NATO ANTI–PIRACY MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE (2008)

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

Table 8-1. Surface Action Checkoff List (Cont.)

PHASE 3 — LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENT

(CONT.)

(f) Selection of LR SSM firing units.

(2) If cooperating with surface attack aircraft, es-

tablish “time windows” for arrival of SSM. TOT for

1. Available missiles and their seeker

aircraft and missiles should not coincide; however,

characteristics.

aircraft and missiles attacks should be coordi-

nated.

2. Accuracy of required target data.

(3) After damage assessment, reattack if results

do not meet OTC’s Damage Criteria.

3. Spacing of other enemy units in relation

to intended line of SSM fire.

d. POST-COMBAT.

4. Direction of attack.

OTC, ASUWC, or SAGC orders action to cease and

issues post-combat instructions (See Phase 4, para-

(g) Safety of friendly forces, including MSFZ

graph d. below).

and MSTZ.

PHASE 4 — SHORT-RANGE ENGAGEMENT

(7) Order coordination and employment of:

a. INITIATION. Unless tasks have already been as-

(a) LR/SSM, including weapon release crite-

signed, the OTC will:

ria and fire distribution.

(b) Jammers.

(1) If appropriate, detach a SAG and consider re-

dispositions of remaining units.

fustion and/or distraction.

(2) Consider main body evasion.

(3) Order Standard Action Plans, and if not already

(8) Intentions, to include plans of approach and

specified:

post-combat rendezvous, must be passed early

since at a later stage communications are likely to

(a) Targets to be engaged.

be saturated and/or jammed.

(b) Communications/links to be used.

(9) Action in case of damage.

(4) Verify position of own forces to avoid engage-

ment of friendly units.

(a) Nominate standby SAGC.

(5) Consider shifting remainder of force to alter-

(b) Action for own damaged ships.

nate SAG net.

b. APPROACH.

(10) Enemy contact report — SITREP to OTC/

ASUWC.

(1) Actions covering formation, disposition, com-

munications, assumption of duties, reassessment

COMBAT.

of threat and enemy’s intentions, and EW policy as

in preceding Phase 3, paragraphs b.(1) to (5).

(1) OTH action is conducted according to the

Standard Plan ordered, or as specified otherwise.

(2) Employment of allocated air submarine, and

surface assets.

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MTP 1(D), Vol. I

Table 8-1. Surface Action Checkoff List (Cont.)

PHASE 4 — SHORT-RANGE ENGAGEMENT

(CONT.)

(4) Action in case of damage.

(a) Assessment of target information.

(a) Standby SAGC take command.

1. Single passive bearing.

(b) Action for own damaged ships.

2. Triangulation.

(5) Missile/gunnery advantage/disadvantage.

3. Deploying a TRU/forward observer.

(a) Maintain missile/gunner advantage.

4. Other sources (e.g., radar).

(b) Carry out action to assume advantage if

not presently held.

(b) Updating plots, identification/recogniton,

and selection of target.

NOT RELEASABLE

1. NOT RELEASABLE

(d) Selection of firing units to include avail-

2. NOT RELEASABLE

able SR SSM/SASS.

(6) NOT RELEASABLE

(3)

Order employment of:

(a) NOT RELEASABLE

(a) SR SSM/SASS — including weapon re-

lease criteria and fire distribution.

(b) NOT RELEASABLE

(b) Guns.

(7) Enemy contact report — SITREP to OTC.

1. Methods of verification and control of

(8) Following the OTC’s policy, order type and

fall of shot.

number of SR SSM/SASS to be fired. A “cocktail

mix” will make the enemy’s ASMD difficult.

2. Control of opening of weapon area.

(9) Consider use of surface- or

3. Control of opening fire.

submarine-launched torpedoes and long-range

ASW weapons.

4. Pre-action calibration (PAC) — range

from enemy to conduct — ESM aspects.

COMBAT.

5. Ammunition type.

(1) Open fire order

— coordination of SR

SSM/SASS and guns.

NOT RELEASABLE.

6. Wind finding.

(2) NOT RELEASABLE.

7. Illumination.

(3) Reassess gunnery advantage/disadvantage;

8. Fire distribution.

change tactics accordingly.

(d) Chaff-firing sectors and patterns for con-

fusion and/or distraction.

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MTP 1(D), Vol. I

Table 8-1. Surface Action Checkoff List (Cont.)

PHASE 4 — SHORT-RANGE ENGAGEMENT

(CONT.)

(4) Weapon arcs — adjust SAG formation to a

d. POST-COMBAT.

course to maximize SAG weapon effectiveness.

(1) Individual ships report to SAGC.

(5) Fire distribution

— consider redistribution.

(a) Damage and assistance required.

(6) Ammunition expenditure — use burst fire ini-

tially; continue burst fire until good hitting rate

(b) Ammunition reports.

achieved, then use continuous fire.

NOT RELEASABLE.

(7) Jamming/chaff employment — continue un-

less interference is caused to own gun/missile

NOT RELEASABLE.

control radar.

(2) SAGC SITREP to OTC.

(8) NOT RELEASABLE.

(3) Update position of post-combat rendezvous (if

(9) Damage reports — only if fighting capability is

required).

reduced.

(4) Update OTC Rendezvous/PIM.

(10) Fall of shot reports

— only if situation is

confused.

(5) Order formation, course, and speed. Consider

maximum sonar speed if significant subsurface

(11) Reassess target priorities.

threat exists.

NOT RELEASABLE

(6) Survivors

— use helicopter assistance.

(7) Further action

— re-engage, shadow, or

NOT RELEASABLE

withdraw.

NOT RELEASABLE

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MTP 1(D), Vol. I

(e) Decision on the use of submarines for detection, identification, and possible attack utiliz-

ing either torpedoes or ASSMs.

(f) Decision on the use of air attack units and/or employment of ASSMs to provide defense in

depth.

(g) Obtaining accurate target data for possible engagement.

(3) Phase 3 — Long Range Engagement.

(a) Consideration of detaching air assets or submarines for long-range attacks.

(b) Detachment as necessary of long-range ASSM units in SAGs with supporting submarines

as appropriate or single units for long-range engagements.

(d) Post-combat.

(4) Phase 4 — Short-Range Engagement.

(a) Detachment of SAGs with short-range missiles, guns, and torpedoes.

(b) Conducting attacks.

8106

— 8109 SPARE

8110

NOT RELEASABLE

8111

— 8119 SPARE

8-8

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MTP 1(D), Vol. I

SECTION II — ANTISURFACE WARFARE BY SURFACE UNITS

8200 SURFACE ACTION CHECKOFF LIST

a. Checkoff List of Surface Action. Table 8-1 contains a checkoff list of points to be consid-

ered during the four phases of surface action. Not all of the points in the table will apply to every action, but

they should be considered and disregarded if not appropriate.

b. Enemy SSMs. Enemy SSMs may be fired from over the horizon: that is, beyond the launching

platform’s active sensor ranges and at shorter or horizon range. With the horizon range threat, appropriate

factors in Table 8-1 must be considered early and plans quickly promulgated. Indeed, under these circum-

stances, phases 2 and 4 may be compressed to run concurrently. Because of the high level of expected EW

activity, success at horizon range depends on careful planning, thorough briefing, and minimal reliance on

radio communications.

8201 SURFACE ACTION GROUP (SAG)

a. SAG Commander. On formation of a SAG, the SAG commander is responsible for:

(1) The organization of the SAG and its tactical employment.

(2) The tactical control of aircraft assigned.

(3) EW coordination.

(4) Local AAW coordination.

(5) Keeping the OTC informed of the progress of the action.

b. Composition. SAG units should be compatible in weapons, sensors, speeds, and maneuver-

ability; however, if a capability such as a complete EW suite is available only in an incompatible unit, that

unit may have to be in the SAG despite any other shortcomings.

NOT RELEASABLE

c. Communications. When the formation of the SAG is preplanned and adequate warning is

given, there will be no difficulty in activating a prepared communication plan. However, this may not be

the case when a SAG is formed in an emergency to counter a sudden threat. In this case, the SAG may em-

ploy any already established control net as ordered by the OTC. Where appropriate, the remainder of the

force should switch to alternate circuits.

d. Electronic Warfare.

(1) On the formation of the SAG, control of EW in the SAG is automatically assumed by the SAG

commander. The SAG commander will reassign ESM tasking based on threat intelligence and retask

ECM assets in order to enhance warning and defense possibilities with minimum mutual interference.

(2) Retasking of the SAGs EW equipment to concentrate on the surface threat against which the

SAG has been detached requires the EWC to reconsider overall force EW tasking. Threats no longer

covered by SAG units may have to be reassigned to ensure complete threat coverage within the force.

e. Antiair Warfare. As soon as possible after the SAG separates from the main body, the SAG

commander should become his own local AAW coordinator, controlling his own friendly aircraft if they

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CHANGE 4

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

are available. This will add to the effectiveness of his forces, better ensure own aircraft safety, and mini-

mize the confusion that would result in divided aircraft control.

f. Antisurface Ship Missiles (ASSMs).

(1) ASSM systems are divided into three categories.

(a) Short range: Up to 20 miles (to-the-horizon ranges).

(b) Medium range: From 20 to 75 miles.

The OTC or delegated authority should, if he has any choice, allocate units to the SAG with ASSM

systems of sufficiently superior range and lethality to ensure success without needlessly wasting his

most powerful assets.

(2) The conflicting use of SAM systems for AAW on the one hand and for SAM in the surface-

to-surface (SASS) mode on the other must be carefully weighed by the OTC. Systems with more than

one tracker can maintain both, although with reduced capabilities. However, most medium- and

long-range SAM systems have sufficient surface-to-surface capability to favorably influence the out-

come of the surface action.

8202 SURFACE ACTION GROUP POLICY

In defense of the main body, the primary concern must be to remain between the enemy and the main

body. If the SAG has been detached to destroy, neutralize, or repel missile carrier(s), the SAG should do so

as far as possible from the main body or convoy. In formulating his policy, the SAG commander must con-

sider the following factors:

a. Relative capabilities of own and enemy forces.

b. Likely tactics of enemy forces.

c. The use of ECM. The SAG commander should make use of the ECM capability of ships of the

SAG to disrupt enemy fire control, surface warning sensors, missile systems, and communications.

d. The use of deception. When approaching the enemy, the SAG commander should consider the

use of physical and electronic measures designed to conceal the size and formation of the SAG. The elec-

tronic emission pattern of the SAG must conform with the deception plan in use.

e. The formation. It is important that deployment into the chosen surface-action formation should

have been completed before action commences. The surface-action formation must allow ships to engage

with all their weapons, and to take avoiding action without endangering adjacent ships. Unnecessarily

large intervals between ships give an enemy with superior speed the opportunity to concentrate on one part

of the group at a time.

f. Pre-action fire control settings. It is vital that these are obtained as early in the action as possible.

Thus, initial settings on fire control equipment must be accurate. However, fire control is vulnerable to

jamming and therefore calibration involving fire control radar transmissions may be inadvisable and

should only be carried out on instruction from the SAG commander.

g. Fire distribution.

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CHANGE 4

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

(1) Normal fire distribution. Normal fire distribution entails the engagement of opposite numbers

of the enemy force and should as far as possible leave no enemy ship unengaged. If concentration of fire

is possible, major enemy ships should receive priority. Normal fire distribution is automatically in

force.

(2) Targets to individual units. The SAG commander may make a fire distribution signal allotting

targets to individual units at any time before or during an action. Special signal groups are available for

this purpose.

h. Number of missiles to be fired in ASSM salvos.

8203 STANDARD SURFACE ACTION PLANS

Three standard surface action plans exist.

NOT RELEASABLE

a. Plan GREYHOUND. Plan GREYHOUND is the plan for SSM attack by ships using a target

reporting unit (TRU) and is best suited for over-the-horizon (OTH) attacks.

b. Plan GROUSE. Plan GROUSE is the plan for SAGs, which may include helicopters, in a coor-

dinated attack against enemy surface units other than missile-armed fast patrol boats. This plan is best

suited for engagements within horizon range.

c. Plan SNIPE. Plan SNIPE is the plan for SAGs against missile-armed fast patrol boats.

8204 USE OF PASSIVE ACOUSTIC MEANS IN ANTISURFACE WARFARE

Towed array sonar (TAS) is capable of passively detecting surface as well as subsurface contacts at

extended ranges. In an area of high surface threat, the OTC may consider assigning a TAS ship to the

ASUW role in addition to, or in lieu of the ASW role. In either case, the resultant effect on the forces ASW

posture must be considered. Hull-mounted sonar, VDS and anti-torpedo detection systems can be em-

ployed to detect and identify any surface ship sonar transmission. These methods can be effective.

8205 PICKETS IN ANTISURFACE WARFARE

Pickets are stationed primarily to extend the surveillance area, and in littoral areas especially to

cover entrances and choke points. A picket-chain consisting of several units might be ordered to cover

large areas. The ASUW picket may be a surface unit, a submarine, or an aircraft.

NOT RELEASABLE

8206 — 8209 SPARE

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CHANGE 4

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

SECTION III — ANTISURFACE WARFARE WITH AIR COOPERATION

8300 GENERAL

Air assets in support of antisurface warfare operations may be used for the detection of the enemy,

for locating, identification/recognition, and reporting in order to contribute to the surface picture and for

target data reporting and transmission. Independent and coordinated attacks on the enemy’s surface units

may be included. The type of support to be provided by air assets depends on operational requirements and

on the capabilities of the air assets. Air assets may also be used to distract the enemy’s attention from own

forces, and to disrupt the enemy’s command and control.

8301 ANTISURFACE OPERATIONS SUPPORT BY FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT

a. The aim of antisurface operations by fixed-wing aircraft is to ensure the detection and

engagement of enemy surface forces in order to deny their effective employment. Fixed-wing aircraft may

be employed in:

(1) Attacks on enemy surface forces.

(2) Scouting, using any sensor to acquire tactical information.

b. Armed reconnaissance, a combination of both types, is possible, depending on the tactical situa-

tion and available air assets.

NOT RELEASABLE

8302 ANTISURFACE OPERATIONS BY HELICOPTERS

a. The aim of antisurface operations by helicopters is to:

(1) Assist forces in the detection, localization, identification, recognition, and targeting of hostile

surface forces.

(2) Attack lightly defended enemy forces, especially fast patrol boats equipped with SSMs.

b. Helicopters will normally be integrated with a surface force that may or may not have other air sup-

port. They may be land based or shipborne. When two or more helicopters cooperate against a particular surface

threat, they form a HAG. The best-fitted helicopter should become HAG commander (CONTROLLER).

c. Helicopters in antisurface operations may be employed in reconnaissance and attack and may

carry out controlled operations or act independently, as ordered by the OTC, or the unit that the OTC has

assigned duty as HCU.

(1) Controlled Operations. When the helicopter has two-way communications with and is

within the radar range of the control unit, the helicopter is to operate under positive or advisory control.

(2) Independent Operations. When the helicopter is beyond radar range and/or communica-

tion range of the HCU, the helicopter is fully responsible for safety, navigation, and the accomplishment

of its task.

8303 COOPERATION BETWEEN FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS

If helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft cooperate in engaging a surface target, the following rules will

apply. As the supporting aircraft approaches the target area and communications are established, the

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CHANGE 4

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

helicopter will provide all available target information to the supporting aircraft. If it is equipped to do so,

the helicopter may be requested to illuminate the target. Special precautions should be observed by attack

aircraft, particularly during periods of reduced visibility and at night, to ensure that the helicopter is safely

clear of dropped illumination devices, the attack flightpath, and weapon effects.

8304 EMPLOYMENT OF A HELICOPTER ACTION GROUP (HAG)

a. Alert State. The limited endurance of missile-armed helicopters prevents, in most cases, the

keeping of a HAG at airborne alert. Missile-armed helicopters should, therefore, normally be placed at the

highest possible alert state (see Chapter 1).

b. Selection of a HAG Rendezvous. The HAG rendezvous should normally be in the direction

of the threat, in order to make best use of the short on-task time of the helicopter.

c. Attack Procedure. The prime requirement for a successful missile attack is precise information

about the position, course, and speed of the target. The need for the missile-firing helicopter to be in visual

contact with and/or be pointed in the general direction of the target mainly depends on the capability of the

sensors available and the missile used. In case of a visual attack, a flare-dropping helicopter may be used.

d. Provision of Helicopter Operating Facilities. When a SAG is to cooperate with a HAG,

units with helicopter refueling facilities should be included in the SAG to increase the effective range and

endurance of the HAG.

