NATO ANTI–PIRACY MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE (2008)

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

ANNEX 2B

NCAGS Information Forms

SECTION I — FORMAT ALFA

Format Alfa is one of the principal methods by which NATO gathers data on shipping. Format

Alfa may be requested at least 24 hours prior to entering the Area of Operations (AOO) and then, if

possible, every six hours until departure from the AOO.

As a general rule Format Alfa should be kept as short as possible and be limited to essential

information only. In normal circumstances data identified in the Format with bold type will suffice.

The form is divided into four sections:

a. Section A covers basic details of the vessel.

b. Section B covers details of the current voyage.

c. Section C covers details of the vessel’s operator.

d. Section D covers cargo data.

Dates and Times should be entered either by the date followed by a four digit time in the 24

hour clock (18 Oct 05 2100 UTC) or a Date Time Group (see Para 5).

The NATO method of expressing time and date is contained within a Date Time Group (DTG)

which is written in the following manner: DDHHHHTIME ZONE MMM YY. Therefore, a DTG

written as 182100Z JUL 06 describes a time of 2100 Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) on the 18

July 2006. NATO units routinely describe UTC as time zone ‘ZULU’ abbreviated to ‘Z’.

Format to be used:

Section A — Ship Data:

(1) Ship’s name.

(2) International callsign.

(3) Type of vessel.

(4) Flag of registry.

(5) IMO number.

(6) Port of registry.

(7) Length overall.

(8) Vessel’s width.

2B-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

(9)

Maximum draft for present voyage.

(10)

Vessel’s gross tonnage.

(11)

Speed:

(a) Service speed.

(b) Maximum speed.

(12)

Significant appearance of vessel for optical recognition.

(13)

MMSI (Maritime Mobile Services Identity) Number.

(14)

Name of communication station being copied.

(15)

INMARSAT Telephone numbers.

(16)

INMARSAT Fax numbers.

(17)

INMARSAT Telex numbers.

(18)

INMARSAT Data numbers.

(19)

Other communication means including e-mail addresses.

Section B — Voyage Data:

(20)

Intended movement — description of passage.

(21)

Last port/country of call including actual date and time of departure from last port.

(22)

Next port of call including Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) at next port of call.

(23)

Current position.

(24)

Date/time and position entering the region.

(a-x) Waypoints of intended track through AOI (date/time—latitudes/longitudes).

(25)

Position and date/time of departing the region.

Section C — Operator Data:

(26)

Name of ship owner/operator including address of ship owner, name of Charterer

(if any) and address of Operator/Charterer.

(27)

Email address of the above.

(28)

Telephone number of above.

2B-2

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

SECTION II — SAILING INSTRUCTIONS

Sailing Instructions (SI) are issued to all ships transiting a SRA and any other ships requiring

specific guidance within the AOO. The issue of a SI indicates that a mutual understanding has been

achieved. The Master has agreed to follow the routeing direction and the NCAGSORG will monitor

the ship’s passage and divert if necessary. The SI is an important tool for the MC in mitigating risk to

commercial shipping transiting the SRA and diversion can be signalled to a merchant vessel in transit

if a danger develops on the planned track.

The following outline is provided as guidance to illustrate the content for the

Sailing

Instructions used in NCAGS.

SAILING INSTRUCTIONS

SHIP’S NAME:

INTERNATIONAL CALLSIGN:

FLAG:

SPEED:

ENTRY POINT:

EXIT POINT:

FINAL DESTINATION:

Note: Entry and exit points define the part of the voyage where Sailing Instructions (SI) apply.

GENERAL SITUATION:

ROUTE:

During the passage you should pass through the following positions:

POSITION DESIGNATOR/WAYPOINT

LAT/LONG

REMARKS

etc

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

COMMUNICATIONS

EMCON

REPORT SUSPICIOUS SIGHTINGS

NOTIFICATION OF DIVERSIONS

SUMMARY OF NAVWARNS IN FORCE

2B-4

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

ANNEX 2C

Routeing/Passage Plans and Amendments

Responsibility for Establishing Routes/Passage Plans. The MC is responsible for

establishing and maintaining a system of routes required for an operation.

Routeing Authority. Routeing Authority resides with the NCAGS CDR who can delegate

this responsibility to a subordinate.

Promulgation of Routes. In normal circumstances the promulgation of routes would be

restricted, therefore the Routeing Authority is responsible for seeing that all who are concerned with

the operation of a particular route hold the necessary information before the route is activated.

Issuing Routeing Instructions to Merchant Ships.

a. General. Routeing instructions to ships always take the form of a list of latitudes and

longitudes of the route positions, together with their Two-Letter Designators.

b. Issuing Sailing Instructions. When a SRA is established and routing is advised,

Sailing Instructions (SI) will be issued to the Master by the Routeing Authority in the format

described in Annex 2B.

Diversions. A diversion may be signalled to a merchant vessel in transit when a danger

develops on the planned track. The procedures for diversions are contained in Annex 3A.

Routeing Liabilities. Advice and routes may be given to Masters, however, it should be

noted that the Allied or Coalition Governments accept no liability.

2C-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

CHAPTER 3

Communications

0301 Purpose

This chapter provides instruction for communications between merchant ships and military forces.

0302 Scope

Merchant vessels will normally communicate with military forces using standard peacetime methods.

In some situations, restrictions on electronic emissions may be required when approaching or when

transiting an AOO (see Para 0403). Instructions for use of non-standard communications methods will

be provided as necessary.

0303 Military Points of Contact

NATO Shipping Centre (NSC). In military operations, every effort is made by the

commanders to provide a free link to either the NATO Shipping Centre (NSC), or a national

equivalent. The NSC website provides information on NSC services and up-to-date information on

national, multi-national and NATO operations and exercises. Useful documents and links to related

sites can also be found there (see Annex 2A).

Local NCAGS Elements. Contact information for NCAGS elements will be distributed by

NSAs, the NSC, an NCAGS Briefing Officer, NAVTEX, local shipping warning such as MARLO

Advisory notices, etc.

Naval Units. Naval vessels or military aircraft may hail merchant vessels transiting an AOO

in order to verify identity and intentions. Reporting instructions and contact information will generally

be provided to merchant vessels prior to their transit of the AOO. Naval units can normally be

contacted by calling standard IMM VHF frequencies.

0304 Communications Reporting Gate (CRG)

A CRG is established to provide a position/line for merchant ships to call the NCAGSORG in

order to establish initial contact or to update previous information held.

Ships will be notified of CRG details for the AOO and reporting requirements will be

promulgated to merchant ships through a variety of means such as the NSC, NSAs, Advisory Notices

or NAVWARNS. Instructions will normally contain details of the information required, the occasions

for reporting and to whom the report is to be sent. Ships will be asked to forward a Format Alfa (see

Annex 2B) before arriving at the CRG.

0305 Messages to Merchant Ships

Types of messages passed to or from merchant ships are described at Annex 3A.

3-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

ANNEX 3A

Message Types

Signalled Messages. The following message types are designed to show the information

that is required, and the sequence in which such information is to be placed in each type of message.

Diversion Message. A message signalling a diversion from the planned track. Any

diversions after sailing must make clear the entire route to be followed to the immediate destination.

The DIVERSION MESSAGE will give a new position, or positions, through which the ship is

requested to pass. The first words of the text will be the identifier ‘DIVERSION MESSAGE’

followed by:

a. The reason for diversion.

b. The position or time at which the diversion is to take place.

c. New positions through which ships are to pass.

d. The immediate destination and amended ETA.

Passage Amendment. This message is sent by a ship to report passage amendments

involving changes in destination or differences of greater than six hours variance from the original

passage plan intentions reported by Format Alfa. The message will be addressed to the original

addressees of the Format Alfa. The first words of the text will be the identifier ‘FORMAT ALFA

PASSAGE AMENDMENT’ followed by:

a. The international callsign, IMO number and name of the ship.

b. Position at Time.

c. Great circle or rhumb line track and speed.

d. Name of next port of call.

e. ETA at next port of call.

Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) Warnings to Merchant Ships

a. Warning and Reporting. The process by which reports of NBC attacks are forwarded

through the military chain of command and units are warned of the resulting hazards. The

process is coordinated by a hierarchical structure of NBC centres.

b. The MERWARN Message System

(MERWARN). A simplified system for

broadcasting warnings of NBC hazards and events that might endanger merchant shipping at

sea. These warnings will originate from naval authorities using the appropriate Navigation

Warning of the World Wide Navigation Warning Service. MERWARN messages will be

originated by NATO naval authorities.

3A-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

CHAPTER 4

Procedural Guidance For Ships At Sea

0401 General Responsibilities of the Master

The Master is at all times responsible for the safe navigation and handling of his ship. Advice

and instructions issued by a naval authority, including a NCAGS LO, do not in any way relieve the

Master of these responsibilities.

Crisis Response Shipping will usually be sourced by commercial charter and Masters of such

vessels should be fully aware of their Charter Party. It may contain specific terms relevant to the use

of the ship in a military environment.

It is the Master’s responsibility to ensure that all appropriate crew members are fully acquainted

with the instructions necessary for the efficient performance of any communication duties including

adherence to the Emission Control (EMCON) policy (see Para 0403 below).

0402 Sensitive Documents and Equipment

On occasion, when a merchant ship is working with military forces, classified material may be

carried on board. Such sensitive material is usually in the custody of the embarked NCAGS LO and

requires special handling and precautions.

Although Sailing Instructions or other documents issued to the Master may be unclassified, due

to the potentially sensitive nature of their contents, the information should only be made available to

the crew on a need-to-know basis. On completion of a voyage, if not collected by NCAGS personnel,

the Master should destroy these documents.

0403 Emission Control (EMCON) Policy and Plans

In times of tension, or when working with military forces, it may be necessary to restrict, or

cease, the normal usage of ships transmitters, navigational equipment and other communication

systems.

The EMCON policy depends on local threat assessment and may affect the passage in certain

circumstances. Military authorities, if required will issue formal advice and guidance. This will be of

primary importance when under escort, taking part in lead-through of mined areas, or as part of

accompaniment.

EMCON is the selective control of emitted electromagnetic or acoustic energy. The EMCON

policy in force has two aims:

a. To minimise the enemy’s detection of emissions and exploitation of the information so

gained.

b. To reduce electromagnetic interference thereby improving friendly sensor performance

The MC will produce an EMCON plan, which governs all electronic emitters onboard.

Electronic emissions, including AIS emissions and emissions for testing and tuning, can be restricted.

Parts of this plan may affect the ship’s passage and adherence will be required.

4-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

0404 Helicopter Transfers

Conduct of Helicopter transfers. Helicopter transfer might be used to pass personnel or

material. The Master must ensure that the correct preparations for helicopter transfers are made and

must give his approval before the transfer operation commences.

On-deck preparation.

a. Fully brief the deck team on safety and intentions. The designated Flight Deck Officer is in

charge of all Flight Deck/winching area operations relating to the ship.

b. Loose articles can potentially be swept into helicopter intakes, which can cause serious

accidents. Stow away all loose equipment, garbage containers, paper, rags, etc. in order to

avoid damage to the aircraft or injury to personnel.

c. Obstructions such as aerials, awnings and stanchions should be lowered to ensure a clear

transfer area. Guardrails are usually best left in place for safety of personnel.

d. Provide fire-fighting equipment, including foam, dry powder and hoses rigged on deck if

possible. However, the equipment should not be directly below the helicopter where it might

hinder the transfer. A fire fighting team in protective fire suits should be mustered with

charged hoses.

e. Personnel on deck should be kept to a minimum, and those actually conducting the transfer

provided with rubber gloves, life jackets and high visibility clothing. During personnel

transfer, the transfer gear should be allowed to ground on deck prior to handling. With the

exception of well-secured protective headgear, no hats or caps should be worn in the vicinity of

the helicopter transfer.

f. The turbulence from a helicopter rotor down wash can cause involuntary movement of

heavy equipment and personnel. Ensure that all equipment in the immediate vicinity of the

transfer is properly secure. Brief personnel involved on the effect of rotor down wash.

g. All crew should be made aware of helicopter operations and that no garbage is to be thrown

over board. Unauthorised personnel are to be kept clear of the area.

h. The helicopter winch wire/hook carries a static charge and should only be touched by

personnel wearing rubber gloves. The winch wire must not be allowed to snag on guardrails or

other obstacles, and on no account must it be secured to any part of the ship. A helicopter in

flight can build up a considerable charge of static electricity, particularly in dry cold climates.

Personnel touching an aircraft load before it is earthed can experience a severe electrical shock

resulting in minor injuries. Charges in the region of 250,000 volts have been measured. A

lapse of ground contact of two or three seconds is sufficient to allow a further build up of static

charge.

Ship Preparation.

a. Communicate with the helicopter on the frequency requested if interoperable equipment is

available.

b. Steer a course that will give a relative wind of 20 degrees/30 degrees on the port bow. This

will allow for a helicopter transfer on the after part of the ship.

4-2

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

c. If it is not possible to keep the relative wind on the port bow, maintain a steady course and

speed as safe navigation permits. The helicopter pilot will hover by the part of the ship he

considers most suitable for transfer, and immediate preparations should be made on deck in the

vicinity as previously described.

Note: Further advice on helicopter operations is to be found in the UK Admiralty Notice to Mariners

No. 4 or US Coastguard Bulletin No. 3, published annually; and in the International Chamber of

Shipping’s Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations.

0405 Heaving Line/Gun line Transfer

Transfer of small items may be requested when underway at sea by means of a heaving line or

gun line. When requested to carry out such a transfer, the warship will tell the merchant ship which

side the transfer will take place and give full instructions of the actions expected of the merchant ship

for which the Master must give his approval. The warship will take station on the merchant ship,

which must maintain a steady course and speed as directed. The merchant ship must prepare as

follows:

a. Ship Preparation.

(1) Indicate the point of transfer by a red flag (on a stave).

(2) Close all scuttles/windows on the side of the transfer.

(3) Clear all personnel not engaged in the transfer from the transfer point and its vicinity.

(4) Ensure that the hands engaged in the transfer can take cover if and when a gun line is

used.

(5) Personnel at the receiving position should wear lifejackets, high visibility clothing and

protective headgear.

b. Steering. Careful attention must be paid to steering the correct course at the speed

requested during the whole of the approach, transfer and break off procedure.

c. Warning Signals

(1) When a gun line is used, the firing ship will sound:

One whistle blast - Exposed personnel take cover.

Two whistle blasts - Immediately before firing the line.

Three whistle blasts - Safe to break cover and take up the line.

(2) When an Emergency Breakaway is required:

Six short blasts of ships whistle will be sounded - when it is necessary to cease

operations immediately.

