NATO ANTI–PIRACY MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE (2008)

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ANTI -PIRACY MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE

UN Conference on the Law of the Sea

Part VII High Seas Section 1 General Provisions

UN Security Council

Resolution 1816 (2008): Temporarily Permit Naval Action within Somali Territorial Sea (6 Months)

Resolution 1838 (2008): Requesting Other States to Deploy Naval Vessel or Aircraft to Somali Territorial Sea

Resolution 1846 (2008): Approve NATO Countries’ Supports for WFP Escort and Naval Actions to Depress Piracy for 1-Year Period

Resolution 1851 (2008): Authorizes States to Use Land-Based Operations in Somalia

ATP 2(B) Vol I thru Chg 1, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) Manual

Concept of Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Operations

NCAGS Communications

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Toolbox

ATP 2(B) Vol II, Naval Co-Operation and Guidance for Shipping Manual (NCAGS) Guide to Owners, Operators, Masters and Officers

NCAGS Operations

The NATO Shipping Centre

NCAGS Information Forms

Routing/Passage Plans and Amendments

Communications

Message Types

Procedural Guidance For Ships At Sea

Protective Measures Against Threats To Merchant Ships

Recommended Protective Measures

ATP 71 thru Chg 2, Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations

Definition of Key Terms

Detection and Surveillance

Interrogation, Approach, and Stopping

Boarding and Searching

Non-cooperative Boardings

Support for Embarked Special Operations Forces during Maritime Interdiction Operations

Boarding Team Equipment

Boarding Kit

Boarding Procedures

STANAG 1444 HOS (Edition 2), Maritime Considerations on the Conduct of Fast Roping and Rappelling (FRR)

Maritime Considerations on the Conduct of Fast Roping and Rappelling

MTP 1(D) Vol I thru Chg 4, Multinational Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures

Antisurface Warfare

Surface Action Checkoff List

Anti-FPB Checkoff List

Force Protection In Harbor

AJP 2.5(A), Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents

Introduction

Procedures for Handling Persons, Materiel and Documents upon Capture

Procedures for Handling Captured Persons

Interrogation of Captured Persons

Captured Materiel and Associated Technical Documents

Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

Technical Format and Detail Procedures, Summary of Geneva Convention

Special Provisions for the Handling of Persons Captured at Sea

Sample Format of a Tactical Questioning Report

Guidelines for Handling Evidence

Escorts and Guards

Summary of Geneva Conventions Which Should Be Communicated to Prisoners of War

AJP 3.1 thru Chg 1, Allied Joint Maritime Operations

Protection of Shipping

Operations in the Littorals

Command of Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982

Part VII HIGH SEAS

Section 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 100

Duty to co-operate in the repression of piracy All States shall co-operate to the fullest

possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside

the jurisdiction of any State.

Article 101

Definition of piracy

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for

private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and

directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on

board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any

State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with

knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

or (b).

Article 102

Piracy by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied

The acts of piracy, as defined in Article 101 , committed by a warship, government ship

or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft

are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship or aircraft.

Article 103

Definition of a pirate ship or aircraft A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or

aircraft if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of

committing one of the acts referred to in Article 101 . The same applies if the ship or

aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of

the persons guilty of that act.

Article 104

Retention or loss of the nationality of a pirate ship or aircraft A ship or aircraft may retain

its nationality although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of

nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such nationality was derived.

Article 105

Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft

On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State

may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the

control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of

the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and

may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property,

subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

Article 106

Liability for seizure without adequate grounds Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on

suspicion of piracy has been effected without adequate grounds, the State making the

seizure shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or

aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.

Article 107

Ships and aircraft which are entitled to seize on account of piracy A seizure on account of

piracy may be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft

clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that

effect.

United Nations

S/RES/1816 (2008)*

Security Council

Distr.: General

2 June 2008

Resolution 1816 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5902nd meeting on

2 June 2008

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President

concerning the situation in Somalia,

Gravely concerned by the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery against

vessels pose to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to

Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes and to international navigation,

Expressing its concerns at the quarterly reports from the International

Maritime Organization (IMO) since 2005, which provide evidence of continuing

piracy and armed robbery in particular in the waters off the coast of Somalia,

Affirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention

on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (“the Convention”), sets out the legal

framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery, as well as other

ocean activities,

Reaffirming the relevant provisions of international law with respect to the

repression of piracy, including the Convention, and recalling that they provide

guiding principles for cooperation to the fullest possible extent in the repression of

piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state,

including but not limited to boarding, searching, and seizing vessels engaged in or

suspected of engaging in acts of piracy, and to apprehending persons engaged in

such acts with a view to such persons being prosecuted,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political

independence and unity of Somalia,

Taking into account the crisis situation in Somalia, and the lack of capacity of

the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to interdict pirates or patrol and secure

either the international sea lanes off the coast of Somalia or Somalia’s territorial

waters,

* Reissued for technical reasons.

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S/RES/1816 (2008)

Deploring the recent incidents of attacks upon and hijacking of vessels in the

territorial waters and on the high seas off the coast of Somalia including attacks

upon and hijackings of vessels operated by the World Food Program and numerous

commercial vessels and the serious adverse impact of these attacks on the prompt,

safe and effective delivery of food aid and other humanitarian assistance to the

people of Somalia, and the grave dangers they pose to vessels, crews, passengers,

and cargo,

Noting the letters to the Secretary-General from the Secretary-General of the

IMO dated 5 July 2007 and 18 September 2007 regarding the piracy problems off

the coast of Somalia and the IMO Assembly resolution A.1002 (25), which strongly

urged Governments to increase their efforts to prevent and repress, within the

provisions of international law, acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels

irrespective of where such acts occur, and recalling the joint communiqué of the

IMO and the World Food Programme of 10 July 2007,

Taking note of the Secretary-General’s letter of

9 November 2007 to the

President of the Security Council reporting that the Transitional Federal

Government of Somalia (TFG) needs and would welcome international assistance to

address the problem,

Taking further note of the letter from the Permanent Representative of the

Somali Republic to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council

dated 27 February 2008, conveying the consent of the TFG to the Security Council

for urgent assistance in securing the territorial and international waters off the coast

of Somalia for the safe conduct of shipping and navigation,

Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in

the territorial waters of Somalia and the high seas off the coast of Somalia

exacerbate the situation in Somalia which continues to constitute a threat to

international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed robbery against

vessels in territorial waters and the high seas off the coast of Somalia;

Urges States whose naval vessels and military aircraft operate on the

high seas and airspace off the coast of Somalia to be vigilant to acts of piracy and

armed robbery and, in this context, encourages, in particular, States interested in the

use of commercial maritime routes off the coast of Somalia, to increase and

coordinate their efforts to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in

cooperation with the TFG;

Urges all States to cooperate with each other, with the IMO and, as

appropriate, with the relevant regional organizations in connection with, and share

information about, acts of piracy and armed robbery in the territorial waters and on

the high seas off the coast of Somalia, and to render assistance to vessels threatened

by or under attack by pirates or armed robbers, in accordance with relevant

international law;

Further urges States to work in cooperation with interested

organizations, including the IMO, to ensure that vessels entitled to fly their flag

receive appropriate guidance and training on avoidance, evasion, and defensive

techniques and to avoid the area whenever possible;

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S/RES/1816 (2008)

Calls upon States and interested organizations, including the IMO, to

provide technical assistance to Somalia and nearby coastal States upon their request

to enhance the capacity of these States to ensure coastal and maritime security,

including combating piracy and armed robbery off the Somali and nearby coastlines;

Affirms that the measures imposed by paragraph

5 of resolution

733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs

1 and

2 of resolution

1425 (2002) do not apply to supplies of technical assistance to Somalia solely for

the purposes set out in paragraph 5 above which have been exempted from those

measures in accordance with the procedure set out in paragraphs 11 (b) and 12 of

resolution 1772 (2007);

Decides that for a period of six months from the date of this resolution,

States cooperating with the TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea

off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by the

TFG to the Secretary-General, may:

(a) Enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts

of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action

permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law;

and

(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with

action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international

law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery;

Requests that cooperating states take appropriate steps to ensure that the

activities they undertake pursuant to the authorization in paragraph 7 do not have

the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage to the ships

of any third State;

Affirms that the authorization provided in this resolution applies only

with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations

or responsibilities of member states under international law, including any rights or

obligations under the Convention, with respect to any other situation, and

underscores in particular that it shall not be considered as establishing customary

international law, and affirms further that this authorization has been provided only

following receipt of the letter from the Permanent Representative of the Somalia

Republic to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council dated

27 February 2008 conveying the consent of the TFG;

10. Calls upon States to coordinate their actions with other participating

States taken pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 7 above;

11. Calls upon all States, and in particular flag, port and coastal States,

States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators or piracy and armed robbery,

and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national

legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction, and in the investigation and

prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the

coast of Somalia, consistent with applicable international law including

international human rights law, and to render assistance by, among other actions,

providing disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their

jurisdiction and control, such victims and witnesses and persons detained as a result

of operations conducted under this resolution;

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S/RES/1816 (2008)

12. Requests States cooperating with the TFG to inform the Security Council

within

3 months of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the

authority provided in paragraph 7 above;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within

5 months of adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this resolution and

on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery in territorial waters and

the high seas off the coast of Somalia;

14. Requests the Secretary-General of the IMO to brief the Council on the

basis of cases brought to his attention by the agreement of all affected coastal states,

and duly taking into account the existing bilateral and regional cooperative

arrangements, on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery;

15. Expresses its intention to review the situation and consider, as

appropriate, renewing the authority provided in paragraph 7 above for additional

periods upon the request of the TFG;

16. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

08-36177

United Nations

S/RES/1838 (2008)

Security Council

Distr.: General

7 October 2008

Resolution 1838 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5987th meeting, on

7 October 2008

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1814 (2008) and 1816 (2008),

Gravely concerned by the recent proliferation of acts of piracy and armed

robbery at sea against vessels off the coast of Somalia, and by the serious threat it

poses to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, to

international navigation and the safety of commercial maritime routes, and to

fishing activities conducted in conformity with international law,

Noting with concern also that increasingly violent acts of piracy are carried out

with heavier weaponry, in a larger area off the coast of Somalia, using long-range

assets such as mother ships, and demonstrating more sophisticated organization and

methods of attack,

Reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (“the Convention”), sets

out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as

well as other ocean activities,

Commending the contribution made by some States since November 2007 to

protect the World Food Programme

(“WFP”) maritime convoys, and, the

establishment by the European Union of a coordination unit with the task of

supporting the surveillance and protection activities carried out by some member

States of the European Union off the coast of Somalia, and the ongoing planning

process towards a possible European Union naval operation, as well as other

international or national initiatives taken with a view to implementing resolutions

1814 (2008) and 1816 (2008),

Noting recent humanitarian reports that as many as three-and-a-half million

Somalis will be dependent on humanitarian food aid by the end of the year, and that

maritime contractors for the WFP will not deliver food aid to Somalia without naval

warship escorts, expressing its determination to ensure long-term security of WFP

deliveries to Somalia and recalling that it requested the Secretary-General in

resolution 1814 (2008) to provide his support for efforts to protect WFP maritime

convoys,

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S/RES/1838 (2008)

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political

independence and unity of Somalia,

Taking note of the letter dated 1 September 2008 of the President of Somalia to

the Secretary-General of the United Nations expressing the appreciation of the

Transitional Federal Government (“TFG”) to the Security Council for its assistance

and expressing the TFG’s willingness to consider working with other States, as well

as regional organizations, to provide advance notifications additional to those

already provided, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1816 (2008), to

combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,

Recalling that in the statement of its President dated

4 September

2008

(S/PRST/2008/33) it welcomed the signing of a peace and reconciliation agreement

in Djibouti and commended the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for

Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, for his ongoing efforts, and emphasizing the

importance of promoting a comprehensive and lasting settlement in Somalia,

Recalling also that in the statement of its President dated

4 September

(S/PRST/2008/33) it took note of the parties’ request in the Djibouti Agreement that

the United Nations, within a period of

120 days, authorize and deploy an

international stabilization force and looking forward to the Secretary-General’s

report due

60 days from its passage, in particular a detailed and consolidated

description of a feasible multinational force, as well as a detailed concept of

operations for a feasible United Nations peacekeeping operation,

Emphasizing that peace and stability, the strengthening of State institutions,

economic and social development and respect for human rights and the rule of law

are necessary to create the conditions for a full eradication of piracy and armed

robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,

Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in

the territorial waters of Somalia and the high seas off the coast of Somalia

exacerbate the situation in Somalia which continues to constitute a threat against

international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reiterates that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed

robbery at sea against vessels off the coast of Somalia;

Calls upon States interested in the security of maritime activities to take

part actively in the fight against piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia, in

particular by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, in accordance with

international law, as reflected in the Convention;

Calls upon States whose naval vessels and military aircraft operate on the

high seas and airspace off the coast of Somalia to use on the high seas and airspace

off the coast of Somalia the necessary means, in conformity with international law,

as reflected in the Convention, for the repression of acts of piracy;

Urges States that have the capacity to do so to cooperate with the TFG in

the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea in conformity with the provisions

of resolution 1816 (2008);

Urges also States and regional organizations, in conformity with the

provisions of resolution 1814 (2008), to continue to take action to protect the World

08-53884

S/RES/1838 (2008)

Food Programme maritime convoys, which is vital to bring humanitarian assistance

to the affected populations in Somalia;

Urges States, as requested in particular by International Maritime

Organization resolution (“IMO”) A-1002(25), to issue to ships entitled to fly their

flag, as necessary, advice and guidance on appropriate precautionary measures to

protect themselves from attack or actions to take if under attack or the threat of

attack when sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia;

Calls upon States and regional organizations to coordinate their actions

pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 above;

Affirms that the provisions in this resolution apply only with respect to

the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or

responsibilities of member States under international law, including any rights or

obligations under the Convention, with respect to any situation, and underscores in

particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary

international law;

Looks forward to the report of the Secretary-General requested in

paragraph 13 of resolution 1816 (2008) and expresses its intention to review the

situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea against vessels off the

coast of Somalia with a view, in particular, upon the request of the TFG, to renewing

the authority provided in paragraph 7 of resolution 1816 (2008) for an additional

period;

10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

08-53884

United Nations

S/RES/1846 (2008)

Security Council

Distr.: General

2 December 2008

Resolution 1846 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6026th meeting, on

2 December 2008

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia,

especially resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008),

Continuing to be gravely concerned by the threat that piracy and armed

robbery at sea against vessels pose to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of

humanitarian aid to Somalia, to international navigation and the safety of

commercial maritime routes, and to other vulnerable ships, including fishing

activities in conformity with international law,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political

independence and unity of Somalia,

Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (“the Convention”), sets

out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as

well as other ocean activities,

Taking into account the crisis situation in Somalia, and the lack of capacity of

the Transitional Federal Government

(“TFG”) to interdict pirates or patrol and

secure either the international sea lanes off the coast of Somalia or Somalia’s

territorial waters,

Taking note of the requests from the TFG for international assistance to

counter piracy off its coasts, including the

1 September

2008 letter from the

President of Somalia to the Secretary-General of the United Nations expressing the

appreciation of the TFG to the Security Council for its assistance and expressing the

TFG’s willingness to consider working with other States and regional organizations

to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, the

20 November 2008 letter conveying the request of the TFG that the provisions of

resolution 1816 (2008) be renewed, and the 20 November request of the Permanent

Representative of Somalia before the Security Council that the renewal be for an

additional 12 months,

Further taking note of the letters from the TFG to the Secretary-General

providing advance notification with respect to States cooperating with the TFG in

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S/RES/1846 (2008)

the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and from

other Member States to the Security Council to inform the Council of their actions,

as requested in paragraphs 7 and 12 of resolution 1816 (2008), and encouraging

those cooperating States, for which advance notification has been provided by the

TFG to the Secretary-General, to continue their respective efforts,

Expressing again its determination to ensure the long-term security of World

Food Programme (WFP) maritime deliveries to Somalia,

Recalling that in its resolution

1838 (2008) it commended the contribution

made by some States since November 2007 to protect (WFP) maritime convoys, and

the establishment by the European Union (EU) of a coordination unit with the task

of supporting the surveillance and protection activities carried out by some member

States of the European Union off the coast of Somalia, as well as other international

and national initiatives taken with a view to implementing resolutions 1814 (2008)

and 1816 (2008),

Emphasizing that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of State

institutions, economic and social development and respect for human rights and the

rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a full eradication of piracy and

armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,

Welcoming the signing of a peace and reconciliation Agreement (“the Djibouti

Agreement”) between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia on

19 August

2008, as well as their signing of a joint ceasefire agreement on

26 October 2008, noting that the Djibouti Agreement calls for the United Nations to

authorize and deploy an international stabilization force, and further noting the

Secretary-General’s report on Somalia of

17 November

2008, including his

recommendations in this regard,

Commending the key role played by the African Union Mission to Somalia

(AMISOM) in facilitating delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia through

the port of Mogadishu and the contribution that AMISOM has made towards the

goal of establishing lasting peace and stability in Somalia, and recognizing

specifically the important contributions of the Governments of Uganda and Burundi

to Somalia,

Welcoming the organization of a ministerial meeting of the Security Council in

December 2008 to examine ways to improve international coordination in the fight

against piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia and to ensure that the

international community has the proper authorities and tools at its disposal to assist

it in these efforts,

Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in

the territorial waters of Somalia and the high seas off the coast of Somalia

exacerbate the situation in Somalia which continues to constitute a threat to

international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reiterates that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed

robbery against vessels in territorial waters and the high seas off the coast of

Somalia;

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Expresses its concern over the finding contained in the 20 November

2008 report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia that escalating ransom payments

are fuelling the growth of piracy off the coast of Somalia;

Welcomes the efforts of the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”)

to update its guidance and recommendations to the shipping industry and to

Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea and to

provide this guidance as soon as practicable to all Member States and to the

international shipping community operating off the coast of Somalia;

