing

motion. Positive aft stick input was required to achieve positive rotation during bolters. Flight with

flaps FULL has not been demonstrated due to limited nose-up control authority from the remaining

good stabilator.

• Do not select flaps FULL with a failed stabilator, because longitudinal

control authority may be insufficient for landing. With a failed

stabilator, do not exceed 10° AOA in AUTO flaps with wing stores or

wing tanks.

• Bolters in STAB RECON require positive aft stick during rotation,

≥¾ aft stick is recommended. Deflections of ≤½ aft stick will result in

excess settle during bolters.

NOTE

Roll and pitch rate control during bolter is significantly improved at

aircraft gross weights ≤46,000 lbs. Consider reducing gross weight, if

possible.

11.4.5 GAIN ORIDE. While not a failure mode, GAIN ORIDE is prescribed for certain AOA or

pitot-static sensor failures to provide better or more predictable handling qualities (see Warning/

Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1). With flaps AUTO, selecting GAIN ORIDE results in fixed

gains that correspond to 0.80 Mach, 39,000 feet, and 250 KCAS. At flight conditions that deviate from

the fixed gains, a slight degradation in handling qualities should be expected. The aircraft is less

sensitive to longitudinal inputs, as less pitch rate is generated per given stick input. Lateral stick inputs

provide similar responses as in GAIN NORM. In GAIN ORIDE, the aircraft is more sensitive to

directional inputs. Regardless, handling qualities remain very good within the 10° AOA and 350 KCAS

NATOPS limits for GAIN ORIDE operation. If the airspeed limit is exceeded, self-sustained pitch

IV-11-13

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

oscillations will start to occur above 375 KCAS, and the aircraft will become uncontrollable above 450

KCAS due to the fixed air data values in the flight control system gains. If the AOA limit is exceeded,

departures are likely since the fixed values of the air data and AOA severely reduce departure

resistance. Additionally, the aircraft will stall at a higher than normal airspeed due to the fixed position

of the LEFs.

With flaps HALF or FULL, GAIN ORIDE results in fixed gains that correspond to 8.1° AOA and

500 feet; handling qualities are best at these conditions and degrade slightly away from on-speed AOA.

At higher airspeeds in 1g flight, the aircraft will stabilize at lower than normal AOA, due to the TEF

position frozen at higher than normal deflections. While not dangerous, this characteristic is

uncomfortable. Also, higher than normal aft stick force is required to maintain flight path while in a

turn. Flight is prohibited above 190 KCAS (flaps FULL) or 200 KCAS (flaps HALF) due to airframe

limitations (flap scheduling). Flight is also prohibited above 10° AOA due to the reduced stall margin

available with fixed LEF deflections.

Transition to or from landing configuration should be done in level flight at 180 KCAS. Transition

should not be made while in a bank due to the higher than normal aft stick forces required to maintain

flight path angle. Sideslip excursions may also occur if flap transition is made in a turn.

Carrier based flight tests (GAIN ORIDE/flaps HALF) demonstrated satisfactory approach handling

qualities. The aircraft remained easily controllable, though increased pilot attention to AOA was

required. During glideslope corrections, deliberate longitudinal inputs were required to maintain

proper AOA and pitch attitude. Approaches flown at conditions other than on-speed resulted in

sluggish longitudinal handling qualities.

Bolters in GAIN ORIDE or with AOA failed require positive aft stick

during rotation, ≥ ½ stick is recommended. Deflection of less than ½ aft

stick will result in excess settle during bolters.

In GAIN ORIDE, AOA will tend to readily increase above 14° when

decelerating from a trimmed on-speed condition. Timely longitudinal

stick inputs will be required to prevent excessive sink rates and correct a

deceleration as power alone will not change the AOA or pitch attitude

sufficiently in GAIN ORIDE. Alpha tone is disabled in GAIN ORIDE

with FLAPS HALF or FULL.

11.4.6 AHRS Failure Flying Qualities. An AHRS channel failure is defined as the loss of both rate

and acceleration data (Xs in CAS P, CAS R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC). Single or dual channel AHRS

failures should have no adverse effect on flying qualities. If a third channel failure is detected, all four

channels will be Xd out because the FCCs will be unable to confirm which channel is providing valid

data. If the third failure can be isolated to a particular channel, all four channels will be Xd out but

the flying qualities will be unaffected with the exception of a small degradation to the g-limiter. If a

third failure occurs but is not detected (two columns of Xs), or is detected but not isolated to a

particular channel (four columns of Xs), flying qualities will be somewhat degraded. When flying

qualities are degraded due to AHRS channel failures, poor roll coordination for large lateral inputs,

pitch coupling, and/or sluggish pitch response can be expected. Due to the higher reliability of AHRS

over previous rate and acceleration sensors, a four channel failure is highly unlikely. However,

simulator evaluation has shown that a complete four channel AHRS failure (no rate and acceleration

inputs to FCCs) is controllable for most of the flight envelope with the flaps in AUTO. Refer to figure

11-1 for AHRS channel failure indications and effects.

IV-11-14

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

AHRS failure modes have not been flight tested. With a four channel

AHRS failure, the aircraft is not controllable with the flaps in HALF or

FULL. At altitudes above 25,000 feet, loss of control occurs below 0.92

Mach. For loss of AHRS above 25,000 feet, maintain airspeed above 0.92

Mach while descending.

With a four channel AHRS failure at altitudes below 20,000 feet, flying qualities are optimum

between 190 to 210 KCAS, and are acceptable above 370 KCAS. When decelerating below 370 KCAS,

flying qualities are degraded until below 270 KCAS. The worst flying qualities are between 270 to 370

KCAS. Flying qualities do improve above 370 KCAS, with a further improvement at supersonic speeds.

Execute a straight-in on-speed approach with flaps in AUTO, and limit angle of bank to 20°. Pitch and

directional damping will be very low and roll coordination weak. If not positioned for landing by in the

middle to in close, a wave-off and go-around should be executed. A clean, lightly loaded aircraft

exhibits the best flying qualities. Flying qualities are not affected by CG locations, and the aircraft can

be landed to the aft CG limit. An arrested landing should be made if airspeed permits. Avoid stabilator

braking.

Level of AHRS

Indications

Effects

Channel Failure

• Xs in one column (CAS P, CAS R,

One Channel Failure

CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC)

• DEGD X

• Xs in two columns (CAS P, CAS

Two Channel (incremental fail-

R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC)

ure)

No effects on flying qualities.

• DEGD X

Two channel (simultaneous fail-

• Xs in two columns (CAS P, CAS

ure caused by loss of communi-

R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC)

cation between the two AHRS

• DEGD X

channels and the FCCs)

• Xs in four columns (CAS P, CAS

Three channel (detected and

R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC)

Small degradation to the

isolated)

• DEGD X

g-limiter

• PCAS, RCAS, and YCAS cautions

• Xs in four columns (CAS P, CAS

Three channel (detected but not

R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC)

• Poor roll coordination for large

isolated)

• DEGD X

lateral inputs

• PCAS, RCAS, and YCAS cautions

• Sluggish pitch response

• Xs in two columns (CAS P, CAS

• Pitch coupling

Three channel (not detected)

R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC)

• DEGD X

• Uncontrollable in flaps HALF

• Xs in four columns (CAS P, CAS

or FULL

R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC)

• Poor roll coordination for large

Four channel

• DEGD X

lateral inputs

• PCAS, RCAS, and YCAS cautions

• Sluggish pitch response

• Pitch coupling

Figure 11-1. AHRS Channel Failure Indication and Effects

IV-11-15 (Reverse Blank)

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

EMERGENCY INDEX

Conference X-ray telephone number (In-flight emergencies only)

314-232-9999 and 866-543-5444

CHAPTERS 12 THRU 17

Page

No.

ABORT

V-14-2

AFTERBURNER FAILURE

V-15-1

AILERON HINGE FAILURE - SUSPECTED, INBOARD

V-15-39

ALQ-99 POD FIRE/MECHANICAL MALFUNCTION

V-15-41

ALQ-99 POD RAT FAILURE

V-15-41

ARRESTMENT - FIELD

V-16-13

Arresting Gear Types

V-16-14

Arrestment - Long Field

V-16-14

Arrestment - Short Field

V-16-14

Arrestment Decision

V-16-14

BARRICADE ARRESTMENT

V-16-14

BRAKE FAILURE/EMERGENCY BRAKES

V-13-3

COCKPIT SMOKE, FUMES, OR FIRE

V-15-14

COCKPIT TEMPERATURE HIGH

V-15-13

CONTROLLABILITY CHECK

V-15-19

CV RECOVERY MATRIX

V-16-15

DISPLAY MALFUNCTION

V-15-16

DITCHING

V-17-4

DOUBLE TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER FAILURE

V-15-8

DUAL MISSION COMPUTER (MC) FAILURE

V-15-16

EJECTION

V-17-1

Ejection Procedures

V-17-3

Ejection Seat Restrictions

V-17-1

High Altitude Ejection

V-17-4

Low Altitude Ejection

V-17-3

Emergency Index-1

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Page

No.

EMERGENCY CATAPULT FLYAWAY

V-14-1

EMERGENCY EGRESS

V-13-2

EMERGENCY TANKER DISENGAGEMENT

V-15-20

ENGINE FAILS TO START/HUNG START

V-13-1

EXTERNAL STORES JETTISON

V-15-20

FCS FAILURE INDICATIONS AND EFFECTS

V-15-22

FORCED LANDING

V-16-4

FUSELAGE FUEL LEAK

V-15-4

GENERAL

V-12-1

Immediate Action Items

V-12-1

Warnings, Cautions, and Advisories

V-12-1

GO AROUND

V-14-3

GROUND FIRE

V-13-2

HOT START

V-13-1

HYDRAULIC FAILURES

V-15-5

HYPOXIA/LOW MASK FLOW

V-15-15

LANDING GEAR EMERGENCY EXTENSION

V-16-5

LANDING GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT

V-14-6

LANDING GEAR UNSAFE/FAILS TO EXTEND

V-16-4

LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION

V-15-16

LOSS OF DC ESSENTIAL BUS

V-13-1

LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL DURING TAKEOFF OR LANDING

(BLOWN TIRE, NWS FAILURE )

V-14-4

OCF - OUT-OF-CONTROL FLIGHT

V-15-17

OCF Recovery Procedures

V-15-18

PLANING LINK FAILURE

V-16-12

Emergency Index-2

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 12

General Emergencies

12.1 GENERAL

Part V contains procedures to correct an abnormal or emergency condition. While these procedures

provide guidance in dealing with an emergency; they should be modified, as required, in case of

multiple/combined emergencies, adverse weather, or other peculiar factors. Use common sense and

sound judgment to determine the correct course of action.

