EA-18G. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008)

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Either wing indicates unlocked (beer can up).

• Catapult with the WINGFOLD switch in FOLD

or HOLD.

• An electrical failure in the WING UNLK caution

circuitry.

The wings cannot be unlocked or folded in flight,

even if the WINGFOLD switch is placed to FOLD

or HOLD. If a WING UNLK caution appears with

IN FLIGHT

the beer cans down, an electrical failure has

1. WINGFOLD switch - VERIFY SPREAD

occurred in the caution circuitry and not in the

2. Wingfold unlock flag (Beer Cans) - CHECK

wing unlock circuitry. If the WINGFOLD switch is

DOWN

inadvertently placed to HOLD or FOLD in flight,

the wings unlock and the ailerons fair when the

If wings inadvertently unlocked/folded on

aircraft transitions to WonW during landing. In

catapult shot -

FOLD, the wings fold when the aircraft decelerates

1. Do not change WINGFOLD switch position.

below 66 KCAS during landing rollout.

2. Climb to a safe altitude.

3. WINGFOLD switch - SPREAD

WING UNLK

If the wings are partially folded -

4. Unload the aircraft to reduce aerodynamic

forces.

Ensure the WINGFOLD switch is lever-locked in

the SPREAD position during takeoff checks. If the

FOR LANDING

wings are commanded to unlock or fold during a

If both beer cans down -

catapult shot, the wings unlock, the ailerons fair,

5. Make a normal landing.

the wings may fold partially, and the aircraft will

If both beer cans are up -

settle.

5. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

6. Make sure NWS HI not engaged.

If the wings are unlocked during landing rollout,

ensure the NWS button is not pressed and full-time

NWS HI is not engaged. In NWS HI, rudder pedal

inputs command significantly greater nosewheel

deflections and may result in a loss of directional

control.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 33 of 63)

V-12-35

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

INITIAL FCS/FCES CAUTION

PROCEDURES

1. Cease maneuvering.

• An FCS/FCES related failure has occurred.

2. FCS page - SELECT and identify failure

If AOA Xd in all four channels -

FCS page Xs and/or BLIN codes identify the

3. Execute AOA Four Channel Failure procedure

location and type of failure. For certain FCS

All other failures -

components, BLIN codes may be the only

3. FCS RESET button - PUSH

indication of a failure and should be treated with

If no reset and no more than single X in any

the same initial level of concern as failures that also

row −

produce Xs. An FCS RESET attempt clears the

4. Land as soon as practical.

FCS caution whether or not the reset was

If no reset and two or more Xs in any row -

FCS

successful. A successful reset is indicated by the

4. The following general restrictions apply:

Initial

RSET advisory and removal of all Xs from the FCS

• AOA below 10° in flaps AUTO, on-speed in

page. The RSET advisory is displayed if a reset

flaps HALF/FULL

attempt was unsuccessful.

• 2g maximum

• Minimum sideslip

• Half lateral stick maximum

5. Refer to the appropriate failure procedure:

• AHRS 1/2 Channel Failure

FCS page Xs indicate the respective FCS function

• AHRS Four Channel Failure

FCS

has been shutdown. The FCS RESET button does

• Aileron Failure

not fix a detected failure, but merely allows the

• AOA Four Channel Failure

FCES

components to be restored and failure indications to

• P/R/Y CAS

Caution Light

be removed if the failure no longer exists. Avoid

• FCS Single Channel Failure

multiple FCS reset attempts of a recurring FCS

• FC AIR DAT

″Flight Controls,

failure to preclude the failure from occurring during

• FCES Caution Light

Flight Controls″

a critical phase of flight (e.g., during final approach

• FLAPS OFF-LEF Failure

to landing).

• FLAPS OFF-TEF Failure

• FLAP SCHED

No single electrical failure (e.g., single channel)

• Rudder Failure

affects flying qualities. The FCS has multiple layers

• Stab Failure

of redundancy and is designed to fail to the least

If no procedure applies -

critical configuration. No electrical or mechanical

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure (if

backup mode is provided for normal CAS functions.

required).

Multiple FCS failures are required before flying

7. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

qualities are degraded.

8. Land as soon as practical.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 34 of 63)

V-12-36

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

AHRS ONE OR TWO CHANNEL FAILURE

• FCCs have detected a failure of AHRS rate or

acceleration data in one or two channels.

For each failed channel, rate sensor failures will

occur in all three sensor axes (Xs in CAS P, CAS R,

AHRS

and CAS Y) and acceleration sensor failures will

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

One or Two

occur in both sensor axes (Xs in N ACC and L

complete -

Channel Failure

ACC) simultaneously.

One channel AHRS failure -

Loss of one or two AHRS channels will not affect

6. Land as soon as practical.

flying qualities.

FCS

Two channel AHRS failure -

Loss of redundancy in rate and acceleration

6. Descend below 25,000 feet.

information to the FCCs is the primary concern for

If degradation in flying qualities is

FCES

a two channel failure. Although there is no

present -

degradation in flying qualities, subsequent AHRS

7. Refer to AHRS Four Channel Failure

Caution Light

failures could lead to controllability problems if the

procedures.

two channel AHRS failure procedures are not

If no degradation in flying qualities is

Five Xs will appear for

followed.

each failed channel

present -

(CAS P, CAS R, CAS Y,

7. Land as soon as practical.

N ACC, and L ACC)

It is possible that a third AHRS channel has failed

but is not detected. Flying qualities will be

degraded for this situation and will include poor

roll coordination for large lateral inputs, pitch

coupling, and sluggish pitch response. If flying

qualities are degraded, assume a four channel

failure has occurred, and refer to AHRS Four

Channel Failure.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 35 of 63)

V-12-37

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

AHRS FOUR CHANNEL FAILURE

• FCCs have detected a failure of AHRS rate or

acceleration data in three or four channels.

For each failed channel, rate sensor failures will

occur in all three sensor axes (Xs in CAS P, CAS R,

AHRS

and CAS Y) and acceleration sensor failures will

Four Channel

occur in both sensor axes (Xs in N ACC and L

Failure

ACC) simultaneously.

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

PCAS

It is possible to experience a three channel failure

complete -

RCAS

with only two channels Xd out. Flying qualities will

6. FLAP switch - AUTO

YCAS

be degraded for this situation.

7. If above 25,000 feet, maintain >0.92 Mach until

FCS

descent below 25,000 feet is accomplished.

A detected loss of a third AHRS channel will result

8. Jettison unwanted stores, if required, to

FCES

in all four AHRS channels being Xd out. Three

improve flying qualities.

columns of Xs will not be displayed because the

9. Execute a straight-in on-speed approach with

Caution Light

FCCs cannot determine the good channel.

flaps in AUTO. Limit angle of bank to 20°.

10. If not positioned for landing by in-the-middle

Below 20,000 feet, flying qualities are best between

to in-close, a wave off and go around should be

″Flight Controls,

190-210 KCAS. Pitch and directional damping will

executed.

Flight Controls″

be very low and roll coordination will be weak.

11. Make an arrested landing if available.

12. Avoid stabilator braking.

Five Xs will appear for

each failed channel

(CAS P, CAS R, CAS Y,

N ACC, and L ACC).

• With a four channel AHRS failure, the aircraft is

not controllable with the flaps in HALF or FULL.

At altitudes above 25,000 feet, loss of control will

occur below 0.92 Mach. For loss of AHRS above

25,000 feet, maintain airspeed above 0.92 Mach

while descending.

• Potential for lateral pilot induced oscillations

(PIO) exists when landing with a Y CAS failure.

AILERON ACTUATOR FAILURE

• Aileron failures may be caused by an actuator

failure (mechanical or two channel failure) or by

Aileron Failure

a switching valve failing to switch to the backup

circuit following a HYD circuit failure.

When FCS/FCES procedures complete -

Speedbrake function and autopilot inoperative.

FCS

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

Following an aileron actuator failure, the surface is

driven to a faired position by air loads and is

FCES

For landing -

damped to prevent oscillations. If the ailerons were

7. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL

drooped, the opposite aileron is driven to the

Caution Light

8. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

undrooped position. With both ailerons undrooped,

9. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown.

approach speed will increase by about 11 knots in

Flaps FULL and 17 knots in Flaps HALF. The

″Flight Controls,

operating aileron continues to provide roll control.

Flight Controls″

Roll damping is noticeably less. Use care to prevent

overcontrol and resulting lateral PIO, especially

when approaching touchdown.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 36 of 63)

V-12-38

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• FCCs have detected an excessive split between

the left and right AOA probes immediately after

takeoff.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF

1. Throttles - MIL (MAX if required)

The AOA caution can only be activated within 12

2. Fly straight ahead.

seconds after WoffW. After 12 seconds, the caution

3. Maintain 10° to 12° pitch attitude with the

is removed, even if the failure remains. If the failure

waterline symbol.

AOA

remains, an FCS caution is set along with Xs in all

When safely airborne -

four AOA channels. With the AOA caution set, the

4. FCS page - SELECT

FCES

FCCs utilize a fixed gain (on-speed AOA) for pitch

If FCS caution set and AOA Xd in all four

axis control, so expected flying qualities during the

channels -

Caution Light

first 12 seconds should be fairly nominal. With the

5. Execute the AOA Four Channel Failure

caution set, movement of the FLAP switch does not

procedure.

″Flight Controls,

change flap scheduling (e.g., flaps stay down). The

If no AOA Xs present -

Flight Controls″

AOA value displayed in the HUD is the average of

5. Continue mission Split was transitory but in-

the two split AOA probes.

dicative of a binding-probe condition. Monitor

AOA for proper indications.

For landing -

6. Execute the AOA Four Channel Failure proce-

With an AOA caution set, HUD displayed AOA

dure.

may be grossly in error and should not be utilized

to control aircraft flyaway.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 37 of 63)

V-12-39

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

AOA FOUR CHANNEL FAILURE

• A persistent (> 10 second) mismatch between the

left and right AOA probes has been detected

(15° in flaps AUTO or 5.5° to 15° in flaps

HALF/FULL depending on sideslip). Mismatch

may be caused by a transient condition; a stuck,

binding, or damaged probe; or a two-channel

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

probe failure.

complete -

4. The following general restrictions apply:

Autopilot inoperative.

• AOA below 10° in flaps AUTO, on-speed in

flaps HALF/FULL

If the detected probe split clears in flaps AUTO,

• 2g maximum

the four channel AOA Xs and the FCS caution are

• minimum sideslip

automatically removed. In flaps HALF/FULL, an

• Half lateral stick maximum

FCS RESET is required to clear the failure

For landing -

indications if the split was transitory. With a four

5. Slow below 180 KCAS at a safe altitude.

channel AOA failure, AOA indications are removed

6. LDG GEAR handle - DN

from the HUD. HUD displayed AOA can be

7. FLAP switch − HALF or FULL

AOA Four Channel

restored by selecting (boxing) the valid AOA probe

8. GAIN switch - ORIDE (ATC is not

Failure

on the FCS page with GAIN ORIDE selected. In

available in GAIN ORIDE.)

flaps AUTO, the FCCs utilize the AOA estimator

9. FCS page − SELECT

for gain scheduling. In flaps HALF/FULL, rudder

10. If possible, identify undamaged probe using

toe-in is disabled, and the FCCs use a fixed 8.1°

center (INS) AOA value, airspeed cross-check

AOA gain for longitudinal control and the estimator

or wingman.

for lateral-directional control. In flaps AUTO, flying

If undamaged probe identified -

FCS

qualities with gains scheduled by the AOA

11. Undamaged probe - SELECT (press

estimator should be essentially normal compared to

AOA pushbutton on DDI as needed)

FCES

the fixed gains used in GAIN ORIDE.

12. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

13. Notify LSO that GAIN ORIDE and a

Caution Light

single probe has been selected.

14. Fly on−speed AOA to touchdown.

″Flight Controls,

15. Maintenance action required prior to

Flight Controls″

• If an AOA probe is stuck or damaged (IFR

next flight.

basket impact, bird strikes, probe icing), AOA

If undamaged probe NOT identified -

errors may be unannunciated if the AOA split

11. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

thresholds are not exceeded.

12. Determine on-speed for intended

• Bolters in GAIN ORIDE or with AOA failed

landing GW.

require positive aft stick during rotation, ≥ 1/2

13. If on-speed AOA and airspeed do not

stick is recommended. Deflection of less than 1/2

cross-check, fly airspeed to touchdown.

aft stick will result in excess settle during bolters.

14. Notify LSO that GAIN ORIDE has been

selected and AOA indications may be in

error.

15. Maintenance action required prior to

next flight.

In GAIN ORIDE, AOA will tend to readily increase

above 14° when decelerating from a trimmed on-

speed condition. Timely longitudinal stick inputs

will be required to prevent excessive sink rates and

correct a deceleration as power alone will not change

the AOA or pitch attitude sufficiently in GAIN

ORIDE. Alpha tone is disabled in GAIN ORIDE

with flaps HALF/FULL.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 38 of 63)

V-12-40

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Auto throttle control (ATC) failed.

• GAIN ORIDE selected with ATC approach mode

ATC FAIL

1. Control throttles manually.

engaged.

2. Avoid flight above 700 KCAS or 1.8 Mach.

• Bank angle >70° in HALF or FULL flaps.

FCES

If GAIN ORIDE selected with ATC

approach mode engaged -

ATC capability not available. Supersonic engine

Caution Light

1. FCS RESET button - PUSH

thrust limiting (SETLIM) and ABLIM may be

disabled.

P CAS

R CAS

• FCS degraded in its ability to measure rates or

Y CAS

acceleration in either pitch (P), roll (R), or yaw

(Y) axis, as indicated.

Refer to AHRS Four Channel Failure proce-

FCS

dures.

FCES

Potential for lateral PIO exists when landing with a

Caution Light

Y CAS failure.

″Flight Controls,

Flight Controls″

FCS SINGLE CHANNEL FAILURE

• FCC channel failure.

No change in flying qualities.

Speedbrake function inoperative.

FCS Single

Channel 2 or Channel 4:

Channel Failure

• ATC inoperative.

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

• Normal NWS inoperative.

complete -

Channel 2 also:

6. Circuit breaker failed channel - PULL, pause

• Loss of HUD baro altitude and IFF reporting

20 seconds, RESET

FCS

(standby altitude and RALT still available).