8305 HELICOPTER IDENTIFICATION/ RECOGNITION AND ATTACK TACTICS

The aim of this procedure is to extend the range at which a surface force can identify/recognize and

attack lightly armed surface units such as fast patrol boats.

a. Employment. Helicopters can be employed to investigate contacts held by other units. By day,

helicopters should be able to make visual identification/recognition if weather conditions permit. How-

ever, at night, a method of illumination is normally required. Identification/recognition and attack proce-

dures are described in paragraph c.

b. Altitude Separation. If more than one missile-armed helicopter is launched, it may be neces-

sary to allocate different height bands for HAG separation. The following altitudes are recommended:

HAG 1

HAG 2

(Feet)

Illuminator

1,500

2,000

(CANDLE)

HAG Commander

800

1,000

(CONTROLLER)

Attack Aircraft

400

600

(ATTACKER)

If each HAG is operating on a separate frequency, it will be necessary for HAG commanders to man

an additional common frequency for coordination. If cooperating with fixed-wing aircraft, altitude separa-

tion should be imposed and departures from these altitudes made only while under positive control.

c. Identification/Recognition and Attack Procedures. By day, two aircraft comprise the

HAG carrying out this procedure: the CONTROLLER (control aircraft) and the ATTACKER (probe or

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ORIGINAL

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

SECTION V — THIRD-PARTY TARGETING

8500 GENERAL

Weapon range of ASSM exceeding the sensor range of the missile-firing unit requires the evaluation

and transmission of target data by a third party acting as an external sensor. When there is a requirement to

disguise the presence or identity of a missile-carrying unit from a target within the firing-units sensor hori-

zon, third-party targeting may be used. Surveillance, identification, classification, recognition, and report-

ing as a contribution for the surface picture compilation by this external sensor is a prerequisite for the

firing unit to decide target selection, weapon, and firing policy. Damage assessment after missile engage-

ment is another important function for an external sensor.

8501 DEFINITIONS

a. Third-Party Targeting (TPT). TPT is the evaluation and reporting/transmission of data for

the surface picture compilation and/or missile engagement by a target reporting unit (TRU).

b. Over-the-Horizon Targeting (OTHT). OTHT is the location evaluation and reporting/trans-

mission of data for a target outside the active sensor horizon of a missile-firing unit by means of a TRU.

c. Disguised Targeting. This is the evaluation and reporting/transmission of data for an enemy

within sensor range of a missile-firing unit aimed to disguise its presence.

d. Remote Targeting. This is the evaluation of target data for a missile engagement by means of

a system-integrated remote sensor platform capable of midcourse and terminal command override.

e. Target Reporting Unit (TRU). TRU is a sensor platform (manned or remotely piloted). This

unit is able to evaluate and report/transmit data for surface picture compilation and missile engagement to a

missile-firing unit.

f. Voice/RATT Reporting. This is the reporting of data for surface picture compilation and mis-

sile engagement for a TRU to a missile-firing unit by voice/RATT.

g. Link Reporting. This is the transmission of data surface picture compilation and missile en-

gagement from a TRU to a missile-firing unit by automatic data transmission in real time (Link).

8502 OVER-THE-HORIZON TARGETING CONSIDERATIONS

a. Appropriate OPGEN or OPTASK ASUW. The OTC normally promulgates his antisurface

warfare policy using the appropriate OPGEN or OPTASK ASUW.

b. Employment of OTHT Weapons. Normally OTHT-capable weapons are force weapons

and therefore are employed as directed by the OTC or delegated authority.

c. Policy Considerations. The following is a list of items to be considered for inclusion in the

policy:

(1) Retain or delegate authority to initiate OTHT and coordination.

(2) Target priorities and desired results.

(3) Firing units in order of preference.

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ORIGINAL

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

(4) TRUs in order of preference.

(5) Force defensive action.

(6) SAG employment.

(7) Geographical and environmental aspects.

(8) EMCON.

(9) Sensor employment (including parameters of target vehicle emitters).

(10) Weapon release criteria.

(11) Mutual interference.

(12) Weapon economy.

(13) Damage assessment.

8503 ACCURACY OF TARGET DATA

Because of the finite size of the search pattern of an ASSM, the greatest possible accuracy of target-

ing information is required to ensure a high probability of missile acquisition which depends upon:

a. The accuracy of the sensor(s) used.

b. The positional accuracy of, and time delay in, plotting and calculating target data (course, speed,

position, and forecast movement).

c. The ability of the missile and/or reporting unit to discriminate between targets in formation to en-

sure engagement of the optimum target.

d. The positional accuracy of the data link/voice reporting reference point.

e. The accuracy of transfer of target data to the ASSM system in the firing system.

f. The accuracy of ASSM navigation and/or guidance systems in the flight profiles.

g. The ability to update target data to the missile in flight.

h. The countermeasures employed by the target and EPM capabilities of ASSM and launch or re-

porting unit.

8504 SELECTION AND STATIONING OF A TARGET REPORTING UNIT

a. Providing Target Data. Where target data cannot be provided by the ASSM launch vehicles

own sensors, selection of the TRU is very important to ensure provision of the most accurate and

up-to-date information. Target reporting units may include:

(1) Radar and/or ESM-fitted helicopters.

(2) Shipborne ASW aircraft.

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ORIGINAL

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

d. TRU Stationing. Stationing the TRU will depend upon:

(1) Type of vehicle used, including self-defense capability of the TRU.

(2) Sensor fit. Active sensors will provide a more accurate solution than that obtained by correlation

and triangulation of passive data. The employment of active sensors will depend upon the emission pol-

icy to which the TRU is subject. The range of the TRU from the target will be a function of the discrimi-

nation possible with active sensors and the degree of risk to the TRU acceptable to the OTC.

(3) Range of ASSM engagement.

(4) Communication range between the TRU and the ASSM platform.

(5) Sensors available in the firing unit.

(6) ASSM flight profile, missile-homing search capability, and missile facility to receive

midcourse guidance corrections.

(7) Geographic and environmental constraints.

(8) Geometric considerations, including the need for passive sensor baseline.

(9) Enemy’s defensive systems.

(10) Rules of Engagement (ROE).

(11) Required recognition level and required recognition confidence level.

8505 TARGET REPORTING

Target data from the TRU can be transferred to the firing unit by voice/RATT report or by data link.

a. Voice/RATT Reporting. This has the disadvantage of being slow in data rate, prone to inaccu-

racy, and unless encrypted, it is not secure. Where voice transmissions are unencrypted, the use of a

low-grade code is essential to avoid compromise of friendly positions. Voice/RATT reports need to be fre-

quent and, if reports are passed in grid, a gridlock is required at the earliest opportunity.

b. Link Reporting. The data link can be directional to a dedicated ASSM platform, or

omnidirectional to permit a number of suitable units to achieve a firing solution. The link need not be

dedicated to TPT, because of the high capacity of modern data link systems, but may be usefully em-

ployed simultaneously in other fields of warfare to best exploit the capabilities of the TRU. Caution

should be exercised when using data link to ensure sufficient gridlock accuracy and track quality for

discriminative targeting of a multiship formation.

8-24

CHANGE 3

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

SECTION VI — DEFENSE AGAINST SURFACE THREAT

8600 DEFENSE AGAINST MISSILE-ARMED SHIPS

a. For a successful defense against missile-armed ships, the following criteria must be considered

in addition to other procedures for antisurface warfare:

(1) Detection of the missile carrier(s).

(2) Actions upon interception of threat radars.

(3) Destruction or neutralization of the missile carrier(s) before reaching its engagement range

against friendly forces.

(4) Detection of missile(s) in flight.

(5) Deception and jamming of missile before lock-on.

(6) Measures to break lock-on of missile.

(7) Destruction of missile.

b. Details of defense against missile attacks are set forth in Chapter 7.

8601 DETECTION OF MISSILE CARRIER(S)

Early warning of missile-launching surface craft is of vital importance for the defense of own forces

to ensure the timely initiation of suitable defense measures. Especially, in this context ESM and airborne

surface surveillance efforts must be carefully considered and coordinated.

a. Target/Threat Radars. The interception of electronic emissions will normally be the first in-

dication of the enemy. Therefore, those radar frequencies should be watched continuously that are known

to be surveillance or fire-control radars of missile carriers and would therefore pose an immediate threat

(e.g., SQUARE TIE). Careful ESM tasking is required, including the determination of threat radars.

b. Use of Active Sensors. The policy for using own airborne and surface platform radars must

be matched carefully with ESM tasking in order to provide maximum warning and minimum interference

to ESM equipment and minimum ESM data to a launching platform.

8602 ACTIONS UPON INTERCEPTION OF TARGET/THREAT RADARS

a. Target/Threat Radar Detection. Once a target/threat radar is detected, the OTC may decide

to attack the missile carrier or avoid action:

(1) If an attack is intended, maneuver at maximum speed to bring own weapons to bear and to mini-

mize enemy weapon effectiveness.

(2) If action is to be avoided, turn away from missile carrier at maximum speed, try to show the

smallest possible radar cross-section, and keep firing arcs open.

b. OTCs Considerations. In addition to the alteration of course, speed, and formation, and de-

pending on whether the decision is to attack or to avoid action, the OTC should consider the following

actions:

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CHANGE 3

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

(1) Actions which cannot be detected by the enemy. Readiness to:

(a) Employ chaff confusion/distraction.

(b) Launch decoys.

(d) Employ fire-control radars and weapons immediately.

(2) Actions which are likely to be detected by the enemy. Employment of:

(a) Chaff confusion and jammers to cause confusion to the enemy’s picture of the situation.

(b) Own active sensors.

8603 ANTI-FPB OPERATIONS

Table 8-2 contains a checkoff list of points to be considered by the OTC during anti-FPB operations. Not

all of these points will apply to every situation.

NOT RELEASABLE

8604 AIR ANTI-FPB OPERATIONS

The following paragraphs describe airplans that may be employed by MPA and helicopters during

anti-FPB operations.

8605 AIR PLAN BLUEBELL

a. Purpose and Use.

(1) Air Plan BLUEBELL is designed for use by MPA employed on anti-FPB operations in support

of a surface force. The aircraft’s primary search sensor will be radar. The airplan is designed to provide

warning of approaching FPBs in the following situations:

(a) Across a given sector, when an assessment can be made of the FPBs’ probable direction of

approach.

(b) All round the surface force, when the FPBs’ direction of approach cannot be assessed.

(2) The OTC attempts to assess the direction from which the FPB threat can be expected and assigns

MPA to execute the appropriate form of the airplan. Aircraft should report all contacts to the OTC im-

mediately, but should not deviate from the patrol to investigate or classify contacts unless specifically

ordered to do so by the OTC.

(3) Air Plan BLUEBELL is designed for use in open-ocean waters. When operating in confined wa-

ters or in areas of dense shipping, a geographic or relative airplan, such as Air Plan 5, may be considered

to be more appropriate.

b. Description.

(1) Air Plan BLUEBELL is designed to provide sufficient warning across a given sector for heli-

copters or probe aircraft to intercept, identify, and engage FPBs before they can reach missile-firing po-

sition. When aircraft are on all-round patrol, the warning is only sufficient for interception. In both

8-26

CHANGE 3

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

Table 8-2. Anti-FPB Checkoff List

PRIOR TO ATTACK

1. Avoid FPB probability areas. Transit in daylight if possible.

2. Very bad weather conditions inhibit FPB operations. Sea states 5 or less may be advantageous to the FPB. Take

this into account when planning transits.

3. Prepare/review preplanned responses.

4. Mount maximum air surveillance/reconnaissance all around the force and/or in the threat direction.

5. If threat direction is known, use pickets, barriers, or SAGs (in advanced position).

6. Identify all contacts as early as possible. Use surface and air units.

7. Select an inner or outer screen, depending on circumstances.

8. Review EMCON plan and EW tasking.

9. Review COMPLAN to ensure that it supports anti-FPB operations.

10. Assume the appropriate degree of readiness. Keep air assets at a high degree of availability.

11. Keep a clear and up-to-date surface picture in which own helicopters, direct support aircraft, and chaff are in-

corporated to prevent confusion and surprise.

12 and 13. NOT RELEASABLE.

WHEN FPB ATTACK DEVELOPS

1. Promulgate the appropriate threat warning.

2. Assume a higher degree of ASUW/AAW readiness.

3. Take appropriate torpedo countermeasures.

4. Ship’s weapon systems are to be used in accordance with standard doctrine.

5. Firm weapon coordination is required.

6. Employ all other possible decoys.

7. Assume the highest aircraft alert state.

8 THRU 16. NOT RELEASABLE.

8-27

CHANGE 3

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

13062 EVACUATION OF ANCHORAGES

a. Passive and Active Mine Countermeasures. The passive and active mine

countermeasures to protect merchant and naval ships from the danger of mines in anchorages, and

measures to move those units to safe waters, are covered by the term, evacuation.

b. Passive Mine Countermeasures. Ships caught in an anchorage by an enemy surprise

mining campaign should remain there until further orders, initiating passive mine countermeasures

immediately.

c. Anchorage Standing Orders. All units will receive Anchorage Standing Orders (in

accordance with Chapter 4 of ATP 6, Vol. I), for information about procedures in a mined area.

d. OPCON Authority. The OPCON authority will detach MCMVs, if available, to conduct

active mine countermeasures, preferably:

(1) Clearance diving in the vicinity of ships at anchor.

(2) Minehunting in link routes, exit channels, and close to ships at anchor.

(3) Minesweeping in channels where they are not endangering units at anchor.

e. No MCM Vessels Available. If no MCMVs are available, the OPCON authority will signal

further intentions.

13063 REPORTING MINE EXPLOSIONS/DETECTIONS

Every ship detonating a mine or detecting a moored mine or a drifting mine case, whether damaged

or not, shall make a mine detection report (MW signal, (see ATP 1 vol II) to the OPCON authority

informing the OTC of the MCM force if in contact with that force. If doubt exists as to which unit activated

a particular mine, the nearest ship is to report. The report does not substitute for any other report requested.

NOT RELEASABLE

13-23 (Reverse Blank)

CHANGE 2

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

CHAPTER 14

Force Protection in Harbor

14000 INTRODUCTION

In times of tension, as well as in war, ships at anchor or at berths are liable to clandestine attack. Such

attack may take various forms (e.g., car bombs, improvised explosive devices (EOD), underwater

swimmers or floating mines). It is important that provision be made within a force, as well as in individual

ships, for an organization to coordinate defense and establish degrees of readiness against this threat.

Command responsibilities are in Chapter 1. All operations involving divers, including bottom search

operations, must be conducted in accordance with ADivP-1, Allied Guide to Diving Operations.

14010 NOT RELEASABLE

14011 SECURITY ALERT STATES

a. The OTC or the operational commander ashore may order the following security alert states

NOT RELEASABLE

(1) Alert State ALPHA.

NOT RELEASABLE

(2) Alert State BRAVO.

NOT RELEASABLE

(3) Alert State CHARLIE.

NOT RELEASABLE

(4) Alert State DELTA.

NOT RELEASABLE

b. The security alert states and/or selected security measures may be ordered by the appropriate

signals from ATP-1, Vol. II.

14-1

CHANGE 2

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

14025 — 14029 SPARE

14030 ACTION AFTER ATTACK

In warships, the search for limpet mines is the responsibility of the ships’ own divers. Any limpets

found are to be dealt with by an officer qualified in rendering mines safe if such an officer is available. If no

such officer is available, one of the ship’s officers must undertake this task in accordance with instructions

based on available knowledge of enemy limpet mines. Clearing limpets from the hulls of merchant ships is

the responsibility of EODTs. In either case, speed is essential; every effort is to be made to find and remove

or render safe a limpet mine after it is discovered on any part of the ship as soon as possible. Ships are to

take all appropriate measures to minimize the effect of an explosion should such occur before a limpet can

be removed or rendered safe.

14-6

CHANGE 2

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

AJP-2.5(A)

March 2008

PUBLICATION NOTICE

ROUTING

1. AJP-2.5(A), CAPTURED PERSONS, MATERIEL AND DOCUMENTS, is

available in the Navy Warfare Library. It is effective upon receipt.

2. Summary: AJP-2.5(A) provides guidance on the procedures for the handling

and administration of captured persons and their effects, for the interrogation

of captured persons, as well as the procedures for the handling and reporting of

captured materiel and documents within the NATO alliance. It is also intended

to improve cooperation between NATO forces during operations and provide a

sound procedural base for instruction in the service schools and establishments

of NATO and its member states.

Navy Warfare Library Custodian

Navy Warfare Library publications must be made

readily available to all users and other interested

personnel within the U.S. Navy.

Note to Navy Warfare Library Custodian

This notice will assist you in providing information to cognizant personnel. It is not accountable.