Unless specifically stated in NATOPS, BLIN or MSP codes shall not be used for in-flight decision

making.

Apply the following rules to all emergencies:

1. Aviate: first and foremost, maintain aircraft control.

2. Analyze the situation and take proper action. Perform immediate action procedures without

delay; however, initially do only those steps required to manage the problem. When operating a

control, be prepared to immediately return the control to its former setting if an undesirable

response occurs.

3. Navigate: land as soon as practical, unless the situation dictates otherwise.

4. Communicate: As soon as possible, notify the flight lead, ship, ATC (air traffic control), or tower

of the emergency, aircraft position, and intended course of action. Relay emergency indications,

actions taken, flight conditions, power setting, etc., as time permits.

12.1.1 Immediate Action Items. Procedural steps preceded by an asterisk (*) are considered

immediate action items. Pilots shall be able to accomplish these steps without reference to the Pocket

Checklist (PCL).

12.1.2 Warnings, Cautions, and Advisories. Warnings, cautions, and advisories are displayed in the

cockpit on the LDDI, on the upper warning/caution/advisory lights panels, or on the lower right

caution lights panel. Certain cautions provide two indications: one on the LDDI and one on the lower

right caution lights panel.

Warnings, cautions, and advisories are categorized and are listed alphabetically by category in figure

12-1 together with cause, remarks, and corrective action. Potential cause(s) for the associated

warning/caution/advisory is indicated by a bullet (•) under the Cause/Remarks column. The categories

are as follows:

a. Warning Lights.

b. DDI Cautions and Caution Lights not associated with FCES or HYD cautions.

c. Flight Control Electronic System (FCES) Cautions.

d. Hydraulic System (HYD) Cautions.

e. DDI Advisories.

f. Advisory Lights.

V-12-1

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Warning Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Fire/overheat condition detected in the APU bay.

APU FIRE extinguishing system operates automatically with

WonW and must be manually activated with WoffW. System

activation secures fuel to the APU, arms the fire bottle, and

discharges the bottle after a 10 second delay. Discharge is

delayed to allow the APU time to spool down before

GROUND

APU

extinguishing agent is introduced.

*1. Throttles - OFF

FIRE

IN FLIGHT or on GROUND

Warning Light

*2. APU FIRE light - PUSH

• Since the fire extinguishing system requires 28 vdc essential

*3. FIRE EXTGH READY light -

‘‘APU Fire,

bus power, the fire bottle may not be discharged if the

PUSH

APU Fire’’

BATT switch is turned OFF during the 10 second delay

4. Egress

time.

• Airborne, if the DISCH light does not come on 10 seconds

after the APU FIRE and READY/DISCH lights have been

pushed, the READY/DISCH light should be pushed and

held until the DISCH light comes on.

If dual BLEED warning lights go

• Bleed air leak or fire detected in common ducting AND the

out due to automatic function of

overheat condition still exists (e.g., automatic BALD

BALD system, execute DUAL BLD

shutdown did not secure the leak).

OFF caution procedure.

Bleed air leak MSP codes: 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959,

*1. Throttles - Minimum practical

960, or 961 (code determines leak location).

*2. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) -

PULL

BLD OFF cautions indicate that the corresponding primary

*3. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT

bleed air shutoff valve has been commanded closed and are

DUAL

CYCLE)

not an indication of actual valve position. Valve(s) could still

*4. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000

L BLEED

be open allowing bleed air to leak.

feet cabin altitude.

and

5. Land as soon as possible.

6. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS

R BLEED

(300 to 325 KCAS optimum).

Warning Lights

7. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

• Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy

(which do not go

8. AV COOL switch - EMERG

out)

breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.), as few as 3 minutes of

9. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

emergency oxygen may be available.

10. HOOK handle - DOWN

″Bleed Air Left

• If both bleeds secured -

(Right),

11. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

- No OBOGS

Bleed Air Left

12. OBOGS control switch - OFF

(Right)″

- No ECS or cabin pressurization

13. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet

- No anti-g protection

MSL prior to emergency oxygen

- No external fuel transfer

depletion (10 to 20 minutes).

- No crossbleed start

14. Consider removing mask and resetting

- No windshield anti-ice/rain removal

emergency oxygen system once below

- May get AV AIR HOT during approach

10,000 feet MSL.

- To prevent canopy fogging, select OFF/RAM or

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

RAM/DUMP and move the DEFOG handle to HIGH

15. Non-essential avionics equipment -

OFF (e.g., radar, UFCD controlled avi-

onics, ECM, sensors, MC2)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 1 of 63)

V-12-3

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Warning Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

If BLEED warning light goes out

due to automatic function of BALD

system, execute SINGLE BLD OFF

caution procedure.

• Bleed air leak or fire detected on designated side AND the

overheat condition still exists (e.g., automatic BALD

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

shutdown did not secure the leak).

*2. BLEED AIR knob - L OFF or R OFF

(DO NOT CYCLE)

Bleed air leak MSP codes: 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959,

If light still on, do the following in

960, or 961 (code determines leak location).

order until the light goes out -

*3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

BLD OFF cautions indicate that the corresponding primary

*4. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) -

bleed air shutoff valve has been commanded closed and are

SINGLE

PULL

not an indication of actual valve position. Valve(s) could still

*5. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT

L BLEED

be open allowing bleed air to leak.

CYCLE)

*6. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000

feet cabin altitude.

R BLEED

In all cases -

7. Land as soon as possible.

Warning Light

(which does not go

If both bleeds secured -

• Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy

out)

1. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS

breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.), as few as 3 minutes of

(300 to 325 KCAS optimum).

″Bleed Air Left

emergency oxygen may be available.

2. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

(Right),

• If both bleeds secured -

Bleed Air Left

3. AV COOL switch - EMERG

- No OBOGS

(Right)″

4. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

- No ECS or cabin pressurization

5. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

- No anti-g protection

6. OBOGS control switch - OFF

- No external fuel transfer

7. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet

- No crossbleed start

MSL prior to emergency oxygen

- No windshield anti-ice/rain removal

depletion (10 to 20 minutes).

- May get AV AIR HOT during approach

8. Consider removing mask and resetting

- To prevent canopy fogging, select OFF/RAM or

emergency oxygen system once below

RAM/DUMP and move the DEFOG handle to HIGH

10,000 feet MSL.

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

9. Non-essential avionics equipment -

OFF (e.g., radar, UFCD controlled avi-

onics, ECM, sensors, MC2)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 2 of 63)

V-12-4

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Warning Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Fire/overheat condition detected in corresponding

engine/AMAD bay.

GROUND

*1. Throttles - OFF

If dual FIRE light indications and unable to determine which

*2. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

light came on first, check engine instruments for indications of

*3. FIRE EXTGH READY light -

a fire. High fuel flow, high EGT, rough running, or smoke and

PUSH AND HOLD UNTIL DISCH

fumes may indicate the affected side, even if present prior to

LIGHT COMES ON (5 sec. max.)

the FIRE light coming on. Do not hesitate to push the FIRE

4. BATT switch - OFF

EXTGH READY light and lower the HOOK handle once

FIRE

5. Egress

FIRE procedures have been initiated. If the hook release cable

is damaged by an engine bay fire, it may be impossible to

Warning Light

lower the hook.

IN FLIGHT

″Engine Fire Left

Dual FIRE lights -

(Right),

*1. Throttles - Minimum practical

Engine Fire Left

Single FIRE light or Dual when side

• The probability of extinguishing a fire and preventing

(Right)″

confirmed -

relights is greatly increased by immediately discharging the

*2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

fire extinguisher.

*3. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

*4. FIRE EXTGH READY light -

• An engine bay fire may damage the engine bay door, which

PUSH AND HOLD UNTIL DISCH

is critical to structural integrity. Following an engine bay

LIGHT COMES ON (5 sec. max.)

fire, limit maneuvering to 5g, limit descent rate at

*5. HOOK handle - DOWN

touchdown to less than 1,000 fpm, and minimize roll and

6. Land as soon as possible.

yaw at landing. An off center arrestment following an engine

fire can lead to catastrophic structural failure.

• Arresting hook position does not agree with HOOK handle

position.

• Hook not fully extended with the HOOK handle down in

IN FLIGHT

flight.

• Hook down with WonW.

1. Reduce airspeed.

If HOOK light remains on -

If the mechanical hook uplatch mechanism fails, the hook

2. Get a visual inspection (if practical).

cannot be released and an arrested landing is not possible. If

If the hook is in the up position -

the hook is unlocked (HOOK handle down) but fails to leave

2. HOOK circuit breaker - PULL

the up position, an arresting hook system failure may be

HOOK

If the HOOK light remains on and

applying HYD 2B pressure to hold the hook up. For this

the hook is partially extended -

reason, pulling the HOOK circuit breaker deenergizes the

(Red)

3. Throttle right engine - IDLE for one

hook selector valve and ensures HYD 2B pressure is removed.

minute then OFF

Warning Light

4. Reduce airspeed to drop HYD2

If the arresting hook snubber is not properly charged, the

pressure to zero (if practical).

arresting hook may not fully extend due to airloads and HYD

5. Restart for landing.

2B back-pressure. In this case, if reducing airspeed does not

If hook still fails to extend (Carrier

extinguish the HOOK light, shutting down the right engine

landing) -

reduces HYD 2B back-pressure and should increase arresting

6. Divert

hook extension. After engine restart, the hook may retract at a

If the hook is partially extended -

maximum rate of 2° minute. If the HOOK light remains on

7. Attempt a normal carrier landing.

after this procedure and a visual inspection confirms the hook

is partially extended, a successful arrestment is possible due to

g-loads at landing.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 3 of 63)

V-12-5

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Warning Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

STEADY

1. Check gear down indications.

• Landing gear in transit.

2. Refer to appropriate emergency

Landing Gear

• Landing gear unsafe.

procedures.

