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officer present eligible to command will act as OTC. The OTC will normally be under the OPCON of

the MCC or RC. The OCA will provide direction that specifies the mission, tasking, and forces

assigned to the OTC, and will also delegate tactical C2 of those forces to the OTC. The OCA may

self-designate as the OTC of the constituted forces(s) or group(s), or the TF/TG commander, or

another command as appropriate. The OTC must design the C2 organization to accomplish the

assigned mission and effectively defend the force. Some functions arising from direction,

coordination, or control may be delegated to subordinates.

0218 Tactical Control

TACON is the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary

to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. The authority exercising OPCOM, OPCON, or TACON

grants this authority to a subordinate commander to assume some function concerning direction,

coordination, or control of movements, manoeuvres, and actions relative to a specific task for a limited

period of time. The officer exercising TACON is also responsible for the safety of assigned units.

TACON is subordinate to TACOM.

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SECTION III — SPECIFIC COMMAND CONSIDERATIONS

0220 Commanders of Allied Forces

When allied task forces of units of two or more nations are formed, the commander shall be named in

the order creating them. The commanders of national units joining an allied task force at sea should

not displace the designated Allied commander by virtue of their national seniority or date of

commission unless specifically so directed by the senior in the chain of allied command.

0221 National Caveats

When allocating forces to NATO, nations may specify restrictions on their employment,

notwithstanding the formal definition of command state in force. This may include ROE related issues

or instructions to maintain national task group integrity. Such restrictions may have an impact upon

commanders’ flexibility of employment.

0222 Command during Task Force Operations

Potential threats to freedom of the seas and/or operations executed in the littorals may dictate the use

of a TF instead of a single TG. For example, power projection operations against a significant threat

may require multiple aircraft carriers (CV/CVN) and amphibious forces acting in concert. In a TF, C2

is more complex, and some of the procedures described in Articles 0230-0233 are modifications to

cope with the increased complexity and take advantage of the opportunities offered by additional

assets. Guidelines for other TF operations are presented in Article 0234.

0223 Command of Maritime Air Operations

Maritime air operations are an integral part of the maritime component and are used to support the

maritime campaign. The MCC will provide the ACC with an air operations directive feeder, which

includes the priorities and objectives for maritime air operations. Excess maritime air sorties are

offered to the ACC for tasking. The MCC retains OPCON of maritime air and delegates

TACOM/TACON as appropriate.

0224 Command in Submarine Operations

Traditionally, submarine operations have been conducted independent of aircraft and surface ships,

and have required a centralised command system. Improvements in submarine communication

capabilities along with refocusing of maritime objectives have brought about much closer cooperation

and interoperability of submarines and other maritime forces. In all types of operations, submarines

remain under the OPCON of the SUBOPAUTH. TACOM, in cases of integrated operations, and

TACON, for direct support, would be delegated as appropriate to the mission. If one or more

submarines are operating in support of surface forces, a submarine-qualified officer (e.g., a submarine

element coordinator) and submarine advisory team should be embarked as part of the TF/TG

commander’s staff.

0225 Command of Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

The naval commander responsible within a specified geographic area for NCAGS is the OCA.

a. Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Commander. When NCAGS is

implemented, the OCA is the naval commander designated as NCAGS commander

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(NCAGSC) and is responsible for cooperation with merchant shipping while they are in the

NCAGS area.

b. Naval Supervision of Shipping (NSS). The naval commander exercises NSS when

mandatory routing of merchant shipping is introduced. This requires the commander

responsible for each sea area to undertake the functions of the OCA.

c. Implementation of Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping. In time of

crisis, NCAGS will be the responsibility of the authority nominated by the SC as the

NCAGSC. This can be either a shore-based commander or the MCC afloat. The choice of

which commander will be dictated by the location of the crisis area and the type of crisis.

Given that the NCAGS area will not accord with any existing boundaries, it is important that

appropriate liaison with other commanders is maintained. In the event that NSS is

established, control will be compulsory and exercised by the OCA.

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SECTION IV — COMMAND DURING SUPPORT OPERATIONS

0230 Support Situations

Occasions may arise when one force provides support to another force. The commander ordering the

support will specify the degree, manner, and duration of support which forces provide each other. The

supporting force OTC should be provided with the necessary information concerning the situation, and

the mission of the force in need of support, at the time when the support is needed. The commander

ordering the support will indicate which of the following relationships apply.

a. Situation A. The supporting force is to join and integrate with the other force. The

senior officer present, or the officer to whom TACOM is delegated, is to become the OTC of

the combined force.

b. Situation B. The supporting force does not integrate. Unless otherwise ordered, the

senior OTC of the two forces is to coordinate the tactical operations of the two forces.

c. Situation C. The supporting force commander has discretion how best to provide

support. This situation may be ordered when, for example:

(1) There is requirement for a force to provide simultaneous support to more than one

force, or to provide support to any number of forces entering a designated area.

(2) When the majority of ships or aircraft are under the OPCON or TACOM of the

supporting commander.

0231 Support Operations — Situation A

The following considerations are applicable under Situation A:

a. Delegation of Tactical Command. The OTC of the overall force may delegate

TACOM or TACON of designated forces to subordinate commanders for the execution of

assigned tasks.

b. Tasking of Forces. The OTC of the overall force will issue tasking directives, specify

reporting requirements, establish tactical communication circuits, order overall force

dispositions, and issue other direction as required by the situation.

0232 Support Operations — Situation B

Under the conditions of Situation B, the coordination between forces will depend upon the following

considerations:

a. Distance between forces.

b. Whether the supporting force is providing craft for overall force defence.

c. Whether only surface support is afforded.

d. Communications requirements and capabilities.

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e. Threat.

f. Weather.

g. Sensor capabilities and limitations.

h. Cover and deception plans.

0233 Support Operations — Situation C

The following considerations are applicable under Situation C:

a. General Support. Situation C differs from Situations A and B in that the missions of

the respective forces may be different. When the supporting force commander is ordered to

support a particular force under Situation C, the supporting force commander will decide

what support can be provided as dictated by the constraints of the assigned mission.

Coordination between respective OTCs is required to eliminate mutual interference and

enhance conservation of resources.

b. Location of Operations. When the supporting force commander is ordered to support

a particular force under the conditions of Situation C, the commander should decide whether:

(1) To operate in a central location and thus be better placed to meet any expected

commitments, or

(2) To move close to the particular force. Taking into consideration the circumstances

above, it may be decided to adopt Situation A or Situation B.

c. Duration of Support. The duration of the support is to be decided by the supporting

force commander in the absence of orders to the contrary. If the OTC of the force being

supported wishes to retain the supporting force beyond this time, approval of appropriate

authorities must be obtained.

d. Support in a Designated Area. The supporting force commander may be ordered to

provide support in a designated area through which a number of forces may be passing. If the

forces are not simultaneously in the same area, the supporting force commander may adopt

the procedures in subparagraph b.

0234

Other Support Operations

Individual units may be assigned to provide support to forces at sea. This support may be in one of

four forms:

a. Area Operations. Area operations are normally conducted in a geographic area, not

related to the protection of a specific force. Areas may be related to the protection of

maritime forces scheduled to enter the area, or to provide defence in depth to distant forces.

TACOM of units conducting area operations remains with the assigning authority.

b. Associated Support. A unit assigned in associated support operates independently of

the supported force, but may be tasked to provide contact information to, and receive

intelligence from, the OTC who is being supported. The designated unit operates under the

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TACON of the assigning authority who coordinates the tasking and movement of the

supporting unit in response to the supported OTC’s requirements.

c. Direct Support. The support provided by a unit or formation not attached or under

command of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support

required by that unit or formation. A unit assigned in direct support will operate under the

TACON of the OTC who is being supported. OPCON and TACOM remain with the

assigning authority. The direct support unit will report to the designated controlling authority

for employment.

d. Integrated Operations (Submarines only). Upon receiving TACOM, the OTC

assumes the responsibility for all operations and safety of assigned submarines, including

local waterspace management and prevention of mutual interference for their designated

area. (See ATP-18, Allied Manual of Submarine Operations.)

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SECTION V — TACTICAL COMMAND AT SEA

0240 Introduction

General. The OTC will always be responsible for accomplishing the mission. The OTC may

delegate authority for the execution of various activities in some or all of the areas of maritime warfare

(e.g., ASUW, ASW and AAW) to designated subordinate warfare commanders and/or coordinators.

Requirements for air coordination, EW coordination, and surveillance coordination concern more than

one area of warfare and so assume particular importance in the devising of a command structure.

Development of Command Structure. In the development of a command structure at

sea, the OTC must identify the activities that will be required by the assigned task and determine who

will be accountable for their execution. For the purposes of this publication, the following conventions

have been adopted for describing the activities in the OTC’s chain of command.

a. Responsibility. The obligation placed upon an individual for correct and timely

execution of a task assigned by a superior that cannot be delegated. Responsibility also

entails accountability for the exercise of the authority delegated when tasking was assigned.

Responsibility cannot be delegated and thus accountability cannot be shifted. When a duty is

assigned, the fact that some tasking can be delegated further down the chain will not lessen

the obligation of the holder of the intermediate authority to a superior. The term

responsibility is also used to describe an activity that is specific to a duty and cannot be

delegated further.

b. Duty. An identified block of related functions within a larger command structure

assigned to a single subordinate. Assignment automatically delegates the requisite authority

for the C2 required to fulfil the tasking. With the delegation of authority comes the inherent

responsibility of the subordinate to the assigning superior for execution of the task in

accordance with known orders and procedures.

c. Function. A defined activity that may be delegated to subordinates through specific

assignment or as part of a duty within the force command structure. Functions are listed and

grouped by warfare area in Tables 1-1 thru 1-11 of ATP-1 Volume I. When any function is

delegated, it is assumed that the necessary authority for command, control, direction or

coordination required for the execution of that function has also been delegated.

0241 Command of Large Forces

A fundamental component of command effectiveness is the ability of the commander and commanded

units to communicate. This is particularly so in the case of large or dispersed forces. If there are

inadequacies in the communications capabilities of individual units, these must be identified and

assessed before a disposition is ordered. There will thus be occasions when the communications

capability of a force will impact upon the OTC’s concept of operations.

0242 Delegation of Command Functions

A centralised command is the most direct way of allowing a commander to make use of his experience

and ability. However, circumstances and command facilities can make delegation necessary. Some

factors are:

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a. Mission.

b. The threat.

c. Need for quick action or reaction.

d. Necessity to carry out many actions in different places at the same time.

e. Practical inability of the commander to exercise all functions because of excessive

workload or the requirements of some actions for specific knowledge of facilities.

f. Lack of appropriate display and communications facilities.

g. Force size and composition.

0243 Command and Control Options

The OTC is always responsible for formulating and promulgating policy; however, other functions,

including warfare functions, may be delegated to subordinates within the constraints of stated policy

and the ROE in force. (For existing approved doctrine on ROE, refer to Chapter 3, AJP-01, Allied

Joint Doctrine, and MC 362.)

The OTC has the following options for the three principal warfare areas:

a. The OTC retains command in the principal areas of warfare by retaining all the warfare

functions.⁸

b. The OTC delegates to one subordinate commander one or more warfare functions.

c. The OTC delegates to more than one subordinate commander several warfare functions.

d. The OTC delegates to subordinates within geographic areas (or sectors) warfare functions

relevant to that area, but may retain any part of the overall function for himself. A principal

warfare commander (PWC) can use this form of delegation as well.

e. A special form of delegation as described in item b. is that the OTC of a large force may

allocate all warfare functions for the defence of a force to a CWC, while retaining overall

responsibility for the mission. The CWC may, in turn, delegate some or all warfare functions

as described above. Figure 2-3 illustrates the CWC organization.

⁸ Article 0243, subparagraph a, describes centralised command while subparagraphs b thru e describe forms of decentralised

command.

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Figure 2-3. Levels of Command and Control within the OTC Warfare Organization

0244 Officer in Tactical Command Responsibilities

OTC Responsibilities. The OTC has overall responsibility for accomplishing the mission

of the force and executing defence. The OTC’s policy and procedure for succession of command

authority, as well as designation of the standby OTC, should be specified by orders in advance of

the operation. The chain of command between the OTC and, when designated, the CWC, PWC,

coordinators, supporting commanders, and the forces under their TACOM/TACON, shall be

specified by the OTC. This may be done by task number designation or by stipulating which task

groups, units, or elements are designated for each commander. The OTC’s responsibilities cannot be

delegated. ATP-1 Volume I, lists detailed responsibilities for mission execution and defence of the

force by the OTC.

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Principal Warfare Area Responsibilities.

a. In exercising command, the OTC must consider both the threat to the force and the units

that are available to counter the threat. However, no single threat may be considered in

isolation; consequently, no tactic to counter a specific threat may be employed without

considering its effect on the security of the force from other threats which may subsequently

materialize. A detailed list of the OTC’s functions are found in ATP-1 Volume I, and are

divided into two categories:

(1) Those functions of the OTC that may be delegated to a CWC.

(2) Those functions which may be delegated to warfare commanders, coordinators, or

others to control assets and take action necessary to execute the promulgated policy.

b. The PWC will be responsible for the collection of information in particular areas and the

dissemination to the OTC and forces of evaluated information in those areas. Warfare

commanders will maintain continuous liaison with each other to ensure timely flow of

mutually supporting information and avoid mutual interference. Some warships have

weapons systems with effective ranges that extend beyond the local area in which the ship is

operating. Since warfare commanders are normally assigned authority to employ these

weapons, this may cause situations in which one commander has TACON of a ship and

another has control of that ship’s force weapons systems. If firing the weapon does not

interfere with the tasking of the ship, there is generally no problem. However, if significant

manoeuvring is required, coordination between the appropriate warfare commanders is vital

in prosecuting the threat. A temporary shift of TACON might be required, but C2 should

remain clear. The OTC (or CWC if designated) should resolve disagreement between the

warfare commanders.

Coordination Responsibilities. Coordinators are asset and resource managers. They carry

out

the policies of the OTC and respond to the specific tasking of the warfare commanders.

Coordinators may also exercise control of specified assets.

Air Coordination. The OTC is responsible for coordinating all friendly air movement within

the force air coordination area

(FACA). To ensure coordination, deconfliction and to prevent

fratricide, maritime air missions should be published on the air tasking order (ATO). The OTC is to

ensure that airspace requirements such as FACA, missile engagement zone, entry gates etc. are

coordinated with the ACA and that airspace control means and/or airspace control orders, issued by

the ACA, are adhered to. These coordination functions may be delegated to an air coordinator.

a. The Air Coordinator. The air coordinator exercises coordination within the FACA.

This duty may be collocated with the AAWC, air resource element coordinator (AREC),

helicopter element coordinator (HEC), or antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC).

b. The Air Resource Element Coordinator. The AREC is a resource manager. The

AREC may, under certain circumstances, exercise TACON for particular aircraft (e.g., for

aircraft projecting power ashore), but the AREC’s primary role remains that of asset

allocation and of informing the warfare commander of the status of these assets, the results

achieved by them, and the information gained from their sensors.

c. The Helicopter Element Coordinator. When two or more ships other than an

aircraft carrier are helicopter equipped, a central scheduling authority for flight operations

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from these ships is useful. In a multi-threat environment, the assets controlled by this

coordinator may be in demand by any of the PWCs. The HEC’s functions, therefore, will in

many ways parallel those of the AREC, with whom the HEC should coordinate, concerning

helicopters. The OTC will delegate the HEC functions generally to the senior commanding

officer of helicopter-equipped ships. These coordinating functions will normally not apply to

amphibious force and logistic helicopters. Requests for helicopters embarked in other than

aircraft carrier, amphibious and logistic ships will be directed to the HEC. The OTC must be

made aware of helicopter scheduling, tasking, and flight operations in order to be able to

resolve potential requirement conflicts. The HEC should promulgate a daily flight schedule.

Electronic and Acoustic Warfare Coordination. The OTC is responsible for determining

and promulgating EAW policies for the force. Force EAW functions may be delegated to the

electronic warfare coordinator (EWC). However, the planning and execution of these functions must

take overall joint force EAW issues into account; thus strong linkages must exist with the electronic

warfare coordination cell, which operates at the joint force level. The EWC is the principal advisor to

the OTC in all matters pertaining to the employment and exploitation of the electromagnetic and

acoustic spectrum. Accordingly, the EWC has broad responsibilities, which impact upon task group

planning as well as the management and control of all active and passive weapons, sensors, and

electronic communications equipment which operate in, or target the electromagnetic

spectrum/environment to include: ESM, ECM, EPM, EMCON, operational deception (OPDEC),

operations security

(OPSEC), SIGINT (which includes COMINT and ELINT), signals security

(SIGSEC), and communications and electronic security (COMSEC)/(ELSEC). The extent, to which

the EWC exercises actual control over assets is scenario dependent, should be clearly stated by the

OTC, and understood by the PWCs. The EWC’s planning and management responsibilities encompass

several areas.

a. The EWC ensures that force assets are employed to support the requirements of the OTC

and PWC. Coordination between the EWC and the PWC is vital to ensure that all assets with

ESM, ECM, and EPM capabilities are managed effectively.

b. The EWC is the principal manager of the electromagnetic and acoustic spectrums. The

EWC formulates, promulgates, controls, and monitors the EMCON plan based upon the

OTC’s emission policy. The ASWC operates force acoustic emitters within the effective

EMCON plan. The ASWC has the authority to break acoustic EMCON in defence of the

force. The ASWC must, however, notify the EWC of this action.

c. The EWC ensures that the force deception plan and assets are employed in a manner that

facilitates the mission and policy of the OTC.

d. The EWC ensures that cryptologic assets, both organic and nonorganic, are employed in a

manner that facilitates responsiveness to the AAW, ASW, ASUW, and EW information needs

of the OTC.

Surveillance. The OTC is responsible for establishing the surveillance areas for each area of

maritime warfare within the overall guidelines of the general picture compilation plan. Surveillance

functions may be delegated to warfare commanders.

Naval Mine Warfare Coordination. The OTC is responsible for formulating and

promulgating the naval mine warfare

(NMW) policy. NMW functions may be delegated to a

designated naval mine warfare coordinator (NMWC). The NMWC is the principal advisor to the OTC

on matters pertaining to NMW. The NMWC is responsible for coordinating the laying of sea

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minefields in support of the OTC and the efforts of supporting MCM forces, which are usually not

under the direct command or control of the OTC/CWC. Specific functions of the NMWC include:

a. Employment of tactical sea mining against targets of opportunity, using force assets.

b. Coordination with appropriate commanders for the laying of tactical sea minefields and

the execution of sea mining plans.

c. Tasking of MCM forces assigned to the TACOM of the OTC/CWC.

d. Coordination with appropriate local commanders for response to enemy mining of

chokepoints, safe havens, or operating areas, and for the execution of MCM plans.

e. Maintaining and disseminating a plot of relevant NMW information to the force.

Accompaniment. NCAGS can recommend accompaniment which is a voluntary arrangement

in which participating merchant ships may be organised for passage through a specific area of increased

risk in company with military assets. It should be noted that the escorting military units might not be in a

legal position, according to international law and the ROE in force, to actively protect merchant ships

under attack. Their response may be possible under the international law pertaining to the defence of self

and others. Sailing in accompaniment does not suspend the master‘s responsibility for the safe navigation

of the ship. The merchant ships will not be under military command or control of maritime units, but will

receive navigational advice and threat information by the OTC if applicable during the entire

accompaniment period.

Convoys. Convoys are only authorised under naval supervision of merchant shipping and are

the ultimate measure of NCAGS exercised by naval authorities of mandatory routeing and/or convoy

organization of merchant ships. It does not include the employment or active protection of such ships.

This will be implemented only with North Atlantic Council (NAC)/Defence Planning Committee (DPC)

approval.

0245 Delegation of Authority

The OTC may retain TACOM and TACON authority or may delegate some of that authority (i.e.,

TACON) to subordinate commanders and coordinators. Such delegation does not mean that the OTC

relinquishes authority over subordinates. It does mean that the subordinate is given some or all of that

same authority over forces assigned by the OTC.

0246 Delegation Considerations

General. The following general considerations are provided for selection and location of

warfare commanders:

a. Availability of interoperable data link and access to required displays.

b. Sufficiency and interoperability of communications equipments.

c. Availability of sufficient skilled personnel and state of training (staff augmentation if

necessary).

d. Living/working space available in units.

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e. No undue limitations imposed by electromagnetic radiation hazards restrictions.

f. Level of tension/state of hostilities.

g. Threat assessment.

h. Area of operations and formation/disposition required.

i. Emission policy including need for silence on unique emitters.

j. Compatibility of unit force weapons and sensors employment with proposed warfare

command functions.

k. The desirability of delegating all functions in a single warfare area to a single subordinate.

Specific Anti-air Warfare Commander Considerations.

a. Availability of communication systems and space for coordination with the

ACC/ACA/ADC and sector AAWCs; adequate voice and data communications for

coordination with and direct control of support aircraft. (Staff augmentation will normally be

required.)

b. Easy access to EW information.

c. Possibility of using AEW aircraft as sector or standby AAWC.

d. Access to air defence planning information such as: air navigation charts, radar

performance data, current atmospheric data, mutual interference planning tools, AEW/air

defence aircraft availability information, etc.

Specific Antisubmarine Warfare Commander Considerations.

a. Availability of communication systems and space required for coordination with support

submarines and the SUBOPAUTH. (Staff augmentation will normally be required.)

b. Availability of air ASW expertise.

c. Requirement for specialised oceanographic expertise.

Specific Antisurface Warfare Commander Considerations.

a. Access to aircrew post mission debriefs.

b. Access to AEW and strike warfare expertise.

c. Access to adequate targeting data.

Authority and Responsibility. In deciding what degree of control is to be delegated, and

when, the OTC must observe one cardinal principle: To operate effectively, each unit and command

must know in detail its obligation to the OTC, warfare commanders and coordinators, and other units.

To achieve this, it is essential that the OTC clearly specify the chain of command. Although control of

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SECTION VI — COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

0250 Command of Amphibious Forces

Operation. An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by a naval

and landing force embarked in ships and craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the LF ashore

tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile. Types of amphibious operations

include demonstrations, raids, assaults and withdrawals.

Force. An amphibious force is a naval and landing force together with supporting forces that

are trained, organised and equipped for amphibious operations. In naval usage, it is the administrative

title of the amphibious type command of a fleet (i.e., national amphibious capability).

a. An amphibious task force (ATF) is the task organization formed to conduct an amphibious

operation. An ATF always includes a Navy force and LF, with their organic aviation, and

may include maritime ships and air forces when appropriate.

b. A LF is a task organization of ground and aviation units assigned to an amphibious

operation.

Unity of Command. The JFC ensures unity of effort in achieving amphibious objectives by

establishing unity of command over amphibious forces. The JFC may establish unity of command by

retaining OPCON over the forces executing the amphibious operation, or by delegating OPCON,

TACOM, or TACON to a subordinate commander. Forces, not command relationships, may be

transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship that the

gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) must be specified.

Operational Level of Command and Control. C2 of amphibious operations will be as

directed in the initiating directive issued by the cognizant operational commander. The directive

designates the commander, amphibious task force (CATF), commander landing force (CLF), and other

commanders involved in the operation. It would also state what command relationships are to apply

following termination of the amphibious operation. Commanders of subordinate task groups within an

ATF, if they were not named in the initiating directive, would be designated by the CATF or CLF as

appropriate. If air forces are assigned to the amphibious operation, the command relationships should

be specified in the initiating directive. The initiating directive may take the form of a campaign plan,

an operation plan or order (OPLAN or OPORD), a letter of instruction, or an order to execute an

existing plan.