Calls upon States, in cooperation with the shipping industry, the

insurance industry and the IMO, to issue to ships entitled to fly their flag

appropriate advice and guidance on avoidance, evasion, and defensive techniques

and measures to take if under the threat of attack or attack when sailing in the

waters off the coast of Somalia;

Further calls upon States and interested organizations, including the

IMO, to provide technical assistance to Somalia and nearby coastal States upon their

request to enhance the capacity of these States to ensure coastal and maritime

security, including combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali and

nearby coastlines;

Welcomes initiatives by Canada, Denmark, France, India, the

Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States

of America, and by regional and international organizations to counter piracy off the

coast of Somalia pursuant to resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008),

the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to counter piracy off

the Somalia coast, including by escorting vessels of the WFP, and in particular the

decision by the EU on 10 November 2008 to launch, for a period of 12 months from

December 2008, a naval operation to protect WFP maritime convoys bringing

humanitarian assistance to Somalia and other vulnerable ships, and to repress acts of

piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;

Calls upon States and regional organizations to coordinate, including by

sharing information through bilateral channels or the United Nations, their efforts to

deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia in cooperation

with each other, the IMO, the international shipping community, flag States, and the

TFG;

Requests the Secretary-General to present to it a report, no later than

three months after the adoption of this resolution, on ways to ensure the long-term

security of international navigation off the coast of Somalia, including the long-term

security of WFP maritime deliveries to Somalia and a possible coordination and

leadership role for the United Nations in this regard to rally Member States and

regional organizations to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of

Somalia;

Calls upon States and regional organizations that have the capacity to do

so, to take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the

coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and relevant

international law, by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, and through

seizure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in

the commission of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, or for which

there is reasonable ground for suspecting such use;

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10. Decides that for a period of 12 months from the date of this resolution

States and regional organizations cooperating with the TFG in the fight against

piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance

notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-General, may:

(a) Enter into the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing

acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action

permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international

law; and

(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with

such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant

international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery

at sea;

11. Affirms that the authorizations provided in this resolution apply only with

respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or

responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or

obligations under the Convention, with respect to any other situation, and

underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing

customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been

provided only following the receipt of the

20 November letter conveying the

consent of the TFG;

12. Affirms that the measures imposed by paragraph

5 of resolution

733

(1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002)

do not apply to supplies of technical assistance to Somalia solely for the purposes

set out in paragraph 5 above which have been exempted from those measures in

accordance with the procedure set out in paragraphs 11 (b) and 12 of resolution

1772 (2007);

13. Requests that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure that the

activities they undertake pursuant to the authorization in paragraph 10 do not have

the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage to the ships

of any third State;

14. Calls upon all States, and in particular flag, port and coastal States,

States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery,

and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national

legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction, and in the investigation and

prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the

coast of Somalia, consistent with applicable international law including

international human rights law, and to render assistance by, among other actions,

providing disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their

jurisdiction and control, such victims and witnesses and persons detained as a result

of operations conducted under this resolution;

15. Notes that the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA Convention”) provides for parties

to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons

responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or

threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; urges States parties to the SUA

Convention to fully implement their obligations under said Convention and

cooperate with the Secretary-General and the IMO to build judicial capacity for the

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S/RES/1846 (2008)

successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off

the coast of Somalia;

16. Requests States and regional organizations cooperating with the TFG to

inform the Security Council and the Secretary-General within nine months of the

progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authority provided in

paragraph 10 above;

17. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within

11 months of adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this resolution

and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery in territorial waters

and the high seas off the coast of Somalia;

18. Requests the Secretary-General of the IMO to brief the Council on the

basis of cases brought to his attention by the agreement of all affected coastal States,

and duly taking into account the existing bilateral and regional cooperative

arrangements, on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery;

19. Expresses its intention to review the situation and consider, as

appropriate, renewing the authority provided in paragraph 10 above for additional

periods upon the request of the TFG;

20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

08-63029

United Nations

S/RES/1851 (2008)

Security Council

Distr.: General

16 December 2008

Resolution 1851 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6046th meeting, on

16 December 2008

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia,

especially resolutions

1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), and

1846 (2008),

Continuing to be gravely concerned by the dramatic increase in the incidents

of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia in the last six months,

and by the threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea against vessels pose to the

prompt, safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, and noting that

pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia have become more sophisticated and daring

and have expanded in their geographic scope, notably evidenced by the hijacking of

the M/V Sirius Star 500 nautical miles off the coast of Kenya and subsequent

unsuccessful attempts well east of Tanzania,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political

independence and unity of Somalia, including Somalia’s rights with respect to

offshore natural resources, including fisheries, in accordance with international law,

Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (UNCLOS), sets out the

legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as

other ocean activities,

Again taking into account the crisis situation in Somalia, and the lack of

capacity of the Transitional Federal Government

(TFG) to interdict, or upon

interdiction to prosecute pirates or to patrol and secure the waters off the coast of

Somalia, including the international sea lanes and Somalia’s territorial waters,

Noting the several requests from the TFG for international assistance to

counter piracy off its coast, including the letter of

9 December 2008 from the

President of Somalia requesting the international community to assist the TFG in

taking all necessary measures to interdict those who use Somali territory and

airspace to plan, facilitate or undertake acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and

the 1 September 2008 letter from the President of Somalia to the Secretary-General

of the UN expressing the appreciation of the TFG to the Security Council for its

assistance and expressing the TFG’s willingness to consider working with other

08-65501 (E)

*0865501*

S/RES/1851 (2008)

States and regional organizations to combat piracy and armed robbery off the coast

of Somalia,

Welcoming the launching of the EU operation Atalanta to combat piracy off the

coast of Somalia and to protect vulnerable ships bound for Somalia, as well as the

efforts by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other States acting in a

national capacity in cooperation with the TFG to suppress piracy off the coast of

Somalia,

Also welcoming the recent initiatives of the Governments of Egypt, Kenya, and

the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, and the United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to achieve effective measures to remedy the

causes, capabilities, and incidents of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of

Somalia, and emphasizing the need for current and future counter-piracy operations

to effectively coordinate their activities,

Noting with concern that the lack of capacity, domestic legislation, and clarity

about how to dispose of pirates after their capture, has hindered more robust

international action against the pirates off the coast of Somalia and in some cases

led to pirates being released without facing justice, and reiterating that the 1988

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime

Navigation (“SUA Convention”) provides for parties to create criminal offences,

establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for or suspected of

seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form

of intimidation,

Welcoming the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia of 20 November

2008 (S/2008/769), and noting the role piracy may play in financing embargo

violations by armed groups,

Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the waters

off the coast of Somalia exacerbate the situation in Somalia which continues to

constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reiterates that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed

robbery against vessels in waters off the coast of Somalia;

Calls upon States, regional and international organizations that have the

capacity to do so, to take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery

at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution,

resolution

1846 (2008), and international law, by deploying naval vessels and

military aircraft and through seizure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and

other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea

off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting

such use;

Invites all States and regional organizations fighting piracy off the coast

of Somalia to conclude special agreements or arrangements with countries willing to

take custody of pirates in order to embark law enforcement officials (“shipriders”)

from the latter countries, in particular countries in the region, to facilitate the

investigation and prosecution of persons detained as a result of operations

conducted under this resolution for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the

coast of Somalia, provided that the advance consent of the TFG is obtained for the

08-65501

S/RES/1851 (2008)

exercise of third state jurisdiction by shipriders in Somali territorial waters and that

such agreements or arrangements do not prejudice the effective implementation of

the SUA Convention;

Encourages all States and regional organizations fighting piracy and

armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an international

cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between and among

states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy

and armed robbery at sea off Somalia’s coast; and recalls that future

recommendations on ways to ensure the long-term security of international

navigation off the coast of Somalia, including the long-term security of WFP

maritime deliveries to Somalia and a possible coordination and leadership role for

the United Nations in this regard to rally Member States and regional organizations

to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia are to be

detailed in a report by the Secretary-General no later than three months after the

adoption of resolution 1846;

Further encourages all states and regional organizations fighting piracy

and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to consider creating a centre in the

region to coordinate information relevant to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the

coast of Somalia, to increase regional capacity with assistance of UNODC to

arrange effective shiprider agreements or arrangements consistent with UNCLOS

and to implement the SUA Convention, the United Nations Convention against

Transnational Organized Crime and other relevant instruments to which States in the

region are party, in order to effectively investigate and prosecute piracy and armed

robbery at sea offences;

In response to the letter from the TFG of 9 December 2008, encourages

Member States to continue to cooperate with the TFG in the fight against piracy and

armed robbery at sea, notes the primary role of the TFG in rooting out piracy and

armed robbery at sea, and decides that for a period of twelve months from the date

of adoption of resolution 1846, States and regional organizations cooperating in the

fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia for which

advance notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-General may

undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of

suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, pursuant to the request of the

TFG, provided, however, that any measures undertaken pursuant to the authority of

this paragraph shall be undertaken consistent with applicable international

humanitarian and human rights law;

Calls on Member States to assist the TFG, at its request and with

notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen its operational capacity to bring

to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate or undertake

criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and stresses that any measures

undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with applicable

international human rights law;

Welcomes the communiqué issued by the International Conference on

Piracy around Somalia held in Nairobi, Kenya, on

11 December

2008 and

encourages Member States to work to enhance the capacity of relevant states in the

region to combat piracy, including judicial capacity;

08-65501

S/RES/1851 (2008)

Notes with concern the findings contained in the 20 November 2008

report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia that escalating ransom payments are

fuelling the growth of piracy in waters off the coast of Somalia, and that the lack of

enforcement of the arms embargo established by resolution

733

(1992) has

permitted ready access to the arms and ammunition used by the pirates and driven in

part the phenomenal growth in piracy;

10. Affirms that the authorization provided in this resolution apply only with

respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or

responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or

obligations under UNCLOS, with respect to any other situation, and underscores in

particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary

international law, and affirms further that such authorizations have been provided

only following the receipt of the 9 December 2008 letter conveying the consent of

the TFG;

11. Affirms that the measures imposed by paragraph

5 of resolution

733

(1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 or resolution 1425 (2002)

shall not apply to weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of

Member States and regional organizations undertaking measures in accordance with

paragraph 6 above;

12. Urges States in collaboration with the shipping and insurance industries,

and the IMO to continue to develop avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices

and advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in waters off the coast of

Somalia, and further urges States to make their citizens and vessels available for

forensic investigation as appropriate at the first port of call immediately following

an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from captivity;

13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

08-65501

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

April 2007

PUBLICATION NOTICE

ROUTING

1. Change 1 to ATP 2(B), Volume I, NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUID-

ANCE FOR SHIPPING (NCAGS) MANUAL, is available in the Navy War-

fare Library. The effective date will be promulgated by the Commander, Navy

Warfare Development Command, for U.S. Navy holders.

2. This multinational manual provides guidance and doctrine for the provision of

NCAGS support throughout the spectrum of military operations.

3. Change 1 incorporates the recommendations and decisions of the 2006 NATO

Shipping Working Group, including updated definitions and descriptions of

terms required to conduct NCAGS operations and a new Tool 202, Conduct

Convoy Operations. A glossary has been added, and editorial corrections have

been made throughout.

Navy Warfare Library Custodian

Navy Warfare Library publications must be made

readily available to all users and other interested

personnel within the U.S. Navy.

Note to Navy Warfare Library Custodian

This notice will assist you in providing information to cognizant personnel. It is not accountable.

IIa

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

NATION

SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

CAN

A. Para 0102, Line 2: Delete "policy." Implementing NCAGS, a

warfare discipline to support naval operations, not a policy.

B. Para 0103, Line 2: Replace "supervision" with "naval supervision

(control)." More accurate description of what is actually occurring.

Naval Supervision of Shipping has not been defined yet in this

document and thus the word "supervision" is entirely misleading and

inaccurate.

C. Para 0104.3, Line 3: Replace "supervision" with "naval

supervision (control)." More accurate description of what is actually

occurring. Naval Supervision of Shipping has not been defined yet

in this document and thus the word "supervision" is entirely

misleading and inaccurate.

D. Para 0105.1.a. Replace with "a. Naval Co-operation and

Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS). The naval warfare discipline

that provides the interface between military operations and

merchant shipping. This interface involves the provision of military

co-operation, guidance, advice, and assistance to, or naval

supervision of, merchant shipping. The NCAGS capability is

employed to enhance the safety of participating merchant ships in

the operations area while supporting military objectives." Correct

and complete description of the NCAGS capability.

E. Glossary-3: Replace current definition of NCAGS with: "Naval

Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS). The naval

warfare discipline that provides the interface between military

operations and merchant shipping. This interface involves the

provision of military co-operation, guidance, advice, and assistance

to, or naval supervision of, merchant shipping. The NCAGS

capability is employed to enhance the safety of participating

merchant ships in the operations area while supporting military

objectives." Correct and complete description of the NCAGS

capability.

GRC

The Aim, Mission, Capability and Shipping Data of NSC as described

at ANNEX 3A, Page 3A-1 are arbitrary and obscure, as there are no

TORS governing the operation of NSC.

TUR

The use of term “coastal waters” mentioned in Para. 11(a) (ANNEX

3F, Page 3F-4) is not acceptable, because this term is not included in

international law.

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

No.

Chapter 1 — CONCEPT OF NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING

0101

Background

1-1

0102

Purpose and Scope

1-1

0103

Mission

1-1

0104

Concept of Operations

1-1

0105

Definitions and Descriptions

1-2

0106

Elements of the Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Organisation

1-3

0107

Peacetime Planning for Merchant Shipping

1-3

0108

Principal Benefits to the Military Commander

1-4

0109

Principal Benefits to Merchant Shipping

1-4

ANNEX 1A — COMPONENTS OF MERCHANT SHIPPING

Chapter 2 — COMMAND AND CONTROL

0201

Command Structure

2-1

0202

Command Relationships

2-1

0203

Factors Affecting the Requirements for NCAGS

2-1

Chapter 3 — NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING OPERATIONS

0301

Introduction

3-1

0302

Responsibilities of Nations

3-2

0303

Action by Nations

3-3

0304

NCAGS Operations

3-3

0305

NCAGS Procedures

3-3

0306

Civil-Military Interface

3-5

0307

Crisis Response Shipping

3-6

0308

Fishing Vessels

3-6

0309

Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System

3-6

ANNEX 3A — THE NATO SHIPPING CENTRE

ANNEX 3B — NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING IN CRISIS

RESPONSE OPERATIONS

ANNEX 3C — NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING IN MARITIME

INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

ANNEX 3D — RECOGNISED MARITIME PICTURE

ANNEX 3E — FISHING VESSELS IN NCAGS OPERATIONS

ANNEX 3F — ROUTEING

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

Page

No.

Chapter 4 — NCAGS COMMUNICATIONS

0401

General

4-1

0402

Military and Non-Military Communications

4-1

0403

Information Exchange Requirements

4-2

0404

Merchant Ship Messages

4-8

0405

Communications Security

4-8

Chapter 5 — NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING TOOLBOX

0501

Introduction

5-1

0502

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping 100 Series Tools

5-1

0503

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping 200 Series Tools

5-2

ANNEX 5A — 100 SERIES NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING

TOOLS

Appendix 1 to Tool 101 — OPTASK NCAGS

5A-3

Appendix 2 to Tool 101 — Change Instructions for Structured Messages

5A-9

Appendix 1 to Tool 108 — Format Alfa

5A-18

Appendix 1 to Tool 117 — Sailing Instruction Format

5A-35

ANNEX 5B — 200 SERIES NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING

TOOLS

Appendix 1 to Tool 202 — Stationing Criteria for Ships in Convoy Formations

5B-6

Appendix 2 to Tool 202 — Joiner Instructions

5B-8

Appendix 3 to Tool 202 — Arrangement for Late Availability

5B-11

Appendix 4 to Tool 202 — Leaver Instructions

5B-12

Appendix 5 to Tool 202 — Straggler Instructions

5B-14

Appendix 6 to Tool 202 — Convoy Communications Instructions and Emission Control . . . 5B-16

Appendix 7 to Tool 202 — Sailing Order Convoys

5B-18

Appendix 8 to Tool 202 — Pre-Sail Briefing

5B-27

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

LOAA-1

Glossary

Glossary-1

Index

Index-1

XII

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

CHAPTER 1

Concept of Naval Cooperation and

Guidance for Shipping

0101 Background

The Alliance’s review of its policy for operations involving merchant shipping has led to the develop-

ment of Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS), with its associated tactics, tech-

niques and procedures, to replace Naval Control of Shipping (NCS). MC 376/1 is the policy document

establishing NCAGS which was developed by the NATO Shipping Working Group (NSWG).

0102 Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this multi-national manual is to describe the procedures and organisation required to

implement NCAGS policy. It provides guidance and doctrine for the provision of NCAGS support

throughout the spectrum of military operations.

0103 Mission

To provide NCAGS support to military commanders and merchant shipping in peacetime, tension, cri-

sis and conflict through cooperation, guidance, advice, assistance and, where necessary, supervision.

Additionally, to provide military guidance, advice or assistance in respect of participating nations’

global, maritime commercial interests to enhance the safety of merchant ships and to support military

operations.

0104 Concept of Operations

Introduction. Many maritime operations will either directly involve or have some impact on

merchant shipping. Additionally, merchant shipping may impact upon the conduct of military operations.

The NCAGS Organisation (NCAGSORG) will seek to develop and implement measures to facilitate the

conduct of military activity at sea either involving, or in the presence of, merchant ships.

Spectrum of Operations. NCAGS provides military commanders with a series of tools capa-

ble of being progressively implemented as appropriate to the nature of any emerging situation. The size of

the NCAGSORG and level of expertise required will be commensurate with the operation, as determined

by the operational planning process. The NCAGSORG must be flexible and prepared to operate within a

wide variety of command structures and operational environments. Figure 1-1 provides an illustration of

the NCAGS response to meet emerging situations. The NCAGS response should be tailored to the

scenario and coordinated with other warfare disciplines.