Warning Light

• Planing link failure.

D LDG Gear Fails to Retract

--------------------------------------------------------------

D LDG Gear Unsafe/Fails to Extend

(Light in LDG

FLASHING

D Planing Link Failure

GEAR Handle)

• Wheels warning (less than 7,500 feet, less than 175 KCAS,

----------------------------------------------------

and over 250 fpm descent rate).

FLASHING (Wheels Warning)

• Loss of air data.

1. LDG GEAR handle - DN or increase

airspeed and/or altitude.

ON DECK

1. Suspend catapult launch.

2. LAUNCH BAR switch - RETRACT

ON DECK

If launch bar fails to retract -

• Launch bar control system malfunction (proximity switch

3. LB circuit breaker - PULL

failure).

IN FLIGHT

1. LDG GEAR handle - LEAVE DN (if

• Launch bar failed to retract after catapult launch (Launch

practical)

RED

bar not up and locked AND weight off the left main gear).

2. LAUNCH BAR switch - VERIFY

• Launch bar control system malfunction (proximity switch

RETRACT

L BAR

failure).

3. LB circuit breaker - PULL

Warning Light

Carrier -

If the red L BAR light remains on, assume that the launch bar

4. Divert or remove cross deck pendants

is NOT up and locked and it may drop to the deck during

1 and 4 and make a normal landing.

landing. The nose landing gear cannot be retracted. Placing

Refer to Landing Gear Malfunction

the LDG GEAR handle UP raises the main landing gear and

Guide.

leaves the nose landing gear extended.

Ashore -

4. Remove arresting wires and make a

normal landing. Refer to Landing

Gear Malfunction Guide.

RALT Warning

• Aircraft is below the primary low altitude warning (LAW)

1. Climb above primary RALT setting or

(on UFCD)

setting.

reset LAW setting to a lower altitude.

• SPIN switch in the RCVY position.

SPN

1. SPIN switch - NORM (GUARD

DOWN)

Warning Light

Selection of manual spin recovery mode (SPIN switch to

RCVY) seriously degrades controllability, prevents recovery

from any departure or spin, and is prohibited.

THREAT

Refer to NTRP 3-22.2-EA-18G (EA-18G Classified Manual).

WARNINGS

• Landing gear in transit.

• Landing gear unsafe.

UNSAFE

• If illuminated with no indications in the front cockpit,

1. Confirm landing gear position with

indicates a popped LG circuit breaker.

pilot.

(rear cockpit)

Does not illuminate for a planing link failure, loss of air data,

or wheels warning.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 4 of 63)

V-12-6

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• MC unable to determine which source error

correction to utilize (e.g., configuration

discrepancy).

1. Perform FCS IBIT

AIR DATA

• FCC source error correction disagrees with MC

If caution remains/returns -

commanded source error correction.

2. Do not takeoff.

Caution is only activated WonW.

• Loss of designated AMAD oil pressure.

1. GEN switch affected engine - OFF

Securing the GEN (ac output) greatly reduces the

If more than 5 minutes to landing -

heat load imparted to the AMAD oil and may

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

prevent heat-related damage to the generator.

3. Restart for landing.

L AMAD PR

4. Land as soon as practical.

R AMAD PR

If restarting affected engine for landing -

5. GEN switch affected engine - ON

6. Affected engine - Restart

A L/R AMAD PR caution could be an indication of

After engine restarted -

an AMAD oil leak which may result in an engine

7. GEN switch affected engine - OFF

/AMAD bay fire.

1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

• Engine anti-ice valves failed to close when

If not in icing conditions -

commanded by the FADEC.

2. ENG ANTI ICE switch - OFF

L ANTI ICE

If caution is removed -

R ANTI ICE

3. Resume normal engine operation.

If caution remains/returns -

Unregulated engine anti-ice airflow may damage the

4. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

inlet device and cause potential engine FOD.

5. Land as soon as practical.

• Anti-skid system failed BIT.

Anti-skid protection not available for use with

normal braking.

GROUND

1. ANTI SKID switch - OFF

D Do not cycle the ANTI SKID switch in response

to an ANTISKID caution immediately prior to

IN FLIGHT

landing for the following reasons:

If more than 30 seconds to landing -

a. The ANTISKID caution is removed for up to

1. ANTI SKID switch - CYCLE ONCE

ANTISKID

13.5 seconds as the system performs IBIT

If caution reappears -

even though the anti-skid system may still be

2. ANTI SKID switch - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

failed.

If less than 30 seconds to landing -

b. If the system is not failed, wheel motion at

3. ANTI SKID switch - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

touchdown or during landing rollout may

4. Regulate brake pedal force to prevent wheel

cause a false BIT failure and a dump of

skid.

normal brake pressure when brakes are

applied.

D If the ANTI SKID switch is not placed to OFF

with an ANTISKID caution displayed, normal

braking capability may be lost completely.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 5 of 63)

V-12-7

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• AOA warning tone in flaps AUTO is unavailable

due to AOA failure or more than one invalid

value used to calculate the FLY lateral weight

If caution caused by AOA failure -

asymmetry.

1. Execute AOA Four Channel Failure procedure.

AOA TONE

Otherwise -

If caution caused by AOA failure, the AOA limit

1. Manually calculate lateral weight asymmetry to

will still be displayed on the CHKLST page.

Otherwise, the FLY lateral weight asymmetry value

determine AOA limit.

and AOA limit value will be removed from the

CHKLST page.

• APU accumulator pressure low (below 2,450 psi).

The APU ACCUM caution can be expected after

IN FLIGHT

APU start or after emergency gear/probe extension

If APU ACCUM caution appeared following

in flight. With WonW, the APU accumulator

emergency gear or probe extension or APU

recharges automatically. With WoffW, the HYD

start -

ISOL switch may need to be held for up to 20

1. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (until 10 seconds

APU ACCUM

seconds following emergency gear/probe extension

after APU ACCUM caution removed -

or APU start to remove the APU ACCUM caution

approximately 30 seconds total)

APU ACC

and 30 seconds to provide a full charge (up to 40

Otherwise -

seconds after in-flight APU start).

1. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (10 seconds

Caution Light

maximum)

If caution remains or returns -

2. Do not reselect HYD ISOL ORIDE (to inhibit

If the APU ACCUM caution appears in flight and

leaking out HYD 2B).

is not related to emergency gear/probe extension or

3. Extend landing gear as soon as practical.

APU start, it may indicate a possible leak in the

isolated HYD 2B system.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 6 of 63)

V-12-8

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Designated air turbine starter rpm too high (e.g.,

GROUND

both sources of ATS overspeed cutout protection

After engine start (other than momentary) -

have failed).

1. APU switch - OFF

2. BLEED AIR knob - OFF

• ECS valve failures are routing engine bleed air to

3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

rotate the corresponding ATS.

4. ENG CRANK switch - VERIFY OFF

IN FLIGHT (other than momentary)

*1. Throttles - Minimum practical

*2. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*3. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

*4. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin

• Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude,

altitude.

heavy breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.), as few

If caution remains -

as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen may be

5. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

available.

With both BLEEDS secured -

• If both bleeds secured -

6. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

L ATS

- No OBOGS

KCAS optimum).

R ATS

- No ECS or cabin pressurization

7. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

- No anti-g protection

8. AV COOL switch - EMERG

- No external fuel transfer

9. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

- No crossbleed start

10. Land as soon as practical.

- No windshield anti-ice/rain removal

11. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

- May get AV AIR HOT during approach

12. OBOGS control switch - OFF

- To prevent canopy fogging, select OFF/RAM or

13. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL prior

RAM/DUMP and move the DEFOG handle to

to emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20 min-

HIGH

utes).

14. Consider removing mask and resetting emer-

gency oxygen system once below 10,000 feet

MSL.

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

Regardless of the engine start air source utilized,

15. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF (e.g.,

the corresponding GEN switch should be ON, as

radar, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM, sensors,

the generator provides primary overspeed cutout

MC2)

protection for the ATS.

16 Land as soon as possible.

1. Paddle switch - PRESS

AUTO PILOT

• Requested autopilot mode has disengaged.

2. Desired autopilot mode - RE-ENGAGE

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 7 of 63)

V-12-9

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

1. ECS mode switch - VERIFY AUTO

• The avionics undercool sensor, located forward of

2. BLEED AIR knob - CYCLE

the avionics bays, has determined that avionics

If conditions permit -

airflow and temperature are deficient. The

3. Either throttle - ADVANCE ABOVE 74% rpm

system assumes that if flow and temperature

If conditions do not permit engine runup -

downstream of the avionics bays are deficient,

4. APU switch - ON

effective avionics cooling is not being provided.

5. BLEED AIR knob - AUG PULL

If caution on after 3 minutes -

6. Do not takeoff.

If caution removed prior to 3 minutes -

In flight, in ECS AUTO mode with the throttles

7. BLEED AIR knob - Push down to normal

above IDLE, if an AV AIR HOT caution is

position

displayed, then the ECS is most likely degraded. On

8. APU switch - OFF prior to takeoff

deck, the avionics cooling fans provide adequate

avionics cooling up to an ambient temperature of

IN FLIGHT

AV AIR HOT

approximately 103° F, but above that an AV AIR

1. Throttles - Maintain above IDLE

HOT caution can be expected. Advancing one or

If caution on after 1 minute -

both throttles above approximately 74% N2 rpm or

2. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet (20,000 to

selecting AUG PULL should remove the caution

25,000 feet optimum for cooling).

within 3 minutes. If an AV AIR HOT caution

3. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

cannot be cleared, maintenance action is required.

KCAS optimum for cooling).

4. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

5. AV COOL switch - EMERG

6. CABIN TEMP knob - FULL COLD (cabin

Selection of MAN with the ECS MODE switch is

pressure altitude will slowly increase)

prohibited. Selecting MAN while the aft cooling fan

If caution off -

shutoff valve is open may cause the fan to

7. Land as soon as practical.

overspeed resulting in a catastrophic fan failure

If caution remains -

potentially leading to loss of OBOGS.

7. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF

(e.g., radar, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM,

sensors, MC2)

8. Land as soon as possible.

• BATT switch is ON on the ground in the

BATT SW

absence of ac power (first engine start). Battery

is depleting and the switch should be placed to

1. BATT switch - CONFIRM ON

BATT SW

OFF unless APU start is about to be made.