7. Land as soon as practical.

• MAD sensor data lost. (Mag heading may

With CH 2 or CH 4 failed -

FCES

degrade).

8. Consider a precautionary arrested landing (if

available). (Normal NWS is not available.)

Channel 4 also:

Caution Light

• AOA indexer/approach lights inoperative.

Pulling the wrong circuit breaker shuts down a

second flight control channel and may result in

degraded flying qualities or loss of control.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 39 of 63)

V-12-41

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Left and right pitot-static probes are reporting in the valid range

but disagree.

• Pitot−static failure (both pitot probes invalid, PTS inoperable or

an excessive split between left and right readings).

Caution is also accompanied by four channel PTS X−out.

FCCs use the highest total pressure input.

If the FC AIR DAT caution resulted from a loss of air data, the

Wheels Warning is also set. With a loss of static pressure, HUD

displayed altitude and vertical velocity are blanked. With a loss of

total pressure, HUD displayed Mach and airspeed are blanked, but

altitude appears with an X to the right (e.g., value is uncorrected).

With the GAIN switch in ORIDE, the FCCs use fixed values for

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

speed, altitude, and AOA depending on FLAP switch position. These

complete - Assess indications.

fixed gains cause the LEFs, TEFs, and AIL droop to be driven to

If HUD airspeed and standby air-

fixed positions.

speed indicators agree -

Flaps

Mach KTAS Feet

°AOA

6. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

AUTO

0.80

459

39,000

3.5

HALF

0.23

151

500

8.1

If airspeed blanked or does not

FULL

0.21

139

500

8.1

agree with standby indicator -

6. Establish 4° to 5° AOA (DO NOT EX-

When ORIDE selected, the FLAPS light comes on along with the

CEED 10° AOA).

CRUIS advisory (flaps AUTO) or the LAND advisory (flaps HALF

or FULL). Noticeable transients may occur when selecting GAIN

FC AIR DAT

In all cases, from wings-level flight

ORIDE. Longitudinal and lateral response is more sluggish as

Once below 350 KCAS/above 4°

airspeed is reduced below the gain values and is more sensitive as

FCS

AOA -

airspeed is increased above the gain values. Do not lower the flaps in

7. GAIN switch - ORIDE

a turn as higher than normal aft stick forces are required and

sideslip excursions may occur due to fixed gains logic. Avoid

FCES

For landing -

over−control and resulting PIO during flap transition.

8. Airspeed - Below 180 KCAS (approxi-

Caution Light

mately 6° to 7° AOA)

In wings-level flight -

D With an FC AIR DAT caution, HUD displayed airspeed may be in

9. LDG GEAR handle - DN

error. Fly an on-speed AOA approach (GAIN ORIDE selected).

10. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL

D Bolters in GAIN ORIDE or with AOA failed require positive aft

11. DO NOT EXCEED 190 KCAS or 10°

stick during rotation, ≥1/2 stick is recommended. Deflection of less

AOA.

than 1/2 aft stick will result in excess settle during bolters.

12. Fly a straight-in approach (if practi-

D AOA warning tone is disabled in GAIN ORIDE with flaps

cal).

HALF/FULL.

13. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown.

(ATC is not available in GAIN

ORIDE.)

D In GAIN ORIDE, AOA will tend to readily increase above 14°

when decelerating from a trimmed on-speed condition. Timely

longitudinal stick inputs will be required to prevent excessive

sink rates and correct a deceleration as power alone will not

change the AOA or pitch attitude sufficiently in GAIN ORIDE.

D If left pitot probe is damaged or suspect, standby instruments

including standby airspeed indicator may be significantly erroneous.

In all cases where airspeed are suspect, reference AOA values to

approximate airspeed for selection of GAIN ORIDE, landing

configuration, and approach to landing.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 40 of 63)

V-12-42

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

complete -

6. Airspeed - Maintain below 250 KCAS

7. Attempt to identify the malfunction.

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

• If MC1 is inoperative, the FCES caution light is

the only indication of a FCES failure.

If failure not identified and DDI warnings

FCES

and FCS cautions still inoperative -

The FCS page is not available.

Caution Light

For landing -

If the FCES light remains on after an FCS RESET

9. Slow below 180 KCAS at a safe altitude.

(With MC1

attempt, an actuator is still failed or one of the

10. LDG GEAR handle - DN

Inoperative)

following cautions did not reset: AOA, ATC FAIL;

11. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL

P, R or Y CAS; FC AIR DAT, FCS, FLAP SCHED,

12. GAIN switch - ORIDE (if required)

FLAPS OFF, HYD 5000, or NWS.

13. FCS page - SELECT VALID AOA PROBE (if

required)

14. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

15. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown. (ATC is not

available in GAIN ORIDE.)

16. Make a precautionary short field arrestment (if

required).

• FCC A over-temperature detected.

• AHRS over-temperature detected.

FCS HOT

The FCCs can only operate for a short time without

FCS HOT

cooling. Placing the AV COOL switch to EMERG

1. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

provides emergency ram air cooling to FCC A and

KCAS optimum for cooling).

Caution Light

the right TR through a dedicated ram air scoop. If

2. AV COOL switch - EMERG

circumstances require airspeed above 325 KCAS,

3. Land as soon as possible.

delay deploying the FCS ram air scoop, as ram air

″Flight Computer Hot,

temperature may actually increase FCC heating and

Flight Computer Hot″

decrease operating time. Once deployed, the FCS

ram air scoop cannot be closed in flight.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 41 of 63)

V-12-43

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

LEF FAILURE

• LEF failures may be caused by an actuator failure (mechanical or two channel

failure) or by a switching valve failing to switch to the backup circuit following

a HYD circuit failure.

Speedbrake function and autopilot inoperative.

LEF actuators continue to operate following single channel failures. If a LEF

actuator is shutdown, the failed surface is mechanically locked in its current

position. The opposite LEF is held frozen by the FCCs except for differential

control in flaps AUTO. In most cases, the LEFs should be fairly symmetric;

however, multiple FCS reset attempts may aggravate the asymmetry.

Additionally, in flaps AUTO, aileron droop is set to zero, and TEFs are also held

fixed in their current position. However, in flaps HALF/FULL, TEFs and aileron

droop follow the normal schedules based on FLAP switch position. With a LEF

locked near 21° LED (±5°), flaps HALF/FULL handling qualities are essentially

normal. If locked above this position, stall margin is reduced. For LEFs locked

near 0° LED (±5°), light to moderate buffet levels persist for AOAs above

on-speed. The buffet is more pronounced with LEF deflections significantly less

When FCS/FCES Initial

than the normal scheduled positions. Selecting flaps FULL with the LEF at or

near 0° results in higher buffet levels at lower AOAs than with the FLAP switch

procedures complete -

set to HALF. Selecting flaps FULL is not recommended.

LEF

Small (1-3°) roll oscillations due to buffet can be expected but are easily

If failed in flaps HALF/

Failure

controllable with small lateral inputs. Roll and line-up control are not

FULL and flaps AUTO re-

significantly different than with normal scheduled positions. The aircraft rolls

faster into the lesser-deflected LEF and slower when rolling away from the

quired -

lesser-deflected LEF. Roll-off may also be experienced with AOA/pitch attitude

6. Airspeed - 180 KCAS

changes. As AOA decreases, the aircraft rolls away from the lesser-deflected LEF

7. LDG GEAR handle - UP

and as AOA increases, the aircraft rolls into the lesser-deflected LEF. Lateral

8. FLAP switch - AUTO

stick and/or trim easily counters this roll-off tendency. A small roll-off will occur

with airspeed changes during a waveoff or bolter but are easily controlled with

9. GAIN switch - ORIDE

small lateral stick inputs.

When TEFs retract to 4°

FLAPS OFF

Glideslope control degradations are more pronounced with LEF deflections

TED -

significantly less than the normal scheduled positions. The addition of wing stores

10. GAIN switch - NORM

FCES

will further degrade glideslope control as a result of additional drag. The aircraft

response to power corrections is sluggish and smaller in magnitude than normal

flap configurations. Larger, longer, and more anticipatory power corrections are

For landing -

Caution Light

required to effect a glideslope change. Power corrections translate to an airspeed

11. Execute Flaps-HALF Con-

change first before a rate of descent change is noticed. The delay in aircraft

trollability Check proce-

response coupled with the larger throttle inputs leads to the tendency to over

dure, including throttle re-

control the glideslope. The technique of applying power and waiting for a

glideslope change will lead to larger glideslope deviations. Anticipatory throttle

sponse and waveoff

FLAPS

inputs are key to controlling glideslope. The sluggish power response also

maneuver.

degrades waveoff performance. When operating shipboard, the waveoff window for

12. FLAP switch - HALF

Amber

all LEF failure conditions should be moved farther out and the LSOs should be

13. Fly a straight-in approach

made aware of the degraded glideslope performance. Upon bolter/waveoff, climb-

out attitude will appear flatter than normal. The LSOs and PRIFLY personnel

(if practical).

should monitor rate of climb as the primary indication of bolter/waveoff

14. Field - If buffet level is

performance. It is recommended aircrew perform a familiarization check of

uncomfortable on-speed, fly

″Flight Con-

aircraft response to control and throttle inputs, including a waveoff maneuver,

a slightly fast approach (6°

trols,

prior to attempting a shipboard landing.

to 7° AOA) then slow to

Flight Con-

If AUTO is selected after HALF or FULL, the TEFs only retract for loads

alleviation (no higher than approximately 17° TED at flap auto retract). If fuel or

on-speed AOA prior to

trols″

range is a concern, momentary selection of GAIN ORIDE brings the TEFs up to

touchdown.

4° TED and then returns them to normal scheduling. GAIN ORIDE also

Carrier - Fly on-speed

commands the operating LEF to 5° LED for the remainder of the flight. If the

throughout approach.

LEFs were previously fixed at a more LED position, GAIN ORIDE may drive a

controllable but undesirable LEF split. Therefore, only select GAIN ORIDE if

TEF retraction is essential or if the LEFs are fixed near 5° LED.

Bolters in GAIN ORIDE or with AOA failed require positive aft stick during

rotation, ≥1/2 stick is recommended. Deflection of less than 1/2 aft stick will

result in excess settle during bolters.

In GAIN ORIDE, AOA will tend to readily increase above 14° when decelerating

from a trimmed on-speed condition. Timely longitudinal stick inputs will be

required to prevent excessive sink rates and correct a deceleration as power alone

will not change the AOA or pitch attitude sufficiently in GAIN ORIDE. Alpha

tone is disabled in GAIN ORIDE with flaps HALF/FULL.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 42 of 63)

V-12-44

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

TEF FAILURE

• TEF failures may be caused by an actuator failure (mechanical or three-four

channel failure) or by a dual HYD 1A/2B circuit failure.

Speedbrake function and autopilot inoperative.

TEF actuators continue to operate following two channel failures. If a TEF

TEF

actuator is shut down, the surface is hydraulically or aerodynamically driven to 5°

Failure

TED and locked. If/when TEF asymmetry exceeds 6°, the opposite TEF fails off

and is also driven to 5° TED and locked.

When FCS/FCES Initial

In flaps HALF/FULL, both TEFs are 5° TED, but aileron droop schedules

procedures complete -

normally with FLAP switch position. With both TEFs locked at only 5° TED,

drag is significantly reduced, approach speeds are significantly higher, and

FLAPS OFF

For landing -

on-speed power settings are near idle. A 10° AOA approach is required to attain

acceptable approach throttle response nearing touchdown. Approach speeds may

6. Execute Controllability

FCES

be near the maximum nose tire speed (195 kgs). If shore based, consideration

Check procedure,

should be given to making an arrested landing taking into account maximum

including throttle response

arresting gear engagement speed and nose tire limit.

Caution Light

and waveoff maneuver.

With this failure, approach drag is reduced and approach power settings are less

7. Adjust gross weight to the

than normal. This results in slower engine response to throttle changes. Flying a

FLAPS

slightly slow approach (10° AOA) reduces approach speed and increases approach

minimum practical.

power setting slightly. Flying qualities at 10° AOA are similar or improved over

8. FLAP switch - FULL or

those observed at on-speed AOA. The aircraft easily trims to and maintains 10°

Amber

HALF

AOA. Glideslope maintenance will dominate the approach task and the tendency

9. Fly a straight-in approach

is to relax AOA maintenance. The 10° AOA approach reduces WOD requirements

by approximately 16 knots and improves approach flying qualities. When

(if practical).

″Flight Con-

operating at the ship, the recovery WOD should be kept as close as possible to the

10. Trim to and fly 10° AOA to

Aircraft Recovery Bulletin recommendations. Due to the large difference between

trols,

touchdown.

WOD requirements at on-speed and 10° AOA, it is imperative that AOA be

Flight Con-

maintained at 10°. The sight picture behind the ship is altered, but the field of

trols″

view over the nose is not degraded.

Slower engine response to throttle changes may result in excessive

sink rates under high WOD conditions. The recovery WOD should

be kept as close as possible to the Aircraft Recovery Bulletin

recommendations.

The aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and small in magnitude.

Larger, longer, and more anticipatory power corrections are required to effect a

glideslope change. There is a tendency to over control the power due to the low

approach power setting and the longer time to effect a change. Power corrections

translate to an airspeed change first before a rate of descent change is noticed.

Aggressive, well-timed, and anticipatory throttle inputs are required for glideslope

control. The technique of applying power and waiting for a glideslope change will

lead to larger glideslope deviations. Waveoff performance is degraded. The

waveoff technique is the same as normal flap configurations. Time to achieve

positive rate of climb is slower than for normal TEF configurations. At the ship,

the waveoff window for a TEF failure condition should be moved farther out. The

LSOs should be aware of degraded waveoff and glideslope performance. Upon

bolter/waveoff, climb-out attitude will appear flatter than normal. The LSOs and

PRIFLY personnel should monitor rate of climb as the primary indication of

bolter/waveoff performance. It is recommended aircrew perform a familiarization

check of aircraft response to control and throttle inputs, including a waveoff

maneuver, prior to attempting a shipboard landing.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 43 of 63)

V-12-45

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• FCCs have detected a LEF hydraulic drive unit (HDU) stall.