Planning for NCAGS Operations. NCAGS must be considered at all levels of planning (stra-

tegic, operational and tactical). NCAGS planning will focus on all aspects relating to merchant shipping

such as the provision of guidance, picture compilation, surveillance, deconfliction or supervision. The

military commander should aim to deliver a tailored, cost effective and executable NCAGS plan. This

plan must conserve military resources and minimise the impact on merchant ships, thereby minimising

negative economic consequences.

1-1

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

Naval Supervision

NCAGS

NCAGS Organisation

Activity

Strategic,

Operational

Planning

NATO

Shipping Centre

Peacetime

Tension

Crisis

Conflict

Crisis Level

Figure 1-1. Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

0105 Definitions and Descriptions

The definitions and descriptions given below are not exhaustive, but include those required in

order to conduct NCAGS operations:

a. Naval Cooperation and Guidance For Shipping (NCAGS). The provision of NATO

military cooperation, guidance, advice, assistance and supervision to merchant shipping to enhance

the safety of participating merchant ships and to support military operations.

b. Participating Merchant Ship. A merchant ship taking part in a naval cooperation and

guidance for shipping operation.

c. Designated Merchant Ship. A merchant ship with a special status that may give it

priority over other ships for higher level naval cooperation and guidance for shipping

activities and, when it is placed under the naval supervision of merchant ships, compels it to

comply with military orders. On request, the North Atlantic Council (NAC)/Defence

Planning Committee (DPC) may allow non-NATO nations to nominate ships.

d. Naval Supervision of Merchant Ships. In NCAGS, the mandatory routeing of merchant

ships, control of their movements and/or convoy organization by naval authorities. Naval

supervision of merchant ships is the ultimate response of NCAGS exercised by naval authorities

and will be implemented only with NAC/DPC approval.

e. Protection of Merchant Ships. The employment of military forces or procedures to

prevent or defend against offensive actions directed at merchant ships.

1-2

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

f. Merchant Shipping. In NCAGS, the complete commercial maritime industry, including

the fishing industry. Its principal elements are listed in Annex 1A.

0106 Elements of the Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Organisation

The NCAGSORG is flexible in order to meet the needs of the military commander and mer-

chant shipping. It may comprise some or all of the following elements tailored to suit the situation

depending on the level of NCAGS support that is to be provided.

a. NATO Shipping Centre (NSC). A permanent operational organisation based at MCC

NORTHWOOD, tasked with establishing and maintaining links with the military, merchant

shipping, NSAs and international maritime agencies. See Annex 3A.

b. NCAGS Commander (NCAGS CDR). The officer assigned to command the

NCAGSORG. He will plan and execute NCAGS and promulgate the OPTASK NCAGS.

c. Convoy Commodore. A naval officer, or master of one of the ships in a convoy, designated

to command the convoy, subject to the orders of the officer in tactical command. If no surface escort

is present, he takes entire command.

d. Staff Officer NCAGS (SO NCAGS). An officer who augments military staffs at all

levels to provide expertise and advice to the command on NCAGS matters as they affect the

planning and execution of operations.

e. NCAGS Unit. A team of NCAGS personnel, deployed ashore or afloat to provide specific

local NCAGS services including gathering local merchant shipping information, providing

guidance to merchant ships and co-operating with and advising local merchant shipping.

f. Shipping Cooperation Point (SCP). A location where NCAGS staff gather and

disseminate information on local merchant shipping and naval operations and provide the

means to brief merchant ships on risks, routeing and protective measures. NCAGS staff

establish and maintain liaison with local and regional authorities, including port authorities,

shipping agents, and local shipping companies and report ship movements to other elements of

the NCAGS organisation. The location of SCPs will be at the discretion of the NCAGS CDR

and can be ashore or afloat. See Tool 114 in Chapter 5.

g. NCAGS Liaison Officer (NCAGS LO). An officer deployed by the NCAGS CDR to

provide liaison outside the direct military chain of command. For LOs deployed to merchant

ships, their position on board does not affect the Master’s responsibility for the safe navigation

and safe handling of the ship. The NCAGS liaison officer makes military knowledge available

to the Master to allow him to understand the naval and military requirements that are

applicable. See Tool 116 in Chapter 5.

h. NCAGS Rear Staff. It will rarely be possible to locate all the necessary NCAGS Staff

at themilitarycommander’sHQ,particularly ifitisafloat.AnNCAGSRearStaffmaythereforebe

established ashore in support of an embarked or remotely located NCAGS Staff.

0107

Peacetime Planning for Merchant Shipping

The NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS), which cooperates closely with both the

NCAGSORG and merchant shipping under the guidance of the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning

Committee (SCEPC), is responsible for developing and maintaining plans for civil shipping support to

the Alliance in crisis and war, including planning for acquiring the civil shipping resources necessary to

meet military lift. PBOS maintains a cadre of civil shipping experts from industry to support NATO crisis

1-3

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

management arrangements. PBOS also works closely with Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations. Each

Allied nation is responsible for its own emergency planning for merchant ships including national con-

trol and direction during crisis.

0108

Principal Benefits to the Military Commander

NCAGS can provide the following principal benefits to the military commander:

a. More comprehensive picture of merchant activity in the maritime portion of the Common

Operational Picture (COP) and/or Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP).

b. Deconfliction of merchant ships from military operations.

c. Improved safety and security of merchant ships in a crisis area.

d. Improved effectiveness in supporting Crisis Response Operations (CRO) and

Maritime

Interdiction Operations (MIO).

e. Better understanding of commercial constraints.

f. Improved counterterrorism capability.

g. More efficient and cost effective employment of military forces.

h. Improved counterpiracy capability.

i. More opportunities for training with merchant ships in both planned and unplanned exercises

arranged with forces on passage (PASSEXes).

0109

Principal Benefits to Merchant Shipping

NCAGS can provide the following principal benefits to merchant shipping:

a. Improved safety and security in crisis areas.

b. Minimising disruptions to passages through areas where military operations are being

conducted.

c. Maintenance of economic flow.

d. Quicker reaction to changing threats.

e. Better understanding of military constraints.

f. Potential for reducing war-risk premiums.

g. Minimising disruption to commercial schedules.

h. Improved support to counterterrorism.

i. Improved support to counterpiracy.

1-4

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

ANNEX 1A

Components of Merchant Shipping

The following organisations, associations and agencies collectively form

“Merchant

Shipping.” This list is not exhaustive, neither are institutions in any particular order, but it serves to illus-

trate the wide community it encompasses.

Classification Societies (e.g., Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay).

Coast Guard.

Customs & Excise.

Federal Waterways Police.

Immigration.

International Maritime Organization.

International Insurance and Reinsurance Organization.

International Labour Organization.

International Transport Worker Federation.

State Harbour Police.

Port Authority.

Port Control.

Harbour Master.

Cargo Handling & Terminal Operators.

Freight Forwarders.

Surveyors and Cargo Agents.

Port Railway Authority.

Vessel Traffic System.

Shipping Reporting Service.

Shipping and Waterways Directorate.

National Maritime Security & Welfare Association.

Shipowner Association.

1A-1

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

CHAPTER 2

Command and Control

0201 Command Structure

The NCAGS command structure and its place within the overall command structure will vary

according to the objectives of an operation. This chapter provides guidance and considerations that

should be taken into account when integrating NCAGS into the command structure for an operation.

0202 Command Relationships

Command responsibilities for NCAGS and their relationships are detailed below:

a. Strategic and Operational Commanders. The development of the Concept of Operations

(CONOPS) by the Strategic Commander (SC) and the subsequent command estimate and

development of the Operation Plan (OPLAN) by the Operational Commander, will determine the

NCAGS requirement.The Operational Commander is also responsible for deciding the level of

NCAGS support required, and establishing the Command and Control (C2) structure to implement it.

b. NCAGS CDR. When assigned, the NCAGS CDR is responsible for the activities of the

NCAGSORG. The NCAGS CDR is to implement those tools best suited to fulfill the operational

aims and objectives and any additional NCAGSORG requirements. He will promulgate the

OPTASK NCAGS.

0203 Factors Affecting the Requirement for NCAGS

The nature of the operation will govern the size and type of NCAGS support provided. The

mission requirements will dictate which branches within military staffs should be augmented by

NCAGS personnel. Early consideration during the planning process must be given to the level of aug-

mentation that may be required. The following factors should be addressed during planning in or-

der to assess the level of NCAGS support required:

a. The mission.

b. The threat.

c. Whether the presence of merchant ships will affect the operation.

d. The geography, hydrography and environmental conditions in the area.

e. The type and intensity of merchant ships in the area.

f. The effect of merchant shipping activity on the operation.

g. The effect of the operation on merchant shipping activity.

h. The level and type of information to be sought from the merchant shipping community.

i. The level and type of guidance, advice, and assistance to be provided to the merchant shipping

community.

2-1

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

CHAPTER 3

Naval Cooperation and Guidance

for Shipping Operations

0301 Introduction

Overview. The NCAGSORG supports two distinct entities, the military commander and mer-

chant shipping. It enables military operations and enhances the safety of merchant ships, while keeping

mutual interference to a minimum.

Capabilities. The ability to establish contacts with the merchant shipping industry allows mer-

chant ship information to be gathered and passed to the RMP for the COP. The NCAGSORG may also ac-

quire a considerable amount of information useful in intelligence. Cooperation and dialogue with

merchant shipping enables the organisation to support military commanders on all aspects of merchant

shipping in their AOO. This assists the military commander in achieving his mission and managing avail-

able assets more effectively. Furthermore, the provision of guidance to merchant shipping may enable the

NCAGS CDR to minimise disruption to military operations.

Toolbox Concept. NCAGS procedures provide a flexible response to operational require-

ments. The various tools available for implementation make up the NCAGS toolbox and are contained in

Chapter 5. They are available for implementation at the operational and tactical levels. Naval Supervision

of Merchant Ships involves complex legal issues and may only be implemented with the authorization of

the NAC/DPC.

Principal Capabilities. The principal NCAGS capabilities are:

a. Enhanced Safety of Merchant Ships. NCAGS is the major source of information and

advice to merchant shipping to enhance the safety of merchant ships during CRO and in major

conflicts.

b. Deconfliction. NCAGS advises merchant ships to avoid, where possible, operational areas,

and advises the military of areas of significant commercial activity in order to minimise any mutual

interference.

c. Civil/Military Interface. The NCAGSORG is the main military source of expertise on

merchant shipping. It provides a liaison between merchant shipping and the military and will

establish reporting requirements.

d. Picture Compilation. The NCAGSORG is a major provider of merchant ship data to the

RMP.

Limitations. The primary NCAGS limitations are:

a. Information. Security requirements will dictate what information is made available to

merchant shipping. Information and guidance passed to merchant shipping must be brief, concise

and not burden recipients with needless details. The commercial sensitivity of the information

supplied by the merchant shipping community must be respected and protected.

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b. Military Asset Control. Apart from its own personnel, the NCAGSORG does not control

military assets but can provide a liaison between military assets and merchant ships.

c. Safe Passage Responsibility. Safe passage responsibility remains with the master except

under Naval Supervision of Merchant Ships.

d. Voluntary Participation. The compliance of merchant ships cannot be assumed as their

participation in NCAGS is purely voluntary.

e. Qualifications. The qualifications and language ability of individual masters can vary

markedly. NCAGS units will have to ensure that the amount and detail of information passed to

individual merchant vessels is sufficient and that the master fully comprehends the requirements.

This may adversely affect the number of ships an NCAGS unit can cover.

0302 Responsibilities of Nations

Where necessary, the lead responsibility for the implementation of NCAGS in ports and locations will

be as follows:

In NATO countries and their overseas territories — the nation concerned.

In all other countries and their overseas territories — one NATO nation is to assume responsibility

on behalf of NATO, as agreed among members, for planning operations within friendly or neutral coun-

tries outside the NATO area in accordance with AAP 8.

0303 Action by Nations

Nomination of Designated Ships. Nations who wish to nominate ships as designated will

supply the Military Commander, via their NSA or equivalent, with a list of ships and their International

Maritime Organization (IMO) number. Designated ships include national ships, those from dependent

territories, and named ships assessed as being of economic benefit to that nation.

NCAGSORG. Nations will establish this organisation by providing personnel and appropriate

support, both ashore and afloat as deemed necessary. Nations are to keep under review and to exercise

periodically the arrangements set out in this document and associated NCAGS publications.

National Cooperation and Coordination. Nations should ensure close cooperation and

coordination between civil and military authorities and provide adequate communication facilities with

merchant ships for emergency purposes. In particular, nations should encourage a close working arrange-

ment between government, shipping companies, port authorities, other appropriate maritime organisa-

tions and the NSC. Arrangements should be made for the speedy interchange of vital information

concerning movements of national shipping, harassment or hostile actions.

Instructions to Masters of Merchant Ships. To avoid confusion in a period of tension or

crisis, or in the early days of conflict, clear advice should be issued in peacetime to masters of national

participating and/or designated merchant ships. There must be no doubt of the action to be taken by mas-

ters and sources from which they may expect guidance or instructions. Such guidance and instructions are

to be issued and updated regularly by nations.

Note: A non-compliant or non-participating vessel may attract greater military attention in the area of

operations.

Supply of Publications and Equipment to Merchant Ships. When authorised, NATO

publications and equipment may be distributed to NATO nations’ participating merchant ships as

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arranged by the appropriate authorities. NATO publications and equipment may not be issued to

non-NATO merchant ships without the express permission of the Military Committee (MC).

0304 NCAGS Operations

Crisis Response Operations (CROs)

a. CROs are multifunctional operations involving military forces, diplomatic and humanitarian

agencies. They are designed to achieve humanitarian goals or a long term political settlement, and

are conducted impartially in support of a United Nations (UN) or other international legal mandate.

These include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding

and humanitarian operations. Maritime forces may play a role in all phases of these operations.

b. The NCAGS contribution to CRO will employ tools aimed at the deconfliction of naval and

merchant ships in the AOO, the collection of information important to the effective utilization of

military assets, input of merchant ship information for the RMP and intelligence. For details see

Annex 3B.

c. In addition to supporting intelligence, operations and planning activities during CRO, the

NCAGSORG would provide valuable information and assistance to the logistics organisations.

Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOs) Support. MIOs are conducted to enforce

sanctions against a nation or nations as part of a CRO. Under such circumstances, elements of the

NCAGSORG may be integrated into the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) and/or MIO Com-

mander (MIOC) staffs to provide advice on merchant shipping issues. This will provide the MIOC

with a predictive element to the RMP, assisting in clearance of non-suspect ships. NCAGS, by provid-

ing intelligence support, will aid in locating and identifying SUS, Contacts of Interest (COI), and Criti-

cal Contacts of Interest (CCOI). This will assist the MIOC in utilising his assets effectively and to help

minimise delays to merchant ships when passing through MIO areas.

NCAGS In Shipping Risk Environments. There will be occasions and areas where mer-

chant ships may be at risk from harassment and/or attack. The nature of the assailant may range from

pirates and terrorist groups to the military forces of belligerent nations or rogue states. NCAGS sup-

port and management may be employed as part of an operation to counter such threats.

Surveillance. Close liaison with the merchant shipping community will result in the collection

of vast quantities of information which, when analyzed, will assist in creating an overall picture of

commercial activity in a particular area. Military commanders have the ability to use NCAGS

resources during surveillance operations. The primary benefit is the provision of merchant shipping

information into the RMP and contributions to the intelligence picture. This includes locating and

identifying SUS, COI, and CCOI for specific surveillance operations and for multi-agency law

enforcement operations.

0305 NCAGS Procedures

The NCAGS procedures utilised in any particular operation will be determined by the require-

ments of the operation and will focus on the safety of merchant ships in the area. Details of the pro-

cedures below are in Chapter 5. They include:

a. NCAGS Area. A geographic area within which the NCAGS organisation conducts NCAGS

activities. The objective of such an area is to enable co-operation between military commanders

and merchant shipping. An NCAGS area is based on, or is the same as, the AOO. See Tool 102 in

Chapter 5.

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b. Shipping Risk Area (SRA). A geographic area of higher or specific risk to merchant ships.

Guidance will be provided to participating merchant ships to help them understand the nature and

extent of the risk in the area and, if applicable, to recommend specific routes through the area. An

NCAGS area may contain one or more SRAs. See Tool 115 in Chapter 5.

c. Communication Reporting Gates (CRGs). A CRG is established to provide a

position for merchant ships to call the NCAGSORG in order to establish initial contact or to

update previous information. A CRGshould bepositioned in such away that aminimumnotice

period of 36 hours is available to merchant ships to contact their owners/operators for onward

passage instructions before reaching the AOO/NCAGS Area/SRA. The CRG will normally be

represented as a line of latitude or longitude. For practical purposes a minimum distance of 600

nautical miles (nm) from the AOO or NCAGS Area should be observed. See Tool 103 in Chapter 5.

d. Monitoring of Merchant Ship Movements. The monitoring of merchant ship movements

is critical to the maintenance of an accurate RMP. NCAGS personnel must make every effort to

update the contact information as required by the OPTASK RMP or OPTASK COP. See Tool 109

in Chapter 5.

e. Guidance to Merchant Ships. Guidance will be provided to participating merchant ships to

help them understand the nature and extent of the risk in the area. The guidance is purely voluntary

and intended to allow merchant ships to determine their own voyage.

f. Accompaniment. NCAGS can recommend accompaniment, which is the coordinated

passage through a specific area of increased risk by one or more merchant ships in company with

military assets. Details will be promulgated via navigational warnings. Accompaniment takes

place under a voluntary arrangement and does not imply direct protection by military assets. See

Tool 118 in Chapter 5.

g. Lead-through. NCAGS can recommend and facilitate the organisation of lead-through

operations for merchant ships. See Tool 121 in Chapter 5.

h. Naval Supervision. Naval supervision is a NAC/DPC decision to place certain merchant

ships under military control in a defined AOO for a defined period of time.