• BATT switch is OFF inflight. (Switch should be

Caution Light

placed to ON to provide essential bus backup

capability from the PMGs and the battery.)

• Dry Bay Fire Suppression System (DBFSS)

discharged.

1. Use all available means to confirm absence of

BAY DISCH

fire.

DBFSS is only armed with the LDG GEAR handle

2. Land as soon as practical.

UP.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 8 of 63)

V-12-10

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• The corresponding primary bleed air shutoff

valve has been commanded closed.

1. BALD system detected a leak in one or both

bleed air systems and the overheat condition

no longer exists (L, R, or both cautions).

2. Over pressurization detected in one or both

systems (both cautions).

IN FLIGHT - DUAL

3. BLEED AIR knob in L OFF, R OFF, or OFF

1. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

(L, R, or both cautions).

2. MSP codes - CHECK for 953 to 961 and for

4. ENG CRANK switch in L or R (L or R

833.

caution, respectively).

If 833 present without 953 to 961

5. FIRE test switch in TEST A or TEST B

(over pressurization) -

(both cautions).

3. BLEED AIR knob - CYCLE TO NORM

If cautions do not return -

BLD OFF cautions are not an indication of actual

4. Resume normal OBOGS operation.

valve position. Valve(s) could still be open allowing

5. Reset emergency oxygen system.

bleed air to leak.

If 953 to 961 are present (BALD shutdown)

or if both cautions return -

Bleed air leak MSP codes: 953, 954, 955, 956, 957,

3. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

958, 959, 960, or 961 (code determines leak location)

4. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

Over pressurization MSP code: 833

KCAS optimum).

5. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

6. AV COOL switch - EMERG

L BLD OFF

7. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

R BLD OFF

• Automatic functioning of the BALD system may

8. Land as soon as practical.

extinguish the red BLEED warning light(s) prior

9. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

(Both BLEED warning

to aircrew recognition and may not trigger the

10. OBOGS control switch - OFF

lights out)

appropriate voice alerts or the voice alerts may be

11. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL prior

the only indication of a bleed air system leak. In

to emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20

this case, cycling the BLEED AIR knob to remove

minutes).

the BLD OFF caution(s) reintroduces hot bleed

12. Consider removing mask and resetting

air to the leaking duct. If the sensing element was

emergency oxygen system once below 10,000

damaged by the leak, automatic shutdown and

feet MSL.

isolation capability may be lost. Extensive damage

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

or fire may result.

13. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF (e.g.,

radar, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM,

• Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude,

sensors, MC2)

heavy breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.), as few

14. Land as soon as possible.

as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen may be

available.

IN FLIGHT - SINGLE

• If both bleeds secured -

1. BLEED AIR knob - L OFF or R OFF (DO

- No OBOGS

NOT CYCLE)

- No ECS or cabin pressurization

2. Land as soon as practical.

- No anti-g protection

- No external fuel transfer

- No crossbleed start

- No windshield anti-ice/rain removal

- May get AV AIR HOT during approach

- To prevent canopy fogging, select OFF/RAM or

RAM/DUMP and move the DEFOG handle to

HIGH

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 10 of 63)

V-12-12

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Loss of fuel boost pressure to designated engine.

• May indicate fuselage fuel leak.

• May indicate fuel transfer failure.

• May indicate a power transmission shaft failure

1. Limit corresponding afterburner usage above

if accompanied with the corresponding GEN, DC

30,000 feet.

L BOOST LO

FAIL, and both HYD circuit cautions.

2. Check for indications of fuselage fuel leak.

R BOOST LO

• May result from prolonged transitions through

3. Monitor fuel transfer.

zero g (greater than 2 seconds).

4. Land as soon as practical.

Afterburner may not operate above 30,000 feet. The

crossfeed and cross cooling valves open

automatically.

• Brake accumulator pressure low (below 2,000

psi).

Emergency brakes may not be available.

BRK ACCUM

1. Extend landing gear as soon as practical.

A BRK ACCUM caution in flight is not normal and

may indicate a possible leak in the isolated HYD

2B system. If the caution appears in flight, do not

attempt to recharge the accumulator as this may

result in additional loss of HYD 2B fluid.

BELOW 47,000 FEET MSL

• Cabin pressure altitude above 21,000 +/- 1,100

feet.

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

Cabin light may not extinguish until cabin pressure

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet

altitude is below 16,500 feet.

cabin altitude.

4. CABIN PRESS switch - CHECK NORM

5. ECS MODE switch - CHECK AUTO

If DCS or hypoxia symptoms present -

• CABIN light may appear with normal cabin

6. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL.

pressurization when aircraft altitude is above

CABIN

7. Land as soon as possible.

47,000 feet MSL. If altitude is maintained,

If DCS or hypoxia symptoms not present -

aircrew should continuously monitor

Caution Light

6. Reset emergency oxygen system and resume

physiological condition.

normal OBOGS operation.

7. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet MSL.

• DCS may be experienced when operating with

8. Land as soon as practical.

cabin pressure altitude above 25,000 feet even

with a working oxygen system. Symptoms of

ABOVE 47,000 FEET MSL

DCS include pain in joints, tingling sensations,

dizziness, paralysis, choking, and/or loss of

1. Continuously monitor physiological conditions

consciousness.

and cabin pressure altimeter.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 11 of 63)

V-12-13

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

IN FLIGHT

1. CANOPY switch - CONFIRM DOWN

• Canopy not down and locked.

2. Slow below 200 KCAS (if practical).

3. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet.

CANOPY

Rear seat occupant should lower seat and lean as

4. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

far forward as possible in case the canopy departs

5. CANOPY switch - DOWN

the aircraft.

6. CABIN PRESS switch - NORM

If light stays on -

7. Land as soon as practical.

1. FUEL page/SDC - RESET

• Capability to display cautions degraded.

2. MC1 - CYCLE to 1 OFF then NORM

CAUT DEGD

If caution remains or reappears -

Cautions may be false or erratic.

3. Land as soon as practical.

CHECK SEAT

1. Ejection seat SAFE/ARMED handle(s) -

• With WonW, one or both ejection seats are not

CHECK ARMED

CK SEAT

armed when both throttles are advanced beyond

If caution remains -

27° THA.

2. Do not takeoff.

Caution Light

• With WonW, trim is not set for takeoff.

1. T/O TRIM button - PRESS UNTIL TRIM

The caution is displayed when both throttles are

ADVISORY DISPLAYED (stabilators 4° NU)

CHECK TRIM

advanced beyond 27° THA if the stabilators are

If carrier-based -

trimmed less than 3.5° TEU with the launch bar up

2. TRIM - SET FOR CATAPULT LAUNCH

(field takeoff) or 6.5° TEU with the launch bar

down (carrier takeoff).

• ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

1. ECS MODE/CABIN PRESS switches/BLEED

CK ECS

• CABIN PRESS switch - DUMP or RAM/DUMP

AIR knob - CHECK POSITION

• BLEED AIR knob - OFF

Caution Light

• With WonW, flaps are not set for takeoff.

If shore-based -

The caution is displayed when both throttles are

1. FLAP switch - HALF

CK FLAPS

advanced beyond 27° THA with the FLAP switch

If carrier-based -

in AUTO and the launch bar up (field takeoff) or

1. FLAP switch - FULL

with the FLAP switch not in FULL and the launch

bar down (carrier takeoff).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 12 of 63)

V-12-14

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• CSC MUX FAIL or CNI interface failure.

• May also be caused by an MPCD malfunction.

MPCD and UFCD may not operate in some or all

modes. If CSC indicates MUX FAIL, the

VOICE/AUR, FCS, and G-LIM 7.5G cautions are

also set, and the following equipment is inoperative:

1. BIT page - CHECK CSC and MPCD BIT

RALT, GPWS

STATUS

CNI

Voice alerts

If MPCD indicates DEGD -

COMM control except by UFC BU

2. MPCD knob - OFF, wait 15 seconds, ON

TACAN, beacon, IFF

SDC RESET function

LOCK/SHOOT lights

TACTS functions

ILS control except by ILS panel

EMCON control

• All three PMG outputs have failed on the

corresponding side.

• May indicate a power transmission shaft failure

1. Electrical RESET button - PRESS

if accompanied with the corresponding BOOST

If caution clears -

L DC FAIL

LO, GEN, and both HYD circuit cautions.

2. Continue normal operations.

R DC FAIL

If caution remains -

The affected FCC channels are powered by the

2. Land as soon as practical.

essential bus. One level of redundancy for the

essential bus is lost.

• The RFCM is in AUTO, PPLAN, or SEMI and

DCOY is selected without a decoy out.

1. Either dispense a decoy (consent) or unbox

DEPLOY

DCOY on EW page.

The RFCM cannot respond to a threat using the

decoy.

• A hot air leak from the inlet device anti-ice

system has been detected.

Inlet device anti-ice capability degraded or lost.

If not in icing conditions -

1. ENG ANTI ICE switch - OFF

L DEVC BLD

If caution remains with switch OFF -

R DEVC BLD

2. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

3. Land as soon as practical.

If not secured, a hot air leak can cause structural

damage to the inlet device and possible engine

FOD.

DFIR OVRHT

• DFIRS reporting an overtemperature condition.

Information

Unless visually confirmed intact -

DFIRS GONE

• DFIRS inadvertently deployed.

1. Land as soon as practical.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 13 of 63)

V-12-15

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Fuel dump valve open with DUMP switch in

OFF.

1. DUMP switch - CYCLE

2. BINGO setting - Set above internal fuel state.

If the dump valve cannot be closed, fuel continues

If caution remains -

to dump until Tanks 1 and 4 are empty. Selecting

3. INTR WING switch - INHIBIT

WING INHIBIT diverts recirculation fuel from the

If external fuel also remains -

wings to the feed tanks. Stopping external transfer

4. EXT TANKS switches - STOP

may make this fuel available if the dump valve is

5. Land as soon as possible.

DUMP OPEN

subsequently closed. When uncommanded fuel

When capacity available in feed tanks -

dump ceases (Tanks 1 and 4 empty), the feed tanks

6. EXT TANKS switches - NORM

should contain between 4,200 and 4,900 lb,

If fuel continues to dump on deck -

depending on JLS cycling.