4-3

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

CHAPTER 5

Protective Measures Against Threats To Merchant

Ships

0501 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to identify various types of threat, to give general advice on how to

avoid a threat and to outline protective measures and ways to counter the consequences of an attack.

Detailed information on specific threats may be provided by the military.

There are minimal defensive measures available to merchant ships, which are normally

unarmed, have a small crew and are restricted by civilian regulations. Situational awareness is

necessary if a Master is to counter or avoid a threat, or mitigate the consequences. This includes

knowledge of the threat and of the presence of friendly forces or authorities that can be contacted to

provide support. It also includes knowledge of individual preparations that can be implemented prior

to entering a threat area.

0502 Situational Awareness

Some aspects about the merchant ship's own situation to be considered are:

a. The Threat. Merchant ships may be sailing through areas threatened by piracy, terrorism

or military conflict. The threat may comprise both regular military forces and para-military

forces such as guerrillas or terrorists. These para-military military forces tend to use a variety

of weapons and methods of delivery and usually attack without warning.

b. Protection. Merchant ships may be sailing through areas where protection is provided

either through a general naval presence, through accompaniment or escort of individual ships or

groups of ships, or they may be transiting areas where no protection is available. Depending on

the political situation and military rules of engagement in effect, naval forces may be able to

assist and protect merchant vessels under attack.

0503 Threat Warnings

If transiting through an area where military forces are operating, the MC may issue Threat

Warnings to indicate to merchant ships the likelihood of an enemy attack. These warnings are written

in plain language and may use a colour code as described below:

WARNING WHITE

Attack is unlikely without adequate warning. Normal

peacetime steaming. Safety of navigation posture.

WARNING YELLOW

Attack is probable.

WARNING RED

Attack is imminent or has already commenced.

5-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

These colour codes may be preceded by one of the following words to indicate the type of threat:

AIR

MINES

NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical)

SURFACE

SUBMARINES

General Threat Countermeasures. At times of increased threat warning levels there are a

number of precautions that can be undertaken to help reduce the possibility of attack and/or reduce

damage levels (see Annex 5A).

0504 General Threat Considerations

Identification. The threat will depend on the attackers’ ability to detect and identify a target.

Also the weapon range and the range/endurance of the weapon carrying platform will decide how far

to sea an attack is likely to be achieved. In some situations, however, one has to assume that attacks

can be carried out indiscriminately. As a general rule threats are more likely to occur in choke points

(straits, fjords, off capes) where less sophisticated weapons are likely to be employed.

Weather and Sea State. Reduced visibility may hamper the attackers ability to detect and

identify a target. Some weapons and sensors will have reduced effect in poor visibility, for instance

laser guided weapons and infra-red weapons and sensors. Smaller vessels may be hampered in high

sea states. High sea states and humidity may impair the use of sensors and weapons.

The Use of Active Electronic and Acoustic Equipment. The use of active electronic

and acoustic equipment such as radio, mobile telephones, satellite communication systems, radars,

Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), echo sounders and doppler logs may be important sources of

information to an attacker. These devices and systems can compromise a vessel’s position and

identity. The use of active electronic and acoustic equipment should be minimised in a threat

environment (see Para 0403).

0505 Types of Threat

The types of threat that may be encountered include:

a. The Air and Surface Threat (see Annex 5B).

b. The Submarine Threat (see Annex 5C).

c. Underwater Sabotage at Anchorages (see Annex 5D).

d. The Mine Threat (see Annex 5E).

e. The Threat from Nuclear Weapons (see Annex 5F).

f. The Threat from Chemical Weapons (see Annex 5G).

g The Threat from Biological Weapons (see Annex 5H).

5-2

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

0506 Protective Measures

The variety of merchant ships and threats make it impossible to make an exhaustive list of

protective measures, tailored to a specific ship or situation. Some commercial companies specialise in

training of crews and tailoring of defensive measures. National and international organisations like the

IMO provide guidance and regulations with regard to general safety aspects. These companies and

organisations may be consulted to optimise preparations prior to entering a threat area.

The IMO International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code has been developed to

counter peacetime threats. Fulfilling the requirements put forward in this code should prepare

merchant ships and ports to deal with peacetime threats, including the threat from terrorism.

5-3

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

ANNEX 5A

Recommended Protective Measures

Warning Yellow:

a. Increase watertight integrity posture. Essential watertight hatches and doors and outside

hatches and portholes should be kept closed and secured

Wear clothing made of fire retardant or non-man made fibre

Post extra lookouts. Ensure lookouts properly briefed

d. Implement darken ship routine

e. Treat unidentified vessels and small craft with caution

Attempt to establish the identity of any approaching vessel, and carry out evasive

manoeuvres if this cannot be done

g. Limit the use of electronic equipment to essential transmissions and safety of navigation

h. Be prepared to issue emergency reports

…….

Warning Red add:

Ensure fire pumps running, hoses are connected and ready to use

…

Have life jackets immediately available; wear life jackets where practicable

5A-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

ANNEX 5B

The Air and Surface Threat

The Threat

a. An air threat may consist of aircraft or helicopter carrying bombs, rockets, machine guns,

biological/chemical agents or missiles. In addition, aircraft may be used for surveillance and

reconnaissance to support other units in conducting attacks. Terrorists could use aircraft for

suicide attacks. Without information provided by military forces, merchant ships will get little

or no warning of an emerging air threat or attack.

b. The surface threat in military conflict may consist of naval surface vessels such as

destroyers, frigates, corvettes or (fast) patrol boats. In areas where the surface threat stems

from terrorism, piracy or non-regular forces, there may be a threat from smaller vessels like

fishing vessels, tugs, speedboats and even personal water craft (jet-skis). In such areas, any

unidentified craft approaching the ship may be a potential threat. Terrorists, pirates and other

non-regular forces may use short range, hand-held weapons. Any type of vessel may be used

for suicide attacks. The surface threat from pirates, terrorists and non-regular forces will

normally diminish with the distance from the coast.

c. Merchant ships may be harassed by ships using close approaches, use of searchlights

against the bridge and non-compliant boardings.

d. Missiles may be launched from distances measured from miles to hundreds of miles. The

missile has the performance characteristics of a small, very fast aircraft; it may use its own

radar to home in on a ship, or it may home in on the ship’s own radio/radar transmitters or

infra-red emissions (eg heat from funnels), or use information from a third party (for example a

surveillance aircraft).

e. The launch of a missile may be detected through a visible flash and smoke. Missiles will

normally hit above the waterline. The main hazard is likely to come from fire, caused either by

the warhead explosion or by the unspent fuel from the missile motor.

Self Protective Measures

a. Watch for evidence that the ship is under surveillance. Visual lookout should be all-round

and continuous.

b. Increase speed.

c. Reduce the number of crew on the weather decks, in positions near the weather decks, or in

machinery spaces, to the bare minimum required for safe steaming. Move all the remaining

personnel to a sheltered position above the waterline with short access to the upper deck.

d. If under missile threat:

(1) Reduce the heat signature by cooling down the funnel.

(2) Turn off all radars.

5B-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

ANNEX 5C

The Submarine Threat

The Threat

a. Submerged submarines are very difficult to detect with other than specially designed

sensors, and an attack will occur without any warning. Submarines have the ability to detect

merchant ships noise at long range, and to identify ships based on propeller revolutions, engine

noise, and noise generated by other equipment such as auxiliary engines, pumps, etc. They may

also be able to locate and identify merchant ships by their radar, echo sounder or their visual

appearance.

b. The main weapon systems are most likely sophisticated torpedoes and/or missiles. Less

sophisticated submarines may be equipped with straight running torpedoes, which may be

easier to evade.

c. Missiles may be launched from distances measured from miles to hundreds of miles. The

missile has the performance characteristics of a small, very fast aircraft; it may use its own

radar to home in on a ship, or it may home in on the ship’s own radio/radar transmitters or

infra-red emissions (eg heat from funnels), or use information from a third party (for example a

surveillance aircraft).

d. The launch of a missile may be detected through a visible flash and smoke. Missiles will

normally hit above the waterline. The main hazard is likely to come from fire, caused either by

the warhead explosion or by the unspent fuel from the missile motor.

Self Protective Measures

a. Avoid, whenever possible, areas where submarines are likely to operate.

b. If navigating within an area where submarines operate, alter course 30 degrees minimum

every two to three hours.

c. If the position of a submarine is indicated, a merchant ship should proceed at full speed

away from the submarine and making short 15-degree minimum course alterations every 8-15

minutes.

d. Increase transiting speed.

e. If under torpedo threat:

(1) Reduce the number of people below decks.

f. If under missile threat:

(1) Reduce the heat signature by cooling down the funnel.

(2) Turn off all radars.

5C-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

ANNEX 5D

Underwater Sabotage at Anchorages

The Threat

a. A merchant ship at anchor can be subject to various potential threats, both in peacetime and

in conflict, varying from acts of terrorism to acts of war. Merchant ships may be the direct

target of saboteurs and special forces aiming to sink the ship.

b. Fulfilling the requirements of the ISPS Code should help merchant ships to counter

peacetime threats, including the threat from terrorism.

Self Protective Measures

a. Post extra lookouts on the upper deck. Ensure lookouts are properly briefed.

b. Deploy own ship’s waterborne security patrol.

c. If possible, rotate the propeller, continuously or at short irregular intervals, as circumstances

permit.

d. Operate bow thrusters and stern thrusters at zero (0) thrust.

e. Turn the rudder frequently.

f. Echo sounder to transmit to counter/combat swimmer/diver threat.

5D-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

ANNEX 5E

The Mine Threat

The Threat

a. Sea mines remain the most likely and dangerous weapon to be used against shipping in

every potential conflict. As a weapon, they are relatively cheap and easy to lay by both military

and civilian assets (ie aircraft, fishing vessels, etc). Nowadays sea mines vary from very simple

contact mines to sophisticated ones, using high technology to detect and identify potential

targets. Sea mines can be laid on the bottom, anchored at a given depth or floating.

b. Sea mines can normally be expected in waters 200 metres or less in depth. In most cases

routes will be designated in an area where mines are suspected, and will be subject to clearing

operations by mine countermeasures (MCM) forces.

Self Protective Measures

a. If possible, avoid waters with less than 200 metres water depth.

b. If possible, sail at high water in order to increase the distance between hull and mine.

c. If possible, take advantage of favourable currents or tidal streams, which will reduce the

time spent in the area of danger without the need to increase speed, or alter other ship-made

influences.

d. Keep the lowest steering speed, in areas where a mine threat might exist, especially in

waters of less than 60 metres.

e. Do not throw anything overboard. Many objects that float may be mistaken by lookouts for

floating mines.

f. Watch should be kept for any unusual or suspicious activity, such as the releasing of objects

into the sea that might indicate mining activity. Aircraft may release mines with or without

parachutes.

g. If a mine clearance operation is in progress in a particular area, merchant ships may be

guided through the area by naval forces. Before arrival in the area, information on the

rendezvous and procedures for such a routing will be provided by the NCAGSORG.

h. Reduce the number of personnel remaining below the main deck, or in compartments below

the waterline, to the absolute minimum.

Follow directly over the same ground as the ship ahead.

Minimise ship’s acoustic signature by securing non-essential machinery. Avoid all

unnecessary alterations of course, engines reversing or extreme changes of revolutions.

5E-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

ANNEX 5F

The Threat from Nuclear Weapons

The Threat

a. Any weapon designed to deliver a conventional explosive could be used to deliver a nuclear

explosive.

b. Characteristics. In case of a nuclear explosion, ships and personnel may be exposed to the

flash, thermal radiation, initial nuclear radiation and contamination in the form of fallout.

Self Protective Measures

Ships and personnel can be protected to an appreciable extent against the hazards of nuclear attack by

material measures, protective clothing and good organisation. If a ship has a pre-arranged

countermeasures plan, ensure that all measures laid down in that plan are carried out. If no such plan

is in existence, consider adapting ships procedures to include the following measures:

a. Ships should be manoeuvred to avoid contamination or to exit the contamination area as

soon as possible.

b. A group, or groups, of compartments should be selected for the crew to take shelter. The

spaces should be as low down in the ship and as far removed from the ship's side as possible.

These spaces should be equipped with washing and lavatory facilities and sufficient food to last

for the passage through the danger area. Spaces selected should be capable of being completely

shut down with all ventilation and other openings secured.

c. Stow below or cover as much gear on the weather decks as possible, particularly absorbent

materials such as rope, awnings, etc. Ensure that food stores and galleys are closed down with

all openings closed. Stop all ventilation fans and close or cover all ventilation and other

openings that are not essential for running machinery and continued steaming. In the absence

of suitable closures, the use of adhesive tape, etc is recommended.

d. Consider having the crew don immersion suits or fire fighting gear. The gear is to be used

to minimise skin exposure. Breathing apparatus can be used to help prevent airborne agents

from being inhaled.

e. Rig and activate all available fire fighting/wash-deck hoses and nozzles to spray water

continuously over as much of the weather decks and superstructure as possible, to prevent

contamination settling. If complete coverage is impossible, concentrate effort on the wheel

house/bridge, over the top of the shelter position(s) and above the machinery spaces.

f. If continual spraying of the upper decks is impracticable, organise working parties to wash

down the weather decks and superstructure. In the event of a nuclear incident, this should be

done at frequent intervals to reduce the build-up of contamination.

g. As soon as possible after clearing the dangerous area, carry out a thorough hosing down of

the entire weather decks and superstructure.

h. Minimise the number of crew who must remain on the weather decks, in positions near the

weather decks, or in machinery spaces, to the bare minimum required for safe steaming. Keep

the remainder of the crew in the selected shelter position(s).

5F-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

Ensure that all personnel remaining in exposed positions (including machinery spaces,

unless ventilation can be stopped), are fully clothed, preferably in foul weather clothing with all

skin covered as far as practicable. Masks with breathing apparatus should be available and

donned if threat is imminent.

Restrict unnecessary movement throughout the ship, to minimise the possible spread of

contamination.

k. Unless essential, do not distil water for drinking whilst in the danger area.

Additional Protective Measures in The Event of a Nuclear Attack

The following additional actions to that listed above should be considered specifically in the event of a

nuclear attack.

a. Light flash and thermal radiation from nuclear attack can be countered by such measures as

protective clothing, shielding the eyes, and shelter behind superstructures. Initial nuclear

radiation can only be reduced by substantial shielding.

b. Move personnel in exposed or relatively unsheltered positions (including machinery spaces)

as often as possible, in order to minimise the radiation dosage. Take as much shelter as the safe

navigation of the ship will permit.

c. Ensure that all exposed personnel remove their outer clothing on returning to shelter, and

wash their exposed skin thoroughly, especially the hands, face and neck, as soon as possible,

and in any case before drinking or eating.

d. The effects of nuclear fallout can be reduced by pre-wetting exposed surfaces, closing down

air intakes and machinery spaces temporarily, sheltering the crew below decks and

decontamination. The presence of fallout, and a rough indication of intensity, can be monitored

using simple radiation detecting instruments, if available.