OPCON of amphibious operations could be based upon one of three models.

a. The CATF and CLF are under OPCON of the MCC. This is the most conventional model.

b. The CATF is also the MCC. This may occur when the sole or primary maritime operation

is the amphibious operation.

c. The CATF is under OPCON of the JFC vice MCC. This may be appropriate when it is

impractical for the MCC to exercise OPCON of the CATF. In this case, C2 arrangements

between the CATF and other component commanders must be clearly defined to ensure

effective execution and coordination of operations within the battlespace.

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Command Authority Options. The command relationships established among the

CATF, CLF, and other designated commanders within the amphibious force is an important decision.

The type of relationship chosen by the common superior commander for the amphibious force

should be based on mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, C2 capabilities,

and recommendations from subordinate commanders.

0251 Parallel Chains of Command in the Amphibious Task Force

Elements of the ATF may be embarked for what could be extended periods of time on the same

platforms, but responsible to different or parallel chains of command. Such parallel chains of

command create special requirements for coordination. Except in emergencies, no significant decision

contemplated by a commander in the chain of command, that affects the plans, disposition or

intentions of a corresponding commander in another chain of command, will be made without

consultation with the commander concerned. In emergency situations, the commander making an

emergency decision will notify corresponding commanders of action taken at the earliest practicable

time.

0252 Designation of Commanders

The CATF and CLF are designated in the initiating directive. Commanders of subordinate TGs within

the amphibious force, if they have not been named in the initiating directive, are designated by the

CATF or CLF as appropriate. Should air forces be assigned, their commander will also be designated

in the initiating directive.

0253 Relationships during Planning of Amphibious Operations

Regardless of the command relationships, when the order initiating planning for the amphibious

operation is received (i.e., the initiating directive), unique relationships are observed during the planning

phase. The commanders designated in the initiating directive are coequal in planning matters and

decisions. All decisions must be reached on the basis of common understanding of the mission,

objectives, and procedures and on a free exchange of information. If a change in the mission occurs after

the commencement of amphibious operations, or if an amphibious operation is initiated from a posture

afloat, coequal planning relationships (either as described above or as specified in the initiating directive)

will apply to any subsequent planning.

0254 Command during Amphibious Operations

The CATF, upon the commencement of amphibious operations, assumes responsibility for the

entire ATF and for the operation, and is vested with the commensurate authority to ensure success of

the amphibious operation.

The CATF exercises command authority through the commanders of the task organization.

These commanders, in turn, exercise their authority through their chains of command.

Within the amphibious objective area (AOA), the CATF is given specific command authority

as prescribed by the commander having overall authority for the operation. The CATF will exercise

control, as prescribed in the initiating directive, over forces not a part of the ATF, when such forces

are operating within the AOA after the arrival of the advance force or the ATF. When such forces are

merely passing through the AOA, control will be exercised only to the extent of preventing or

minimising mutual interference.

2-24

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

NEWPORT RI 02841-1207

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

QUANTICO VA 22134-5001

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

WASHINGTON, DC 20593-0001

June 2007

LETTER OF PROMULGATION

1. NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON

THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, is UNCLASSIFIED. Handle in accordance with the

administrative procedures contained in NTTP 1-01.

2. NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A is effective upon receipt and supersedes

NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7 dated October 1995. Destroy superseded material

without report.

3. NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A is intended for use by operational commanders

and supporting staff elements at all levels of command. It is designed to provide officers in command

and their staffs with an overview of the rules of law governing naval operations in peacetime and during

armed conflict.

4. NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A is approved for public release; distribution is

unlimited.

JUL 2007

NWP 1-14M

CONTENTS

Page

No.

CHAPTER 1 — LEGAL DIVISIONS OF THE OCEANS AND AIRSPACE

1.1

INTRODUCTION

1-1

1.2

U.S. OCEANS POLICY

1-1

1.3

GENERAL MARITIME REGIMES UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS

REFLECTED IN THE 1982 LOS CONVENTION

1-2

1.3.1

Internal Waters

1-2

1.3.2

Territorial Seas

1-2

1.3.3

Contiguous Zones

1-2

1.3.4

Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)

1-2

1.3.5

High Seas

1-2

1.4

MARITIME BASELINES

1-2

1.4.1

Low-Water Line

1-2

1.4.2

Straight Baselines

1-3

1.4.3

Bays, Gulfs, and Historic Bays

1-5

1.4.4

River Mouths

1-7

1.4.5

Reefs

1-7

1.4.6

Harbor Works

1-7

1.5

NATIONAL WATERS

1-7

1.5.1

Internal Waters

1-7

1.5.2

Territorial Seas

1-7

1.5.3

Islands, Rocks, and Low-Tide Elevations

1-7

1.5.4

Archipelagic Waters and Sea Lanes

1-8

1.6

INTERNATIONAL WATERS

1-9

1.6.1

Contiguous Zones

1-9

1.6.2

Exclusive Economic Zones

1-9

1.6.3

High Seas

1-9

1.6.4

Coastal Security Zones

1-9

1.7

CONTINENTAL SHELVES

1-10

1.8

SAFETY ZONES

1-10

1.9

AIRSPACE

1-10

1.10

OUTER SPACE

1-10

CHAPTER 2 — INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND NAVIGATION OF WARSHIPS,

NAVAL CRAFT, AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT

2.1

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

2-1

2.1.1

Sovereign Immunity Defined

2-1

2.1.2

Sunken Warships, Naval Craft, Military Aircraft, and Government Spacecraft

2-1

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2.2

WARSHIPS

2-1

2.2.1

Warship Defined

2-1

2.2.2

Warship International Status

2-1

2.2.3

Crew Lists

2-2

2.2.4

Nuclear-Powered Warships

2-2

2.3

OTHER NAVAL CRAFT

2-2

2.3.1

Auxiliary Vessels

2-2

2.3.2

Military Sealift Command (MSC) Vessel Status

2-2

2.3.3

Small Craft Status

2-2

2.3.4

Unmanned Surface Vehicles Defined

2-2

2.3.5

Unmanned Underwater Vehicles Defined

2-3

2.3.6

Unmanned Service Vehicles/Unmanned Underwater Vehicles Status

2-3

2.4

MILITARY AIRCRAFT

2-3

2.4.1

Military Aircraft Defined

2-3

2.4.2

Military Aircraft International Status

2-3

2.4.3

Auxiliary Aircraft

2-3

2.4.4

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Defined/Status

2-3

2.5

NAVIGATION IN AND OVERFLIGHT OF NATIONAL WATERS

2-4

2.5.1

Internal Waters

2-4

2.5.2

Territorial Seas

2-4

2.5.3

International Straits

2-6

2.5.4

Archipelagic Waters

2-7

2.6

NAVIGATION IN AND OVERFLIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS

2-9

2.6.1

Contiguous Zones

2-9

2.6.2

Exclusive Economic Zones

2-9

2.6.3

High Seas Freedoms and Warning Areas

2-10

2.6.4

Declared Security and Defense Zones

2-10

2.6.5

Polar Regions

2-11

2.6.6

Nuclear-Free Zones

2-11

2.7

AIR NAVIGATION

2-12

2.7.1

National Airspace

2-12

2.7.2

International Airspace

2-12

2.7.3

Open Skies Treaty

2-14

2.8

EXERCISE AND ASSERTION OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS

AND FREEDOMS

2-14

2.9

RULES FOR NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY FOR VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT

2-15

2.9.1

International Rules

2-15

2.9.2

National US Inland Rules

2-15

2.9.3

Navigational Rules for Aircraft

2-15

2.10

MILITARY AGREEMENTS AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO PROMOTE AIR

AND MARITIME SAFETY

2-15

2.10.1

United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republic Agreement on the Prevention of

Incidents On and Over the High Seas

2-15

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2.10.2

United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republic Agreement on the Prevention of

Dangerous Military Activities

2-16

2.10.3

U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement

2-17

2.11

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE

2-17

2.11.1

Outer Space Defined

2-17

2.11.2

The Law of Outer Space

2-17

2.11.3

International Agreements

2-18

2.11.4

Rescue and Return of Astronauts

2-18

2.11.5

Return of Outer Space Objects

2-19

CHAPTER 3 — PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY AT SEA AND MARITIME LAW

ENFORCEMENT

3.1

INTRODUCTION

3-1

3.2

RESCUE, SAFE HARBOR, AND QUARANTINE

3-1

3.2.1

Assistance to Persons, Ships, and Aircraft in Distress

3-1

3.2.2

Safe Harbor/Innocent Passage

3-2

3.2.3

Quarantine

3-2

3.3

ASYLUM AND TEMPORARY REFUGE

3-2

3.3.1

Asylum

3-2

3.3.2

Temporary Refuge/Termination or Surrender

3-3

3.3.3

Inviting Requests for Asylum or Refuge

3-4

3.3.4

Protection of U.S. Citizens

3-4

3.4

RIGHT OF APPROACH AND VISIT

3-4

3.5

REPRESSION OF PIRACY

3-5

3.5.1

U.S. Law

3-5

3.5.2

Piracy Defined

3-5

3.5.3

Use of Naval Forces to Repress Piracy

3-6

3.6

PROHIBITION OF THE TRANSPORT OF SLAVES

3-6

3.7

SUPPRESSION OF UNAUTHORIZED BROADCASTING

3-6

3.8

SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFIC

3-6

3.9

RECOVERY OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY LOST AT SEA

3-7

3.10

PROTECTION OF PRIVATE AND MERCHANT VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT,

PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND PERSONS

3-7

3.10.1

Protection of U.S. Flag Vessels and Aircraft, U.S. Nationals, and Property

3-7

3.10.2

Protection of Foreign Flag Vessels and Aircraft and Persons

3-8

3.10.3

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

3-8

3.11

MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT

3-8

3.11.1

Jurisdiction to Proscribe

3-9

3.11.2

Jurisdiction to Enforce

3-10

3.11.3

Limitations on the Exercise of Maritime Law Enforcement Jurisdiction

3-13

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3.11.4

Counterdrug Operations

3-15

3.11.5

Use of Force in Maritime Law Enforcement

3-15

3.11.6

Other Maritime Law Enforcement Assistance

3-16

3.12

HOMELAND SECURITY VS. HOMELAND DEFENSE

3-16

3.13

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

3-16

3.14

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS

AGAINST THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION (SUA)

3-17

CHAPTER 4 — PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE MARITIME

ENVIRONMENT DURING PEACETIME

4.1

INTRODUCTION

4-1

4.2

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

4-1

4.3

NONMILITARY MEASURES

4-2

4.3.1

Diplomatic

4-2

4.3.2

Judicial

4-2

4.3.3

Economic

4-3

4.4

MILITARY MEASURES

4-3

4.4.1

Naval Presence

4-3

4.4.2

Interception of Intruding Aircraft

4-4

4.4.3

The Right of Self-Defense

4-4

4.4.4

Maritime Interception Operations (MIO)

4-6

4.4.5

Proliferation Security Initiative

4-8

4.4.6

Antiterrorism/Force Protection

4-9

4.4.7

Maritime Warning Zones

4-9

4.4.8

Maritime Quarantine

4-9

4.5

U.S. MARITIME ZONES AND OTHER CONTROL MECHANISMS

4-10

4.5.1

Safety Zones

4-10

4.5.2

Security Zones

4-10

4.5.3

Naval Vessel Protection Zones (NVPZs)

4-11

4.5.4

Outer Continental Shelf Facilities

4-11

4.5.5

Other Areas

4-11

4.6

DETAINEES AT SEA DURING PEACETIME

4-12

CHAPTER 5 — PRINCIPLES AND SOURCES OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

5.1

WAR AND THE LAW

5-1

5.1.1

Law Governing When Nations Can Legally Use Force

5-1

5.1.2

Law Governing How Armed Conflict is Conducted

5-1

5.2

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND ITS APPLICATION

5-2

5.3

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

5-2

5.3.1

Principle of Military Necessity

5-2

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5.3.2

Principle of Distinction

5-3

5.3.3

Principle of Proportionality

5-3

5.3.4

Principle of Unnecessary Suffering

5-3

5.4

PEOPLE IN THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

5-3

5.4.1

Combatants

5-4

5.4.2

Noncombatants

5-4

5.4.3

Civilians

5-4

5.5

SOURCES OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

5-4

5.5.1

Customary Law

5-4

5.5.2

International Agreements

5-5

5.6

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

5-6

CHAPTER 6 — ADHERENCE AND ENFORCEMENT

6.1

ADHERENCE TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

6-1

6.1.1

Adherence by the United States

6-1

6.1.2

Policies

6-1

6.1.3

Command Responsibility

6-2

6.1.4

Individual Responsibility

6-2

6.2

ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

6-2

6.2.1

The Protecting Power

6-3

6.2.2

The International Committee of the Red Cross

6-3

6.2.3

DOD Requirements for Reporting Contact with the ICRC

6-3

6.2.4

Reprisal

6-4

6.2.5

Reciprocity

6-4

6.2.6

War Crimes under International Law

6-5

6.3

REPORTABLE VIOLATIONS

6-7

CHAPTER 7 — THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY

7.1

INTRODUCTION

7-1

7.2

NEUTRAL STATUS

7-1

7.2.1

Neutrality under the Charter of the United Nations

7-1

7.2.2

Neutrality under Regional and Collective Self-Defense Arrangements

7-2

7.3

NEUTRAL TERRITORY

7-2

7.3.1

Neutral Lands

7-2

7.3.2

Neutral Ports and Roadsteads

7-2

7.3.3

Neutral Internal Waters

7-3

7.3.4

Neutral Territorial Seas

7-3

7.3.5

The 12-Nautical-Mile Territorial Sea

7-4

7.3.6

Neutral International Straits

7-4

7.3.7

Neutral Archipelagic Waters

7-4

7.3.8

Neutral Exclusive Economic Zone

7-5

7.3.9

Neutral Airspace and Duties

7-5

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7.4

NEUTRAL COMMERCE

7-5

7.4.1

Contraband

7-6

7.4.2

Certificate of Noncontraband Carriage

7-7

7.5

ACQUIRING ENEMY CHARACTER

7-7

7.5.1

Acquiring the Character of an Enemy Warship or Military Aircraft

7-7

7.5.2

Acquiring the Character of an Enemy Merchant Vessel or Civil Aircraft

7-8

7.6

VISIT AND SEARCH

7-8

7.6.1

Procedure for Visit and Search of Merchant Vessels

7-8

7.6.2

Visit and Search of Merchant Vessels by Military Aircraft

7-9

7.6.3

Visit and Search of Civilian Aircraft by Military Aircraft

7-9

7.7

BLOCKADE

7-9

7.7.1

General

7-9

7.7.2

Criteria for Blockades

7-9

7.7.3

Special Entry and Exit Authorization

7-10

7.7.4

Breach and Attempted Breach of Blockade

7-10

7.7.5

Contemporary Practice

7-11

7.8

BELLIGERENT CONTROL OF THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

AND NEUTRAL COMMUNICATION AT SEA

7-11

7.9

EXCLUSION ZONES AND WAR ZONES

7-12

7.10

CAPTURE OF NEUTRAL VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT

7-12

7.10.1

Destruction of Neutral Prizes

7-13

7.10.2

Personnel of Captured Neutral Vessels and Aircraft

7-13

7.11

BELLIGERENT PERSONNEL INTERNED BY A NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT

7-13

CHAPTER 8 — THE LAW OF TARGETING

8.1

PRINCIPLES OF LAWFUL TARGETING

8-1

8.2

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

8-1

8.2.1

Lawful Combatants

8-1

8.2.2

Unlawful Combatants

8-1

8.2.3

Hors de combat

8-2

8.2.4

Noncombatants

8-2

8.2.5

Objects

8-3

8.3

CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN OBJECTS

8-3

8.3.1

Incidental Injury and Collateral Damage

8-3

8.3.2

Civilians in or on Military Objectives

8-3

8.4

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

8-4

8.5

DISTINCTION BETWEEN MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND PROTECTED PERSONS

AND OBJECTS

8-4

8.5.1

Protective Signs and Symbols

8-4

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8.5.2

Protective Signals

8-9

8.5.3

Identification of Neutral Platforms

8-9

8.6

SURFACE WARFARE

8-9

8.6.1

Enemy Warships and Military Aircraft

8-9

8.6.2

Enemy Merchant Vessels and Aircraft

8-10

8.6.3

Enemy Vessels and Aircraft Exempt from Destruction or Capture

8-11

8.7

SUBMARINE WARFARE

8-12

8.7.1

Interdiction of Enemy Merchant Shipping by Submarines

8-12

8.7.2

Enemy Vessels and Aircraft Exempt From Submarine Interdiction

8-13

8.8

AIR WARFARE AT SEA

8-13

8.9

BOMBARDMENT

8-14

8.9.1

General Rules

8-14

8.9.2

Warning before Bombardment

8-15

8.10

LAND WARFARE

8-15

8.10.1

Targeting in Land Warfare

8-15

8.10.2

Special Protection

8-15

8.11

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

8-16

8.11.1

General IO Targeting Considerations

8-16

8.11.2

Physical Attack/Destruction

8-16

8.11.3

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs)

8-16

8.11.4

Computer Network Attack (CNA)

8-17

CHAPTER 9 — CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS

9.1

INTRODUCTION

9-1

9.1.1

Unnecessary Suffering

9-1

9.1.2

Indiscriminate Effect

9-1

9.2

NAVAL MINES

9-2

9.2.1

Current Technology

9-2

9.2.2

Peacetime Mining

9-2

9.2.3

Mining during Armed Conflict

9-3

9.3

LAND MINES

9-3

9.4

TORPEDOES

9-4

9.5

CLUSTER AND FRAGMENTATION WEAPONS

9-4

9.6

BOOBY TRAPS AND OTHER DELAYED-ACTION DEVICES

9-4

9.7

EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

9-4

9.8

INCENDIARY WEAPONS

9-5

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9.9

DIRECTED-ENERGY DEVICES

9-5

9.10

OVER-THE-HORIZON WEAPONS SYSTEMS

9-5

9.11

NONLETHAL WEAPONS

9-5

CHAPTER 10 — NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

10.1

INTRODUCTION

10-1

10.2

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

10-1

10.2.1

General

10-1

10.2.2

Treaty Obligations

10-1

10.3

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

10-3

10.3.1

Treaty Obligations

10-3

10.3.2

Riot Control Agents (RCAs)

10-3

10.3.3

Herbicidal Agents

10-4

10.4

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

10-4

10.4.1

Treaty Obligations

10-4

10.4.2

U.S. Policy Regarding Biological Weapons

10-4

CHAPTER 11 — TREATMENT OF DETAINED PERSONS

11.1

INTRODUCTION

11-1

11.2

HUMANE TREATMENT

11-1

11.3

COMBATANTS

11-2

11.3.1

Lawful Combatants

11-2

11.3.2

Unlawful Combatants

11-3

11.4

NONCOMBATANTS

11-4

11.5

CIVILIANS

11-4

11.6

HORS DE COMBAT

11-4

11.7

QUESTIONING AND INTERROGATION OF DETAINED PERSONS

11-4

11.8

QUESTIONING OF PRISONERS OF WAR

11-5

CHAPTER 12 — DECEPTION DURING ARMED CONFLICT

12.1

GENERAL

12-1

12.1.1

Permitted Deceptions

12-1

12.1.2

Prohibited Deceptions

12-1

12.2

IMPROPER USE OF PROTECTIVE SIGNS, SIGNALS, AND SYMBOLS

12-1

12.3

NEUTRAL FLAGS, INSIGNIA, AND UNIFORMS

12-1

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

No.

CHAPTER 1 — LEGAL DIVISIONS OF THE OCEANS AND AIRSPACE

Figure 1-1.

Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace

1-3

Figure 1-2.

Straight Baselines

1-4

Figure 1-3.

The Semicircle Test

1-5

Figure 1-4.

Bay with Islands

1-6

Figure 1-5.

Bay with Mouth Exceeding 24 Nautical Miles

1-6

Figure 1-6.

Territorial Sea of Islands and Low-Tide Elevations

1-8

CHAPTER 2 — INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND NAVIGATION OF WARSHIPS, NAVAL CRAFT,

AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT

Figure 2-1.

A Designated Archipelagic Sea Lane

2-8

CHAPTER 8 — THE LAW OF TARGETING

Figure 8-1a.

The Red Cross

8-5

Figure 8-1b.

The Red Crescent

8-6

Figure 8-1c.

Red Crystal, symbol of medical and religious activities

8-6

Figure 8-1d.

The Red Star of David

8-6

Figure 8-1e.

Three Red Stripes

8-6

Figure 8-1f.

Symbols for Prisoner of War Camps

8-7

Figure 8-1g.

Civilian Internment Camps

8-7

Figure 8-1h.

Cultural Property under the 1954 Hague Convention

8-7

Figure 8-1i.

The Roerich Pact

8-7

Figure 8-1j.

Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces

8-8

Figure 8-1k.

Civil Defense Activities

8-8

Figure 8-1l.

The 1907 Hague Sign

8-8

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PREFACE

SCOPE

This publication sets out those fundamental principles of international and domestic law that govern U.S. naval

operations at sea. Part I, Law of Peacetime Naval Operations, provides an overview and general discussion of the

law of the sea, including definitions and descriptions of the jurisdiction and sovereignty exercised by nations over

various parts of the world’s oceans; the international legal status and navigational rights of warships and military

aircraft; protection of persons and property at sea; and the safeguarding of national interests in the maritime

environment. Part II, Law of Naval Warfare, sets out those principles of law of special concern to the naval

commander during any period in which U.S. naval forces are engaged in armed conflict. Although the primary

emphasis of Part II is upon the rules of international law concerned with the conduct of naval warfare, attention is

also directed to relevant principles and concepts common to the whole of the law of armed conflict.

PURPOSE

This publication is intended for the use of operational commanders and supporting staff elements at all levels of

command. It is designed to provide officers in command and their staffs with an overview of the rules of law

governing naval operations in peacetime and during armed conflict. The explanations and descriptions in this

publication are intended to enable the naval commander and his staff to comprehend more fully the legal

foundations upon which the orders issued to them by higher authority are premised and to understand better the

commander’s responsibilities under international and domestic law to execute his mission within that law. This

publication sets forth general guidance. It is not a comprehensive treatment of the law nor is it a substitute for the

definitive legal guidance provided by judge advocates and others responsible for advising commanders on the

law.

Officers in command of operational units are encouraged to utilize this publication as a training aid for assigned

personnel.

APPLICABILITY

Part I of this publication is applicable to U.S. naval operations during time of peace. Part I also complements the

more definitive guidance on maritime law enforcement promulgated by the U.S. Coast Guard.

Part II applies to the conduct of U.S. naval forces during armed conflict. It is the policy of the United States to

apply the law of armed conflict to all circumstances in which the armed forces of the United States are engaged in

combat operations, regardless of whether such hostilities are declared or otherwise designated as “war.” Relevant

portions of Part II are, therefore, applicable to all hostilities involving U.S. naval forces irrespective of the

character, intensity, or duration of the conflict. Part II may also be used for information and guidance in situations

in which the United States is a nonparticipant in hostilities involving other nations. Part II complements the more

definitive guidance on land and air warfare promulgated, respectively, by the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force.

STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors approve and the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgates standing rules of engagement (SROE) for US forces (Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs Instruction 3121.01B). These rules delineate the circumstances under which forces

will initiate and/or continue engagement with other forces encountered. Combatant commanders may augment the

SROE as necessary to reflect changing political and military policies, threats, and missions specific to their area

of responsibility. Such augmentations to the standing rules are approved by the President and/or Secretary of

Defense and promulgated by the Joint Staff, J-3, as annexes to the SROE.

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This publication provides general information, is not directive, and does not supersede guidance issued by such

commanders or higher authority.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

For purposes of this publication, international law is defined as that body of rules that nations consider binding in

their relations with one another. International law derives from the practice of nations in the international arena

and from international agreements. International law provides stability in international relations and an

expectation that certain acts or omissions will effect predictable consequences. If one nation violates the law, it

may expect that others will reciprocate. Consequently, failure to comply with international law ordinarily involves

greater political and economic costs than does observance. In short, nations comply with international law

because it is in their interest to do so. Like most rules of conduct, international law is in a continual state of

development and change.