7. Turn aircraft into the wind.

8. Throttles - OFF

Delaying landing until the transfer tanks are empty

If caution removed -

and uncommanded fuel dump ceases will prevent

3. EXT TANKS switches - CHECK NORM

fuel from dumping onto hot exhaust nozzles and

fouling of the landing area.

• EAU overheat detected.

1. UFCD - Turn off EAU (AEA/EAU ON/EAU

The EAU automatically shuts down; however, the

EAU OVRHT

OFF ENABLE)

UFCD EAU corner highlight remains. The caution

remains until the EAU is commanded off or the

overheat is no longer detected.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 14 of 63)

V-12-16

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• The ECS compressor/turbine is icing (e.g., an

ECS valve failure or malfunction in the warm air

GROUND

system which normally prevents ECS icing

1. Throttles - IDLE

occurred).

2. BLEED AIR knob - OFF

• ECS controller failure with altitude below 30,000

3. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

feet (ECS DEGD, MSP 8A0 or 8A1).

4. Do not takeoff.

• ECS icing sensor failure with altitude below

30,000 feet (MSP 8E1).

IN FLIGHT

1. MSP codes - CHECK

For a sensor or ECS controller failure, the caution

If MSP 8A0 or 8A1 (ECS control failure) or

is inhibited above 30,000 feet, since insufficient

8E1 (sensor failure) present -

moisture is present to cause ECS icing.

2. Throttles - Minimum practical (to reduce cabin

pressurization surge)

The ECS system incorporates a bypass valve

3. BIT/HYDRO-MECH/ECS RESET option -

designed to prevent ECS compressor/turbine failure

SELECT

when icing occurs. Depending on the severity of the

If ECS continues to operate (good pressur-

failure which caused the icing condition, the

ization and no AV AIR HOT caution) -

capacity of the bypass valve may be exceeded. If an

1. ENG page - SELECT

ECS ICING caution appears (without MSPs 8A0,

2. Airspeed - Increase to at least 0°C INLET

ECS ICING

8A1, or 8E1), there is one of two outcomes: (1)

TEMP (if possible)

bypass, in which case the system needs to be

If ECS fails (pressurization lost or AV AIR

de-iced but the ECS continues to function or (2)

HOT caution) -

the ECS compressor/turbine fails and conditioned

1. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet (20,000-

ECS airflow is lost (loss of cabin pressurization and

25,000 feet optimum for cooling).

AV AIR HOT caution).

2. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

KCAS optimum for cooling).

The ECS ICING caution may or may not be

3. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

removed after selecting OFF/RAM.

4. AV COOL switch - EMERG

5. CABIN TEMP knob - FULL COLD (cabin

pressure altitude slowly increases)

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

6. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF

Selection of MAN with the ECS MODE switch is

(e.g., radar, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM,

prohibited. Selecting MAN while the aft cooling fan

sensors, MC2).

shutoff valve is open may cause the fan to

7. Land as soon as possible.

overspeed resulting in a catastrophic fan failure

Otherwise -

potentially leading to loss of OBOGS.

6. Land as soon as practical.

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

If caution remains at IDLE or engine

L EGT HIGH

response is abnormal -

R EGT HIGH

• Designated exhaust gas temperature out of

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

limits.

3. Refer to Single Engine Landing Procedure.

″Engine Left (Right),

If caution clears -

Engine Left (Right)″

2. Land as soon as practical.

3. Consider HALF flap approach for landing.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 15 of 63)

V-12-17

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Abnormal engine condition due to a failure(s) in

the engine control system. The failure(s) result in

a change in ENG STATUS on the ENG page:

GROUND

a. PERF90 - 10% or less thrust loss and/or

1. Do not takeoff.

slower engine transients. AB is not inhibited.

b. AB FAIL - No afterburner capability.

INFLIGHT

c. THRUST - Engine thrust limited to between

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

40% and 90% and significantly slower

2. ENG page - Determine ENG STATUS

transients.

If PERF 90, ABFAIL, THRUST, or IDLE -

d. IDLE - Engine limited to idle power.

3. Use throttles as required.

e. SHUTDN - Engine automatically shutdown.

4. Land as soon as practical.

For landing -

L ENG

5. FLAP switch - HALF (THRUST or IDLE)

R ENG

6. Assess throttle response in the landing

If ENG STATUS has changed, a FADEC reset

configuration.

″Engine Left (Right)

should not be attempted, particularly airborne, as

If SHUTDN -

Engine Left (Right)″

any degrade in ENG STATUS is most likely

3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

indicative of the failure of a mechanical component.

4. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

Under these conditions, the engine may fail to

Procedure.

restart following shutdown and FADEC reset

If SHUTDN and operational necessity

attempt.

dictates -

3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

With an ENG STATUS of PERF90, AB FAIL,

4. Reset lined out FADEC by commanding a

THRUST, or IDLE, engine performance is

channel transfer.

degraded, but the FADEC is still controlling the

If caution clears -

engine and there are NO throttle restrictions.

5. Attempt affected engine restart.

A FADEC reset should not normally be attempted.

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

If caution remains at IDLE -

L ENG VIB

• Excessive engine vibration in either the fan or

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

R ENG VIB

compressor section of the engine.

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

FAN VIB greater than 1.6 ips

Procedure.

″Engine Left (Right)

CORE VIB greater than 2.2 ips

If caution removed and engine is required -

Engine Left (Right)″

3. Throttle - Advance slowly, maintaining vibra-

tion level below the caution threshold.

• A component which contains classified

information has reported a critical failure which

ERASE FAIL

Information

may prevent successful erasure of stored

classified data.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 16 of 63)

V-12-18

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• External tanks are pressurized with WonW (EXT

TANKS switch(es) in ORIDE).

• External tanks over pressurized with WoffW.

GROUND

1. EXT TANKS switch(es) - VERIFY NORM

External tank pressurization is terminated for

If caution remains -

EXT TANK

in-flight refueling (PROBE switch in EXTEND) and

2. Do not catapult.

for arrested landing (both HOOK and LDG GEAR

IN FLIGHT

handles down).

1. EXT TANKS switch(es) - STOP (when external

NOTE

transfer complete)

Carrier launch prohibited with less than 2,700 lbs

(1,700 lbs for ARS) and greater than 100 lbs in

external drop tank.

1. FUEL page/EFD - IDENTIFY EXT TANK

WITH TRAPPED FUEL

Perform the following steps while monitoring

fuel transfer and tank quantities -

2. EXT TANKS switch(es) - ORIDE

3. EXT TANKS switch(es) - CYCLE to STOP and

• One or more external tanks failed/slow to transfer

back to ORIDE

when commanded.

4. PROBE switch - CYCLE

5. BLEED AIR knob - CYCLE THRU OFF TO

External fuel available but not transferring.

NORM

6. Apply positive and negative g.

Failure to transfer may also affect ability to refuel

7. FUEL page/SDC - RESET

affected tank(s). If in-flight refueling is required,

If practical -

consider inhibiting refueling of external tank(s) that

8. Descend below freezing level.

EXT XFER

set the caution and were slow to transfer

If 5-wet loading and fuel is transferred from

(corresponding EXT TANKS switch to STOP).

IB tanks before MB tanks are empty -

9. Speed - Maintain below 300 KCAS/0.6 IMN,

whichever is less.

If a MB tank is trapped near full -

When in 5-wet loading, if fuel is transferred from IB

10. SELECT JETT failed tank or control fuel

tanks before MB tanks are empty, failure to maintain

transfer to prevent exceedance of 29,000 ft-lb

airspeed below 300 KCAS/0.6 IMN, whichever is less,

lateral weight asymmetry limit.

may result in aircraft structural damage.

If/when transfer complete but prior to landing -

11. EXT TANKS switch(es) - NORM

FOR CARRIER LANDING -

If IB or C/L tank(s) over 800 lb fuel or MB

tank(s) over 500 lb fuel -

12. Divert or SELECT JETT non-transferring tank(s).

WonW, both engines shutdown -

• Left or right engine FADEC indicates an overheat

1. Discontinue any electrical power to FADECs for

condition.

30 to 60 minutes.

2. Do not attempt engine start.

After the cooling period and prior to any

FADEC HOT

FADEC operation -

3. Confirm absence of engine related MSP codes.

------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------

WonW, IDLE or above -

• Insufficient fuel flow through the FADEC for

1. Both engines - SHUTDOWN

adequate cooling.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 17 of 63)

V-12-19

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Designated engine flamed out.

With the throttle at or above IDLE, ignition is

activated automatically whenever a flameout is

sensed. For a dual engine flameout, both generators

drop off line as rpm decays through 60%. With both

generators off-line, the standby flight instruments

must be used, and the EFD only displays RPM and

EGT. PMGs supply rated power to run the flight

SINGLE ENGINE FLAMEOUT

L FLAMEOUT

controls down to approximately 20% N₂ rpm on

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

R FLAMEOUT

spooldown (battery below 20%).

If rpm continues to decrease with increasing

If a single engine fails, its accessories are also lost: fuel

EGT (failed auto-restart) -

″Engine Left

boost pump (BOOST LO caution), hydraulic pump

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

(Right),

(HYD cautions), and ac/dc generator (GEN and/or

3. Refer to Single Engine Landing Procedure.

Engine Left

DC FAIL cautions). One generator supplies sufficient

If engine auto-restarts -

power to operate all systems. As hydraulic pressure

(Right)″

4. Check engine response at safe altitude.

decays below 900 psi, the aileron, rudder, and LEF

5. Land as soon as practical.

switching valves function (typically within 2 seconds).

If any of these surfaces X, there is no hazard

associated with multiple reset attempts to regain the

Xd surface. If a windmilling engine causes hydraulic

system output to fluctuate between 800 and 2,000 psi,

the switching valves cycle between their primary and

backup circuits. If this occurs, reduce airspeed until

hydraulic pressure fluctuations cease.

• Engine FUEL INLET TEMP high (>121°C).

• Engine FUEL NOZ TEMP high (>177°C).

• FEED TANK TEMP high.