IIa

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

NATION

SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

1) Owing to the medical profession secrecy the Belgian Ministry of Fefence consider the

sentence "list any wounds, injuries, illnesses" in Point 27 of Appendix 1 to Annex K as

non-existing

2) The Belgian Ministry of Defence considres that, in view of Appendix 2 to Annex K, the

BEL

"Medical records" will be handled according to the applicable medical professionsecrecy

standards.

3) With the rspect to Paragraph 0707,2,d,(4), the Belgian Ministry of Defence interprets

the "safety of the CPERS" as the "medical safety of the CPERS"

Further to paragraph 0104 under 2 and paragraph 0105 under 1, The Netherlands will

aplly the Additional Protocol I

(1977) and relevant sections of the Third Geneva

Convention on Prisoners of War (1949) to determine the status of captured personnel

NLD

during an armed conflict. The Netherlands thus considers the stipulations of the

Additional Protocol I (1977) to have been incorporated into Annex V and the glossary of

AJP-2.5(A).

A. The United Staes of America(USA) does not subscribe to the generic application of the

Geneva Conventions as implied in paragraphs 0104.1, 0302.3.b, 0303.2.d, 0702.1.a(3),

and 0706.1. Not all captured personnel meet the criteria of an enemy prisoner of

war(EPW) under GC3 or that of a protected person as set forth in GC4. For those

individuals who do not meet the requirements of either GC3 or GC4, the USA will apply

Department of Defense Policy as set forth in DOD Directive 5100.77. It is Department of

Defense Policy that members of Armed Forces will comply with the law of war during all

armed conflicts, no matter how they are characterized, and in all other military operations.

The Law of war is defined as: That part of international law that regulates the conduct of

armed hostilities. It is often called the "law of armed conflict." The law of war

encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United

States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which

the Unites States is a party, and applicable customary international law.

B. The USA does not subscribe to language in Para. 0104.3, the provision that any

USA

detainee who is not an enemy prisoner of war or is protected under GC4 will be handed

over to competent civilian authorities. The USA will comply with US policy regarding any

individual detained who does not meet the requirements of the Geneva Convention.

C. The USA does not subscribe to the language in paragraphs 0204.1.c(1) and 0805.1.b,

to the extent that captured persons (CPERs) do not meet the criteria of GC3 or GC4. The

USA shall treat all CPERs humanely and in accordance with applicable law and US

policy as provided in US domestic law and the laws of war.

D. The USA does not subscribe to the 24 hours and 72 hours timelines for keeping

CPERs at collecting points and holding areas as set forth in paragraphs 0302.1, 0302.2,

G001.6, and G002.12. Within the operational environment, the amount of time CPERs

stay at collecting points and holding areas is a function of security and operational

considerations, which include ensuring the safety of CPERs. The US will keep detainees

at collecting points and holding areas only as long as circumstances require based on

security/operational conditions and available transportation.

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

E. The USA does not subscribe to Para. 0303.2.e, as it is inconsistent with current US

policy. The USA will comply with applicable law and policy as provided in US law, policy

and the laws of war.

F. The USA does not agree with the word "communicate" in Para. 0303.7. The USA will

comply with Article 70, GC3, which provides that an enemy prisoner of war may "write" to

his family. Further, Article 70 only applies to capture cards. It does not provide for "letters,

cards and emails." The USA will comply with Article 71, GC3, with respect to

correspondence.

G. The USA does not subscribe to the Internationla Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC)

having the right to "investigate" or "inspect" USA facilities per Para. 0304.1 and Annex M,

page M-1. The ICRC mission is to be an impartial, neutral and independent organization

whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of

war and internal violence, and to provide them with assistance. It directs and

coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the movement in situations of

conflict. It also endevaours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening

humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles.

H. The USA does not subscribe to the ICRC being allowed unfettered access to

individual CPERS held in interrogation facilities as per Para. 0401.1. While the USA

agrees that ICRC may have access to interrogation facilities, the Geneva Conventions

USA

specifically recognize that access to CPERs by the ICRC may be limited for reasons of

"imperative military necessity" under GC3, Article 126.

I.The USA does not use the term "international humanitarian law" in Para. 0801.2. The

USA uses the term "law of war" or "Law of Armed Conflict." The USA will comply with the

law of war as described in reservation "a" above.

J. The USA does not subscribe to the parctise of allowing prisoners of war (POWs) to

maintain possessions of medical supplies in Annex L, Para. L004 and Annex V, POW

HANDLING ORGANISATION / ACTION AT COLLECTING POINT table. USA policy is

that any medical supplies, especially medications found in the possession of the POWs

at time of capture, must be confiscated, placed in a locked container, and identified with

POW's name and capture tag number. This ensures the POW's safety by preventing the

risk of individula suicide attempts or use of medical supplies by other POWs for suicide

attempts while in custody. In addition, there is no guarantee that substances reported to

be prescription drugs or medical supplies are in fact prescription drugs or medical

supplies. Such substances should be assessed for medical intelligence value and

determined by competent medical authority to be what they are reported to be. Medical

supplies can be subsequently provided in a controlled, prescribed manner. If medical

personnel of an enemy force are detained as captured personnel, captured medical

supplies and drugs can be distributed to them for the purpose of providing medical care

to POWs within areas designated by the Coalition as POW medical treatment areas.

XII

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

No.

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

0101

Purpose…………………………………………………………………………………… 1-1

0102

Scope……………………………………………………………………………………… 1-1

0103

Terms and Definitions…………………………………………………………………….. 1-1

0104

Prisoner of War Status……………………………………………………………………. 1-1

0105

The Geneva Conventions…………………………………………………………………. 1-2

0106

The Detaining Power……………………………………………………………………… 1-2

0107

Knowledge of the Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols……………

1-3

CHAPTER 2 - PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PERSONS, MATERIEL AND

DOCUMENTS UPON CAPTURE

0201

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….. 2-1

0202

Persons……………………………………………………………………………………. 2-1

0203

The Handling of Persons Captured at Sea………………………………………………… 2-3

0204

Tactical Questioning……………………………………………………………………… 2-3

0205

Categorisation…………………………………………………………………………….. 2-4

0206

Materiel…………………………………………………………………………………… 2-6

0207

Documents………………………………………………………………………………… 2-7

CHAPTER 3 - PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONS

0301

General Handling Procedures…………………………………………………………….. 3-1

0302

Facilities…………………………………………………………………………………... 3-3

0303

Processing of POWs and Other CPERS…………………………………………………... 3-3

0304

Inspections, Media Operations, Visits and Photography…………………………………. 3-5

CHAPTER 4 - INTERROGATION OF CAPTURED PERSONS

0401

General Provisions………………………………………………………………………... 4-1

0402

Organisation………………………………………………………………………………. 4-3

0403

Procedures at Interrogation Units…………………………………………………………. 4-3

0404

Procedures at Joint Interrogation Centres and Combined Joint Interrogation Centres

4-4

0405

Reporting

4-5

CHAPTER 5 - CAPTURED MATERIEL AND ASSOCIATED TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

0501

General……………………………………………………………………………………. 5-1

0502

Safety……………………………………………………………………………………… 5-1

0503

Exploitation……………………………………………………………………………….. 5-2

0504

Reporting………………………………………………………………………………….. 5-3

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

0505

Further Handling………………………………………………………………………….. 5-3

0506

Security…………………………………………………………………………………… 5-4

CHAPTER 6 - CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

0601

General……………………………………………………………………………………. 6-1

0602

Categorisation…………………………………………………………………………….. 6-1

0603

Exploitation……………………………………………………………………………….. 6-2

0604

Translation

6-3

0605

Tagging and Handling of CDOCs

6-3

0606

Reporting, Reproduction and Dissemination……………………………………………... 6-4

0607

Handling of Category “A” Documents…………………………………………………… 6-4

0608

Handling of Special Documents…………………………………………………………... 6-5

0609

Further Handling………………………………………………………………………….. 6-5

0610

Security…………………………………………………………………………………… 6-5

CHAPTER 7 - CAPTURED PERSONS, MATERIEL AND DOCUMENTS IN COMBINED

JOINT OPERATIONS

0701

General……………………………………………………………………………………. 7-1

0702

Responsibilities…………………………………………………………………………… 7-1

0703

The Handling of CPERS and the Operational Planning Process…………………………. 7-6

0704

The Organisation for Handling CPERS…………………………………………………... 7-7

0705

The CJDIF………………………………………………………………………………… 7-8

0706

Responsibilities Pursuant to the Geneva Conventions or Other Applicable International

Law as They Pertain to the CJDIF…………………………………

7-9

0707

Organisation………………………………………………………………………………. 7-9

0708

CMAT and CDOCs……………………………………………………………………

7-11

CHAPTER 8 - NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

0801

General

8-1

0802

Peace Support Operations

8-1

0803

Defence Against Terrorism Operations

8-2

0804

Responsibilities…………………………………………………………………………… 8-2

0805

Treatment of CPERS…………………………………………………………...…………. 8-3

0806

General Procedures……………………………………………………………………….. 8-3

0807

CPERS Suspected of Committing or Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Acts,

War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity or Other Crimes………………………………... 8-5

0808

Additional Procedures…………………………………………………………………….. 8-5

0809

Media Operations…………………………………………………………………………. 8-6

ANNEX A - CAPTURE TAG

A001

General……………………………………………………………………………………. A-1

ANNEX A - APPENDIX - CAPTURE TAG FORMAT

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX B - GROUP CAPTURE REPORT

B001

General……………………………………………………………………………………. B-1

ANNEX B - APPENDIX - SAMPLE FORMAT FOR A GROUP CAPTURE REPORT

ANNEX C - SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE HANDLING OF PERSONS CAPTURED AT

SEA………………………………………………………………………………………………

C001

General Principles………………………………………………………………………. C-1

C002

After an Engagement at Sea ……………………………………………………………. C-1

C003

Hospital Ships……………………………………………………………………

C-1

C004

Neutral Ports…………………………………………………………………………….

C-1

C005

CPERS Documentation………………………………………………………………….. C-1

C006

Reports………………………………………………………………………………….. C-1

C007

Tactical Questioning and Interrogation………………………………………………… C-1

C008

Evacuation of CPERS…………………………………………………………………… C-1

C009

Transfer of CPERS Between Ships……………………………………………………… C-1

C010

Guidelines for Guarding and Handling CPERS at Sea…………………………………... C-1

C011

Removal of CPERS to Maritime Units in Amphibious Operations……………………… C-2

ANNEX D - SAMPLE FORMAT FOR A TACTICAL QUESTIONING REPORT

ANNEX E - PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL REPORT (PRETECHREP)

ANNEX F - GUIDELINES FOR HANDLING EVIDENCE

F001

General……………………………………………………………………………………. F-1

F002

Evidence Custody…………………………………………………………………………. F-1

F003

Evidence Submission……………………………………………………………………... F-2

F004

Evidence Storage Facilities……………………………………………………………….. F-2

F005

Evidence Inventory……………………………………………………………………….. F-3

F006

Transfer and Shipment of Evidence………………………………………………………. F-3

F007

Disposal of Evidence……………………………………………………………………… F-3

ANNEX G - HOLDING FACILITIES FOR CAPTURED PERSONS

G001

General……………………………………………………………………………………. G-1

G002

Collecting Point…………………………………………………………………………… G-2

G003

Holding Area……………………………………………………………………………… G-3

G004

Long-Term Holding Facility……………………………………………………………… G-4

G005

Facilities for Inprocessing CPERS………………………………………………………... G-5

G006

Planning Factors for Holding Areas and Long-Term Holding Facilities…………………. G-6

G007

Construction Recommendations………………………………………………………….. G-7

G008

Interrogation Facility……………………………………………………………………… G-9

ANNEX H - ESCORTS AND GUARDS

H001

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….. H-1

H002

Definitions………………………………………………………………………………… H-1

H003

The Escort………………………………………………………………………………… H-1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

H004

The Guard…………………………………………………………………………………. H-3

H005

Control of CPERS………………………………………………………………………… H-4

H006

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………… H-5

ANNEX H - APPENDIX - GUIDELINES FOR THE MOVEMENT OF CAPTURED

PERSONS

ANNEX I -SUMMARY OF GENEVA CONVENTIONS WHICH SHOULD BE

COMMUNICATED TO PRISONERS OF WAR

ANNEX J - INTERNMENT SERIAL NUMBER

J001

General……………………………………………………………………………………. J-1

J002

The Internment Serial Number……………………………………………………………. J-1

ANNEX K - PRISONER OF WAR PERSONNEL RECORD AND PRISONER OF WAR

RECORD CARD

K001

Preparation Instructions…………………………………………………………………... K-1

ANNEX K - APPENDIX 1 - SAMPLE FORMAT OF A PRISONER OF WAR RECORD

ANNEX K - APPENDIX 2 - SAMPLE FORMAT OF A PRISONER OF WAR RECORD

CARD

ANNEX K - APPENDIX 3 - BIOMETRICS

K301

General……….…………………………………………………………………………… K-3-1

K302

Types of Biometric Data………………………………………………………………….. K-3-1

K303

Standards……..…………………………………………………………………………… K-3-2

ANNEX L - PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE HANDLING OF PROPERTY AND MONEY

OF PRISONERS OF WAR

L001

Personal Effects…………………………………………………………………………… L-1

L002

Personal Documents and Effects………………………………………………………….. L-1

L003

Military Effects…………………………………………………………………………… L-1

L004

Medical Supplies………………………………………………………………………….. L-2

L005

Food……………………………………………………………………………………….. L-2

ANNEX M - THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

M001

The International Committee of the Red Cross…………………………………………… M-1

M002

Inspections of CPERS Facilities………………………………………………………….. M-1

ANNEX N - SYSTEM OF ALLOCATING INTERROGATION SERIAL NUMBERS

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N001

General……………………………………………………………………………………. N-1

N002

Composition of the Interrogation Serial Number…………………………………………. N-1

ANNEX O - SAMPLE FORMAT OF A SEARCH REPORT

ANNEX P - SAMPLE FORMAT OF AN INTERROGATION REPORT

ANNEX Q - JOINT CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTRE

Q001

General

Q-1

Q002

Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Centre

Q-1

Q003

Captured Materiel Exploitation Operations

Q-2

ANNEX R - COMTECHREP - TYPE A

R001

Purpose

R-1

R002

Format

R-1

ANNEX S - COMTECHREP - TYPE B

S001

Purpose

S-1

S002

Format

S-1

ANNEX T - COMTECHREP - TYPE C

T001

Purpose

T-1

T002

Format

T-1

ANNEX U - JOINT CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTRE

U001

General

U-1

U002

Joint Captured Document Exploitation Centre

U-1

U003

Captured Document Exploitation Operations

U-2

ANNEX V - PRISONER OF WAR HANDLING AIDE MEMOIRE

ANNEX W - STANAG 1059 COUNTRY AND NATO COMMAND CODES

W001

General

W-1

W002

Three-Letter ISO-Based Codes and Two-Letter NATO Codes for Countries

W-1

W003

Three-Letter ISO-Based Codes and Two-Letter NATO Codes for NATO Commands

W-7

W004

Six-Character ISO-Based Codes and Four-Character NATO Codes for NATO

Subordinate Commands

W-7

GLOSSARY

XVII

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

No.

CHAPTER 3 - PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONS

Figure 3-1

CPERS Evacuation Chain………………………………………………………….. 3-2

CHAPTER 7 - CAPTURED PERSONS, MATERIEL AND DOCUMENTS IN COMBINED

JOINT OPERATIONS

Figure 7-1

Organisation for Handling CPERS………………………………………………….. 7-8

Figure 7-2

Example Organisation of a CJDIF………………………………………………….. 7-10

CHAPTER 8 - NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Figure 8-1

CPERS Handling Process in a NA5CRO…………………………………………..

8-4

ANNEX G - HOLDING FACILITIES FOR CAPTURED PERSONS

Figure G-1

Example of an Initial Collecting Point…...…………………………...…………….. G-2

Figure G-2

Example of a Central Collecting Point (200 man capacity).…………….……………G-3

Figure G-3

Example of a Holding Area (500 man capacity)………………………………….. G-4

Figure G-4

Example of a POW Long-Term Holding Facility………………………………….. G-5

Figure G-5

Example of a CPERS Processing Facility ………………………………………... G-6

Figure G-6

Example of an Interrogation Facility………………………………………………... G-10

XIX

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

0101

Purpose

The purpose of this publication is to provide guidance on the procedures for the handling and

administration of captured persons (CPERS) and their effects, for the interrogation of CPERS, as well

as the procedures for the handling and reporting of captured materiel

(CMAT) and documents

(CDOCs) within the NATO alliance. It is also intended to improve cooperation between NATO forces

during operations and provide a sound procedural base for instruction in the service schools and

establishments of NATO and its member states.