5F-2

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

ANNEX 5G

The Threat from Chemical Weapons

The Threat

Chemical compounds are available with such versatile properties that, in addition to being able to kill,

they may be used to incapacitate and to do so for varying lengths of time. Moreover, these effects can

be achieved without material damage or destruction. The use of chemical agents is directed primarily

against humans or food supplies.

a. Method of Attack. The probability of a chemical attack at sea is low but the possibility

must not be discounted; any weapon designed to deliver a conventional explosive or nuclear

load could also be used to deliver a chemical agent. Obviously, an attack on a ship at sea

requires great accuracy to be effective. The following delivery methods are possible:

(1) Air burst bombs or missiles to envelop the target in aerosol spray or droplets.

(2) Aerosol or droplets sprayed from an aircraft or cruise missile.

(3) Chemical filled shell or missile.

b. Types and Characteristics of Chemical Agents. Chemical agents may be liquids,

aerosols, vapours or solids and can produce a very rapid reaction if inhaled, absorbed or

swallowed in any form. In liquid or aerosol states they may penetrate clothing and skin, even

though the droplets may be so small that they cannot be seen or felt upon the body. The most

likely groups to be used are:

(1) Nerve agents.

(2) Incapacitating agents.

(3) Blister agents.

c. Nerve Agents.

(1) The most dangerous of the known lethal chemical agents comprise the nerve group.

These act on the body through the nervous system. The agents are liquids emitting a toxic

vapour that can be inhaled, absorbed through the skin or swallowed with contaminated food

or water. Contaminated areas remain dangerous for a period which varies according to the

concentration, weather conditions and the type of structure on which the agent has landed.

It is most dangerous in confined, unventilated spaces.

5G-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

(2) Symptoms of nerve agent poisoning are any one or more of the following:

a. Blurring of vision - difficulty in focusing.

b. Excessive salivation.

c. Sudden headache.

d. Tightness of the chest.

e. Pinpointing of pupils of the eyes.

(3) Later, unless preventative measures are taken quickly, convulsions and paralysis occur,

followed by death. With large doses, death comes within minutes. A sub-lethal dose can

reduce the body's resistance to a subsequent dose for days or even weeks.

d. Incapacitating Agents. These are non-lethal agents that produce physical and/or mental

effects of sufficient severity to prevent personnel from carrying out their normal duties. The

duration of effect can last from several minutes to several days. Recovery is usually complete

and normally there are no after-effects. These agents can produce one or more of the following

states: temporary paralysis, persistent lachrymation (excessive watering of eyes), diarrhoea,

vomiting, convulsive spells or mental confusion.

e. Blister Agents

(1) The principal blister agent, known as ‘mustard’, gives off an invisible vapour having a

slight but characteristic odour of garlic or onions.

(2) It may be delivered in the form of vapour or liquid and in either form can seriously

damage the eyes, respiratory passages and skin if these are unprotected. It will penetrate

normal clothing in a few minutes. Severe internal injury will result from the consumption

of contaminated food or drink.

(3) Symptoms may first appear in the eyes, varying from mild irritation to intense pain.

Penetration of the skin will result in inflammation with an itching or burning sensation.

More severe penetration causes the formation of blisters which, when broken, leave a raw,

painful surface, easily infected.

Self Protective Measures

As with defence against nuclear attack, individual ships and crew can be protected appreciably against

chemical attack by material measures, protective clothing and good organisation (see Annex 5F Para

2).

5G-2

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), Vol. II

ANNEX 5H

The Threat from Biological Weapons

The Threat

a. Biological agents would normally be delivered by:

(1) Airborne Methods. Aircraft or missiles releasing an aerosol cloud or releasing

the agent in canisters, bomblets, or rockets.

(2) Ashore. Aerosol generators or sprays.

(3) At Sea. Aerosol generators or sprays from ships, ship borne missiles, submarines,

or floating mines. The resultant ‘cloud’ may be effective for considerable distances in a

downwind direction.

b. Biological agents lend themselves particularly to attack by sabotage.

c. A biological agent is any organism that can be used to produce disease or death. For the

purposes of war they may be classified in the following types:

(1) Micro-Organisms. Such as Microbes or Bacteria.

(2) Toxins. Poisonous substances of an organic origin such as Ricin.

(3) Disease Vectors. Animals or insects (flies, fleas, rats, birds, etc.) that transfer

infective agents from one host to another.

(4) Ests. Living organisms that interfere with the health of other organisms

d. An agent may enter the body by any of three routes - ingestion, injection, and inhalation

(most lethal agents enter by inhalation).

Self Protective Measures

a. As with defence against nuclear attack, individual ships and crew can be protected

appreciably against biological attack by material measures, protective clothing and good

organisation (see Annex 5F Para 2). Specific measures for biological contamination are:

(1) In Food. By cooking.

(2) In Water. By chlorination or boiling for several minutes.

(3) In Wounds. By careful attention to cleanliness/disinfection.

(4) In Enclosed Spaces. By constant attention to cleanliness.

5H-1

ORIGINAL

ATP-2(B), VOL. II

LO.

Liaison Officer.

MCM.

Mine Countermeasures.

MERCOMMS.

Merchant Vessel Communications.

MERWARN.

Warnings to Merchant Ships.

MIO.

Maritime Interdiction Operation.

MOT.

Ministry of Transport.

MPS.

Maritime Pre-positioning Ship.

NAC.

North Atlantic Council.

NATO.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

NAVWARN.

Navigational Warning.

NBC.

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical.

NCAGS.

Naval Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping.

NCAGS CDR.

NCAGS Commander.

NCAGS LO.

Naval Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping Liaison Officer.

NCAGSORG.

NCAGS Organisation.

NSA.

National Shipping Authority/Administration.

NSC.

NATO Shipping Centre.

NUC.

Nuclear.

PBOS.

Planning Board for Ocean Shipping.

PIM.

Position and Intended Movement.

PfP.

Partnership for Peace.

POF.

Potential Opposing Forces.

Acronyms-2

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), VOL. II

GLOSSARY

accompaniment. A voluntary arrangement in which merchant ships may be organised for passage

through a specific area of increased risk in company with military assets. Details will be promulgated

via navigational warnings. Accompaniment does not imply direct protection by military assets;

however, the percents of military assets may act as a deterrent to any unlawful interference to

merchant ships.

anti-terrorism. All defensive and preventive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces,

individuals and property to terrorism. Note: such measures include protective and deterrent measures

aimed at preventing an attack or reducing its effect(s).

area of operation. An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to

conduct military activities.

communication reporting gate. A geographical reference point or line at which merchant ships

are to call the NCAGS organisation in order to establish initial contact, or to update previous

information. The communication reporting gate allows the military commander timely information

about merchant ships approaching the area of operation.

communications security material. All documents, devices or equipment (including crypto

material) associated with the securing or authenticating of telecommunications.

convoy. A number of merchant ships or naval auxiliaries, or both, usually escorted by warships

and/or aircraft, or a single merchant ship, or naval auxiliary under surface escort, assembled and

organised for the purpose of passage together.

crisis response shipping. All shipping employed in support of allied military operations,

including ships taken up from trade, chartered shipping and, when appropriate, national pre-positioned

ships.

damage control. In naval usage, measures necessary aboard ship to preserve and re-establish

water-tight integrity, stability, manoeuvrability and offensive power; to control list and trim; to effect

rapid repairs of materiel; to limit the spread of, and provide adequate protection from, fire; to limit the

spread of, remove the contamination by, and provide adequate protection from, toxic agents; and to

provide for care of wounded personnel.

designated merchant ships. Merchant ships nominated as ‘designated’ by NATO nations

through their National Shipping Authorities. These ships may have priority over other ships for higher

level NCAGS activities and under Naval Supervision of Merchant Ships will comply with military

orders. On request, the North Atlantic Council may allow non-NATO nations to nominate ships.

dispersal. In NCAGS, reduction of the concentration of shipping by re-berthing within a port area,

or at working/holding anchorages in the vicinity.

Glossary-1

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), VOL. II

emergency movement. The execution of Diversion, Port Evacuation, Area Evacuation and

subsequent movements in order to preserve hulls and cargoes when attack in a port or area is

imminent. The majority of these movements are based on national Civil Emergency Plans although

military commanders can order any element if the risk assessment is considered to be high.

emission control. Selective control of emitted electromagnetic or acoustic energy. The aim may be

twofold:

a. To minimize the enemy's detection of emissions and exploitation of the information so

gained.

b. To reduce electromagnetic interference, thereby improving friendly sensor performance.

escort. A combatant unit(s) assigned to accompany and protect another force or convoy.

humanitarian operation. An operation specifically mounted to alleviate human suffering where

responsible civil actors in an area are unable or unwilling to adequately support a population. It may

precede, parallel, or complement the activity of specialised civil humanitarian organisations.

immediately vital cargo. A cargo already loaded which the consignee country regards as

immediately vital for the prosecution of the war or for national survival, notwithstanding the risk to the

ship. If the cargo is carried in a ship of another nation, then that nation must agree to the delivery of

the cargo. The use of this term is limited to the period of implementation of the shipping movement

policy.

lead-through. Designed to minimise the risk to merchant ships transiting mined areas, and to

facilitate the liaison between these ships and the on-scene Mine Countermeasures Commander for safe

navigation purposes. Details will be promulgated via navigational warnings. Naval co-operation and

guidance for shipping can recommend and facilitate the organisation of lead-through operations for

merchant ships.

merchant ship. A ship engaged in mercantile trade except river craft, estuarial craft, or craft which

operate solely within harbour limits.

merchant ship communications system. A worldwide system of communications to and from

merchant ships using the peacetime commercial organisation as a basis but under an operational

control authority, with the ability to employ the broadcast mode to ships when the situation makes

radio silence necessary. Also called ‘mercomms' system’.

merchant shipping. The complete commercial maritime industry, including the fishing industry.

Glossary-2

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), VOL. II

national shipping authority. The organisation within each allied government responsible in time

of war for the direction of its own merchant shipping.

naval co-operation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS). The provision of NATO military

co-operation, guidance, advice, assistance and supervision to merchant shipping to enhance the safety

of participating merchant ships and to support military operations.

NCAGS area. A geographical area within which the NCAGS organisation conducts NCAGS

activities.

The objective of such an area is to maximise the co-operation between military

commanders and merchant shipping.

NCAGS commander. The officer assigned to command NCAGS organisation. The NCAGS

commander is typically also the commander of the naval force.

NCAGS liaison officer. An officer deployed aboard a merchant ship to provide liaison between the

merchant ship Master and military authorities. The NCAGS liaison officer is the naval advisor to the

merchant master. His position on board does not affect the master’s responsibilities for the safe

navigation and safe handling of the ship. The NCAGS liaison officer makes military knowledge

available to the master to allow the master to understand the naval and military requirements that are

applicable.

NCAGS organisation. Supports two distinct entities, the merchant shipping community and the

military commander. Therefore, it supports both military operations and enhances the safety of

merchant ships, while keeping mutual interference to a minimum.

NCAGS unit. A team of naval co-operation and guidance for shipping personnel, deployed ashore or

afloat, to provide specific local naval co-operation and guidance for shipping services including the

gathering of local merchant shipping information, providing guidance to merchant ships and co-

operating with and advising local merchant shipping.

naval supervision of merchant ships. The ultimate response of NCAGS guidance exercised by

naval authorities of mandatory routeing, control of movement and/or convoy organisation. Naval

supervision of merchant ships will be implemented only with North Atlantic Council/Defence

Planning Committee approval.

NATO shipping centre. A permanent organisation in the NATO headquarters in Northwood

(GBR) tasked with establishing and maintaining links with the military, merchant shipping, national

shipping authorities and international maritime agencies.

participating merchant ships. Any merchant ships, including fishing vessels, which by the

submission of the appropriate proforma, are participating in a NCAGS operation

Glossary-3

ORIGINAL

ATP 2(B), VOL. II

sailing instruction. A document used by NCAGS to inform merchant vessels of general situation

in the operation area, route to follow through the area and special instructions regarding

communications, emission control, notification of diversion etc. May be delivered by Email, Fax or by

hand by a Briefing Officer depending on situation and content.

security. The condition achieved when designated information, material, personnel, activities and

installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as against

loss or unauthorised disclosure.

shipping co-operation point (SCP). A location where NCAGS staff will gather information on

local merchant shipping and naval operations and will provide the means to brief merchant shipping on

risks, routeing and organisation for protection. The SCP will, depending on the level of an operation,

encompass co-ordination, co-operation or, when naval supervision of merchant ships is authorised,

control. The location of shipping co-operation points will be at the discretion of the NCAGS

commander and can be ashore or afloat. The SCP liaises with local and regional authorities including

port authorities, shipping agents, and local shipping companies and reports ship movements to other

elements of the NCAGS organisation.

shipping risk area. A geographic area of higher or specific risk to merchant ships. Guidance will

be provided to participating merchant ships to help them understand the nature and extent of the risk in

the area and, if applicable, to recommend specific routes through them.

terrorism. The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in

an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological

objectives.

Glossary-4

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

January 2008

PUBLICATION NOTICE

ROUTING

1. Change 2 to ATP-71, ALLIED MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS,

is available in the Navy Warfare Library. It is effective on receipt.

2. Summary: Change 2 to ATP-71 incorporates the following changes:

a. The definitions for Assault Force and Boarding Party were added under the

Definition of Key Terms.

b. Figure 2-1 was renamed and updated.

c. Minor changes were made as indicated by change bars in the text.

Navy Warfare Library Custodian

Navy Warfare Library publications must be made

readily available to all users and other interested

personnel within the U.S. Navy.

Note to Navy Warfare Library Custodian

This notice will assist you in providing information to cognizant personnel. It is not accountable.

IIa

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

NATION

SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

BGR

The Bulgarian Navy does not have available the necessary equipment of

the boarding group, as required in Annex A and B.

ITA

ITA does not accept the wording of paragraph “0202.4e. - Boarding Offi-

cer.” In according with national regulations the control of the Boarding

Party is kept by the Commanding Officer of the boarding ship.

ITA

ITA does not accept the wording of paragraph “0504.b. - Boat Engineer.”