WoffW: ≥ 60°C for 10 min or >65°C for 15 sec

WonW: ≥ 80°C for 15 sec (<5,000 lb fuel)

PREFLIGHT

≥ 60°C for 10 min or >65°C for 15 sec

1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

(>5,000 lb fuel)

IN FLIGHT

If a FUEL HOT caution is set, the parameter which

1 RDR knob - STBY (if practical)

triggered the caution should be highlighted in red on

Without a THERMAL caution -

the ENG page. In LOT 26 and up, the feed tank

2. Throttle affected engine - Increase fuel flow above

temperature limits that trigger a FUEL HOT caution

3,500 pph. (MIL power optimum) and maintain at

differ for inflight and on-deck conditions.

least 80% N2 rpm whenever possible.

L FUEL HOT

NOTE

3. Land as soon as practical.

R FUEL HOT

Aircraft shutdown or refueling should be expedited

With either THERMAL caution -

following a FUEL HOT caution inflight that is

2. Throttle (THERMAL caution side) - OFF

removed after landing. The FUEL HOT caution may

3. Consider restarting affected engine for landing.

reoccur if FEED TANK TEMP continues to increase.

• Engine Restart

At normal ambient conditions, the fuel system should

• Single Engine Landing

provide adequate cooling for the FADECs and

POSTFLIGHT

subsystem accessories. With extremely hot ambient

1 RDR knob - OFF

conditions (> 103°F), fuel system temperatures can

approach their limits, particularly during extended

If caution remains for more than 5 minutes-

low altitude flight or with low fuel states. If a

2. Throttle (THERMAL caution side) - OFF

corresponding THERMAL caution has also been set,

the fuel thermal management system has lost the

capability to regulate fuel system temperatures. In

this case, increasing fuel flow may not have the

desired effect of reducing fuel system temperatures.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 18 of 63)

V-12-20

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• The designated fuel/air heat exchanger is leaking,

and the fuel system has failed to shut off flow to

the heat exchanger.

Due to fuel/air heat exchanger location (above the

engine inlet), engine fuel ingestion is possible if fuel

*1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

L FUEL INLT

flow is not immediately secured.

*2. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

R FUEL INLT

3. Land as soon as possible.

Failure to secure an engine with an unisolated fuel/air

heat exchanger leak may result in catastrophic engine

failure and/or fire.

• At least one feed tank below 1,125 lb.

• May also be an indication of a fuel transfer failure.

• May indicate fuselage fuel leak.

• Sideslip may be required to transfer wing fuel.

FUEL LO

1. Throttles - Reduce fuel flow (if practical)

If a low level indication was caused by a transient

2. Land as soon as possible.

condition such as prolonged negative g flight, the

FUEL LO

3. Check for fuel transfer failure indications.

FUEL LO caution remains for 60 seconds after the

If trapped fuel indicated -

low level indication has cleared.

″Fuel Low, Fuel

4. EXT TANKS - CHECK

Low″

5. Avoid negative g maneuvering.

If the FUEL LO caution remains displayed, aircrew

must assume that at least one feed tank is below

approx. 1,125 lb regardless of displayed fuel quantity.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 19 of 63)

V-12-21

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Internal wing tank fuel asymmetry exceeds 350 lb.

• Tank 1 and 4 fuel is not scheduling properly (e.g.,

Tank 4 full and Tank 1 empty).

Wing tank transfer failures are most likely the result

of a valve failure. If one internal wing tank fails to

transfer, the other is also commanded to stop

transferring shortly thereafter when wing tank

balancing logic detects a 200 lb split. When Tank 4

drops to approximately 3,000 lb, the SDC declares a

wing transfer failure, cancels wing balancing logic, and

reinitiates transfer from the good tank. All fuel from

1. FUEL page - Check wing and transfer tanks

the failed tank should be available through gravity

If wing asymmetry exceeds 350 lb -

transfer with the aid of bank angle changes or a

2. Monitor wing tank transfer.

steady sideslip. Selecting INTR WING INHIBIT

3. Roll heavy wing up 5° (if required).

isolates normal wing transfer/refuel and diverts

If one wing still fails to transfer or when both

recirculation fuel to the feed tanks.

wings below approximately 200 lb -

4. INTR WING switch - INHIBIT

FUEL XFER

In general, only two types of Tank 1 and 4 transfer

5. Recalculate lateral weight asymmetry if wings are

failures set the FUEL XFER caution (Tank 4 fails to

split for landing.

transfer (pump failure) or Tank 1 fails to stop

6. Land as soon as practical.

transferring (pump and/or valve failure). In the first

If Tank 1 empty & Tank 4 full -

case, Tank 1 also stops transferring when it reaches

2. INTR WING switch - INHIBIT

the fuel transfer schedule (approximately 1,000 lb).

3. Monitor Tank 1 and 4 transfer.

Tank 4 continuously gravity transfers to Tank 3 and,

4. Land as soon as practical.

when feed tank balancing logic is initiated, to Tank 2

using scavenge pump. The last 1,000 lb of Tank 1

transfers when Tank 2 cycles in and out of FUEL LO.

With Tank 4 near full, the FUEL XFER caution is set

when Tank 1 drops below 400-500 lb.

In the second case, Tank 1 depletes as soon as the

feed tanks can accept its fuel, and the FUEL XFER

caution is set fairly rapidly. Assuming normal Tank 4

transfer, the caution is removed when Tank 4 depletes

to approximately 2,100 lb.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 20 of 63)

V-12-22

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Designated generator ac power source is off line.

May indicate a power transmission shaft failure if

SINGLE GEN FAILURE

accompanied with the corresponding BOOST LO,

1. GEN switch - CYCLE

DC FAIL, and both HYD circuit cautions.

If GEN fails to reset -

2. Electrical RESET button - PRESS

A dual GEN failure may be caused by a fault in the

If GEN still failed -

radar.

3. GEN switch - OFF

4. Land as soon as practical.

SINGLE GEN FAILURE

Either generator is capable of powering the entire

DUAL GEN FAILURE

electrical load of the aircraft.

1. RADAR knob - OFF

2. Electrical RESET button - PRESS

DUAL GEN FAILURE

If either GEN fails to reset -

Primary failure indications: loss of all displays, loss

3. Failed GEN switch(es) - CYCLE

of cabin pressurization (both bleed valves close).

If both GENs remain inop -

GEN caution lights are inoperative. The EFD

4. Battery gauge - CHECK

L GEN

only displays RPM and EGT. The standby flight

If gauge reads 28 vdc -

R GEN

instruments must be used. COMM1 (last frequency

5. Land as soon as practical.

and G XMT) and IFF EMERG available. Gear

For landing -

L GEN

R GEN

must be emergency extended. Anti-skid inoperative.

6. IFF MASTER switch - EMERG

7. G XMIT switch - COMM 1 (if required)

Caution Lights

If the battery gauge indicates approximately 28 vdc,

8. Refer to Landing Gear Emergency Extension

the PMGs run the FCC channels and the essential

Procedure.

bus indefinitely. If the battery gauge indicates 24

9. Make a short field arrestment (if available).

vdc or below, the battery is powering the essential

10. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pres-

bus and about 5 to 10 minutes of battery power

sure. (Anti-skid is not available.)

remains to run the FCCs.

If gauge reads 24 vdc or below -

5. Land as soon as possible using ″For landing″

Refer to the Emergency Power Distribution chart in

procedures.

Chapter 15 for operative and inoperative

equipment.

SINGLE GEN FAILURE AND AMAD PR

1. GEN switch - OFF (Do not reset.)

SINGLE GEN FAILURE AND AMAD PR

2. Shut down engine immediately if practical.

A single generator failure accompanied by an

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

AMAD low pressure caution on the same side is a

procedure.

potential indication of major mechanical damage to

4. Land as soon as practical.

the generator and AMAD.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 21 of 63)

V-12-23

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

If PARK BRK released during first engine

start -

Battery Start

1. PARK BRK handle - SET

2. Operating GEN switch - CYCLE

• Left and right 115 vac buses are isolated (bus tie

3. Start second engine.

open).

External Power Start

• May be caused by electrical fault protection

1. PARK BRK handle - SET

circuitry.

2. GEN TIE CONTROL switch - CYCLE

• May be caused by initial engine start with the

3. Start second engine.

PARK BRK released.

IN FLIGHT

GEN TIE

1. GEN TIE CONTROL switch - NORM (DO

NOT CYCLE)

Caution Light

If both GENs operating -

If the left and right buses are isolated because of a

2. Do not attempt to reset GEN TIE.

detected fault, cycling the GEN TIE CONTROL

3. Continue mission with GEN TIE on.

switch reenergizes the faulty bus/equipment and

With L or R GEN caution light -

may cause further damage or loss of the remaining

2. GEN switch affected side - CYCLE

generator.

3. Electrical RESET button - PRESS

If GEN restored -

4. Do not attempt to reset GEN TIE.

5. Continue mission with GEN TIE on.

If GEN still failed -

4. GEN switch affected side - OFF

5. Land as soon as practical.

6. Refer to Emergency Power Distribution chart.

• Nz REF (g-command limiter) set to 7.5 g

regardless of gross weight.

1. Limit symmetrical accelerations to the

following:

G-command limiter will not prevent an aircraft

G-LIM 7.5G

overstress at gross weights above 42,097 lb. Above

GW (lb)

Acceleration (g)

42,097 lb gross weight, pilot must limit g to prevent

≤42,097

-3.0 to +7.5

″Flight Controls,

an overstress.

45,000

-2.8 to +7.0

Flight Controls″

50,000

-2.5 to +6.3

Normally, for aircraft gross weights of 42,097 lb to

55,000

-2.3 to +5.7

57,405 lb, Nz REF is reduced by the FCS to

60,000

-2.1 to +5.2

prevent aircraft overstress. Above aircraft gross

66,000

-1.9 to +4.7

weight of 57,405 lb, the FCS maintains 5.5 g.

• G-limiter overridden.

Selected by momentarily pressing the paddle switch

when the stick is near the full aft limit. Maximum

allowed g-limit increased by 33% (allows a 10 g

1. Stick - Return to near neutral to disengage

G-LIM OVRD

command at 7.5 g Nz REF). Unless g-limiter

override.

override is desired, control maximum g-level. If the

paddle switch has failed electrically, NWS and the

autopilot may be commanded off without pilot

action or notification.

• GPS approach flight phase and HERR exceeds

GPS DEGD

Information

108 feet for 10 seconds.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 22 of 63)

V-12-24

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

HAND CNTRL

• Either hand controller inoperative.