Practice of Nations

The general and consistent practice among nations with respect to a particular subject, which over time is

accepted by them generally as a legal obligation, is known as customary international law. Customary

international law is the principal source of international law and is binding upon all nations.

International Agreements

An international agreement is a commitment entered into by two or more nations that reflects their intention to be

bound by its terms in their relations with one another. International agreements, whether bilateral treaties, executive

agreements, or multilateral conventions, are the second principal source of international law. However, they bind only

those nations that are party to them or that may otherwise consent to be bound by them. To the extent that multilateral

conventions of broad application codify existing rules of customary law, they may be regarded as evidence of

international law binding upon parties and nonparties alike.

U.S. Navy Regulations

U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, require U.S. naval commanders to observe international law. Article 0705,

Observance of International Law, states:

At all times, a commander shall observe, and require their commands to observe, the principles of international law.

Where necessary to fulfill this responsibility, a departure from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized.

Throughout this publication, references to other publications imply the effective edition.

Report administrative discrepancies by letter, message, or e-mail to:

COMMANDER

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

ATTN: N5

686 CUSHING ROAD

NEWPORT RI 02841-1207

fleetpubs@nwdc.navy.mil

ORDERING DATA

Order printed copies of a publication using the Print on Demand system. A command may requisition a

publication using standard military standard requisitioning and issue procedures or the Naval Supply Systems

Command website called the Naval Logistics Library (https://nll1.ahf.nmci.navy.mil). An approved requisition is

forwarded to the specific site at which the publication’s electronic file is officially stored. Currently, two copies

are printed at no cost to the requester.

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CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS

Procedures for recommending changes are provided below.

WEB-BASED CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommended changes to this publication may be submitted to the Navy Warfare Development Doctrine

Discussion Group, accessible through the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) website at:

http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil/.

URGENT CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS

When items for changes are considered urgent (as described in Paragraph 3.4.2), send this information by

message to the Primary Review Authority, info NWDC. Clearly identify and justify both the proposed change and

its urgency. Information addressees should comment as appropriate. See accompanying sample for urgent change

recommendation format on page 23.

ROUTINE CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS

Submit routine recommended changes to this publication at any time by using the accompanying routine change

recommendation letter format on page 24 and mailing it to the address below, or posting the recommendation on

the NWDC Doctrine Discussion Group site.

COMMANDER

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

DOCTRINE DIRECTOR (N5)

686 CUSHING ROAD

NEWPORT RI 02841-1207

CHANGE SYMBOLS

Revised text in changes is indicated by a black vertical line in either margin of the page, like the one printed next

to this paragraph. The change symbol indicates added or restated information. A change symbol in the margin

adjacent to the chapter number and title indicates a new or completely revised chapter.

WARNINGS, CAUTIONS, AND NOTES

The following definitions apply to warnings, cautions, and notes used in this manual:

An operating procedure, practice, or condition that may result in injury or death if not carefully

observed or followed.

An operating procedure, practice, or condition that may result in damage to equipment if not carefully

observed or followed.

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CHAPTER 1

Legal Divisions of the Oceans and Airspace

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The oceans of the world traditionally have been classified under the broad headings of internal waters, territorial

seas, and high seas. Airspace has been divided into national and international airspace. In the latter half of the 20^th

century, new concepts evolved, such as the exclusive economic zone and archipelagic waters, that dramatically

expanded the jurisdictional claims of coastal and island nations over wide expanses of the oceans previously

regarded as high seas. The phenomenon of expanding maritime jurisdiction and the rush to extend the territorial

sea to 12 nautical miles and beyond were the subject of international negotiation from 1973 through 1982 in the

course of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. That conference produced the 1982 United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention), which came into effect on 16 November

1994.

In 1983, the United States announced that it would neither sign nor ratify the 1982 LOS Convention due to

fundamental flaws in its deep seabed mining provisions. Further negotiations resulted in an additional Agreement

regarding Part XI, which replaced the original deep seabed mining provisions. This Agreement contains legally

binding changes to the 1982 LOS Convention and is to be applied and interpreted together with the Convention as

a single treaty.

On 7 October 1994, the President of the United States submitted the 1982 LOS Convention and the Part XI

Agreement reforming its deep seabed mining provisions to the Senate for its advice and consent to accession and

ratification, respectively. In February 2004, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously recommended

Senate advice and consent. As of the date of this publication the Senate has not acted on this recommendation.

1.2 U.S. OCEANS POLICY

Although the United States is not a party to the 1982 LOS Convention, it considers the navigation and overflight

provisions therein reflective of customary international law and thus acts in accordance with the 1982 LOS

Convention, except for the deep seabed mining provisions. President Reagan’s 10 March 1983 Oceans Policy

Statement provides:

First, the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests relating

to traditional uses of the oceans [in the 1982 LOS Convention]—such as navigation and overflight. In

this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other States in the waters off their coasts, as

reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and others under

international law are recognized by such coastal States.

Second, the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on

a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the

Convention. The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other States designed

to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and

other related high seas uses.

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1.3 GENERAL MARITIME REGIMES UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS

REFLECTED IN THE 1982 LOS CONVENTION

The legal classifications (“regimes”) of ocean and airspace areas directly affect maritime operations by

determining the degree of control that a coastal nation may exercise over the conduct of foreign merchant ships,

warships, and aircraft operating within these areas. The nature of these regimes, particularly the extent of coastal

nation control exercised in those areas, is set forth in the succeeding paragraphs of this chapter. The Department

of Defense (DOD) 2005.1-M, Maritime Claims Reference Manual contains a listing of the ocean claims of coastal

nations and may be accessed at www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/20051m.htm.

While the legal classifications are thoroughly discussed in the remainder of this chapter, the below represents a

brief summary of the primary zones affecting navigation and overflight (Figure 1-1).

1.3.1 Internal Waters

Internal waters are landward of the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.

1.3.2 Territorial Seas

The territorial sea is a belt of ocean that is measured seaward up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline of the

coastal nation and subject to its sovereignty. Ships enjoy the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea.

Innocent passage does not include a right for aircraft overflight of the territorial sea.

1.3.3 Contiguous Zones

A contiguous zone is an area extending seaward from the baseline up to 24 nautical miles in which the coastal

nation may exercise the control necessary to prevent or punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration,

and sanitary laws and regulations that occur within its territory or territorial sea. Ships and aircraft enjoy high seas

freedoms, including overflight, in the contiguous zone.

1.3.4 Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)

An Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) is a resource-related zone adjacent to the territorial sea—where a State has

certain sovereign rights (but not sovereignty) and may not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline.

Ships and aircraft enjoy high seas freedoms, including overflight, in the EEZ.

1.3.5 High Seas

The high seas include all parts of the ocean seaward of the EEZ.

1.4 MARITIME BASELINES

The territorial sea and all other maritime zones are measured from baselines. In order to calculate the seaward

reach of claimed maritime zones, it is first necessary to comprehend how baselines are drawn.

1.4.1 Low-Water Line

Unless other special rules apply, the normal baseline from which maritime claims of a nation are measured is the

low-water line along the coast as marked on the nation’s official large-scale charts.

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Figure 1-1. Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace

1.4.2 Straight Baselines

Where the coastline is deeply indented or where there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate

vicinity, the coastal nation may employ straight baselines. The general rule is that straight baselines must not

depart from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas they enclose must be closely linked to the land

domain. A coastal nation that uses straight baselines must either clearly indicate them on its charts or publish a list

of geographical coordinates of the points joining them together (Figure 1-2). The United States does not employ

this practice and restrictively interprets its use by others.

1.4.2.1 Unstable Coastlines

Where the coastline is highly unstable due to natural conditions, e.g., deltas, straight baselines may be established

connecting appropriate points on the low-water line. These straight baselines remain effective, despite subsequent

regression or accretion of the coastline, until changed by the coastal nation.

1.4.2.2 Low-Tide Elevations

A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed land area surrounded by water and that remains above water at low tide

but is submerged at high tide. As a rule, straight baselines may not be drawn to or from a low-tide elevation unless

a lighthouse or similar installation, which is permanently above sea level, has been erected thereon.

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1.4.3 Bays, Gulfs, and Historic Bays

There is a complex formula for determining the baseline closing the mouth of a legal bay or gulf. For baseline

purposes, a “bay” is a well-marked indentation in the coastline of such proportion to the width of its mouth as to

contain landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. The water area of a “bay” must

be as large as or larger than that of a semicircle whose diameter is the length of the line drawn across the mouth

(Figure 1-3). Where the indentation has more than one mouth due to the presence of islands, the diameter of the

test semicircle is the sum of the lines across the various mouths (Figure 1-4).

The baseline across the mouth of a bay may not exceed 24 nautical miles in length. Where the mouth is wider

than 24 nautical miles, a baseline of 24 nautical miles may be drawn within the bay so as to enclose the maximum

water area (Figure 1-5). Where the semicircle test has been met, and a closure line of 24 nautical miles or less

may be drawn, the body of water is a “bay” in the legal sense.

So-called historic bays are not determined by the semicircle and 24-nautical mile closure line rules described

above. To meet the international standard for establishing a claim to a historic bay, a nation must demonstrate its

open, effective, long-term, and continuous exercise of authority over the bay, coupled with acquiescence by

foreign nations in the exercise of that authority. The United States has taken the position that an actual showing of

acquiescence by foreign nations in such a claim is required, as opposed to a mere absence of opposition.

Figure 1-3. The Semicircle Test

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1.4.4 River Mouths

If a river flows directly into the sea, the baseline is a straight line across the mouth of the river between points on

the low-water line of its banks.

1.4.5 Reefs

The low-water line of a reef may be used as the baseline for islands situated on atolls or having fringing reefs.

1.4.6 Harbor Works

The outermost permanent harbor works, which form an integral part of the harbor system, are regarded as forming

part of the coast for baseline purposes. Harbor works are structures, such as jetties, breakwaters and groins,

erected along the coast at inlets or rivers for protective purposes or for enclosing sea areas adjacent to the coast to

provide anchorage and shelter.

1.5 NATIONAL WATERS

For operational purposes, the world’s oceans are divided into two parts. The first includes internal waters,

territorial seas, and archipelagic waters. These national waters are subject to the territorial sovereignty of coastal

nations, with certain navigational rights reserved to the international community. The second part includes

contiguous zones, waters of the exclusive economic zone, and the high seas. These are international waters in

which all nations enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight. International waters are discussed

further in paragraph 1.6.

1.5.1 Internal Waters

Internal waters are landward of the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. Lakes, rivers, some bays,

harbors, some canals, and lagoons are examples of internal waters. From the standpoint of international law,

internal waters have the same legal character as the land itself. There is no right of innocent passage in internal

waters, and, unless in distress (see paragraph 2.5.1), ships and aircraft may not enter or overfly internal waters

without the permission of the coastal nation. Where the establishment of a straight baseline drawn in conformity

with the 1982 LOS Convention has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas that had previously not been

considered as such, a right of innocent passage exists in those waters.

1.5.2 Territorial Seas

The territorial sea is a belt of ocean measured seaward from the baseline of the coastal nation and subject to its

sovereignty. The United States claims a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea and recognizes territorial sea claims of

other nations up to a maximum breadth of 12 nautical miles.

1.5.3 Islands, Rocks, and Low-Tide Elevations

Each island has its own territorial sea and, like the mainland, has a baseline from which it is calculated. An island

is defined as a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. Rocks are

islands that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own. Provided they remain above water at

high tide, they too possess a territorial sea determined in accordance with the principles discussed in the

paragraphs on baselines. Rocks, however, have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. A low-tide

elevation (above water at low tide but submerged at high tide) situated wholly or partly within the territorial sea

may be used for delimiting the territorial sea as though it were an island. Where a low-tide elevation is located

entirely beyond the territorial sea, it has no territorial sea of its own (Figure 1-6).

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Figure 1-6. Territorial Sea of Islands and Low-Tide Elevations

1.5.3.1 Artificial Islands and Off-Shore Installations

Artificial islands and off-shore installations have no territorial sea of their own (see, however, paragraph 1.8).

1.5.3.2 Roadsteads

Roadsteads normally used for the loading, unloading, and anchoring of ships, and which would otherwise be

situated wholly or partly beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea, are included in the territorial sea.

Roadsteads must be clearly marked on charts by the coastal nation.

1.5.4 Archipelagic Waters and Sea Lanes

An archipelagic nation is a nation that is constituted wholly of one or more groups of islands. Such nations may

draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of their outermost islands, provided that the ratio

of water to land within the baselines is between 1:1 and 9:1. The waters enclosed within the archipelagic baselines

are called archipelagic waters. (The archipelagic baselines are also the baselines from which the archipelagic

nation measures seaward its territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone.) The United States

recognizes the right of an archipelagic nation to establish archipelagic baselines enclosing archipelagic waters

provided the baselines are drawn in conformity with the 1982 LOS Convention. (See paragraph 2.5.4 regarding

navigation and overflight of archipelagic waters.)

Archipelagic nations may designate archipelagic sea lanes through their archipelagic waters suitable for

continuous and expeditious passage of ships and aircraft. All normal routes used for international navigation and

overflight are to be included. If the archipelagic nation does not designate such sea lanes, the right of archipelagic

sea lanes passage may nonetheless be exercised by all nations through routes normally used for international

navigation and overflight. If the archipelagic nation makes only a partial designation of archipelagic sea lanes, a

vessel or aircraft must adhere to the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage while transiting in the established

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archipelagic sea lanes but retains the right to exercise archipelagic sea lanes passage through all normal routes

used for international navigation and overflight through other parts of the archipelago.

1.6 INTERNATIONAL WATERS

For operational purposes, international waters include all ocean areas not subject to the territorial sovereignty of

any nation. All waters seaward of the territorial sea are international waters in which the high seas freedoms of

navigation and overflight are preserved to the international community. International waters include contiguous

zones, exclusive economic zones, and high seas.

1.6.1 Contiguous Zones

A contiguous zone is an area extending seaward from the territorial sea to a maximum distance of 24 nautical

miles from the baseline. In that zone, the coastal nation may exercise the control necessary to prevent or punish

infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws and regulations that occur within its territory or

territorial sea (but not for purported security purposes; see paragraph 1.6.4.). The United States claims a 24-

nautical-mile contiguous zone.

1.6.2 Exclusive Economic Zones

An EEZ is a resource-related zone adjacent to the territorial sea. An EEZ may not extend beyond 200 nautical

miles from the baseline. As the name suggests, its central purpose is economic. The United States recognizes the

sovereign rights of a coastal nation to prescribe and enforce its laws in the exclusive economic zone for the

purposes of exploration, exploitation, management, and conservation of the natural resources of the waters,

seabed, and subsoil of the zone, as well as for the production of energy from the water, currents, and winds. The

coastal nation may exercise jurisdiction in the zone over the establishment and use of artificial islands,

installations, and structures having economic purposes; over marine scientific research (with reasonable

limitations); and over some aspects of marine environmental protection (including implementation of

international vessel-source pollution control standards). (For a discussion of marine scientific research,

hydrographic surveys and military surveys in the EEZ, see paragraphs 2.6.2.1 and 2.6.2.2.) In the EEZ all nations

enjoy the right to exercise the traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, of the laying of

submarine cables and pipelines, and of all other traditional high seas uses by ships and aircraft that are not

resource related. The United States established a 200-nautical mile EEZ by Presidential Proclamation 5030 on 10

March 1983.

1.6.3 High Seas

The high seas include all parts of the ocean seaward of the exclusive economic zone. When a coastal nation has

not proclaimed an exclusive economic zone, the high seas begin at the seaward edge of the territorial sea.

1.6.4 Coastal Security Zones

Some coastal nations have claimed the right to establish military security zones, beyond the territorial sea, of

varying breadth in which they purport to regulate the activities of warships and military aircraft of other nations

by such restrictions as prior notification or authorization for entry, limits on the number of foreign ships or aircraft

present at any given time, prohibitions on various operational activities, or complete exclusion. International law

does not recognize the right of coastal nations to establish zones during peacetime that would restrict the exercise

of nonresource-related high seas freedoms beyond the territorial sea. Accordingly, the United States does not

recognize the validity of any claimed security or military zone seaward of the territorial sea that purports to

restrict or regulate the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight. (See paragraph 2.5.2.3 for a discussion of

temporary suspension of innocent passage in territorial seas. See also paragraph 4.4 for a further discussion of

declared security and defense zones in time of peace and paragraph 7.9 for a discussion of exclusion zones and

war zones during armed conflict.)

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1.7 CONTINENTAL SHELVES

The juridical continental shelf of a coastal nation consists of the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that

extend beyond its territorial sea to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a distance of 200 nautical miles

from the baseline used to measure the territorial sea where the continental margin does not extend to that distance.

The continental shelf may not extend beyond 350 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea or 100

nautical miles from the 2,500-meter isobath, whichever is greater. Although the coastal nation exercises sovereign

rights over the continental shelf for purposes of exploring and exploiting its natural resources, the legal status of

the superjacent water is not affected. Moreover, all nations have the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines on

the continental shelf.

1.8 SAFETY ZONES

Coastal nations may establish safety zones to protect artificial islands, installations, and structures located in their

internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial seas, and exclusive economic zones, and on their continental

shelves. In the case of artificial islands, installations, and structures located in the exclusive economic zones or on

the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea, safety zones may not extend beyond 500 meters from the outer

edges of the facility in question, except as otherwise authorized by generally accepted international standards.

1.9 AIRSPACE

Under international law, airspace is classified as either national airspace (that over the land, internal waters,

archipelagic waters, and territorial seas of a nation) or international airspace (that over contiguous zones,

exclusive economic zones, the high seas, and territory not subject to the sovereignty of any nation). Subject to a

right of overflight of international straits (see paragraph 2.5.3) and archipelagic sea lanes (see paragraph 2.5.4.1),

each nation has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its national airspace. Except as nations may have

otherwise consented through treaties or other international agreements, the aircraft of all nations are free to

operate in international airspace without interference by other nations.

1.10 OUTER SPACE

The upper limit of airspace subject to national jurisdiction has not been authoritatively defined by international

law. International practice has established that airspace terminates at some point below the point at which

artificial satellites can be placed in orbit without free-falling to earth. Outer space begins at that undefined point.

All nations enjoy a freedom of equal access to outer space and none may appropriate it to its national airspace or

exclusive use.

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CHAPTER 2

International Status and Navigation of

Warships, Naval Craft, and Military Aircraft

2.1 SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

2.1.1 Sovereign Immunity Defined

As a matter of customary international law, all vessels owned or operated by a state, and used, for the time being,

only on government noncommercial service are entitled to sovereign immunity. This means that such vessels are

immune from arrest or search, whether in national or international waters. Such vessels are also immune from

foreign taxation, exempt from any foreign state regulation requiring flying the flag of such foreign state either in

its ports or while passing through its territorial sea, and are entitled to exclusive control over persons onboard

such vessels with respect to acts performed on board. The privilege of sovereign immunity includes protecting the

identity of personnel, stores, weapons, or other property on board the vessel. The United States asserts the

privilege of sovereign immunity for all United States ship (USS) and United States Coast Guard cutter (USCGC)

vessels described below.

2.1.2 Sunken Warships, Naval Craft, Military Aircraft, and Government Spacecraft

Sunken warships, naval craft, military aircraft, and government spacecraft retain their sovereign immune status

and remain the property of the flag nation until title is formally relinquished or abandoned, whether the cause of

the sinking was through accident or enemy action (unless the warship or aircraft was captured before it sank). As

a matter of policy, the U.S. government does not grant permission to salvage sunken U.S. warships or military

aircraft that contain the remains of deceased service personnel or explosive material. Requests from foreign

countries to have their sunken warships or military aircraft, located in U.S. national waters, similarly respected by

salvors, are honored.

2.2 WARSHIPS

2.2.1 Warship Defined

International law defines a warship as a ship belonging to the armed forces of a nation bearing the external

markings distinguishing the character and nationality of such ships, under the command of an officer duly

commissioned by the government of that nation and whose name appears in the appropriate service list of

officers, and manned by a crew that is under regular armed forces discipline (the mere presence of a number of

civilians onboard a warship does not alter the status of the vessel). In the U.S. Navy, those ships designated

“USS” are “warships” as defined by international law. U.S. Coast Guard vessels designated “USCGC” under the

command of a commissioned officer are also “warships” under international law.

2.2.2 Warship International Status

As a matter of customary international law, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from interference by the

authorities of nations other than the flag nation. Police and port authorities may board a warship only with the

permission of the commanding officer. A warship cannot be required to consent to an onboard search or

inspection, nor may it be required to fly the flag of the host nation. Although warships are required to comply

with coastal nation traffic control, sewage, health, and quarantine restrictions instituted in conformance with the

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1982 LOS Convention, a failure of compliance is subject only to diplomatic complaint or to coastal nation orders

to leave its territorial sea immediately. Moreover, warships are immune from arrest and seizure, whether in

national or international waters, and are exempt from foreign taxes and regulation and exercise exclusive control

over all passengers and crew with regard to acts performed on board. U.S. Navy policy requires warships to assert

the rights of sovereign immunity.

2.2.3 Crew Lists

It is US policy that providing a list of crew members (to include military and nonmilitary personnel) or any other

passengers on board a USS or USCGC vessel as a condition of entry into a port or to satisfy local immigration

officials upon arrival is prohibited. For more information concerning US policy in this regard see CNO

WASHINGTON DC 101814Z Nov 05 (NAVADMIN 288/05).

2.2.4 Nuclear-Powered Warships

Nuclear-powered warships and conventionally powered warships enjoy identical international legal status.

2.3 OTHER NAVAL CRAFT

2.3.1 Auxiliary Vessels

Auxiliary vessels are vessels, other than warships, that are owned by or under the exclusive control of the armed

forces. Because they are State owned or operated and used for the time being only on government noncommercial

service, auxiliary vessels enjoy sovereign immunity. This means that, like warships, they are immune from arrest

and search, whether in national or international waters. Like warships, they are exempt from foreign taxes and

regulation, and exercise exclusive control over all passengers and crew with respect to acts performed on board.

U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Army vessels that, except for the lack of a commissioned officer as

commanding officer would be warships, are also auxiliary vessels.

2.3.2 Military Sealift Command (MSC) Vessel Status

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) Force includes: (1) United States Naval Ships (USNS) (i.e., U.S. owned

vessels or those under bareboat charter, and assigned to MSC); (2) the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and

the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) (when activated and assigned to MSC); (3) privately owned vessels under time

charter assigned to the Afloat Prepositioned Force (APF); and (4) those vessels chartered by MSC for a period of

time or for a specific voyage or voyages. All USNS, APF, NDRF and RRF vessels are entitled to full rights of

sovereign immunity. As a matter of policy, however, the U.S. claims only freedom from arrest and taxation for those

MSC Force time and voyage charters not included in the APF. The United States, also as a matter of policy, does not

currently claim sovereign immunity for MSC foreign flagged voyage or MSC foreign flagged time-chartered

vessels. For more information concerning MSC Sovereign Immunity Policy, to include information concerning the

provision of crew lists, see CNO WASHINGTON DC 101814Z Nov 05 (NAVADMIN 288/05).

2.3.3 Small Craft Status

US Navy and US Coast Guard motor whale boats and other small boats deployed from larger vessels are

sovereign immune craft whose status is not dependent upon the status of the launching platform.

2.3.4 Unmanned Surface Vehicles Defined

Unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) are water craft that are either autonomous or remotely navigated and may be

launched from surface, subsurface, or aviation platforms. The anticipated stealth, mobility, flexibility of

employment, and network capabilities of USVs are expected to make them extremely valuable as force

multipliers, particularly in the littoral environment. Potential missions envisioned for USVs include laying

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undersea sensor grids, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) prosecution, barrier operations, sustainment of carrier

operating areas, mine countermeasures (MCM), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), bottom

mapping and survey, and special operations support.