The measures and procedures required to execute naval supervision in an AOO are implemented

and managed by the appointed NATO military commander in accordance with the NAC/DPC

guidance for that operation.

Merchant ships may be placed under naval supervision only by their flag state. Such ships are

required to comply with the orders of the military commander, but the Master will always retain the

responsibility for the safe navigation of the vessel. If such ships do not comply with military orders

as required by their flag state, then they are fully responsible for any consequences of such action

and will be dealt with in accordance with the laws of their flag state.

Individual ships not under naval supervision may participate in NCAGS operations when naval

supervision is in force by submitting the appropriate pro forma to the military commander.

Individual ships not under naval supervision are free to navigate through the AOO subject to any

restrictions identified in the NAC/DPC guidance for that operation.

i. Convoys. NACAGS can recommend to sail merchant ships in convoys. Convoys are only

authorised under Naval Supervision of Merchant Ships. See Tool 202 in Chapter 5.

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j. Independent. During Naval Supervision of Merchant Ships a merchant ship, not in a convoy,

will be given a Sailing Instruction (SI) as appropriate. See Tool 201 in Chapter 5.

0306 Civil-Military Interface

Information Exchange. Responsibility within each Allied government for exercising national

liaison and direction of its own merchant shipping is vested in their NSA. NSAs, including locations, are

listed in AAP 8. However, Fishing Vessels may be administered by other national authorities. When

tasked, the NCAGSORG will provide the appropriate national shipping administrations and organisa-

tions, as well as NSAs, with information on the current situation with regards to shipping. Similarly, the

IMO and PBOS will be asked to indicate to nations their contact points for NCAGS information. Informa-

tion should include what merchant ships can expect upon arrival in the operational area and how they can

contact the NCAGSORG. This information should be passed to merchant ships through their shipping

companies, in accordance with national procedures. NCAGS will also seek to liaise with civil authorities

and merchant shipping as required to meet the overall aims of the operation. Participating merchant ships,

as indicated by these organisations, will be specifically briefed and provided with guidance.

Civil Emergency Planning for Merchant Shipping. The NAC has established a number of

Planning Boards and Committees to plan for the organisation and operation of a crisis situation and for

making the best use of civil resources. The NATO SCEPC is responsible for developing and maintaining

plans for shipping, air and surface transport resources to meet military lift requirements. It is responsible

(among many others) for the PBOS and Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport (PBIST).

Dispersal And Emergency Movement of Merchant Ships. The procedures outlined are

conducted in association with national authorities Civil Emergency Plans (CEP). On these occasions all

ships, whether participating or not, will be involved. The NCAGSORG can be used to both assist and

facilitate nations’ CEPs.

a. Dispersal. Dispersal can be ordered in a port or area by military or national authorities as

dictated by the threat level. This action will be carried out by Port Authorities with possible military

assistance and is in accordance with Tool 119.

b. Emergency Movement. The purpose of emergency movement is to preserve ships and

cargoes when attack is imminent. It consists of four elements, diversion, port evacuation, area

evacuation and subsequent movements, which are all described in Tool 119. The majority of these

movements are based on national CEPs although military commanders can order any element if the

risk assessment is considered to be high.

c. Immediately Vital Cargo (IVC)

(1) Definition. A cargo already loaded, which the consignee country regards as immedi-

ately vital for the prosecution of the war or for national survival, notwithstanding the risk to the

ship. If the cargo is carried in a ship of another nation, then that nation must agree to the deliv-

ery of the cargo. The use of this term is limited to the period of implementation of the shipping

movement policy.

(2) Declaration of IVCs. National authorities must declare a ship as an IVC ship through

their NSAs. For NCAGS purposes these ships then become Designated Ships IAW article 0105.

(3) Routeing IVC Ships. National authorities should coordinate the routeing of IVC

ships with the naval commander concerned, which may be delegated to the NCAGSORG.

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0307 Crisis Response Shipping

The purpose of CRS is to augment forces in an area of risk in order to enhance military capabil-

ity. It permits a timely, tailored and reversible employment of forces that makes optimum use of

available resources. In CRS, the term RE/RE covers reinforcement, resupply and retrograde ships.

The conduct of reinforcement may require the use of a large number of merchant ships. CRS may

include government-owned vessels such as U.S. Maritime Pre-positioning Ships (MPS), as well as

strategic sealift assets, ships on military charter or Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT). The

NCAGSORG will liaise with other warfare disciplines such as surface and amphibious warfare, and

the logistics organisation to ensure that all aspects of RE/RE are considered in all levels of operations

and planning.

When RE/RE shipping is under military direction and control, very little may be required

from the NCAGSORG. However, when RE/RE is sailing independently NCAGS may provide

direct liaison with the ship concerned for advice and information, positional report for RMP

purposes, routeing advice and deployment of NCAGS LOs. NCAGS will also advise military

commanders on all merchant shipping aspects of RE/RE.

For all practical purposes, the military commander may consider RE/RE to be designated, as it

is possible that the merchant ships may not have been designated as part of the chartering process. See

Tool 120 in Chapter 5.

0308 Fishing Vessels

The presence of fishing vessels in the military commander’s AOO may complicate the tactical

situation such that the he will wish to have some degree of oversight of them. Fishing grounds and

access to them will be kept open whenever operational circumstances permit. The requirement to

deconflict military and fishing operations may have a high priority.

The SO NCAGS will provide information concerning fishing in the AOO which will include

the whereabouts of fishing grounds, numbers and types of fishing vessels, locations and type of fixed

fishing gear, and any intelligence which may indicate use of those vessels as minelayers, intelligence

gathers, etc., to the military commander. This information gathering may be delegated to the NSC or

to other NCAGS staff by the SO NCAGS.

Fishing vessels may take part in the NCAGS operation voluntarily as Participating Ships, or they

may be designated by nations in the same way as other merchant ships.

Details of Fishing Vessels in NCAGS Operations are in Annex 3E.

0309 Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System

Aim and Concept. The aim of Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System (AWNIS)

is to provide a complete navigational safety information service for allied military commands and civil

shipping during crisis or conflict. In concept, AWNIS will use those assets of military and civilian organi-

sations that have maritime safety, navigational and routeing responsibilities, and combine them into a co-

herent organisation for use by allied commanders.

Activation. The decision to activate AWNIS depends on the threat to shipping from hostile

action. As a general rule, if mine warfare (MW) forces are deployed or NCAGS is implemented, then

AWNIS should be activated. AWNIS procedures may be used in a multinational scenario, and in this

instance, the decision to activate AWNIS in a particular area or region will be made by the appropriate

national authorities and/or military commander.

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Liaison with NCAGS. AWNIS should be activated at the same time as the NCAGSORG to en-

able liaison for the maritime safety aspects of an operation to be promulgated in a timely manner. Within a

defined NCAGS area, or the AOO, the NCAGS CDR or military commander may issue AWNIS proce-

dures as appropriate.

Unclassified Messages. AWNIS uses the World Wide Navigational Warning System

(WWNWS) for disseminating unclassified navigational information to the merchant marine. Com-

manders at sea should report all matters relating to Maritime Safety Information (MSI) through their

chain of command to the relevant AWNIS authorities.

Classified Information. Military communications facilities are used for disseminating classi-

fied and/or sensitive navigational and routeing information. The maritime military commander responsi-

ble for the area concerned controls navigational safety information.

Navigational Warnings (NAVWARNs). NCAGS elements are to be included as addressees

in all appropriate navigational warnings.

MIO. NAVWARNS may be generated by AWNIS to inform merchant ships of the boarding pro-

cedures in a MIO. Liaison between the MIOC and NCAGS CDR can be further improved by nominating

safe anchorages and ports as inspection and holding areas.

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ANNEX 3A

The NATO Shipping Centre

Aim:

The aim of the NSC is to provide the military capacity that allows improved information exchange on

merchant shipping, and that facilitates increased voluntary cooperation between military commanders

and commercial shipping operators.

Mission:

a. The NSC is to collect and process merchant shipping factual and movement data, and is to

develop an accurate shipping picture of relevant merchant ships in order to support the NCAGS

CDR/military commander in the execution of his mission.

b. The NSC is to advise merchant shipping of potential risks and identify possible interference

with maritime operations.

Capability:

a. Permanently established, the NSC will provide merchant shipping information to military

commanders and the NCAGSORG.

b. The NSC is designed to provide information on two concurrent operations. In order to do so the

NSC will collect and process merchant shipping data, and develop an accurate shipping picture of

relevant merchant ships to enable the military commanders to execute their mission.

c. The NSC will be fully integrated in the headquarters command, control and communications

structure.

d. The NSC can support both Article V and non-Article V operations.

e. The NSC will exchange merchant shipping data at the unclassified level, provide access to the

database through classified and unclassified networks for authorised users and exchange data with

elements of the NCAGSORG (when activated) using the NCAGS automatic data processing

(ADP) system.

f. The NSC is designated as NATO’s point of contact for merchant shipping and institutions, such

as the NSAs, Ministries of Transport (MOTs) and other maritime authorities.

Shipping Data:

a. Information provided by the NSC on merchant ships consists of the static ship details and the

dynamic ship data that vary with the voyage. This data is normally unclassified and is accessible to

both national military and government departments of the contributing nations, either on an

unclassified website or the RMP as appropriate.

b. The commercial sensitivity of the information supplied by the merchant shipping community

will be respected and protected.

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Tasks:

When no NCAGS elements are activated, the NSC will:

(1) Collect and process merchant shipping data.

(2) Contribute to the shipping plot in the RMP if required.

(3) Advise military and civil authorities of potential risks to merchant shipping.

(4) Identify possible interference with maritime exercise areas.

(5) Maintain an internet site containing information on security related matters.

(6) Advise on augmentation and prepare for operations.

On activation of NCAGS elements the NSC will support the following tasks:

(1) Smooth transition to the development of an accurate shipping plot within the RMP.

(2) Advise authorities and companies of risks. Identify possible interference with maritime

operations and request their cooperation for the establishment of the shipping plot.

(3) Supply information on merchant shipping to military commanders and civil authorities.

(4) Maintain a database of available national and commercial information concerning mari-

time safety and security information.

(5) Provide information and warnings to merchant ships.

(6) Provide advice on shipping operations.

When an NCAGSORG is activated the NSC will concentrate on the quality of the merchant ship

data supplied, liaison with the merchant shipping community, and data exchange with participating

organisations. The NSC will operate under the control of the NCAGS CDR.

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ANNEX 3B

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for

Shipping in Crisis Response Operations

Tasks:

a. NCAGS Tasks in CRO. The focus of much effort during a CRO is on the movement of

reinforcement and resupply materials. This effort requires effective liaison with the merchant

shipping industry. The SO NCAGS on the operational staff will liaise with other staff members

regarding the effect of merchant ship activities on operational planning. In addition, this officer

would provide valuable information to the logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) movements, and

should liaise closely to support the movement of military supplies. This includes the coordination

of shipping schedules for the transportation of goods, recommendations on types and availability of

ships, as well as issues such as charter parties and traffic patterns. NCAGS tasks during a CRO in

the AOO may include the following:

(1) Provide a source of expertise regarding merchant ships and the commercial shipping in-

dustry. This includes the ability to analyze merchant ship trends and develop a risk analysis.

(2) Facilitate merchant ship movements through the AOO by briefing merchant ship masters

and port authorities, including sanitized/cleared hydrographic and pilotage updates.

(3) Monitor infrastructure in ports of interest and inform on potential problems.

(4) Deconflict merchant and naval ships through briefings to merchant ship masters.

(5) Provide advice to the Task Force/Task Group (TF/TG) commander on merchant shipping.

(6) Input data and help maintain the merchant ship component of the RMP by monitoring and

maintaining a liaison with merchant shipping within or approaching the AOO.

(7) Through liaison with intelligence staffs, evaluate information received to identify possible

COIs, SUS and CCOIs, as well as information on important cargoes or other merchant ships of

interest (such as liquefied natural gas carriers).

(8) If tasked, liaise with non-governmental organisations regarding coordination of shipping

movements.

b. Level of Support. The level of traffic, as well as the amount of information and evaluation

required to develop and maintain the RMP, will determine the number of personnel required for the

operation both at sea and ashore. The situation may call for NCAGS officers on the staff of the

operational commander and may also require the establishment of SCPs in the primary ports or at

chokepoints.

Command and Control (C2):

a. Task Organisation. The deployment of NCAGS assets within the military organisation will

be dependent on the situation that led to the establishment of the operation and will be detailed in

the appropriate mission specific OPGEN and OPTASK(s) as required.

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b. Organisation and Personnel. The actual organisation structure will be mission dependent.

NCAGS personnel can be utilised effectively at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Depending on the operation, the maritime threat, the amount of traffic and the CRS requirements, it

may be advisable to employ SO NCAGS on the intelligence and/or operational staffs, as well as

deploying one or more SCP or NCAGS units ashore. This in-port presence provides the military

commander with the capability to monitor port status and provide local liaison.

Procedures:

a. NCAGS Procedures in a CRO. The use of NCAGS procedures assists with the monitoring,

coordination and deconfliction of shipping. This will improve the military commander’s

situational awareness and permit the tracking of CRS, as well as high-value units (HVUs) and

COIs. Through liaison and contacts with the maritime industry, participating merchant ships can be

tracked either by regular provision of position and intended movement (PIM) information or

through automatic polling by electronic means.

b. Civil-Military Interface. NCAGS personnel will establish additional liaison with pilotage,

vessel traffic services, national authorities, shipping agents, and owners and operators, to obtain

information regarding commercial traffic within, and approaching the AOO.

c. National Authorities. When tasked, the NCAGSORG will provide national authorities with

information on the current situation in the AOO, including what their national merchant ships can

expect on arrival and how to contact military authorities if required. This information would be

passed to merchant ships through their shipping companies, in accordance with national

procedures.

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ANNEX 3C

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for

Shipping in Maritime Interdiction Operations

Introduction. MIOs may be conducted to enforce sanctions against a nation or nations. Under

such circumstances, elements of the NCAGSORG may be deployed to support the operation. These

personnel are integrated into the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to provide advice on commercial

maritime issues at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The use of these resources to provide ad-

vance information on merchant ships assists the MIOC in identifying SUS well in advance thereby saving

valuable time and assets that would otherwise be used to clear non-suspect ships.

Objectives. There are two primary focus areas that are provided by NCAGS support to MIO:

a. Assist with the compilation of the RMP in the AOO in order to decrease the time required to

clear or board vessels.

b. Disseminate information to the merchant shipping community regarding MIO, encouraging

merchant shipping deconfliction with the MIOC.

Tasks. NCAGS personnel carry out the following tasks:

a. Input data and help maintain the merchant ship component of the RMP by monitoring and

liaising with merchant ships within and approaching the AOO.

b. Provide updates on the movement of merchant ships in and around the AOO, including ships in

port.

c. Monitor and update over-the-horizon (OTH) tracks for merchant ships, as well as collecting

information from industry, civilian and other government sources. This provides a predictive

element to the RMP with respect to merchant ships approaching and departing the AOO.

d. Through close liaison with intelligence staffs, evaluate information received to contribute to the

process of identifying possible SUS, COI, and CCOI.

e. Through close liaison with shipping organisations, collate information including port of origin,

destination, nature of cargo, configuration, superstructure, freeboard, accessibility, number of

holds, crew complement, maximum speed and linguistic requirements for the MIOC.

f. Provide advice to the MCC and MIOC on all aspects of merchant shipping in the AOO,

including deconfliction, and maritime industry issues.

g. Inform the shipping community of military intentions when appropriate.

Level of Support. The level of traffic, as well as the amount of information and evaluation

required to develop and maintain the RMP, will determine the number of personnel required for the oper-

ation both at sea and ashore. The situation may call for NCAGS officers on the staffs of the MIOC and/or

the RMP authority. A very large AOO, with high traffic density, may require the establishment of

NCAGS units in the primary ports or at a chokepoint, particularly if the level of traffic requires daily

evaluations or pre-clearance of multiple ships. NCAGS personnel will be required to support the MIOC

with a detailed and extensive database of shipping information.

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Command and Control (C2):

a. Task Organisation. The focus of NCAGS activity will be on picture compilation, including

filtering the merchant ship element and relaying relevant data as required by the military

commander, and on the deconfliction of merchant shipping from military operations. The

deployment of NCAGS assets to the operational commander will be dependent on the situation that

led to the establishment of the operation and will be detailed in the appropriate mission specific

OPGEN and OPTASKs.

b. Organisation and Personnel. NCAGS personnel will augment the existing MIO task

organisation as part of the military commander and MIOC staffs. The organisation must be flexible

enough to react to the requirements of the situation that have triggered the MIO. The volume of

ships as well as the level of detail and evaluation required to develop and maintain the RMP, will

determine the number of personnel required for the operation.

Procedures:

a. NCAGS Procedures in MIO. In order to monitor and update the movement of all merchant

shipping in the AOO, NCAGS personnel inputting information to the RMP must obtain PIM

information to maintain a track of relevant merchant ships as required by the operational

commander. Tracks should be updated on a regular basis and at least every six hours. These

merchant ship movements are then monitored and evaluated to ensure ships follow the intended

route. Any deviations in ship movements are reported to the MIOC.

b. Civil-Military Interface. When NCAGS personnel are tasked to identify all merchant ships

approaching the AOO, standard NCAGS procedures are applied. These procedures include

establishing liaison with pilotage authorities, vessel traffic services, national authorities, shipping

agents, and owners and operators to obtain information regarding merchant ship traffic

approaching the AOO. The information required includes name, flag, IMO number, international

radio callsign, ship type, nature of cargo, last port of call, date and time of departure, estimated time

of arrival (ETA) to the AOO, next port of call and ETA, final destination and ETA, agent, present

position, course and speed, name of owner and port of registry. The MIOC also requires detailed

descriptions of these ships, including color schemes of superstructure and funnels, upright

sequence (see “Merchant Marine Identification Guide - World” issued by U.S. ONI), flag and other

characteristics to assist in visual identification by day or night, as well as to provide information for

the boarding teams.

c. National Authorities. When tasked, the NCAGSORG will provide national authorities with

information on the current situation in the AOO, including what their national merchant ships can

expect on arrival, and how and when to contact the MIOC. This information would be passed to

merchant ships through their shipping companies, in accordance with (IAW) national procedures.

d. Pre-clearance. If pre-clearance procedures are in effect, NCAGS personnel will make

arrangements for the pre-clearance of merchant ships before they arrive at the AOO. Pre-clearing

will take place at a nation’s port of departure, or at a predetermined location established by the

MIOC. Detailed descriptions of SUS/COI/CCOI would then be passed on to the MIOC to assist

with identification and verification. Mobile, shore-based teams assist with pre-clearance by

obtaining advance notification of vessel arrival or departure and cargo configuration, providing the

master with MIO checkpoint procedures and by validating documents. In addition, personnel in

ports can initiate and terminate tracks on the C2 system.