Information

• Engine anti-ice failure detected while the ENG

ANTI ICE switch is ON.

The corresponding L HEAT or R HEAT advisory is

1. Avoid icing conditions.

removed on the failed side. Engine and inlet device

HEAT FAIL

If icing conditions encountered -

anti-ice capability lost on failed side.

2. Refer to Extreme Weather Procedures.

If the ENG ANTI ICE switch is placed to OFF, the

HEAT FAIL caution is replaced by the HEAT

advisory.

• Fuel remaining sufficient to fly to HOME

waypoint with 2,000 lb reserve or less.

1. Change HOME waypoint (if appropriate) or

HOME FUEL

HOME FUEL caution logic is disabled with WonW,

analyze configuration, fuel flow, and profile for

the refueling probe extended, the landing gear

BINGO.

cycled down then up, or within 5 seconds after a

HOME waypoint change.

• A failure is detected in the day ID strobe light,

1. Identify aircraft type on approach to make sure

ID LT

interconnecting wiring, or the day ID power

of proper arresting gear weight setting.

supply.

• Transponder failed to respond to a valid Mode 4

interrogation (failure or Mode 4 not enabled).

IFF 4

• Failure in the KIV-6.

• Mode 4 codes zeroized, or KIV-6 installed but

Information

″Mode 4 reply,

not keyed with crypto.

Mode 4 reply″

The IFF 4 caution and voice alert are disabled with

the IFF MODE 4 switch in the OFF position.

IFF OVRHT

• IFF overheat detected.

1. IFF - OFF (if practical)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 23 of 63)

V-12-25

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. ENG ANTI ICE switch - ON

2. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - ON

NO ICE VISIBLE ON LEFS -

3. Airspeed - Increase until INLET TEMP is at

• Engine inlet icing conditions detected.

least +5°C (+10°C preferred) on ENG page (if

possible).

The INLET ICE caution is designed to come on

4. AOA - Maintain less than 6° (if possible) to

when 0.025 inch of ice has accumulated on the ice

prevent ice accumulation on underside of LEX.

detector located in the left inlet. Any delay in

5. Climb or descend out of icing danger zone

activating the engine anti-ice system can result in

(> 25,000 feet, or below freezing level).

ice accumulating rapidly on the IGVs and shedding

When clear of icing conditions and caution

into the engine when the system is turned on. Ice

removed -

accumulation on the LEFs is similar to the inlet lip

6. ENG ANTI ICE switch - OFF

and can serve as an indication of how much ice may

be on the inlet. As little as 0.5 inch of ice ingested

ICE VISIBLE ON LEFS -

by the engine from the inlet lip can result in

3. Throttles - Reduce below 80% N₂ rpm (if

compressor stalls and major FOD.

possible). Avoid throttle transients above 90%

INLET ICE

N₂ rpm.

With ice clearly visible on the LEFs, reducing

4. Airspeed - Maintain above 250 KCAS.

throttle settings below 80% N₂ rpm while

5. AOA - Maintain less than 6° (if possible) to

descending below the freezing level should generate

prevent ice accumulation on underside of LEX.

sufficient inlet spillage to shed inlet ice outside the

6. Avoid abrupt maneuvers and bank angles over

inlet and not into the engine. Similarly, avoiding

20°.

throttle transients above 90% N₂ rpm, abrupt

7. Descend below the freezing level.

maneuvers, and bank angles over 20° should help

For landing in icing conditions -

prevent ice from detaching from the inlet lip.

8. WINDSHIELD switch - ANTI ICE or RAIN

(as required)

With no ice visible on the aircraft, an INLET

9. Reduce airspeed and lower the landing gear at

TEMP of at least +5°C should provide sufficient

the last possible moment (minimizes ice

aerodynamic heating to prevent ice accumulation on

accumulation on the gear).

the LEFs and inlet lips.

If a missed approach is necessary -

10. Slowly advance throttles to the minimum power

required for a safe waveoff.

11. Raise landing gear and flaps as soon as

possible.

1. ATT switch - STBY

• HUD displayed aircraft attitude is supplied by

2. Verify HUD pitch ladder coincides with the

the standby attitude indicator.

standby attitude reference indicator.

INS ATT

3. Attempt an inflight alignment.

W replaces O on the HUD. GPS functions still

If IFA unsuccessful -

operate.

4. Refer to HIAOA procedure.

GROUND

1. Secure and realign INS.

INFLIGHT if INS information is incorrect -

• INS failure detected during periodic BIT.

1. ATT switch - STBY

INS DEGD

2. Verify HUD pitch ladder coincides with the

GPS function still operates. ABLIM function may

standby attitude reference indicator.

not be available.

3. Attempt an inflight alignment.

If IFA unsuccessful -

4. Refer to HIAOA procedure.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 24 of 63)

V-12-26

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

IN FLIGHT

1. Reduce airspeed to minimum practical.

• Boarding ladder unlocked.

2. Get a visual inspection (if practical).

LADDER

3. Consider shutting off left engine to prevent

May FOD left engine.

engine FOD.

4. Land as soon as practical.

1. MC switch - CYCLE to 1 OFF then NORM

• Mission Computer 1 failed.

If caution remains -

With MC1 failed:

Use no more than ½ lateral stick with tanks or

MC 1

• G-limiter defaults to 7.5 g (G−LIM 7.5G caution

A/G stores on the wings.

displayed).

Refer to G-LIM 7.5G and NO RATS

• Autopilot is inoperative (A/P option removed).

procedures.

• LDDI inoperative.

Land as soon as practical.

• Mission Computer 2 failed.

MC switch - CYCLE to 2 OFF then NORM

With MC2 failed:

Use no more than ½ lateral stick with tanks or

• G-limiter defaults to 7.5 g (G−LIM 7.5G caution

A/G stores on the wings.

MC 2

displayed).

Refer to G-LIM 7.5G and NO RATS

• Autopilot is inoperative (A/P option removed).

procedures.

• RDDI inoperative.

Land as soon as practical.

MC CONFIG

• OFP loaded into either MC is incorrect.

Do not takeoff.

• MIDS overheat condition.

If an overheat occurs, the MIDS will secure itself in

30 seconds unless MIDS O/H OVRD is boxed.

TCN - OFF

MIDS OVRHT

D/L, BCN, ILS - OFF

If TCN or D/L turned back on, expect MIDS O/H

MIDS page - Verify MIDS page deactivates

caution to return until MIDS page activates. If

MIDS O/H then remains, MIDS is still in an

overheat condition.

Verify mission/maintenance cards installed in

• MU/mission card problem.

proper MU slot and MU door is closed.

MU LOAD

If accompanied by a MNTCD or MSNCD

Caution is disabled in flight.

advisory, refer to MNTCD or MSNCD

procedures.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 25 of 63)

V-12-27

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

1. INS knob - OFF then realign (GND, CV, or

IFA)

• Indicates functional failures of the INS, GPS,

NAV FAIL

and air data functions.

IN FLIGHT

1. Use standby instruments for altitude/airspeed/

vertical velocity.

2. Attempt an in-flight alignment.

GPS operating and POS/AINS selected -

• Aided INS and air data function horizontal

velocities disagree.

GPS operating and POS/INS selected -

1. Cross check velocity vector.

NAV HVEL

• INS, GPS, or air data function horizontal

2. Cross check horizontal velocities on HSI/

velocities disagree.

DATA/NAVCK page.

GPS failed or inoperative -

• INS and air data function horizontal velocities

disagree. May be caused by high wind velocity.

INS declared invalid -

• GPS and air data function vertical velocities

disagree.

1. Cross check HUD velocity vector, HUD digital

GPS declared valid -

vertical velocity, and standby rate-of-climb

NAV VVEL

• INS and GPS vertical velocities disagree.

indicator.

GPS declared invalid or ANAV installed and

2. If vertical velocities disagree, consider using

INS aided -

standby attitude for landing.

• INS and air data function vertical velocities

disagree.

Carrier based -

1. SDC - RESET

2. Cycle gear and hook (if practical).

• RATS not available.

If caution remains -

3. Advise carrier of NO RATS condition.

One of the following input parameters

Ship should increase wind-over-deck (WOD).

missing/invalid: longitudinal acceleration, WonW,

If required WOD not available -

wheel speed, hook down position, THA.

4. Reduce gross weight to permit recovery with

NO RATS

available WOD.

When single engine, RATS is not available and the

If shipboard recovery not possible -

NO RATS caution should be expected.

5. Divert

6. Execute shore based procedure.

Caution is displayed when the INS knob is OFF.

Shore based -

1. MSP codes - CHECK for 851

If set -

2. ANTI SKID switch - OFF

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 26 of 63)

V-12-28

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

1. Check oxygen system integrity:

• Mask integrity

• Hose connections

• OBOGS monitor pneumatic BIT plunger

unlocked and fully extended

• Oxygen concentration is below acceptable limits.

IN FLIGHT

• Disconnected oxygen hose.

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

• Removing oxygen mask without placing the OXY

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

FLOW knob to OFF.

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet

• System gas leak (broken integrity).

cabin altitude.

4. Check oxygen system integrity:

• Mask integrity

OBOGS DEGD

• Hose connections

D Good flow does not equate to good oxygen

• OBOGS monitor pneumatic BIT plunger

(Cautions of any duration)

concentration. An OBOGS DEGD caution

unlocked and fully extended

indicates that the oxygen concentration is

If system integrity not compromised -

inadequate and hypoxia may result.

5. Maintain cabin altitude below 10,000 feet.

6. OBOGS control switch - OFF

D Under less than optimum conditions (low

Once below 10,000 feet cabin altitude and

altitude, heavy breathing, loose fitting mask,

no hypoxic symptoms present -

etc.), as few as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen

7. Consider removing mask and resetting

may be available.

emergency oxygen system or resuming normal

OBOGS operation if flow appears normal and

donning of mask is desired.

8. Land as soon as practical.

If system integrity restored -

5. Resume normal OBOGS operation.

6. Reset emergency oxygen system.

• MC or SMS overlay halted due to run time.

OCS

1. Attempt to reload overlay.

Stores that require overlay may not be available.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 27 of 63)

V-12-29

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Designated ENG OIL TEMP high (149°C or

PREFLIGHT

above).