If a weak HDU fails to drive a LEF surface to the commanded position, an

FLAP

uncommanded roll−off may result. When aerodynamic loads are reduced, the

If LEF Xs not present

SCHED

weak HDU may operate normally.

(HDU Stall) -

1. Limit AOA to 6° maximum

FCES

There are two sets of LEF conditions that can set the FLAP SCHED caution.

when below 3,000 feet AGL

and above 0.6 Mach.

Caution Light

One set of conditions relates to aircraft maneuvering that may be departure

prone with incorrect LEF movement. For this case, the FLAP SCHED caution

If LEF Xs present (HDU

is asserted when all of the following conditions occur:

failed) -

FLAPS

1) There’s a 10° difference between the LEF command vs. position

1. Execute FLAPS OFF pro-

2) AOA is greater than 12°

cedure.

Amber

3) Nz greater than 1.5 Gs

4) LEF rate is less than 1.5°/sec OR is diverging from its command

For landing -

2. FLAP switch - HALF or

The second set of conditions detects severely degraded LEF performance that

FULL

″Flight

can cause pronounced roll−off at intermediate AOA due to less than optimum

3. Fly a straight-in approach

Controls,

LEF deflection on one side of the aircraft. For this case, the FLAP SCHED

(if practical).

Flight

caution is asserted when all of the following conditions occur at any flight

4. Fly on-speed AOA to

Controls″

condition:

touchdown.

1) There’s a 4° difference between the LEF command vs. position

2) LEF rate is 2°/sec slower than estimated rate capability of the LEF

Also, for this case, the FLAP SCHED caution will remain on for an additional 6

seconds after the HDU stall condition clears.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 44 of 63)

V-12-46

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

• Nosewheel steering malfunction/failure

If no FCS Channel 2 or 4 failure -

(mechanical or electrical).

1. Do not attempt taxi.

• Launch bar signal to the FCCs has failed.

If FCS Channel 2 or 4 failure present and

emergency high gain NWS required -

When failed, the NWS or NWS HI cue is removed

1. WINGFOLD switch - HOLD or FOLD

from the HUD. The NWS system reverts to a 360°

If FCS CH 4 failed -

free-swiveling mode. If NWS was lost due to a FCS

NWS

2. NWS button - PRESS and RELEASE

CH 2 or CH 4 failure, emergency high gain NWS

If FCS CH 2 failed -

can be provided by unlocking the wings. Single

FCES

2. NWS button - PRESS and RELEASE

channel NWS operation prevents detection of NWS

3. Paddle switch - PRESS

command failures. Disengage NWS if

Caution Light

4. NWS button - PRESS and RELEASE

uncommanded motion occurs.

IN FLIGHT

If no BLIN code 123 present -

1. Make a precautionary short field arrestment (if

When emergency high gain NWS mode is entered,

available).

NWS indications may not be displayed on the

If BLIN code 123 present -

HUD. As a result, inadvertent nosewheel steering

1. NWS Low gain available by holding the

actuation may injure ground personnel.

NWS switch pressed

RUDDER ACTUATOR FAILURE

• Rudder failures may be caused by an actuator

failure (mechanical or two channel failure) or by

a switching valve failing to switch to the backup

circuit following a HYD circuit failure.

Speedbrake function, autopilot, and rudder toe-in

Rudder Failure

inoperative.

Following a rudder actuator failure, the surface is

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

driven to a faired position by air loads and is

complete -

damped to prevent oscillations. With one rudder

failed, the rolling surface to rudder interconnect

6. Execute Flaps-HALF Controllability Check

FCS

(RSRI) may not have sufficient rudder authority to

procedure.

coordinate lateral stick inputs. Countering a roll-off

FCES

with lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and

For landing -

aggravates the roll-off. The only way to ensure

7. FLAP switch - HALF

Caution Light

balanced flight is to minimize sideslip by the early

8. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

and proper use of the operating rudder.

9. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown.

(DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.)

With a failed rudder, lineup control is degraded.

″Flight Controls,

Make lineup corrections slowly and smoothly,

Flight Controls″

particularly when single engine. When single engine,

large throttle transients can cause significant yaw

and roll, making heading control difficult.

Departure resistance is degraded above on-speed

AOA. Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to

prevent a departure when single engine with MAX

power selected. Bolter performance may be

degraded due to the lack of rudder toe-in.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 45 of 63)

V-12-47

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

FCES CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

STABILATOR ACTUATOR FAILURE

• Stabilator failures may be caused by an actuator

failure (mechanical or three-four channel failure)

or by a dual HYD circuit failure (1B/2A or

1A/2B).

Autopilot inoperative.

Stabilator reconfiguration control laws are

automatically enabled following a single stabilator

failure to compensate for the loss of that surface. If

hydraulics are intact, the failed stabilator is driven

to 2° TEU and locked. Following a dual HYD

circuit failure, the failed stabilator may be driven to

the locked position by aiding airloads. Below 300

KCAS in both flaps AUTO and flaps HALF, flying

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

Stabilator Failure

qualities should be nearly normal.

complete -

6. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

7. AOA - Maintain below 10°

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

• In flaps AUTO, maximum roll rate is extremely

D Flaps HALF

FCS

low in the transonic region below 20,000 feet,

D DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

especially when rolling away from the failed

FCES

stabilator. Significant roll and yaw coupling may

For landing -

occur with forward stick inputs at > Mach 1.4 and

9. FLAP switch - HALF

Caution Light

altitude >30,000 feet.

10. Fly a straight-in approach.

• In flaps AUTO, DO NOT EXCEED 10° AOA due

11. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown.

to reduced nose-down pitch authority.

12. Make a precautionary short field arrestment (if

• Upon contact with the deck during a bolter,

available).

″Flight Controls,

aircraft yaws into good stabilator when the flight

13. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during landing

Flight Controls″

control system deflects the good stabilator TEU

rollout (e.g., aero braking).

in preparation for aircraft nose rotation. The yaw

is sudden and pronounced, but can be controlled

with rudder to counter the yawing motion.

Positive aft stick input is required to achieve

positive rotation during bolters.

• Bolters in STAB RECON require positive aft

stick during rotation, ≥3/4 aft stick is

recommended. Deflections of ≤1/2 aft stick will

result in excess settle during bolters.

NOTE

Roll and pitch rate control during bolter is

significantly improved at aircraft gross

weights ≤46,000 lbs. Consider reducing

gross weight, if possible.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 46 of 63)

V-12-48

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

HYD CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• HYD circuit 1A pressure low (<1,400 psi).

1. Maintain airspeed below 380 KCAS (if

HYD 1A is the first circuit shutdown during RLS

practical).

operation for HYD 1. If caution remains without

2. Land as soon as practical.

HYD 1B, the leak was successfully isolated in HYD

If right aileron Xs -

1A.

3. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

HYD

required)

There is no effect on system operations for a HYD

If right aileron not restored -

1A failure. Following loss of HYD 1A, the right

4. Refer to:

aileron switching valve should switch to the backup

• Aileron Failure

circuit. If the surface Xs, there is no hazard

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

associated with multiple FCS RESET attempts to

restore the surface.

• HYD circuit 1B pressure low (<1,400 psi).

1. Maintain airspeed below 380 KCAS (if

HYD 1B is the second circuit shutdown during RLS

practical).

operation for HYD 1. If caution remains without

2. Land as soon as practical.

HYD 1A, the leak was successfully isolated in HYD

If left rudder or left LEF Xs -

1B.

3. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

HYD

required)

There is no effect on system operations for a HYD

If either surface not restored -

1B failure. Following loss of HYD 1B, the left

4. Refer to appropriate FCS procedure:

rudder and left LEF switching valves should switch

• Rudder Failure

to their backup circuits. If either surface Xs, there

• FLAPS OFF-LEF Failure

is no hazard associated with multiple FCS RESET

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

attempts to restore the surface.

1. Maintain airspeed below 380 KCAS (if

practical).

2. Land as soon as practical.

• HYD circuit 2A pressure low (<1,400 psi).

If right LEF Xs -

3. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

HYD 2A is the first circuit shutdown during RLS

required)

operation for HYD 2. If caution remains without

If right LEF not restored -

HYD 2B, the leak was successfully isolated in HYD

4. Refer to:

2A.

• FLAPS OFF-LEF Failure

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

With HYD 2A failed:

FOR LANDING

• No landing gear retraction/normal extension

5. Select Jettison unwanted stores prior to gear

HYD

• No normal NWS

extension.

• No normal braking including anti-skid

6. Perform Landing Gear Emergency Extension

Procedure.

• No probe retraction/normal extension

7. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if required)

• No launch bar extension

8. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL (for landing)

9. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

Following loss of HYD 2A, the right LEF switching

If arrested landing not practical (e.g., short

field gear not available) -

valve should switch to the backup circuit. If the

9. Make a normal landing.

surface Xs, there is no hazard associated with

10. Use emergency brakes with steady brake

multiple FCS RESET attempts to restore the

pressure. (Anti-skid is not available.)

surface.

11. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after

touchdown to preserve APU ACCUM pressure

for slow-speed NWS.

Once stopped or clear of runway -

12. Do not taxi.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 47 of 63)

V-12-49

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

HYD CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• HYD circuit 2B pressure low (<1,400 psi).

1. Maintain airspeed below 380 KCAS (if

HYD 2B is the second circuit shutdown during RLS

practical).

operation for HYD 2. If caution remains without

2. Land as soon as practical.

HYD 2A, the leak was successfully isolated in HYD

If right rudder or left aileron X -

2B.

3. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

HYD

required)

If lowered, the hook cannot be retracted. Following

If either surface not restored -

loss of HYD 2B, the right rudder and left aileron

4. Refer to appropriate FCS procedure:

switching valves should switch to their backup

• Rudder Failure

circuits. If either surface Xs, there is no hazard

• Aileron Failure

associated with multiple FCS RESET attempts to

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

restore the surface.

1. Throttle left engine - IDLE

2. Maintain airspeed below 380 KCAS (if

practical).

3. Land as soon as practical.

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

4. HYD pressure gauge - Check for pressure

fluctuations

(a) HYD pump internal failure (simultaneous

If simultaneous HYD 1A/1B accompanied

HYD 1A/1B cautions with pressure

with pressure fluctuations (HYD pump

fluctuations). May be accompanied by the

internal failure) -

HYD1 HOT caution.

5. Throttle left engine - OFF

(b) HYD pump shaft shear (simultaneous HYD

If HYD1 HOT caution never displayed -

1A/1B cautions with zero pressure and no

6. Consider restart for landing.

HYD

fluctuations).

If left rudder, right aileron, or left

HYD

LEF Xs -

(simultaneous HYD 1A/1B cautions

7. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

accompanied by L GEN, L DC FAIL, and L

required)

BOOST LO cautions).

If surface(s) not restored -

(d) Both circuits lost due to a HYD 1 leak which

8. Refer to appropriate FCS procedure:

could not be isolated by RLS (HYD 1A on

• Rudder Failure

then off, HYD 1B on then off, then HYD

• Aileron Failure

1A/1B both on).

• FLAPS OFF-LEF Failure

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

If single engine -

9. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

Procedure.

1. Perform the FCS procedures for Aileron

Failure.

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

HYD

2. Refer to:

HYD

Flight control surface affected:

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

• Right aileron lost (faired and damped).

• Hydraulic Subsystem Malfunction Guide

3. Perform the HYD 2A For Landing procedures.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 48 of 63)

V-12-50

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

HYD CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Carrier landings not recommended.

1. Perform the FCS procedures for FLAPS OFF-

TEF Failure.

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

2. Verify failed stab locked at 2° TEU.

3. AOA-Maintain below 10°

HYD

Flight control surfaces affected:

4. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during

HYD

• Both TEFs lost (locked 5° TED).

landing rollout (i.e., stab braking).

• Right stabilator lost (locked 2° TEU).

5. See remarks for the following FCS

• Right rudder lost (faired and damped).

procedures:

• Stab Failure

• Rudder Failure

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

• Hydraulic Subsystem Malfunction Guide

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

1. Perform the FCS procedures for Stab Failure.

2. See remarks for the following FCS procedures:

Flight control surfaces affected:

• Rudder Failure

HYD

• Both LEFs lost (frozen).

• FLAPS OFF-LEF Failure

HYD

• Left stabilator lost (locked 2° TEU).

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

• Left rudder lost (faired and damped).

• Hydraulic Subsystem Malfunction Guide

• Both LEX spoilers lost.

3. Perform the HYD 2A For Landing procedures.

1. Perform the FCS procedures for Aileron

Failure.

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

HYD

2. Refer to:

Flight control surface affected:

HYD

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

• Left aileron lost (faired and damped).

• Hydraulic Subsystem Malfunction Guide

3. Land as soon as practical.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 49 of 63)

V-12-51

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

HYD CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Throttle right engine - IDLE

2. Maintain airspeed below 380 KCAS

(if practical).

3. Land as soon as practical.

4. HYD pressure gauge - Check for pressure

fluctuations

If simultaneous HYD 2A/2B accompanied

with pressure fluctuations (HYD pump

internal failure) -

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

5. Throttle right engine - OFF

If HYD2 HOT caution never displayed -

6. Consider restart for landing.

(a) HYD pump internal failure (simultaneous

If right rudder, left aileron, or right

HYD 2A/2B cautions with pressure

LEF Xs -

fluctuations). May be accompanied by the

7. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

HYD2 HOT caution.

required)

(b) HYD pump shaft shear (simultaneous HYD

If surface(s) not restored -

2A/2B cautions with zero pressure and no

8. Refer to appropriate FCS procedure:

fluctuations).

• Rudder Failure

• Aileron Failure

(simultaneous HYD 2A/2B cautions

• FLAPS OFF-LEF Failure

HYD

accompanied by R GEN, R DC FAIL, and R

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

HYD

BOOST LO cautions).

For landing -

(d) Both circuits lost due to a HYD 2 leak which

9. Select Jettison unwanted stores prior to gear

could not be isolated by RLS (HYD 2A on

extension.

then off, HYD 2B on then off, then HYD

If single engine -

10. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

2A/2B both on).

Procedure.

If both engines still running -

With a hydraulic leak downstream from the brake

10. Perform Landing Gear Emergency Extension

valve, the HYD 2 cautions may only appear when

Procedure

brakes are applied. Once brakes are released, all

11. PROBE switch - EMER EXTD (if required)

cautions may disappear. If this occurs, do not taxi.

12. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

Continual use of brakes or emergency brakes will

If arrested landing not practical (e.g., short

lead to total loss of HYD 2 fluid.

field gear not available) -

12. Make a normal landing.

13. Use emergency brakes with steady brake

pressure. (Anti-skid is not available.)

14. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after

touchdown to preserve APU ACCUM pressure

for slow-speed NWS.

Once stopped or clear of runway -

15 Do not taxi. (Even if HYD 2 cautions are re-

moved.)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 50 of 63)

V-12-52

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

HYD CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

Flight control surfaces affected:

• Both LEFs lost (frozen).

• Right aileron lost (faired and damped).

May be uncontrollable in flaps HALF/FULL

• Left stabilator lost (locked 2° TEU).

if stores not jettisoned.

• Left rudder lost (faired and damped).

• Both LEX spoilers lost.

1. Perform the FCS procedures for Stab Failure.

2. EMERG JETT button - PUSH (prior to mode

HYD

Flaps AUTO flying qualities acceptable. Enough

transition)

HYD

lateral trim authority is available to balance the

3. See remarks for the following FCS procedures:

HYD

failure induced roll-off up to 0.85 Mach. Jettison all

• Aileron Failure

stores prior to mode transition since the transition

• Rudder Failure

with stores results in an uncontrollable nose-up

• FLAPS OFF-LEF Failure

tendency. Mode transition in a clean configuration

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

can be accomplished (expect a LWD roll near

• Hydraulic Subsystem Malfunction Guide

on-speed AOA). Carrier approach is possible but

4. Perform the HYD 2A For Landing procedures.

exhibits sloppy directional/centerline control. In the

event of bolter, the decision to go around should be

made immediately upon recognition of a missed

wire as rudder power may be insufficient to

maintain directional control below 140 KCAS.

Carrier landings not recommended since ap-

proach speed may be in excess of 200

• Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

KCAS.

Flight control surfaces affected:

1. Perform the FCS procedures for FLAPS OFF-

• Both TEFs lost (locked 5° TED).

TEF Failure.

• Left aileron lost (faired and damped).

2. Verify failed stab locked at 2° TEU.

HYD

• Right stabilator lost (locked 2° TEU).

3. AOA-Maintain below 10°

HYD

• Right rudder lost (faired and damped).

4. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during landing

HYD

rollout (i.e., stab braking).

Flaps AUTO flight exhibits sluggish roll

5. See remarks for the following FCS procedures:

characteristics above 15° AOA. Expect loose and

• Stab Failure

sluggish response in flaps HALF/FULL with high

• Rudder Failure

approach speeds due to TEF failure.

• Aileron Failure

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

• Hydraulic Subsystem Malfunction Guide

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 51 of 63)

V-12-53

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

HYD CAUTIONS

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Carrier landings not recommended due to

• Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

high approach speeds.

1. Perform the FCS procedures for FLAPS OFF-

Flight control surfaces affected:

TEF Failure.

• Both TEFs lost (locked 5° TED).

2. Maintain airspeed below 250 KCAS

• Right aileron lost (faired and damped).

(if practical).

• Right stabilator lost (locked 2° TEU).

3. Verify failed stab locked at 2° TEU.

• Right rudder lost (faired and damped).

HYD

4. AOA-Maintain below 10°

5. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during landing

HYD

In flaps AUTO, full LWD lateral trim and half

rollout (i.e., stab braking).

HYD

lateral stick are required to keep wings level at 0.7

6. Consider SEL JETT of right wing stores.

Mach and 20,000 feet, while full lateral trim is

7. See remarks for the following FCS procedures:

required at 0.6 Mach and 20,000 feet. Lateral

• Rudder Failure

• Stab Failure

authority is lost around 14° AOA. Mode transition

• Aileron Failure

to flaps HALF/FULL may be safely accomplished

• FLAPS OFF-LEF Failure

with or without stores. Consider SEL JETT of right

• Hydraulic Flow Diagram

wing stores to balance failure induced roll.

• Hydraulic Subsystem Malfunction Guide

8. Perform the HYD 2A For Landing procedures.

See the Hydraulic Subsystem Malfunction Guide.

Uncontrollable during transition from flaps

AUTO to flaps HALF/FULL.

When FCS/FCES Initial steps 1 thru 5

complete -

• Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

6. Maintain airspeed below 250 KCAS (if practical).

7. Verify failed stab locked at 2° TEU.

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure in Flaps

AUTO.

Maintain FLAP switch in AUTO. Mode transition

For landing -

to HALF flaps results in uncontrollable nose-up

9. Maintain FLAP switch in AUTO.

pitch.

If divert available or shore−based -

10. Fly a straight−in approach (if practical).

Flight control surfaces affected:

HYD

11. Maintain approach speed above 150 KCAS for

• Both LEFs lost (frozen).

HYD

controllability on deck in event of bolter.

• Left aileron lost (faired and damped).

HYD

12. Make a precautionary short field arrestment (if

• Left stabilator lost (locked 2° TEU).

available).

• Left rudder lost (faired and damped).

13. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during landing

rollout (i.e., stab braking).

In flaps AUTO, flying qualities are acceptable with

If no divert available -

smooth lateral stick inputs. Wings level can be

10. Determine if Auto Flap configuration yields

maintained up to 0.85 Mach. Piloted simulation

acceptable approach speed to allow for carrier

determined that Auto Flap approach and landing is

landing (recommend 10° AOA approach).

controllable. A 10° AOA approach to reduce

If approach speed slow enough to allow for

approach speed is recommended.

carrier landing -

11. Land

If approach speed too fast for carrier

landing -

11. Set up for controlled ejection.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 52 of 63)

V-12-54

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Afterburner limiting function of the FADEC is

activated.

The ABLIM function is used during MAX power

ABLIM

Information

catapult launches only. ABLIM limits engine power

to half afterburner with the throttles at MAX.

ABLIM is disabled with an FCC Ch 2 or 4, MC1,

FADEC, or INS failure.

D An ACI configuration that is incompatible with

TAWS/GPWS has been detected.

ACI

Information

TAWS/GPWS voice alerts are unavailable and are

replaced with ″whoop/whoop″. Visual cues are still

available.

• Aft Quick Disconnect Connector (QDC) is not

connected.

1. Verify aft HMD properly connected.

• Aft QDC is not properly secured to Quick

2. Verify aft QDC is properly connected and

Mounting Bracket (QMB).

mounted in the QMB.

AHMD

• Aft coarse alignment is invalid or has not been

3. Aft HMD - ALIGN

performed.

4. Verify aft HDU is properly connected to the

• Aft Helmet Display Unit (HDU) is not connected

helmet.

to the helmet.

• INS switched to NAV without a complete

1. INS knob - IFA or GYRO

ALGN

alignment.

• Radar hardware needed to support AMRAAM

AM DL

Information

data link not installed.

ARMAMENT

• Refer to NTRP 3-22.2-EA-18G (EA-18G

ADVISORIES

Classified Manual).

• Autopilot barometric altitude hold mode

BALT

Information

engaged.

BIT

• Built-in test failure detected.

1. BIT page - Identify failure

• TAWS/GPWS has been deselected.

Information

CFIT

Protection against CFIT is unavailable.

COM1H

• ARC 210 COM1 or COM2 not loaded with Have

Information

COM2H

Quick time.

• Indicates COMM 1 or COMM 2 is reporting

failed checksum or validity fill loading error.

COM1L

With COMM 1 and 2 on -

When selected on the MUMI page, COMM 1 boxes

COM2L

1. MUMI page - SELECT COMM

while the data is downloaded from the DMD to

COMM 1 and 2 and unboxes when the download is

complete.

COM1S

• ARC 210 COM1 or COM2 not loaded with

Information

COM2S

SINCGARS time.

• Onboard unit other than MU contains classified

CDATA

Information

data.

‘

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 54 of 63)

V-12-56

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• All systems have not been checked for configura-

tion compatibility because one or more of the

CONFG

Information

systems is off or not communicating. Typical

poststart with RADAR knob in OFF.

• Autopilot coupled to WYPT, OAP, SEQ #, or

CPLD

Information

TCN.

• GAIN switch in ORIDE with FLAP switch in

CRUIS

Information

AUTO.

D BAD

• ALE-47 dispenser failure.

Information

• ALE-47 dispenser expendables quantity below

D LOW

Information

set BINGO level.

• Indicates a failure of the COMSEC capability

DCSCS

Information

has been detected.

• Degrade detected that may result in loss of

DECM

jamming functionality or jammer interface

1. BIT/EW/DECM STATUS page - CHECK

problems.

• The integrity of the DFIRS-stored electronic

boresight constants (EBCs) is uncertain.

1. BIT/SENSORS/EBC ENTRY page - Verify per-

EBC

manent Mode S address

Mode S may be unavailable.

Only activated with WonW.

• ECS auxiliary duct door not in commanded

position.

GROUND

1. Do not takeoff.

If the advisory is displayed above 0.4 Mach, a door

is failed open. If the advisory is displayed below

0.32 Mach, a door is failed closed. The advisory

INFLIGHT

clears if the doors are in the correct position for

1. Accelerate and maintain 0.40 IMN using

flight conditions. The advisory may return if the

minimum power.

failure still exists and the flight conditions reoccur.

ECSDR

2. There are no throttle restrictions and the

No flight restrictions are imposed as long as

airspeed is maintained above 0.4 Mach.

mission may be continued provided airspeed

remains above 0.40 IMN to landing.

For landing -

3. Minimize time below 0.40 IMN.

Minimize operation at high power settings below 0.4

4. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

Mach with both doors failed closed. A dual bleed

5. AV COOL switch - EMERG

shutdown is possible under such conditions.

1. Fuel page - CHECK

• Failure in fuel quantity gauging system that may

If all fuel quantities invalid -

F-QTY

affect fuel quantity indications or FUEL XFER

2. SDC - RESET

caution display.

3. FLBIT - PERFORM

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 55 of 63)

V-12-57

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

1. ENG page - Verify ENG

STATUS

If ENG STATUS is NORM -

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

3. ENG page - Push unboxed

channel (A or B) on affected

• Left or right FADEC has lost backup redundancy in one channel.

engine

If dual channel lineouts are

FADEC

If advisory remains, a level of redundancy is lost. Another

removed -

engine/control system failure may result in engine shutdown. ABLIM

4. Restart affected engine.

function may not be available.

5. Continue mission.

If ENG STATUS is other than

NORM or dual lineouts do not

clear -

2. Do not takeoff.

IN FLIGHT

Information

D ALQ-99 control laws invalid.

D 5-Wet FCC control law gains are no longer being applied.

There is possibility of looseness in the flaps AUTO longitudinal

flying qualities at certain localized flight conditions. This is not

FCCGN

Information

considered to be a safety of flight issue and will not interfere with

inflight refueling operations. The degradation, if any, may become

apparent for CGs aft of approximately 30% MAC. Flaps AUTO

lateral/directional and all flaps HALF or FULL flying qualities are

unaffected by this issue.

FPAH

• Autopilot flight path angle hold mode engaged.

Information

• Flight performance advisory system is unable to calculate HOME

FPAS

Information

FUEL caution.

GPS

• GPS NORM mode error > 1,000 feet.

1. INS knob - NAV

• GPS multi-path is detected.

GPSMP

Information

GPS-aided navigation is prevented.

GSEL

• Autopilot ground track select mode engaged.

Information

GTRK

• Autopilot ground track hold mode engaged.

Information

HDG

• Autopilot magnetic heading hold mode engaged.

Information

• Designated engine anti-ice system is operating.

LHEAT

Both advisories should be displayed with the ENG ANTI ICE switch

Information

RHEAT

ON. Single advisory displayed during post-start engine anti-ice

functional test with the switch OFF. Corresponding advisory is

removed if an anti-ice failure is detected.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 56 of 63)

V-12-58

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Engine anti-ice failure detected while the ENG

ANTI ICE switch is OFF.

1. Avoid icing conditions.

If the ENG ANTI ICE switch is placed to ON, the

If icing conditions are

HEAT

HEAT advisory is replaced by the HEAT FAIL

encountered -

caution. The corresponding L HEAT or R HEAT

2. Refer to Extreme Weather

advisory is not displayed on the failed side. Engine

Procedures.

and inlet device anti-ice capability lost on failed

side.

• INS attitude data is not being provided to the

FCCs for sideslip and AOA estimation

calculations. May be caused by an INS failure

(INS ATT caution), by placing the ATT switch

to STBY with good INS data, or by an FCC

detected failure. Autopilot inoperative.

1. FCS RESET button - PUSH

If advisory remains -

HIAOA

Above approximately 20° AOA in flaps AUTO, the

2. Monitor any sideslip excursions above 20° AOA

FCCs use INS data for sideslip and sideslip rate

in flaps AUTO.

feedback to provide roll coordination and departure

resistance. When INS data is not available or

invalid, the FCCs will no longer use INS data.

There is no significant degradation to flying

qualities, departure resistance or roll performance

with this indication.

• Forward Quick Disconnect Connector (QDC) is

not connected.

1. Verify forward HMD properly connected.

• Forward QDC is not properly secured to Quick

2. Verify forward QDC is properly connected and

Mounting Bracket (QMB).

mounted in the QMB.

HMD

• Forward coarse alignment is invalid or has not

3. Forward HMD - ALIGN

been performed.

4. Verify forward HDU is properly connected to

• Forward Helmet Display Unit (HDU) is not

the helmet.

connected to the helmet.

HSEL

• Autopilot heading select mode engaged.

Information

• SDC HUD Backup is unavailable.

HUDBU

Information

In the event of a dual MC failure, the backup HUD

page will not be available on the MPCD or UFCD.

1. BIT/COMM/PIDS MAINT page - Check

CRYPTO status

D Fault with the airborne interrogator.

If CRYPTO lined out -

D Mode 4 crypto keys may not be loaded.

2. Reload M4 Crypto.

IFFAI

If CRYPTO not lined out -

Unable to interrogate Mode 4 or cannot interrogate

2. Information:

any mode.

D IFF may be DEGD

D Unable to interrogate Mode 4

D Unable to solve ROE if M4 not removed

• GAIN switch in ORIDE with the FLAP switch in

LAND

Information

HALF or FULL.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 57 of 63)

V-12-59

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• LTD/R and/or Marker degrade detected.