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ANNEX 3D

Recognised Maritime Picture

Purpose and Scope. This annex provides NCAGS SOs with background information on the

RMP. Its content is largely derived from existing RMP documentation, particularly EXTAC 619. Guid-

ance on submitting data to the RMP is contained in Chapter 5, Tool 109.

Definitions:

a. RMP. The RMP is a non-real time geographic presentation of processed all-source contact and

planning data, known at a given time, of surface, subsurface, amphibious and maritime air units,

forces and operations in a designated area of interest (AOI), compiled by an assigned RMP

manager. The RMP is in accordance with requirements from operational directives and tasking to

support decision makers in the conduct of C2 of maritime forces and operations. The RMP is

neither a tactical plot nor a real-time display.

b. RMP Manager. The RMP manager is a duty/responsibility of a SC assigned authority (for

example: RC, CJTF, or TF) to control the RMP management process in accordance with SC

directives. RMP managers have an overall responsibility for the RMP management process for a

dedicated AOI. To prevent circular reporting of RMP data there should only be one RMP and one

RMP manager for a specific geographic location.

c. RMP Management Process. The RMP management process is sequential, iterative and

repetitive in nature. Understanding and executing this process is the most effective means of

ensuring standardization and consistency among users involved in RMP management. This

process ensures that the data is properly entered into the RMP track database. The RMP

management process consists of four distinct elements:

(1) Direction. The SC should promulgate operational directives (OPDIR RMP) for normal

(standing) and specific situations to the assigned RMP manager. The RMP managers shall spec-

ify and tailor the SC OPDIR RMP by promulgating their OPTASK RMP and SUPPLEMENTS

as required to units and forces under NATO OPCON in their AOI.

(2) Collection. Data collection involves the accumulation of data reports from multiple

sources in a variety of message and reporting formats.

(3) Filtering. RMP managers have the responsibility and capability to suppress that infor-

mation which is not essential to immediate requirements based on specific data attributes. If

properly used, filtering can also reduce operator task loading, thus improving RMP manage-

ment without reducing the overall quality of the RMP. It is therefore essential that NCAGS SOs

work closely with RMP managers to establish the filtering criteria for merchant ships. Ideally

this should be reflected both in the OPTASK RMP as well as the OPTASK NCAGS. Points to

consider when establishing filtering criteria include:

(a) Command requirement for level of merchant ship input in AOO.

(b) Track update and deletion frequency.

1. Responsibility for filtering process.

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Flag.

Type of vessel.

Port of arrival/departure.

Intelligence requirements.

Geographical area.

(4) Data Validation. Data validation is the assessment of incoming filtered data against cri-

teria, set to improve data quality, coupled with the necessary elimination of data that deviates

from those standardized criteria (e.g., incomplete, excessively time late and unreliable data).

The validation process involves identifying data of operational interest to the RMP manager.

Originating data sources should be contacted if information submitted does not meet the valida-

tion criteria, or if additional data is required.

(5) Evaluation. Data evaluation involves assessing the reliability of the source and the

credibility of the data against the existing track database. Reports that radically alter the “known

data” on contact should be carefully scrutinized prior to assimilation into the database.

(6) Fusion. Data fusion is the process of merging evaluated and validated data into a single,

coherent picture. The data fusion process includes merging duplicate tracks.

(a) Resolving ambiguous data on single tracks.

(b) Correlation of different reports (e.g., electronic intelligence (ELINT) and acoustic

data) on a single track or identifying unknown tracks. Data fusion is performed by RMP

managers only.

RMP Data. RMP data includes geographic, contact and planning data on friendly, neutral and

adversary surface, subsurface, amphibious and maritime air forces based on information provided

from a variety of sources.

(1) Track Alert Criteria. An important way to distinguish contacts is in terms of their inter-

est and their significance to the RMP. The RMP manager is to assign the following alert-criteria

to the RMP track data.

(a) CCOI. Critical contacts of interest, also called target tracks (TGT), are designated by

the operational commanders and normally require more frequent reporting.

(b) COI. Contacts of interest, also called high interest tracks (HIT), are designated by the

operational commanders.

(e.g., identification, questioning, examination or boarding).

(d) NSP. Non-suspect tracks are tracks that were previously of interest and are no longer

of operational concern.

e. Evaluation and Validation Criteria. The standard evaluation criteria for RMP track data

are:

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(1) Area of Probability.The contact’s area of probability (AOP) expands with time based

on the associated motion model. If the AOP expands to become unusable by decision makers,

the contact should be removed from the database.

(2) Source.

(3) Confidence Level.

(4) Time Late. The difference between the time of the last contact report and current time.

Track time late is relevant in relation to track deletion criteria as specified in OPTASK RMP.

f. High Interest Track Broadcast (HIT B). The HIT B is a high speed, high frequency (HF)

transmission of selected RMP data. In order for the reception of the HIT B to be unencumbered by

emission control (EMCON) the broadcast should preferably be a super-high/ultrahigh frequency

(SHF/ UHF) satellite communications (SATCOM) transmission ashore for relay by land line to HF

re-radiating stations to units unable to receive the RMP by other means. Instructions for the type of

tracks, cycle rate and HF frequencies should be promulgated within the OPTASK RMP

supplement.

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ANNEX 3E

Fishing Vessels in NCAGS Operations

Benefits of Cooperation:

a. Many Allied as well as non-NATO fishing vessels may be operating both in and outside the

AOO. Therefore, some form of military/civilian oversight over fishing vessels, both in transit and

while actively engaged in fishing may be necessary for one or more of the following reasons:

(1) To keep fishing vessels clear of NATO military sensitive areas such as submarine operat-

ing areas and “noise sensitive” areas where towed arrays of underwater listening devices may be

employed.

(2) To avoid areas where enemy forces may be deployed, including mined areas.

(3) To maintain a plot, as far as practicable and convenient, of all fishing activity.

(4) To ensure as far as is practical, that NATO’s fishing fleets continue to provide for national

needs and with minimum disruption.

b. Benefits to the fishing community are:

(1) Ensuring uninterrupted fishing for as long as possible.

(2) Maintaining the information flow between the military and fishing authorities.

(3) Enhancing safety in transit and at fishing grounds.

(4) Limiting mutual interference between fishing and military activities.

NCAGS Policy for Fishing Vessels:

a. It is a national responsibility to determine the degree of direction and control over fishing

vessels, and the degree of access permitted to Distant Water Fishing Vessels within their national

fisheries waters or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This may be determined by complex legal

agreements or historical fishing practice within national fisheries waters.

b. States exercise fishing jurisdiction within their national fisheries waters and exercise “flag state

control” over their national flag vessels. Fishing activity is regulated by national licencing and

through access agreements with other nations. Such agreements may be ongoing and subject to

continual re-negotiation. It is essential, therefore, to maintain close cooperation between national

administrations and NATO authorities. National instructions for the control of fishing vessels

should take into account the operational requirements of the military commander. There is no legal

obligation to do so unless emergency legislation is activated.

c. Emergency legislation may result from a national initiative or, at NATO’s request through the

NAC/DPC. Flag-states should advise their vessels engaged in distant water fishing activities to

cooperate with any NATO operation.

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d. Beyond national fishery waters the degree of control over fishing vessels remains a national

function. However, military commanders may influence this level of control in the AOO via

NAC/DPC. This control is dependent upon the voluntary cooperation of fishing vessels.

e. The boundaries of national fisheries waters or EEZs are those declared or proclaimed by that

nation. These limits will be accepted by other nations as long as they reflect accepted principles of

international law and law of the sea.

National Responsibilities:

a. The authority for the control and monitoring for fishing vessel activity rests with the individual

nations. This applies to all vessels within the nation’s fisheries waters and for flagged vessels of that

nation engaged in distant waters fishing outside NATO national fishing limits. Within their

national fisheries waters, individual nations have jurisdiction over all vessels engaged in fishing,

subject to any treaty or multinational fishing access agreements.

b. Within its fisheries waters, each nation will make the necessary arrangement to:

(1) Prevent fishing in dangerous or militarily sensitive areas.

(2) Facilitate the protection of fishing vessels.

(3) Control fishing vessels within their fisheries waters.

(4) Plan to provide instructions to vessels intending to participate in Distant Waters Fishing,

in periods of crisis.

(5) Keep fishing activity clear of nominated areas in the AOO as requested by the Military

Commander.

c. National Shipping Authority. Briefing information for fishing vessels may be forwarded

via NSAs and will be consistent with military requirements.

d. NATO Jurisdiction. In the absence of national emergency legislation, NATO military

authorities have no formal jurisdiction over fishing vessels. Compliance with instructions passed

through national authorities would be expected, however, even this control could be severely

limited outside the NATO nation’s fishery limits unless nations agree to designate them.

Military Commander’s Options:

a. If a fishing vessel is taking part in an operation, the NCAGS CDR will have the ability to

influence its operations through the participation and designation categories in the NCAGSORG.

b. A fishing vessel designated by its flag-state should comply with naval orders. A

non-participating fishing vessel or a participating vessel or designated fishing vessel which is

non-compliant, may achieve SUS criteria within the RMP.

Monitoring Fishing Activity:

a. Fishing activity may be monitored. This would mainly entail information exchange between

military commanders and national fishing authorities on expected fishing vessel activity in the

AOO. If activated, this can be undertaken by the NSC, RCs’ Shipping Centres, or other elements of

the NCAGSORG as decided by the NACAGS CDR.

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b. Fishing activity and military operations can be deconflicted by seeking voluntary cooperation,

issuing relevant NAVWARNS, or issuing orders to designated fishing vessels.

Naval Supervision of Merchant Ships:

a. If a fishing vessel’s planned route is going to pass through or adjacent to declared sensitive

areas, nations should ensure that this vessel is given a briefing provided by the NCAGSORG.

Vessels may be re-routed and monitored to ensure their safe passage. Fishing vessels transitting

through the AOO may be routed by the NCAGSORG either as independents or in groups as the

operational situation and risk dictates.

b. National authorities may require that fishing activities utilize alternative fishing grounds. In this

case they will do the following:

(1) Determine the fishing requirement.

(2) Select the desired fishing area.

(3) Assign fishing vessels to the designated area and notify NATO military authorities of the

relevant details to facilitate deconfliction.

(4) Brief the responsible representative of national fishing authority on the military opera-

tional requirements.

c. As a matter of general policy, fishing grounds and access to them will be kept open whenever

operational circumstances permit. If long transit times are required, national fishing authorities

should give notice of their intentions as far in advance as is possible.

National Fishing Representative:

a. Authority:

(1) National Fishing Representatives will be nationally appointed. Since their authority de-

rives from national legislation, the exact extent of this authority may differ between countries.

However, they must be given sufficient powers over the fishing vessels and the personnel of

their own nations to be able to effectively implement the orders of the military commander con-

cerning the movement and the conduct of fishing vessels sailing in their group.

(2) When multinational fishing groups are formed, the nations concerned should make neces-

sary arrangements among themselves so that authority vested in the Representative will apply to

all vessels included in the group.

b. Duties. The National Fishing Representative will be responsible for communications with the

national authorities, relaying information to and from the fishing vessels within his group and

directing the general movements of the group. He may be required to round up stragglers, both en

route and when the group is deployed on the distant fishing ground. The navigation and handling

and fishing operations of each vessel are the responsibility of the individual master. The internal

control and organisation of the fishing groups is a matter for national arrangements.

c. Communication Facilities. National authorities must have adequate communication

facilities to enable them to communicate with fishing vessels as required by the military

commander.

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ANNEX 3F

ROUTEING

Responsibility for Establishing Routes. The military commander is responsible for estab-

lishing and maintaining a system of routes when required in an operation.

Routeing Authority. The Routeing Authority is delegated to the NCAGS CDR, but he may

also delegate this authority to select and allocate routes for a complete passage.

a. The NCAGS CDR is authorised to issue convoy routes which will include rendezvous, joiner

and leaver positions. To achieve this, close coordination with relevant military commanders for the

entire passage is required in order to provide the relevant information for promulgation.

b. The NCAGS CDR is authorised to route independents. The allocation of routes for

independents may be delegated to SCPs when all tactical information is available.

Sailing Authority. The Sailing Authority is the authority responsible for the sailing of an inde-

pendent or convoy along the prescribed routes shown below, and this can be delegated to a subordinate el-

ement. He may also be the Routeing Authority.

Routeing Systems. There are two established methods of routeing. These are:

a. Standard Route. In NCAGS, a preplanned single track, connecting positions within the main

shipping route. Standard routes must be checked at regular intervals to ensure continuing validity

for safety.

b. Latitude and Longitude. Non-predetermined routes which are issued by the Routeing

Authority as required. These are of particular use in an emergency before standard routes are

activated.

c. Promulgation of Routes. In normal circumstances the promulgation of routes would be

restricted; therefore, the Routeing Authority is responsible for seeing that all who are concerned

with the operation of a particular route hold the necessary information before the route is activated.

Standard Routes are always classified at a minimum of Restricted.

Designating a Selected Route:

a. Details of the selected route or routes must be passed by the Sailing Authority to other naval

authorities concerned and to the NCAGS authority responsible for issuing the orders and routeing

instructions to the ships being sailed.

b. When a standard routeing is to be used, this information is passed by reference to the appropriate

code name or reference number of the selected route which will be assigned by the NCAGS CDR.

c. For communication purposes, in all routeing systems, route positions are given Letter Designators

by the Sailing Authority. To increase security, different letter designators are assigned for each

sailing.

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Issuing Routeing Instructions to Merchant Ships:

a. General. With the exception of ships in ocean convoys, routeing instructions to ships always

take the form of a list of latitudes and longitudes of the route positions together with their two-letter

designators. Under no circumstance is reference to be made to code words, reference position

numbers, or route position numbers.

b. Convoys. Routeing instructions are passed only to the officer commanding (OC), the Convoy

Commodore, and the Commanding Officers (COs) of Escorts. Vice and Rear Commodores receive

copies of the route in a sealed envelope.

General Routeing Guidelines. The list below is a general guide to the “dos and don’ts” of

routeing:

Dos:

(1) All routes should be planned to provide the most economic diversion from ships’ planned

passages whilst maintning safety at all times.

(2) All routes must be checked on a navigational chart before being promulgated.

(3) Only the Routeing Authority can issue and amend routes.

(4) Waypoints must not exceed 500 nm.

(5) Routes must obey The Rules of the Road.

(6) They must take into account merchant ship handling characteristics.

(7) They must take into account meteorology, oceanography, the current tactical situation,

current and future intelligence and AWNIS input for Maritime Safety Information issues.

(8) Routes can only be uni-directional.

(9) Each uni-directional route in the standard system must bear a codename and each

waypoint given a two-letter designator.

b. Don’ts:

(1) Routes must not go over land, and this must be checked before promulgation.

(2) No NCAGS element can issue routes without approval from the Routeing Authority.

(3) Send routes by unclassified means.

(4) Issue routes without checking the current risk and tactical situation, which may require

changing the waypoints.

(5) Forget to check every part of the route for adequate water depth and tides for all ships

likely to use it.

(6) Forget merchant ships characteristics and manoeuvering capabilities.

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Letter Designators. All waypoints are allocated two-letter designators, except for the final

position, which is assigned a single letter. The following points should be noted:

a. The first letter of the two-letter designator remains the same for any particular convoy or

independent, except as explained in sub para (f) below.

b. The second letter and the final single letter are given in alphabetical sequence, starting with any

letter selected at random at the route position nearest the port of departure and continuing, in the

direction in which the convoy or independent is travelling.

c. The letters I and O are never used.

d. A two-letter route position designator assigned to a main convoy or to a coastal convoy is not to

be assigned as a designator to any of the route positions on a joiner or leaver route. Nor should the

first letter of the main or coastal convoy designator be used as the first letter of the joiner or leaver

designators.

e. The rendezvous position of an ocean joiner convoy or independent with the main convoy and the

break-off position from the main convoy of an ocean leaver convoy or independent are to be

indicated by the letter designator of the main convoy route.

f. When there are more than 24 route positions, the method of designating them must be modified.

After the entire alphabet (less I and O) has been used for the second letter, the first letter is to change

to the one following it in the alphabet, and the sequence continues. The following chart shows the

assignment of two-letter route position designators for a route with 27 possible positions,

beginning with JT:

Positio

Designato

Position

Standard Route System:

a. Establishing and Numbering of Standard Routes. In the standard route plans, which

set out the route positions of Standard Routes, the points on the track are numbered from North to

South and from East to West. Route positions must be established in sufficient numbers to ensure

that successive route positions are not more than 500 miles apart.

b. Selecting and Reporting Standard Route Positions. After considering all the factors

involved such as AWNIS information, intelligence, weather, sonar conditions and so forth, the

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Routeing Authority selects a route from those given in the predetermined plans. The Sailing

Authority (if different) may establish intermediate route positions and will assign two-letter

designators to all route positions. Geographic coordinates of any intermediate position established

together with the two-letter designators allocated to every position on the route must be reported in

the appropriate message.

- Example -

The table below shows Standard Route MAPLE. In sailing a vessel on independent passage from Liv-

erpool, GBR, to New York, USA, the Routeing Authority selects Route MAPLE, positions 1 to 12 and

sends this information in the appropriate message to the Sailing Authority.