In according with national regulations the Boarding Party Boat Crew must

be unarmed.

ITA

ITA does not accept the wording of paragraph “0503.d. - Security Team.”

In according with national regulations the composition of Security Team

does not include engineering officer or rating.

TUR

a. By taking into account MIO and Embargo are very different with their

definitions, legal aspects and contents, it is assessed that it is not conve -

nient to define Embargo as part of MIO, as described in Pages 1-1 and

1-2, Paragraph 103.

b. Since seaborne enforcement measures encompassed by MIO interfere

with the freedom of the high seas, these measures must be derived from

international law, treaty or convention, or the resolutions or enactments of

the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

(OSCE), or another international or regional security organization as de-

scribed in MC 362/1. Therefore it is considered that any individual nation

does not have the right to provide the authority for a MIO contrary to the

depiction in page 1-3, paragraph 0105.

FRA

§ 503, e. Boarding Party Composition, Search team: les équipes de visite

des bâtiments français n’ont pas obligatoirement la compétence

“escalade.”

FRA

Annexe B.001, 1, alinéas w et x: Quand les équipes de visite n’ont pas la

compétence “escalade,” elles ne disposent pas d’équipement spécialisé.

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

No.

CHAPTER

— INTRODUCTION

0101

Purpose

1-1

0102

Definition

1-1

0103

Overview

1-1

0104

Objectives of Maritime Interdiction

1-2

0105

International Law

1-3

0106

Scope

1-3

0107

Definition of Key Terms

1-3

CHAPTER

— CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

0201

Concept

2-1

0202

Command Relationships and Responsibilities

2-1

0203

Communications

2-4

CHAPTER

— DETECTION AND SURVEILLANCE

0301

Overview

3-1

0302

Detection

3-1

0303

Surveillance

3-3

0304

Sensors

3-4

CHAPTER

— INTERROGATION, APPROACH, AND STOPPING

0401

Overview

4-1

0402

Shipboard Requirements

4-1

0403

Shipboard Preparations

4-1

0404

Interrogation Procedures

4-2

0405

Approach Procedures

4-3

0406

Diversion Procedures

4-5

0407

Stopping Procedures

4-6

CHAPTER

— BOARDING AND SEARCHING

0501

Overview

5-1

0502

Discussion

5-1

0503

Boarding Party Composition

5-2

0504

Boarding Party Boat Crew Composition

5-3

0505

Boarding Party Equipment

5-3

0506

Pre-boarding Instructions to Vessel Being Boarded

5-3

0507

Boarding Party Communications

5-4

0508

Pre-boarding Briefs

5-5

0509

Unopposed Boarding Procedures

5-6

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

Page

No.

0510

Cargo Inspection

5-16

0511

Data/Evidence Collection

5-16

0512

Information Collection

5-18

0513

Debarkation Procedures

5-18

0514

Non-cooperative and Opposed Boarding Operations

5-19

0515

Helicopterborne Assault Force

5-19

CHAPTER

— DIVERSION PROCEDURES

0601

Overview

6-1

0602

Voluntary Diversion

6-1

0603

Involuntary Diversion

6-1

0604

Opposed Diversion

6-2

0605

Possible Cargo Seizure

6-2

0606

Other Considerations

6-2

0607

Postboarding Procedures

6-2

CHAPTER

- NON-COOPERATIVE BOARDINGS

0701

Introduction

7-1

0702

Command Relationships and Responsibilities

7-2

0703

No-Go Criteria

7-2

0704

Detection and Surveillance

7-2

0705

Query and Approach

7-2

0706

Stopping Suspect Vessel and Boarding

7-3

0707

Search and Inspection

7-6

0708

Debarkation Procedures

7-6

0709

Diversion Procedures

7-6

0710

Postboarding Procedures

7-6

CHAPTER

- SUPPORT FOR EMBARKED SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DURING

MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

0801

Introduction

8-1

0802

Command Relationships and Responsibilities

8-1

0803

Force Packages

8-3

0804

Operations

8-3

0805

Integration of Embarked Augmentation Team and Assets

8-6

0806

Communications Considerations

8-7

ANNEX A — BOARDING TEAM EQUIPMENT

A001

Required Equipment

A-1

A002

Radios

A-2

A003

Ship Control Team Equipment

A-2

ANNEX B — BOARDING KIT

B001

Contents of Kit

B-1

XII

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

Page

No.

ANNEX C — SAMPLE MERCHANT DOCUMENTS

C001

Overview

C-1

ANNEX D — BOARDING PROCEDURES

D001

Introduction

D-1

D002

Embarkation

D-1

D003

Crew Control

D-2

D004

Inspection

D-2

D005

Completion/Debarkation

D-2

D006

Tactical Sweep Procedures

D-2

ANNEX E - CHECKLISTS

E001

Seaworthiness Assessment Checklist

E-1

E002

Operational Brief to Command Team Checklist

E-2

E003

Bridge/CIC Watch Checklist

E-3

E004

Go/No Go Checklist

E-4

E005

Boarding Officer Pre-mission Brief to Boarding Team .

E-5

E006

Ship Control Team Pre-mission Brief

E-6

E007

Ship Control Team Turnover Checklist

E-7

E008

Boarding Officer Task List

E-8

ANNEX F — OPTASK MIO AND INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN OPTASK

MIO SUPP

F001

OPTASK MIO

F-1

F002

OPTASK MIO SUPP

F-1

GLOSSARY

Glossary-1

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

LEP-1

XIII

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

No.

CHAPTER 2 — CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Figure 2-1.

Opposed Boarding Command and Control Structure

2-2

Figure 2-2.

Boarding Party Command and Control Structure

2-3

Figure 2-3.

Proposed Maritime Interdiction Force Communications Plan

2-5

CHAPTER 3 — DETECTION AND SURVEILLANCE

Figure 3-1.

Sensor Level of Identification

3-4

CHAPTER 5 — BOARDING AND SEARCHING

Figure 5-1.

Boarding Party Communications

5-4

Figure 5-2.

Document Validation Process

5-8

ANNEX C — SAMPLE MERCHANT DOCUMENTS

Figure C-1.

Sample Cargo Manifest

C-2

Figure C-2.

Sample Statement

C-6

Figure C-3.

Sample Dangerous/Hazardous Cargo Manifest

C-7

Figure C-4.

Sample Bill of Lading

C-8

Figure C-5.

Sample Worksheet

C-9

Figure C-6.

Sample Crew List

C-12

Figure C-7.

Sample Certificate of Registry

C-13

ANNEX D — BOARDING PROCEDURES

Figure D-1.

The Fatal Funnel Concept

D-5

Figure D-2.

The Buttonhook

D-7

Figure D-3.

The Crisscross

D-8

Figure D-4.

The SAS

D-9

Figure D-5.

The Israeli Move

D-10

Figure D-6.

The Triangulation Concept

D-12

Figure D-7.

Nonverbal Signals

D-14

Figure D-8.

The Cover Concept

D-15

Figure D-9.

Slicing the Pie

D-16

Figure D-10.

The Ladder Concept

D-17

XIV

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

FOREWORD

ATP-71, Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations, provides the objectives of maritime interdiction

operations, their principles of inspection, and tactical guidance for conducting maritime interdiction and

boarding operations by allied ships and associated elements from other services.

This document is unclassified and does not require security protection. It may be released to

non-NATO nations independently by member nations and NATO commands and agencies as required.

Comments and recommended changes to this document should be sent directly to the address

listed below:

COMMANDER

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

ATTN: N57

686 Cushing Road

Newport, Rhode Island 02841-1207

References and related publications:

a. AJP-3.1

Allied Joint Maritime Operations

b. AJP-3.4

NATO Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

c. AJP-3.4.1

Peace Support Operations

d. ATP-1

Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures Volume I

Allied Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book Volume II

e. APP-1

Allied Maritime Voice Reporting Procedures

f. APP-7

Joint Brevity Words Publication

g. APP-11

NATO Message Catalogue

h. ATP-2

Allied Naval Control of Shipping Manual

I. MC 362

NATO Rules of Engagement

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

0101 Purpose

ATP-71, Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations, provides:

a. The historical aspect of maritime interdiction, the objectives of maritime interdiction operations,

and the principles of inspection.

b. Tactical guidance for conducting maritime interdiction and boarding operations by allied ships

and associated elements from other services.

0102 Definition

A maritime interdiction operation (MIO) encompasses seaborne enforcement measures to intercept the

movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specific area. MIO are normally re-

stricted to the interception and, if necessary, boarding of vessels to verify, redirect or impound their car-

goes in support of the enforcement of economic or military sanctions. Units engaged in MIO normally

exercise the right to perform the following:

a. Interrogate vessels for reasons other than safe navigation.

b. Send armed boarding parties to visit vessels bound to, through, or out of a defined area.

c. Examine each ship’s papers and cargo.

d. Search for evidence of prohibited items.

e. Divert vessels failing to comply with the guidelines set forth by the sanctioning body.

f. Seize vessels and their cargo that refuse to divert.

0103 Overview

In broad terms, the enforcement of sanctions and embargos is designed to force a nation or party to

obey international law or to conform to a resolution or mandate. Sanctions generally concern the denial of

supplies, diplomatic, economic, and other trading privileges, and the freedom of movement of those liv-

ing in the area of sanctions. Sanctions may be conducted partially against a particular party, or impar-

tially, in the context of a peace support operation, over a wide area embracing all parties. The military

objective is to establish a barrier that is selective, allowing only those goods, persons or services autho-

rized to enter or exit. Depending on geography, sanction enforcement normally involves some combina-

tion of air, land, and maritime forces such as MIOs, and the enforcement of no-fly zones. Commanders,

commanding officers, and other key decision-making personnel should have a working knowledge of the

principles and law of the sea involved prior to commencing a MIO. The effectiveness of MIO is related to

compliance with the sanctions or embargo, reduction in the flow of prohibited items, and/or prevention of

escalating hostilities. This objective may be obscured by the framework of platforms, personnel, and lo-

gistics required to support a MIO.

The United Nations will normally establish the provisions for an embargo and authorize the use of

force through a UN Security Council Resolution. The right to impose an embargo may also be derived

1-1

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

from the customary international law that defines the right of a nation, or group of nations, to defend

against a threat to the peace or actual breach of the peace. This right is also termed individual or collective

self-defence.

The authority establishing the MIO must address the following items in the resolution:

a. Force. The resolution should prescribe the level of force authorized in conducting the MIO.

Generally, the rules of engagement (ROE) and national interpretations of the resolution will

prescribe the conditions under which, and the extent to which, force may be used in enforcing the

resolution.

b. Prohibited Items. The resolution itself will specify the prohibited items. However, when

dealing with questionable cargoes, the MIO commander may require clarification of the prohibition

status of specific goods from the sanctioning authority. For example, if the resolution bans petroleum

products, but merchant ships are encountered carrying oil shale, coal, or natural gas, the MIO may

wish to clarify what is to be stopped by contacting the sanctioning authority through the chain of

command. Certain goods are generally exempt from seizure, such as medical and hospital stores,

religious objects, humanitarian relief supplies, and humanitarian-related foodstuffs.

c. Geographic Limitations. Although the resolution may set the geographic limitations for

the MIO and authorize entry into the target country’s territorial sea, the decision regarding whether

to allow pursuit into the target country’s territorial sea varies between participating nations. This

decision may be modified based on political developments during the MIO enforcement. Some

members may prohibit any entry into territorial seas, others may create arbitrary limits on territorial

waters (TTW), e.g., 3 nm, and still others may authorize pursuit to the coastline. This issue is further

complicated by regional geography and the target country’s maritime claims.

d. Disposition. Normally, ships are not seized during a MIO; those carrying prohibited items

are diverted to an acceptable port or returned to their port of origin. However, the UN resolution

may authorize the seizure and subsequent sale of the violating vessels and their prohibited items.

For a MIO to be recognized as lawful under international law, the provisions thereof must be ap-

plied to ships of all nationalities. This means that all ships in transit of the defined area, including those of

one’s own nation, must be subjected to an inspection. Force may be utilized, if required, to ensure compli-

ance with interdiction operations.

See ATP-1 Volume I, Chapter 8, Section VII, for further guidelines on the preparation and execu-

tion of multinational embargo operations.

0104 Objectives of Maritime Interdiction

There are two objectives of maritime interdiction:

a. Primary. The primary objective is to determine if a vessel is in compliance with or in violation

of the stated reason for interdiction.

b. Secondary. The secondary objective is to gather intelligence about:

(1) The vessel’s itinerary and future intentions.

(2) Military and shipping activity in and around an embargoed nation’s ports.

1-2

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

0105 International Law

(R)

The United Nations, individual nations, or other recognized political authorities may provide authority for

a MIO. Reference sources are available to commanding officers to amplify international law of the sea.

0106 Scope

Allied force ships must be prepared to conduct MIO on short notice. In support of this objective, guidance

provided herein is applicable to all commands that may be involved in the planning and/or execution of a

MIO. The information contained herein may be useful to personnel of other armed services who are also

tasked to support MIO.

0107 Definition of Key Terms

Although some terms used in MIO are not specific to the MIO mission, the following definitions are tai-

lored to be MIO specific:

a. Unopposed Boarding. An unopposed boarding is one in which the master of the vessel

complies with the on-scene commander (OSC) directions and the following additional conditions

are met:

(1) No apparent passive/active resistance measures are employed.

(2) There is no intelligence to indicate a threat.

NOTE

Throughout this publication, compliant or cooperative boardings, and consensual

visits are regarded as unopposed boardings.

b. Non-cooperative Boarding. A non-cooperative boarding is one in which there is no

intelligence to indicate a threat, and any or all of the conditions listed below are met:

(1) The master of the vessel does not acknowledge communications, fails to cooperate in estab-

lishing his purpose in the area, or continuously refuses to cooperate in allowing boarding to take

place.

(2) Passive measures in place are intended to delay, impede, complicate, and/or deter boarding

of the suspect vessel and can be overcome by mechanical means.

(3) Passive resistance measures in place are intended only to delay, impede, complicate, and/or

deter search and seizure of suspect vessel and can be overcome by mechanical means.

NOTE

Throughout this publication, non-compliant boardings are regarded as non-cooper-

ative boardings.

c. Opposed Boarding. Opposed boarding is one in which any or all of the following

conditions are met:

(1) The master of the vessel actively refuses to allow boarding to take place.

1-3

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

(2) Passive resistance measures in place are clearly intended to inflict harm on the boarding

party or create a very dangerous environment.