2.3.5 Unmanned Underwater Vehicles Defined

Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are underwater craft that are either autonomous or remotely navigated

and may be launched from surface, subsurface, or aviation platforms. Towed systems, hard-tethered devices,

systems not capable of fully submerging such as USV, semi-submersible vehicles, or bottom crawlers are not

considered UUVs. The sea services may employ UUVs for a wide variety of missions, including, but not limited

to: ISR, MCM, ASW, Surveillance, Inspection/Identification, oceanography, communication/navigation network

nodes, payload delivery, information operations (IO), time critical strike, barrier patrol (homeland defense,

antiterrorism/force protection), and barrier patrol (sea base support).

2.3.6 Unmanned Service Vehicles/Unmanned Underwater Vehicles Status

USVs and UUVs engaged exclusively in government, noncommercial service are sovereign immune craft.

USV/UUV status is not dependent on the status of its launch platform.

2.4 MILITARY AIRCRAFT

2.4.1 Military Aircraft Defined

Military aircraft include all aircraft operated by commissioned units of the armed forces of a nation bearing the

military markings of that nation, commanded by a member of the armed forces, and manned by a crew subject to

regular armed forces discipline, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (see paragraph 2.4.4).

2.4.2 Military Aircraft International Status

Military aircraft are “State aircraft” within the meaning of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944

(the “Chicago Convention”), and, like warships, enjoy sovereign immunity from foreign search and inspection.

Subject to the right of transit passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage, and entry in distress (see paragraph 2.5.1),

State aircraft may not enter national airspace (see paragraph 1.9) or land in the sovereign territory of another

nation without its authorization. Foreign officials may not board the aircraft without the consent of the aircraft

commander. Should the aircraft commander fail to certify compliance with local customs, immigration or

quarantine requirements, the aircraft may be directed to leave the territory and national airspace of that nation

immediately.

2.4.3 Auxiliary Aircraft

Auxiliary aircraft are State aircraft, other than military aircraft, that are owned by or under the exclusive control of

the armed forces. Civilian owned and operated aircraft, the full capacity of which has been contracted by the DOD

and used in the military service of the United States, qualify as “auxiliary aircraft” if they are designated as “State

aircraft” by the United States. In those circumstances they too enjoy sovereign immunity from foreign search and

inspection. As a matter of policy, however, the United States normally does not designate Air Mobility

Command-charter aircraft as State aircraft.

2.4.4 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Defined/Status

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are pilotless aircraft that are either autonomous or remotely piloted and may be

launched from surface or aviation platforms or land bases. Per DOD Directive 4540.1, use of Airspace by US

Military Aircraft and Firing Over the High Seas, manned and unmanned aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles are

to be considered “military aircraft.” UAVs have been integrated into all levels of military operations and offer an

unprecedented reconnaissance and intelligence capability.

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All UAVs operated by the DOD shall be considered “military aircraft” and retain the overflight rights under

customary international law as reflected in the LOS Convention. Since DOD-operated UAVs are considered

“military aircraft,” all domestic and international law pertaining to “military aircraft” is applicable. This includes

all conventions, treaties, and agreements relating to “military aircraft,” “auxiliary aircraft,” “civil aircraft” and

“civilian airliners.”

2.5 NAVIGATION IN AND OVERFLIGHT OF NATIONAL WATERS

2.5.1 Internal Waters

As discussed in the preceding chapter, coastal nations exercise the same jurisdiction and control over their internal

waters and superjacent airspace as they do over their land territory. Because most ports and harbors are located

landward of the baseline of the territorial sea, entering a port ordinarily involves navigation in internal waters.

Because entering internal waters is legally equivalent to entering the land territory of another nation, that nation’s

permission is required. To facilitate international maritime commerce, many nations grant foreign merchant

vessels standing permission to enter internal waters, in the absence of notice to the contrary. Warships and

auxiliaries, and all aircraft, on the other hand, require specific and advance entry permission, unless other bilateral

or multilateral arrangements have been concluded.

Exceptions to the rule of nonentry into internal waters without coastal nation permission, whether specific or

implied, arise when rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress, or when straight baselines established in

accordance with customary international law as reflected in the 1982 LOS Convention have the effect of

enclosing, as internal waters, areas of the sea previously regarded as territorial seas or high seas. In the latter

event, international law provides that the right of innocent passage (see paragraph 2.5.2.1) or that of transit

passage in an international strait (see paragraph 2.5.3) may be exercised by all nations in those waters.

2.5.2 Territorial Seas

2.5.2.1 Innocent Passage

International law provides that ships (but not aircraft) of all nations enjoy the right of innocent passage for the

purpose of continuous and expeditious traversing of the territorial sea or for proceeding to or from internal waters.

Innocent passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only insofar as incidental to ordinary navigation, or as

rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the

peace, good order, or security of the coastal nation. Activities considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good

order, or security of the coastal nation, and therefore inconsistent with innocent passage, are:

1. Any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of the

coastal nation, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the

Charter of the United Nations

2. Any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind

3. Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal nation

4. Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal nation

5. The launching, landing, or taking on board of any aircraft

6. The launching, landing, or taking on board of any military device

7. The loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal,

immigration or sanitary laws, and regulations of the coastal nation

8. Any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to the 1982 LOS Convention

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9. Any fishing activities

10. The carrying out of research or survey activities

11. Any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of

the coastal nation

12. Any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.

Foreign ships, including warships, exercising the right of innocent passage are required to comply with the laws

and regulations enacted by the coastal nation in conformity with established principles of international law and, in

particular, with such laws and regulations relating to the safety of navigation. Innocent passage does not include a

right of overflight. A vessel does not enjoy the right of innocent passage if, in the case of a submarine, it navigates

submerged, or if, in the case of any ship, it engages in an act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of

the defense or security of the coastal nation.

While the 1982 LOS Convention does not prohibit noninnocent passage, such as overflight of or submerged

transit in the territorial sea, the coastal state may take affirmative actions in and over its territorial sea to prevent

passage that is not innocent, including, where necessary, the use of force. If a foreign ship or aircraft enters the

territorial sea or the airspace above it and engages in noninnocent activities, the appropriate remedy, consistent

with customary international law, which includes the right of self-defense, is first to inform the ship or aircraft of

the reasons the coastal nation questions the innocence of the passage, and to provide the vessel a reasonable

opportunity to clarify its intentions or to correct its conduct in a reasonably short period of time. (See paragraph

2.5.2.4 as to warships.)

2.5.2.2 Permitted Restrictions

For purposes such as resource conservation, environmental protection, and navigational safety, a coastal nation

may establish certain restrictions upon the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels. Such restrictions upon the

right of innocent passage through the territorial sea are not prohibited by international law, provided that they are

reasonable and necessary; do not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage;

and do not discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any nation or those carrying cargoes to, from, or on

behalf of any nation. Further, these restrictions cannot prohibit transit or otherwise impair the rights of innocent

and transit passage of nuclear-powered sovereign vessels. The coastal nation may, where navigational safety

dictates, require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage to utilize designated sea lanes and traffic

separation schemes.

2.5.2.3 Temporary Suspension of Innocent Passage

A coastal nation may suspend innocent passage temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea when it is

essential for the protection of its security. Such a suspension must be preceded by a published notice to the

international community and may not discriminate in form or in fact among foreign ships.

2.5.2.4 Warships and Innocent Passage

All warships enjoy the right of innocent passage on an unimpeded and unannounced basis. If a warship does not

comply with coastal nation regulations that conform to established principles of international law and disregards a

request for compliance that is made to it, the coastal nation may require the warship immediately to leave the

territorial sea in which case the warship shall do so immediately.

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2.5.2.5 USV/UUV and Navigational Rights

Customary international law as reflected in the 1982 LOS Convention gives vessels of all nations the right to

engage in innocent passage as well as in transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage. The size, purpose, or

type of cargo is irrelevant. The same rules apply to USV and UUV transit and navigation. USVs and UUVs retain

independent navigation rights and may be deployed by larger vessels as long as their employment complies with

the navigational regimes of innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage as applicable.

2.5.2.6 Assistance Entry

All ship and aircraft commanders have an obligation to assist those in danger of being lost at sea. See paragraph

3.2.1. This long-recognized duty of mariners permits assistance entry into the territorial sea by ships or, under

certain circumstances, aircraft without permission of the coastal nation to engage in bona fide efforts to render

emergency assistance to those in danger or distress at sea. This right applies only when the location of the danger

or distress is reasonably well known. It does not extend to entering the territorial sea or superjacent airspace to

conduct a search, which requires the consent of the coastal nation.

2.5.3 International Straits

2.5.3.1 International Straits Between One Part of the High Seas/EEZ and Another Part of the

High Seas/EEZ

Straits that are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone

and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone are subject to the legal regime of transit passage.

Transit passage exists throughout the entire strait (shoreline-to-shoreline) and not just the area overlapped by the

territorial sea of the coastal nation(s). Under international law, the ships and aircraft of all nations, including

warships, auxiliary vessels, and military aircraft, enjoy the right of unimpeded transit passage through such straits

and their approaches.

Transit passage is defined as the exercise of the freedoms of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of

continuous and expeditious transit in the normal modes of operation utilized by ships and aircraft for such

passage. Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage, shall: (a) proceed without delay through

or over the strait; (b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or

political independence of States bordering the strait and, (c) refrain from any activities other than those incident to

their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by

distress. Surface warships may transit in a manner consistent with sound navigational practices and the security of

the force, including the use of their electronic detection and navigational devices such as radar, sonar and depth-

sounding devices, formation steaming, and the launching and recovery of aircraft. Submarines are free to transit

international straits submerged, since that is their normal mode of operation.

Transit passage through international straits cannot be hampered or suspended by the coastal nation for any

purpose during peacetime. This principle of international law also applies to transiting ships (including warships)

of nations at peace with the bordering coastal nation but involved in armed conflict with another nation.

Coastal nations bordering international straits overlapped by territorial seas may designate sea lanes and prescribe

traffic separation schemes to promote navigational safety. However, such sea lanes and separation schemes must

be approved by the competent international organization (the International Maritime Organization (IMO)) in

accordance with generally accepted international standards. Merchant ships and government-operated ships

operated for commercial purposes must respect properly designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes.

Warships, auxiliaries and government ships operated on exclusive government service, i.e., sovereign-immune

vessels (see paragraph 2.1) are not legally required to comply with such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes

while in transit passage. Sovereign immune vessels, however, must exercise due regard for the safety of

navigation. Warships and auxiliaries may, and often do, voluntarily comply with IMO-approved routing measures

in international straits where practicable and compatible with the military mission. When voluntarily using an

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IMO-approved traffic separation scheme, such vessels must comply with applicable provisions of the 1972

International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (72 COLREGS).

2.5.3.2 International Straits Not Completely Overlapped by Territorial Seas

Ships and aircraft transiting through or above straits used for international navigation that are not completely

overlapped by territorial seas and through which there is a high seas or exclusive economic zone corridor suitable

for such navigation, enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight while operating in and over such a

corridor. Accordingly, so long as they remain beyond the territorial sea, all ships and aircraft of all nations have

the unencumbered right to navigate through and over such waters subject only to due regard for the right of others

to do so as well. In international straits not completely overlapped by territorial seas, all vessels enjoy high seas

freedoms while operating in the high seas corridor beyond the territorial sea. If the high seas corridor is not of

similar convenience (e.g., to stay within the high seas corridor would be inconsistent with sound navigational

practices), such vessels enjoy the right of unimpeded transit passage through the strait.

2.5.3.3 International Straits Between a Part of the High Seas/EEZ and the Territorial Seas of a

Coastal State

The regime of innocent passage (see paragraph 2.5.2.1), rather than transit passage, applies in straits used for

international navigation that connect a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone with the territorial sea

of a coastal nation. There may be no suspension of innocent passage through such straits. Additionally, warships,

auxiliaries, and ships operated on exclusive government service, i.e., sovereign-immune vessels (see paragraph

2.1), are not legally required to comply with sea lanes and traffic separation schemes while conducting innocent

passage but must exercise due regard for the safety of navigation.

2.5.4 Archipelagic Waters

2.5.4.1 Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage

All ships and aircraft, including warships and military aircraft, enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage

while transiting through, under, or over archipelagic waters and adjacent territorial seas via all routes normally

used for international navigation and overflight. Archipelagic sea lanes passage is defined under international law

as the exercise of the freedom of navigation and overflight for the sole purpose of continuous, expeditious and

unobstructed transit through archipelagic waters, in the normal modes of operations, by the ships and aircraft

involved. This means that submarines may transit while submerged and that surface warships may carry out those

activities normally undertaken during passage through such waters, including activities necessary to their security,

such as formation steaming and the launching and recovery of aircraft as well as operating devices such as radar,

sonar, and depth-sounding devices. The right of archipelagic sea lanes passage is substantially identical to the

right of transit passage through international straits (see paragraph 2.5.3.1). When archipelagic sea lanes are

properly designated by the archipelagic nation, the following additional rules apply:

1. Each such designated sea lane is defined by a continuous axis line from the point of entry into the

territorial sea adjacent to the archipelagic waters, through those archipelagic waters, to the point of exit

from the territorial sea beyond.

2. Ships and aircraft engaged in archipelagic sea lanes passage through such designated sea lanes are required

to remain within 25 nautical miles either side of the axis line and must approach no closer to the coastline

than 10 percent of the distance between the points on islands bordering the sea lane and the axis line

(Figure 2-1).

The right of archipelagic sea lanes passage, through designated sea lanes as well as through all normal routes,

cannot be hampered or suspended by the archipelagic nation for any purpose. In situations where an archipelagic

state has only partially designated sea lanes, the navigational regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage applies to

those lanes. However, vessels and aircraft retain the right to use all normal routes for transits through areas of

archipelagic waters where there are no designated sea lanes.

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2.5.4.2 Innocent Passage

Outside of archipelagic sea lanes, all ships, including warships, enjoy the more limited right of innocent passage

throughout archipelagic waters just as they do in the territorial sea (see paragraph 2.5.2.1). Submarines must

remain on the surface and fly their national flag. Any threat or use of force directed against the sovereignty,

territorial integrity, or political independence of the archipelagic nation is prohibited. Launching and recovery of

aircraft are not allowed, nor may weapons exercises be conducted. The archipelagic nation may promulgate and

enforce reasonable restrictions on the right of innocent passage through its archipelagic waters for reasons of

navigational safety and for customs, fiscal, immigration, fishing, pollution, and sanitary purposes. Innocent

passage may be suspended temporarily by the archipelagic nation in specified areas of its archipelagic waters

when essential for the protection of its security, but it must first promulgate notice of its intentions to do so and

must apply the suspension in a nondiscriminating manner. There is no right of overflight through airspace over

archipelagic waters outside of archipelagic sea lanes.

2.6 NAVIGATION IN AND OVERFLIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS

2.6.1 Contiguous Zones

The contiguous zone is comprised of international waters in and over which the ships and aircraft, including

warships and military aircraft, of all nations enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight as

described in paragraph 2.6.3. Although the coastal nation may exercise in those waters the control necessary to

prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws that may occur within its

territory (including its territorial sea), it cannot otherwise interfere with international navigation and overflight in

and above the contiguous zone.

2.6.2 Exclusive Economic Zones

The coastal nation’s jurisdiction and control over the exclusive economic zone are limited to matters concerning

the exploration, exploitation, management, and conservation of the resources of those international waters. The

coastal nation may also exercise in the zone jurisdiction over the establishment and use of artificial islands,

installations, and structures having economic purposes; over marine scientific research (with reasonable

limitations); and over some aspects of marine environmental protection. Accordingly, the coastal nation cannot

unduly restrict or impede the exercise of the freedoms of navigation in and overflight of the exclusive economic

zone. Since all ships and aircraft, including warships and military aircraft, enjoy the high seas freedoms of

navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms (see paragraph

2.6.3), in and over those waters, the existence of an EEZ in an area of naval operations need not, of itself, be of

operational concern to the naval commander.

2.6.2.1 Marine Scientific Research

Coastal nations may regulate marine scientific research conducted in marine areas under their jurisdiction. This

includes the EEZ and the continental shelf. Marine scientific research includes activities undertaken in the ocean

and coastal waters to expand general scientific knowledge of the marine environment for peaceful purposes, and

includes: physical and chemical oceanography, marine biology, fisheries research, scientific ocean drilling and

coring, geological/geophysical scientific surveying, as well as other activities with a scientific purpose. The

results of marine scientific research are generally made publicly available. It is the policy of the United States to

encourage freedom of marine scientific research. Accordingly, the United States does not require that other

nations obtain its consent prior to conducting marine scientific research in the U.S. EEZ.

2.6.2.2 Hydrographic Surveys and Military Surveys

Although coastal nation consent must be obtained in order to conduct marine scientific research in its EEZ, the

coastal nation cannot regulate hydrographic surveys or military surveys conducted beyond its territorial sea, nor

can it require notification of such activities.

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A hydrographic survey is the obtaining of information in coastal or relatively shallow areas for the purpose of

making navigational charts and similar products to support safety of navigation. A hydrographic survey may

include measurements of the depth of water, configuration and nature of the natural bottom, direction and force of

currents, heights and times of tides and water stages, and hazards to navigation.

A military survey is the collecting of marine data for military purposes and, whether classified or not, is generally

not made publicly available. A military survey may include collection of oceanographic, hydrographic, marine

geological, geophysical, chemical, biological, acoustic, and related data.

OPNAVINST 3128.9 (series), Subj: Diplomatic Clearance for U.S. Navy Marine Data Collection Activities in

Foreign Jurisdictions, provides guidance for determining requirements and procedures for marine data collection

activities by Department of the Navy marine data collection assets. Marine data collection is a general term used

when referring to all types of survey or marine scientific activity, i.e., military surveys, hydrographic surveys, and

marine scientific research.

2.6.3 High Seas Freedoms and Warning Areas

All ships and aircraft, including warships and military aircraft, enjoy complete freedom of movement and

operation on and over the high seas. For warships, this includes task force maneuvering, flight operations, military

exercises, surveillance, intelligence gathering activities, and ordnance testing and firing. All nations also enjoy the

right to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high seas as well as on the continental shelf beyond

the territorial sea, with coastal nation approval for the course of pipelines on the continental shelf. All of these

activities must be conducted with due regard for the rights of other nations and the safe conduct and operation of

other ships and aircraft.

Any nation may declare a temporary warning area in international waters and airspace to advise other nations of

the conduct of activities that, although lawful, are hazardous to navigation and/or overflight. The United States

and other nations routinely declare such areas for missile testing, gunnery exercises, space vehicle recovery

operations, and other purposes entailing some danger to other lawful uses of the seas by others. Notice of the

establishment of such areas must be promulgated in advance, in the form of a special warning to mariners, notice

to mariners (NOTMAR), notice to airmen (NOTAM), Hydro Altantic/Hydro Pacific (HYDROLANT/HYDROPAC)

messages, and the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System.

Ships and aircraft of other nations are not required to remain outside a declared warning area, but are obliged to

refrain from interfering with activities therein. Consequently, ships and aircraft of one nation may operate in a

warning area within international waters and airspace declared by another nation, collect intelligence and observe

the activities involved, subject to the requirement of due regard for the rights of the declaring nation to use

international waters and airspace for such lawful purposes. The declaring nation may take reasonable measures

including the use of proportionate force to protect the activities against interference. (See paragraph 4.3.7 for a

discussion of the establishment of warning zones during periods of heightened tensions not rising to the level of

international armed conflict.)

2.6.4 Declared Security and Defense Zones

As a general rule, international law does not recognize the peacetime right of any nation to restrict the navigation

and overflight of foreign warships and military aircraft beyond its territorial sea. Although several coastal nations

have asserted claims that purport to prohibit warships and military aircraft from operating in so-called security

zones extending beyond the territorial sea, such claims have no basis in international law in time of peace, and are

not recognized by the United States.

The Charter of the United Nations and general principles of international law recognize that a nation may exercise

measures of individual and collective self-defense against an armed attack or imminent threat of armed attack.

Those measures may include the establishment of “defensive sea areas” or “maritime control areas” in which the

threatened nation seeks to enforce some degree of control over foreign entry into those areas. Historically, the

establishment of such areas extending beyond the territorial sea has been restricted to periods of war or to

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declared national emergency involving the outbreak of hostilities. International law does not determine the

geographic limits of such areas or the degree of control that a coastal nation may lawfully exercise over them,

beyond laying down the general requirement of reasonableness in relation to the needs of national security and

defense. (See paragraphs 7.8 and 7.9 for further discussions of the establishment and limitations of such zones in

the course of an international armed conflict.)

2.6.5 Polar Regions

2.6.5.1 Arctic/Antarctica Regions

The United States considers that the waters, ice pack, and airspace of the Arctic region beyond the lawfully claimed

territorial seas of littoral nations have international status and are open to navigation by the ships and aircraft of all

nations. Although several nations have, at times, attempted to claim sovereignty over the Arctic on the basis of

discovery, historic use, contiguity (proximity), or the so-called “sector” theory, those claims are not recognized in

international law. Accordingly, all ships and aircraft enjoy the freedoms of high seas navigation and overflight on,

over, and under the waters and ice pack of the Arctic region beyond the lawfully claimed territorial seas of littoral

states.

A number of nations have asserted conflicting and often overlapping claims to portions of Antarctica. These

claims are premised variously on discovery, contiguity, occupation and, in some cases, the “sector” theory. The

United States does not recognize the validity of the claims of other nations to any portion of the Antarctic area.

2.6.5.2 The Antarctic Treaty of 1959

The United States is a party to the multilateral treaty of 1959 governing Antarctica. Designed to encourage the

scientific exploration of the continent and to foster research and experiments in Antarctica without regard to

conflicting assertions of territorial sovereignty, the 1959 accord provides that no activity in the area undertaken

while the treaty is in force will constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying such claims.

The treaty also provides that Antarctica “shall be used for peaceful purposes only,” and that “any measures of a

military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military

maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons” shall be prohibited. All stations and installations, and

all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargo or personnel in Antarctica, are subject to

inspection by designated foreign observers. Therefore, classified activities are not conducted by the United States

in Antarctica, and all classified material is removed from U.S. ships and aircraft prior to visits to the continent. In

addition, the treaty prohibits nuclear explosions and disposal of nuclear waste anywhere south of 60^o South

Latitude. The treaty does not, however, affect in any way the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight in

the Antarctic region. The United States recognizes no territorial, territorial sea or territorial airspace claims in

Antarctica.

On 14 January 1998, the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, to which the United

States is a party, entered into force. The protocol designates Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and

science, and sets forth basic principles and detailed mandatory rules applicable to human activities in Antarctica,

including obligations to accord priority to scientific research.

2.6.6 Nuclear-Free Zones

The 1968 Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which the United States is a party, acknowledges the

right of groups of nations to conclude regional treaties establishing nuclear-free zones. Such treaties or their

provisions are binding only on parties to them or to protocols incorporating those provisions. To the extent that

the rights and freedoms of other nations, including the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, are not

infringed upon, such treaties are not inconsistent with international law. The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of

Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) is an example of a nuclear-free zone arrangement that is

fully consistent with international law, as evidenced by U.S. ratification of its two Protocols. This in no way

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affects the exercise by the United States of navigational rights and freedoms within waters covered by the Treaty

of Tlatelolco.