The Sailing Authority allocates BK through W as the two-letter designators.

The routeing authority consults the predetermined routeing publication and extracts the latitudes and

longitudes for Route MAPLE, positions 1 to 12. These, together with the two-letter designators, are

then put in the SI for the vessel, as shown below, without reference to the code name for the route or

the route position numbers.

56.00 N

010.00 W

47.00 N

045.00 W

53.30 N

016.00 W

45.00 N

050.00 W

52.00 N

022.00 W

44.00 N

054.00 W

50.00 N

025.00 W

43.00 N

057.30 W

48.30 N

032.30 W

41.00 N

062.00 W

48.00 N

040.00 W

38.30 N

065.00 W

10.

Latitude and Longitude:

The Routeing Authority decides on a route from a chart, taking into account current information and

intelligence. The latitudes and longitudes of the chosen route are then passed to the Sailing Authority

in the appropriate message. The Sailing Authority assigns a two-letter designator to each latitude and

longitude and then includes them in the appropriate message.

11.

Coastal Routeing:

a. General. Although routeing in coastal waters inside the 100 metre line follows the same

general rules and employs the same methods as described above, there is seldom scope to offer

widely differing routes for coastal voyages. In consequence, routeing is normally “as safe

navigation permits” if there are no navigational dangers or minefields, or via messages

promulgated via the “Q” message system and/or Standard Routes if hazards exist.

b. Standard Coastal Routes. In addition to “Q” messages, Standard Routes for sailing coastal

shipping may be laid down by the military commander when movement of shipping is restricted

because of the presence of navigational dangers.

12.

Combined Routeing System. Routes may consist of a combination of any of the routeing

systems described in previous paragraphs.

a. The “Q” Message System. Described in AHP-1, “Q” messages promulgate classified

navigational information. Information contained in such messages that is required by merchant

ships can only be released after the serial number and the date-time group of the message has been

removed.

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b. Routeing Authorities must consult all relevant “Q” messages, including “Q” messages covering

those areas through which the route passes, when formulating a route.

13.

Terminal Area Routeing:

a. Terminal Area Routeing applies to convoys or independents from the end of the ocean transit

route to the port or anchorage of destination. These routes, which may be standard coastal routes,

“Q” routes, or specially devised routes, are classified for security purposes in the same manner as

the ocean route to which they apply.

b. Terminal Area Routeing is normally the responsibility of the Routeing Authority of the area

from which the convoy or ships sails. However, when current information of the routes from the last

position of the ocean route to the destination is not held, or is doubtful, this part of the route must be

omitted, with the NCAGS element at the destination being informed of who will assume Routeing

Authority from the last known position.

14.

Stragglers from Convoys:

a. General. Each vessel in a convoy is to be provided with a sealed envelope containing

instructions to follow in the event of them becoming a straggler as defined in ATP 2(B), Vol II.

b. Contents. The instructions to be followed by ocean stragglers are to be promulgated by the

Sailing Authority of the main convoy. As a minimum, they are to contain the route to be followed,

the communications to be kept, and whether or not a New Position Report should be made.

c. Reporting the Movements of Stragglers from Convoys. The Military Commander of

the area in which a ship is declared a straggler shall promulgate information concerning the

straggler. This will consist of the corrected position, the SOA, and revised information including

ETA, as required. This information will go to other Military Commanders concerned, the NCAGS

element at the immediate destination, ship’s NSA, and the NSA of the country in which the ship’s

final destination lies.

15.

Messages Ordering Diversions and Destination Changes:

a. General. All diversions ordered for a convoy or independent after sailing must make clear the

entire route to be followed to the immediate destination. In diverting a convoy or independent, the

NCAGS CDR on behalf of the military commander, orders the new route by a message addressed to

the OC and Convoy Commodore and by a diversion message to the master of an independently

routed ship.

b. Diversion Message. For alterations to the route of a ship or a convoy at sea, the ship or

Convoy Commodore is to be given the new route by means of a DIVERSION MESSAGE as laid

down in ATP 2(B), Vol II. The same diversion instructions must be sent to appropriate civil

authorities by the MERCO DIVERTORD message. In addition to including a new ETA, straggler’s

instructions should be included when applicable.

c. Method of Amending the Route. The DIVERSION MESSAGE and the appropriate

military messages will give a new position or positions through which the ship or convoy is

required to pass. New positions may be established by using bearings and distances from the

lettered designators allocated to the positions given in the original messages. Two-letter

designators must always be assigned to new route positions.

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16.

Corrections to Positions and ETAs. In order to assist the military commander, the NCAGS

CDR responsible for making amendments to routes and the OC, Convoy Commodore if unescorted, or the

master of an independently routed ship, will make a report when the electronic emission policy in force

permits if:

a. Ocean Passage. Because of weather or other circumstances, his actual position differs by

more than 50 miles ahead or astern, or is more than 15 miles to either side of the predetermined dead

reckoning position.

b. Coastal Passage.

(1) Once in the area if it becomes evident that the actual time of arrival will be more than 4

hours earlier, or later, than the last ETA given. The OC controlling the port of immediate desti-

nation is to be informed, and onward instructions will be issued by the Sailing Authority.

(2) As instructed by the Sailing Authority.

17.

Routeing Liabilities. Advice and routes may be given to masters provided it is made clear to

the Master that the Allied, or coalition, governments accept no liability. As far as possible, ships must be

routed clear of convoy routes and focal areas unless they are designated and are included in convoys.

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CHAPTER 4

NCAGS Communications

0401 General

NCAGS, in common with most military disciplines, relies heavily on communications to effect com-

mand and control, pass data and disseminate information. This may be made more complex by the

wide geographical dispersal of NCAGS elements and the need to utilize both military and commercial

communication channels.

0402 Military and Non-Military Communications

The aim of NCAGS Communications is to provide channels that facilitate the passing of data and dis-

semination of information among military and non-military organisations. As operations expand, the

detailed communications plan will become more complex. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 give an impression of

the overall communications relationships for peacetime and CRO, respectively.

Military

MCC/NCAGS

Regional

SCC

Organisation

Commander

Commanders

NSC

NCAGS

Organisation

SCP/NCAGS Unit

Non-military

Agencies and

Other

International

Commercial

Organisations

Government

Maritime Bodies

Organisations

National Shipping/

Port and

Merchant

Civil Maritime

Harbour Authorities

Ships

Authorities

Figure 4-1. Impression of Peacetime and Tension Communications Within the NCAGS Organisation.

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Military

MCC/NCAGS

Regional

SCC

Organisation

Commander

Commanders

NSC

NCAGS

Staff

NCAGS

Organisation

SCP/NCAGS Unit

Non-military

Agencies and

Other

International

Commercial

Organisations

Government

Maritime Bodies

Organisations

National Shipping/

Port and

Merchant

Civil Maritime

Harbour Authorities

Ships

Authorities

Coordinated information exchange between MCC/NCAGS

Commander and Non-military Agencies and Organisations

Figure 4-2. Impression of Crisis and Conflict Communications Within the NCAGS Organisation.

0403 Information Exchange Requirements

NCAGS military Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) are relatively simple in concept. These

are being met by both conventional methods and increasingly technology based solutions. Conven-

tional methods include signal messages, very high frequency (VHF) radio, fax transmissions, and se-

cure and non-secure telephone. Technology based solutions range from formal and informal emails

(the definition of formal and informal emails is under development by NATO), to data synchronization

between various information systems. The challenge is to establish connectivity with a number of

NCAGS elements distributed over a wide geographic area often in non-military locations. This requires

a flexible communications’ architecture capable of providing maximum connectivity while preserving

communications’ security. Ideally, this should involve both “push” and “pull” techniques, i.e., infor-

mation sent and information pulled by the recipients from, say, a website. Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 list

the secure and non-secure equipment and connectivity necessary to support the IERs. Table 4-3 lists

the minimum requirements for NCAGS Commanders and SCPs during operations and exercises. The

overall communications requirements will be determined through consultation with the Maritime com-

ponent communications staff officer (N-6) and will be driven by the scope and scale of the operation.

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Table 4-1. Peacetime and Tension Information Exchanges and Equipment and Connectivity Requirements

(1 of

Organisational Element Exchange

Equipment and Connectivity Requirements

Secure:

- Complete C4ISTAR systems and connectivity.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

Component Commander to NSC

- Maritime Command and Control Information System

- Tasking (criteria) for white shipping picture data.

(MCCIS).

- Forward relevant CLASSIFIED and UNCLAS information as

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

required.

Non-secure:

- Request information on known SUS/COI/CCOI.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

- Request general shipping information.

email.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing.

NSC to Component Commander

Secure:

- Input of ‘global’ white shipping data to the RMP (via SCC).

- Complete C4ISTAR systems and connectivity.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- MCCIS.

- Voice and facsimile (military).

Non-secure:

- Known SUS/COI/CCOI information.

- UNCLAS NCAGS ADP system compatible with MCCIS.

- General shipping information.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing.

SCC to NSC

Secure:

- RMP.

- Existing C4 system and connectivity.

Non-secure:

- None.

NSC To SCC

Secure:

- Input of ‘global’ white shipping data to the RMP.

- Existing C4 system and connectivity.

Non-secure:

- UNCLAS NCAGS ADP system compatible with MCCIS.

NSC to NCAGS Unit

Secure:

- Updated ‘global’ merchant ship picture.

- Complete C4 systems and connectivity.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- MCCIS.

- Voice and facsimile (military).

- Supply any additional information as required for the conduct

Non-secure:

of NCAGS unit functions.

- UNCLAS NCAGS ADP system compatible with MCCIS.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing.

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Table 4-1. Peacetime and Tension Information Exchanges and Equipment and Connectivity Requirements (2 of 2)

Organisational Element Exchange

Equipment and Connectivity Requirements

NCAGS Unit to NSC

Secure (depending on individual unit operational

requirements):

- Input local merchant ship passage data for the merchant ship

picture compilation.

- Complete C4 systems and connectivity.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- MCCIS (deployable unit if at remote location).

- Voice and facsimile (military).

Non-secure:

- Information as required on local merchant ship, port and other

relevant data.

- UNCLAS NCAGS ADP system compatible with MCCIS.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing (if facilities are available).

- Digital/video camera

NSC to Non-military Agencies and Organisations

Secure:

- Relevant information on military operations.

- None.

Non-secure:

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Requests for international or national shipping information.

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Toll-free International Maritime Satellite Organization

(INMARSAT)-C (phone, fax and data).

- Interactive web site.

Non-military Agencies and Organisations To NSC

Secure:

- Request UNCLAS military warning information.

- None.

Non-secure:

- Inform of issued international and national guidance.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- INMARSAT (ship to shore).

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Table 4-2. Crisis and Conflict Information Exchanges and Equipment and Connectivity Requirements

(1 of 4)

Organisational Element Information Exchange

Equipment and Connectivity Requirement

MCC/NCAGS CDR to Rear Staff (if established)

Secure:

- Various exchanges to coordinate NCAGS operations for both

- Complete C4 systems and connectivity.

military and non-military factors.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity

and

email.

- MCCIS.

- Voice and facsimile (military).

Non-secure:

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity

and

email.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing.

Rear Staff (if established) to MCC/NCAGS CDR

Secure:

- Various exchanges to coordinate NCAGS operations for both

- Complete C4 systems and connectivity.

military and non-military factors.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity

and

email.

- MCCIS.

- Voice and facsimile (military).

Non-secure:

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity

and

email.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing.

MCC/NCAGS CDR (and Rear Staff, if established) to NSC

Secure:

- OPTASK NCAGS.

- Complete C4ISTAR systems and connectivity.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity

and

email.

- Commander’s intentions for defined periods.

- MCCIS.

- Tasking (criteria) for white shipping picture data.

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Forward relevant CLASSIFIED and UNCLAS information as

Non-secure:

required.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity

and

- Request information on known SUS/COI/CCOI.

email.

- Request general shipping information.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing.

NSC to MCC/NCAGS CDR (and Rear Staff, if established)

Secure:

- Input of ‘global’ white shipping data to the RMP (via SCC).

- Complete C4ISTAR systems and connectivity.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity

and

email.

- MCCIS.

- Voice and facsimile (military).

- Known SUS/COI/CCOI information.

Non-secure:

- General shipping information.

- UNCLAS NCAGS ADP system compatible with MCCIS.

- Routeing planning.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing.

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Table 4-2. Crisis and Conflict Information Exchanges and Equipment and Connectivity Requirements (2 of 4)

Organisational Element Information Exchange

Equipment and Connectivity Requirement

SCC to NSC

Secure:

- RMP.

- Existing C4 system and connectivity.

Non-secure:

- None.

NSC to SCC

Secure:

- Input of ‘global’ white shipping data to the RMP.

- Existing C4 system and connectivity.

Non-secure:

- UNCLAS NCAGS ADP system compatible with MCCIS.

MCC/NCAGS CDR (and Rear Staff if established) to

Secure:

SCP/NCAGS Unit

- Complete C4 systems and connectivity.

- OPTASK NCAGS.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- MCCIS.

- Voice and facsimile (military).

Non-secure:

- Commander’s intentions for defined periods.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

- Relevant CLASSIFIED and UNCLAS information as required.

email.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing.

SCP/NCAGS Unit to MCC/NCAGS CDR (and Rear Staff, if

Secure (depending on individual unit operational

established)

requirements):

- SITREPS

- Complete C4 systems and connectivity.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- MCCIS (deployable unit if at remote location).

- Voice and facsimile (military).

Non-secure:

- Recommend local navigational warnings and routeing guidance.

- UNCLAS NCAGS ADP system compatible with MCCIS.

- Local merchant ship, port and other relevant information as

required.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing (if facilities are available).

- Digital/video camera.

MCC/NCAGS CDR (and Rear Staff, if established) to

Secure:

Non-military Agencies and Organisations

- Voice and facsimile (civilian).

- Coordinate local navigational warnings.

Non-secure:

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Liase as required to deconflict military operations in an area.

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- INMARSAT (ship to ship and ship to shore).

- Video teleconferencing.

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Table 4-2. Crisis and Conflict Information Exchanges and Equipment and Connectivity Requirements (3 of 4)

Organisational Element Information Exchange

Equipment and Connectivity Requirement

Non-military Agencies and Organisations to MCC/NCAGS

Secure:

CDR (and Rear Staff, if established)

- None.

- Issued international and national guidance.

Non-secure:

- Coordinate local navigational warnings.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Liase as required to deconflict merchant ship movements in a

military operations area.

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- INMARSAT (ship to shore).

NSC to SCP/NCAGS Unit

Secure:

- Updated ‘global’ merchant ship picture.

- Complete C4 systems and connectivity.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- MCCIS.

- Voice and facsimile (military).

- Briefing materials for master’s brief.

Non-secure:

- Forward CLASSIFIED and UNCLAS information as required.

- UNCLAS NCAGS ADP system compatible with MCCIS.

- Supply any additional information as required for the conduct of

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

SCP/NCAGS unit functions.

email.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing.

SCP/NCAGS Unit to NSC

Secure (depending on individual unit operational

requirements):

- Local merchant ship movements inputs for the merchant ship

picture.

- Complete C4 systems and connectivity.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- MCCIS (deployable unit if at remote location).

- Voice and facsimile (military).

Non-secure:

- UNCLAS NCAGS ADP system compatible with MCCIS.

- Local merchant ship, port and other relevant information as

required.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Online collaboration tool (chat).

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Video teleconferencing (if facilities are available).

- Digital/video camera.

NSC to Non-military Agencies and Organisations

Secure:

- Daily SITREP of flagged ships in the AOO.

- None.

Non-secure:

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Relevant information on military operations in an area.

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Requests for international or national shipping information.

- Toll-free INMARSAT-C (phone, fax and data).

- Interactive website.

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Table 4-2. Crisis and Conflict Information Exchanges and Equipment and Connectivity Requirements (4 of 4)

Non-military Agencies and Organisations to NSC

Secure:

- Ship information in accordance with FORMAT ALPHA.

- None.

Non-secure:

- Ship position updates.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

email.

- Issued international and national guidance.

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

- Local incident reports.

- INMARSAT (ship to shore).

Organisational Element Information Exchange

Equipment and Connectivity Requirement

SCP/NCAGS Unit to Non-military Agencies and

Secure:

Organisations

- None.

- Brief masters on risk and routes including self protection mea-

sures and lead through operations as instructed.

- Deconflict merchant ships from military operations in the AOO

Non-secure:

as instructed.

- Personal computer with Inter/Intranet connectivity and

- Issue sailing instructions as appropriate.

email.

- Organise NCAGS LO embarkation and disembarkation in

- Voice and facsimile (military and civilian).

accordance with established priorities.

- Toll-free INMARSAT-C (phone, fax and data).

- Facilitate local navigational safety.

0404 Merchant Ship Messages

Merchant messages are formatted messages. As formatted messages are designed to be generated and

processed automatically, the manual drafting is considered to be an exception. These message formats

are listed in the NATO Message Catalogue (APP-11). These messages are normally unclassified.

Its uses are also normally limited to military users and civilian shipping authorities (see diagram). It

should be kept in mind that not all civilian shipping authorities have access to the required message

handling software or the NATO Message Catalogue (APP-11). These authorities may have to be pro-

vided with an unclassified edition to ensure sufficient capability.

The types and purpose of the NCAGS MTF messages are as follows:

SAILNOTE (SAILING NOTIFICATION): The Sailing Notification is used to transmit the

movements of one or more merchant vessels.

MERSITREP (MERCHANT VESSEL SITUATION REPORT): The MERSITREP Message

is the principal means by which reports regarding Merchant Vessels are made.

MERSITSUM (MERCHANT VESSEL SITUATION SUMMARY): The MERSITSUM Mes-

sage is a specialised MERSITREP used for making multiple ship Situation Summaries.

By modifying various fields the purpose of each of the three message types can be varied, effecting a

request or change. These three messages may be amplified for specific uses through the use of “RE-

QUEST,” “CHANGE” AND “CHANGE REQUEST.”