(3) Intelligence indicates a possible threat on board the subject vessel, or the vessel is suspected

of carrying terrorist contraband.

d. Consensual Visit. A consensual visit is conducted at the invitation of the master (or

person-in-charge) of a vessel, which is not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the boarding

officer. The voluntary consent of the master permits the boarding, but it does not allow the assertion

of law enforcement authority, such as arrest or seizure. A consensual visit is not, therefore, an

exercise of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction per se. Nevertheless, such visits have utility in

allowing rapid verification of the legitimacy of a vessel’s voyage by obtaining or confirming vessel

documents, cargo, and navigation records without undue delay to the visited vessel.

e. Right of Approach and Visit. Under international law, a warship, military aircraft, or other

duly authorized ship or aircraft may approach any vessel in international waters to verify its

nationality. Unless the vessel encountered is itself a warship or government vessel of another

nation, it may be stopped, boarded, and the ship’s documents examined, provided there is

reasonable ground for suspecting that it is:

(1) Engaged in piracy.

(2) Engaged in the slave trade.

(3) Engaged in unauthorized broadcasting.

(4) Without nationality.

(5) Of the same nationality as the warship though flying a foreign flag, or refusing to show its

flag.

f. Suspect Vessel. Any vessel designated by the joint force commander (JFC), maritime

component commander (MCC), or MIO commander.

g. Cleared Vessel. A suspect vessel that has been cleared to proceed after a query or boarding.

h. Detained Vessel. A suspect vessel that has been queried or boarded and is believed to be

carrying contraband. The suspect vessel remains in this status until changed by higher authority.

I. Diverted Vessel. A suspect vessel that has been queried or boarded, believed or found to be

in violation, and diverted to a neutral port requested by the detainee, or diverted to a port selected by

the cognizant commander.

j. Special Agreement Vessels. Vessels covered by special agreements or policies for which

specific alternatives to visit and search are mandated. Passenger ferries and cruise ships may be

included in this category.

k. Boarding Ship. M.O. unit tasked with providing the boarding party for boarding a suspect

vessel.

l. Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure. To determine the true character of vessels, cargo, and

passengers, M.O. forces conduct M.O. using visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) procedures.

1-4

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

m. Heliborne Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure. To board a suspect vessel by helicopter,

special operations forces (SOF) or other specially trained and designated forces use the heliborne

visit, board, search, and seizure (HVBSS) procedure.

n. Permissible Cargo. Designated exceptions to the prohibited cargo category. Examples

include medical supplies, foodstuffs, and other humanitarian aid as determined by proper authority.

o. Prohibited Cargo. Specified cargo destined for import to, or export from, a country

designated by applicable prohibitions or resolutions.

p. Query Ship. M.O. unit making initial contact with, and conducting the query of a vessel.

q. Takedown Operation. The act of boarding a suspect vessel by means of HVBSS or VBSS

to gain control of key stations and force the suspect vessel to submit to search or diversion.

r. Boarding Party (BP). Sometimes called Boarding Team (BT), is the team responsible for

carrying out the visit and search of the suspected vessel. Its size and structure are defined in article

0503 and is to provide the suitable degree of self-protection. BP is composed of boarding ship crew

personnel, and will be set up in a way oriented to provide the team with the adequate skills in the

required fields to accomplish the mission.

s. Assault Force (AF). Assault Force is the SOF team tasked to take down the suspect vessel in

an opposed boarding environment.

1-5

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

CHAPTER 2

Concept of Operations

0201 Concept

M.O. may have high political interest and, as such, require a highly flexible concept of operations.

Commanding officers should prepare their crews to conduct M.O. within a wide variety of command

structures and operational environments. Allied or multinational forces, or a single nation, in support of

specified objectives, may carry out M.O. Operations may be conducted by naval forces alone or as part of

joint operations involving one or all services.

The recognized sanctioning body establishes the provisions of a M.O., normally a UN Security

Council Resolution. After a commander responsible for conducting the M.O. has been designated, an op-

erational order (OPORD) will be issued that conforms to the resolution. The assigned commander will is-

sue OPGENs and OPTASKs that will be detailed and address the following:

a. What goods, persons or services are to be identified, tracked, diverted, or seized.

b. The disposition of identified goods, persons or services that are not to enter or depart from a

specified nation.

c. Types of vessels expected to transit the operating area (OPAREA).

d. Questions to ask a suspect vessel during boarding.

e. Criteria for diversion.

f. Percentages of cargo on various types of shipping that should be searched.

g. Rules of engagement.

h. Contact classification criteria.

i. Specific reporting procedures; initial contact report, boarding summaries, challenge summaries,

and diversion reports.

0202 Command Relationships and Responsibilities

The key to successful command relationships is achieving unity of command and effort. The com-

mander must have the ability to unify the efforts of a widely diverse force and execute through a clearly

defined chain of command.

Establishing a coordination centre staffed with members from coalition forces to share intelli-

gence, and operational information, ensure coordination among allied/coalition forces, and provide a fo-

rum where routine problems can be resolved informally can be useful in resolving issues. Inclusion of

liaison personnel at all levels of the chain of command provides commonality, focuses the efforts of the

MIO force, and is highly encouraged.

The command structure varies depending on the specific operations area as well as according to the

political objectives of the MIO, but resembles the basic structure described in Figure 2-1. Geography of

2-1

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

MIO Commander

Sector

MIO Coordinator

On-Scene Commander

Assault Force

Boarding Officer

SAR/MED

Commander

EOD Assets

Support Ships

see note

assets

see note

Boarding

Assault Force

Party

Air Mission

Commander

Note: In case Assault Force and Boarding Party are onboard the suspect vessel at the same time,

the Boarding Party will be under TACON of the Assault Force Commander

Figure 2-1. Opposed Boarding Command and Control Structure

the operational area has a significant impact on the size of MIO force required and the amount of decen-

tralization within the command structure.

4. Command Responsibilities. The following are key MIO personnel and their responsibilities:

a. Maritime Interdiction Operation Commander. The MIO commander is the officer in

tactical command (OTC) of all forces assigned to conduct the MIO.

b. Sector Maritime Interdiction Operations Coordinator. The sector MIO coordinator is

assigned as required to provide command and control (C2) when geography prohibits operations in

a single geographic area. There may be a need for a number of sector MIO coordinators. They are

responsible for:

(1) Conducting MIO within the assigned operations area or sector and exercising tactical con-

trol (TACON) of all MIO forces within that area or sector.

(2) Assigning boarding and assist ships as required.

(3) Tasking aircraft or other supporting forces as required, so that the OSC can conduct a par-

ticular boarding.

(4) Assigning units VHF working channels and night signal colours, to be used for suspect ves-

sel interrogation, in order to prevent mutual interference.

(5) Maintain an accurate database of boarded vessels.

2-2

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

c. On-Scene Commander. The OSC is the officer exercising TACON at the scene of all

forces assigned to conduct or support the boarding of a vessel. The OSC is normally the

commanding officer (CO) of the boarding ship. The OSC will keep the MIO commander apprised

of the progress and status of the boarding operation.

d. Assault Force Commander. The assault force commander (AFC) is the officer exercising

TACON of the heliborne assault force (HAF) that conducts the takedown of a vessel. The AFC

reports to the OSC as soon as feasible after departure from the assembly point and is responsible for

the actual assault of the vessel. Once control of the vessel has been obtained, the AFC retains

control of all forces aboard the vessel until the OSC directs him to turn control over to the boarding

officer. The AF will be under TACON of the MIO Commander (exceptionally of a Sector MIO

Coordinator) until an opposed boarding is launched, where AF team will be transferred under OSC

TACON until the end of the operation.

e. Boarding Officer. The boarding officer (BO) is the officer in control of the boarding party

(R)

and is responsible for visiting and searching the suspect vessel. The BO remains in control of the

boarded vessel until relieved or directed by the OSC to return control of the vessel to its master. The

BO will communicate with the OSC on a predetermined interval, providing boarding status reports.

Figure 2-2 is a generic C2 relationship that may be tailored to meet the specific mission.

f. Air Mission Commander. The air mission commander (AMC) is the aviation officer

assigned as mission commander for all aircraft directly supporting the HAF. AMC will be under

TACON of AFC for the takedown operation. The AMC is responsible for:

(1) Planning the safe execution of aircraft support to the HAF.

(2) Coordinating with the AFC for conducting all aircraft-related portions of the takedown

operation.

Boarding Ship

Commanding Officer

(OSC)

Boarding Officer

(BO)

Assistant Boarding Officer

Boat Coxswain

(ABO)

Security Team

Search Team(s)

Leader

Security Team

Figure 2-2. Boarding Party Command and Control Structure

2-3

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

Note. Surface combat air patrol and other aircraft in the area not directly supporting the HAF

should report directly to the OSC.

0203 Communications

A solid communications plan is vital to the success of a MIO. The complex nature of MIO requires

all participating units to pay close attention to the compatibility of communications systems. The MIO

commander is responsible for developing the communications plan and managing the communications

requirements of all the participating units. The plan should include primary, secondary and tertiary fre-

quencies and be designed for minimal interference from local port and merchant use in the operations

area. The following actions can be taken to minimize problems:

a. All helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft assigned should be equipped with bridge-to-bridge

(BTB) capable (maritime bandwidth) VHF FM radios.

b. MIO commander or sector MIO coordinator should assign designated BTB channels to all units

conducting MIO to minimize mutual interference. Consideration should be given to local port and

merchant usage in the operations area in an attempt to find little-used channels for MIO.

c. Assault teams and boarding parties should be equipped with UHF/VHF portable radios to

enhance communications within the boarded vessel. UHF portable radios should preferably be

operating in military UHF-band (225-400 MHZ) to be interoperable with shipborne UHF

transceivers.

d. Strict circuit discipline should be required on all boarding and assault nets to ensure rapid

transfer of urgent information.

e. Codewords should be established for key information in the event clear voice circuits must be

utilized.

f. All units involved in boarding operations should have VHF-BTB capability.

g. Once the boarding has commenced, VHF-BTB radios should be used as an emergency backup

circuit for all forces involved.

h. The OSC should ensure all participating units are thoroughly familiar with circuits to be used

during the boarding.

i. Assault team and boarding party members should conduct frequent radio checks consistent with

the tactical situation.

j. Extra batteries should be available for all portable radios to be used by assault teams, boarding

parties, and boat crews.

Figure 2-3 provides a recommended communications plan for MIO. If utilized, encrypted (digi-

(R)

tized voice), portable radios should be operated in the secure mode. Whenever non-secure radios are uti-

lized, station call signs and codewords for sensitive information should be prepared locally. Use of

satellite communications (SATCOM) is considered essential for rapid and reliable communications be-

tween MIO commander, sector MIO coordinator, and OSC.

Note. AFC and aircraft have limited communications equipment available and will only be up on one or

two nets at one time. OSC is net control on all circuits, except supporting fire and assault nets, which are

controlled by the AFC.

2-4

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

CHAPTER 3

Detection and Surveillance

0301 Overview

All vessels within the designated surveillance area should be tracked, identified, and interrogated for pos-

sible boarding. All available sensors should be used to detect, identify, and collect intelligence on vessels

within the assigned surveillance area. Every contact determined to be a suspect vessel should be tracked,

observed, and considered to be a potential target for a takedown operation. The MIO commander or sector

MIO coordinator generally determines the identification as a suspect vessel. Maintaining an accurate data-

base of vessels previously challenged and/or boarded is critical to prevent multiple interceptions of the

same vessel as it passes through a geographic area. Contact information must be systematically shared by

all units (not just those assigned to MIO duties) operating within the MIO area. Effective operations are

critically dependent on support from shore authorities to compile, collate, and disseminate information on

merchant ship movements. The generation and exchange of a comprehensive database is a valuable tool.

Without significantly disrupting trade it is not possible to thoroughly search every merchant ship entering

the operations area. Therefore, intelligence is vital to target likely embargo breakers. Forces conducting

MIO must be prepared for ships and/or agents to employ any subterfuge to break the embargo. These ploys

may include mechanical breakdown, declaring false destinations, entering cleared ports close to the target

area and making a quick dash into TTW, crew changes, or multiple changes of ownership.

0302 Detection

Picture Compilation. In order to build the recognized surface picture (RSP), identification of

all surface contacts in an area of interest must be made with positive identification of friendly, neutral, and

suspect units. Units involved in MIO are to produce a plot of all surface contacts, while covering the area

of interest with a stated percentage of coverage against defined targets. This can be done by continuous

radar coverage or revisiting (with defined intervals) contacts in the area of interest. This plot of radar con-

tacts must be disseminated to all units involved.

Objectives of the Recognized Surface Picture. The building of the RSP aims at one or

more objectives as listed below:

a. Detecting all surface tracks in an area of interest.

b. Identifying all surface tracks in an area of interest to a level required by the type of operation.

c. Identifying a specific and defined contact in an area of interest.

d. Identifying a specific type of contact in an area of interest.

e. Tracking identified contacts in an area of interest.

f. Vectoring a platform (air/surface) to identify a contact.

g. Vectoring a platform (air/surface) to intercept a contact.

Size of the Area of Interest. The size of an area of interest that can be covered depends on the

following factors. See ATP-31 for further details on the size of a surface surveillance area and surveil-

lance methods.

3-1

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

a. The assets available to execute the operation.

b. The type of sensors available.

c. The objective for the building of the RSP.

d. The environmental conditions in the area of interest.

e. The target characteristics.

Non-organic Search Assets. Depending on the nature of the MIO, the following non-organic

assets may be available to assist in detecting traffic that will enter the surveillance area:

a. National intelligence sensors.

b. Maritime patrol aircraft.

c. Airborne early warning assets.

d. Carrier or shore-based surveillance aircraft.

e. Tactical data link from other units.

f. Tactical exchange via voice circuits.

5. Organic Sensors. Organic detection assets vary from ship to ship. Every effort should be made to

maximize all available sensors. The following sensors may be available:

a. Helicopters. Embarked helicopters should be utilized for radar, visual search, and other

correlations. When operating in a multiship effort, air asset coordinators should schedule 24-hour

airborne/alert helicopters (if available) to support MIO.

Helicopters should be kept outside of shoulder-fired weapons range unless the MIO

commander determines the identification of the vessel is of such importance that the

possible loss of aircraft and aircrew is an acceptable risk.

b. Surface Search Radars and Visual Search (Lookouts). Surface search radars and visual search

should be utilized. Visual search should utilize all available equipment, such as night vision

devices, etc.

c. Cryptologic Detection. Some platforms may be equipped with cryptologic detection

systems. Ensure operators are briefed on potential target frequencies.

d. Electronic Warfare Support Measures. Use organic electronic warfare support

measures

(ESM) systems to detect, locate, and track target vessels. Report and log

radar/visual-to-ESM correlations.