0102 Scope

This publication is intended to cover the handling of CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs in operations across

the spectrum of armed conflict. Since warfighting is the basis for the ability of NATO to conduct other

types of operations, the procedures outlined in this publication are primarily applicable to conventional

military operations. However, the adaptation of these procedures to other types of operations such as

Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO) and Defence Against Terrorism Operations

(DATOs) is also addressed. The publication also provides general guidelines for the handling of

CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs in multinational operations based on the Combined Joint Task Force

(CJTF) concept with the participation of both NATO member Nations and coalition partners.

0103

Terms and Definitions

1. Terms, definitions, acronyms and abbreviations used in this publication are explained in the

Glossary.

2. For purposes of convenience, a CPERS, either a prisoner of war (POW) or other detained person¹,

is referred to throughout the publication as ”he”. However, it should be remembered that a CPER may

be male or female. Where particular procedures refer to female POWs or other detained person, this

will be made clear in the text of the publication.

3. The term ”Detaining Power” will, throughout this publication, have the meaning given in the

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (GC3) and the

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949

(GC4).

0104

Prisoner of War Status

CPERS can be divided into two broad categories: CPERS who are POWs and other persons

whose liberty has been restricted. All CPERS enjoy the protections of the GCs as set forth in GC4,

Article 4, or other applicable international law while in the custody of a Detaining Power.

¹ In this context the term “detained person” does not include refugees, displaced persons and other persons who

have been detained for their own protection. It does, however, include retained personnel.

1 - 1

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

POW status is conferred on CPERS who fall within the categories listed in Article 4 of GC3.

These categories are included in the definition of a POW in the Glossary, or, if ratified by the nations

concerned, those who meet the expanded definition of a POW as stated in Protocol I of the 1977

Protocols².

Should any doubt arise as to whether any persons, including those appearing to be POWs,

having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into Allied hands, belong to any of the categories

of persons entitled to POW status pursuant to article 4 of GC3, such persons shall enjoy the protection

of GC3 until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal. If such a tribunal

determines that an individual does not qualify for POW status, then the Detaining Power must

determine whether the detained person qualifies as a ”protected person” pursuant to GC4 and obtain

legal advice relative to the proper course of action for dealing with such detained persons. If it is

determined that these detained persons do not have POW or protected status, they will be handed over

to competent civilian authorities

(national, United Nations or authorities of other international

organisations) or held in the custody of a NATO force in accordance with the provisions of the

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for that particular operation or mission.

Furthermore, when NATO forces are engaged in NA5CROs including DATOs, the MOA

should contain specific guidelines as to which individuals will have POW status in accordance with

applicable international law. Directions for handling other detained persons, once their status has been

determined by a competent authority, including those suspected of terrorism, crimes against humanity,

war crimes or other crimes, are also to be included in the MOA relevant to that particular operation or

mission. These procedures are described in general terms in Chapters 7 and 8.

Children captured as participants in a hostile action will be detained and handled in accordance

with applicable international law³. They will be segregated from adult CPERS.

0105

The Geneva Conventions

Treatment of POWs as well as the handling of personal possessions including personal

documents belonging to them will at all times be in accordance with GC3 and, if ratified by the

nations concerned, with the 1977 Protocols².

Treatment of other detained persons as well as the handling of their personal possessions and

documents will at all times be in accordance with applicable international law.

0106

The Detaining Power

The responsibilities of the “Detaining Power” as set out in GC3 rest with the nation which

initiated the capture or detention of the CPERS in question. CPERS awaiting the determination of their

real status are considered as POWs. Both such CPERS and confirmed POWs may only be transferred

by the Detaining Power in accordance with the conditions laid down in GC3, Article 12 (2). NATO is

not a state and, therefore, cannot itself be a party to treaties and other international instruments relating

² It should be noted that not all NATO member nations have ratified the 1977 Additional Protocols. However,

nations should honour those provisions of the Protocols that they consider customary international law.

³ GC4 and the Additional Protocols refer to CPERS under the age of 15 as children. GC3 does not address the

issue of children captured as active participants in an armed conflict. This issue will be referred to the member

nations for legal guidance and should be addressed in the MOA, if relevant to the particular operation or mission.

Guidance may also be found in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and in the

Optional Protocol of 25 May 2000 to this Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict. (For the

purposes of that Convention, a child means every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law

applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.)

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to the conduct of armed conflict. Individual NATO troop contributing nations may, of course, be a

party to such international instruments. In NATO-led operations, a lead nation may be designated to

receive POWs from of other NATO nations participating in the operation. A MOA may be entered

into to govern the procedures for transfer and the responsibilities of the designated nation following

transfer. Any such arrangements must be in accordance with GC3, Article 12.

0107 Knowledge of the Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols

The Geneva Conventions require the signatories in time of both peace and war to circulate the

text of the Conventions as widely as possible within their countries. They are especially required to

ensure that the provisions and implications of the Conventions are clearly understood by the members

of their armed forces and by the civilians attached to them. This is especially important for those who

may be called upon to deal with CPERS. It is suggested in the Conventions that instruction in them is

included in the syllabus of appropriate military and civilian courses of instruction.

The conventions also state that any military or other authority assuming responsibility for

dealing with POWs in time of war or armed conflict must be in possession of the text of the

Conventions and that its personnel must be instructed in how the Conventions affect them in the

execution of their duties with POWs.

If ratified by the nations concerned, these requirements are, by inference, also applicable to the

1977 Protocols.

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CHAPTER 2

Procedures for Handling Persons, Materiel and Documents

upon Capture

0201 Introduction

CPERS and their effects, CMAT and CDOCs are prime sources of information and should be

exploited for intelligence purposes with a minimum of delay. Intelligence exploitation, therefore,

requires expeditious and correct handling and reporting on these information sources. The procedures

outlined in this chapter pertain specifically to the handling of persons, materiel and documents at the

point of capture. A more detailed description of the procedures for the subsequent handling of CPERS

and their effects, CMAT and CDOCs is given in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this publication.

When practicable, suitably manned, trained and equipped forces should be allocated to combat

units specifically to process CPERS and their effects as well as CMAT and CDOCs and subsequently

evacuate them from the combat zone.

Especially in connection with NA5CROs, capturing units should be aware of the possibility

that, depending on national or NATO directives, CPERS may be suspected of having committed acts

subject to legal prosecution, and that CMAT and CDOCs may constitute evidence that could be used

in legal proceedings. Therefore, such CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs should be properly tagged and

subsequently handed over to the military police or other competent authorities as soon as possible.

0202 Persons

Conditions allowing, the following procedures should be followed at the initial point of

capture:

a. CPERS should be disarmed immediately, and their weapons made safe. Personnel

conducting searches should be aware that CPERS may carry concealed explosives on their

person (in order to carry out “suicide bombings”). The CPERS and his effects should be

thoroughly searched. CPERS should be searched by personnel of their own gender. If that is

not possible, CPERS may be searched by personnel of the opposite sex in the presence of a

witness, when possible an officer or non-commissioned officer, to ensure that the search is

conducted in accordance with standards of propriety relevant to that particular situation.

All documents and effects of military or investigative interest as well as items that may

pose a threat to the security of own forces should be removed.

b. CPERS with POW status may retain clothing, identity documents, protective equipment

(helmets, gas masks and those articles issued for personal protection), eating

utensils, personal effects etc., as stipulated in GC3, Article 18. All identification

documents should be reviewed/inspected and catalogued, and then returned to the POW as

soon as possible.

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c. A Capture Tag (CAPTAG) should then be filled out and provided to the CPERS. The

designated parts of the tag will be attached to his personal effects and documents in

accordance with the procedures outlined at Annex A.

d. Where a group of CPERS are taken at the same time or are to be evacuated together, a

Group Capture Report (GROUPCAPREP) should be completed. The format for this report

is at Annex B. Category A or B CPERS (as described in paragraph 0205) are to be

separately reported by an Intelligence Report (INTREP). (Refer to STANAG 2022.)⁴ Any

Category A or B CPERS should be moved to the nearest suitable interrogation unit or

facility as expeditiously as practicable.

e. It is important that the personal effects, CMAT and CDOCs taken from the CPERS

accompany him to the next receiving unit. Valuable information may be lost by not having

these items available during processing and interrogation.

f. CPERS should be allowed no opportunity to exchange information among themselves, to

exchange identities or to dispose of materiel, documents and personal effects.

g. Subsequent questioning and interrogation must not be compromised by unauthorised and

unsupervised contact between CPERS and personnel not concerned with interrogation

duties.

h. Within the confines of the tactical situation, CPERS are to be segregated according to rank,

grade, service, sex, nationality or warring faction, and if necessary, ethnic and religious

group to minimise the opportunity to prepare counter-interrogation measures. Children

should be separated from adult CPERS. Furthermore, deserters, civilians and regime and

other indoctrination personnel will be individually segregated from other CPERS. Such

segregation shall be undertaken in a manner which does not violate applicable international

law (e.g. GC3, Articles 16 and 22, for CPERS with POW status).

CPERS are to be guarded in a manner, which shall deny the opportunity for self-injury,

suicide, escape or sabotage. Use of force, including lethal force, will be in accordance with

the established principles of self-defence and Rules of Engagement (ROE).

CPERS will also be prevented from observing sensitive and critical activities, materiel and

procedures involving NATO, national or allied forces.

⁴ An INTREP may follow one of the following formats: the “5W” format (Who, What, Where, When, Why-

-and How) or the “SALUTE” format (Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment) format.

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k. CPERS are to be escorted to the nearest initial collecting point as quickly as possible and

subsequently evacuated to higher echelon’s collecting point or holding area as expeditiously

as possible.

Naval and air force personnel should be identified and the intelligence organisation is to be

notified in order that interrogation by naval/air force personnel may take place at the

earliest opportunity.

0203 The Handling of Persons Captured at Sea

The handling of persons captured at sea is in addition to GC3 governed by the Convention for

the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at

Sea of 12 August 1949 (GC2). In this Convention, the term 'shipwrecked' covers all eventualities at

sea including sinking by enemy action and the crashing of aircraft into the sea.

The handling of POWs captured at sea should follow the principles and, where practicable, the

same procedures set out in Chapters 1 through 6 of this publication. Although the unique nature of

maritime operations and the organisation and manning of naval units may preclude strict adherence to

these procedures, the GCs, in particular GC2, Article 16, and applicable international law must be

respected. Additional special provisions that take the different nature of maritime and amphibious

operations into account are detailed in Annex C.

0204 Tactical Questioning

As soon as possible after capture, CPERS should be screened by interrogators or personnel

trained in tactical questioning. Tactical questioning may also be conducted at sea. This tactical

questioning should be carried out so that subsequent interrogations are not compromised or

jeopardised. The object of tactical questioning is to screen CPERS and to obtain valuable information

which would deteriorate or be lost altogether if the questioning was delayed until a trained interrogator

could be made available. In order to achieve this, it is necessary that:

a. CPERS are thoroughly searched even though this may already have been done at the point

of capture.

b. The tactical questioners should have been provided, by the unit commander and his

intelligence staff, with clearly stated information requirements.

c. In the course of questioning, tactical questioners are to adhere to the following provisions:

(1) No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against CPERS, in particular to obtain

information from them or from third parties. (In accordance with GC4, Article 31.)

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(2) A POW, when questioned on the subject, is bound only to give his surname, first names

and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this,

equivalent information. Neither physical or mental torture, nor any other form of

coercion may be inflicted in order to secure information of any kind whatever. They

may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment

of any kind. (In accordance with GC3, Article 17.)

(3) CPERS who are incapable, for physical or mental reasons, of stating their identity are to

be handed over to the unit medical staff for treatment and/or evacuation.

(4) Questioning of CPERS shall be carried out in a language which they can understand.

For each captured person, the tactical questioners produce a Tactical Questioning Report

(TQREP) referring to the CPERS number (from the CAPTAG). The format of a TQREP is provided in

Annex D.

Tactical questioners and interrogators check that CPERS and any associated documents or

effects have been correctly tagged and that these documents and effects accompany the CPERS as

they are moved.

0205 Categorisation

CPERS shall be categorised according to their assessed intelligence value as early as possible.

This may be done by capturing units where a tactical questioning and language capability exists. This

categorisation shall be reassessed by interrogation units (IUs) whenever they receive CPERS.

Categories:

a. Category A. CPERS of high value whose broad or specific knowledge of the adversary’s

war effort or of the activities of one of the parties in the conflict makes it necessary for

them to be interrogated without delay by specialised interrogation personnel and at the

highest level. Category A CPERS could include the following:

(1)

General Officers or their equivalents.

(2)

Chiefs of Staff of major formations, and heads of staff

sections down to Army level.

(3) Officers in intelligence or communications organisations or appointments.

(4) Officers in special police units and counter-terrorist units.

(5) Officers and NCOs of Special Operations Forces.

(6) Personnel with knowledge of ciphers/cryptography.

(7) Personnel with knowledge of subjects of particular intelligence interest or importance

like:

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(a) Scientific and technical personnel

- personnel with current knowledge of

radiological, biological and chemical weapons or any other new type of materiel or

weapon of mass destruction.

(b) Psychological operations (PSYOPS) personnel.

(d) Indoctrination personnel (e.g. political officers).

(e) Other CPERS with wide knowledge of the adversary’s or the particular warring

faction’s military capabilities or political, religious, cultural, psychological and

economic factors.

(f) Persons with knowledge of organised crime organisations and operations. (These

persons are to be reported to relevant legal and law enforcement authorities for

further interrogation.)

(g) Persons with knowledge of terrorist organisations and operations. (These persons

are to be reported to the counterintelligence and security organisations for further

interrogation.)

(h) Persons with knowledge of terrorism, war crimes, crimes against humanity and

other crimes.

(These persons are to be reported to relevant legal and law

enforcement authorities for further interrogation.)

(i) Aviation personnel/naval personnel whose mission subordination, training and

knowledge of enemy locations, movements and organisation are thought likely to

be of considerable interest.

(8) CPERS who display a willingness to assist interrogation staff in the achievement of

their primary task and whose assistance can be material to the achievement of that task.

Category B. CPERS who have sufficient information of intelligence value to warrant

further interrogation or who may be of assistance to interrogation staff.

Category C. CPERS who have information of limited, immediate tactical value, which is,

therefore, time sensitive.

Category D. CPERS of no intelligence interest.

The above definitions are a broad guide only and considerable latitude shall be exercised by

interrogation staff in the categorising of CPERS.

The timely interrogation and exploitation of CPERS in Category A and B is vital to the

achievement of the primary aim of interrogation. The swift transfer of Category A and B CPERS to a

Joint Interrogation Centre (JIC) or a Combined Joint Interrogation Centre (CJIC), which are described

in paragraph 0402, is therefore extremely important.

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When a capturing unit moves a CPERS who is assessed or presumed to be Category A or B to a

medical facility or to a holding point, the intelligence organisation should be alerted as soon as

possible to ensure the early exploitation of his intelligence potential.

0206 Materiel

CMAT includes items necessary to equip, operate, maintain, or support military, terrorist or

criminal activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes.

(However, CMAT does not include real estate, installations, and utilities.) CMAT that has no further

intelligence value or value as evidence in legal proceedings will ordinarily be disposed of through

appropriate logistics channels or by ordnance personnel. Generally, this CMAT will be handed over to

or retrieved by service and recovery units.

Great care should be taken to ensure the safe handling of CMAT. The possibility that CMAT

and other items having belonged to or been used by an adversary could be booby-trapped should be

considered before they are handled. All weapons and armaments should be cleared or otherwise

rendered safe. Ammunition should be stored so that the danger of explosion is minimised. Weapons of

mass destruction and other weapons and equipment containing bio-hazardous, radioactive or toxic

materials should be cordoned off, and trained personnel should be summoned to dispose of them.

High-voltage equipment should be handled with great care.

CMAT and Associated Technical Documents (ATDs) considered of intelligence or other

interest will be handled by the capturing unit in the following manner:

An INTREP will be prepared by the capturing unit upon the discovery or capture of CMAT

or ATDs believed to be of intelligence interest. The reporting channels are from the

capturing unit through the chain of command to the first Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)

element.

If possible, the capturing unit will conduct a preliminary screening to obtain information of

immediate technical or tactical value. A Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP) as

set out in Annex E will be prepared and submitted through established intelligence

channels.

CMAT will be tagged by the capturing unit as follows:

National identifying letters of capturing unit as prescribed in STANAG 1059—see Annex

Designation of capturing unit including service.