2.7 AIR NAVIGATION

2.7.1 National Airspace

Under international law, every nation has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its national airspace, that is,

the airspace above its territory, its internal waters, its territorial sea, and, in the case of an archipelagic nation, its

archipelagic waters. There is no right of innocent passage of aircraft through the airspace over the territorial sea

or archipelagic waters analogous to the right of innocent passage enjoyed by ships of all nations. Accordingly,

unless party to an international agreement to the contrary, all nations have complete discretion in regulating or

prohibiting flights within their national airspace (as opposed to a flight information region (FIR)—see paragraph

2.7.2.2), with the sole exceptions of overflight of international straits pursuant to transit passage and archipelagic

sea lanes pursuant to archipelagic sea lanes passage. Foreign aircraft wishing to enter national airspace must

identify themselves, seek or confirm permission to land or to transit, and must obey all reasonable orders to land,

turn back, or fly a prescribed course and/or altitude. Pursuant to the Convention on International Civil Aviation of

1944 (the Chicago Convention), civil aircraft in distress are entitled to special consideration and should be

allowed entry and emergency landing rights. Customary international law recognizes that foreign State aircraft in

distress, including military aircraft, are similarly entitled to enter national airspace and to make emergency

landings without prior coastal nation permission. The crew of such aircraft are entitled to depart expeditiously and

the aircraft must be returned. While on the ground under such circumstances, State aircraft continue to enjoy

sovereign immunity (see paragraph 2.4.2). (Concerning the right of assistance entry, see paragraph 2.5.2.6. For

jurisdiction over aerial intruders, see paragraph 4.3.2.)

2.7.1.1 International Straits Between One Part of the High Seas/EEZ and Another Part of the

High Seas/EEZ

All aircraft, including military aircraft, enjoy the right of unimpeded transit passage through the airspace above

international straits overlapped by territorial seas. Such transits must be continuous and expeditious, and the

aircraft involved must refrain from the threat or the use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or

political independence of the nation or nations bordering the strait. The exercise of the right of overflight by

aircraft engaged in the transit passage of international straits cannot be impeded or suspended in peacetime for

any purpose.

In international straits not completely overlapped by territorial seas, all aircraft, including military aircraft, enjoy

high seas freedoms while operating in the high seas corridor beyond the territorial sea. (See paragraph 2.7.2 for a

discussion of permitted activities in international airspace.) If the high seas corridor is not of similar convenience

(e.g., to stay within the high seas corridor would be inconsistent with sound navigational practices), such aircraft

enjoy the right of unimpeded transit passage through the airspace of the strait.

2.7.1.2 Archipelagic Sea Lanes

All aircraft, including military aircraft, enjoy the right of unimpeded passage through the airspace above

archipelagic sea lanes. The right of overflight of such sea lanes is essentially identical to that of transit passage

through the airspace above international straits overlapped by territorial seas.

2.7.2 International Airspace

International airspace is the airspace over the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, the high seas, and

territories not subject to national sovereignty (e.g., Antarctica). All international airspace is open to the aircraft of

all nations. Accordingly, aircraft, including military aircraft, are free to operate in international airspace without

interference from coastal nation authorities. Military aircraft may engage in flight operations, including ordnance

testing and firing, surveillance and intelligence gathering, and support of other naval activities. All such activities

must be conducted with due regard for the rights of other nations and the safety of other aircraft and of vessels.

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(Note, however, that the Antarctic Treaty prohibits military maneuvers and weapons testing in Antarctic airspace.)

These same principles apply with respect to the overflight of high seas or EEZ corridors through that part of

international straits not overlapped by territorial seas.

2.7.2.1 Convention on International Civil Aviation

The United States is a party to the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (as are most nations). That

multilateral treaty, commonly referred to as the “Chicago Convention,” applies to civil aircraft. It does not apply

to military aircraft or U.S. government charter aircraft designated as “State aircraft” (see paragraph 2.4.2), other

than to require that they operate with “due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.” The Chicago

Convention established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop international air

navigation principles and techniques and to “promote safety of flight in international air navigation.”

Various operational situations do not lend themselves to ICAO flight procedures. These include military

contingencies, classified missions, politically sensitive missions, or routine aircraft carrier operations. Operations

not conducted under ICAO flight procedures are conducted under the “due regard” standard. (For additional

information see DOD Directive 4540.1, Use of Airspace by US Military Aircraft and Firings Over the High Seas,

and OPNAVINST 3770.4, Use of Airspace by US Military Aircraft and Firing Over the High Seas, and

Commandant, United States Coast Guard Instruction COMDTINST M3710.1, Coast Guard Air Operations

Manual.)

2.7.2.2 Flight Information Regions

A Flight Information Region (FIR) is a defined area of airspace within which flight information and alerting

services are provided. FIRs are established by ICAO for the safety of civil aviation and encompass both national

and international airspace. Ordinarily, but only as a matter of policy, U.S. military aircraft on routine point-to-

point flights through international airspace follow ICAO flight procedures and utilize FIR services. As mentioned

above, exceptions to this policy include military contingency operations, classified or politically sensitive

missions, and routine aircraft carrier operations or other training activities. When U.S. military aircraft do not

follow ICAO flight procedures, they must navigate with “due regard” for civil aviation safety.

Some nations, however, purport to require all military aircraft in international airspace within their FIRs to

comply with FIR procedures, whether or not they utilize FIR services or intend to enter national airspace. The

United States does not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its FIR procedures to foreign military

aircraft in such circumstances. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace should

not identify themselves or otherwise comply with FIR procedures established by other nations, unless the United

States has specifically agreed to do so.

2.7.2.3 Air Defense Identification Zones in International Airspace

International law does not prohibit nations from establishing air defense identification zones (ADIZ) in the

international airspace adjacent to their territorial airspace. The legal basis for ADIZ regulations is the right of a

nation to establish reasonable conditions of entry into its territory. Accordingly, an aircraft approaching national

airspace can be required to identify itself while in international airspace as a condition of entry approval. ADIZ

regulations promulgated by the United States apply to aircraft bound for U.S. territorial airspace and require the

filing of flight plans and periodic position reports. The United States does not recognize the right of a coastal

nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the United

States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. airspace. Accordingly, U.S.

military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace should not identify themselves or otherwise comply with

ADIZ procedures established by other nations, unless the United States has specifically agreed to do so.

It should be emphasized that the foregoing contemplates a peacetime or nonhostile environment. In the case of

imminent or actual hostilities, a nation may find it necessary to take measures in self-defense that will affect

overflight in international airspace.

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2.7.3 Open Skies Treaty

Initially proposed by President Eisenhower in 1955 to foster mutual and cooperative aerial observation among

NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, the 1992 Open Skies Treaty entered into force on 1 January 2002. The Treaty

obligates each of its member nations to accept overflight of its entire national territory by other member nations

using unarmed aircraft equipped with mutually agreed sensors. Overflight quotas are scaled to the physical size of

the participating nations with the United States and Russia/Belarus (a multiple nation entity permitted for this

purpose) each being obliged to accept up to 42 such flights annually.

Although the European security environment has changed dramatically since the Treaty was negotiated in 1992, it

remains a useful element in the European security framework providing a further means for transparency, mutual

understanding, and cooperation among its members. Member nations are Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,

Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United

Kingdom, and the United States.

Department of the Navy guidance on the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty is reflected in Secretary of the

Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5710.26, Compliance and Implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies.

Department of the Navy policy is to comply with all provisions of the Open Skies Treaty while also complying

with Navy and Marine Corps safety and security directives. When conducting an overflight, Open Skies aircraft

have priority in air traffic control systems over all other air traffic except declared emergencies or actual

emergency aircraft. Open Skies aircraft are allowed to overfly the entire national territory of a signatory state,

regardless of airspace restrictions except for safety of flight issues. Open Skies aircraft are permitted access to the

airspace above all Department of the Navy and other military facilities, bases, and programs, as well as to any

other airspace in U.S. territory.

2.8 EXERCISE AND ASSERTION OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

As announced in the president’s United States Oceans Policy statement of 10 March 1983:

The United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a

worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the [1982 LOS]

convention. The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to

restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other

related high seas uses.

When maritime nations appear to acquiesce in excessive maritime claims and fail to exercise their rights actively

in the face of constraints on international navigation and overflight, those claims and constraints may, in time, be

considered to have been accepted by the international community as reflecting the practice of nations and as

binding upon all users of the seas and superjacent airspace. Consequently, it is incumbent upon maritime nations

to protest diplomatically all excessive claims of coastal nations and to exercise their navigation and overflight

rights in the face of such claims. The president’s Oceans Policy Statement makes clear that the United States has

accepted this responsibility as a fundamental element of its national policy.

Since the early 1970s, the United States, through DOD Instruction C2005.1 Freedom of Navigation (FON)

Program (U), has reaffirmed its long-standing policy of exercising and asserting its freedom of navigation and

overflight rights on a worldwide basis. Under the FON Program, challenges of excessive maritime claims of other

nations are undertaken both through diplomatic protests by the Department of State and by operational assertions

by US Armed Forces. U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program assertions are designed to be politically neutral as

well as nonprovocative and have encouraged nations to amend their claims and bring their practices into

conformity with the Convention. Commanders and commanding officers should refer to combatant commander

theater-specific guidance and appropriate operational orders (OPORDs) for specific guidance on the planning and

execution of FON operations in a particular area of operations.

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2.9 RULES FOR NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY FOR VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT

2.9.1 International Rules

Most rules for navigational safety governing surface and subsurface vessels, including warships, are contained in

the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, known informally as the or 72 COLREGS

informally as the “International Rules of the Road.” These rules apply to all international waters (i.e., the high

seas, exclusive economic zones, and contiguous zones) and, except where a coastal nation has established

different rules, in that nation’s territorial sea, archipelagic waters, and inland waters as well. The 1972 COLREGS

have been adopted as law by the United States. (See Title 33, US Code (USC), Sections 1601 to 1606 (33 USC

1601 and 1606).) US Navy Regulations, 1990 Article 1139, directs that all persons in the naval service

responsible for the operation of naval ships and craft “shall diligently observe” the 72 COLREGS. In accordance

with COMDTINST M5000.3, Coast Guard Regulations, Coast Guard personnel must comply with all Federal law

and regulatations.

2.9.2 National US Inland Rules

Many nations have adopted special rules for waters subject to their territorial sovereignty (i.e., internal waters,

archipelagic waters, and territorial seas). Violation of these rules by U.S. government vessels, including warships,

may subject the United States to lawsuit for collision or other damage, provide the basis for diplomatic protest,

result in limitation on U.S. access to foreign ports, or prompt other foreign action.

The United States has adopted special inland rules applicable to navigation in US waters landward of the

demarcation lines established by US law for that purpose. (See COMDTINST M16672.2D, Navigation Rules,

International — Inland; Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, part 80; and 33, USC 2001 to 2073.) The 72

COLREGS apply seaward of the demarcation lines in US national waters, in the US contiguous zone and EEZ,

and on the high seas.

2.9.3 Navigational Rules for Aircraft

Rules for air navigation in international airspace applicable to civil aircraft may be found in Annex 2 (Rules of the

Air) to the Chicago Convention, DOD Flight Information Publication (FLIP) General Planning, and

OPNAVINST 3710.7 (series) Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standaridzations (NATOPS) General

Flight and Operating Instructions. The same standardized technical principles and policies of ICAO that apply in

international and most foreign airspace are also in effect in the continental United States. Consequently, US pilots

can fly all major international routes following the same general rules of the air, using the same navigation

equipment and communication practices and procedures, and being governed by the same air traffic control

services with which they are familiar in the United States. Although ICAO has not yet established an

“International Language for Aviation,” English is customarily used internationally for air traffic control.

2.10 MILITARY AGREEMENTS AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO PROMOTE AIR AND

MARITIME SAFETY

2.10.1 United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republic Agreement on the Prevention of

Incidents On and Over the High Seas

In order better to assure the safety of navigation and flight of their respective warships and military aircraft during

encounters at sea, the United States and the former Union of the Soviet Republics (USSR) in 1972 entered into

the US-USSR agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas. This Navy-to-Navy

agreement, popularly referred to as the “Incidents at Sea” or “INCSEA” agreement, has been highly successful in

minimizing the potential for harassing actions and navigational one-upmanship between United States and former

Soviet Union units operating in close proximity at sea. Although the agreement applies to warships and military

aircraft operating on and over the “high seas,” it is understood to embrace such units operating in all international

waters and international airspace, including that of the exclusive economic zone and the contiguous zone.

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Principal provisions of the INCSEA agreement include:

1. Ships will observe strictly both the letter and the spirit of the 72 COLREGS.

2. Ships will remain well clear of one another to avoid risk of collision and, when engaged in surveillance

activities, will exercise good seamanship so as not to embarrass or endanger ships under surveillance.

3. Ships will utilize special signals for signaling their operation and intentions.

4. Ships of one party will not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, or other

weapons at the ships and aircraft of the other party, and will not launch any object in the direction of

passing ships nor illuminate their navigation bridges.

5. Ships conducting exercises with submerged submarines will show the appropriate signals to warn of

submarines in the area.

6. Ships, when approaching ships of the other party, particularly those engaged in replenishment or flight

operations, will take appropriate measures not to hinder maneuvers of such ships and will remain well clear.

7. Aircraft will use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other party, in

particular ships engaged in launching and landing aircraft, and will not simulate attacks by the simulated

use of weapons or perform aerobatics over ships of the other party nor drop objects near them.

The INCSEA agreement was amended in a 1973 protocol to extend certain of its provisions to include nonmilitary

ships. Specifically, the 1973 protocol provided that U.S. and Soviet military ships and aircraft shall not make

simulated attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons at nonmilitary ships of the

other party nor launch or drop any objects near nonmilitary ships of the other party in such a manner as to be

hazardous to these ships or to constitute a hazard to navigation.

The agreement also provides for an annual review meeting between Navy representatives of the two parties to

review its implementation. The INCSEA agreement continues to apply to U.S. and Russian ships and military

aircraft and is also in force between the United States and Ukraine.

OPNAVINST 5711.96 (series), US/USSR Incidents At Sea and Dangerous Military Activities Agreements,

provides information on and issues procedures concerning the INCSEA Agreement including the Table of

Supplementary Signals authorized for use during communications between US and Russian Federation units

under the INCSEA agreement.

2.10.2 United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republic Agreement on the Prevention of

Dangerous Military Activities

To avoid dangerous situations arising between their respective military forces when operating in proximity to

each other during peacetime, the United States and the former Soviet Union in 1990 entered into the U.S.-

U.S.S.R. Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. The agreement, commonly referred to as

the “DMA agreement,” addresses four specific activities:

1. Unintentional or distress (force majeure) entry into the national territory of the other party;

2. Use of lasers in a manner hazardous to the other party;

3. Hampering operations in a manner hazardous to the other party in a “special caution area”; and

4. Interference with command and control networks in a manner hazardous to the other party.

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The DMA agreement continues to apply to US and Russian Federation armed forces. OPNAVINST 5711.96B

provides implementing guidance for the DMA agreement to Navy department units.

2.10.3 U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement

Established on 19 January 1998 by an agreement between the US Secretary of Defense and the Minister of

National Defence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement

(MMCA) provides a forum for conducting military exchanges between the United States and PRC to strengthen

maritime and air safety. The MMCA does not establish legally binding procedures between the countries but,

rather, provides a mechanism to facilitate consultations between their respective maritime and air forces. The

MMCA forum addresses such measures to promote safe maritime practices as:

1. Search and rescue activities

2. Communications procedures when ships encounter each other

3. Interpretations of the International Rules of the Road

4. Avoidance of accidents at sea.

2.11 MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE

2.11.1 Outer Space Defined

As noted in paragraph 1.9, each nation has complete and exclusive control over the use of its national airspace.

Except when exercising transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage, overflight in national airspace by

foreign aircraft is not authorized without the consent of the territorial sovereign. However, man-made satellites

and other objects in earth orbit may overfly foreign territory freely. Although there is no legally defined boundary

between the upper limit of national airspace and the lower limit of outer space, international law recognizes

freedom of transit by man-made space objects at earth orbiting altitude and beyond. A generally acceptable

definition is that outer space begins at the undefined upper limit of the earth’s airspace and extends to infinity.

2.11.2 The Law of Outer Space

International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to the outer space activities of nations.

Outer space is open to exploration and use by all nations. However, it is not subject to national appropriation, and

must be used for peaceful purposes. The term “peaceful purposes” does not preclude military activity. While acts

of aggression in violation of the Charter of the United Nations are precluded, space-based systems may lawfully

be employed to perform essential command, control, communications, intelligence, navigation, environmental,

surveillance, and warning functions to assist military activities on land, in the air, and on and under the sea. Users

of outer space must have due regard for the rights and interests of other users.

2.11.2.1 General Principles of the Law of Outer Space

International law governing space activities addresses both the nature of the activity and the location in space

where the specific rules apply. In general terms, outer space consists of both the earth’s moon and other natural

celestial bodies, and the expanse between these natural objects.

The rules of international law applicable to outer space include the following:

1. Access to outer space is free and open to all nations.

2. Outer space is free from claims of sovereignty and not otherwise subject to national appropriation.

3. Outer space is to be used for peaceful purposes.

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4. Each user of outer space must show due regard for the rights of others.

5. No nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction may be stationed in outer space.

6. Nuclear explosions in outer space are prohibited.

7. Exploration of outer space must avoid contamination of the environment of outer space and of the earth’s

biosphere.

8. Astronauts must render all possible assistance to other astronauts in distress.

2.11.2.2 Natural Celestial Bodies

Natural celestial bodies include the earth’s moon, but not the earth. Under international law, military bases,

installations, and forts may not be erected nor may weapons tests or maneuvers be undertaken on natural celestial

bodies. Moreover, all equipment, stations, and vehicles located there are open to inspection on a reciprocal basis.

There is no corresponding right of physical inspection of man-made objects located in the expanse between

celestial bodies. Military personnel may be employed on natural celestial bodies for scientific research and for

other activities undertaken for peaceful purposes.

2.11.3 International Agreements

1. Outer Space Activities. The key legal principles governing outer space activities are contained in four

widely ratified multilateral agreements: the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; the 1968 Rescue and Return of

Astronauts Agreement; the Liability Convention of 1972; and the Space Objects Registration Convention

of 1975. A fifth, the 1979 Moon Treaty, has not been widely ratified. The United States is a party to all of

these agreements except the Moon Treaty.

2. Related. Several other international agreements restrict specific types of activity in outer space. The U.S.-

U.S.S.R. Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, which is no longer in force, prohibited the

development, testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components. Also prohibited was

any interference with the surveillance satellites both nations used to monitor ABM Treaty compliance. The

ABM Treaty was continued in force between the United States and Russia, the United States and Belarus,

the United States and Kazakhstan, and the United States and Ukraine. However, on 13 December 2001, the

United States provided notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty effective 13 June 2002.

a. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (a multilateral treaty) includes an agreement not to test nuclear

weapons or to carry out any other nuclear explosions in outer space.

b. The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention (also a multilateral treaty) prohibits military or other

hostile use of environmental modification techniques in several environments, including outer space.

c. The 1992 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union and the

associated Radio Regulations govern the use of the radio frequency spectrum by satellites and the

location of satellites in the geostationary-satellite orbit.

2.11.4 Rescue and Return of Astronauts

Both the Outer Space Treaty and the Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement establish specific requirements

for coming to the aid of astronauts. The treaties do not distinguish between civilian and military astronauts.

Astronauts of one nation engaged in outer space activities are to render all possible assistance to astronauts of

other nations in the event of accident or distress. If a nation learns that spacecraft personnel are in distress or have

made an emergency or unintended landing in its territory, the high seas, or other international area (e.g.,

Antarctica), it must notify the launching nation and the secretary-general of the United Nations, take immediate

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steps to rescue the personnel if within its territory, and, if in a position to do so, extend search and rescue

assistance if a high seas or other international area landing is involved. Rescued personnel are to be safely and

promptly returned.

Nations also have an obligation to inform the other parties to the Outer Space Treaty or the Secretary-General of

the United Nations if they discover outer space phenomena that constitute a danger to astronauts.

2.11.5 Return of Outer Space Objects

A party to the Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement must also notify the secretary-general of the United

Nations if it learns of an outer space object’s return to earth in its territory, on the high seas, or in another

international area. If the object is located in sovereign territory and the launching authority requests the territorial

sovereign’s assistance, the latter must take steps to recover and return the object if practicable. Similarly, such

objects found in international areas shall be held for or returned to the launching authority on request. Expenses

incurred in assisting the launching authority in either case are to be borne by the launching authority. Should a

nation discover that such an object is of a “hazardous or deleterious” nature, it is entitled to immediate action by

the launching authority to eliminate the danger of harm from its territory.

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CHAPTER 3

Protection of Persons and Property at Sea

and Maritime Law Enforcement

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The protection of both U.S. and foreign persons and property at sea by U.S. naval forces in peacetime involves

international law, domestic U.S. law and policy, and political considerations. Vessels and aircraft on and over the

sea, and the persons and cargo embarked in them, are subject to the hazards posed by the ocean itself, by storm,

by mechanical failure, and by the actions of others such as pirates, terrorists, and insurgents. In addition, foreign

authorities and prevailing political situations may affect a vessel or aircraft and those on board by involving them

in refugee rescue efforts, political asylum requests, law enforcement actions, or applications of unjustified use of

force against them.

Given the complexity of the legal, political, and diplomatic considerations that may arise in connection with the

use of naval forces to protect civilian persons and property at sea, operational plans, operational orders, and, most

importantly, the standing rules of engagement (SROE) promulgated by the operational chain of command

ordinarily require the on-scene commander to report immediately such circumstances to a higher authority and,

whenever it is practicable under the circumstances to do so, to seek guidance prior to the use of armed force.

A nation may enforce its domestic laws at sea provided there is a valid jurisdictional basis under international law

to do so. Because U.S. naval commanders may be called upon to assist in maritime law enforcement actions, or to

otherwise protect persons and property at sea, a basic understanding of maritime law enforcement procedures is

essential.

3.2 RESCUE, SAFE HARBOR, AND QUARANTINE

Mishap at sea is a common occurrence. The obligation of mariners to provide material aid in cases of distress

encountered at sea has long been recognized in custom and tradition. A right to enter and remain in a safe harbor

without prejudice, at least in peacetime, when required by the perils of the sea or force majeure is universally

recognized. At the same time, a coastal nation may lawfully promulgate quarantine regulations and restrictions for

the port or area in which a vessel is located.

3.2.1 Assistance to Persons, Ships, and Aircraft in Distress

Customary international law has long recognized the affirmative obligation of mariners to go to the assistance of

those in danger of being lost at sea. Both the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 LOS

Convention codify this custom by providing that every nation shall require the master of a ship flying its flag,

insofar as he can do so without serious danger to his ship, crew, or passengers, to render assistance to any person

found at sea in danger of being lost and to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress if

informed of their need of assistance, insofar as it can reasonably be expected of him. He is also to be required,

after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew, and its passengers and, where possible, to inform

the other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of registry, and the nearest port at which it will call. (See

paragraph 2.5.2.6 for a discussion of “Assistance Entry.”)

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3.2.1.1 Duty of Masters

In addition, the United States is party to the 1974 London Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, which requires the

master of every merchant ship and private vessel not only to speed to the assistance of persons in distress, but to

broadcast warning messages with respect to dangerous conditions or hazards encountered at sea.

3.2.1.2 Duty of Naval Commanders

US Navy Regulations, 1990, Article 0925, requires that, insofar as he can do so without serious danger to his ship

or crew, the commanding officer or senior officer present, as appropriate, shall proceed with all possible speed to

the rescue of persons in distress if informed of their need for assistance (insofar as this can reasonably be expected

of him); render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; and, after a collision, render

assistance to the other ship, her crew and passengers, and, where possible, inform the other ship of his identity.

Article 4-2-5, COMDTINST M5000.3, US Coast Guard Regulations, Article 4-2-5, (series) imposes a similar

duty for the Coast Guard.