3-2

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

0303 Surveillance

Surveillance of the suspect vessel is vital to collecting intelligence that the boarding party or

takedown forces may require later. As much intelligence as possible should be collected for future use in

case the suspect vessel becomes non-cooperative or hostile. The tasking in relation with surveillance will

depend upon the type of MIO being conducted:

a. Embargo Operations. Identify suspect vessels, determine vessel’s name, flag, destination,

origin, cargo, port of registry, estimated time of departure (ETD), estimated time of arrival (ETA),

ship owner, and agent.

b. Drug Interdiction. Identify a specific suspected vessel on which intelligence has been

obtained, or track all contacts and determine which contacts are acting suspicious (suspect) and

identify those contacts to the level required by the OTC.

c. Locate Suspected Vessels. Identify a specific vessel as designated by OTC or higher

command.

d. Environmental Patrol. Identify those contacts that are violating national and international

laws; register those items required for legal prosecution.

e. Fishery Patrol. Identify those contacts, considered to be fishery vessels that violate national

and international laws and regulations; register those items required for legal prosecution.

f. Refugees. In MIO areas, there is also a likelihood of refugees attempting to flee the country that

is the subject of the operation. Depending on existing policy, patrolling ships must be ready to

recover refugees from small boats and hand them over to proper authorities.

Essential Elements of Information. Essential elements of information (EEI) for the conduct

of MIO should include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Number and type (civilian/military) of personnel on board suspect vessel and the number,

location, and types of weapons carried.

b. Evidence of topside or portable weapons, such as machineguns or shoulder rockets.

c. Photographs of cargo on deck, hatches that lead into ship, bridge configuration, and unusual

activity (will greatly assist takedown forces, if required).

d. Nature of cargo and how stowed (cargo status).

e. Evidence of false waterlines.

f. Suspicious or unusual activity.

g. Unusual obstructions on deck or any evidence of preparations to repel or impede boarding

operations.

h. Manoeuvres by suspect vessel to evade interdiction.

i. Evidence of old markings painted over.

3-3

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

Possible Level of Identification Range (nm)

Sensor

DAY

NIGHT

DAY

NIGHT

Visual

Type:

10-15

Superstructure

5-10

Hull colors

1-2

Name/homeport

0.5-2

<0.5

Suspicious outfit

<0.5

N/A

Electro-Optical

N/A

Type:

N/A

5-10

(LLTV)

Superstructure

5-10

Hull colors

1-2

Name/homeport

Infrared

N/A

Type:

N/A

5-10

(IRDS/FLIR

Superstructure

5-10

IR goggles)

Hull colors

1-2

Name/homeport

ESM

Radar type

RHR

ESM

Radar type

RHR

Fingerprinting

Name

Imaging radar

Type:

64-128

Superstructure

32-64

Acoustic

Noise sources

1-10

(NB)

Figure 3-1. Sensor Level of Identification

0304 Sensors

Sensors that may be used during MIO are listed in Figure 3-1. The estimated level of identification

that can be obtained in day or night operations is listed. The ranges given for identification to listed levels

are only an estimate and should be used for planning purposes. Ranges based on information and condi-

tions encountered will need to be updated.

Visual, Electro-Optical, and Infrared. Visual, EO, and IR identification and their corre-

sponding ranges will strongly depend on the environmental parameters, such as temperature, humidity,

fog, rain, background lights, etc. EO devices, either airborne or shipborne, can be used for identification

of the ship and survey of the crew during a boarding by night, depending on its technical characteristics.

a. Visual identification by night largely depends on the astronomical conditions and/or the

availability of a procedure available within approved ROE to employ a searchlight. Identification

by name using IR equipment depends on the specifications of the IR sensor.

b. Identification by visual, EO, or IR means at a farther distance may be facilitated by the ability to

compare a contact’s silhouette with a picture or drawing. The following sources on merchant ships,

hulls, and superstructures are presently available:

3-4

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

CHAPTER 4

Interrogation, Approach, and Stopping

0401 Overview

This phase sets the tone for all boarding operations, so sound judgement and caution are critical.

Effort should be made to be cordial, yet remain cautious, alert, and in control. This phase will present a

major opportunity to gather intelligence. If a ship’s helicopter is present, it should be utilized to the fullest

extent possible, in concert with other aircraft that have been tasked to support the MIO. All helicopters

should be equipped with VHF-BTB radios to assist with interrogating vessels that are not within VHF FM

range of ships.

A suspect vessel’s introduction to MIO operations is through the ship’s BTB radio operator. As-

sign a radio operator with a strong, clear, and confident voice who is well versed in radiotelephone com-

munication procedures. Prepare a system that uses standard queries. The communicator’s location is at

the discretion of the CO; the bridge or operations room are the most commonly preferred. The radiotele-

phone operator will:

a. Conduct the query.

b. Fill out the initial contact report and transmit in accordance with the applicable OPTASK MIO.

c. Communicate with the boarding officer/assistant boarding officer once embarked in the suspect

vessel.

d. Receive and log boarding reports and recommendations.

e. Make required voice situation reports (SITREPs) to the MIO commander.

0402 Shipboard Requirements

Watch station manning requirements vary, depending on surveillance equipment installed. In general, nor-

mal underway watch stations should be augmented to provide extra BTB radio log keepers, increased sur-

veillance capability, and timely situation reporting. Bridge and operations room VHF monitoring stations

should have a copy of the questions with blank spaces for responses. A separate log should be maintained

and a tape recording made, if possible, of all BTB conversations.

0403 Shipboard Preparations

Positioning. During this, and all phases of MIO, manoeuvre the ship to minimize susceptibility

to a hostile act, such as ramming or dropping mines. If operating overtly, maintain a safe distance that

minimizes the distance needed to be covered by the ship’s small boat once it is decided to conduct a

boarding. Additionally, give consideration to positioning the ship up sun on the contact’s port or star-

board quarters within the most effective range of the crew served weapons (e.g., chain gun/machinegun),

providing reasonable accuracy to ships weapons and sufficient sea room for manoeuvring, if required.

Conditions of Readiness. If suspect vessel is to be boarded, muster the VBSS team. Before the

VBSS team leaves for a boarding, the internal ship organization must ensure that everything that will be

needed for the boarding is available. Some items in addition to the normal equipment lists are, but not lim-

ited too; food for team members, toilet paper, water for team members, any extra equipment needed for

boarding, flashlights, medical kit and extra socks, etc. Additionally, someone must be responsible to log

4-1

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

times that the teams have been embarked and quantities of food and water for each boarded vessel. One

way to accomplish this is with a dry ease board, divided into the following categories: name, number of

crew, amount of fresh water, food supplies, time of arrival and time of departure.

Ship Manoeuvring. When ready to commence the boarding, the boarding ship should close the

suspect vessel’s quarter (no greater than 500 yards). If a helicopter is assisting, place the helicopter on the

disengaged side of the vessel to be boarded to count the number of personnel that were directed to muster

on deck of the vessel. Ensure the helicopter continues to look for potential hazards to the boarding team

(BT). The OSC will coordinate with the suspect vessel to ascertain the locations of all vessel

crewmembers as well as the location of all containers and cargo doors.

The helicopter will conduct a security sweep to visually determine/confirm low threat conditions and num-

bers of crewmembers mustered at designated areas. The helicopter will be placed on the disengaged side to

monitor boarding.

0404 Interrogation Procedures

It is imperative that the overall tone of any hailing or interrogation be firm, yet cordial and

nonconfrontational. The bridge watch of the suspect vessel may not be proficient in English and may have

to locate someone who is; this person may not necessarily be the master. It is important to ensure the ves-

sel’s master is present during hailing and interrogation, even if the master does not speak English. Due to

accents and colloquialisms, the responses may not be easily understood, with questions having to be re-

peated more than once. The suspect vessel’s crew should break down the hail into short phrases to assist

in translation or understanding. Request that the vessel spell words, if necessary. A list of ports in the area

of operation should be prepared and used as a ready reference. While maintaining a polite attitude, remain

alert for any delaying tactics.

Initial Query. The scripted hailings included in this section should only be used if the MIO com-

mander does not provide specific scripts.

a. A ship or an aircraft may conduct the initial query. The purpose of this query is to obtain the

information about the merchant vessel to determine whether or not a boarding will be required.

Units should make initial contact with the vessel on VHF channel 16, having attracted attention by

night by the use of appropriate coloured light. Interrogation procedures are then conducted on an

assigned VHF working channel. To gain the attention of the vessel, specifically if its name is

unknown, refer to its latitude/longitude position in reference to a known geographic reference

point, course, and speed. In the absence of specific guidance, the following hail is recommended:

“Merchant vessel ____________, this is (nation) Navy warship/aircraft. Request

you state your port of origin, your flag, registry, international call sign, your cargo,

your last port of call, next port of call, and final destination, over.”

b. If it is determined that a boarding operation will not be necessary based on stated destination, the

following may be used to dispatch the vessel:

“Merchant vessel ___________, this is (nation) Navy warship/aircraft. We do not

intend to conduct an inspection. You are instructed to proceed directly to your desti-

nation of _______________. Thank you for your cooperation.”

Subsequent Interrogation Prior to Boarding. If the decision to board is made, this should

be relayed directly to the vessel’s master. In the absence of specific guidance, the following hail is

recommended:

4-2

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

“Merchant vessel ___________, this is (nation) Navy warship/aircraft. Intentions

are to conduct a visit and search of your vessel in accordance with (guiding author-

ity, normally the UN Charter, Article 51), and under the authority of (specific reso-

lution, e.g., UNSCR XXX). We intend no harm to your vessel, cargo, or crew. If the

inspection team confirms that your manifest is in order, your cargo accessible, and

you are not carrying prohibited cargo, you will be allowed to proceed to your desti-

nation. Please stand by to accept my boarding team. You will need to (i.e., rig a lad-

der, stop your engines, and go to a holding point).”

Tell the vessel how you intend to manoeuvre your ship. If the vessel’s master consents to being boarded,

the following additional information should be obtained:

The total number of people on board the vessel, the number of women, children, sick or injured.

Whether or not animals are carried on board the vessel.

Any weapons and their location on board the vessel.

The preferred location for placement of the pilot’s ladder.

In addition, instruct the vessel’s master to:

(1) Have his crew muster in a space in open view of the boarding ship and helicopters (to facili-

tate counting prior to boarding). A prudent master will not want to abandon key watch stations

(i.e., bridge and engineering watchstanders). The crewmembers not present at muster should be

clearly stated by the vessel’s master.

(2) Turn on all interior lights (and exterior, if at night).

(3) Have all unlocked spaces opened as much as possible and keys made readily available for

all locked spaces.

(4) Have all the ship’s papers and crew identification brought to the bridge.

(5) If boarding by boat, instruct vessel to slow to bare steerageway and come to a course suit-

able for boarding or to stop, depending on tactical situation.

(6) If boarding by helicopter, advise master of course and speed to steer, position boarding

party will transfer to, and actions to be taken by his crew.

0405

Approach Procedures

The approach manoeuvre’s purpose should be obvious while maintaining the secure posture of the

boarding ship and should consider possible egress routes of the suspect vessel.

Single-Ship Approach Procedures (Overt). The single-ship approach procedures consist

of the following:

a. The boarding ship should be positioned abaft the beam on the windward quarter of the vessel to

be boarded, if possible, at a safe distance until the threat of small arms or shoulder-fired weapons

provides a clear arc of fire for the forward weapon system and can be assessed. Remaining abaft the

beam reduces exposure to ramming attempts while providing the best possible view of the bridge

and superstructure.

4-3

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

b. If the operation is being conducted at night, all available night vision devices and optical

enhancement devices should be employed to observe the suspect vessel and gather intelligence.

c. When the OSC is satisfied with the threat assessment, the boarding ship should close the suspect

vessel as close as sea state and weather conditions allow.

d. During daylight boarding, the sun should be kept behind the boarding ship to aid in observing

the suspect vessel while making the reverse more difficult.

e. The wake area of the suspect vessel should be avoided because of the threat of mines or

own-ship’s screw fouling objects deployed from the suspect vessel.

f. Topside spaces should be cleared of all unnecessary personnel. Personnel remaining topside on

the boarding ship should be instructed to observe the suspect vessel and report any activity by its

crew to the bridge, where an accurate record of activity should be maintained.

g. The approach and initial time alongside should be characterized by extreme caution since the

true intentions of the suspect vessel are unknown.

h. Own boats and helicopters should be kept clear of the line of fire of the manned weapon systems.

i. Own-ship’s helicopter should never be so close that spray from rotor wash causes personnel on

deck to get wet.

j. For safety, attempt to keep rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB)/motor whaleboat transits as short as

possible and down sea.

Dual-Ship Approach Procedures. The dual ship approach procedures consist of the following:

a. The boarding ship should approach in accordance with paragraph 0405.2.

b. The second ship (assist ship) should manoeuvre, when directed by the boarding ship, to the

opposite quarter of the suspect vessel. The assist ship should remain outside of small arms range in

case the boarding ship takes the suspect vessel under fire (remaining clear of the boarding ship’s

firing arc).

c. If the assist ship is called upon to provide fire support, the boarding ship should open distance

from the suspect vessel to avoid the field of fire from the assist ship. In effect, the boarding ship and

assist ship switch positions with respect to range to the suspect vessel, while remaining on their

respective sides of the vessel.

d. The assist ship should be prepared to take over as boarding ship and OSC in case the original

boarding ship can no longer fulfil the duty.

e. Movement of boats, helicopters, and weapon systems of both ships must be strictly coordinated.

Defensive Considerations. The boarding and assist ship should be in an increased readiness

condition. Manning additional damage control and weapons stations should be considered as a minimum.

To facilitate remaining abaft the beam of the suspect vessel, the forward weapons systems should provide

the threat of main armament, if equipped. Manning of other details, such as flight quarters, boarding and

search and rescue (SAR) boat, and additional high-point gunners (the main deck of a lightly laden mer-

chant will usually be too high to allow an acceptable field of fire from normal small arms positions), may

be required. If damage has been sustained by the suspect vessel, a rescue and assistance detail should be

provided. For safety reasons, all personnel on the deck of the boarding ship should be kept out of sight of

4-4

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

the suspect vessel. RHIB/small boat preparations on the boarding ship should therefore take place on the

side away from the target ship, as feasible.