DTG of capture.

Location of capture (geographic coordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone

designation and 100,000-metre square identification).

Adversary unit or warring faction from which CMAT was captured (including national

identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059).

Summary of circumstances of capture.

Associated CPERS.

ATDs will be tagged as described in paragraph 0207.1. c.

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e. CMAT and any ATDs should be subsequently evacuated.

f. If the CMAT cannot be evacuated, ATDs should be forwarded with photographs, drawings

or a detailed description of the CMAT to the nearest intelligence staff for exploitation. The

CMAT should be kept under guard until further instructions are received.

g. If CMAT has to be destroyed for operational or safety reasons, unidentified items should be

photographed, sketched or described in writing as documentation. This documentation will

then be forwarded to the nearest intelligence staff for exploitation.

CMAT and ATDs that may constitute evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected

of crimes against humanity, terrorism, war crimes and other crimes as applicable will be safeguarded

or secured separately from other CMAT and ATDs. Tags for such CMAT and ATDs should be

marked “EVIDENCE”. These items should be reported as soon as possible by the capturing unit or

person to the military police or other personnel specially trained and authorised to handle evidence, so

that they may establish a chain of custody/evidence. Guidelines for handling items to be used as

evidence are detailed in Annex F.

0207 Documents

CDOCs are important sources of intelligence and information. It should be noted that

documents include all types of media that may contain, record or store information. A detailed

definition of the term “document” may found in the Glossary. Therefore, specialist personnel may be

required to access information from various types of media. CDOCs considered of intelligence interest

will be handled by the capturing unit in the following manner:

a. If possible, the capturing unit will conduct a preliminary screening to obtain information of

immediate technical or tactical value.

b. An INTREP identifying the CDOCs and its disposition as well as giving information

considered to be of immediate tactical value will be prepared and submitted by the

capturing unit.

c. The original CDOCs should not be marked on; they should be collected and stored in

watertight containers or bags and tagged. The capturing unit/person will tag the CDOC or

CDOCs as follows.

National identifying letters of capturing unit as prescribed in STANAG 1059.

Designation of capturing unit including service.

Serial number of the CDOC or CDOCs. This will consist of a number allocated sequen-

tially by the capturing unit.

DTG of capture.

Location of capture (geographic coordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone

designation and 100,000-metre square identification).

Adversary unit or warring faction from which CDOC was captured (including national

identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059).

Summary of circumstances under which the CDOCs were obtained.

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Interrogation serial number of any associated CPERS, if appropriate or known. CDOCs

associated with a captured person should be marked with part C of the CAPTAG.

CDOCs that may constitute evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected of crimes

against humanity, terrorism, war crimes and other crimes as applicable will be safeguarded or secured

separately from other CDOCs when practicable. Tags identifying such documents should be marked

”EVIDENCE”. These documents should be reported as soon as possible by the capturing unit or

person to the military police or other personnel specially trained and authorised to handle evidence in

order to establish a chain of custody/evidence. Guidelines for handling items to be used as evidence

are detailed in Annex F.

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CHAPTER 3

Procedures for Handling Captured Persons

0301 General Handling Procedures

Standard administrative procedures for the handling of CPERS will be as set out below.

Operational conditions may require deviations from these procedures. Where this is the case, the

principles and procedures will be followed as far as circumstances allow. The provisions of applicable

international law will always be observed.

The Detaining Power will at all times be responsible for the care, custody and control of CPERS.

Article 12 of GC3 permits the transfer of POWs from the custody of the Detaining Power to the

custody of another power that has ratified GC3 and has the will and means to uphold the provisions of

the Convention.

The interrogation of CPERS is set out in Chapter 4 of this publication and should be read in

conjunction with this chapter.

As soon as possible after capture, individuals are to be provided with tags in accordance with

the procedures outlined in Annex A and collected at a suitable point or area where a GROUPCAPREP

should be compiled (see Annex B).

Evacuation is to be carried out as soon as the tactical situation permits to one of the following

facilities that should be situated far enough from the combat zone for the CPERS to be out of danger:

a. Collecting points.

b. Holding areas.

c. Long-term detention facilities.

d. Medical facilities.

e. Interrogation units (usually collocated with a-c above).

Figure 3-1 illustrates the CPERS evacuation chain and lists recommended actions at each stage

in the CPERS handling process.

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Point of Capture

Unwounded

Wounded

• Disarm

• Search

• Give first aid

• Guard

• Search

• Provide with tag (CAPTAG)

• Guard

• Transport under escort to next higher echelon

• Provide with tag (CAPTAG)

• Transport under escort to aid

station of next higher echelon

Next Higher Echelon’s (e.g. Battalion or Brigade’s)

Collecting Point

Aid Station

• Guard

• Search

• (Provide with tag (CAPTAG))

• Segregate

• Send GROUPCAPREP to formation

Tactical Questioning

• Report (TQREP and INTREP)

• Categorise

Selected for Interrogation

Not Selected for Interrogation

• Expedite Category A and

• Transport under escort to higher

B CPERS to Interrogation

formation’s holding area

Unit or Centre

Interrogation Unit

Formation’s (e.g. Brigade, Division or

(Collocated with Holding

Corps’) Holding Area

Clearing or Dressing Station

Area)

• Interrogate (Interrogation

• Guard

Report and INTREP)

• Segregate

• Expedite Category A and

• Conduct detailed search (Search

B CPERS to Interrogation

Report)

Centre

• Induct, register and process

(Internment Serial No., POW Record

and Record Card)

• Report to ICRC (Red Cross forms)

• Shelter and feed

• Transport under escort to long-term

detention facility

Interrogation Centre

Long-Term Detention Facility

(Collocated with Long-Term

Hospital

Detention Facility

• Induct, register and process

• Interrogate (Interrogation

• Guard

(POW Record and Record Card)

Report and INTREP)

• Induct, register and process

• Report to ICRC (Red Cross forms)

(Internment Serial Number, POW

Record and Record Card)

• Report to ICRC (Red Cross forms)

• House, feed and provide facilities i.a.w.

applicable international law

Figure 3-1: CPERS Evacuation Chain.

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0302 Facilities

Collecting Points. These are usually established at battalion or brigade level, but may also

be established at any appropriate command level. A central collecting point may be established at

division level. Collecting points are intended to hold CPERS for up to 24 hours. They should be

evacuated as soon as the tactical situation permits. Interrogation units may be collocated with them.

Holding Areas. These will usually be temporary areas located at division and corps level, but

in certain operations may also be located at brigade level. Holding areas are intended to hold CPERS

for up to 72 hours from time of capture. They should be evacuated as soon as the tactical situation

permits. At corps level holding areas for accommodating large numbers of CPERS for longer periods

of time may be established. Interrogation units may also be collocated with these.

Long-Term Detention Facilities. These include POW facilities and other detention

facilities.

POW Facilities. POW facilities are of a more established nature and are designed for the

extended internment and complete administration of POWs. These facilities may be

established in the Communications Zone, the Rear Combat Zone or other location away

from the battlefield, or outside the area of operations. POWs not selected for interrogation

may be transported directly to a POW facility. Interrogation units or centres may be

collocated with POW facilities. POWs will be treated in accordance with GC3.

Other Detention Facilities. Other detention facilities include internment facilities and

other installations separate from POW facilities that are designed for the extended

incarceration of other detained persons pending decision on their status and disposition.

CPERS held in such facilities are entitled to treatment in accordance with international law

including GC4 when applicable. In all cases, internment will occur only when absolutely

necessary to the security of the Detaining Power and will be in accordance with the

provisions of GC4 when applicable.

Medical Facilities. CPERS will receive proper medical treatment to include dispatch to

the nearest facility as necessary. They will remain the responsibility of the CPERS

administration organisation while undergoing treatment.

Interrogation Units. CPERS assessed to have information of immediate tactical value

may be subjected to tactical questioning. Based on the results of tactical questioning, an

evaluation of effects or the circumstances of capture, CPERS who are assessed as Category

A or B as defined in Chapter 2 of this publication, are to be sent to the nearest suitable

interrogation unit. These units will normally be collocated with the collecting points and

holding areas. The early exploitation of a captured person’s intelligence potential may make

it necessary for interrogation units to come forward to the initial point of capture.

Guidelines. Guidelines for establishing collecting points, holding areas and long-term

detention facilities are contained in Annex G.

0303

Processing of POWs and Other CPERS

Stage 1 - The Capture. Whenever conditions allow, the procedures outlined in Chapter 2

of this publication are to be followed by the capturing unit.

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Stage 2 - Evacuation and Holding. The tasks set out in Chapter 2 of this publication shall

be completed at the collecting point if they have not been done at the point of capture. The duties and

procedures of escorts and guards are detailed in Annex H. At holding areas registration of CPERS

should take place and the following processes should be completed.

a. POWs are to be informed of their rights under GC3 as summarised in Annex I.

b. POWs are to be issued an Internment Serial Number (INTERNSN). The INTERNSN is a

unique serial number allocated by the national POW handling organisation to enable the

identification and tracking of the POW during his internment. A recommended format for

an INTERNSN is detailed in Annex J.

c. Records and record cards for POWs are to be initiated (Annex K). All records for POWs

and other CPERS should be digitised when possible and maintained in databases accessible

to intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Biometric data may be used in addition to

photographs and fingerprints to ensure unmistakable identification of CPERS.

d. Civilians who do not have POW status may be interned and will be treated in accordance

with GC4 and applicable international law. They shall be accommodated and administered

separately from POWs and from persons deprived of liberty for any other reason.

e. CPERS other than those with POW status suspected of terrorism, war crimes, crimes

against humanity and other crimes will be handed over to the law enforcement agencies or

judicial authorities appointed by NATO to deal with them as determined by the MOA.

POWs may be transferred from/to collecting points and holding areas into or from the custody

of interrogation units. The responsibility for the guarding, feeding, medical treatment and safety of

POWs remains with the unit which has custody of the POWs.

GC3 stipulates that a nation transferring POWs to another nation still has the obligation to

ensure that treatment of the transferred POWs is in accordance with the GC3 and other applicable

international law. Any such transfer should be conducted in accordance with the operational plan.

Stage 3 - POW Facilities. If any of the above procedures or duties have not been carried

out, they will be completed by the facility authorities at the earliest opportunity.

POWs may be transferred to the custody of interrogation units or interrogation centers and from

such custody as described above. If not already allocated, it will be the responsibility of the facility

staff to allocate a POW INTERNSN to CPERS who have been interrogated before completion of

processing and registration. Interrogation Serial Numbers (INTGSNs) shall not be used for this

purpose. The responsibility for the safeguarding, feeding and medical treatment of CPERS so

transferred remains with the unit having custody of them. When CPERS are transferred to a holding

area or POW facility under the control of another NATO nation’s armed forces or of a NATO nation

acting as the Detaining Power on behalf of the nations participating in a NATO force, the transferring

nation or formation will ensure that the information required by this publication is transferred together

with the CPERS. The receiving forces will be responsible for completing the documentation required

by their own forces or those required by this publication.

As soon as possible after capture and not more than one week after arrival at a temporary or

long-term holding facility or a hospital every POW shall be given the opportunity to communicate

with his family and - in wartime - the Central Prisoner of War Agency. Resulting letters, cards and e-

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mails will be forwarded as quickly as possible after inspection by intelligence personnel or appropriate

authority.

POW Personal Property. The procedure for handling, recording and safeguarding the

personal property taken from POWs as set out in Annex L shall be used.

Financial Accountability. GC3 establishes how the financial matters of POWs should be

handled. This includes records of pay, accounts and work records. The officer commanding the POW

facility will ensure that all such GC3 requirements are met.

10.

POW Rights. GC3 requires that POWs have access to copies of GC3 in their own language.

This is the responsibility of the Detaining Power. This responsibility may be delegated to the officer

commanding the POW facility.

0304 Inspections, Media Operations, Visits and Photography

Inspections. Representatives and delegates of Protecting Powers and International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegates have the right to investigate the treatment and

administration of POWs and other CPERS wherever they may be in accordance with GC3, GC4 or

other applicable international law. They are to be given every assistance in this work. This right may

only be suspended for reasons of “imperative military necessity” by the national authority of the

detaining power, and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure. Legal advice must be sought

before taking such action. The provision of full and open inspection facilities will assist in establishing

a favourable impression of the quality of the treatment of CPERS. The role of the ICRC is explained

in Annex M.

Media Operations. The increased ability of the international press to focus on the treatment of

CPERS could lead to adverse publicity and pressure. This could in turn damage domestic and

international support for an operation. Also, media exposure could jeopardise military and law

enforcement operations. The section responsible for media operations within the headquarters is to be

kept informed of operations and data pertaining to CPERS within the Command’s Area of

Responsibility (AOR). The Command should issue a policy regarding media access to CPERS and

facilities holding CPERS consistent with applicable international law.

Visits. The Command should issue a policy regarding the authorisation of visits by persons

who are not representatives or delegates of a Protecting Power or the ICRC. Such visits should serve

an official purpose and be limited in frequency, scope and duration. Operational security within

CPERS facilities should be strictly maintained. Exposure of CPERS to the media and other visitors to

facilities holding CPERS must not violate the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and other

applicable international law especially regarding protection against public curiosity.

Photography. All photography of CPERS and facilities holding CPERS must serve an

official purpose and be approved by the Commander or the senior officer responsible for the handling

of CPERS. The GCs (inter alia GC3, Articles 13 and 14) must be complied with.

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CHAPTER 4

Interrogation of Captured Persons

0401 General Provisions

Geneva Conventions. The treatment of CPERS held for interrogation will comply with the

provisions of the Geneva Conventions, or other applicable international law. The responsibilities of

the Detaining Power as set out in GC3 and GC4 shall rest with the capturing or detaining nation. The

term ”Detaining Power” will have the meaning as understood in GC3 and GC4. The ICRC is to be

allowed access to individual CPERS held in interrogation facilities, but not to sensitive areas (e.g.

operations and communications rooms).

Interrogation Personnel. A lead interrogator should be designated with responsibility for

the conduct of the interrogation. Interrogators must be trained and qualified to conduct systematic and

extended questioning of CPERS to obtain information of intelligence value. They should have the

necessary language skills to conduct interrogations in the area of operations. If interpreters are used, it

should be noted that this may diminish the interrogators’ effectiveness and may entail security

problems.

Aim. The primary aim of interrogation is the timely extraction of information from CPERS

following tactical questioning, and the timely dissemination of information and intelligence resulting

from interrogations to relevant commands in order that it may be used in the production of

intelligence estimates and in decision making. In order to achieve this aim, CPERS should be

screened by trained personnel as soon as possible after their capture in order to obtain information of

immediate tactical value and to categorise them according to their assessed intelligence or counter-

intelligence value to ensure the effective allocation of interrogation resources. Category A or B

CPERS (as assessed in accordance with paragraph. 0205) during tactical questioning (as described in

paragraph 0204) should be transferred as soon as possible to an interrogation unit or centre. The

categorisation of a CPERS may be changed based on the results of an interrogation and with the

passage of time.

Responsibilities. The responsibilities are as follows:

a. The operational commander through his intelligence organisation is responsible for the

interrogation of CPERS in order to obtain information of intelligence or counter-

intelligence value.

b. Information obtained during operational interrogation may not be admissible as evidence in

criminal proceedings unless certain legal procedures have been followed. Therefore,

interrogation of CPERS for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in criminal

proceedings should be the responsibility of competent law enforcement agencies or judicial

authorities. If criminal activity is uncovered during interrogation the appropriate law

enforcement agencies or judicial authorities must immediately be involved to process the

information for legal consideration. Ordinarily, where criminal activity is suspected,

questioning by law enforcement agencies or judicial authorities should take place first.

Failure to do so may taint any evidence obtained by questioning. This, in turn, may prevent

a successful prosecution for the criminal activity concerned. If it is deemed desirable for

military intelligence personnel to be present during a law enforcement interview of a

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suspect legal advice should be obtained first to determine the effect this may have upon the

admissibility of the evidence gathered during the interview. Ultimately, in a NATO

operation, the commander of the NATO force may have to decide whether interrogation for

the purpose of intelligence collection or an interview to obtain evidence in accordance with

legal standards has the highest priority in a particular case.

c. The responsibility for the handling, guarding, administration and welfare of CPERS in

custody of NATO forces shall rest with the CJ1 staff. The guard force and administrative

staff shall not conduct interrogation operations.

d. CPERS should be held by the interrogation organisation for the minimum time consistent

with the effective exploitation of their intelligence potential. It is not the intention that

interrogation staff should assume administrative responsibility for CPERS.