Laser designation/ranging and/or marking may be

If ATFLIR installed -

unavailable or inaccurate.

1. TAC/FLIR/SETUP page - IDENTIFY FAIL-

If ATFLIR installed-

URE

ALN DEGD - Neither LTD/R nor Marker will fire

If either TFLIR or ATFLIR installed -

L DEGD

due to alignment errors.

2. FLIR IBIT - PERFORM (SUPT/BIT/

PWR DEGD - LTD/R power could be deficient for

SENSORS/FLIR or ATFLIR)

ranging and/or designating.

If advisory remains -

RNG DEGD - Laser ranging will be invalid but

designating may still be possible.

3. FLIR switch - CYCLE

MRK DEGD - Marker will either not fire or fire at

low power.

• Improper weapon load, codes, or incompatible

1. SMS processor - Check for proper codes

LOAD

fuzing. Refer to NTRP 3-22.2-EA-18G (EA-18G

If LOAD remains -

Classified Manual).

2. Do not takeoff.

• ACL mode has been enabled and the current IFF

M2ID

Mode 2 code is not the same as the last four

Information

digits of the aircraft Link 4 address.

• Transponder replied to a valid Mode 4

interrogation.

M4 OK

Information

IFF MODE 4 switch must be in DIS or DIS/AUD

to enable this advisory.

MIDS

• MIDS fault detected.

1. MIDS page - IDENTIFY FAILURE

1. Verify maintenance card installed in proper MU

• MU/maintenance card problem.

slot and MU door is closed.

MNTCD

If advisory remains -

Advisory is disabled in flight.

2. Do not takeoff.

• MU/mission card problem.

• MU keys not loaded.

• OFP loading failure.

• Mission card 90% full.

1. Verify mission card installed in proper MU slot

• Mission card 100% full.

and MU door is closed.

MSNCD

• Mission cards swapped inflight and new card has

If advisory remains -

a different ID.

2. MUMI page - Identify cause

• EAU writing to mission card after landing.

The advisory clears inflight for certain causes when

the MUMI page is selected.

• Memory Unit memory full.

MU FL

Information

Oldest stored data will be overwritten.

• DoV mission card data is not present or failed to

load.

• No DoV data is available for current position for

If DOV displayed on MUMI page -

NODOV

30 seconds.

1. Reload mission card.

CV alignment times will increase.

INS performance while unaided may be degraded.

NOSEC

• GPS operating in non-secure mode.

Information

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 58 of 63)

V-12-60

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• GPS satellite communication lost.

P/INS

Information

Position keeping has reverted from POS/AINS to

POS/INS. INS not being updated with GPS data.

PCODE

• GPS keys incorrect or not loaded.

Information

RALT

• Autopilot radar altitude hold mode engaged.

Information

RMMCD

• RMM not installed or failed.

Information

RMMFL

• RMM full (less than 20 minutes remaining).

Information

RCRD

• MU turned off.

Information

ROLL

• Autopilot roll attitude hold mode engaged.

Information

RSET

• FCS RESET attempt successful.

Information

• FCS RESET attempt unsuccessful.

RSET

Information

FCS failure and failure indications remain.

• MATT key(s) invalid or not loaded.

SCODE

1. SAT page - Identify failure

• MATT channel(s) failed.

• Landing gear down with the ANTI SKID switch

SKID

Information

in OFF.

• Mode S is enabled while acquisition squitter is

SQTTR

Information

disabled.

• Pitch, roll, and yaw trim properly set for takeoff.

TRIM

Information

Stabilators 4° TEU, roll trim zero, RUD TRIM

knob mechanically neutral.

• GPS assisted velocity vector enhancement

disabled.

Only the air data function is being used to smooth

the velocity vector and may result in degraded

velocity vector accuracy.

1. Monitor velocity vector for errors.

If errors noted -

VVEL

2. Maintain level flight for 3 minutes (if practi-

With a VVEL advisory displayed, sustained climbs

cal).

and descents, such as penetration from the marshal

stack, can result in uncued (i.e., no cautions)

vertical velocity errors and a possible inaccurate

velocity vector position. Error magnitudes increase

at slower airspeeds and lower altitudes. Errors of up

to 3° (e.g., actual flightpath 3° below the displayed

velocity vector) have been observed in the landing

configuration.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 59 of 63)

V-12-61

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Advisory Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Refer to NTRP 3-22.2-EA-18G (EA-18G Classi-

A/A

• Air-to-Air master mode selected.

fied Manual).

1. Refer to NTRP 3-22.2-EA-18G (EA-18G Classi-

A/G

• Air-to-Ground master mode selected.

fied Manual).

• RFCM or ALE-47 is requesting consent to

1. Refer to NTRP 3-22.2-EA-18G (EA-18G Classi-

CONSNT

execute countermeasures response as indicated

fied Manual).

by HUD cueing, or ALE-47 BIT underway.

1. Refer to NTRP 3-22.2-EA-18G (EA-18G Classi-

• Continuous wave (RF Threat) detected.

fied Manual).

STEADY

Decoy is deployed and either transmitting or

enabled to transmit, or decoy portion of DECM

BIT is underway.

-------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to NTRP 3-22.2-EA-18G (EA-18G Classi-

DCOY ON

FLASHING

fied Manual).

Decoy is deployed and transmission is inhibited due

to altitude limit or EMCON selected. Also flashes

for 30 seconds upon deployment of, or enabling

transmission from, last usable decoy if invalid reel

count occurs during its deployment.

• Fire extinguisher bottle discharge initiated or

GROUND

DISCH

pressure drop detected.

1. Do not takeoff.

STEADY

Decoy is deployed to, or beyond, the defined

minimum successful deployment length or 8 sec

(ALE-50)/16 sec (ALE-55) have elapsed since

launch squib firing, or decoy portion of BIT

underway.

-------------------------------------------------------

DPLY

Information

FLASHING

Decoy is currently being deployed, or decoy sever

has failed or cannot be determined. Flashes

indefinitely if first sever attempt unsuccessful.

Transitions to off if sever re-attempt successful or

continues to flash for 30 seconds and then

transitions to off if sever re-attempt fails.

• TEF(s) OFF, LEF(s) OFF, SPIN mode engaged,

FLAPS

GAIN ORIDE selected, or FLAPS HALF/FULL

Information

(Amber)

over 240 KCAS (auto flap retract).

FULL

• FLAP switch in FULL.

Information

HALF

• FLAP switch in HALF.

Information

HOOK

• Hook is down.

Information

(Green)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 61 of 63)

V-12-63

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Advisory Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Launch bar extended. (Weight on the nose gear,

L BAR

LAUNCH BAR switch in EXTEND, launch bar

Information

(Green)

not up (launch bar proximity switch not ener-

gized))

STEADY

• Left main landing gear down and locked.

Information

--------------------------------------------------------------

LEFT

FLASHING

• Left planing link failure detected with the

1. Refer to Planing Link Failure Procedure.

left main landing gear down and locked.

1. Refer to NTRP 3-22.2-EA-18G (EA-18G Classi-

LOCK/SHOOT

• Radar in STT; ready to shoot.

fied Manual).

MRAD

• The master radiate function is enabled.

Information

MASTER CAUTION

• Warning or caution has been activated.

1. MASTER CAUTION light - RESET

NOSE

• Nose landing gear down and locked.

Information

• CVRS mode switch in MAN or AUTO (in A/A or

A/G).

• The SSR is commanded to record.

RCDR ON

Information

The light is not an indication that tape is actually

pulling or SSR actually recording.

READY (APU)

• APU online and ready to support engine start.

Information

STEADY

• Right main landing gear down and locked.

Information

-------------------------------------------------------

RIGHT

FLASHING

• Right planing link failure detected with the

1. Refer to Planing Link Failure Procedure.

right main landing gear down and locked.

SPD BRK

• Speedbrake function surfaces not fully retracted.

Information

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 62 of 63)

V-12-64

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

GPWS Voice Warnings

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Aircraft is <150 feet, <200 KCAS, more than 60

seconds after takeoff/bolter or wave-off,

descending and landing gear is not down and

Wave-off

CHECK GEAR

locked for 0.3 seconds.

LDG GEAR handle - DN

There is no visual cue.

Approach Phase -

• Aircraft is <150 feet, <200 KCAS, more than 60

Immediately add power (up to MAX may be

seconds after takeoff/bolter or waveoff, and sink

required) to reduce sink rate and pull up using

rate ≥ threshold for 0.3 seconds. Threshold varies

the direction-of-pull arrow on the HUD to

linearly with a maximum sink rate of 2,040 fpm

maintain 10 to 12° AOA.

POWER

from 150 feet.

Takeoff Phase -

• Aircraft is <150 feet, <250 KCAS, less than 60

seconds after takeoff/bolter or waveoff, and a

Do not exceed 14° AOA (AOA tone).

sink rate≥300 fpm for greater than 0.3 seconds.

• Aircraft is ≥150 feet and MC1 calculates a dive

recovery is required.

Immediately pull-up using the direction-of-pull

PULL UP

• Aircraft is ≤90 feet for 0.3 seconds and airspeed

arrow on the HUD.

is either ≥250 KCAS or ≥200 KCAS (when more

than 60 seconds after takeoff/bolter or wave-off).

• Aircraft is ≥150 feet, angle of bank >45°, and

MC1 calculates a dive recovery is required. May

be followed by PULL UP once bank angle is

Immediately roll towards wings level in

ROLL LEFT/RIGHT

≤45°.

direction indicated and pull-up using the

• Aircraft is <150 feet, <200 KCAS, more than 60

direction-of-pull arrow on the HUD.

seconds after takeoff/bolter or wave-off, and at a

bank angle of ≥45° for more than one second.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 63 of 63)

V-12-65 (Reverse Blank)

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 13

Ground Emergencies

13.1 LOSS OF DC ESSENTIAL BUS

With WonW and both GENs offline, the Essential Bus is powered by the battery through the battery

contactor. If the battery contactor fails to apply power to the Essential Bus, the following cautions

and/or failures are displayed together and indicate an essential bus failure:

• L and R OIL PR cautions

• Landing gear position lights inoperative

• BINGO caution

• UHF 1 and 2 inoperative

• NWS caution

• Fuel dump inoperative

• FIRE EXTGH READY light on

• HOOK position light inoperative

• SPN RCVY light on

If a loss of the DC Essential Bus is suspected -

1. BATT switch - CYCLE

2. Electrical RESET button - PUSH

3. GEN switches - CYCLE

If DC Essential Power not restored -

4. APU start and crossbleed capability are lost.

13.2 ENGINE FAILS TO START/HUNG START

If no EGT rise within 20 seconds after throttle advance or rpm stabilizes below IDLE -

1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

2. Continue cranking for 3 minutes.

After 3 minutes -

3. ENG CRANK switch - OFF

4. APU switch - OFF

13.3 HOT START

If EGT climbs rapidly through 750°C -

*1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

2. Engine - CRANK UNTIL EGT BELOW 200°C, reengage when rpm below 30%.

V-13-1

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

When EGT below 200°C -

3. ENG CRANK switch - OFF

4. APU switch - OFF

13.4 GROUND FIRE

Several fire conditions exist that may be detected and signalled by ground crew without correspond-

ing cockpit FIRE indications. These may include, for example, APU exhaust torching, ignition of fuel

or other flammable liquids exposed to hot surfaces, or brake assembly flash fires. Aircraft location and

the nature of the fire condition will determine the course of action. If a fire occurs during hot refueling,

the pilot must decide whether to taxi clear or shutdown immediately.

Brake flash fires can occur if excess grease or residual/leaking brake fluid have built up in the wheel

brake assembly or on the carbon discs. These materials may ignite at normal post landing brake

temperatures. Visible flames may extend from the wheel assembly while flammable material is being

consumed, and smoke may be visible for a short time after the fire goes out.

In most cases, if ground crew signal a fire condition, the aircraft should be stopped and shutdown

immediately. If the fire is related to the wheel brake system, consider chocking the nosewheel and

leaving the parking brake released to reduce the amount of heat transferred from the brakes to the

wheel assembly or to isolate a brake fluid leak which may feed a wheel brake fire.

13.5 EMERGENCY EGRESS

1. Canopy - OPEN (CANOPY switch, CANOPY JETT handle, or canopy handcrank)

CANOPY JETT rocket thrusters may ignite spilled fuel or hydraulic

fluid and may injure ground crew in the immediate vicinity.

NOTE

• The CANOPY switch should be used to raise the canopy unless there

are overriding circumstances. If weight is not on the left main gear

(e.g., gear up landing), the CANOPY switch must be held to raise the

canopy.

• If electrical power is not available, the canopy must be jettisoned or

raised with the handcrank.

V-13-2

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 14

Takeoff Emergencies

14.1 EMERGENCY CATAPULT FLYAWAY

After catapult launch, several emergencies may cause the aircraft to settle, e.g., slow catapult, AB

blowout, degraded engine performance, single engine total loss of thrust, improper trim setting, etc. If

settling cannot be stopped immediately, it is necessary to eject without delay. Priorities during

emergency catapult flyaway are to establish control of the aircraft, arrest aircraft settle, and accelerate

for climbout.

If a settle is detected, the throttles should be advanced to MAX as soon as possible. If the thrust

output of one engine is degraded, some yaw and roll should be expected. If one engine is failed

completely, significant amounts of yaw and roll result with both throttles at MAX. In this worst case,

full rudder pedal and partial lateral stick may be required to oppose yaw/roll and maintain

lateral-directional control of the aircraft. Too much rudder pedal is not harmful, but too little rudder

pedal may cause controllability problems. Therefore, FULL rudder pedal to oppose yaw/roll is

prudent.

Proper AOA control is crucial to maintaining aircraft control and to arresting aircraft settle. AOA

must be high enough to minimize altitude loss yet low enough to maintain lateral-directional control.

During a nominal, two-engine catapult launch, the aircraft is trimmed to capture and maintain a

reference AOA of 12° (hands off). The FCS does allow small overshoots during initial flyaway, but peak

AOA should typically be below 13°. Catapult launch bulletins ensure an endspeed at least 15 knots

above minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc). Vmc numbers for the EA-18G launch bulletins are

defined at 14° AOA, which was selected as a compromise between arresting settle off the bow and

controllability. (Increased AOA helps arrest sink but also reduces lateral-directional controllability

resulting in higher minimum control speeds.) During single engine, MAX power catapult flyaway,

controllability should be sufficient if airspeed is above Vmc.