Helicopter Support Considerations. During unopposed boardings, helicopters (if available

and suitable) are preferred over the RHIB/small boat because of reduced sea state restrictions and ability

to more quickly embark the BT on a vessel with a high freeboard. Means of insertion include fast rope,

landing at vessel helo spot or using helo hoist system. Fast rope/rapid rope procedures can only be used if

personnel are suitably trained. In certain circumstances, a helicopter may be used to conduct routine

boardings by first inserting a security team and then the BT. If a HAF is to be inserted, the assist ship, if

equipped, normally provides the primary support to the HAF helicopter(s). Both ships should maintain a

ready deck and manned refueling detail and be prepared for prolonged flight operations. Boarding ship’s

helicopter may be used as a sniper platform or a surveillance asset.

0406 Diversion Procedures

Following an interrogation, it may become apparent that a ship is carrying illegal cargo and/or is

proceeding to a prohibited port. Having this knowledge may present the option of simply diverting the

suspect vessel to another port, if inbound, or returning to previous port, if outbound, vice conducting a

boarding operation. Vessels may also have to be diverted to an inspection port or anchorage when

weather conditions do not permit boarding, following a boarding when it becomes apparent that the vessel

may be carrying prohibited cargo, or when the BT cannot easily check its cargo.

Diversion and Possible Cargo Seizure. If the suspect vessel is suspected of carrying an ille-

gal cargo, and guidelines have been established for diverting ships to a prearranged port where their cargo

will be seized, the following direction should be communicated to the vessel’s master:

“Merchant vessel ___________, this is (nation) Navy warship. It is believed that

you are carrying cargo that is subject to interception under (the reason for intercep-

tion), and you will not be allowed to proceed. You may, however, return to your port

of origin at this time. If you do not decide to turn back, you will be directed to pro-

ceed to (port/anchorage) where this cargo will be taken into custody. (Nation) in-

tends no harm to your ship, your cargo, or your crew. master and crew will be free to

leave as soon as your vessel has reached its new destination. Please do not resist. Co-

operate in this action so that we can avoid any damage or injury and ensure the safety

of the crew.”

Diversion to Port of Vessel’s Choice. If no seizure of cargo is planned, it may be possible to

allow the vessel, if outbound, to return to its previous port or, if inbound, to proceed to a port of its choice

other than those that are prohibited. Depending on the situation, either an order or an offer to divert to a

port of choice may be extended.

a. The following is an order to divert:

“Merchant vessel ____________, this is (nation) Navy warship. You are not autho-

rized to proceed to (intended port) or any other port in (target country). Please pro-

vide us with your intentions regarding another port of call.”

b. The following is an offer to divert:

“Merchant vessel ____________, this is (nation) Navy warship. You are free to

choose to divert now to a port not in (target country). If you choose this option, in-

spection may be avoided. What is your decision?”

c. If the vessel selects a suitable port, it will be directed to proceed with the following:

4-5

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

“Merchant vessel ____________, this is (nation) warship. You are released to pro-

ceed directly to your destination of (port). Thank you for your cooperation.”

0407 Stopping Procedures

The measures taken to stop a vessel vary and depend on several factors. ROE and specific instruc-

tions from seniors in the chain of command must be taken into account. For the purpose of this manual, it

is assumed that the boarding ship is fully aware of the limits to the magnitude and type of force it may em-

ploy. Stopping the vessel may not mean coming to a stop, but slowing to bare steerageway or dead slow

ahead (depending on engineering configuration and sea state) to support small boat operations. Ship’s po-

sition must be closely monitored to prevent the vessel from closing TTW if the boarding operation is not

conducted while dead in water (DIW). In the absence of other guidance, the following should be used to

inform the master that his ship is to be boarded:

“Merchant vessel ________________, this is (nation) Navy warship. At this time,

(nation) intends to exercise its right to board and inspect under international law in

accordance with its previously published notice to mariners. (Nation) intends no

harm to your vessel, its cargo, or your crew. Please stop/slow your vessel and stand

by to accept (nation) boarding team.”

At this point, a cooperative vessel will comply with the request and stop/slow. If a vessel refuses to

consent to inspection, it must divert (if inbound), return to port of origin (if outbound), or be considered

for a non-cooperative or opposed boarding. Stopping procedures for uncooperative vessels are described

in Chapter 7.

4-6

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

CHAPTER 5

Boarding and Searching

0501 Overview

The boarding and search phase is the most important and most hazardous phase of MIO. The procedures in

this chapter are designed to provide shipboard personnel with the basic guidance required to conduct

boarding operations without assistance. Boarding and search procedures, although hazardous in nature,

must be conducted in a non-threatening and non-confrontational manner. Members of the boarding party

must be adaptive and able to think on their feet. Boarding parties must be relaxed, confident, and cordial

while remaining mentally and physically alert to respond quickly, if required.

0502 Discussion

The boarding phase is potentially dangerous in two areas: first, during small boat and helicopter

operations, getting the boarding party on and off the suspect vessel; second, during the actual boarding

and search of the suspect vessel.

Boarding party members may be required to climb from their boat up a 10- to 20-metre pilot’s lad-

der at night and in poor weather conditions, so excellent physical conditioning is a must. Ships may have

to conduct numerous boardings in a 24-hour period. Boarding party members must be mentally and phys-

ically alert at all times. To maximize safety, all boarding party and boat crewmembers should be removed

from the ship’s watch bills to the maximum extent possible, especially if the tactical environment requires

frequent boardings.

Small arms proficiency and formal training are key elements in the safety of all boarding party

members, particularly search team members.

No-Go criteria must be clearly understood by all boarding party members. No-Go criteria must be

reviewed prior to each boarding mission in the event there are any changes. Each individual must be able

to recognize potential trouble and be trained to deal with that situation and/or disengage as required.

No-Go criteria should be evaluated continually during all phases of the operation. Personnel safety is a

major priority. No-Go criteria are established to prevent mission execution under overly hazardous or

risky conditions. If No-Go criteria are met, the mission should be aborted, cancelled, delayed, or trans-

ferred to a unit with different capabilities. (See Annex E for an example No-Go checklist.) No-Go criteria

will be mission dependent and may include the following:

a. Weather, seawater temperature, and sea conditions have the potential to make the launch,

recovery, and operation of small boats and boardings unsafe. Weather should be reviewed

continuously and if deteriorating, consideration should be given to aborting the boarding.

b. Mission essential personnel, support assets, and equipment are unavailable.

c. Loss of COMMS between OSC and boarding party small boats while conducting a

non-cooperative boarding using ship’s force boarding party.

d. Suspect vessel enters TTW and nation does not authorize Allied Forces pursuit.

e. Authorized levels of force are unsuccessful and freeboard prevents ship’s force non-cooperative

boarding.

5-1

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

f. Supporting Ship not in position to deliver timely, overwhelming firepower (within most

effective range of crew served weapons) to counter threats to the boarding party during insertion.

g. Passive resistance measures in place are clearly intended to inflict harm on the boarding party or

create a very dangerous environment.

h. The suspect vessel has demonstrated intent to actively oppose the boarding or intelligence

indicates such intent exists.

i. Suspect vessel opposes boarding

j. Suspect vessel fails sea worthiness assessment.

k. OSC or BO determines operation is unsafe.

An unopposed boarding may escalate to a non-cooperative or opposed boarding at

any time. SOF or other specially trained and designated forces will conduct opposed

boardings and may conduct unopposed or non-cooperative boardings as tasked.

0503

Boarding Party Composition

The boarding party should be comprised of a minimum of 10 members designated as follows:

a. Boarding Officer. The BO is usually an officer. This member must be mature, in excellent

physical condition, small arms qualified, and have the complete confidence of the CO of the ship.

b. Assistant Boarding Officer. The assistant boarding officer (ABO) is usually an officer

who should be in training or qualified as a BO. This member must be in excellent physical

condition, small arms qualified, and have the confidence of the CO of the ship.

c. Security Team Leader. The security team leader should be a senior enlisted member of the

boarding ship. This member must be mature, in excellent physical condition, and small arms

qualified.

d. Security Team. The security team is a group of five members (usually ratings). They must be

(R)

mature, in excellent physical condition, and small arms qualified. Composition of security teams

that are in charge of securing engineering spaces should (when available) include an experienced

engineering officer or rating.

e. Search Team. The search team is a group of two of the most experienced and mature men on

the boarding party (senior petty officers preferred). They must be mature, in excellent physical

condition, and small arms qualified. Search team members must be proficient in the use of climbing

equipment in order to conduct container searches.

NOTE

For smaller sized vessels, a 10-member team may be unwieldy. A smaller team

should be used for such operations with the remaining team members standing by as

a reserve force in the delivery craft.

5-2

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

b. Second Search Team. The second search team has the same composition and qualifications

as the first search team. This team may augment the security team if services of a second search team

are not required.

c. Additional Security Team Members. The additional security team members have the

same qualifications as the security team members.

0504 Boarding Party Boat Crew Composition

The boat crew should be kept to a minimum of three, if possible, to avoid overcrowding in the boat. Rec-

ommended boat crew composition is as follows:

a. Coxswain. The best coxswain is required because many boardings can be at night and in all

types of weather and sea conditions. This member must be mature and proficient with a hand-held

radio.

b. Boat Engineer. The boat engineer should be qualified on a rifle to provide covering fire if

(R)

boarding party is attacked while attempting to embark/debark from suspect vessel.

c. Bow Hook. The bow hook should be the best seaman available because of the demanding

nature of boat operations at night and in poor weather conditions.

NOTE

To minimize small boat loading and if properly qualified for both positions, the BO

may act as boat officer and both the bow hook and engineer requirements can be

filled by a single person.

0505 Boarding Party Equipment

Annex A contains a detailed list of typical equipment for boarding party members. Annex B con-

tains a detailed list of recommended contents of the boarding kit.

Arming of Boarding Party. The boarding party should be armed with the standard service pis-

tol and/or riot shotgun. For a boarding part of 12, at least 2 riot shotguns should be carried amongst the se-

curity team members. Boat crews should always be armed with service pistols. Other weapons may also

be required for the boat crews, including a riot shotgun, rifle, and/or machinegun. Weapons are also re-

quired for additional boarding party personnel, if utilized. All members of the boarding party, except

those carrying shotguns, may carry the standard baton with speed ring, if qualified. Weapons should be

loaded with the chamber empty. All boarding party members are required to be current with their weap-

ons qualifications and have exhibited sound judgement and maturity to the CO. Every boarding party and

boat crewmember shall wear body armour (if available).

0506 Pre-boarding Instructions to Vessel Being Boarded

Prior to launching a boat with a boarding party, the suspect vessel shall have complied with the fol-

lowing instructions:

a. Slowed to a complete stop and is DIW or dead slow, if required by seas or proximity to shoal

waters.

b. Rigged pilot’s or Jacob’s ladder (pilot’s ladder preferred) on leeward side. Mark it with light

shining toward the water, if at night. Once rigged, no one is to be near the ladder.

5-3

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

c. Energized all interior lights (exterior also if at night) and open all unlocked spaces.

d. Stated nature and location of any hazardous cargo on board.

e. Mustered all personnel on board in topside location (not near boarding ladder) visible from

boarding ship. The master will probably insist on keeping bridge and engine room manned and may

want to keep the ship’s cook in galley near meal hours. These routine exceptions should be allowed.

In addition to the above, the suspect vessel may be asked if it has weapons aboard and instructed to

secure them inside the vessel. This may, however, lead crewmembers to consider armed resistance. The

CO of the boarding ship should make the decision on this matter based on the current tactical situation.

0507 Boarding Party Communications

Internal Radios. The BT should use protected/digitized voice-secure UHF portable radios to

communicate with each other during the boarding and search phases. The optimum UHF frequency for

communicating with team members inside the skin of the ship is between 475 and 512 MHZ. It is also rec-

ommended to use radios with a minimum power rating of 5 watts. For prolonged boardings, the team

should ensure they have sufficient replacement batteries on hand. If plain voice radios are the only option,

codewords should be established for passing key information such as intentions, levels of tension, dis-

crepancies in documentation and/or cargo and distress. Standard radiotelephone procedures should be

used and all transmissions should be kept brief to allow for urgent transmissions. For non-secure radios,

do not use the ship’s name or use the ship’s name in the small boat call sign. A minimum of six radios is

required. Stations, call signs, and type of information sent are shown in Figure 5-1.

External Radios. Communications between the mother ship and the VBSS team are essential.

Loss of this communication link, outside of extremely extenuating circumstances is grounds to abort the

operation. All participants must be thoroughly familiar with the boarding operations circuits and should

conduct on-line interoperability communication checks on all circuits prior to operations. The frequency

Title

Call Signs

Information

Commanding Officer

"Control"

Controls boarding team via

(CO)

the BO and ship's boat via

coxswain, as required

Boarding Officer

"Boarding Officer"

Controls the search team(s)

(BO)

and ship's boat while keeping

CO informed.

Assistant Boarding

"ABO"

Controls security detail.

Officer (ABO)

Assists BO.

Security Team Leader

"Security"

Informs ABO of security

matters.

Search Team Leader (#)

"Search (#)"

Informs BO of progress

and/or problems.

Boat Coxswain

"Gig, RHIB, or Motor

Receives orders.

Whale Boat"

Reports boat status.

Figure 5-1. Boarding Party Communications

5-4

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

range for these communications will be from 0 to 475 MHZ (VHF/UHF). Ships equipped with encrypted

(digitized voice), but not crypto secure, will operate them in the secure mode. Helicopters should also be

equipped with BTB capable (maritime bandwidth), FM radios.

The OSC develops and promulgates lost communications and distress visual signals.

0508 Pre-boarding Briefs

At a minimum, two pre-boarding (the C2 and BT) briefs should be conducted prior to each board-

ing operation. Additional briefings may be required as the tactical situation dictates.

Command and Control Pre-boarding Briefs. The C2 pre-boarding brief is a com-

mand-level briefing to address critical C2 that will vary from boarding to boarding. This briefing is nor-

mally conducted over secure voice circuits, but should include face-to-face interface if multinational or

takedown operations are planned.

a. The purpose of the briefing is to assist the CO of the ship, senior warfare officers, and other

designated personnel. Participation in this briefing should include (as applicable), but is not limited

to:

(1) MIO commander or sector MIO coordinator

(2) OSC

(3) Senior warfare officers of the boarding ship

(4) BO

(5) AMCs (for boardings involving SOF)

(6) AFC (for boardings involving SOF)

b. Issues to be addressed and resolved during this briefing should include, but are not limited to:

(1) Intelligence brief on suspect vessel

(2) Possible threats

(3) ROE (to deal with each threat identified for every platform involved)

(4) Codewords (not already promulgated)

(5) Emergency signals and procedures

(6) No-Go criteria

Boarding Party Brief. The boarding party brief is a working-level briefing that addresses the

actual conduct of the boarding about to take place. This briefing is normally held on board the boarding

ship. However, portions may be relayed to the assist ship via secure voice, if multiple boarding parties are

anticipated.

a. Participants in this briefing include, but are not limited to:

(1) OSC (ship’s CO).