3.2.2 Safe Harbor/Innocent Passage

Under international law, no port may be closed to a foreign ship seeking shelter from storm or bad weather or

otherwise compelled to enter it in distress, unless another equally safe port is open to the distressed vessel to

which it may proceed without additional jeopardy or hazard. The only condition is that the distress must be real

and not contrived and based on a well-founded apprehension of loss of or serious damage or injury to the vessel,

cargo, or crew. In general, the distressed vessel may enter a port without being subject to local regulations

concerning any incapacity, penalty, prohibition, duties, or taxes in force at that port.

Innocent passage through territorial seas and archipelagic waters includes stopping and anchoring when incidental

to ordinary navigation, necessitated by force majeure or by distress. Stopping and anchoring in such waters for the

purpose of rendering assistance to others in similar danger or distress is also permitted by international law.

3.2.3 Quarantine

Article 0859, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, requires that the commanding officer or aircraft commander of a ship

or aircraft comply with quarantine regulations and restrictions. While commanding officers and aircraft

commanders shall not permit inspection of their vessel or aircraft, they shall afford every other assistance to

health officials, U.S. or foreign, and shall give all information required, insofar as permitted by the requirements

of military necessity and security. To avoid restrictions imposed by quarantine regulations, the commanding

officer should request free pratique in accordance with the sailing directions for that port.

3.3 ASYLUM AND TEMPORARY REFUGE

3.3.1 Asylum

International law recognizes the right of a nation to grant asylum to foreign nationals already present within or

seeking admission to its territory. The United States defines “asylum” as:

Protection and sanctuary granted by the United States Government within its territorial jurisdiction or

in international waters to a foreign national who applies for such protection because of persecution or

fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion.

Whether to grant asylum is a decision reserved to higher authority.

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3.3.1.1 Territories under the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the United States and International

Waters

Any person requesting asylum in international waters or in territories and internal waters under the exclusive

jurisdiction of the United States (including the U.S. territorial sea, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, territories under U.S. administration, and U.S. possessions), will be

received on board any U.S. Navy or Marine Corps aircraft, vessel, activity or station. Persons seeking asylum are to be

afforded every reasonable care and protection permitted by the circumstances. Under no circumstances will a person

seeking asylum in U.S. territory or in international waters be surrendered by the Navy or Marine Corps to foreign

jurisdiction or control, unless at the personal direction of the Secretary of the Navy or higher authority. With respect to

the Coast Guard, individuals seeking asylum will not be received on board Coast Guard units except in extreme

circumstances and in no case will they be received on board a Coast Guard aircraft. However, once such individuals are

received on board a Coast Guard unit, they will not be surrendered to foreign jurisdiction without Commandant

approval unless the commanding officer/officer-in-charge determines the risk to the unit or Coast Guard personnel has

become unacceptable or the individual voluntarily departs the unit. (See US Navy Regulations 1990, Article 0939;

SECNAVINST 5710.22A, Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge, and COMDTINST M16247.1, Coast Guard

Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, (MLEM), Appendix L, for specific guidance.)

3.3.1.2 Territories under Foreign Jurisdiction

Commanders of U.S. warships, military aircraft, and military installations in territories under foreign jurisdiction

(including foreign territorial seas, archipelagic waters, internal waters, ports, territories, and possessions) are not

authorized to receive on board foreign nationals seeking asylum. Such persons should be referred to the American

Embassy or nearest U.S. consulate in the country, foreign territory, or foreign possession involved, if any, for

assistance in coordinating a request for asylum with the host government insofar as practicable. Because warships

are extensions of the sovereignty of the flag nation and because of their immunity from the territorial sovereignty

of the foreign nation in whose waters they may be located, they have often been looked to as places of asylum.

The United States, however, considers that asylum is generally the prerogative of the government of the territory

in which the warship is located.

However, if exceptional circumstances exist involving imminent danger to the life or safety of the person,

temporary refuge may be granted. (See paragraph 3.3.2.)

3.3.1.3 Expulsion or Surrender

Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees provides that a refugee may not be expelled

or returned in any manner whatsoever to the frontier or territories of a nation where his life or freedom would be

threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social

group, unless he may reasonably be regarded as a danger to the security of the country of asylum or has been

convicted of a serious crime and is a danger to the community of that country. This obligation applies only to

persons who have entered territories under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. It does not apply to

temporary refuge granted abroad.

3.3.2 Temporary Refuge/Termination or Surrender

International law and practice have long recognized the humanitarian practice of providing temporary refuge to

anyone, regardless of nationality, who may be in imminent physical danger for the duration of that danger. (See

Article 0939, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, SECNAVINST 5710.22 (series), and the Coast Guard’s MLEM.)

SECNAVINST 5710.22 defines “temporary refuge” as:

Protection afforded for humanitarian reasons to a foreign national in a DOD shore installation, facility,

or military vessel within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign nation or [in international waters], under

conditions of urgency in order to secure the life or safety of that person against imminent danger, such

as pursuit by a mob.

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It is the policy of the United States to grant temporary refuge in a foreign country to nationals of that country, or

nationals of a third nation, solely for humanitarian reasons when extreme or exceptional circumstances put in

imminent danger the life or safety of a person, such as pursuit by a mob. The officer in command of the ship,

aircraft (but not Coast Guard aircraft), station, or activity must decide which measures can prudently be taken to

provide temporary refuge. Temporary refuge shall not be granted on board a Coast Guard aircraft. When deciding

which measures may be prudently taken to provide temporary refuge, the safety of U.S. personnel and security of

the unit must be taken into consideration.

Although temporary refuge should be terminated when the period of active danger is ended, the decision to

terminate protection will not be made by the commander. Once a Navy or Marine Corps unit has granted

temporary refuge, protection may be terminated only when directed by the Secretary of the Navy or higher

authority. In the case of the Coast Guard, temporary refuge will not be terminated without commandant approval

unless the commanding officer/officer-in-charge determines the risk to the unit or Coast Guard personnel has

become unacceptable or the claimant voluntarily departs the unit. (See Article 0939, US Navy Regulations, 1990;

SECNAVINST 5710.22, A political Asylum and Temporary Refuge, and COMDTINST M16247.1, Coast Guard

Maritime Law Enforcement Manual (MLEM), Appendix L, for specific guidance.)

A request by foreign authorities for return of custody of a person under the protection of temporary refuge will be

reported in accordance with SECNAVINST 5710.22 (series). The requesting foreign authorities will then be

advised that the matter has been referred to higher authorities.

3.3.3 Inviting Requests for Asylum or Refuge

U.S. armed forces personnel shall neither directly nor indirectly invite persons to seek asylum or temporary

refuge.

3.3.4 Protection of U.S. Citizens

The limitations on asylum and temporary refuge are not applicable to U.S. citizens. See paragraph 3.10 and the

standing rules of engagement for applicable guidance.

3.4 RIGHT OF APPROACH AND VISIT

As a general principle, vessels in international waters are immune from the jurisdiction of any nation other than

the flag nation. However, under international law, a warship, military aircraft, or other duly authorized ship or

aircraft may approach any vessel in international waters to verify its nationality. Unless the vessel encountered is

itself a warship or government vessel of another nation, it may be stopped, boarded, and the ship’s documents

examined, provided there is reasonable ground for suspecting that it is:

1. Engaged in piracy (see paragraph 3.5);

2. Engaged in the slave trade (see paragraph 3.6);

3. Engaged in unauthorized broadcasting (see paragraph 3.7);

4. Without nationality (see paragraphs 3.11.2.3 and 3.11.2.4); or

5. Though flying a foreign flag, or refusing to show its flag, the vessel is, in reality, of the same nationality as

the warship.

The procedure for ships exercising the right of approach and visit is similar to that used in exercising the

belligerent right of visit and search during armed conflict described in paragraph 7.6.1. See OPNAVINST

3120.32C, Standard Organization and Regulations of the US Navy and COMDTINST M16247.1, Coast Guard

Maritime Law Enforcement Manuel (MLEM) for further guidance.

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3.5 REPRESSION OF PIRACY

International law has long recognized a general duty of all nations to cooperate in the repression of piracy. This

traditional obligation is included in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 LOS Convention,

both of which provide:

[A]ll States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other

place outside the jurisdiction of any State.

3.5.1 U.S. Law

The U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 8) provides that:

The Congress shall have Power… to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high

seas, and offences against the Law of Nations.

Congress has exercised this power by enacting 18 USC 1651, which provides that:

Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is

afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.

U.S. law authorizes the president to employ “public armed vessels” in protecting U.S. merchant ships from piracy

and to instruct the commanders of such vessels to seize any pirate ship that has attempted or committed an act of

piracy against any U.S. or foreign flag vessel in international waters.

3.5.2 Piracy Defined

Piracy is an international crime consisting of illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for

private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft in or over international waters against another

ship or aircraft or persons and property on board. (Depredation is the act of plundering, robbing, or pillaging.)

3.5.2.1 Location

In international law piracy is a crime that can be committed only on or over international waters (including the

high seas, exclusive economic zone, and the contiguous zone), in international airspace, and in other places

beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any nation. The same acts committed in the internal waters, territorial sea,

archipelagic waters, or national airspace of a nation do not constitute piracy in international law but are, instead,

crimes within the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the littoral nation.

3.5.2.2 Private Ship or Aircraft

Acts of piracy can only be committed by private ships or private aircraft. A warship or other public vessel or a

military or other state aircraft cannot be treated as a pirate unless it is taken over and operated by pirates or unless

the crew mutinies and employs it for piratical purposes. By committing an act of piracy, the pirate ship or aircraft,

and the pirates themselves, lose the protection of the nation whose flag they are otherwise entitled to fly.

3.5.2.3 Mutiny or Passenger Hijacking

If the crew or passengers of a ship or aircraft, including the crew of a warship or military aircraft, mutiny or revolt

and convert the ship, aircraft or cargo to their own use, the act is not piracy. If, however, the ship or aircraft is

thereafter used to commit acts of piracy, it becomes a pirate ship or pirate aircraft and those on board voluntarily

participating in such acts become pirates.

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3.5.3 Use of Naval Forces to Repress Piracy

Only warships, military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on

governmental service and authorized to that effect, may seize a pirate ship or aircraft.

3.5.3.1 Seizure of Pirate Vessels and Aircraft

A pirate vessel or aircraft encountered in or over U.S. or international waters may be seized and detained by any

of the U.S. vessels or aircraft listed in paragraph 3.5.3. The pirate vessel or aircraft, and all persons on board,

should be taken, sent, or directed to the nearest U.S. port or airfield and delivered to U.S. law enforcement

authorities for disposition according to U.S. law. Alternatively, higher authority may arrange with another nation

to accept and try the pirates and dispose of the pirate vessel or aircraft, since every nation has jurisdiction under

international law over any act of piracy.

3.5.3.2 Pursuit of Pirates into Foreign Territorial Seas, Archipelagic Waters, or Airspace

If a pirate vessel or aircraft fleeing from pursuit by a warship or military aircraft proceeds from international

waters or airspace into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or superjacent airspace of another country, every

effort should be made to obtain the consent of the nation having sovereignty over the territorial sea, archipelagic

waters, or superjacent airspace to continue pursuit (see paragraphs 3.11.2.2. and 3.11.3.3). The inviolability of the

territorial integrity of sovereign nations makes the decision of a warship or military aircraft to continue pursuit

into these areas without such consent a serious matter. However, the international nature of the crime of piracy

may allow continuation of pursuit if contact cannot be established in a timely manner with the coastal nation to

obtain its consent. In such a case, pursuit must be broken off immediately upon request of the coastal nation, and,

in any event, the right to seize the pirate vessel or aircraft and to try the pirates devolves on the nation to which

the territorial seas, archipelagic waters, or airspace belong.

Pursuit of a pirate vessel or aircraft through or over international straits overlapped by territorial seas or through

archipelagic sea lanes or air routes, may proceed with or without the consent of the coastal nation or nations,

provided the pursuit is expeditious and direct and the transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage rights of

others are not unreasonably constrained in the process.

3.6 PROHIBITION OF THE TRANSPORT OF SLAVES

International law strictly prohibits use of the seas for the purpose of transporting slaves. The 1982 LOS

Convention requires every nation to prevent and punish the transport of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag. If

confronted with this situation, commanders should maintain contact, consult the standing rules of engagement and

Coast Guard use of force policy, and request guidance from higher authority.

3.7 SUPPRESSION OF UNAUTHORIZED BROADCASTING

The 1982 LOS Convention provides that all nations shall cooperate in the suppression of unauthorized

broadcasting from international waters. Unauthorized broadcasting involves the transmission of radio or television

signals from a ship or off-shore facility intended for receipt by the general public, contrary to international

regulation. Commanders should request guidance from higher authority if confronted with this situation.

3.8 SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFIC

All nations are required to cooperate in the suppression of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic

substances in international waters. International law permits any nation that has reasonable grounds to suspect that

a ship flying its flag is engaged in such traffic to request the cooperation of other nations in effecting its seizure.

International law also permits a nation that has reasonable grounds for believing that a vessel exercising freedom

of navigation in accordance with international law and flying the flag or displaying the marks of registry of

another nation is engaged in illegal drug trafficking to request confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, request

authorization from the flag nation to take appropriate action with regard to that vessel. Coast Guard personnel,

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embarked on Coast Guard cutters or U.S. Navy ships, regularly board, search and take law enforcement action

aboard foreign-flagged vessels pursuant to such special arrangements or standing, bilateral agreements with the

flag state. (See paragraph 3.11.3.2 regarding utilization of U.S. Navy assets in the support of U.S. counterdrug

efforts.)

3.9 RECOVERY OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY LOST AT SEA

The property of a sovereign nation lost at sea remains vested in that sovereign until title is formally relinquished

or abandoned. Aircraft wreckage, sunken vessels, practice torpedoes, test missiles, and target drones are among

the types of U.S. government property which may be the subject of recovery operations. Should such U.S.

property be recovered at sea by foreign entities, it is U.S. policy to demand its immediate return. Specific

guidance for the on-scene commander in such circumstances is contained in the standing rules of engagement and

applicable operation order. See also paragraph 2.1.2.2 for a similar discussion regarding the status of sunken

warships and military aircraft.

3.10 PROTECTION OF PRIVATE AND MERCHANT VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT, PRIVATE

PROPERTY, AND PERSONS

In addition to the obligation and authority of warships to repress international crimes such as piracy, international

law also contemplates the use of force in peacetime in certain circumstances to protect private and merchant

vessels, private property, and persons at sea from acts of unlawful violence. The legal doctrines of individual and

collective self-defense and protection of nationals provide the authority for U.S. armed forces to protect U.S. and,

in some circumstances, foreign flag vessels, aircraft, property, and persons from violent and unlawful acts of

others. U.S. armed forces should not interfere in the legitimate law enforcement actions of foreign authorities

even when directed against U.S. vessels, aircraft, persons or property. Consult the applicable standing rules of

engagement for detailed guidance.

3.10.1 Protection of U.S. Flag Vessels and Aircraft, U.S. Nationals, and Property

International law, embodied in the doctrines of self-defense and protection of nationals, provides authority for the

use of proportionate force by U.S. warships and military aircraft when necessary for the protection of U.S. flag

vessels and aircraft, U.S. nationals (whether embarked in U.S. or foreign flag vessels or aircraft), and their

property against unlawful violence in and over international waters. Standing rules of engagement promulgated by

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the operational chain of command and incorporated into

applicable operational orders, operational plans, and contingency plans, provide guidance to the naval commander

for the exercise of this inherent authority. Those rules of engagement (ROE) are carefully constructed to ensure

that the protection of U.S. flag vessels and aircraft and U.S. nationals and their property at sea conforms with US

and international law and reflects national policy.

3.10.1.1 Foreign Internal Waters, Archipelagic Waters, and Territorial Seas

Unlawful acts of violence directed against U.S. flag vessels and aircraft and U.S. nationals within and over the

internal waters, archipelagic waters, or territorial seas of a foreign nation present special considerations. The

coastal nation is primarily responsible for the protection of all vessels, aircraft, and persons lawfully within its

sovereign territory. However, when that nation is unable or unwilling to do so effectively or when the

circumstances are such that immediate action is required to protect human life, international law recognizes the

right of another nation to direct its warships and military aircraft to use proportionate force in or over those waters

to protect its flag vessels, its flag aircraft, and its nationals. Because the coastal nation may lawfully exercise

jurisdiction and control over foreign flag vessels and aircraft and foreign nationals within its internal waters,

archipelagic waters, territorial seas, and national airspace, special care must be taken by the warships and military

aircraft of other nations not to interfere with the lawful exercise of jurisdiction by that nation in those waters and

superjacent airspace. U.S. naval commanders should consult the standing rules of engagement for specific

guidance as to the exercise of this authority.

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3.10.1.2 Foreign Contiguous Zones and Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves

The primary responsibility of coastal nations for the protection of foreign shipping and aircraft off their shores

ends at the seaward edge of the territorial sea. Beyond that point, each nation bears the primary responsibility for

the protection of its own flag vessels and aircraft and its own citizens and their property. On the other hand, the

coastal nation may properly exercise jurisdiction over foreign vessels, aircraft, and persons; in and over its

contiguous zone to enforce its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws; in its exclusive economic zone to

enforce its natural resource-related rules and regulations; and on its continental shelf to enforce its relevant seabed

resources-related rules and regulations. When the coastal nation is acting lawfully in the valid exercise of such

jurisdiction or is in hot pursuit (see discussion in paragraph 3.11.2.2) of a foreign vessel or aircraft for violations

that have occurred in or over those waters or in its sovereign territory, the flag nation should not interfere. U.S.

commanders should consult the standing rules of engagement for specific guidance as to the exercise of this

authority.

3.10.2 Protection of Foreign Flag Vessels and Aircraft and Persons

International law, embodied in the concept of collective self-defense, provides authority for the use of

proportionate force necessary for the protection of foreign flag vessels and aircraft and foreign nationals and their

property from unlawful violence, including terrorist or piratical attacks, at sea. In such instances, consent of the

flag nation should first be obtained unless prior arrangements are already in place or the necessity to act

immediately to save human life does not permit obtaining such consent. Should the attack or other unlawful

violence occur within or over the internal waters, archipelagic waters, or territorial sea of a third nation, or within

or over its contiguous zone or exclusive economic zone, the considerations of paragraphs 3.10.1.1 and 3.10.1.2,

respectively, would also apply. U.S. commanders should consult applicable standing rules of engagement for

specific guidance.

3.10.3 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

The Secretary of State is responsible for the safe and efficient evacuation of U.S. government personnel, their

family members and private U.S. citizens from foreign nations when their lives are endangered by war, civil

unrest, man-made or natural disaster. The Secretaries of State and Defense are assigned lead and support

responsibilities, respectively, and, within their general geographic areas of responsibility, the combatant

commanders are prepared to support the Department of State to conduct NEOs.

3.11 MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT

As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, U.S. naval commanders may be called upon to assist in the

enforcement of U.S. laws at sea, principally with respect to the suppression of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs

and psychotropic substances into the United States. Activities in this mission area involve international law, U.S.

law and policy, and political considerations. Because of the complexity of these elements, commanders should

seek guidance from higher authority whenever time permits.

A wide range of US laws and treaty obligations pertaining to fisheries, wildlife, customs, immigration,

environmental protection, and marine safety are enforced at sea by agencies of the United States. Since these

activities do not ordinarily involve DOD personnel, they are not addressed in this publication. However, naval

commanders should consult Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 4-11, Environmental Protection, for guidance on

environmental requirements to which the Navy is subject. NWP 4-11 provides environmental doctrine for

progressively demanding postures, from peacetime through war and it also integrates environmental planning into

the operational planning process by requiring that all operation plans/OPORDERs contain an environmental

protection annex (Annex L). Coast Guard commanders should likewise consult Commandant Publication

P5090.1A, Commanding Officer’s Environmental Guide, a desktop guide to federal environmental stewardship

requirements for commanding officers and officers in charge of Coast Guard shore units, vessels, and aircraft.

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3.11.1 Jurisdiction to Proscribe

Maritime law enforcement action is premised upon the assertion of jurisdiction over the vessel or aircraft in

question. Jurisdiction, in turn, depends upon the nationality, the location, the status, and the activity of the vessel

or aircraft over which maritime law enforcement action is contemplated.

International law generally recognizes five bases for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction: (a) territorial, (b)

nationality, (c) passive personality, (d) protective, and (e) universal. It is important to note that international law

governs the rights and obligations between nations. While individuals may benefit from the application of that

body of law, its alleged violation cannot usually be raised by an individual defendant to defeat a criminal

prosecution.

3.11.1.1 Territorial Principle

This principle recognizes the right of a nation to proscribe conduct within its territorial borders, including its

internal waters, archipelagic waters, and territorial sea.

3.11.1.2 Objective Territorial Principle

This variant of the territorial principle recognizes that a nation may apply its laws to acts committed beyond its

territory which have their effect in the territory of that nation. So-called “hovering vessels” are legally reached

under this principle as well as under the protective principle. The extraterritorial application of U.S. anti-drug

statutes is based largely on this concept. (See paragraphs 3.11.2.2.2 and 3.11.4.1.)

3.11.1.3 Nationality Principle

This principle is based on the concept that a nation has jurisdiction over objects and persons having the nationality

of that nation. It is the basis for the concept that a ship in international waters is, with few exceptions, subject to

the exclusive jurisdiction of the nation under whose flag it sails. Under the nationality principle a nation may

apply its laws to its nationals wherever they may be and to all persons, activities, and objects on board ships and

aircraft having its nationality. As a matter of international comity and respect for foreign sovereignty, the United

States refrains from exercising that jurisdiction in foreign territory.

3.11.1.4 Passive Personality Principle

Under this principle, jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the victim, irrespective of where the crime occurred

or the nationality of the offender. U.S. courts have upheld the assertion of jurisdiction under this principle in cases

where U.S. nationals have been taken hostage by foreigners abroad on foreign flag ships and aircraft, and where

U.S. nationals have been the intended target of foreign conspiracies to murder. This principle has application to

the apprehension and prosecution of international terrorists.

3.11.1.5 Protective Principle

This principle recognizes the right of a nation to prosecute acts that have a significant adverse impact on its

national security or governmental functions. Prosecution in connection with the murder of a U.S. congressman

abroad on official business was based upon this principle. Foreign drug smugglers apprehended on non-U.S. flag

vessels on the high seas have been successfully prosecuted under this principle of international criminal

jurisdiction.

3.11.1.6 Universal Principle

This principle recognizes that certain offenses are so heinous and so widely condemned that any nation may

apprehend, prosecute, and punish that offender on behalf of the world community regardless of the nationality of

the offender or victim. Piracy and the slave trade have historically fit these criteria. More recently, genocide,

certain war crimes, hostage taking, and aircraft hijacking have been added to the list of such universal crimes.

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3.11.2 Jurisdiction to Enforce

3.11.2.1 Over U.S. Vessels

U.S. law applies at all times aboard U.S. vessels as the law of the flag nation and is enforceable on U.S. vessels by

the U.S. Coast Guard anywhere in the world. As a matter of comity and respect of foreign sovereignty,

enforcement action is not undertaken in foreign territorial seas, archipelagic waters, or internal waters without the

consent of the coastal nation.

For law enforcement purposes, U.S. vessels are those which:

1. Are documented or numbered under U.S. law;

2. Are owned in whole or in part by a U.S. citizen or national (including corporate entities) and not registered

in another country; or

3. Were once documented under US law and, without approval of the US Maritime Administration have been

either sold to a non-US citizen or placed under foreign registry or flag.