1. Throttle affected engine - ADVANCE ABOVE

• Designated AMAD OIL TEMP high (88°C or

74% rpm

above).

2. ENG page - Identify out of limit parameter

If caution removed in 20 seconds -

May be caused by an engine malfunction, hot fuel

3. Continue mission, monitoring OIL TEMPs

at low fuel states, an over-serviced AMAD,

until airborne.

AMAD/fuel heat exchanger failure, fuel

If caution remains longer than 20 seconds -

recirculation system failure, motive flow system

3. Do not takeoff.

failure, or with a normally operating system during

4. Throttle affected engine - OFF (within 5

extended ground operations with OAT greater than

minutes)

103°F.

IN FLIGHT

L OIL HOT

If an OIL HOT caution is set, the parameter which

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

R OIL HOT

triggered the caution should be highlighted in red

If caution removed -

on the ENG page. If AMAD OIL TEMP is high,

2. Land as soon as practical.

securing the GEN (ac output) greatly reduces the

If caution remains at IDLE -

heat load imparted to the AMAD oil and may

2. ENG page - Identify out of limit parameter

prevent heat-related damage to the generator. If an

If AMAD OIL TEMP hot -

OIL HOT caution was caused by extended ground

3. GEN switch affected side - OFF

operations with OAT greater than 103°F, increasing

If caution remains and more than 5 minutes

the affected engine rpm should clear the caution

to landing -

within 20 seconds (normal operating system).

1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

2. Consider restarting for landing.

POSTFLIGHT

Prolonged operation of a hot AMAD may result in

If caution on for more than 5 minutes -

an engine bay fire.

1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

• Designated engine oil pressure out of limits.

If caution remains after 10 seconds -

L OIL PR

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

R OIL PR

Zero oil pressure without the L/R OIL PR caution

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

indicates the oil pressure transmitter has failed and

Procedure.

″Engine Left (Right),

the oil pressure switch is detecting oil pressure

If caution clears -

Engine Left (Right)″

greater than 35 psi. Flight may be continued.

2. Land as soon as practical.

3. Consider HALF flap approach for landing.

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

If caution remains at IDLE or engine

L OVRSPD

response is abnormal -

R OVRSPD

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

• Designated fan or compressor rpm high.

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

″Engine Left (Right),

Procedure.

Engine Left (Right)″

If caution clears -

2. Land as soon as practical.

3. Consider HALF flap approach for landing.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 28 of 63)

V-12-30

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Parking brake still set when throttles are

GROUND

advanced over 27° THA with the INS on.

1. PARK BRK handle - RELEASE

IN FLIGHT

1. PARK BRK handle - CYCLE AND CHECK

PARK BRAKE

FULLY STOWED

Even if PARK BRAKE caution is extinguished in

Whether or not the caution clears -

flight, the possibility exists that the parking brake

2. Make a fly-in arrested landing with LSO

may still be engaged.

assistance (if available).

• Designated pitot tube, AOA probe, or AOA probe

cover heater malfunction.

1. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - ON

L PITOT HT

After landing -

R PITOT HT

If displayed immediately after takeoff, the caution

2. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - AUTO

may also be an indication of a WonW proximity

switch failure on the corresponding side.

• INS velocities unreliable.

Position keeping supplied by the air data function.

POS/ADC is not as reliable a position keeping

1. HSI/DATA/TCN page - Verify selected TCN

POS/ADC

source as the INS or GPS.

information is loaded in TCN Data Table

2. Position keeping - SELECT POS/TCN

Automatic position keeping reversion with a

hierarchy of AINS, INS, GPS, MIDS (if installed)

and FCC air data is provided in case of an INS

and/or GPS failure.

• A present position discrepancy exists between

INS position and GPS position.

1. WYPT 0 - CHECK

POS ERROR

ANAV is preventing aided navigation because

2. Realign INS.

horizontal position is more than 20 nm different, or

vertical position is greater than 5000 ft different.

• Air refueling probe not fully retracted with

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

PROBE UNLK

PROBE switch in RETRACT.

2. PROBE switch - CYCLE

If Q99 POD caution and/or both FWD and

AFT RESET is indicated on the STORES

page -

1. DDI/STORES/SELECT STATION/BOTH (or

• Automatic ALQ-99 transmitter(s) reset failed.

ALL/RESET) TRANSMITTER - RESET

2. Continue flight if able to reset at least one

The MENU option at the bottom of each DDI is

transmitter on the affected pod(s).

Q99 POD

replaced with the STORES option providing one

If RESET does not clear indication -

pushbutton access to the STORES page.

3. Accelerate aircraft and vary g loading.

If still unable to clear at least one transmit-

Refer to ALQ-99 Pod RAT Failure in chapter 15.

ter RESET with the RESET pushbutton -

4. Affected pod power pushbutton - BOTH/OFF

5. Continue mission if no vibration present and

able to visually confirm normal operation, at

mission commander’s discretion.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 29 of 63)

V-12-31

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Use no more than ½ lateral stick with tanks or

R-LIM OFF

• Roll rate limiting failed.

A/G stores on the wings.

• BRU-32 rack(s) failed to lock or unlock during

rack test.

GROUND

RACK UNCPL

1. Do not takeoff.

Store may not be jettisonable.

FIRE EXTGH

• Fire extinguisher bottle armed.

If FIRE light unintentionally pressed -

READY

1. Identify affected FIRE light.

FIRE light or APU FIRE light pressed.

2. FIRE light - RESET

Light

1. Ensure ground crew secure door prior to

• Ground refueling door not properly secured.

takeoff.

REFUEL DR

If caution remains -

Only activated with WonW.

2. Do not takeoff.

• Flight controls out of rig.

RIG

1. Do not takeoff.

Only activated with WonW.

• Software incompatible and/or engine FADEC

1. BIT/CONFIG page - Identify lined out system.

software mismatched.

2. Turn on affected system if not already on.

S/W CONFIG

3. IBIT affected system.

Incompatible software is lined-out on the

If caution remains -

BIT/CONFIG page.

3. Do not takeoff.

• Engine stall detected on designated side.

Engine stalls result from conditions which exceed

the stall margin of the engine (high AOA, steam or

exhaust ingestion, etc.), or engine/aircraft damage

which reduces the stall margin of the engine.

Engine stalls are often indicated by audible bangs,

airframe vibration, and visible flames out the

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

exhaust and/or inlet.

If stall does not clear or L/R ENG VIB

Self-recovering single pop or surge stalls do not

L STALL

caution present -

result in L or R STALL caution unless engine

R STALL

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

limits are exceeded. A hung stall, or multiple pop

stalls (three or more in 5 sec), will result in a L or

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

″Engine Left (Right),

R STALL caution. Hung stalls are indicated by a

Procedure.

lack of throttle response, increasing EGT, and

Engine Left (Right)″

If stall clears -

steady or decreasing rpm. If engine rpm continues

2. Check engine response at a safe altitude.

to fall, the L or R FLAMEOUT caution may also be

set.

3. Land as soon as practical.

NOTE

A L or R STALL caution caused by a hung

stall will time out after 5 sec regardless of

whether the stall has actually cleared.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 30 of 63)

V-12-32

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Designated engine thermal control valve (TCV)

has failed open. Fuel thermal management

system has lost capability to regulate fuel system

GROUND

temperatures.

1. Do not takeoff.

If a TCV fails open, hot feed fuel is recirculated

INFLIGHT

back to the fuel tanks instead of being burned. May

1. ENG page - Monitor corresponding FEED

eventually lead to a corresponding FUEL HOT

L THERMAL

TANK TEMP, FUEL INLET TEMP, and

caution.

R THERMAL

FUEL NOZ TEMP

2. RDR knob - OFF

Engine FUEL INLET TEMP high (≥121°C).

3. Land as soon as practical.

Engine FUEL NOZ TEMP high (≥177°C).

If either FUEL HOT caution comes on -

FEED TANK TEMP high.

4. Throttle (THERMAL caution side) - OFF

WoffW: ≥60°C for 10 min or >65°C for 15 sec

5. Restart for landing.

WonW: ≥80°C for 15 sec (<5,000 lb fuel)

≥60°C for 10 min or >65°C for 15 sec

(>5,000 lb fuel)

1. BIT page - CHECK CSC BIT status

• Voice alert or master caution aural tone

VOICE/AUR

If CSC MUX fail -

inoperative.

2. Refer to CNI caution procedure.

1. STORES page - Turn off affected ALQ-99

transmitter.

If transmitter already OFF or caution re-

UNCMD JAM

• Uncommanded jamming detected.

mains, consider -

2. Secure EAU as required.

3. EMCON - SELECT

4. Airspeed - Reduce below RAT speed

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 31 of 63)

V-12-33

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

If visible moisture not present -

1. WINDSHIELD switch - OFF

If visible moisture present (ice/rain) -

1. WINDSHIELD switch - ANTI ICE or RAIN

• Windshield temperature high or sensor failed.

(for a maximum of 5 minutes )

If caution remains and switch OFF -

If caution remains with the switch in OFF, an ECS

2. Throttles - Minimum practical

valve failure may be directing hot air to the

3. Land as soon as practical.

windshield. In this case, securing the ECS may be

If greater than 5 minutes to landing -

the only means to stop windshield airflow.

4. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

5. OXY FLOW knob(s) − OFF

6. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet MSL.

7. BLEED AIR knob − OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

8. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

KCAS optimum).

Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude,

WDSHLD HOT

9. ECS MODE switch − OFF/RAM

heavy breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.), as few as

10. AV COOL switch − EMERG

3 minutes of emergency oxygen may be available.

11. Maintain altitude below 10,000 ft MSL prior to

emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20 min-

utes).

Once below 10,000 feet MSL −

12. Consider removing mask and resetting

Do not operate the windshield anti-ice/rain removal

emergency oxygen.

system on a dry windshield. If a WDSHLD HOT

13. CABIN PRESS switch − RAM/DUMP

caution appears, place the WINDSHIELD switch to

14. OBOGS control switch − OFF

OFF immediately to prevent heat damage to the

If AV AIR HOT caution appears −

windshield.

15. Non−essential avionics equipment − OFF (e.g.,

radar, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM,

sensors, MC2)

16. Land as soon as possible.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 32 of 63)

V-12-34

ORIGINAL

EA-18G. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008) - page 7