5-5

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

(2) Tactical action officers and senior warfare officers who will be on watch during the

boarding.

(3) Key weapons control personnel for topside gunners.

(4) Entire boarding party.

(5) Entire boat crew.

(6) Air controller.

Issues to be addressed and resolved during this briefing should include, but are not limited to:

(1) Intelligence brief on the suspect vessel, including its characteristics.

(2) Last port of call.

(3) Home port.

(4) Next port.

(5) Type of cargo.

(6) Specific intelligence desired from suspect vessel.

(7) Possible threats.

(8) ROE for each threat and each weapon (topside gunners, helicopter sniper/gunner, BT mem-

bers). ROE to be thoroughly briefed prior to each operation.

(9) Codewords.

(10) Overall mission plan.

(11) Emergency signals and procedures.

(12) Communication check procedures.

(13) Actions to be taken while on board in the event of an emergency, toinclude fire, flooding,

and casualties.

(14) Weather and sea conditions. To include the current weather as well as anticipated changes

that could take affect during the boarding operations.

(15) No-Go criteria.

0509

Unopposed Boarding Procedures

Small Boat Operations.

a. When directed by the OSC, the boarding party will embark in the ship’s boat for transfer to the

suspect vessel. The ship should manoeuvre to make a lee for the launch of the small boat. Once

clear, the ship must manoeuvre to maintain visual observation of the suspect vessel and provide

covering fire, if required. Careful consideration of winds, seas, navigation hazards, TTW, and

5-6

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

possible sudden manoeuvres by the suspect vessel are required. When a small boat is used to

transfer the BT, it may be efficient to place an armed protection team in a second boat.

b. The coxswain must remain clear of the suspect vessel’s wake to avoid any obstructions from the

vessel. Once the boarding party is on board the suspect vessel, the boat should be directed to a safe

position from which a rapid response can be made in case of an emergency. The position should be

included as a part of the BT brief conducted prior to launching the boat. The boat engineer should be

qualified on a rifle and prepared to provide covering fire for the boarding party as they climb aboard

the suspect vessel.

Boarding the Suspect Vessel. One of the most hazardous phases of boarding operations is

the embarking of the boarding party from the boat to the suspect vessel. Getting off the boat and climbing

a 10- to 20-metre ladder up the side of a merchant vessel is hazardous in the best of conditions. MIO may

require this act to be conducted at night and/or in moderately foul weather conditions. Security team per-

sonnel should board first and secure the area around the ladder. Once the area is secure, the remainder of

the boarding party should follow. In the interest of safety, no more than two boarding party members

should be allowed on the ladder at one time. If the ship’s first mate or another ship’s officer approaches to

greet the boarding party, the security team leader must clear him prior to his approach.

a. High Freeboard. The vessel to be boarded must provide a pilot’s ladder to facilitate the

embarkation of the VBSS team. The BO must assess the safety of this ladder upon initial approach

to the suspect vessel.

b. Low Freeboard. Caving ladder (rope ladder) can be used if appropriate. The BO will

determine the appropriate method of embarkation.

c. Vessel Under Tow. Plan for the worst-case situation (e.g., an unmanned tow with way on

(4-6 knots), no available pilot or accommodation ladder, or in ballast with high freeboard).

Planning considerations may include:

(1) Vertical insertion of the boarding party by helicopter hoist or fast rope.

(2) Query of the tow master to determine boarding location, ladder condition, safety condi-

tions, and boarding crew manning requirements.

(3) Excessive freeboard height possibly requiring two pilot’s ladders secured together to facili-

tate boarding.

(4) Mast and rigging obstructions and objects on the deck of the vessel possibly necessitating a

high hover (50 feet) for hoist transfer.

d. Small Vessel. MIO may involve boarding small cargo dhows or coastal freighters. Boarding

procedures and party composition can differ greatly from the norm during the boarding of small

vessels (150 feet/50 metre). Boarding dhows can be dangerous and difficult, especially during

heavy weather. Most dhows do not have ladders adequate for embarkation for the boarding party.

Party members often have to wait for rising swells to provide sufficient height for climbing over the

sides of the vessel. Large or partially laden dhows are difficult to board due to the height of the

gunwales. A caving ladder with two J-hooks can be helpful in this situation. Although some dhows

are equipped with rigid wooden ladders that can be tied to the side of the vessel, these ladders are

unstable and often more dangerous than climbing over the side. A fully equipped 10- or 12-man

boarding party is not required when boarding small cargo vessels. The majority of these vessels

carry cargo in one main hold that runs three-quarters of the length of the vessel. Remaining cargo is

loaded on the main deck. A typical crew includes the master and 12- to 20-deck hands of all ages. A

six to eight man boarding party equipped with minimal gear is sufficient for conducting boarding

5-7

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

and inspection of such a vessel. The team should consist of a BO, ABO, and two or three two-man

search/security teams. Dhows and small coastal freighters are often extremely dirty and their cargo

holds seldom lit. The BT should take measures to ensure they maintain high levels of protection

against unsanitary conditions, to include wearing rubber surgical gloves. Flashlights will be

required in nearly all cargo holds on these small vessels.

3. Boarding Officer Procedures. The BO is responsible for ensuring the team is properly equipped and

they are personally briefed on their specific assignments for the upcoming operation. Once aboard the

suspect vessel, the BO ensures the crew is assembled and security is set around the vessel’s crew before

proceeding to the pilothouse to meet with the ship’s master. Then the BO, the ABO, one security team

member, and the photographer, if assigned, will proceed to the pilothouse to meet with the ship’s master.

The remainder of the boarding party will muster the crew and remain with them.

Secure Bridge

Check Manifests for

Obtain Shipping

Documents

Dangerous or Hazardous

Material

Ensure Boarding

Check Nationality of Crew

Party Safety

and Passengers

Notify Boarding

Check the Bill of Health

Party

Certificate

Identify Key

Information

Inspect

Documents

Are

There

Yes

Discrepancies?

Compare

Documents

Information

Yes

Mismatched?

Verify Cargo

Count

Were

Discrepancies

Implement

Count Valid?

Resolved

Diversion

With

Procedures

Master?

Yes

Complete

Figure 5-2. Document Validation Process

5-8

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

a. Sample introduction to the master is as follows:

“I am the senior (nation) officer present, and I intend to inspect your cargo. Please follow all

instructions. Your cooperation will be necessary to conduct this inspection. We would like to see

your manifest first, and then we will inspect the cargo. Please inform your crew of our intent and for

their safety, direct them not to interfere with the inspection team. Please tell them to remain calm

and to help us avoid any misunderstanding or confrontation. All crewmembers are safe, and no

harm is intended. Thank you for your cooperation.”

b. Sample safe haven offer (if appropriate) is as follows:

“If you fear persecution in ___________for permitting boarding of your vessel in compliance with

(reason for interception), (nation) will assist you in finding safe haven outside _____________ .”

Examination of Documents. Close examination of the shipping documents can help determine the

true intentions of the suspect vessel. To ensure a successful inspection, the BO must obtain and validate

an accurate description and destination of cargo. The BO must be familiar with the documentation mer-

chant vessels are required to carry. The BO directs the master or chief mate of the vessel boarded to pres-

ent the ship’s documents for inspection and validation once the bridge is secured. Figure 5-2 shows a

common process in document verification.

a. The documents examined are only one of the tools available to help reach a conclusion regarding

the true nature of a ship’s identity, crew, and cargo.

b. All the documents encountered can be very easily forged or altered, or details (cargo) may be

deliberately omitted.

c. Based upon training and experience, accept or reject the documentation presented.

d. Regardless of whether or not the documentation is believed to be true, conduct a search of the

vessel.

e. A general plan of the ship can be invaluable to the BO when planning the search and disposition

of his team.

f. The following documents should always be examined:

(1) Certificate of Registry. The original is required to be aboard. The certificate shows na-

tionality of the vessel as recorded in an official register. It may also be referred to as a certificate

of vessel documentation, vessel documentation/registration, or certificate of vessel nationality,

and includes the following information:

(a) Identification of owner

(b) Nationality and home port

(d) Authorized employment in a particular trade

(e) Other unique information about the vessel.

(2) Certificate of Charter. The original is required if the vessel is chartered. The certificate

lists chartering party by name, address, etc., and gives details of the charter’s duration.

5-9

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

(3) Crew and Passenger List. The original is required to be aboard. The crew identifies

the crew by name, position, passport number, and nationality. The passenger list is used to dis-

tinguish between crew and passengers and identifies the passengers by name and nationality.

(4) Ship’s Logs. All ships maintain deck logs and radio logs that can be used to confirm in-

formation from other sources. Most vessels have two logs, a rough and a smooth copy. These

logs can be used to confirm information found or stated by the master. The engineering log may

be used to cross-reference validity of the ship’s logs.

(5) Cargo Manifest. The cargo manifest is an itemized list of the vessel’s cargo, shown to

custom officials for entry into the port of offload. The manifest is required to be an original, usu-

ally on the shipper’s letterhead. The authorizing signature will be on the first page, unless the

manifest contains an amendment. Manifest amendments reflect what is onboard and occur dur-

ing the following situations:

(a.) If some cargo is offloaded at a port while in transit to the ultimate destination, amend-

ments may originate from the shipper or the carrier.

(b) If the manifest is transmitted via fax or computer, the master signs the amendment to

account for cargo onboard. The manifest lists each shipment being carried. A shipment is

cargo being shipped by a consignor or shipper. Each shipment is expected to have the full

name and address of the consignee and the person responsible for picking up the shipment

upon arrival. Shipments in large containers have corresponding container numbers listed

on the manifest. Refer to intelligence messages and hit lists to determine phoney or front

consignees.

Pay particular interest to the following:

(a) The manifest is required to be aboard if the ship is carrying cargo.

(b) The master should have the original manifest; however, in some cases, a photocopy

and/or telex copy may be acceptable. (Seek guidance from higher authority if unsure what

is acceptable.)

and the master may only offer the papers for cargo bound for the restricted port. Review all

cargo manifests, regardless of stated or intended destinations.

(d) Look for the following:

(i) Manifests must be complete. As a minimum, the following should be clearly

identifiable:

(aa) Port of onload.

(bb) Intended port of offload.

(cc) Shipper’s name and complete address.

(dd) Consignee’s name and complete address.

(ee) Type and amount of cargo(s).

(ff) Container sizes and ID numbers for containerized cargo.

5-10

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

(ii) Look for obvious signs of omission, forgery, and alterations such as:

(aa) Missing information.

(bb) Poor-quality photocopies.

(cc) Information whited out or crossed out.

(dd) Manifests and bills of lading that do not match.

(e) Make note of manifest items:

(i) That is obvious military cargo, regardless of destination.

(ii) Having any military address, regardless of the cargo item.

(iii) Having any military value, such as chemicals, metals, or raw rubber.

(iv) Listed as medical supplies.

(v) Destined for any embassy or embassy officials. These are not automatically pro-

tected under diplomatic immunity and may generally be searched.

(6) Bills of Lading. These bills are issued to a shipper by a carrier and describe the goods to

be shipped, acknowledge their receipt, and states the terms of the contract for their carriage. The

bill of laden numbers should be arranged sequentially. This document identifies the actual ship-

per and the origin and ultimate destination of shipment in list format. Some merchant vessels

operate under a charter for specific voyages or periods of time. The document lists chartering

party by name, address, and duration. A chartered ship requires an original charter invoice.

(7) Dangerous Cargo Manifest. This is generally kept separate from the regular manifest

and usually must be requested. It should list the International Maritime Organization (IMO)

classification of the cargo. Careful consideration should be given before boarding vessels car-

rying chemicals or dangerous substances in order to prevent exposing the boarding party to po-

tential health risks.

(8) Cargo Load Plan. The cargo load plan indicates where the cargo is on the ship. It may

also indicate where the cargo was onloaded and where it will be offloaded. This is useful in

comparing other documents. Telexes may be crucial to verify other documents. They are used

to arrange cargo onload or offload and show communication with agents and owners.

(9) Passports/Seaman Books. Should be compared to the presented crew list.

(10) Navigational Charts. Gives confirmation of the voyage so far and the voyage to the

next port.

(11) Bill of Health Clearance. This document certifies the absence of infectious disease

and is presented to the port authorities upon arrival. The document also lists any diseases pres-

ent at the port of origin and on the vessel.

Additional documents that may be examined are:

(1) Port clearance paper, which can help substantiate claims to last port of call (LPOC).

5-11

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

(2) Consular’s declaration of innocence of cargo. This declaration is rare. If it is found, it

means that cargo aboard has been inspected by government officials and has not been found to

be in violation for reason of operation. Despite the presence of this document, a search of the

ship’s cargo should be conducted.

Examples of common documents may be found in Annex C.

(1) Consider any suspect vessel as holding unauthorized cargo unless proved otherwise. Docu-

ments may look correct at first glance but may have been forged or have information omitted. A

closer inspection and comparison of manifest documents may uncover inconsistencies or alter-

ations. If the paperwork appears to be in order but the BO still suspects the vessel is carrying

prohibited items, the BO can recommend diversion to a neutral port where a more thorough in-

spection of the vessel can be conducted. Before beginning the inspection process, identify key

information common to the various documents and ship information in general. Determine the

validity of a document using the following indicators:

(a) Shipping documents have identifiable information that can be cross-referenced. Incon-

sistencies in cross-referencing will invalidate the shipping documents. Information such as

the shipping company, ship’s name, port of embarkation, and port of debarkation should be

consistent with each document.

(b) Whiteout and cross-out marks can be made only if initialled by the master or stamped

with an official stamp. Documents altered in any manner should arouse suspicion.

(2) Unapproved cargo shall not be addressed to or designated for further shipment to a country

of interest. In addition, unapproved cargo shall not be allowed to originate from a country of in-

terest. Depending on the sanctions imposed, unapproved cargo may include:

Military hardware

Industrial raw materials, crude petroleum, and refined petroleum products

Chemicals and hazardous materials

Vehicles and household goods

Medical supplies

Clothing

Material in need/short supply

Anything identified as general cargo

Decision to Divert.

a. To recommend diversion of a suspect vessel, the BO must firmly understand the principles of

prohibited items and free goods. The final decision is normally made further up the chain of

command; however, the BO’s recommendation is critical in aiding seniors in making the proper

decision.

b. The BO should move to a location where his communications cannot be overheard before

discussing this and other sensitive matters. Codewords should be developed locally for key

5-12

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

NATO ANTI–PIRACY MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE (2008) - page 3