Under normal circumstances, proper AOA control should be provided by the FCS. However, certain

catapult failures (mis-trim, AOA probe splits or failures, FCS malfunctions) may require the pilot to

actively control flyaway pitch attitude/AOA. With an AOA malfunction, HUD displayed AOA may be

in error, so that pitch attitude becomes the only reliable source of AOA control. For this reason, the

recommended flyaway procedure is to maintain 10 to 12° pitch attitude with the waterline symbol

without exceeding 14° AOA (AOA tone). This should provide an AOA high enough to arrest the settle

yet low enough to retain lateral-directional control.

Depending on aircraft gross weight, stores jettison may be required to ensure a positive single engine

rate of climb (SEROC). Immediate jettison of excess weight minimizes altitude loss and, when

launching with a lateral weight asymmetry, returns the aircraft to a symmetric configuration,

potentially improving lateral-directional controllability.

It is also essential that the flaps remain in FULL until a positive rate of climb is established, as flap

retraction increases aircraft settle.

V-14-1

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

The first four steps in the procedure are the most important to arrest settle and maintain control of

the aircraft. Raising the LDG GEAR handle reduces drag and allows a greater rate of climb; however,

attention should not be diverted from maintaining aircraft control to perform this action. The landing

gear should only be raised when the first four immediate action steps have been accomplished,

controllability is not in question, and raising the gear does not compound the emergency.

NOTE

When the LDG GEAR handle is raised, the on-speed AOA bracket is

removed from the HUD.

If flyaway airspeed available -

*1. Throttles - MAX

*2. Rudder pedal - FULL AGAINST YAW/ROLL

*3. EMERG JETT button - PUSH

*4. Maintain 10° to 12° pitch attitude with W symbol.

• Do not exceed 14° AOA (AOA tone).

If unable to arrest yaw/roll or stop settle -

*5. EJECT

• Exceeding 10° to 12° pitch attitude may result in rapid loss of lateral

directional control.

• Raising flaps will increase aircraft settle.

14.2 ABORT

Maximum planned abort speed is dependent on ambient conditions, gross weight, runway length,

and runway and/or braking conditions. However, the decision to abort depends on the nature and

severity of the emergency.

Published maximum abort speeds for the existing conditions should allow the aircraft to be stopped

within the runway remaining without the use of long field arresting gear. For extreme emergencies, the

availability of long field arresting gear may influence the decision to abort. For other, less critical

emergencies, the decision to abort or continue the takeoff is crucial. Successfully stopping a heavy

weight aircraft on a high speed abort may prove to be a more extreme emergency than continuing a

V-14-2

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

takeoff with the given malfunction. No rule can be made to cover every situation, so good judgment and

common sense should be used. A thorough preflight briefing of abort contingencies should aid the pilot

in making a timely abort decision.

Once the decision to abort is made, the amount of runway remaining dictates braking technique and

the decision to take any long field gear. After brakes are applied, stabilator braking with up to full aft

stick is extremely effective in aiding deceleration. At heavy takeoff gross weight, excessive brake

heating, melted wheel assembly fuze plugs, and/or blown tires should be anticipated. If the long field

gear is required to stop the aircraft, inform the tower and/or other members of the flight as soon as

possible. Lower the hook in time for it to fully extend. If the aircraft cannot be stopped in the runway

remaining, the decision whether or not to eject must be made. If in doubt, eject prior to the aircraft

leaving the prepared surface.

*1. Throttles - IDLE

*2. Speedbrake - AS DESIRED

*3. Brakes - APPLY

*4. Stick - AFT below 100 knots (if required)

*5. HOOK handle - DOWN (if required)

NOTE

A rule of thumb to ensure full hook extension is 1,000 feet prior to the

arresting gear.

14.3 GO AROUND

Several emergency situations may require the use of the Go Around procedure: FIRE light on takeoff

(engine fire), loss of thrust on takeoff (engine failure), or loss of directional control on takeoff or

landing (NWS or blown tire). The decision to abort or execute a go around depends on the nature and

severity of the emergency. Refer to the preceding ABORT discussion.

For a loss of directional control on landing, the decision to execute a go around should not be

delayed. In most cases, it is better to go around immediately than struggle with directional control and

possibly depart the runway. An immediate go around allows time to assess the emergency and set up

for an arrested landing, if required.

The Go Around procedure provides a quick, simple way to safely get airborne if a situation arises

which requires immediate action. The use of MIL or MAX power depends on airspeed, runway

remaining, and aircraft configuration/asymmetry. If one engine fails, asymmetric thrust effects are

exacerbated at MAX power but are nonetheless controllable if AOA is maintained near on-speed.

When safely airborne, raising the landing gear, if HYD 2A is operative, improves acceleration and

climb; however, it may not always be prudent depending on the nature of the emergency.

V-14-3

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

With the FLAP switch in HALF, SEROC is normally sufficient at all gross weights and ambient

conditions. However, if the situation warrants, jettisoning excess weight increases SEROC and, if

asymmetric, returns the aircraft to a symmetric configuration, potentially improving lateral-directional

controllability. See figure 14-1, for the maximum weight and altitudes for 100 fpm SEROC.

1. Throttles - MIL or MAX

2. Maintain ON-SPEED AOA and balanced flight.

3. EMERG JETT button - PUSH (if required)

When single engine with the operating engine at MAX, the possibility of

an adverse yaw departure increases as AOA exceeds on-speed.

14.4 LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL DURING TAKEOFF OR LANDING (BLOWN TIRE, NWS

FAILURE)

A directional control problem on takeoff or landing may be caused by a NWS, brake, landing gear

component failure, planing link failure or a blown tire. Directional control problems may be

compounded by wet or icy runways, crosswinds, hydroplaning, high lateral weight asymmetries, or

single-engine operations. It may be difficult to identify the source of the problem, and time is usually

critical. The decision whether to continue a takeoff or to abort, or on landing, to continue rollout

depends on the speed at the time the directional control problem is detected, the stopping distance

required, and the availability of arresting gear.

Loss of brakes may be caused by a brake or anti-skid system failure. A brake system failure may

cause a locked brake and/or blown tire, resulting in ineffective braking and/or loss of directional

control. A blown tire may cause engine FOD or flap and gear door damage. If decision to stop is made,

the primary danger is loss of directional control. For Planing Link Failure Procedures, refer to chapter

16.

If the decision to takeoff is made, nose rotation and/or takeoff may be

delayed by abnormal aircraft attitudes due to failures, increased drag,

and lack of or reduced rudder toe due to rudder deflection to counter

directional motion.

If detected after touchdown and flyaway airspeed available -

*1. Go Around

V-14-4

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 15

Inflight Emergencies

15.1 AFTERBURNER FAILURE

Afterburner failure can be recognized by failure of the nozzle to open, which may be the only

symptom that is immediately recognizable. The afterburner receives continuous ignition any time the

throttle is above the MIL detent and afterburner lightoff is not yet detected. If an afterburner does not

light after selection or blows out, reduce the throttle to MIL and reselect afterburner. If an afterburner

fails to light on subsequent attempts, maintenance action is most likely required.

15.2 RESTART

Ignition is activated automatically whenever a flameout is sensed and the throttle is at or above IDLE. At

least 350 KCAS is required to maintain 12% rpm for a windmill airstart. When single engine, the hydraulic

system switches from 3,000 to 5,000 psi output pressure above approximately 500 KCAS/1.0 IMN (see figure

15-2). This results in additional horsepower extraction and reduced windmill rpm. The hydraulic system

output drops from 5,000 to 3,000 psi at approximately 480 KCAS/0.95 IMN. Therefore, maintain airspeed

below 480 KCAS/0.95 IMN to maximize the chance of a successful windmill restart.

Continuing automatic restart attempts at high altitude or high AOA may cause the engine to

overtemp. In this case, place the throttle OFF until in a better start environment. The optimum restart

envelope is below 25,000 feet. If the engine is shut down from a high power setting and rpm decays to

0%, temporary rotor binding may occur. In this case, engine rotation will not be regained until the

engine cools evenly (about 10 to 15 minutes). Windmill restart attempts made after rpm has degraded

to 0% may require up to 450 knots to obtain 12% rpm for ignition.

APU restart is the last alternative. If APU restart is required, HYD ISOL ORIDE should first be

selected for 10 seconds prior to APU start, assuming good HYD 2B. With the APU switch ON, and the

green READY light on, the engine crank switch may be used to crank the engine for restart. The APU

restart envelope is below 250 KCAS, below 10,000 ft. See figures 15-1 through 15-4.

Attempting to restart an engine that has flamed out for no apparent

reason may result in an engine bay fuel leak/fire.

If rpm above 30% -

1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE or above

If rpm below 30% -

1. Throttle good engine - 80% N₂ rpm minimum.

2. ENG CRANK switch - L or R (affected side)

3. Throttle affected engine - IDLE or above

4. Monitor EGT during start (871°C maximum). FADEC will not prevent hot starts airborne.

V-15-1

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

15.3 FUSELAGE FUEL LEAK

The possibility of fire is normally of prime concern with any fuel leak; however, with a massive leak,

the fuel loss itself must be dealt with promptly and correctly to ensure that sufficient fuel remains to

return to base. Fuel loss rates can be in excess of 1,000 ppm from failed main fuel lines. Left unchecked,

this leak can rapidly drain external tanks, both transfer tanks, and the feed tank on the leaking side.

Since leaks may occur upstream of the throttle-operated fuel shutoff valve in the fuel control, shutting

down the throttle may not stop the leak. Pressing the corresponding FIRE light closes the feed tank

fuel shutoff valve for that engine and stops fuel flow through the main fuel line.

The pilot may not be able to visually determine which side is leaking. Utilize a wingman, when

available, and check for secondary indications to determine the side of the leak. In addition to the

primary cockpit indications listed in the procedure, the following may also be indications of a fuselage

fuel leak: FUEL LO caution, erratic engine operation at high power settings, abnormal fuel flow

indications.

1. Afterburners - DESELECT

Afterburner operation with a fuselage fuel leak may result in a fire.

2. Analyze indications to determine which side is leaking:

• Visual confirmation of fuel leakage

• L or R BOOST LO caution

• FEED tank imbalance (lower feed tank)

• FUEL LO caution (lower feed tank)

• Erratic engine operation

If unable to confirm side -

3. Land as soon as possible.

If side confirmed -

3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

4. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

Securing the good engine may result in flameout of both engines.

If fuel leak stops -

5. Land as soon as practical.

If fuel leak continues -

6. Land as soon as possible.

V-15-4

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

15.5

DOUBLE TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER FAILURE

Failure of both transformer-rectifiers (TRs) can be recognized by loss of the HUD (but not the other

displays), bleed air including cockpit airflow/pressurization, and other equipment which operates on

the main dc busses. The FCC channels continue to be powered by their respective PMG outputs. The

Essential Bus is powered by the EBB PMGs with the battery charger and the battery as backups.

Therefore, the battery gauge should read greater than 24 vdc (26.5 nominal) and the BATT SW caution

light should be out.

With a dual TR failure, time is not critical, and essential bus equipment need not be turned off.

Equipment requiring ac power only will remain operable with a dual TR failure and need not be turned

off to conserve battery power. If the L or R DC FAIL caution lights illuminate, all three 28 volt dc

windings from the corresponding PMG are prevented from supplying FCC CH or essential bus backup

power. See the Emergency Power Distribution Charts (figure 15-7) for operative and inoperative

equipment.

1. BATT SW caution light - CONFIRM OUT

2. Electrical RESET button - PRESS

3. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325 KCAS optimum).

4. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

5. AV COOL switch - EMERG

6. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

7. OBOGS control switch - OFF

8. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL prior to emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20 minutes).

9. Consider removing mask and resetting emergency oxygen system once below 10,000 feet MSL.

10. Land as soon as practical.

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

11. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF (e.g., radar, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM,

sensors, MC2)

12. Land as soon as possible.

For landing -

13. Perform Landing Gear Emergency Extension Procedure.

14. Make a short field arrestment (if available).

15. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pressure. (Anti-skid is not available.)

V-15-8

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

BOTH GENERATORS INOPERATIVE

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

ENGINE

FLIGHT CONTROLS

Caution lights panel

Afterburner ignition

CAS

(less GEN and FUEL LO lights)

Anti-icing

Flaps

CABIN light may be on but is not accurate

APU ready light

Flap position indicator

CK ECS light is not fully functional

APU start

Master caution lights

Bleed air leak detectors

Utility flood lights

Engine ignition

Engine start

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

NAVIGATION

Fire detectors and extinguishers

Front cockpit standby attitude

COMM 1 R/T

Engine fuel display

reference indicator

IFF emergency

(RPM and EGT only)

Standby airspeed/Mach indicators

Tank 4 scavenge pump

Standby altimeters

OTHER

Wing transfer

Standby rate-of-turn indicators

Arresting hook extension

Standby turn needles

Canopy

Emergency air refueling

Emergency jettison

FCS ram air selection

Intercom

Landing gear (emergency system)

Landing gear position indicator

Voice alerts (APU fire,

engine fire, bleed air)

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

OTHER

AEA pallet

ENGINE

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Air refueling light and normal probe

Anti-ice control

Approach lights

extension

Bleed air system

Caution/advisory displays

ALQ-218

Engine fuel display

CK ECS light is not fully functional

Anti-skid

(all functions except RPM

Console lights

Arresting hook retraction

and EGT)

Flood lights

Battery charger

External fuel transfer

Formation lights

CPWS pressure sensing

Fuel CG control/fuselage transfer

GEN caution lights

CSC interference blanker

Fuel dump

Instrument lights

DDIs/MPCD/UFCD

FUEL LO warning light

Landing/taxi lights

Data link

Fuel thermal mgmt

Light test switch

Hook warning light

Fuel transfer pressure light

Nav flood lights

Hydraulic pressure indicator

Inlet ice detector

Position lights

JHMCS

Internal wing fuel inhibit

Strobe lights

Landing gear (normal system)

N₁ lockup

Landing gear warning tone

Tank 4 transfer pump

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Master caution tone

COMM 2 R/T

MATT

FLIGHT CONTROLS

DMS

OBOGS

Autopilot

ICLS, IFF, INS/ANAV

OBOGS monitor

INCANS

Radar

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

KY-58

ALR-67

Aft cockpit standby ARI

Radar altimeter

CVRS

AOA indexer lights

Radar beacon

Selective jettison

HUD

TACAN

Voice alerts

(fuel low, bingo, altitude,

L & R AOA heaters

flight computer hot, flight controls,

L & R pitot static/total temp

Mode 4 reply, engine)

heaters

Weapon fire/launch/release

MC 1/2

Windshield anti-ice/rain removal

Total temperature probe

Frequency selection lost. Will operate on last selected frequency. Guard transmit receive can be selected by COMM G XMT switch.