3.11.2.2 Over Foreign Flag Vessels

The ability of a coastal nation to assert jurisdiction legally over nonsovereign immune foreign flag vessels

depends largely on the maritime zone in which the foreign vessel is located and the activities in which it is

engaged. The internationally recognized interests of coastal nations in each of these zones are outlined in Chapter

Maritime law enforcement action may be taken against a flag vessel of one nation within the national waters of

another nation when there are reasonable grounds for believing that the vessel is engaged in violation of the

coastal nation’s laws applicable in those waters, including the illicit traffic of drugs. Similarly, such law

enforcement action may be taken against foreign flag vessels without authorization of the flag nation in the

coastal nation’s contiguous zone (for fiscal, immigration, sanitary, and customs violations), in the exclusive

economic zone (for all natural resources violations), and over the continental shelf (for seabed resource

violations). In the particular case of counter-drug law enforcement (of primary interest to the Department of

Defense), coastal nation law enforcement can take place in its internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea,

or contiguous zone without the authorization of the flag nation. Otherwise, such a vessel is generally subject to

the exclusive jurisdiction of the nation of the flag it flies. Important exceptions to that principle are detailed in the

following paragraphs.

3.11.2.2.1 Hot Pursuit

Should a foreign ship fail to heed an order to stop and submit to a proper law enforcement action when the coastal

nation has good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that nation, hot pursuit

may be initiated. The pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal

waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea, or the contiguous zone of the pursuing nation, and may only be

continued outside the territorial sea or contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary

that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone receives the order to stop,

the ship giving the order should likewise be within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is

within a contiguous zone, the pursuit may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the rights for the

protection of which the zone was established. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the

territorial sea of its own nation or of a third nation. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships,

military aircraft or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and

authorized to that effect. The right of hot pursuit applies also to violations in the exclusive economic zone or on

the continental shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations, of the laws and regulations of

the coastal nation applicable to the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety zones.

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1. Commencement of Hot Pursuit. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship is

satisfied by such practicable means as are available that the ship pursued, or one of its boats or other craft

working as a team and using the ship pursued as a mother ship, is within the limits of the territorial sea,

within the contiguous zone or the exclusive economic zone, or above the continental shelf. Pursuit may

only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance that enables it to

be seen or heard by the foreign ship.

2. Hot Pursuit by Aircraft. Where hot pursuit is effected by aircraft:

a. The preceding provisions apply; and

b. The aircraft must do more than merely sight the offender or suspected offender to justify an arrest

outside the territorial sea. It must first order the suspected offender to stop. Should the suspected

offender fail to comply, pursuit may be commenced alone or in conjunction with other aircraft or ships.

3. Requirement for Continuous Pursuit. Hot pursuit must be continuous, either visually or through

electronic means. The ship or aircraft giving the order to stop must itself actively pursue the ship until

another ship or aircraft of or authorized by the coastal nation, summoned by the ship or aircraft, arrives to

take over the pursuit, unless the ship or aircraft is itself able to arrest the ship.

3.11.2.2.2 Constructive Presence

A foreign vessel may be treated as if it were actually located at the same place as any other craft with which it is

cooperatively engaged in the violation of law. This doctrine is most commonly used in cases involving mother

ships that use contact boats to smuggle contraband into the coastal nation’s waters. In order to establish

constructive presence for initiating hot pursuit, and exercising law enforcement authority, there must be:

1. A foreign vessel serving as a mother ship beyond the maritime area over which the coastal nation may

exercise maritime law enforcement jurisdiction;

2. A contact boat in a maritime area over which that nation may exercise jurisdiction (i.e., internal waters,

territorial sea, archipelagic waters, contiguous zone, EEZ, or waters over the continental shelf) and

committing an act subjecting it to such jurisdiction; and

3. Good reason to believe that the two vessels are working as a team to violate the laws of that nation.

3.11.2.2.3 Right of Approach and Visit

See paragraph 3.4.

3.11.2.2.4 Special Arrangements and International Agreements

International law has long recognized the right of a nation to authorize the law enforcement officials of another

nation to enforce the laws of one or both on board vessels flying its flag. The 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit

Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances specifically recognizes and encourages such arrangements

and agreements to aid in the suppression of this illegal traffic. Special arrangements may be formalized in written

agreements or consist of messages or voice transmissions via diplomatic channels between appropriate

representatives of the requesting and requested nations. International agreements authorizing foreign officials to

exercise law enforcement authority on board flag vessels take many forms. They may be bilateral or multilateral;

authorize in advance the boarding of one or both nations’ vessels; and may permit law enforcement action or be

more limited. Typically, the flag nation will verify (or refute) the vessel’s registry claim, and authorize the

boarding and search of the suspect vessel. If evidence of a violation of law is found, the flag nation may then

authorize the enforcement of the requesting nation’s criminal law (usually with respect to narcotics trafficking) or

may authorize the law enforcement officials of the requesting nation to act as the flag nation’s agent in detaining

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the vessel for eventual action by the flag nation itself. The flag nation may put limitations on the grant of law

enforcement authority and these restrictions must be strictly observed.

3.11.2.3 Over Stateless Vessels

Vessels that are not legitimately registered in any one nation are without nationality and are referred to as

“stateless vessels.” They are not entitled to fly the flag of any nation and, because they are not entitled to the

protection of any nation, they are subject to the jurisdiction of all nations. Accordingly, stateless vessels may be

boarded upon being encountered in international waters by a warship or other government vessel and subjected to

all appropriate law enforcement actions.

3.11.2.4 Over Vessels Assimilated to Statelessness

Vessels may be assimilated to a ship without nationality, that is, regarded as a stateless vessel, in some

circumstances. The following is a partial list of factors that should be considered in determining whether a vessel

is appropriately assimilated to stateless status:

1. No claim of nationality

2. Multiple claims of nationality (e.g., sailing under two or more flags)

3. Contradictory claims or inconsistent indicators of nationality (e.g, master’s claim differs from vessel’s

papers; homeport does not match nationality of flag)

4. Changing flags during a voyage

5. Removable signboards showing different vessel names and/or homeports

6. Absence of anyone admitting to be the master; displaying no name, flag or other identifying

characteristics

7. Refusal to claim nationality.

Determinations of statelessness or assimilation to statelessness usually require utilization of the established

interagency coordination procedures (see paragraph 3.11.3.4).

3.11.2.5 Other Actions

When operating in international waters, warships, military aircraft, and other duly authorized vessels and aircraft

on government service (such as auxiliaries), may also engage in the right of approach and perform a consensual

boarding, neither of which constitute an exercise of jurisdiction over the vessel in question. However, such actions

may afford a commander with information that could serve as the basis for subsequent maritime law enforcement

actions.

3.11.2.5.1 Right of Approach

See paragraph 3.4 for a discussion of the exercise of the right of approach preliminary to the exercise of the right

of visit.

3.11.2.5.2 Consensual Boarding

A consensual boarding is conducted at the invitation of the master (or person in charge) of a vessel that is not

otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the boarding officer. The plenary authority of the master over all activities

related to the operation of his vessel while in international waters is well established in international law and

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includes the authority to allow anyone to come aboard his vessel as his guest, including foreign law enforcement

officials. However, some nations do not recognize a master’s authority to assent to a consensual boarding.

The voluntary consent of the master permits the boarding, but it does not allow the assertion of law enforcement

authority. A consensual boarding is not, therefore, an exercise of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction per se.

The scope and duration of a consensual boarding may be subject to conditions imposed by the master and may be

terminated by the master at his discretion. Nevertheless, such boardings have utility in allowing rapid verification

of the legitimacy of a vessel’s voyage by obtaining or confirming vessel documents, cargo, and navigation records

without undue delay to the boarded vessel.

In cases where the vessel’s flag state is a party to a bilateral/multilateral agreement that includes a ship boarding

provision and there exists reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is engaged in the illicit activity that is the

subject of the agreement, boardings shall be conducted under the terms of that agreement vice seeking the

master’s consent. See 3.11.2.2.4.

3.11.3 Limitations on the Exercise of Maritime Law Enforcement Jurisdiction

Even where international and domestic U.S. law would recognize certain conduct as a criminal violation of U.S.

law, there are legal and policy restrictions on U.S. law enforcement actions that must be considered. Outside of

the United States, a commander’s greatest concerns will be: limitations on DOD assistance to civilian law

enforcement agencies; the requirement for coastal nation authorization to conduct law enforcement in that

nation’s national waters; and the necessity for interagency coordination. Similarly, a fourth restriction, the concept

of posse comitatus, limits U.S. military activities within the United States.

3.11.3.1 Posse Comitatus

Except when expressly authorized by the Constitution or act of Congress, the use of U.S. Army or U.S. Air Force

personnel or resources as a posse comitatus—a force to aid civilian law enforcement authorities in keeping the

peace and arresting felons—or otherwise to execute domestic law, is prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act, 18

USC 1385. Additionally, 10 USC 375 required that DOD prescribe regulations to ensure that all DOD Services,

including the US Navy and US Marine Corps, do not directly participate in civilian law enforcement activities,

except where authorized by law. (See DOD Directive 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement

Officials, and SECNAVINST 5820.7C.) Notably however, no such restrictions are applicable to the U.S. Coast

Guard, even when operating as a part of the Department of the Navy. Further, the Justice Department has opined

that the Posse Comitatus Act itself does not apply outside the territory of the United States. (Memorandum from

the Office of Legal Counsel to National Security Council re: Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act

(Nov. 3, 1989).)

3.11.3.2 DOD Assistance

Although the Posse Comitatus Act forbids military authorities from enforcing, or being directly involved with the

enforcement of civil law, some military activities in aid of civil law enforcement may be authorized under the

military purpose doctrine. For example, indirect involvement or assistance to civil law enforcement

authorities which is incidental to normal military training or operations is not a violation of the Posse Comitatus

Act. Additionally, Congress has specifically authorized the limited use of military personnel, facilities, platforms,

and equipment to assist Federal law enforcement authorities in the interdiction at sea of narcotics and other

controlled substances and in certain circumstances to assist with domestic counterterrorism operations.

3.11.3.2.1 Use of DOD Personnel

Although Congress has enacted legislation in recent years expanding the permissible role of the Department of

Defense in assisting law enforcement agencies, DOD personnel may not directly participate in a search, seizure,

arrest or similar activity unless otherwise authorized by law. Permissible activities presently include training and

advising federal, state and local law enforcement officials in the operation and maintenance of loaned equipment.

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DOD personnel made available by appropriate authority may also maintain and operate equipment in support of

civil law enforcement agencies for the following purposes:

1. Detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea traffic

2. Aerial reconnaissance

3. Interception of vessels or aircraft detected outside the land area of the United States for the purposes of

communicating with them and directing them to a location designated by law enforcement officials

4. Operation of equipment to facilitate communications in connection with law enforcement programs

5. The transportation of civilian law enforcement personnel

6. The operation of a base of operations for civilian law enforcement personnel

7. The transportation of suspected terrorists to the United States for delivery to federal law enforcement

personnel.

3.11.3.2.2 Providing Information to Law Enforcement Agencies

The Department of Defense may provide federal, state or local law enforcement officials with information

acquired during the normal course of military training or operations that may be relevant to a violation of any law

within the jurisdiction of those officials. Present law provides that the needs of civilian law enforcement officials

for information should, to the maximum extent practicable, be taken into account in planning and executing

military training or operations. Intelligence information held by DOD and relevant to counterdrug or other civilian

law enforcement matters may be provided to civilian law enforcement officials, to the extent consistent with

national security.

3.11.3.2.3 Use of DOD Equipment and Facilities

The Department of Defense may make available equipment (including associated supplies or spare parts), and

base or research facilities to federal, state, or local law enforcement authorities for law enforcement purposes.

Designated platforms (surface and air) are routinely made available for patrolling drug trafficking areas with U.S.

Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) embarked. LEDET personnel on board any U.S. Navy

vessel have the authority to search, seize property, and arrest persons suspected of violating U.S. law.

3.11.3.3 Law Enforcement in Foreign National Waters

Law enforcement in foreign national waters may be undertaken only to the extent authorized by the coastal nation.

Such authorization may be obtained on an ad hoc basis or be the subject of a written agreement. (See paragraph

3.5.3.2 for exceptions related to the pursuit of pirates.)

3.11.3.4 Interagency Coordination

Presidential Directive 27 in Procedures for Dealing with Non-Military Incidents, requires coordination within the

executive branch of the government for nonmilitary incidents that could have an adverse impact on US foreign

relations. This coordination includes consultation with the Department of State and other concerned agencies prior

to taking actions that could potentially have such an impact. The Coast Guard has developed an internal

notification mechanism that results in the provision or denial of a statement of no objection from the appropriate

superior authority, which constitutes authorization to conduct the specific action requested. Interagency

coordination initiated for law enforcement actions on naval vessels will be made through appropriate law

enforcement agency channels by the embarked Coast Guard LEDET.

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3.11.4 Counterdrug Operations

3.11.4.1 U.S. Law

It is unlawful for any person who is on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or who is a

U.S. citizen or resident alien on board any U.S. or foreign vessel, to manufacture or distribute, or to possess with

intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance. This law applies to:

1. U.S. vessels anywhere (see paragraph 3.11.2.1);

2. Vessels without nationality (see paragraph 3.11.2.3);

3. Vessels assimilated to a status without nationality (see paragraph 3.11.2.4);

4. Foreign vessels where the flag nation authorizes enforcement of U.S. law by the United States (see

paragraph 3.11.2.2.4);

5. Foreign vessels located within the territorial sea or contiguous zone of the United States (see paragraph

1.5); or

6. Foreign vessels located in the territorial seas or archipelagic waters of another nation, where that nation

authorizes enforcement of U.S. law by the United States (see paragraph 3.11.2.2.4).

3.11.4.2 DOD Mission in Counterdrug Operations

DOD has been designated by statute as lead agency of the federal government for the detection and monitoring of

aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, including its possessions, territories, and

commonwealths. DOD is further tasked with integrating the command, control, communications, and technical

intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs into an effective

communications network.

3.11.4.3 U.S. Coast Guard Responsibilities in Counterdrug Operations

The Coast Guard is the primary maritime law enforcement agency of the United States. It is also the lead agency

for maritime drug interdiction and shares the lead agency role for air interdiction with the U.S. Customs Service.

The Coast Guard may make inquiries, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters

over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection and suppression of violations of the

laws of the United States, including maritime drug trafficking. Coast Guard-commissioned warrant and petty

officers may board any vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, address inquiries to those on board,

examine the ship’s documents and papers, and examine, inspect and search the vessel and use all necessary force

to compel compliance. When it appears that a violation of U.S. law has been committed, the violator may be

arrested and taken into custody. If it appears that the violation rendered the vessel or its cargo liable to fine or

forfeiture, the vessel or offending cargo may be seized.

Coast Guard-commissioned warrant and petty officers are also designated customs officers providing them

additional law enforcement authority.

3.11.5 Use of Force in Maritime Law Enforcement

In the performance of maritime law enforcement missions, occasions will arise where resort to the use of force

will be both appropriate and necessary. U.S. armed forces personnel engaged in maritime law enforcement actions

under Coast Guard operational or tactical control (OPCON or TACON) both outside and within territorial limits

of the United States will follow the Coast Guard Use of Force Policy for warning shots and disabling fire. DOD

forces under Coast Guard OPCON or TACON inside the territorial limits of the United States retain the right of

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self-defense in accordance with the CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3121B.01, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing

Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, Enclosure L.

3.11.5.1 Standing Rules of Engagement and Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces

Distinguished

The standing rules of engagement and standing rules for the use of force by U.S. forces delineate fundamental

policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders during military operations,

contingencies, and routine military department functions, including AT/FP. (See paragraphs 4.3.3.2, 4.3.3.3 and

4.3.3.4.) However, Coast Guard units performing law enforcement duties, as well as DOD units supporting such

Coast Guard units, will be guided by the Coast Guard’s Use of Force Policy (found in Chapter 4 of the MLEM).

Neither the standing rules of engagement or the Coast Guard’s Use of Force Policy limit a commander’s inherent

authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense of

the commander’s unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity.

3.11.5.2 Warning Shots

A warning shot is a signal—usually to warn an offending vessel to stop or maneuver in a particular manner or risk

the employment of disabling fire or more severe measures. Under international law, warning shots do not

constitute a use of force. Disabling fire is firing under controlled conditions into a noncompliant vessel’s rudder,

propeller area/outboard engine, or engine room for the sole purpose of stopping it after warning shots or oral

warnings have gone unheeded. U.S. armed forces personnel employing warning shots and disabling fire in a

maritime law enforcement action will comply with the U.S. Coast Guard Use of Force Policy.

3.11.6 Other Maritime Law Enforcement Assistance

In addition to the direct actions and dedicated assistance efforts discussed above, the naval commander may

become involved in other activities supporting law enforcement actions, such as acting in support to the U.S.

Border Patrol. Activities of this nature usually involve extensive advance planning and coordination. DOD forces

detailed to other U.S. government-led federal agencies will operate under common mission-specific, rules for the

use of force approved by the Secretary of Defense and the lead federal agency. (See CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing

Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, Enclosure L.

3.12 HOMELAND SECURITY VS. HOMELAND DEFENSE

The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for homeland security in the maritime environment. Homeland

security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist acts within the US, reduce its vulnerability to terrorism,

and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. DOD contributes to homeland security through

its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities. Homeland defense is the

protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external

threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. US Northern Command has the lead for

homeland defense for the air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska,

and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles, the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the US

Virgin Islands. The defense of Hawaii and US territories and possessions in the Pacific remain the responsibility

of US Pacific Command. The Coast Guard acts in support of DOD theater commanders for homeland defense in

the maritime environment.

3.13 PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

Proliferation Security/Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. (See paragraph 4.3.5 for greater detail on PSI.)

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3.14 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST

THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION (SUA)

The 1988 UN convention, adopted in response to the 1986 hijacking of the Italian-flag cruise ship, Achille Lauro,

and the murder of an American tourist on board, filled a gap in international law by providing a legal regime

governing acts of violence on board or against ships engaged in maritime navigation and fixed platforms on the

continental shelf. In 2005, significant anti-terrorism and non-proliferation amendments were made to suppression

of unlawful acts (SUA). These amendments are an essential element of PSI (see paragraph 3.13), as they include a

comprehensive framework for boarding suspect vessels at sea. In addition, the amended SUA establishes

additional offenses, including using a ship to commit terrorist acts, nonproliferation offenses, the transport of

persons alleged to have committed an offense under 12 UN terrorism conventions (including SUA), attempts,

accomplice liability, and organizing or directing others to commit offenses.

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CHAPTER 4

Protecting National Security Interests in the

Maritime Environment during Peacetime

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the broad principles of international law that influence the conduct of nations as they

endeavor to protect their interests in the maritime environment during peacetime. As noted in the preface, this

publication provides general information. It is not directive and does not supersede guidance issued by combatant

commanders, in particular any guidance they may issue that delineates the circumstances and limitations under

which the forces under their command will initiate and/or continue engagement with other forces encountered.

Historically, international law governing the use of force by nations has been divided into rules applicable in

peacetime and rules applicable in time of war. However, in the last half century, the concepts of “peace” and

“war” have become blurred to the extent that it is not always possible to draw neat distinctions between the two.

This chapter will focus specifically on safeguarding national interests in the maritime environment during those

times when the nation state whose interest is at stake is not involved in armed conflict with the entity threatening

its interest. The conduct of actual armed conflict involving US forces, irrespective of character, intensity, or

duration, is addressed in Part II: The Law of Naval Warfare.

4.2 CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

As nations endeavor to protect their national security interests in the maritime environment during peacetime they

are guided by international law, to include the Charter of the United Nations. As a starting point, Article 2,

paragraph 3, provides that:

All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that

international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

Additionally, Article 2, paragraph 4, provides that:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the

territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the

Purposes of the United Nations.

In combination, these two provisions establish the fundamental principle of modern international law that nations

are proscribed from using force or the threat of force to impose their will on other nations or to otherwise resolve

their international differences. However, history has shown that nation states, as well as non-State actors, have at

times used force or the threat of force to accomplish their objectives. Anticipating that nations might resort to the

threat or use of force, Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations vests certain powers in the UN Security

Council. Pursuant to Article 39:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or

act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in

accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

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Article 41 provides that:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be

employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon its Members…to apply such measures.

These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,

telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

And Article 42 provides that:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or

have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to

maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,

blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members…

These provisions do not, however, extinguish a nation’s right of individual and collective self-defense. Article 51

of the Charter provides that:

Nothing in the…Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an

armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken

measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The following sections discuss some of the measures that nations, acting in conformity with the Charter of the

United Nations, may take in protecting their national interests during peacetime.

4.3 NONMILITARY MEASURES

Wholly apart from military measures designed to influence the conduct of States, insurgents, or terrorist groups

by force of arms, nations, to varying degrees, possess less compulsory means of exerting influence in order to

secure their own national interests. Such measures include diplomatic pressure, judicial intervention, economic

influence, and even certain military measures falling short of the actual use of force. Each of these measures is

examined in more detail in the sections that follow.

4.3.1 Diplomatic

As contemplated by the Charter of the United Nations, States generally rely on peaceful means to resolve their

differences and to protect their interests. Diplomatic measures include all those political actions taken by one

nation to influence the behavior of other States within the framework of international law. They may involve

negotiation, conciliation or mediation, and may be cooperative or coercive (e.g., severing of diplomatic relations).

The behavior of an offending nation may be curbed by appeals to world public opinion as in the General

Assembly or, if their misconduct endangers the maintenance of international peace and security, by bringing the

issue before the Security Council. Ordinarily, however, differences that arise between States are resolved or

accommodated through the normal day-to-day, give-and-take of international diplomacy. The key point is that

disputes between the United States. and other States arising out of conflicting interests are normally addressed and

resolved through diplomatic channels and do not involve resort to the threat or use of force.

4.3.2 Judicial

States may also seek judicial resolution of their peacetime disputes, both in national courts and before

international tribunals. A nation or its citizens may bring a legal action against another nation in its own national

courts, provided the court has jurisdiction over the matter in controversy (such as where the action is directed

against property of the foreign nation located within the territorial jurisdiction of the court) and provided the

foreign nation does not interpose a valid claim of sovereign immunity. Similarly, a nation or its citizens may bring

a legal action against another nation in the latter’s courts, or in the courts of a third nation, provided jurisdiction

can be found and sovereign immunity is not interposed.

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States may also submit their disputes to the International Court of Justice for resolution. Article 92 of the Charter

of the United Nations establishes the International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the United

Nations. No nation may bring another before the Court unless the latter nation first consents. That consent can be

general and given beforehand or can be given in regard to a specific controversy. States also have the option of

submitting their disputes to ad hoc or other established tribunals.

4.3.3 Economic

States often utilize economic measures to influence the actions of others. The granting or withholding of “most

favored nation” status to another country is an often used measure of economic policy. Similarly, trade

agreements, loans, concessionary credit arrangements and other aid, and investment opportunity are among the

many economic measures that States extend, or may withhold, as their national interests dictate. Examples of the

coercive use of economic measures to curb or otherwise seek to influence the conduct of other States include the

suspension of U.S. grain sales and the embargo on the transfer of U.S. technology to the offending nation, boycott

of oil and other export products from the offending nation, suspension of “most favored nation” status, and the

assertion of other economic sanctions.

4.4 MILITARY MEASURES

The goal of U.S. national security policy is to ensure the survival, safety, and vitality of the United States and to

maintain a stable international environment consistent with U.S. national interests. U.S. national security interests

guide global objectives of deterring, and if necessary, defeating armed attack or terrorist actions against the

United States, including U.S. forces, and, in certain circumstances, U.S. persons and their property, U.S.

commercial assets, persons in U.S. custody, designated non-U.S. military forces, and designated foreign persons

and their property.

In order to deter armed attack, U.S. military forces must be both capable and ready, and must be perceived to be

so by potential aggressors. Equally important is the perception of other States and non-State actors that, should the

need arise, the United States has the will to use its forces in individual or collective self-defense. The following

are military measures nations may employ in the maritime environment during peacetime in order to safeguard

their security interests.

4.4.1 Naval Presence

U.S. naval forces constitute a key and unique element of our national military capability. The mobility of forces

operating at sea combined with the versatility of naval force composition—from units operating individually to

multicarrier strike group formations—provide the President and Secretary of Defense with the flexibility to tailor

U.S. military presence as circumstances may require.