0405 Communications Security

NCAGS elements may be tasked to arrange for the distribution of cryptographic material to merchant ships

and NCAGS staff as required. This could include secure devices to cover voice transmissions and text

messages.

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Table 4-3. Minimum Required Facilities

NCAGS CDR Staff

Equipment

Remarks

Direct access to MMHS 24/7

To send and receive military signals IAW message priority

4 x PC¹ (unclassified with access to Internet²)

NCAGS ADP + access to www/email simultaneously

1 x PC (classified)

Produce classified documents

2 x PC printer³

1 for unclassified and 1 for classified system

2 x Beamer + projection screen

To project NAMESIS plot and briefings, etc.

1 x data line with access to Internet

Minimum ISDN connection

4 x telephone (un-secure international)

1 x telefax (un-secure international)

1 x MERCS

PIA and printer if possible

Access to ship databases

In order to collect information of ships and ports

1 x set of charts

1 x navigator set

Including parallel ruler and divider

1 room

Office desks, chairs, conference table IAW manning

Publications/documents

As given in the publication/document list

SCP

Equipment

Remarks

Direct access to MMHS 24/7

To send and receive military signals IAW message priority

3 x PC⁴ (unclassified with access to Internet⁵)

NCAGS ADP + access to www/email simultaneously

1 x PC (classified)

Produce classified documents

2 x PC printer⁶

1 for unclassified and 1 for classified system

1 x Beamer + projection screen

1 x data line with access to Internet

Minimum ISDN connection

3 x telephone (un-secure international)

1 x telefax (un-secure international)

2 x MERCS

PIA and printer if possible

Access to ship databases

In order to collect information of ships and ports

Digital camera

1 x set of charts

Covering the NCAGS area

1 x navigator set

Including parallel ruler and divider

1 room

Office desks, chairs, conference table IAW manning

Publications/documents

As given in the publication/document list

¹ To be installed in local network (LAN) if possible

² All PCs to have minimum Microsoft Office 2000, Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional, Adobe Acrobat Reader,

WinZip, antivirus program and firewall (all programs in English version), and ability to burn CD-ROM

³ One colour if possible

⁴ To be installed in LAN if possible

⁵ All PCs to have minimum Microsoft Office 2000, Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional, Adobe Acrobat Reader,

WinZip, antivirus program and firewall (all programs in English version), and ability to burn CD-ROM

⁶ One colour if possible

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CHAPTER 5

Naval Cooperation and Guidance

for Shipping Toolbox

0501 Introduction

The NCAGS Toolbox comprises a series of procedures and tactics available to support maritime opera-

tional objectives. These tools may be used in combination or alone as required. The list is in no particu-

lar order of priority for implementation. The descriptions and measures within each tool are generic

and may be modified as required to meet specific mission objectives. 200 series tools are for imple-

mentation during Naval Supervision of Merchant Ships which requires NAC/DPC approval to

implement.

0502 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping 100 Series Tools

100 series measures may be implemented with the authority of military commanders. Details of the

measures are shown in Annex A to this Chapter.

Tool

100 SERIES - ANNEX A

101

Issue OPTASK NCAGS

Appendix 1: OPTASK NCAGS Layout

Appendix 2: Change Instructions for Structured Messages

102

Establish an NCAGS Area

103

Establish Communication Reporting Gates (CRG)

104

Liaise with the Merchant Shipping Community

105

Conduct Open Source Information Collection

106

Conduct Focussed Information Collection

107

Establish Communication with Merchant Ships

108

Collect Merchant Ship Information And Voyage Data

Appendix 1: Format Alfa

109

Submit Merchant Ship Data to the RMP

110

Spare

113

Assist in the Deconfliction of Merchant Ship Movements and Military Operations

112

Brief Merchant Ship Masters

113

Spare

114

Establish Shipping Cooperation Points (SCP)

115

Establish Shipping Risk Areas (SRA)

116

Deploy NCAGS Liaison Officers (NCAGS LOs)

117

Provide Merchant Ships with Sailing Instructions (SIs)

Appendix 1: Sailing Instruction Format

118

Recommend and Facilitate Accompaniment of Merchant Ships

119

Facilitate Dispersal and Emergency Movement

120

Provide NCAGS Services to Crisis Response Shipping (CRS)

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121

Recommend and Facilitate Lead-through

122

Generate Routes for NCAGS Purposes

123

Produce Navigational Safety Warnings using WWNWS or AWNIS

0503 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping 200 Series Tools

After approval of Naval Supervision of Merchant Ships, by the NAC/DPC, the following tools are

available to the military commander.

Tool

200 SERIES - ANNEX B

201

Mandatory Routeing for Merchant Ships

202

Conduct Convoy Operations

Appendix 1 — Stationing Criteria for Ships in Convoy Formations

Appendix 2 — Joiner Instructions

Appendix 3 — Arrangement for Late Availability

Appendix 4 — Leaver Instructions

Appendix 5 — Straggler Instructions

Appendix 6 — Convoy Communications Instructions and Emission Control

Appendix 7 — Sailing Order Convoys

Appendix 8 — Pre-Sail Briefing

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ANNEX 5A

100 Series Naval Cooperation and

Guidance for Shipping Tools

101 Issue OPTASK Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Merchant Shipping

References:

a. OPGEN/OPDIRs.

b. OPLAN/OPORD.

c. ASSESSREPS, INTREPS, NAVSITSUMS, MARINTSUMS, Direction and Guidance signals.

d. APP 11.

Purpose. The purpose of the OPTASK NCAGS is to enable the NCAGS CDR to promulgate de-

tailed tasking and instructions for all aspects of NCAGS operations. The message should be promulgated

by the NCAGS CDR and should be sent to all units and commands, which will be involved in, or affected

by, NCAGS operations in the declared area.

The OPTASK contains the terms of reference for the various elements of the NCAGSORG. Care-

ful drafting is therefore essential if the NCAGSORG is to function effectively. The OPTASK must be

written in such a way that military commanders have a full understanding of the NCAGS contribution to

the mission.

Tasks. The OPTASK NCAGS should follow the criteria below:

a. Generate and maintain the initial OPTASK for the operation which should contain as much

tasking as possible for the day-to-day running of the NCAGSORG and supporting organisations

such as the NSC.

b. Provide the outline of the current operation from the NCAGS perspective.

c. Provide for the execution of NCAGS operations.

d. Allocate duties and responsibilities to the NCAGSORG.

e. Define supporting and supported roles.

f. Advise military commanders of specific NCAGS related issues and policies with regard to

merchant shipping.

Implementation:

a. The OPTASK NCAGS must be consistent with the OPTASK messages of other warfare

disciplines and should take into account relevant OPDIRs, OPGENs and other warfare

management messages.

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b. Only unique NCAGS communications information should be in OPTASK NCAGS. All other

communications details will be in accordance with OPTASK Communications or any automatic

data processing (ADP) standing operation instructions.

c. Changes and amendments to the OPTASK NCAGS must be in accordance with Appendix 2.

d. Create new OPTASK NCAGS for major developments of the operational situation, such as:

(1) Embargo operations.

(2) Accompaniment operations.

(3) Lead-through operations.

(4) Non-combatant evacuation operations.

(5) Convoying.

e. An example of the OPTASK NCAGS is contained in Appendix 1.

f. OPTASKs classified above RESTRICTED increase communications complexity, and elements

of the NCAGSORG may have difficulty in receiving this signal.

5A-2

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APPENDIX 1 TO TOOL 101

OPTASK NCAGS

Brief Summary of Section Titles.

Reference

Shipping Cooperation Point

Period

NCAGS Unit

Mission—NCAGS CDR Mission

Routeing Policy

Conduct of Operations

Protection Policy

General Situation

Evasion Instructions

NCAGSORG

Diversion Instructions

NCAGS Area

NCAGS Communications

Shipping Risk Area

Emission Control Plans

SRA Threats

AWNIS

NCAGS Commanders Duties

Reporting Instructions

Supporting Commanders Duties

Special Instructions

Unit Duties

Special Information

Shipping Cooperation Point Duties

Acknowledge

C10

Escort Commanders Duties

NCAGS Liaison

OPTASK NCAGS MESSAGE STRUCTURE

ORIGINATOR:

NCAGS commander.

ADDRESSEES:

All units and commands that will be involved or affected by

NCAGS operations in the area.

CLASSIFICATION:

As appropriate, does not require an end of set marker (//).

Unclassified, unless higher classification is

-Example- NATO UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT INDICATOR CODE: The SIC line does not require an end of set marker (//). The

example shows an EXER/OPER SIC plus LKC and LRD.

-Example- SIC ALC / LKC / LRD

SPARE LINE FOR CODE

If exercise or operation code names are desirable for specific

WORD(S):

identification, they shall be inserted in the line prior to the

message ID line using EXER/ or OPER/.

-Example- EXER/BRIGHT FUTURE 02

5A-3

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-Example-

MSGID/OPTASK NCAGS/CTF 902/001/APR

REF

Reference given in the following sequence:

(1) Alphabetic designator.

(2) Reference identification.

Note: Reference is mandatory if the message is a change to a

previous OPTASK NCAGS.

-Example-

A1/REF/A/ATP 2(B)VOL I

/B/CTF 902 OPGEN001/APR

/C/AAP8(NAVY)(AIR)

PERIOD

Period covered by the message (Time ZULU).

DTG to DTG . If end time not known use UFN (Until Further Notice)

-Example-

A2/PERIOD/280800Z OCT-UFN

MISSION

NCAGS CDR mission.

-Example-

B1/MISSION/

(Free text as required).

CONDUCT

Conduct of Operations. NCAGS CDR general instructions

-Example-

B2/CONDUCT/

(Free text as required).

GENSIT

General Situation. A brief description of overall assessment of

own and possible opposing forces (POF) as they affect mercantile

and crisis response shipping (CRS).

-Example-

C1/GENSIT/1/POF INCREASE IN NAVAL ACTIVITY.

NATO SHIPPING HAS BEEN CONSIGNED TO ASSIST

GREYLAND.

C1/GENSIT/2/SHIPPING UNHINDERED ON

TRADITIONAL TRADE ROUTES. IF SITUATION

DETERIORATES ELEMENTS OF TG 902.04 WILL BE

MADE AVAILABLE TO ESCORT CRS.

NCAGSORG

NCAGS Organisation. Details of the NCAGS organisation

including the allocation of NCAGS coordination teams, NCAGS

units and the role of the ashore and afloat NCAGS staff.

-Example-

C2/NCAGSORG/1/CTF 902 EMBARKED IN USS

MOUNT WHITNEY IS NCAGS CDR

C2/NCAGSORG/2/SCPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN

BREST AND CADIZ

NCAGSAREA

NCAGS Area. Name / coordinates of the NCAGS area(s).

-Example-

C3/NCAGSAREA 01/4100N 00500E - 3649N 00500E -

EASTWARDS ALONG COASTLINE TO 02400E, THENCE

NORTH TO 3520N 02400E THEN NORTHWEST TO 3755N

01600E ALONG THE COAST TO 4100N AND WEST TO

4100N 00500E

SRA

Shipping Risk Area (SRA). Number/coordinates of SRA(s).

-Example-

C4/SRA/1/4100.0N-00530.0E/4100.0N-

00820.0E/4030.0N-00530.0E/4030.0N-00820.0E

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SRATHREAT

Shipping Risk Area Threat. Number of SRA(s) and summary of

threats.

-Example-

C5/SRATHREAT/SRA1/ASW THREAT CONSIDERED HIGH.

NCAGSCDRDUTY

NCAGS Commanders Duties. List all the duties and tasks of the

NCAGS commanders, plus other NCAGS tasks.

-Example-

C6/NCAGSCDRDUTY/1/IMPLEMENT NCAGS

PROCEDURES IN NCAGS AREA

C6/NCAGSCDRDUTY/2/PROMULGATE ROUTEING DIRECTIVE

C6/NCAGSCDRDUTY/3/PROMULGATE DIVERSION ORDERS

SUPPCOMDUTY

Supporting Commands Duties.

List the duties and tasks of a command that is providing support

to the NCAGS Commanders (e.g., NATO Shipping Centre).

-Example-

C7/SUPPCOMDUTY/1/ NSC IS TO PROVIDE LIAISON

FOR NSAS ON A DAILY BASIS.

C7/SUPPCOMDUTY/2/MCC NORTHWOOD TO INFORM

CTF 902 ABOUT ……….

UNITDUTY

Unit Duties. List the duties, tasks and authority delegated by the

NCAGS CDR to NCAGS Units.

-Example-

C8/UNITDUTY/1/GATHER LOCAL MERCHANT

SHIPPING INFORMATION

C8/UNITDUTY/2/PROVIDE GUIDANCE AND ADVICE

TO MERCHANT SHIPS

SCPDUTY

SCP Duties. List the duties, tasks and authority delegated by the

NCAGS CDR to SCPs.

-Example-

C9/SCPDUTY/1/SAIL CRISIS RESPONSE SHIPPING

AS DIRECTED BY NCAGS CDR

C9/SCPDUTY/2/BRIEF MASTERS PRIOR TO

ENTERING SRA

C10

ESCORTDUTY

Escort Commanders Duties. Details of instructions that have

been given to the escort commander. Detail the relationship and

authority the escort commander has over accompanied ships,

convoys and convoy commodores (for example evasive

steering).

-Example-

C10/ESCORT DUTY/1/ESCORTS WILL PROVIDE AREA

ASW PROTECTION WITHIN SRA

C10/ESCORTDUTY/2/ESCORTS MUST INFORM SHIPS

ABOUT EMERGENCY TURNS UPON GAINING SONAR

CONTACT

NCAGSLIAIS

NCAGS Liaison. Details of how the NCAGS commander will

liase with superior authorities, NSAs and other commands (i.e.,

Military Sealift Command).

-Example-

D1/NCAGSLIAIS/1/CTF 902 WILL LIAISE WITH MCC

AND PROVIDE A SITREP AT 2000Z OF ALL NATO

MERCHANT SHIPS APPROACHING THE NCAGS AREA.

D1/NCAGSLIAIS/2/DIRLAUTH NCAGSCDR- MSCLANT

FOR CONTROL OF MSC CRS SHIPS.

5A-5

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

SCP

Shipping Cooperation Point. Information about SCPs given in

the following sequence (separate paragraph for each SCP):

(1) Title.

(2) DTG when operational.

(3) Location/position.

(4) SCP area of responsibility.

(5) Actual manning.

(6) SMA/callsign and routeing indicator (if any).

(7) Communications guarded.

(8) Telephone/fax/SATCOM numbers/e-mail address.

(9) R/V position(s).

(10) Calling and reporting protocols.

(11) Associated anchorages.

(12) Port code.

(13) Remarks.

-Example-

E1/SCP/1/(1) HNLMS ZUIDERKRUIS

(2) 200800Z1 OCT-UFN

(3) OFF CAPE FINISTERRE

(4) SCP AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

(5) 1 OIC, 6 STAFF

(6) SCP ZUIDERKRUIS;CS PAOZ; RNFLXX

(7) VHF 16-8-6

(8) INMARSAT 8998898, EMAIL (ALL LOWER

CASE)

ZUIDERKRUIS@MODNL.NAVY.ORG

(9)270 CAP FINISTERRE 16NM

(10) -

(11) -

(12) -

(13) FOUR NCAGS LOs EMBARKED

E1/SCP/2/(1)SCP CADIZ

(2) 200800Z1 OCT-UFN

(3) CADIZ, SPAIN

(4) SCP AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

(5) 1 OIC, 18 OFF, 12 RATINGS

(6) SCP CADIZ

(7) VHF 16 - 77

(8) PHONE-FAX 0046-12345678

(9) -

(10) -

(11) OFF CADIZ ROADS

(12) CAD

(13) NOT FITTED WITH CRYPTO EQUIPMENT

NCAGS UNIT

NCAGS Unit. Information about NCAGS units given in the

following sequence (separate paragraph for each NCAGS unit):

(1) Title.

(2) DTG when operational.

(3) Location/position.

(4) Unit area of responsibility.

(5) Actual manning.

5A-6

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

(6) SMA/callsign and routeing indicator (if any).

(7) Communications guarded.

(8) Telephone/fax/SATCOM numbers/e-mail address.

(9) R/V position(s).

(10) Calling and reporting protocols.

(11) Associated anchorages.

(12) Port code.

(13) Remarks

-Example-

E2/NCAGS UNIT/1/(1)USS CHAFEE

(2)DTG WHEN OPERATIONAL

(3)ETC.

E2/NCAGS UNIT/2/(1) NCAGS DET 102

(2)DTG WHEN OPERATIONAL

(3)ETC.

Routeing Policy. State the routeing policy.

ROUTEPOL

-Example-

F1/ROUTEPOL/1/NCAGSCDR WILL BE THE ROUTEING

AUTHORITY AND WILL STATE ANY SRA ROUTES TO BE

IMPLEMENTED.

F1/ROUTEPOL/2/NCAGSCDR WILL ROUTE SHIPS THROUGH

THE NCAGS AREA VIA THE NORMAL TRADING ROUTES.

PROTECT

Policy for the Protection of Shipping. Details of types of

shipping, by category (crisis response shipping and other entitled

shipping) and speed, which are to be protected, whether

accompaniment or convoy will be used. The level of protection

which is desired or must be provided. Embarkation of NCAGS

LOs.

-Example-

F2/PROTECT/1/ALL CRISIS RESPONSE SHIPPING

WILL BE ESCORTED WHILE IN SRA. MERCHANT SHIPS

ARE TO BE ESCORTED WHEN POSSIBLE, WHEN

WITHIN THE NCAGS AREA.

F2/PROTECT/2/PROTECTION LEVELS WILL BE

SIGNALED BY CTF 301.4

EVASION

Evasion Instructions. Details of who can authorise evasion.

Reactions to be taken to specific threats and which zigzag plans

may be employed.

-Example-

G1/EVASION/ESCORT CDR. ZIGZAG PLANS 6 OR 10

MAY BE ORDERED. FOR ASW THREAT CRS SHIPS

WILL BE ORDERED TO EXECUTE EMERGENCY TURNS.