Figure 15-7. Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 1 of 4)

V-15-9

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

BOTH TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIERS INOPERATIVE

BOTH GENERATORS OPERATIVE

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

Front cockpit standby ARI

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Left and right pitot static/Total

COMM 1 R/T

ENGINE

temperature heaters

IFF

Afterburner ignition

Standby airspeed/Mach indicators

IFF (emergency)

Anti-icing

Standby altimeters

INS/ANAV

APU ready light

Standby rate-of-climb indicators

Radar altimeter

APU start

Standby turn needles

Bleed air leak detectors

OTHER

Engine fuel display engine start

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Arresting hook extension

Engine ignition

Caution/advisory displays

Battery charger

Fire detectors and extinguishers

Caution lights panel (less GEN

Canopy

Fuel dump

and FUEL LO lights)

DDIs/MPCD/UFCD

Internal fuel transfer

CABIN light may be on but is not accurate

Emergency air refueling

Tank 4 scavenge pumps

CK ECS light is not fully functional

Emergency jettison

Wing transfer

Console lights

FCS ram air selection

Emergency instrument light

Hydraulic pressure indicator

FLIGHT CONTROLS

Flood lights

Intercom

All channels autopilot

Instrument lights

JHMCS

All channels are operative

Master caution lights (and tone)

Landing gear (emergency system)

CAS

NVG floodlights

Landing gear position indicator

Flaps

Position lights

Voice alerts (all)

Flap position indicator

Utility floodlights

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

OTHER

AEA pallet

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

ALQ-218

AOA indexer lights

ALR-67

ENGINE

HUD

Air refueling lights and

Anti-ice

normal probe extension

Bleed air system

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Anti-skid

External fuel transfer

Approach lights

Arresting hook retraction

Fuel c.g. transfer

CK ECS light is not fully functional

Cabin ram air selection

FUEL LO warning light

Formation lights

CPWS pressure sensing

Fuel tank pressure light

GEN caution lights

CVRS

Fuel thermal mgmt

Landing/taxi lights

Data link

Inlet ice detector

Lights test switch

DMD

Internal wing fuel inhibit

Strobe lights

Hook warning light

N₁ lockup

Landing gear (normal system)

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Landing gear warning tone

COMM 2 R/T

MATT

DMS

Nosewheel steering

ILS

OBOGS

INCANS

OBOGS monitor

KY-58

Radar

Radar beacon

Selective jettison

TACAN

Weapon fire/launch/release

Windshield anti-ice removal

Backup mode operative only.

Figure 15-7. Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 2)

V-15-10

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

LEFT GENERATOR INOPERATIVE - BUS TIE OPEN

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

OTHER

Anti-skid

ENGINE

Arresting hook extension and retraction

FLIGHT CONTROLS

Afterburner ignition

Audio tones

Autopilot

Anti-ice control

Battery charger

CAS

Anti-icing

Cabin ram air selection

Flaps

APU ready light

Canopy

Flap position indicator

APU start

CPWS

Speedbrake

Bleed air leak detectors

CVRS

Speedbrake advisory light

Bleed air system

Data link

Engine fuel display

DMD

Engine ignition

ECS

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Engine start

Emergency air refueling

COMM 1 R/T

External fuel transfer

Emergency jettison

IFF (less Mode 4)

Fire detectors and extinguishers

FCS ram air selection

IFF emergency

Fuel dump

Hook warning light

INCANS

Fuel quantity

Intercom

KY-58

Fuel tank pressure light

Interface blanker

Radar altimeter

Inlet ice detector

JHMCS

Radar beacon

Internal wing fuel inhibit

Landing gear (emergency system)

N₁ lockup

Landing gear (normal system)

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Tank 1 transfer pump

Landing gear position indicator

Approach lights

Tank 4 scavenge pump

Landing gear warning tone

Caution lights panel (less FUEL LO light)

Wing diverter valves

Master caution tone

Emergency instrument light

Wing transfers

Nosewheel steering

Forward console, flood and instrument

OBOGS monitor

lights

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

RDDI

Lights test switch

AOA indexer lights

Selective jettison (stations 6 thru 10 only)

Master caution lights

HUD

Voice alerts (APU fire, engine fire

NVG floodlights

Right pitot static/total temp heaters

bleed air)

Position lights

Front cockpit standby ARI

Weapons launch/release (stations 6 thru

Utility floodlights

Standby airspeed/Mach indicators

10 only)

Standby altimeters

Windshield anti-ice/rain removal

Standby rate-of-climb indicators

Standby turn needles

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

OTHER

AEA pallet

ENGINE

AEA ECS valve

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

FUEL LO warning light

Air refueling light

AFT console, flood and instrument lights

Tank 4 transfer pump

ALQ-218

Caution/advisory/display

ALR-67

Formation lights

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

LDDI/MPCD/UFCD

Landing/taxi lights

L AOA probe heater

MATT

Strobe lights

L pitot static/total temp heater

Nozzle indication on EFD

MC 1

OBOGS

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Total temp probe heater

Radar

DMS

ILS

Selective jettison (stations 2 thru 5 only)

INS/ANAV

Voice alerts

(fuel low, bingo, altitude,

TACAN

flight computer hot, flight controls,

Mode 4 reply, engine)

Weapon fire/launch/release

(Station

thru 5 only)

Failure of stations 2 thru 5 will not be indicated on DDI until SMS attempts to communicate with failed stations.

Figure 15-7. Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 3)

V-15-11

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

RIGHT GENERATOR INOPERATIVE - BUS TIE OPEN

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

OTHER

ENGINE

AEA pallet

Afterburner ignition

ALR-67

Anti-ice control

FLIGHT CONTROLS

Air refueling light and normal probe

Anti-icing

Autopilot

extension

APU ready light

CAS

Anti-skid

APU start

Flaps

Arresting hook extension and retraction

Bleed air leak detectors

Flap position indicator

Audio tones (less Master Caution)

Bleed air system

Speedbrake

Cabin ram air selection

Engine fuel display

Speedbrake advisory light

Canopy

Engine ignition

CPWS

Engine start

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Data link

External fuel transfer

COMM 1 R/T

ECS (cold cockpit, defog air flow)

Fire detectors and extinguishers

COMM 2 R/T

Emergency air refueling

Fuel Dump

DMS

Emergency jettison

FUEL LO warning light

IFF (Less Mode C)

FCS ram air selection

Fuel tank pressure light

IFF emergency

Hook warning light

Internal wing fuel inhibit

ILS

Intercom

N₁ lockup

INS/ANAV

Landing gear (emergency system)

Tank 4 transfer pump

Radar beacon

Landing gear (normal extension)

Wing diverter valves

Landing gear position indicator

Wing transfer

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Landing gear warning tone

Aft console, flood and instruments lights

LDDI/MPCD/UFCD

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

Caution lights panel

MATT

AOA indexer lights

Formation lights

Nosewheel steering

Front cockpit standby attitude

Landing/taxi lights

OBOGS

reference indicator

Lights test switch

OBOGS monitor

Left AOA heater

Master caution lights

Radar

Left pitot static/total temp heater

NVG floodlights

Radar coolant pump

Standby airspeed/Mach indicator

Strobe lights

Standby altimeters

Utility floodlights

Voice alerts (APU fire, engine fire,

Standby rate-of-climb indicators

bleed air)

Standby turn needles

Windshield anti-ice/rain removal

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

ENGINE

OTHER

Inlet ice detector

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

ALQ-218

Tank 1 transfer pump

Approach lights

Battery charger

Forward console, flood instrument lights

CSC

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

Position lights

CVRS

AOA indexer lights

Hydraulic pressure indicator

Aft cockpit standby attitude

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Interference blanker

reference indicator

INCANS

JHMCS

HUD

Radar altimeter

Master caution tone

MC 2

RDDI

R AOA heater

Selective jettison

R pitot static/total temp heater

Voice alerts

(fuel low, bingo, altitude,

flight computer hot, flight controls,

Mode 4 reply, engine)

Weapon fire/launch/release

Back-up mode operative only.

Figure 15-7. Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 4)

V-15-12

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

15.6 COCKPIT TEMPERATURE HIGH

Hot cockpit airflow may be caused by an ECS control failure or a valve failure. Selecting full COLD

on the CABIN TEMP knob should shut off warm air to the cockpit. If this procedure fails to secure

warm air to the cockpit, then the failure is most likely with the cockpit flow valve itself. If this is the

case, securing both BLEEDS may be the only means to stop the flow of warm air.

Selection of MAN with the ECS MODE switch is prohibited. Selection of

MAN while the aft cooling fan shutoff valve is open may cause the fan to

overspeed resulting in a catastrophic fan failure potentially leading to loss

of OBOGS.

In ECS MAN mode, cockpit temperature can reach 190°F, if the cockpit

flow valve is stuck full open.

1. CABIN TEMP knob - FULL COLD

If temperature still high -

2. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet.

3. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

If temperature not reduced -

4. Emergency oxygen green ring - PULL

5. OXY FLOW knob - OFF

6. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

7. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL prior to emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20 minutes).

Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy breathing, loose

fitting mask, etc.) as few as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen may be

available.

8. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300-325 KCAS optimum).

9. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

10. AV COOL switch - EMERG

V-15-13

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

Once below 10,000 feet MSL -

11. Consider removing mask and resetting emergency oxygen.

12. OXY FLOW knob - OFF

13. OBOGS control switch - OFF

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

14. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF (e.g., radar, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM, sensors,

MC2)

15. Land as soon as possible.

15.7 COCKPIT SMOKE, FUMES, OR FIRE

Consider all unidentified fumes in the cockpit as toxic. Do not confuse condensation from the ECS.

The most probable source of visible smoke or fumes in the cockpit is from the engine bleed air or

residual oil in the ECS ducts. This smoke is blue gray in color, has a characteristic pungent odor, and

may cause the eyes to sting. Another source of smoke or fumes is an electrical malfunction or overheat

of equipment located in the cockpit. In the event of an electrical short or overload condition, this

equipment may generate electrical smoke (usually white or gray in color) but should not cause an open

fire since cockpit equipment uses very little electrical current. Cockpit electrical wiring insulation may

smolder and create smoke, but will not erupt into a seriously damaging fire.

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

*4. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

• DCS may be experienced when operating in an unpressurized cabin

above 25,000 feet MSL even with a working oxygen system. Symptoms

of DCS include pain in joints, tingling sensations, dizziness, paralysis,

choking, and/or loss of consciousness.

• Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy breathing,

loose fitting mask, etc.) as few as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen may

be available.

5. Maintain airspeed 200 to 300 KCAS.

6. OBOGS control switch - OFF

7. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL prior to emergency oxygen depletion (10-20 minutes).

8. Consider resetting emergency oxygen system once below 10,000 feet MSL.

V-15-14

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

If smoke and fumes persist -

9. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE.)

10. AV COOL switch - EMERG

If smoke and fumes persist or fire present -

11. All electrical equipment - OFF

12. UFCD controlled avionics - OFF

(AC power is required.)

13. Required electrical equipment - ON

Restore power to equipment one at a time.

If smoke/fire starts again, secure that equipment.

If unable to clear smoke -

14. Slow and jettison canopy. Secure all loose articles and ensure helmet visor is down. The rear

crewmember should lower the seat and lean as far forward as possible before jettisoning canopy.

15.8 HYPOXIA/LOW MASK FLOW

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy breathing, loose

fitting mask, etc.) as few as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen may be

available.

4. OBOGS control switch - OFF

If hypoxic symptoms persist -

5. Remain on emergency oxygen as long as possible.

6. Land as soon as possible.

Once below 10,000 feet cabin altitude and hypoxic symptoms removed -

7. Consider removing mask and resetting emergency oxygen system or resuming normal OBOGS

operation if flow appears normal and donning of mask is desired.

8. Land as soon as practical.

V-15-15

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

15.9 LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION

Decompression sickness (DCS) becomes a physiological concern at exposures to cabin altitudes in

excess of 18,000 feet. The potential for DCS increases at exposures above 25,000 feet or in the case of

a rapid decompression. Aircrew exposed to these conditions should be alert for the symptoms of DCS.

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

4. CABIN PRESS switch - CHECK NORM

5. ECS MODE switch - CHECK AUTO

DCS may be experienced when operating in an unpressurized cabin above

25,000 feet MSL even with a working oxygen system. Symptoms of DCS

include pain in joints, tingling sensations, dizziness, paralysis, choking,

and/or loss of consciousness.

If DCS or hypoxia symptoms present -

6. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL.

7. Land as soon as possible.

If DCS or hypoxia symptoms not present -

6. Reset emergency oxygen system and resume normal OBOGS operation.

7. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet MSL.

8. Land as soon as practical.

15.10 DISPLAY MALFUNCTION

If a display malfunctions (stale data or DDI pushbuttons do not work), attempt to restore by cycling

display power. If cycling power to the display does not fix the problem, cycling the corresponding

mission computer may restore the DDI (cycle MC1 for LDDI, MC2 for RDDI). HUD symbology is

driven by either MC1 or MC2. If the UFCD malfunctions, attempt to restore by cycling the MPCD or

8 x 10 display.

If all displays are flashing STANDBY, and a backup HUD is displayed in the front cockpit, a dual

MC failure has occurred.

15.11 DUAL MISSION COMPUTER (MC) FAILURE

A dual MC failure is recognized by STANDBY flashing on the HUD and L/RDDIs. In the front

cockpit, a backup HUD format (driven by the SDC) is displayed on the MPCD and UFCD. After

cycling an MC, the corresponding display (LDDI for MC1, RDDI for MC2) continues to flash

STANDBY for approximately 11 seconds while the MC boots up.