Handling of CPERS During the Interrogation Phase. If practicable, throughout the

interrogation phase, CPERS should be:

Segregated according to rank, grade, service, sex, nationality or warring faction, and if

necessary, ethnic and religious group to minimise the opportunity to prepare counter-

interrogation measures. Children should be separated from adult CPERS. However, young

children should not be separated from immediate family members, if captured with them.

Furthermore, civilians, deserters, regime officials, indoctrination personnel and persons

deemed to require protection from other CPERS will be individually segregated. Such

segregation shall be undertaken in a manner which does not violate applicable international

law (e.g. GC3, Articles 16 and 22).

Allowed no opportunity to exchange information among themselves, to exchange identities

or to dispose of materiel, documents and effects of intelligence interest. Whenever possible

facilities should allow for prisoners to be segregated from each other to prevent

communication with and observation of each other while in transit to and from the

interrogation facility.

Allowed no opportunity to compromise interrogation operations by unauthorised and

unsupervised contact with personnel not concerned with interrogation duties.

Allowed no opportunity to observe sensitive and critical activities, materiel and procedures

involving NATO or national forces.

Guarded in a manner, which shall deny the opportunity for self-injury, suicide, escape or

sabotage. Use of force, including lethal force, will be in accordance with the established

ROE.

Provided necessary medical care and regularly examined by medical personnel.

Other CPERS Treated As POWs. The procedures for the debriefing of defectors and

adversary deserters and the questioning of other combatants shall be the same as those for POWs.

Such categories shall be segregated from other CPERS during interrogation and holding wherever

practicable.

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0402 Organisation

It is important that the interrogation organisation is as flexible and straightforward as possible.

An Interrogation Unit (IU) and a Joint Interrogation Centre (JIC) may comprise the basic interrogation

organisation.

IU. The primary aim of IUs is to exploit the time-sensitive intelligence potential of CPERS

in Categories A, B and C, and to identify Category A and B CPERS in order to arrange

their early transfer to a JIC. IUs may be set up and employed at any appropriate command

level. Such units would form part of the appropriate command or task force’s intelligence

organisation. They may operate at holding areas for CPERS or elsewhere to meet the

commander’s intelligence requirements. IUs will, therefore, operate as closely as possible

to collecting points, holding areas, and, possibly, long-term holding facilities as possible to

avoid the need for separate guard forces as well as medical, catering and other

administrative staffs. Only personnel who are trained and qualified to conduct

interrogations should be employed as interrogators. Naval, army and air force interrogation

staffs may be attached to IUs where appropriate, thus forming, Joint Interrogation Units

(JIU). Interrogation personnel from two or more nations may form Combined Joint

Interrogation Units (CJIU). IUs may be supported by one or more teams capable of, and

responsible for, providing linguistic and technical support to interrogations and translating

and exploiting CDOCs. These teams should consist of linguists and technical specialists

capable of retrieving information from electronic media.

JIC. JICs may be set up and employed at any appropriate joint command level. Combined

Joint Interrogation Centres (CJICs) may be established. Ideally JIC/CJICs would be

collocated at POW facilities and other long-term detention facilities in order to facilitate

interrogation operations and minimise the need for administrative and logistic support.The

primary aim of JIC/CJICs is the extensive and, where necessary, extended interrogation of

CPERS in order that their tactical, operational and strategic intelligence potential can be

fully exploited. Appropriate navy, army or air force interrogation staffs should be organic to

those centers. JIC/CJICs should also have organic teams capable of, and responsible for,

providing linguistic support to interrogations and translating and exploiting CDOCs. These

teams should consist of linguists and technical specialists capable of retrieving information

from electronic media.

The aim of the above organisations is to ensure the effective use of the interrogation resources

in an armed conflict. Where IUs or JICs are established, they should not only report their products

through national reporting channels but also those reporting channels of the relevant NATO command.

Nations which do not have a need or organisation for the formation of a JIC may delegate this

responsibility to an IU, a JIU or a CJIC.

0403 Procedures at Interrogation Units

IUs, JIUs and CJIUs receiving CPERS shall adopt the following procedures:

a. Allocate an Interrogation Serial Number to CPERS selected for interrogation in accordance

with the procedure set out at Annex N.

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Review the GROUPCAPREP, the TQREP and any associated documents and materiel.

Conduct a thorough search of the CPERS to ensure that he has been properly disarmed and

that all material of intelligence interest has been recovered. During the search of the

CPERS his physical and mental condition should be observed and all items in his

possession should be thoroughly inspected and evaluated for intelligence value and for their

potential danger to own personnel and to the CPERS himself. Effects and articles essential

to his safety will be returned to him after the search has been completed. The principles set

out in applicable international law shall be strictly observed. Results of the search including

observations of the CPERS physical and mental condition as well as information of

intelligence value gathered from documents, effects and other articles should be recorded in

a Search Report (SEARCHREP). A sample format for a SEARCHREP is shown in Annex

O. This information may also be included in the Interrogation Report (INTGREP).

At the end of each interrogation an INTGREP will be submitted by the most appropriate

means. The INTGREP is described in Annex P.

On completion of interrogation at the IU, POWs shall be sent to a JIC/CJIC for further

specialised interrogation, if warranted. If the POWs are deemed to be of no further

intelligence interest, they shall be forwarded to a POW facility established by the Detaining

Power in accordance with the current administrative instructions.

CPERS who are not POWs will be processed in accordance with instructions from higher

national or NATO command.

0404 Procedures at Joint Interrogation Centers and Combined Joint Interrogation

Centers

JICs and CJICs receiving CPERS shall adopt the following procedures:

a. Allocate an Interrogation Serial Number (INTGSN) to CPERS selected for interrogation in

accordance with the procedure set out at Annex N, if one has not already been allocated.

b. Review any pertinent reports (such as INTREPS and Intelligence Summaries) as well as

any reports from previous questioning and interrogation as well as any associated

documents and materiel.

c. Search the CPERS to ensure that they are properly disarmed and that all objects of

intelligence interest have been recovered. If an extensive and thorough search has been

conducted by an interrogation unit at lower echelon, results of the search should be reported

in a Search Report or included in the INTGREP; if a search has not been conducted, this

should also be recorded in the INTGREP. Effects and articles essential to CPERS’ safety

will be returned to them after inspection to ensure that they contain no material of

intelligence interest and cannot be used to harm interrogation and guard personnel or to

inflict self-injury.

d. At the end of each interrogation an INTGREP will be submitted by the most appropriate

means.

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On completion of interrogation, POWs shall be sent to a POW facility established by the

Detaining Power in accordance with the current administrative instructions and applicable

international law.

CPERS who are not POWs will be processed in accordance with instructions from higher

national or NATO command.

POWs sent to POW facilities and other detained persons who remain in custody after

interrogation may be subjected to further interrogation should the need arise.

0405 Reporting

INTREPs. The capturing unit should identify any category A or B CPERS and report them by

submitting an INTREP. These CPERS will be moved to the nearest suitable interrogation unit or

facility as expeditiously as practicable.

Interrogation Serial Number. Every individual selected for interrogation will be given an

INTGSN. This number, once issued, will remain with the captured person throughout his interrogation

at whatever level and should not be changed. This number is issued for intelligence source

identification. This number shall not be confused with the POW Internment Serial Number

(INTERNSN), which should NOT be used for this purpose. The INTGSN will be composed as

detailed in Annex N.

Search Report. The Search Report is used to record the results of the thorough and extensive

search conducted by IUs and JICs. Results of the search including observations of the CPERS physical

and mental condition as well as information of intelligence value gathered from documents, effects

and other articles should be recorded in a Search Report. A sample format for a Search Report is

shown in Annex O. This information may also be included in the INTGREP.

Interrogation Reports. INTGREPs may also be used to report results gathered from the search

and tactical questioning (or screening), if this has not been done previously. INTGREPs shall be

forwarded to the Command intelligence organisation as quickly as possible. One copy shall remain in

the captured person’s file which shall accompany him through all phases of the interrogation process.

These reports will remain in the intelligence channels and shall not be forwarded to the administrative

authorities when CPERS are sent to detention facilities or other holding facilities. A sample format for

an INTGREP is shown in Annex P.

Intelligence Reports. The preparation of full INTGREPs shall not delay the communication of

important interrogation products to the Command. Where such information has been sent in advance

of the INTGREP in the form of, for example, an INTREP, this fact should be mentioned and any

relevant message identification and DTG should be referred to in the report.

CDOC Exploitation. Information and intelligence obtained from the exploitation of CDOCs

will normally be separately reported in accordance with Chapter 6 of this publication. INTGREPs will

refer to such exploitation, particularly where CPERS are prepared to confirm such

information/intelligence.

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CHAPTER 5

Captured Materiel and Associated Technical Documents

0501 General

Exploitation of CMAT, and ATDs should be carried out carefully and promptly. Some of this

materiel may be unknown or only partially known in its design, construction, technical data, function,

capabilities, modes of employment, etc. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to gain information for

possible counteractivities and necessary protective measures to support friendly operations. Materiel

and ATDs of special intelligence interest should be stated in the intelligence staff's information and

other intelligence requirements and included in the Intelligence Collection Plan.

CMAT and ATDs of interest to a particular component or nation should preferably be handed

over to that component or nation at the earliest possible moment for exploitation.

Procurement of technical experts and the way they should be utilised for exploitation are to be

decided by the nations. Nations may decide to establish Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Centres

(JCMECs) on a permanent or ad hoc basis. Guidance on this matter is offered in Annex Q.

The results of the exploitation of CMAT and ATDs shall be made available to the commander

and to other NATO or national commanders and authorities in accordance with stated intelligence

requirements and reporting procedures consistent with national laws and policy. In combined

operations TECHINT as well as photographic documentation of the CMAT and copies of ATDs

should be shared among all the troop-contributing nations. If a command intelligence database has

been established such intelligence and information may be stored in it.

TECHINT personnel and units often operate under the operational control of the intelligence

staff. However, logistic staff must provide transportation support for the evacuation of CMAT from

the combat zone to a facility where intelligence exploitation can take place. Furthermore, workshops

and other logistic facilities may have to be placed at the disposal of TECHINT personnel and staff in

their work.

Procedures for handling CMAT and ATDs that may constitute evidence in criminal

proceedings are detailed in Annex F.

0502 Safety

Great care should be taken to ensure the safe handling of CMAT. When necessary, trained personnel

(e.g. Explosive Ordnance Disposal specialists) should be tasked to handle or dispose of weapons,

armaments, ammunition and explosives. All weapons and armaments should be cleared or otherwise

rendered safe. Ammunition should be stored so that the danger of explosion is minimised. Weapons of

mass destruction and other weapons and equipment containing bio-hazardous, radioactive or toxic

materials should be cordoned off, and specialists should dispose of them. High-voltage equipment

should be handled with great care. The possibility that CMAT and other items having belonged to or

been used by an adversary could be booby-trapped should be considered before they are handled.

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0503 Exploitation

Intelligence exploitation of CMAT and ATDs is in principle a national responsibility to be

undertaken by the capturing nation, but this responsibility may be assumed by a NATO Command or

Force. Wherever forces of two or more NATO nations are operating together, mutual support for the

purposes of proper and timely exploitation should be given. This is especially important when the

capturing nation does not have the necessary technical capability to exploit particular CMAT and

ATDs. In that case such CMAT and ATDs should be turned over to an allied nation that has such a

capability as expeditiously as possible. In cases where responsibility for exploitation is handed over to

an allied nation, that nation will keep the capturing nation fully informed of the results obtained and

will forward copies of ATDs and reports prepared. The exploiting nation will be responsible for

reporting as described in this Chapter.

During the exploitation process, CMAT and the original copy of ATDs must be kept together.

When exploitation has been completed, the CMAT must be handed over to appropriate national

agencies for utilisation or disposal, with copies of ATDs as appropriate. A copy of the ATDs will be

forwarded to the document exploitation unit of the national JIC or, if applicable, the CJIC (see Chapter

4 of this publication), or other national or NATO agency responsible for CDOCs. When possible,

photographs of the CMAT should be taken and removed with the CMAT/ATDs.

In the exploitation of CMAT and ATDs, close coordination should be exercised between

elements at various levels within the intelligence organisation where linguistic and technical assistance

could be sought. CPERS associated with CMAT and ATDs should, if possible, be kept available for

questioning during the exploitation process, but the evacuation and interrogation of CPERS have

higher priority.

CMAT and ATDs considered to be of intelligence or other interest will be exploited through

the following process. Whenever feasible, in order to expedite handling, the processing stages may be

combined.

a. Reporting. The capturing unit reports the capture or discovery of CMAT or ATDs

believed to be of intelligence or other interest through higher headquarters to the first

TECHINT element in the chain of command by means of a PRETECHREP (as at Annex E)

or an INTREP.

b. Preliminary Screening. Preliminary screening and reporting of information of

immediate technical, operational or other value through established intelligence channels

will be accomplished by the capturing unit.

c. Complementary Examination. Complementary examination and reporting may be

carried out in the field by technical experts or Technical Exploitation Teams (TETs). (See

Annex Q.) If possible, the preliminary screening, translation and categorization of ATDs

should be carried out by translators specialized in the exploitation of technical documents.

d. Detailed Exploitation. If special circumstances require it, detailed exploitation may be

undertaken outside the AO. (See Annex Q.)

CMAT and ATDs will be tagged as follows by the first technical exploitation specialist or team

performing exploitation for intelligence or other purposes:

a. CMAT.

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• Serial number of CMAT of intelligence interest.

•

Serial number of ATDs if applicable.

b. ATDs.

As for CMAT above, with the serial number(s) of associated CMAT and clearly marked

with the flagword “TECHDOC”.

c. Associated CPERS. The capture tag number and the interrogation serial number (if

allocated) will be recorded on the CMAT and ATD tags in order to facilitate interrogation

to obtain information of technical, operational or other value.

0504 Reporting

Reports will be submitted in accordance with relevant reporting procedures. Copies of all

reports should follow the CMAT during the exploitation process. The following reports are required:

a. INTREP. An INTREP will be prepared by the capturing unit upon the discovery or capture

of CMAT or ATDs believed to be of intelligence interest. The reporting channels are from

the capturing unit through the chain of command to the first element with technical

exploitation capability.

b. Preliminary Technical Report. A PRETECHREP may be prepared and submitted by

the capturing unit or a Technical Exploitation Team (TET) after preliminary screening.

(See Annex E.)

c. Complementary Technical Report. A COMTECHREP type A, B or C will be

prepared and submitted by proper authority or TET after complementary examination in the

field. (See Annexes R, S and T.)

d. Detailed Technical Report. A DETECHREP will be prepared and submitted by proper

authority or Specialist Team after detailed exploitation in rear areas. This report has no set

format. The flagword DETECHREP should be used as report identifier, and the report will

include necessary data identifying the CMAT and its disposition.

e. INTREPs may, as the circumstances dictate, be submitted in advance but not in lieu of the

reports listed above.

0505

Further Handling

An appropriate national or NATO commander or staff will direct and coordinate the

exploitation process and decide when CMAT can be handed over for utilisation or disposal.

Intelligence staff will ensure that duplicate photographs of CMAT and copies of ATDs are provided

and distributed for further exploitation by technical and other elements as appropriate.

When exploitation is complete, final disposition of the materiel will be carried out as

determined by the commander or his staff or in accordance with agreed procedures.

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0506

Security

CMAT and ATDs will be classified in accordance with the applicable security classification

guidance, also considering the circumstances of capture and the value of denying the opposing forces

the knowledge that a particular document or piece of materiel is in NATO hands.

At all stages during the intelligence exploitation process, the CMAT and ATDs will be placed

under guard in order to prevent looting, misuse or destruction. No item is authorised for retention as a

war trophy or souvenir. CMAT and ATDs to be used as evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS

suspected of terrorist acts, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes are to be safeguarded

separately from other CMAT and ATDs and should be in the custody of the military police or other

investigative authority. (Guidelines for the handling of such CMAT and ATDs may be found in Annex

F.) The investigative authority will assist in the intelligence exploitation of such evidence.

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CHAPTER 6

Captured Documents

0601 General

CDOCs are valuable sources of information and should be exploited for intelligence or law

enforcement purposes with a minimum of delay. It should be noted that documents include all types of

media that may contain, record or store information. Therefore, specialist personnel may be required

to access information from various types of media. A detailed definition of the term “document” may

be found in the Glossary.

ATDs, which are marked “TECHDOC”, will be handled as described in Chapter 5. All other

types of CDOCs will be handled as described in this Chapter.