DIVERSION

Diversion Instructions. Details of which commands can authorise

diversion and the authority they have over various types of shipping.

-Example-

G2/DIVERSION/ESCORT CDR CAN AUTHORISE

TACTICAL DIVERSIONS FOR PARTICPATING SHIPS

NCAGSCOMMS

NCAGS Communications

Amplify or supplement details in OPTASK COMMS. Details

telephone, fax and mail lines, SMAs as well as radio communications

if not in OPTASK COMMS. Details of MERCS if used.

5A-7

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

-Example-

H1/NCAGSCOMMS/1/COMMS BETWEEN NCAGSORG, CTF

902 AND TGS WILL BE VIA EMAIL, PHONE, FAX

/2/MERSHIPS WILL USE THEIR IRCS FOR

COMMERCIAL SHIP TO SHORE COMMUNICATIONS

/3/NSC NORTHWOOD RI RXDBON

EMCON

Emission Control Plans for Shipping Operation. Details of EMCON

plans and their applicability by ship type. EMCON plan should be

co-

ordinated with EMCON plan of other forces operating within the

operating area/NCAGS area. Use grid in ATP 2(B), Vol. II and

amplify as required.

-Example-

I1/EMCON/1/VHF(SHIP/SHORE) - U 2/HF

(SHIP/SHIP) - S

AWNIS

Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System. Details

of any AWNIS activation and C3 used.

-Example-

J1/AWNIS/AWNIS WILL BE ACTIVATED FROM

190800Z8 CTF 301 WILL BE THE AREA AND

SUB-AREA ORIGINATING AUTHORITY

REPINST

Reporting Instructions. Instructions for any special reporting

requirements and requests. Including reporting requirements

from SCPs .

-Example-

X1/REPINST/SCPS TO REPORT DAILY BY EMAIL TO

CTF, INFO NSC AND REARLINK AT 0500Z AND

1700Z

SPECINST

Special Instructions. As necessary which do not lie in any

other segment.

-Example-

Y1/SPECINST/1/NSC WILL ISSUE SOI BY 181800Z OCT

Y1/SPECINST/2/FIR TO BE SUBMITTED TO CTF 902

BY ENDEX

SPECINFO

Special Information. As necessary which do not lie in any

other segment.

-Example-

Y2/SPECINFO/

(free

text as required)

ACKNLDGE

Acknowledge. Addressees required to acknowledge.

-Example-

Z1/ACKNLDGE/CINCEASTLANT/CTF 902

5A-8

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

APPENDIX 2 TO TOOL 101

Change Instructions for

Structured Messages

Previously promulgated messages are modified in the course of an operation as follows:

1. By changes to promulgated messages. This method has the advantage of allowing separation to some

degree of perishable and non-perishable information, thus reducing repetition of the same text in subse-

quent messages. It is described below:

a. Changes are identified by MSGID followed by the title of the message being changed, followed

by “CHANGE”, followed by a three-figure number indicating the change serial, followed by the

effective DTG of the change, with each separated by a slant. The complete message identifier is not

given because, as explained in section A1 of each message structure, referencing the message to be

changed is mandatory.

- Example -

MSGID/OPTASK AAW/CHANGE/003/021200Z5

b. To delete a section in an existing message, the appropriate section alphanumeric identifier is

listed, followed by “DELETE”.

E3/DELETE

c. To add a new section to an existing message, its complete text, including the alphanumeric

identifier and self-explanatory abbreviations, is inserted.

d. For major amendments to a section in an existing message, the complete section, including the

alphanumeric identifier, self-explanatory abbreviation, and revised text, are inserted. For minor

amendments the alphanumeric identifier, self-explanatory abbreviations and directions for the

amendment only are necessary.

e. The order of the contents of a change message is to conform to the structure sequence of the

message to be changed.

2. By promulgation of the replacement message under the next sequential serial number. This message

will automatically supersede its predecessor at the first time listed in section A2 of the replacement

message.

5A-9

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

102 Establish a Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Area

References.

Purpose. In order to meet the military requirement to manage risk in the AOO and to gain the

cooperation of merchant ships transiting it, the area within which NCAGS procedures have been imple-

mented must be clearly defined and promulgated. In most cases this area will coincide with the estab-

lished AOO. Careful attention must be paid when defining the area to ensure that it is large enough to

ensure safe and effective military operations free of interference from merchant shipping, provide safe

passage for merchant ships, and ensure that once established, the minimum of changes will be required to

it, while ensuring that the area is not so large that it is unmanageable.

NOTE: NCAGS area —An area within which NCAGS procedures have been implemented. An

NCAGS area is based on, or is the same as, the AOO.

Tasks. To establish an NCAGS area, the following considerations should be taken into account:

a. Simplicity in Plotting. The aim must be to allow the area to be easily plotted by merchant

ships.

b. Keep the Area to a Modest Size. The declaration of such an area may cause rises in

insurance rates. If the area is limited to waters in which there is actual threat to shipping, either from

enemy action or interference with military operations, mariners may choose to avoid the area

completely. However, careful thought should also be given to the size to avoid frequent changes.

c. Promulgation to merchant shipping should contain both the boundaries of the area and reason

for establishing the area. The document promulgating the NCAGS area should contain details of

how to contact the NCAGSORG for guidance.

d. Whenever possible, promulgation should be in advance of activation to allow both military

authorities and merchant shipping to make preparations.

e. Care must be taken when promulgating an area to ensure that full explanation is given in order

not to have any actions misinterpreted, thus unintentionally increasing concern in the shipping

industry.

Implementation:

a. Manning. The establishment of an area for NCAGS will usually require the appointment of a

NCAGS CDR and staff. The function of the NCAGS CDR may be assigned to the MCC.

b. Equipment. N/A

c. Communications. It is important to remember the requirement to communicate with merchant

ships at sea.

d. Related Tools.

5A-10

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

103 Establish Communication Reporting Gates

References:

a. OPTASK NCAGS.

b. OPTASK RMP.

c. Other OPTASKS as required.

Purpose. A CRG is established to provide a position for merchant ships to call the NCAGSORG

in order to establish initial contact or to update previous information.

Tasks:

a. Select the CRG, using a time or location that will provide the NCAGS personnel with sufficient

lead- time to prepare information relevant to the merchant ship. A CRG should be positioned so that

a minimum notice period of

hours is available to merchant ships to contact their

owners/operators for onward passage instructions before reaching the AOO/NCAGS area/SRA.

The CRG will normally be represented as lines of latitude or longitude which encompass the area

concerned. For practical purposes a minimum distance of 600 nautical miles (nm) from the AOO

should be observed.

b. The reporting criteria must be tailored to meet the mission requirements. Ships will be asked to

provide a Format Alfa or another requested form of report.

c. Promulgate the CRG location and the reporting requirements to both the military and merchant

shipping communities. Promulgation can be achieved through a variety of means, such as through

the NSC, NSA advisories, or a Notice To Mariners (NOTMARs). Instructions should contain

details of the information required in the report, the occasions of reporting, and to whom the report

is to be sent.

d. Provide the merchant ship PIM information to RMP manager via OTHT Form Gold formatted

messages or by appropriate alternate means. It is essential that this information be forwarded in a

timely manner.

e. Store all reports in a ship information database that can readily be accessed for further analysis.

Implementation:

a. Organisation and Manning. The establishment of a CRG may require additional personnel

to deal with the increase in communications if traffic levels are high.

b. Equipment. Database.

c. Communications. Communications requirements for supporting a CRG will be

predominantly commercial in nature and will use GMDSS. Means to effectively communicate with

both military and merchant ships include facsimile message, telephone, VHF, email, etc.

d. Related Tools. 101, 102, 104, 106, 107, 108, 111, 112, 115, 120.

5A-11

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

104 Liaise with the Merchant Shipping Community

References:

a. MC 376/1.

b. OPTASK NCAGS.

Purpose. Enhance and make maximum use of cooperation between naval and civilian maritime

communities. The cooperation and information exchange is vital in order to avoid disruption of the flow

of shipping.

Tasks:

a. Develop, foster and maintain a collaborative working relationship with the merchant shipping

community to enable rapid collection and dissemination of vital information through information

networks and open sources (i.e., Internet, shipping databases (e.g., Lloyds Register-Fairplay),

shipping companies, etc.).

b. Develop and maintain a collaborative working relationship with commercial trade and

insurance organisations that support merchant shipping and to improve data collection.

c. Develop and maintain a collaborative working relationship with governments and military

sources to enable rapid collection and dissemination of vital information and data.

Implementation:

a. Manning. NCAGS personnel are required to establish this liaison in advance of and in the

early stages of an operation. Numbers will be dependent on the sources to be contacted.

b. Equipment. N/A.

c. Communications. Facilities to use both civil and military lines of communications.

d. Related Tools. 101, 103, 105, 106, 107, 111, 112, 113, 119.

5A-12

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

105 Conduct Open Source Information Collection

References: OPTASK NCAGS, OPTASK INT, OPGEN, OPORDs and other directives.

Purpose. To collect information on merchant shipping by researching and data mining open

sources. This will provide generic and background information, particularly in the early stages of an

operation.

Tasks:

a. The SO NCAGS identifies the information to be gathered based on the military commander’s

stated requirements.

b. Mine open sources including:

(1) Classification society information (e.g., Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay).

(2) National information sources (e.g., NSAs, shipping centres and other government

departments).

(3) Internet maritime websites and links.

(4) NATO Shipping Centre (NSC).

(5) Media (e.g., company schedules, Journal of Commerce).

(6) Maritime industry magazines and databases (e.g., Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay, Maritime

Reporter)

c. Process information gathered from sources to produce a fused, accurate and relevant data output

that meets the commander’s stated requirements.

d. Disseminate this information to appropriate military authorities using the specified

communication and information systems.

Implementation:

a. Manning. SO NCAGS and additional staffs will be dependent on the situation.

b. Equipment. Will be governed by the scope and scale of the requirements but will include as

minimum a personal computer (PC) with Internet access, email and active user licenses for open

source databases (as needed).

c. Communications. Requirements will be determined through consultation with N-6 prior to

the start of an operation.

d. Connectivity. Internet.

e. Related Tools. 101, 104, 106, 109.

5A-13

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

106 Conduct Focussed Information Collection

References. OPTASK NCAGS, OPTASK INT, OPGEN, OPORDs and other directives.

Purpose. To collect information on merchant shipping by using NCAGS personnel and other

assets in theatre. This will provide focussed and specific information that augments open source collec-

tion. Focussed collection of information will be activated when the situation requires interaction with the

shipping community.

Tasks:

a. The SO NCAGS identifies the information requirements based on the military commander’s

stated requirements.

b. The SO NCAGS will liaise with the intelligence staff to determine information collection

requirements and priorities.

c. NCAGS personnel will gather information by:

(1) Observing activities in ports, anchorages and on board merchant ships.

(2) Contacting local shipping companies, ship owners, ship operators, ship agents, and ship

masters for information regarding their ships.

(3) Contacting local shipping authorities, such as vessel traffic services, coast guard, port po-

lice, pilots and harbour masters.

(4) Receiving information from merchant ships.

(5) Monitor infrastructure in ports of interest and inform on potential problems.

d. Photograph ships and merchant facilities if permitted by local authorities.

e. Disseminate this information to appropriate military authorities using the specified communication

and information systems.

Implementation:

a. Manning. SO NCAGS and additional staffs will be dependent on the situation.

b. Equipment. Digital/video camera and a PC with Internet access and email.

c. Communications. Requirements will be determined through consultation with N-6 prior to

the start of an operation.

d. Related Tools. 101, 104, 105, 109.

5A-14

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

107

Establish Communication with Merchant Ships

References:

a. OPTASK NCAGS, OPTASK COMMS.

b. NAVWARNS.

c. A Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) Handbook.

Purpose:

a. To provide merchant ships with directions for contacting the NCAGSORG.

b. To provide information of interest to shipping.

c. To collect standardised data on ships for the RMP and the NCAGS database.

If the NSC is activated, contact with merchant ships could be centralised through them. However,

NCAGS Units and SCPs will need to contact ships directly and the details below may apply. The

method of contacting merchant ships is to use the GMDSS, which is part of the Safety of Life at Sea

(SOLAS) Convention.

Although mainly designed for safety at sea, the system is used for commercial communications. It

is a combination of terrestrial and satellite communications systems. The system is only mandatory

for vessels over 300 GT.

Under GMDSS, although encouraged to do so, nations do not have to apply GMDSS to the

following types of ships:

(1) Fishing vessels.

(2) Warships.

(3) Pleasure yachts not engaged in trade.

(4) Wooden ships of a primitive build.

(5) Sailing vessels.

Tasks:

a. Identify ships that need to be contacted.

b. Obtain Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI), Station (ship) identifiers and/or any official

ship’s contact numbers (mobile, private communications companies subscribed to). MMSIs and

station identifiers can be obtained from directory enquiries, INMARSAT Internet site, a GMDSS

handbook, owners, operators or port authorities as well the ship itself.

c. Provide suitable equipment to be available which has capability for transmit and receive, fax,

email, TELEX and voice communications.

d. Arrange a toll free line to encourage merchant ships to contact the NCAGSORG.

5A-15

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

e. Inform the shipping community of communications details to allow them to contact military

sources. This can be via the NSC website, NAVWARNS, or by contacting NSA’s Civil Maritime

Authorities (CMA), PBOS and IMO.

Types of communication:

(1) NAVTEX (transmission only, must be only a few words describing how to contact the

NCAGSORG and why). NAVTEX is not worldwide and therefore it is necessary to check

whether a ship can receive NAVTEX; details are in GMDSS handbooks.

(2) Enhanced Group Call

(EGC) (FLEETNET only — transmission only and will require

IMO assistance to establish). INMARSAT A, B and C only.

(3) Telex number — direct contact between ship and NCAGS authority. Telex can be sent to

all INMARSAT receivers.

(4) Toll-free telephone/telex number — direct contact between ship and NCAGSORG. Telex

can be received on any INMARSAT receiver. Voice is not availabe on INMARSAT C. For

ships working in GMDSS Sea Areas 1 and 2, use the ship’s MMSI on digital selective calling

(DSC).

(5) Fax number —range toll-free, direct contact between ship and NCAGSORG. Fax can only

be sent on INMARSAT A, B or M.

(6) Internet website — interactive. Unlikely to be read on ships but owners/operators may for-

ward on intranet site if requested.

(7) E-mail address of ship — it would be unusual to be able to directly email a ship unless you

are a subscriber to their private server. You will need to contact owners/operators to establish

the most efficient way of emailing a ship. An alternative is to email the Land Earth Station (LES)

the ship is subscribing to and request they forward the e-mail by telex via INMARSAT.

Implementation:

a. Manning. NCAGS elements will be nominated to be responsible for maintaining contact with

ships on approach to and transiting the AOO/NCAGS area. Whatever element is nominated must

be sufficiently manned with personnel and equipment to enable communication with the expected

traffic volume expected.

b. Equipment. Access to a PC, telephone, fax or telex will be essential. If an NCAGS element is

afloat, access to a full range of GMDSS equipment will be required.

c. Communications. Internet and e-mail account.

d. Related Tools. Unlike most other tools this one has a relationship with most of the toolbox.

5A-16

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

108 Collect Merchant Ship Information and Voyage Data

References: OPTASK NCAGS, NAVWARN, commercial databases.

Purpose. To collect information on merchant ships in the AOO through submission of a Format

Alfa and subsequent position reports.

Considerations. As a general rule the Format Alfa should be kept as short as possible and be

limited to the information determined essential. This can be achieved through a variety of means, such as

through the NSC, NSA advisories, or a Notice To Mariners. Normally the data in bold in Appendix 1 of

this tool will suffice. Cargo data requirements must be tailored iaw mission requirements. Cargo data

should not normally be requested for exercises.

Tasks:

a. Determine the ship information and voyage data required to support the operation.

b. Issue a NAVWARN requesting merchant ships approaching the NCAGS area/AOO to submit

Format Alfa and subsequent position reports. Instructions should contain details of the information

required in the report, the occasion for reporting, and to whom and how the report is to be sent.

c. Submit merchant ship data to the RMP in accordance with Tool 109.

d. Store all Format Alfa information in a database for further analysis.

e. If required give advice/guidance to the ship as determined by the situation.

Implementation:

a. Organisation and Manning. Additional personnel will be required to manipulate the data

submitted in the Format Alfa if traffic levels are high.

b. Equipment. Computer with database/telex/telephone.

c. Communications. Communications requirements will be predominantly commercial in

nature. Means to effectively communicate with merchant ships equipped with GMDSS.

d. Connectivity. Functional GMDSS.

e. Related Tools. 101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 109, 112, 114.

5A-17

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP 2(B), VOL. I

APPENDIX 1 TO TOOL 108

Format Alfa

The Format Alfa is a principal means by which NATO gathers data regarding shipping. The form

is divided into four sections:

a. Section A covers basic details of the vessel.

b. Section B covers details of the current voyage.

c. Section C covers details of the ship’s operator.

d. Section D covers cargo data.

Date and Time. Should be entered either by the date followed by a four digit time (18 Oct 97

21.00 UTC) or a Date Time Group.

Date Time Group (DTG). The NATO method of expressing time and date is contained within

the DTG and is written in the following manner: DDHHMMMonthYY; therefore, the DTG

182100JUL03Z describes a time of 21:00 (GMT / UTC) on the 18

July

2003. NATO units routinely de-

scribe GMT / UTC as time zone “Zulu” abbreviated to “Z”.

a. Section A — Ship Data:

(1) Ship’s name.

(2) International callsign.

(3) Type of vessel.

(4) Flag of registry.

(5) IMO number.

(6) Port of registry.

(7) Overall length.

(8) Vessel’s width.

(9) Maximum draft for present voyage.

(10) Vessel’s gross tonnage.

(11) Speed:

(a) Service speed.

(b) Maximum speed.

5A-18

CHANGE

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

NATO ANTI–PIRACY MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE (2008) - page 1