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ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

1. MC switch - CYCLE TO 1 OFF, THEN TO 2 OFF

After 15 seconds, if MC1 is restored (MC1 Backup Mode) -

2. MC switch - MOVE FROM 2 OFF TO NORM

15.12 OCF - OUT-OF-CONTROL FLIGHT

Selection of manual spin recovery mode (SPIN switch in RCVY) seri-

ously degrades controllability, will prevent recovery from any departure

or spin, and is prohibited.

15.12.1 Departure from Controlled Flight. A typical departure occurs as a yaw divergence (nose-

slice) followed by an uncommanded roll in the same direction. The yaw divergence can happen very

quickly; therefore, the yaw rate tone may not provide sufficient departure warning. Usually, a

departure is preceded by a slow buildup in sideslip and uncomfortable sideforces. The buildup of

sideslip is accompanied by ″vortex rumble″; however, vortex rumble may not be noticed during

aggressive maneuvering. Therefore, excessive sideforce provides the most reliable departure warning

cue to the pilot. The initial phase of the departure is not particularly violent or disorienting unless it

occurs at high airspeed or Mach number. Recognition of these cues permits neutralization of the

controls and avoidance of a departure.

15.12.1.1 Departures with Lateral Weight Asymmetries. Complying with NATOPS limits for

asymmetric store loadings is required to prevent departures. Aggressive longitudinal maneuvering

beyond NATOPS AOA limits may result in a yaw departure away from the heavy wing, which cannot

be controlled with lateral stick or pedal inputs. At low airspeed, recovery is immediate when AOA is

reduced below NATOPS limits. At higher airspeed, more violent and sudden departures may occur

with little or no warning when maneuvering aggressively beyond NATOPS limits. In such cases, the

resulting post-stall gyrations rapidly transition to an upright spin away from the heavy wing.

15.12.1.2 Departure Recovery. Recovery is generally very prompt, on release of the controls. Some

departures, particularly from inadvertent tailslides, may exhibit large transitory sideslips or negative

g rolls prior to positive recovery. Sideslip type departures yield excessive gravity-induced sideslip at

relatively slow airspeeds (<90 KCAS) and can quickly develop into a spin. In the absence of a steady

spin arrow, controls should remain neutral throughout all such post departure motion, as CAS reliably

regains control. Any pilot input will delay recovery or precipitate further departure. For departure

recoveries that stabilize in a negative g stall, application of aft stick may be used to finish the recovery.

15.12.2 Spin. Spin is confirmed by a steady spin arrow or the presence of a sustained yaw rate,

elevated positive or negative AOA, and airspeed less than 150 KCAS. Spin arrows very reliably indicate

the appropriate recovery action. While some departures may generate sufficient yaw rate to trip the

command arrow, they are typically self-recovering by the time the arrow is displayed, and the arrow

will quickly disappear. Therefore, with the spin arrow present, a brief hesitation is all that is required

to confirm a steady, valid arrow prior to applying anti-spin lateral stick.

15.12.2.1 Spin Recovery. The command arrow indicates the proper control stick position for

upright or inverted spins. For upright spins, the command arrow directs the pilot to apply full lateral

stick with the spin direction. For inverted spins, the command arrow directs the pilot to apply full

V-15-17

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

lateral stick opposite the spin direction. In general, spin recovery is straightforward and reliable if the

OCF procedures are followed and sufficient altitude remains. For lateral weight asymmetry loadings,

recoveries from upright spins away from the heavy wing are essentially identical to the symmetrical

loaded airplane. Spin recoveries for less common upright spins into the heavy wing, and inverted spins,

were sometimes delayed due to the oscillatory nature of the spin. Recovery begins immediately but

may take up to one turn to become apparent. Recovery from a fully developed spin may include high

roll rates with significant negative g unloads, which, though disorienting and uncomfortable, should be

interpreted as a positive indication of imminent recovery. When the command arrow is removed,

lateral stick should be smoothly returned to neutral. Maintaining anti-spin lateral stick after the

command arrow has disappeared may transition the recovering spin into a controllable roll that could

delay recovery.

15.12.3 OCF Recovery Procedures

*1. Controls - RELEASE, FEET OFF RUDDERS, SPEEDBRAKE IN

If still out of control -

*2. Throttles - IDLE

*3. Altitude, AOA, airspeed, and yaw rate - CHECK

If command arrow present -

*4. Lateral stick - FULL WITH ARROW

When command arrow removed -

*5. Lateral stick - SMOOTHLY NEUTRAL

When recovery indicated by AOA and yaw rate tones removed, side forces subsided, and

airspeed accelerating above 180 knots -

*6. Recover.

Failure to ensure all criteria are met may result in departure during

recovery.

Passing 6,000 ft AGL, dive recovery not initiated -

*7. Eject.

Post departure dive recovery initiated below 6,000 ft AGL is not assured.

Delaying the ejection decision below 6,000 ft AGL while departed may

result in unsuccessful ejection.

V-15-18

ORIGINAL

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

15.12.4 Post Departure Dive Recovery

1. One-g roll to the nearest horizon.

2. Throttles - MAX (MIL if altitude not critical)

3. Pull to and maintain 25° to 35° AOA until positive rate of climb established.

A positive rate of climb requires wings level pitch attitude (waterline)

greater than indicated AOA.

If aircraft departs during dive recovery below 6,000 ft AGL -

4. Eject

15.13 CONTROLLABILITY CHECK

Requirement: Malfunction, failure, or damage, which degrades approach and landing character-

istics.

Purpose (to determine):

• Whether to attempt an approach or a controlled ejection.

• Safe landing configuration.

• Safe final approach airspeed/AOA.

Climb to and maintain a safe altitude in VMC:

• 15,000 feet AGL (recommended)

• At or above 5,000 feet AGL (if practical)

Coordinate a visual inspection (if possible).

Plan to configure aircraft and conduct controllability check as close to field/CV as possible

(avoid populated areas if able).

• In all cases, consider BINGO fuel requirements.

Reference the appropriate emergency procedure to plan the following:

• Normal or Emergency Landing Gear Extension

• Appropriate flap setting for controllability check and landing

• AOA and/or airspeed limitations

• Any controllability issues that may arise from landing gear and/or flap extension

• Desired landing gross weight and fuel dump plan

Consider Select Jettison stores prior to gear extension if:

• Lateral weight asymmetry is over 12,000 ft−lb to establish a more symmetric configuration

• Emergency Landing Gear extension required (i.e. no HYD 2A)

• Stated in appropriate emergency procedure

V-15-19

ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

If single engine −

6. Reduce gross weight (48,000 lb max, lower if practical).

7. Maintain operating engine above 80% RPM during flap and landing gear extension.

8. Do not exceed 15° AOB in turns (if possible).

If normal landing gear extension possible (i.e. no HYD2A caution) −

9. Slow to below 250 KCAS.

10. LDG GEAR handle − DN

If normal landing gear extension not possible −

Execute Landing Gear Emergency Extension procedure.

• Do not configure flaps during Landing Gear Emergency Extension.

• Return to Controllability Check procedure once gear extended.

Once landing gear down and locked −

10. DO NOT TRIM until minimum controllable airspeed is determined.

11. Crosscheck AOA and airspeed during decel.

12. FLAP switch − AUTO/HALF/FULL based on:

• Flap setting stated in appropriate emergency procedure

• If single engine, flaps HALF

• Consideration of type landing, failure/damage, engine performance, etc.

13. Determine minimum controllable airspeed by slowing in 10 knot increments.

• If still controllable at AOA limit stated in appropriate emergency procedure or on−speed, plan

on flying appropriate AOA for approach and landing.

• If one−half stick or rudder pedal deflection required to maintain balanced flight prior to AOA

limit stated in appropriate emergency procedure or on−speed, add 10 knots for airspeed to be

used during approach and landing.

• If lateral stick required for balanced flight, plan for turns in the direction of stick

displacement (if possible).

14. Assess:

• Controllability in a 15° AOB turn

• Throttle response and wave−off maneuver

If controllability unacceptable to attempt landing −

15. Consider a controlled ejection over an unpopulated area (if possible).

If controllability acceptable to attempt landing −

15. Fly a straight−in approach.

• Do not exceed minimum−controllable−airspeed−plus−10 knots, or equivalent AOA, as

determined during controllability check.

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ORIGINAL W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

If single engine −

16. Execute Single Engine Approach and Landing procedure.

If dual engine −

16. Return to appropriate emergency procedure to ensure all corrective action steps are

completed prior to attempting approach to landing.

17. If arrested landing desired/required, consider effects of approach speed on max arresting−

gear engagement speed.

18. If controllability changes or safe landing is not certain at any point on approach, execute

wave−off/missed approach immediately.

15.14 EXTERNAL STORES JETTISON

Refer to External Stores Jettison Chart (figure 15-8).

15.15 EMERGENCY TANKER DISENGAGEMENT

Emergency tanker disengagement may be required if difficulties occur in either the tanker or the

receiver aircraft. Emergency breakaway signals are by radio transmission and/or turning on the lower

anti-collision lights. If the situation allows, normal, but expeditious, disconnect procedures should be

followed to minimize the possibility of aircraft damage.

The following procedures may result in damage to the tanker and/or

receiver aircraft.

1. Throttles - IDLE

2. SPEEDBRAKE switch - AFT

V-15-20A (Reverse Blank)

W/IC1

A1-E18GA-NFM-000

EMERGENCY JETTISON

Requirements: WoffW or LDG GEAR handle UP

1. EMERG JETT button - PUSH Jettison all stores/racks/launchers sequential by station pairs: 3 & 9, 2 & 10, 4 & 8, then 6 (100 ms)

SELECTIVE JETTISON

Requirements:

(1) WoffW, (2) LDG GEAR handle UP, (3) All landing gear up and locked

1. Find a clear area (if possible).

2. LT TEST switch - TEST Verify all JETT STATION SELECT buttons are illuminated.

3. JETT STATION SELECT buttons - SELECT DESIRED STATIONS (CTR, LI, RI, LM, RM, LO, RO)

4. SELECT JETT knob - ROTATE (as required)

a. L FUS MSL - Left fuselage missile

b. R FUS MSL - Right fuselage missile

c. RACK/LCHR - Rack/launcher (jettisons whatever is attached to the selected parent racks)

d. STORES - (1) Jettisons ordnance loaded on selected parent racks, CVERs, or IMERs;

(2) Jettisons missiles attached to launchers on selected stations except HARM;

(3) HARM anti-compromise launch.

5. SIM mode - UNBOXED

6. MASTER ARM switch - ARM

7. SELECT JETT button - PUSH Jettison sequential by selected stations: RM, LM, RI, LI, CL, RO, LO (350 ms)

After jettison -

8. MASTER ARM switch - SAFE

9. SELECT JETT knob - SAFE

NOTE

• Outboard station ADU-773 missile rails cannot be jettisoned, since they are installed in place of a BRU-32 rack.

• If multiple stations selected for STORE jettison include AGM-88s, the first HARM in the default sequence is launched first, then

the sequence continues from that station, releasing the remaining selected non-HARM stores. Regardless of the number

selected, only one HARM is launched each time the SELECT JETT button is pushed.

• With the SELECT JETT knob rotated out of the SAFE position, the SMS unlocks all racks/launchers. When SAFE is reselected,

racks/launchers are not locked again until commanded by either lowering the landing gear or selecting SIM mode.

AUX RELEASE

Requirements: (1) station must be HALKD or HAULK following a failed normal release or SELECT JETT attempt, (2) WoffW, (3)

MASTER ARM switch - ARM (SIM unboxed), (4) auxiliary cartridge installed in the HUNG parent rack.

During an AUX REL, the Mk 19 auxiliary cartridge is fired, opening the selected parent rack’s hooks and allowing the attached

store or rack/launcher to free fall from the aircraft. Lacking a forced ejection, this release mode is prohibited except in an

emergency and then only in 1.0g level flight.

NOTE

A Mk 19 auxiliary cartridge is not installed in a parent rack when a wing station is loaded with an IMER, a HARM, a Maverick, a

Harpoon, or a SLAM.

1. Find a clear area (if possible).

2. LT TEST switch - TEST Verify all jettison pushtiles are illuminated.

3. AUX REL switch - ENABLE

4. Jettison pushtiles - SELECT HUNG STATION(S)

5. SELECT JETT knob - ROTATE TO EITHER RACK/LCHR or STORES

6. SIM mode - UNBOXED

7. MASTER ARM switch - ARM

8. SELECT JETT button - PUSH

Fires the aux cartridge(s) for gravity release of all stores/racks/launchers from the selected parent rack(s).

After AUX REL -

9. MASTER ARM switch - SAFE

10. SELECT JETT knob - SAFE

11. AUX REL switch - NORM

Figure 15-8. External Stores Jettison Chart

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A1-E18GA-NFM-000

NOTE

A simultaneous failure of channels 1

and 3 prevents the display of any

FCS cautions. The FCS display shows

the word INVALID. Use FCES light

to monitor FCS failures.

EFFECTS:

Autopilot inoperative.

Loss of HUD air data displays.

Roll rate limiting is failed. Use no more than ½

lateral stick with rate limited stores aboard.

FCS G-limiter defaults to 7.5g.

Degraded flying qualities

>20° in AUTO

FLAPS.

Use no more than ±15° bank when selecting

HALF or FULL FLAPS from AUTO

FLAPS.

Loss of speedbrake function.

Figure 15-14. FCS Failure Indications and

Effects - Channels 1 and 3

EFFECTS:

FLAP SCHED caution is not displayed.

Left probe AOA blanked from FCS status page.

Autopilot inoperative.

ATC inoperative.

Normal NWS inoperative.

Left leading edge flap locked in failed position.

Left aileron and left rudder failed

(flutter

damper).

Left spoiler.

Loss of Air Data from left pressure transmitter

set (PTS)

Flaps - AUTO:

Loss of speedbrake function.

Flaps freeze.

Flaps - HALF or FULL:

Right leading edge flap frozen.

Trailing edge flaps 30° or 40° maximum.

Scheduled with airspeed.

Figure

15-15. FCS Failure Indications and

No aileron droop.

Effects - Channels

1 and 4

No rudder toe-in.

Loss of AOA approach/indexer lights.

Loss of AHRS over temperature detection.

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EA-18G. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008) - page 8