Nations may decide to establish Joint Captured Document Exploitation Centres (JCDECs) on a

permanent or ad hoc basis. A CJTF may decide to establish a Combined Joint Captured Document

Exploitation Centres (CJCDEC) on a permanent or ad hoc basis. Guidance on this matter is offered in

Annex U.

0602 Categorisation

CDOCs should be categorised according to their assessed intelligence or other value as soon

after capture as possible. The categorisation of each CDOC should be reassessed as it is exploited and

assessed by document exploitation elements at each level in the chain of command.

In order to ensure the timely exploitation of time-sensitive CDOCs of intelligence or other

value, CDOCs are to be divided into categories as follows:

a. Category A. Documents which because of their special intelligence or other value require

priority removal and/or special handling and are of interest to another command, collection

agency or other agency i.e. TECHINT, air force, navy, PSYOPS, cryptography, law

enforcement etc. These documents should be translated as quickly as possible to exploit

information of intelligence or other value to operations and to force protection. Specific

examples of Category A documents change according to the Priority Intelligence

Requirements and will be set forth in each document exploitation element's standing opera-

ting procedures. Documents to be used as evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS

suspected of terrorism, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes will be

handled as Category A documents.

b. Category B. Documents containing information of intelligence or other interest to the

supported field command (answering operational-level intelligence requirements). These

documents should also be translated as quickly as possible to exploit information of

intelligence or other value to operations and to force protection.

c. Category C. Personal documents and items containing no perceived information of

intelligence or other interest but still requiring special administrative accountability i.e.

currency, works of art, family photos, or letters. Category C is the lowest category of

CDOCs that can be assigned by field elements.

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d. Category D. Documents containing no known information of immediate intelligence or

other value. This designation should be applied only by the echelon at which appropriate

document exploitation expertise exists.

In principle, CDOCs are the responsibility of the nation of the capturing unit. However, in order

to ensure that information of intelligence or other interest is efficiently utilised, such documents

should be handled through command channels in the initial phases of the exploitation process. Final

and thorough exploitation will be the responsibility of the capturing nation, the NATO Force or NATO

Command in accordance with national law and policies or the MOA.

0603 Exploitation

Exploitation of CDOCs is in principle a national responsibility to be undertaken by the

capturing nation, but this responsibility may be assumed by a NATO Command or Force. Wherever

forces of two or more NATO nations are operating together, mutual support for the purposes of proper

and timely exploitation should be given. This is especially important when the capturing nation does

not have the necessary capability to exploit CDOCs. In that case such CDOCs should be turned over

as expeditiously as possible to an allied nation that has such a capability. In cases where responsibility

for exploitation is handed over to an allied nation, that nation will keep the capturing nation fully in-

formed of the results obtained and will forward copies of CDOCs and reports prepared. The exploiting

nation will be responsible for reporting as described in this Chapter.

CDOCs will be forwarded as expeditiously as appropriate to the document exploitation unit of

the national JIC or, if applicable, the CJIC (see Chapter 4 of this publication), or other national or

NATO agency, such as a JCDEC or Combined Joint Captured Document Exploitation Centre

(CJCDEC), responsible for captured documents.

CDOCs associated with CPERS should, if possible, follow the CPERS from whom it was taken

during the interrogation and exploitation process. If specialist exploitation is necessary, copies of the

CDOC may follow the CPERS in lieu of the original CDOC.

CDOCs considered to be of intelligence or other interest will be exploited through the following

process. Whenever feasible, in order to expedite handling, the processing stages may be combined.

a. Reporting. The capturing unit reports the capture or discovery of CDOCs believed to be

of intelligence or other interest through higher headquarters to the first document

exploitation element in the chain of command by means of an INTREP.

b. Preliminary Screening. If possible, preliminary screening, translation, categorisation

should be accomplished by translators specialised in the exploitation of military and

technical documents. Therefore, tactical questioners should forward CDOCs to DOCEX

specialists in (C)JICs or (C)JCDECs as soon as possible, or these specialists should be

detached to lower tactical levels. Reporting of information of immediate tactical value

gained from CDOCs through established intelligence channels will be accomplished by

personnel conducting tactical questioning for the capturing unit.

c. Supplementary Examination. Supplementary examination should be carried out by

translators specialised in the exploitation of military or technical documents. Therefore,

interrogators should forward CDOCs to DOCEX specialists in (C)JICs or (C)JCDECs as

soon as possible, or these specialists should be detached to lower tactical levels. CDOCs of

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special intelligence or other interest will be reproduced and disseminated to intelligence and

other staffs, as appropriate.

d. Detailed Exploitation. Detailed exploitation and reporting may take place at a (C)JIC or

at a (C)JCDEC by DOCEX specialists.

Information technology may be used to support the translation of documents and to scan them

for reproduction and dissemination.

0604

Translation

Levels of Translation. Translation of CDOCs is often a time-consuming task. Therefore,

depending on the assessed intelligence or other value of the CDOCs, the following levels of translation

may carried out:

Summary Translation. A summary translation should consist of a concise outline of the

contents in the CDOC and highlight information of intelligence or other value.

Extract Translation. Specific parts of a CDOC containing specific information of

intelligence or other value may be translated in full.

Full or Complete Translation. A full or complete translation of a CDOC may be made

when the entire contents of a CDOC are of such intelligence or other value as to warrant a

complete translation.

A CDOC may go through several levels of translation. As the result of a preliminary screening,

it may initially be translated in summary form before being forwarded to the next higher echelon.

After complementary examination and evaluation, a translation of excerpts of intelligence or other

interest to this or a higher echelon may be made. Finally, a full or complete translation may be made in

order to facilitate a detailed exploitation of the CDOC.

0605 Tagging and Handling of CDOCs

Capturing units shall do everything possible to preserve the integrity of captured documents.

CDOCs should be placed in appropriate protective containers for transit and storage (file folders,

ration cases, watertight bags, etc).

The capturing unit will tag or otherwise identify the container holding the CDOC in accordance

with the procedures stated in Chapter 2, para 0204. It is important that the original CDOC not be

marked or otherwise altered. CDOCs associated with a CPERS should be tagged with part C of the

Captured Personnel and Personal Effects Tag. If this CPERS has been interrogated, the INTGSN

should be noted on the tag.

CDOCs will be categorised as described in paragraph 0602. 2. The CDOC containers or tags

should be clearly marked with the letters "CDOC CAT" followed by the category letter.

Example: CDOC CAT "C".

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Documents constituting evidence to be used in legal proceedings against persons suspected of

terrorism, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes will be marked ”EVIDENCE”. Such

documents will be kept separate from other documents and will be stored under guard or in a secure

area in order to ensure an unbroken chain of custody/evidence. Procedures for handling such CDOCs

are outlined in Annex F. Copies of CDOCs assessed to be of intelligence or other value will be

provided to the intelligence element of the capturing nation.

CDOCs, even if assessed to be damaged in the field, should not be disposed of or destroyed

until reviewed by DOCEX specialists.

0606 Reporting, Reproduction and Dissemination

The reporting of information and intelligence obtained from documents should be as

expeditious as possible. The use of information technology makes it possible to transfer documents

and translations of documents with great speed to experts for exploitation and to intelligence and other

customers. Databases should, therefore, be established to retrieve stored documents, and link analysis

should be employed to exploit information obtained from these documents by identifying links to

persons, places and events.

Reports will be submitted in accordance with relevant reporting procedures. Copies of all

reports should follow the CDOCs through the exploitation process. NATO information systems such

as the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES) and Crisis Response

Operations in NATO Open Systems (CRONOS) should be used for the widest dissemination to NATO

and coalition forces (through plug-in systems) to process and disseminate CDOCs in a uniformed and

expeditious manner. The following reports are required:

a. Intelligence Report. An INTREP identifying the CDOC and its disposition, and giving

information considered to be of immediate value, will be prepared and submitted by the

capturing unit and other exploiting elements as appropriate.

Detailed Document Report. A Detailed Document Report (DEDOCREP) will be

prepared and submitted after a complementary and detailed examination/exploitation has

found the CDOC to be of current intelligence or other value. This report has no set format.

An adapted INTREP format could be used. It should include, at minimum, a summary

translation. The flagword “DEDOCREP” will be used as the report identifier, and the report

will include necessary data identifying the CDOC and its disposition.

Reproduction and dissemination of CDOCs and translations as necessary will be carried

out at the earliest possible stage of the exploitation process. Copies of CDOCs considered of interest

or translations thereof and lists of exploited documents, whether disseminated or not, will be submitted

to appropriate national and NATO staffs.

0607 Handling of Category "A" Documents

All Category A documents require special, restricted handling. The national and NATO Command or

Force headquarters should be kept informed of the seizure and disposition of such documents as soon

as possible. If appropriate, they are to be handed over to the relevant component or nation without

delay. Here they should be handled in close coordination with the intelligence and other relevant

specialist staff.

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0608 Handling of Special Documents

Unmarked Maps, Charts, Air Imagery, Etc. Unmarked maps, charts, air imagery and other

types of cartographic material and information should be forwarded to the nearest geographic staff,

survey unit or topographical section for exploitation. Copies may be retained to meet operational

needs.

Marked Maps, Charts and Air Imagery. Marked maps, charts and air imagery will be

immediately forwarded to the nearest national supporting intelligence centre or other all-source

analysis facility for analysis, but relevant geographic staffs, survey units and topographical sections

are to be informed of their existence, with scale, series, edition and other identification data.

Personal Papers. Personal papers belonging to a captured person, such as identity papers,

personal letters and photographs that are not to be used as evidence, etc., if examined and determined

to be of no intelligence or other value, will be returned to him in accordance with applicable

international law. Copies of such papers will be made and forwarded to the appropriate agency, e.g. a

DOCEX unit.

0609 Further Handling

Further handling is to be carried out in accordance with the procedures for handling CMAT/ATDs as

described in Chapter 5.

0610 Security

CDOCs will be classified in accordance with national and NATO security regulations and

protected in accordance with their intelligence or other value based on their operational sensitivity and

in order to ensure protection of the information as well as sources and collection methods. The

DOCEX or other intelligence element initially handling the CDOC should determine its classification.

Circumstances of capture and the value of denying the opposing forces the knowledge that a particular

piece of materiel or document is in own or NATO hands are also important considerations in

determining the proper classification of a CDOC. The original classification markings on CDOCs

should, therefore, not necessarily serve as a guideline. The classification of a CDOC may subsequently

be reviewed as to its continued intelligence or other relevance.

CDOCs to be used as evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected of terrorist acts,

crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes are to be safeguarded separately from other

CDOCs and should be in the custody of the military police or other investigative authority.

(Guidelines for the handling of such CDOCs may be found in Annex F.) Copies of such CDOCs

should be supplied to intelligence and other appropriate staffs. The investigative authority will assist in

the intelligence and other exploitation of such evidence.

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CHAPTER 7

Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents in Combined

Joint Operations

0701 General

1. This Chapter is intended to provide guidance to NATO forces and other forces participating in a

NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) operation on the handling and processing of persons,

materiel and documents captured during that operation. Furthermore, the aim of this Chapter is to

describe the responsibilities of the Commander of the CJTF and his staff. It provides guidelines for the

planning necessary to ensure that CPERS with various types of status are handled in accordance with

international law or other applicable law. It also provides guidance on how to handle CMAT and

CDOCs so that they may be exploited for intelligence and other purposes.

2. NATO member countries and other countries participating under the auspices of NATO in a

coalition must be prepared to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. In the course of these

operations, NATO and Coalition forces will have to be prepared to deal with CPERS of various

categories. They must be able to handle CMAT and CDOCs correctly and expeditiously to extract

information of intelligence and other value, including evidence for use in legal proceedings against

CPERS suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or terrorism. The handling of CPERS,

CMAT and CDOCs needs to be taken into consideration by the commander, at each echelon, in all

aspects of planning for operations and in subsequent conduct of operations.

3. The greatest number of CPERS may be expected to come from the Land Component Command’s

AO. Therefore, the main emphasis of this Chapter is on the handling of persons, materiel and

documents captured in the land environment. Nevertheless, the principles of planning and preparation

for dealing with CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs are valid for other environments and for commanders at

all levels within the AO.

0702 Responsibilities

The Nations and NATO. The member Nations must have a common understanding of the

definitions and procedures regarding CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs and their handling prior to forming

a CJTF. NATO, in conjunction with the troop-contributing nations to a CJTF, develops ROE

applicable to the particular operation or mission. The member Nations support NATO in manning the

CJTF staff and units to provide the necessary manpower to handle CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs.

a. The nations participating in the CJTF should formulate a Memorandum of Agreement

which includes:

(1) A common definition of a POW consistent with the provisions of the GCs and other

applicable international law as they pertain to the particular operation or mission.

(2) Procedures for determining the status of CPERS who do not immediately fall under

these pre-defined categories (e.g. by convening a tribunal to determine POW status).

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(3) Measures to ensure that all CPERS regardless of status are treated in accordance with

the GCs or other applicable international law.

(4) Procedures for the transfer of CPERS to a CJTF organisation handling CPERS so that

the obligations of the detaining member nation of the CJTF in accordance with

applicable international law are fulfilled. In general, the handover of CPERS with POW

status between nations and to a CJTF may require:

• The designation of a Nation that assumes the responsibilities of the detaining power

on behalf of all nations contributing troops to the CJTF. This Nation will provide

the commander of the CJTF organisation handling CPERS.

• The written authorisation of the government of each Nation contributing troops to

the CJTF permitting the transfer of its CPERS to the lead nation charged with the

handling of CPERS on behalf of all troop-contributing nations.

• Provisions for regular inspections by representatives of the troop-contributing

nations with CPERS in the custody of the CJTF.

(5) Conditions and procedures for the handover of CPERS who have not been accorded

POW status to:

• Appropriate civil authorities in the host nation (if it has a functioning law

enforcement and judicial system meeting recognised international standards for the

treatment of detained persons and for fair and impartial judicial proceedings),

• An international police authority (e.g. the United Nations Civilian Police), or

• An international tribunal.

(6) If relevant, conditions and procedures for the extradition of CPERS who have not been

accorded POW status to:

• A NATO member state,

• A non-NATO member state participating in the CJTF, or

• Another state requesting extradition.

(7) Agreed interrogation methods and techniques.

(8) Provisions for release of persons in accordance with GCs or other applicable

international law

(9) Provisions for inspections by representatives and delegates of Protecting Powers and

ICRC delegates including a mechanism for suspending such inspections on the grounds

of imperative military necessity.

(10)

Procedures regarding the exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs. This is to

include provisions for the transportation and storage of such CMAT and CDOCs.

(11)

Procedures regarding the final disposition of CMAT and CDOCs

including final ownership of these items and financial and logistical responsibility for

their final removal or destruction.

(12)

Procedures regarding the sharing of intelligence and information

obtained through interrogation and the exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs by the troop-

contributing nations.

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(13)

Standards ensuring the interoperability of communications and

information systems, thus enabling the expeditious reporting of intelligence and

information obtained from all sources including interrogation and the exploitation of

CMAT and CDOCs.

(14)

Provisions for the establishment of intelligence databases in accordance

with AIntP-3 data exchange standards. These databases should be accessible by the

intelligence staffs of all component commands and multinational and single nation

formations and units.

(15)

Standards and procedures for the collection, processing, recording and

storage of personal data on CPERS, including, if applicable, biometric data.

(16)

Regulations and procedures regarding the photography of CPERS and

CPERS facilities including the prohibition of private photography of such persons and

facilities.

b. NATO drives efforts to meet the Statement of Requirements developed by the CJTF for

personnel to be contributed by the member Nations and coalition partners to man staff

positions in the CJTF headquarters and for units to handle CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs. In

developing the operational plans with annexes and ROE, NATO should include procedures

for dealing with special categories of CPERS such as those suspected of committing or

conspiring to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity or terrorist acts.

The CJTF Commander. The CJTF Commander is responsible for planning and conducting

operations within the constraints and restraints of the GCs or other applicable international law.

Therefore, he must also have exact knowledge of his responsibilities for CPERS and their handling.

This Chapter only lists the main responsibilities which the Commander and his staff must discharge.

The Commander and his staff must, therefore, be familiar with the provisions of the GCs or other

applicable international law in as much detail as possible. The moral and political importance placed

on the correct and humane treatment of CPERS in all types of conflicts makes it essential that the

Commander receives competent legal, political, medical and intelligence advice in these matters.

The commander’s main responsibilities regarding the treatment of CPERS are to ensure that:

a. The individual members of his force comply with the provisions of the GCs or other

applicable international law.

b. Persons captured by the CJTF are treated in accordance with the GCs or other applicable

international law.