Naval presence, whether as a showing of the flag during port visits or as forces deployed in response to

contingencies or crises, can be tailored to exert the precise influence best suited to U.S. interests. Depending upon

the magnitude and immediacy of the problem, naval forces may be positioned near areas of potential discord as a

show of force or as a symbolic expression of support and concern. Unlike land-based forces, naval forces may be

so employed without political entanglement and without the necessity of seeking littoral nation consent. So long

as they remain in international waters and international airspace, U.S. warships and military aircraft enjoy the full

spectrum of the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, including the right to conduct naval maneuvers,

subject only to the requirement to observe international standards of safety, to recognize the rights of other ships

and aircraft that may be encountered, and to issue NOTAMs and NOTMARs as the circumstances may require.

Deployment of a carrier strike group into the vicinity of areas of tension and augmentation of U.S. naval forces to

deter interference with U.S. commercial shipping in an area of armed conflict provide graphic illustrations of the

use of U.S. naval forces in peacetime to deter violations of international law and to protect U.S. flag shipping.

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4.4.2 Interception of Intruding Aircraft

All nations have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their national airspace (see paragraphs 1.9 and 2.5.1).

With the exception of overflight in transit passage of international straits and in archipelagic sea lanes passage

(see paragraphs 2.5.3 and 2.5.4.1), distress (see paragraph 3.2.1.1), and assistance entry to assist those in danger

of being lost at sea (see paragraph 2.5.2.6), authorization must be obtained for any intrusion by a foreign aircraft

(military or civil) into national airspace (see paragraph 2.5). That authorization may be flight-specific, as in the

case of diplomatic clearance for the visit of a military aircraft, or general, as in the case of commercial air

navigation pursuant to the Chicago Convention.

A state’s right to use force against an aircraft in flight during peacetime is based on the degree to which that

aircraft poses a threat to the vital interests of the state using force and the availability and effectiveness of lesser

measures. Military aircraft intruding into foreign airspace on a military mission may constitute a sufficient threat

to justify the use of force in self-defense. This appears true both for tactical military aircraft capable of directly

attacking the overflown state and for unarmed military aircraft capable of being used for intelligence-gathering

purposes. State practice also suggests that an aircraft with military markings may be presumed to be on a military

mission unless evidence is produced to the contrary by its state of registry. A state may not use weapons against

an aircraft with civil markings except in the exercise of self-defense. Absent compelling evidence to the contrary

from the overflown state, an aircraft with civil markings will be presumed to be engaged in nonmilitary

commercial activity.

Customary international law provides that a foreign civil aircraft entering national airspace without permission

due to distress or navigational error may be required to comply with orders to turn back or to land. In this

connection the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 7 December 1944 (Chicago Convention) has been

amended to provide, in effect:

1. That all nations must refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft, and, in the case of the

interception of intruding civil aircraft, that the lives of persons on board and the safety of the aircraft must

not be endangered. (This provision does not, however, detract from the right of self-defense recognized

under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.)

2. That all nations have the right to require intruding aircraft to land at some designated airfield and to resort

to appropriate means consistent with international law to require intruding aircraft to desist from activities

in violation of the Convention.

3. That all intruding civil aircraft must comply with the orders given to them and that all States must enact

national laws making such compliance by their civil aircraft mandatory.

4. That all nations shall prohibit the deliberate use of their civil aircraft for purposes (such as intelligence

collection) inconsistent with the Convention.

The amendment was approved unanimously on 10 May 1984 and entered into force on 1 October 1998. The

Convention, by its terms, does not apply to intruding military aircraft. The United States takes the position that

customary international law establishes similar standards of reasonableness and proportionality with respect to a

nation’s response to military aircraft that stray into national airspace through navigational error or that are in

distress.

4.4.3 The Right of Self-Defense

The Charter of the United Nations, as reflected in Article 51, recognizes that all nations are vested with an

inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. US doctrine on self-defense, set forth in CJCSI 3121.01B,

Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, provides that the use of force

in self-defense against armed attack or the threat of imminent armed attack, rests upon two elements:

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Necessity: The requirement that a use of force be in response to a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent,

and;

Proportionality: The requirement that the use of force be in all circumstances limited in intensity, duration, and

scope to that which is reasonably required to counter the attack or threat of attack and to ensure the continued

safety of U.S. forces.

4.4.3.1 Anticipatory Self-Defense

Included within the inherent right of self-defense is the right of a nation to protect itself from imminent attack.

Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous. The determination of whether or not an attack is

imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known at the time. International law

recognizes that it would be contrary to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations if a threatened nation

were required to absorb an aggressor’s initial and potentially crippling first strike before taking those military

measures necessary to thwart an imminent attack. Anticipatory self-defense involves the use of armed force where

attack is imminent and no reasonable choice of peaceful means is available.

4.4.3.2 The CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)/Standing Rules for the Use of Force

(SRUF)

CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, establishes

fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders during military

operations, contingencies, and routine military department functions including AT/FP. At the national level, rules

of engagement are promulgated by the President and Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commanders to guide them in the employment of their forces toward the

achievement of broad national objectives. At the tactical level, rules of engagement are task-and mission-oriented.

At all levels, rules of engagement are consistent with the law of armed conflict.

Because rules of engagement also reflect operational and national policy factors, they often restrict combat

operations far more than do the requirements of international law. A full range of options is reserved to the

President and Secretary of Defense to determine the response that will be made to hostile acts and demonstrations

of hostile intent. The CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for

US Forces, provides implementation guidance on the inherent right and obligation of self-defense and the

application of force for mission accomplishment. A principal tenet of U.S. SROE/SRUF is that commanders

always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or

demonstrated hostile intent. Unit self-defense includes defense of other U.S. military forces in the vicinity.

Individual self-defense is a subset of unit self-defense and can be limited by the unit commander.

4.4.3.3 Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)

The SROE establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders

and their forces during all military operations and contingencies and routine Military Department functions

occurring outside U.S. territory (which includes the 50 states, the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and Northern

Marianas, U.S. possessions, protectorates, and territories) and outside U.S. territorial seas. Routine military

department functions include antiterrorism/force protection duties. However, routine military department

functions exclude all law enforcement and security duties on DOD installations, and off installation while

conducting official DOD security functions, outside U.S. territory and territorial seas. The SROE also apply to air

and maritime homeland defense missions conducted within U.S. territory and territorial seas, unless otherwise

directed by the Secretary of Defense.

4.4.3.4 Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF)

The SRUF establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders

and their forces during all DOD civil support (e.g., military assistance to civil authorities) and routine Military

Department functions (including AT/FP duties) occurring within U.S. territory or U.S. territorial waters. The

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SRUF also apply to land homeland defense missions occurring within U.S. territory and to DOD forces, civilians,

and contractors performing law enforcement and security duties at all DOD installations (and off-installation

while conducting official DOD security functions), within or outside U.S. territory unless otherwise directed by

the Secretary of Defense.

4.4.3.5 Self-Defense Pursuant to the SROE

Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a

hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Hostile intent is the threat of the imminent use of force against the

United States, U.S. forces, or other designated persons or property. The determination of whether or not an attack

is imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to U.S. forces at the time and

may be made at any level. Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander military members may exercise

individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When individuals are assigned

and acting as part of a unit, individual self-defense should be considered a subset of unit self-defense. As such,

unit commanders may limit individual self-defense by members of their unit. Both unit and individual self-

defense includes defense of other U.S. military forces in the vicinity.

4.4.3.6 Self-Defense Pursuant to the SRUF

Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a

hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Hostile intent is the imminent threat of the use of force against the

United States, U.S. forces, or other designated persons or property. Unless otherwise directed by a unit

commander military members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated

hostile intent. When individuals are assigned and acting as part of a unit, individual self-defense should be

considered a subset of unit self-defense. As such, unit commanders may limit individual self defense by members

of their unit. Both unit and individual self-defense includes defense of other U.S. military forces in the vicinity.

The determination of whether the danger of death or serious bodily harm is imminent will be based on an

assessment of all facts and circumstances known to DOD forces at the time and may be made at any level.

Individuals with the capability to inflict death or serious bodily harm and who demonstrate the intent to do so may

be considered an imminent threat. Per the SRUF, normally force is to be used only as a last resort, and the force

must be the minimum necessary. If force is required, nondeadly force is authorized and may be used to control a

situation when doing so is reasonable under the circumstances. Deadly force is to be used only when all lesser

means have failed or cannot be reasonably employed. See CJCSI 3121.01B for more detailed information

concerning the use of force in self-defense.

4.4.3.7 Warning Shots Pursuant to SRUF

When operating under SRUF, warning shots are not authorized within U.S. territory (including U.S. territorial

waters), except when in the appropriate exercise of force protection of U.S. Navy and naval service vessels within

the limits set forth in CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the use of Force for US

Forces, Enclosure M and Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.2.1, Antiterrorism/Force

Protection, Appendix E.

4.4.4 Maritime Interception Operations (MIO)

Nations may desire to intercept vessels at sea in order to protect their national security interests. The act of

“intercepting” ships at sea may range from querying the master of the vessel to stopping, boarding, inspecting,

searching, and potentially even seizing the cargo or the vessel. As a general principle, vessels in international

waters are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag state. Moreover, interference with a vessel in

international waters violates the sovereign rights of the flag state unless that interference is authorized by the flag

state or otherwise permitted by international law. Finally, inside a coastal nation’s national waters, the coastal

nation exercises sovereignty, subject to the right of innocent passage and other international law. Given these

basic tenets of international law, commanders should be aware of the legal bases underlying the authorization of

MIO when ordered by competent authority to conduct such operations.

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4.4.4.1 Legal Bases for Conducting MIO

There are several legal bases available to conduct MIO, none of which are mutually exclusive. Depending on the

circumstances, one or a combination of these bases can be used to justify permissive and nonpermissive

interference with suspect vessels. The bases for conducting lawful boardings of suspect vessels at sea were greatly

enhanced by the 2005 Protocols to the SUA Convention (see paragraph 3.14 for a discussion of SUA and the

2005 Protocols).

4.4.4.1.1 MIO Pursuant to a United Nations Security Council Resolution

One legal justification for maritime interception operations is authorization by the UN Security Council. Under

Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations the Security Council may authorize the “complete or partial

interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of

communication…” As such, the UN Security Council may authorize member nations to use naval forces to

intercept vessels and possibly board, inspect, search, and seize them or their cargoes as necessary to maintain or

restore international peace and security. On three separate occasions since 1990 the UN Security Council

authorized States to halt shipping into and out of Iraq, Haiti, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, respectively,

to ensure strict implementation of other Security Council resolutions.

4.4.4.1.2 Flag State Consent

As a general rule ships are subject to the jurisdiction of their flag state (see paragraph 3.11.1.2). As such, the flag

state has the right to authorize officials of another nation to board vessels flying its flag. Similar to agreements in

the law enforcement realm (see 3.11.2.2.4) nations may negotiate bilateral or multilateral agreements to obtain

advance consent to board another nation’s vessels for other than law enforcement purposes. Alternatively,

commanders, via the chain of command, may seek consent to board a vessel from a particular nation. Care should

be taken to identify and comply with the limits of the flag nation’s consent. Consent to board a vessel does not

automatically extend to consent to inspect or search the vessel or to the seizure of persons or cargo. Commanders

need to be aware of the exact nature and extent of flag state consent prior to conducting interceptions at sea.

4.4.4.1.3 Master’s Consent

(See paragraph 3.11.2.5.2.)

4.4.4.1.4 Right of Visit

International law allows nonpermissive interference with ships where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that

the ship is engaged in, inter alia, piracy, slave trade, or unauthorized broadcasting. If a warship encounters a

foreign-flagged vessel on the high seas, it may board the ship without the flag or master’s consent if there are

reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is engaged in one of these unauthorized activities.

4.4.4.1.5 Stateless Vessels

Vessels that are not legitimately registered in any one state are without nationality and are referred to as stateless

vessels. Such vessels are not entitled to fly the flag of any State and, because they are not entitled to the protection

of any state, they are subject to the jurisdiction of all states. Additionally, a ship that sails under more than one

flag, using them according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question and may be

assimilated to a ship without nationality. If a warship encounters a stateless vessel or a vessel that has been

assimilated to a ship without nationality on the high seas it may board and search the vessel without the consent of

the master.

4.4.4.1.6 Condition of Port Entry

Under international law, a coastal state may impose any condition on ships entering its ports or internal waters,

including a requirement that all ships (other than sovereign immune vessels) entering port will be subject to

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boarding and inspection. A vessel intending to enter a nation’s port or internal waters can therefore be boarded

and searched without flag state consent provided the port state has imposed such a measure as a condition of port

entry on a nondiscriminatory basis. Such boardings and inspections need not wait until a ship enters port—they

can occur at any location, preferably when a ship enters the territorial sea.

4.4.4.1.7 Bilateral/Multilateral Agreements

Flag consent to board and search can be provided in advance using a bilateral or multilateral agreement. Such

agreements greatly expedite the process by which officials from one State can board suspect vessels of another

state.

4.4.4.1.8 Belligerent Rights Under the Law of Armed Conflict

(See paragraph 7.6.)

4.4.4.1.9 Inherent Right of Self-Defense

States can legally conduct MIO pursuant customary international law under circumstances that would permit the

exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

4.4.5 Proliferation Security Initiative

PSI is a global effort that aims to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials

worldwide. The goal of PSI is to establish a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing

proliferation to or from nation States and non-State actors of proliferation concern. This approach includes at-sea

interdiction by committed nations acting in support of PSI. As such, the PSI is a set of activities, not a formal

treaty-based organization. It is best understood as a set of partnerships that establishes the basis for cooperation on

specific activities, when the need arises. It does not create formal “obligations” for participating states, but does

represent a political commitment to establish “best practices” to stop proliferation-related shipments. PSI seeks to

use existing national and international legal authorities for such interdictions. In many cases, such legal authority

will be found in a bilateral agreement. In the event that no bilateral agreement exists, the PSI statement of

interdiction principles urges PSI participants and “all States concerned with this threat (PSI activity) to

international peace and security” to “seriously consider providing consent under appropriate circumstances to the

boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other States and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in

such vessels that may be identified by such States.”

PSI-interdiction training exercises and other operational efforts will help States work together in a more

cooperative, coordinated, and effective manner to stop, search, and seize shipments. The focus of PSI is on

establishing greater coordination among its partner states and a readiness to act effectively when a particular

action is needed. Actual interdictions will likely involve only a few PSI participants with geographic and

operational access to a particular PSI target of opportunity (see CJCSI 3520.02, Proliferation Security Initiative

(PSI) Activity Program).

PSI activities include:

1. Undertaking a review and providing information on current national legal authorities to undertake

interdictions at sea, in the air, or on land, and indicating willingness to strengthen authorities, where

appropriate

2. Identifying specific national “assets” that might contribute to PSI efforts (e.g., information sharing,

military, and/or law enforcement assets)

3. Providing points of contact for PSI-assistance requests and other operational activities, and establishing

appropriate internal government processes to coordinate PSI response efforts

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4. Being willing to actively participate in PSI-interdiction training exercises and actual operations as

opportunities arise

5. Being willing to conclude relevant agreements (e.g., boarding arrangements) or otherwise to establish a

concrete basis for cooperation with PSI efforts.

4.4.6 Antiterrorism/Force Protection

When naval forces operate in the maritime environment during peacetime, a constant underlying mission is force

protection, both in port and at sea. Commanders possess an inherent right and obligation to defend their units and

other US units in the vicinity from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. US naval doctrine provides tactics,

techniques, and procedures to deter, detect, defend against, and mitigate terrorist attacks (see NTTP 3-07.2.1

Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism/Force Protection (Rev.A)). AT/FP actions are

designed to conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place while

degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect

against accidents, weather, or disease.

4.4.7 Maritime Warning Zones

As nations endeavor to protect their interests in the maritime environment during peacetime they might employ

naval forces in geographic areas where various land, air, surface, and subsurface threats exist. Commanders are

then faced with ascertaining the intent of entities (e.g., small boats, low slow flyers (LSFs), jet skis, swimmers)

proceeding toward their units. Oftentimes ascertaining intent is a very difficult problem, especially when

operating in the littorals where air and surface traffic is heavy. Given an uncertain operating environment,

commanders may be inclined to establish some type of assessment, threat, or warning zone around their units in

an effort to help sort the common operational picture and ascertain the intent of inbound entities. This objective

may be accomplished during peacetime while adhering to international law as long as the navigational rights of

other ships, submarines, and aircraft are respected. Specifically, when operating in international waters,

commanders may assert notice (via NOTAMs and NOTMARs) that within a certain geographic area, for a certain

period of time, dangerous military activities will be taking place. Commanders may request that entities traversing

the area communicate with them and state their intentions. Moreover, such notice may include reference to the

fact that if ships and aircraft traversing the area are deemed to represent an imminent threat to U.S. naval forces

they may be subject to proportionate measures in self-defense. Ships and aircraft are not required to remain

outside such zones and force may not be used against such entities merely because they entered the zone.

Commanders may use force against such entities only to defend against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile

intent, including interference with declared military activities.

4.4.8 Maritime Quarantine

Maritime quarantine was invoked for the first and only time by the United States as a means of interdicting the

flow of Soviet strategic offensive weapons (primarily missiles) into Cuba in 1962 involving a limited coercive

measure on the high seas applicable only to ships carrying offensive weaponry to Cuba and utilizing minimum

force required to achieve its purpose. The quarantine was an action by the United States, which dealt with the

need to act in defense of western hemisphere interests and security while, to the greatest degree possible,

maintaining the rights of freedom of navigation in what was otherwise a peacetime environment.

Although it has been compared to and used synonymously with blockade, quarantine is a peacetime military

action that bears little resemblance to a true blockade. (For an in-depth discussion of blockade, see paragraph 7.7).

Quarantine is distinguished from blockade, in that:

1. Quarantine is a measured response to a threat to national security or an international crisis; blockade is an

act of war against an identified belligerent.

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2. The goal of quarantine is de-escalation and return to the status quo ante or other stabilizing arrangement;

the goal of a blockade is denial and degradation of an enemy’s capability with the ultimate end-state being

capitulation in armed conflict.

3. Quarantine is selective in proportional response to the perceived threat; blockade requires impartial

application to all nations—discrimination by a blockading belligerent renders the blockade legally invalid.

Maritime quarantine is an action designed to address crisis-level confrontations during peacetime that present

extreme threats to U.S. forces or security interests, with the ultimate goal of returning conditions to a stable status

quo.

4.5 U.S. MARITIME ZONES AND OTHER CONTROL MECHANISMS

The United States employs maritime zones and other control mechanisms pursuant to both domestic and

international law. These are grounded in a coastal state’s right to exercise jurisdiction (to varying degrees

depending on purpose and exact location) over waters within and adjacent to their territorial land masses. In all

cases the statutory basis and implementing regulations and polices are consistent with international law, and in

particular the LOS convention. However, when deployed, commanders should be aware of similar sounding

maritime zones and control mechanisms declared by other nations that purport to be legitimate but are in fact

inconsistent with international law and the LOS convention and unlawfully impede freedom of navigation.

As many of these zones and other control mechanisms have as their primary purpose the restriction of access (for

assorted reasons), they can be used as tools by the military to enhance the security and safety of both maritime

and land-based units.

4.5.1 Safety Zones

Safety zones are areas comprised of water or shoreline, or a combination of both, to which access is limited for

safety and environmental purposes. No person, vessel, or vehicle may enter or remain within a safety zone unless

authorized by the Coast Guard. Such zones may be described by fixed geographical limits or they may be a

prescribed area around a vessel, whether at anchor, moored, or underway. In general, safety zones may be

established within the navigable waters of the United States seaward to 12 nautical miles from the baseline.

However, as explicitly permitted by Article 60 of the LOS Convention, safety zones may also be established to

promote the safety of life and property on an outer continental shelf facility, an attending vessel, or adjacent

waters. Such safety zones may extend up to 500 meters from the outer continental shelf facility.

4.5.2 Security Zones

Security zones are areas comprised of water or land, or a combination of both, to which access is limited for the

purposes of:

1. Preventing the destruction, loss, or injury to vessels, harbors, ports or waterfront facilities resulting from

sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or similar causes;

2. Securing the observance of the rights and obligations of the United States;

3. Preventing or responding to an act of terrorism against an individual, vessel, or structure that is subject to

the jurisdiction of the United States; or

4. Responding to a national emergency as declared by the president by reason of actual or threatened war,

insurrection or invasion, or disturbance or threatened disturbance of the international relations of the

United States.

In general, security zones can be established within the navigable waters of the United States seaward to 12

nautical miles from the baseline. However, security zones established to prevent or respond to an act of terrorism

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against an individual, vessel, or structure may also be in the exclusive economic zone or on the outer continental

shelf, provided the individual, vessel, or structure is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Enforcement

of security zones is primarily the responsibility of the Coast Guard. Those convicted of security zone violations

are subject to civil and criminal penalties.

4.5.3 Naval Vessel Protection Zones (NVPZs)

Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. in 2001, to provide for the safety and security

of United States naval vessels in the navigable waters of the United States, the U.S. Coast Guard established naval

vessel protection zones (NVPZs) under authority contained in 14 USC 91. NVPZs provide for the regulation of

traffic in the vicinity of U.S. naval vessels in the navigable waters of the United States. A U.S. naval vessel is any

vessel owned, operated, chartered, or leased by the U.S. Navy; any vessel under the operational control of the

U.S. Navy or a unified commander. As a result, the establishment and enforcement of NVPZs are a function

directly involved in and necessary to military operations and the safety and security of naval commanders and

personnel.

The official patrol may be a Coast Guard commissioned officer, a Coast Guard warrant or petty officer, the

Commanding Officer of a US naval vessel or his or her designee.

All vessels within 500 yards of a US naval vessel must operate at the minimum speed necessary to maintain a safe

course and proceed as directed by the official patrol.

Vessels are not allowed within 100 yards of a US naval vessel, unless authorized by the official patrol. Vessels

requesting to pass within 100 yards of a US naval vessel must contact the official patrol on VHF-FM channel 16.

Under some circumstances, the official patrol may permit vessels that can only operate safely in a navigable

channel to pass within 100 yards of a US naval vessel in order to ensure a safe passage in accordance with the

navigation rules.

Under similar conditions, commercial vessels anchored in a designated anchorage area may be permitted to

remain at anchor within 100 yards of passing naval vessels.

Though restrictive in nature, the effects of NVPZs have not been significant because the protection zones are

limited in size and the official patrol may allow access to the zone. Additionally, the naval vessel protection zones

will affect a given location for a limited time while the vessel is in transit, along with notifications made by the

Coast Guard so mariners can make adjustments.

4.5.4 Outer Continental Shelf Facilities

Safety zones may also be established on the continental shelf around offshore platforms pursuant to the Outer

Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 USC 1333). Outer continental shelf (OCS) safety zones may be established

around OCS facilities being constructed, maintained, or operated on the OCS to promote the safety of life and

property on the facilities, their appurtenances and attending vessels, and on the adjacent waters within the safety

zones. An OCS safety zone may extend to a maximum distance of 500 meters around the OCS facility measured

from each point on its outer edge or from its construction site, but may not interfere with the use of recognized sea

lanes essential to navigation. The following vessels are authorized to enter and remain in an OCS safety zone:

vessels owned or operated by the OCS facility, vessels under 100 feet in overall length not engaged in towing, and

vessels authorized by the cognizant Coast Guard commander.

4.5.5 Other Areas

For more information concerning regulated navigation areas, restricted waterfront areas, restricted areas, danger

zones, naval defensive sea areas, and other control mechanisms, see the COMDTINST M16247.1 Coast Guard

Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, (MLEM), Appendix O, for specific guidance.

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