The Staff. Although the commander bears the overall responsibility for the handling of

CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs, he delegates responsibility for certain aspects of the process to his staff.

The following discussion identifies tasks and suggests staff sections and special staff that could

execute them. It is not a complete list. In a CJTF these tasks may be delegated or assigned in a number

of different ways.

a. CJ1 Staff. The CJ1 has overall staff responsibility for the handling of CPERS within the

Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTFHQ). He will be assisted by CJ2 for

intelligence and CJ3 for operational matters, CJ4 for logistical and medical matters, the

Legal Advisor for matters pertaining to the GCs or other applicable international law and

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the Provost Marshal for matters pertaining to the physical detention and guarding of

CPERS. CJ1 may be responsible for :

(1) Developing policy for the handling of CPERS within the CJTF AO in conformity with

the GCs or other applicable international law.

(2) Issuing instructions for the safe custody, welfare, discipline and, if necessary,

evacuation of CPERS from the AO.

(3) Determining the format of the INTERNSN to be used by the CJTF.

(4) Issuing instructions for the administration of CPERS including submission of reports

and returns in accordance with the GCs or other applicable law (in connection with e.g.

transfers, deaths, repatriations).

(5) Issuing instructions on the collection, processing, recording and storage of personal data

on CPERS. These instructions may include guidelines for the use of biometrics.

(6) Appointing officers and staffs to run CJTF collection points and holding areas for

CPERS and the Combined Joint Detention and Interrogation Facility (CJDIF) within

the AO and the issuing of orders for the operation of these collection points and holding

areas and facilities.

(7) Providing on the advice of CJ2, interpreters for CJTF and CJDIF collection points and

holding areas, and Interrogation Teams as well as interpreters for CDOC and CMAT

Exploitation Centres and Teams.

(8) Determining the status of CPERS and convening boards of inquiry where necessary to

include review and appeal boards.

(9) Arranging for the transfer of CPERS to other nations; or to international legal bodies,

consistent with GCs or other applicable international law. Additionally, CJ1 is

responsible for the transfer of CPERS from the nations’ forces participating in the

CJTF, and from the other component commands to CJTF collection points and holding

areas for CPERS as well as to the CJDIF.

(10)

Assisting in the repatriation of CPERS with POW status during and after

hostilities.

(11)

Provisions for regular inspections by representatives of the troop-

contributing nations with CPERS in the custody of the CJTF.

(12)

Developing media policy as it pertains to the handling of CPERS and

policy regarding visits to CPERS facilities.

CJ2 Staff. CJ2 may be responsible for:

(1) Producing estimates of likely numbers of POWs before the beginning of an operation

(assisted by the CJ3 and CJ5 Staff as well as national intelligence organisations).

(2) Organising the formation of CJ2, including CJ2X, and the Interrogation Element of the

CJDIF (assisted by CJ1).

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(3) Tasking the CJDIF in accordance with the Commander’s Priority Intelligence

Requirements to collect information and intelligence through interrogation of CPERS

and exploitation of CMAT, CDOCs and personal effects belonging to CPERS.

(4) Processing and disseminating information and intelligence collected by the CJDIF.

(5) Determining security policy regarding CPERS and CPERS facilities, including

photography of CPERS, CPERS facilities, CMAT and CDOCs.

CJ3 Staff. CJ3 may be responsible for:

(1) Selecting locations for collection points and holding areas for CPERS and the location

of the CJDIF (assisted by CJ2 and CJ4) and issuing orders to units for their

construction.

(2) Issuing instructions for the activation of CJTF collection points and holding areas for

CPERS and the CJDIF.

(3) Identifying units to act as guards and escorts for CPERS and to reinforce military police

and issuing orders for execution of these tasks.

CJ4 Staff. CJ4 may be responsible for:

(1) Procuring and providing construction materials and stores for the establishment of

collection points, holding areas and long-term detention facilities for CPERS, storage

facilities for CMAT and the CJDIF.

(2) Producing Administrative Instructions covering the feeding, clothing, movement and

accommodation of CPERS.

(3) Planning for the provision of sufficient resources to meet the requirements for the

handling of the projected numbers of CPERS and expected amount of CMAT.

(4) Issuing instructions for the medical examination and treatment of CPERS.

(5) Recovering or disposing of CMAT after it has been examined.

Force Provost Marshal. The Force Provost Marshal (FPM) is the NATO Commander’s

principal staff advisor on Military Police matters. (He may, or may not, be double-hatted as

the NATO Military Police Commander. If he is also the NATO Military Police

Commander, he is empowered to execute Operational Command of allocated military

police resources.) He may be responsible for:

(1) Providing guidelines and policy for the guarding and escort of CPERS by other military

units within the AO.

(2) Planning military police operations to handle CPERS.

(3) Supporting the CJTF staff in the planning process as it pertains to the handling of

CPERS.

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(4) Providing guidance for the guarding of CPERS at CJTF collection points, handling

areas and long-term detention facilities.

(5) If he is also the NATO Military Police Commander, he may be responsible for

supervising all military provosts or police assigned to the CJTF in the execution of their

duties in handling CPERS.

f. Additional Responsibilities. The Commander should furthermore delegate

responsibility for the following tasks:

(1) Inspection and validation of all handling procedures for CPERS, and of all detention

facilities, to ensure compliance with the provisions of the GCs or other applicable

international law.

(2) Liaison with the ICRC.

(3) Development of agreed biometric standards as well Standard Operating Procedures for

collecting, processing, transmitting and storing biometric data from CPERS.

0703 The Handling of CPERS and the Operational Planning Process

The impact of persons captured by the CJTF on the Commander’s plan will vary according to

the type of operation. This is especially relevant when dealing with several types of CPERS in the

same operation. In general, the impact on operations of having to handle CPERS may be described as

follows:

a. The obligation to protect and the need to guard CPERS reduces the numbers of troops

available for operations or other duties.

b. Guarding and escorting CPERS generally requires that troops assigned to these duties

receive special training.

c. The logistical requirements of dealing with CPERS place an additional burden on the

CJTF’s logistic resources.

d. The transport of CPERS places an additional burden on the transport system.

e. CPERS may hamper the conduct of operations and inhibit the commander’s operational

flexibility.

f. The administration of CPERS creates additional pressures on the CJTF staff.

g. CPERS contribute to improved intelligence about military, political, criminal and terrorist

actors in the CJTF Area of Intelligence Responsibility and Area of Interest.

A number of steps may be taken in conjunction with the Operational Planning Process to

determine the impact of CPERS on an operation and provide the basis for making the necessary

preparations to deal with persons captured by the CJTF during the operation. These steps are:

a. Step 1. CJ2 assesses whether the operation will result in the capture of POWs or other

persons, and the category and projected numbers of the anticipated CPERS.

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b. Step 2. If the assessment in Step 1 indicates the operation will result in the capture of

POWs or other persons, this should then be considered in the planning process as ‘Other

Relevant Factors’. Early consideration of religious, cultural and ethnic factors will facilitate

the planning and conduct of CPERS operations.

c. Step 3. Having considered the impact of POWs and other CPERS on the plan, measures

for handling POWs and other CPERS should be considered as a possible task. Troops and

other necessary resources should subsequently be allocated to the task. This will normally

include guard personnel, interpreters, logistical support, transport and medical support.

d. Step 4. Once the Commander has selected his course of action, details of his plan for

handling POWs and other CPERS are included in the ‘Execution’ paragraph of his orders.

Depending on the potential impact of POWs and other CPERS on the operation, the need to

make a specific plan for their handling may be reflected in the ‘Concept of Operations’.

However, POWs and other CPERS will always be included in the ‘Coordinating

Instructions’ for the execution of the plan.

Dealing with CPERS will nearly always affect an operation in unexpected ways. The

Commander and staff of the CJTF will rarely be able to make a plan for the handling of CPERS with

any assurance that it will succeed without significant difficulty. Therefore, it is necessary to base the

plan on a worst-case scenario and prepare to allocate sufficient resources to meet that challenge. In the

non-linear battlespace, POWs and other persons may be captured by different units of different

nationalities. The unplanned arrival of large numbers of CPERS in a commander’s AO can create

enormous problems for the conduct of the operation.

0704 The Organisation for Handling CPERS

An organisation and a chain of command for the handling and exploitation of CPERS, CMAT

and CDOCs should be established if the CJTF is to deal effectively with these issues.

In the pre-deployment planning phase of an operation, the CJTF may establish an organisation,

e.g. a CJDIF, for handling CPERS commensurate in size with the estimated number of POWs and

other persons to be captured during the operation or campaign. If a CJDIF is established, the CJTF

should identify units to conduct the handling of CPERS.

This organisation for handling CPERS assumes responsibility for all aspects of the evacuation

and custody of CPERS once they have been delivered to a CJTF collection point, leaving unit and

formation commanders free to conduct operations. A diagram showing the relationship between the

CJTF headquarters and the organisation for handling CPERS, e.g. a CJDIF, is shown in Figure 7-1.

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THE NATIONS AND NATO

ICRC POW

CJTF COMMANDER

INFORMATION

BUREAU

CJ1

CJ2

CJ3

CJ4

FPM

COMPONENT COMMANDS

CJDIF COMMANDER & STAFF

CMAT &

CDOC

INTER-

EXPLOI-

DETENTION

ROGATION

TATION

ELEMENT

CENTRES

CPERS

TECH-

CJTF COLLECTING

INTER-

INT &

POINT or HOLDING AREA

ROGATION

DOCEX

TEAM

TEAMS

CPERS

LEGEND:

FORMATION

UNIT

(E.g. Multinational

Operational Command

Intelligence

Division or

CPERS

Brigade)

CPERS Matters

Logistics

Figure 7-1. Example of CJTF Organisation for Handling CPERS.

The organisation for handling CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs should be flexible, adapting to the

size of the operation or campaign and the CJ2 assessment of the expected numbers of POWs and other

CPERS. CJTF intermediate collection points and holding areas may be established in direct support of

formations and units; however, in principle, formations and units are responsible for guarding and

transporting CPERS to the CJTF collection point. The size of the AO, the availability and type of

transport and the numbers of CPERS involved, will determine if intermediate holding areas and

collection points are required.

0705 The CJDIF

A CJDIF may be established within the framework of a CJTF. It may also be established within

the framework of a multinational formation (e.g. division or brigade), a sector or an agreement

between two or more participating nations. (In these cases the term Multinational Detention and

Interrogation Facility—or something to that effect—may be more appropriate.)

The mission of the CJDIF is:

a. To assume custody of CPERS resulting from a combined joint operation either as POWs in

an armed conflict or as other CPERS apprehended during a NA5CRO.

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b. To provide for their long-term detention until a decision has been reached on their final

disposition.

c. To conduct competent interrogations of POWs and other CPERS by trained interrogators

for the purpose of gathering information of intelligence and other value.

d. To provide support to law enforcement personnel and other legal authorities in the

questioning of CPERS for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in legal

proceedings.

0706 Responsibilities Pursuant to the Geneva Conventions or Other Applicable

International Law as They Pertain to the CJDIF

The responsibilities of the “Detaining Power” as set out in GC3 rest with the nation which

initiated the capture or detention of the CPERS in question. POWs may only be transferred by the

Detaining Power in accordance with the conditions laid down in GC3, Article 12 (2). NATO is not a

state and, therefore, cannot itself be a party to treaties and other international instruments relating to

the conduct of armed conflict. Individual NATO troop contributing nations may, of course, be a party

to such international instruments. In NATO-led operations, a lead nation may be designated to receive

POWs from other NATO nations participating in the operation. The lead nation, which should

subsequently fill the position of Commander of CJTF, will be responsible to each nation transferring

POWs to the CJDIF for ensuring that the treatment of POWs is in accordance with international law,

including GC3 or, where civilians are detained, in accordance with GC4. A MOA may be entered into

to govern the procedures for transfer and the responsibilities of the designated nation following

transfer. Any such arrangements involving POWs must be in accordance with GC3, Article 12.

GC3 also stipulates that a nation transferring POWs to another nation still has the obligation to

ensure that treatment of the transferred POWs is in accordance with the GC3 or other applicable

international law. Ideally, this responsibility could be met by requiring each nation to appoint its

senior officer serving in the CJDIF as its representative responsible for ensuring that the treatment of

persons captured by its troops is in accordance with GC3 or other applicable international law, thus

fulfilling its obligations in accordance with GC3.

0707 Organisation

The organisation of the CJDIF will invariably be based on the type of combined joint operation

being conducted, the estimated or real number of CPERS to be detained and interrogated, and the

adjusted Statement of Requirements based on contributions from the participating nations. An

example of how a CJDIF may be organised is shown in Figure 7-2.

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COMMANDER

LEGAL ADVISOR

DEPUTY

COMMANDER

(Chief of Staff)

STAFF

ADMINIS-

SERVICE

TRATION

SUPPORT

PROVOST

CJ2

MEDICAL

OFFICER

(MP OFFICER)

Information

Requirements

and Reporting

DETENTION

INTERROGATION

ELEMENT

MEDICAL

INTERROGATION

DOCUMENT &

GUARD

SECTION &

OPERATIONS &

EFFECTS

FORCE

INFIRMARY

ANALYSIS

EXPLOITATION

BATH, LAUNDRY

AUDIO-VISUAL

KITCHEN

INTERROGATION

& MAINTENANCE

DOCUMEN-

TEAMS

SECTION

TATION

Figure 7-2. Example Organisation of a CJDIF

A CJDIF may comprise the following functions and elements:

a. Commander. The Commander has overall responsibility for the operation of the CJDIF. He

is especially responsible for ensuring that the treatment of CPERS in his custody is in

accordance with the GCs or other applicable international law.

b. Legal Advisor. The operation of the CJDIF is governed by a wide range of international

laws, including the GCs, and regulations. Breaches of these laws and regulations may have

serious consequences for both the violators and the Commander. Therefore, the

Commander should have a qualified legal advisor to assist him in ensuring compliance with

all applicable conventions, laws and regulations.

c. Deputy Commander. The Deputy Commander assumes command of the CJDIF in the

Commander’s absence. He is also Chief of the facility’s Operations Staff. In this capacity

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he is responsible to the Commander for the planning, coordination and conduct of

operations within the facility.

Staff. The work of the Staff is directed by the Deputy Commander. The Staff may consist of

the following functions and elements:

(1) Administration. Administration is mainly responsible for receiving, processing,

maintaining and transferring records and documents concerning the administration of

CPERS in the custody of the CJDIF.

(2) Service Support. This section provides the service support necessary to operate the

CJDIF. This includes supply, maintenance, construction, transportation etc. Depending

on the size of the CJDIF, budget and finance can either be a separate function or

integrated in the Service Support Section.

(3) Provost Officer (Military Police Officer). The Provost Officer (Military Police Officer)

is the staff officer responsible for planning and supervising detention operations. He

advises the CJDIF Commander on matters pertaining to detention procedures. As

delegated by the Commander, he conducts inspections to ensure that relevant

regulations are followed and that the detention facilities and the treatment of CPERS in

the custody of the CJDIF are in compliance with all applicable conventions, laws and

regulations. In that capacity, he should have powers of arrest over all personnel serving

in the CJDIF. He may also serve as the CJDIF security officer.

(4) Medical Officer. The Medical Officer is the staff officer responsible for medical

services within the CJDIF. In this capacity he is responsible to the Commander for the

health and safety of the CPERS in the custody of the CJDIF. He advises the

Commander on matters pertaining to health, hygiene and sanitation. He supervises the

CJDIF Medical Section and Infirmary. In a smaller CJDIF he also provides medical

treatment to all personnel in the absence of other physicians.

Detention Element. The Detention Wing guards, escorts, handles, houses, clothes and feeds

the CPERS in the custody of the CJDIF. Furthermore, it provides medical treatment and

bath and laundry facilities for the detained persons.

Interrogation Element. The Interrogation Wing plans and conducts interrogations based on

the Information Requirements determined by CJ2. Information collected from

interrogations and from the exploitation of documents and effects is reported to CJ2. To

support subsequent interrogations and to record interrogations for documentation purposes,

an audio-visual documentation section may be included in the organisation of the

Interrogation Wing.

0708

CMAT and CDOCs

In general, the procedures for handling CMAT and CDOCs will be in accordance with the

guidelines given in Chapters 2, 5 and 6 of this Publication. Specific procedures may be adapted to the

requirements of a particular operation or campaign.

Available resources for the handling and exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs will also

determine the size and capabilities of the organisations designated to carry out these tasks. Where

possible, a CJCMEC and a CJCDEC as outlined in Annexes Q and U respectively will provide the

most capable organisational structure for the handling and exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs. They

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ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO ANTI–PIRACY MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE (2008) - page 5