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information and briefed prior to boarding operations for contingency where non-secure

communications are required.

Log Entries. The BO may be required to make log entries in the vessel’s deck log. The following

formats are examples of log entries on the suspect vessel, depending on the appropriate status:

Log Entry for a Cleared Ship:

The _____________________ (given name, nationality, and class of ship (e.g., steamer or sail-

ing ship) was visited by me at _________________ (hour and date). I have examined the papers

produced by the master concerning the ship and its cargo showing its voyage is lawful. The cir-

cumstances have been reported to the CO of the visiting ship, who has directed the ship be al-

lowed to proceed on its voyage. The ship is accordingly allowed to proceed on its voyage.

Entered ______________________ (hour, date, and geographical position when entry is

made). _________________________ (signed name, grade of examining officer).

NOTE

Do not disclose the name of the visiting ship and the name or grade of its company

Log Entry for a detained ship:

The __________________ (given name, nationality, and class of ship (e.g., steamer or sailing

ship)) was visited by me at_______________________ (hour and date). I have examined the

papers produced by the master concerning the ship and its cargo, that were

__________________________ (irregular, fraudulent, defaced, in part destroyed, found to

show the presence of prohibited items apparently regular), but due to my suspicions (state rea-

sons), a search appeared to be warranted. The circumstances have been reported to the CO of the

visiting ship, who has directed that the ship be detained for the following reason:

_________________________________________ (State the reason. It could be one noted

above or any other reason justifying detention, such as breach of blockade, other than neutral

service, or great deviation from direct course.) The ship is accordingly detained. Entered

_________________ (hour, date, and geographical position when entry is made)

________________________ (signed name, grade of examining officer).

Control of the Boarding Party. In general, the BO will exercise control of the boarding party

through the ABO. If required, a separate UHF/VHF protected voice circuit may be utilized between BO,

OSC, and small boat. This is normally accomplished by selecting a separate channel on the same portable

radios used by other boarding party members. The disadvantage of separate circuits for BO and ABO is

the loss of connectivity within the boarding party when BO and ABO are separated. Additional guidance

for boarding party is contained in Annex D.

Search Team Procedures.

a. The function of a search team is to conduct the actual search of the suspect vessel. As critical

positions on the boarding party, the importance of selecting the most experienced men cannot be

overly emphasized. Specific guidance for search team personnel is contained in Annex D.

b. Initial Sweep. An initial security sweep will be conducted to determine if there are any

unaccounted weapons or personnel on board the suspect vessel and to look for obvious safety

hazards. Results of the security sweep are reported to the BO who will check with the crew list to

make sure that the location of crew and passengers is clearly determined. The BO will direct the

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search teams to conduct a search of all or part of the cargo areas based on the cargo documentation

presented by the ship’s master and other relevant information.

c. Sweep of Cargo Holds/Tanks (Search Phase). The search team when entering cargo

holds or tanks must exercise extreme caution. Lighting is often poor or nonexistent; ladders may be

structurally weak or damaged; decks and ladders may be oily; noxious or hazardous vapours may

be present (especially in tanks); air may be oxygen deficient; cargo may not be securely stowed;

and other hazards exist separate from the threat of armed resistance. It is important that members of

the boarding party never open any hatch, door, package, container, etc. This is to avoid injury of the

boarding party by badly stowed containers, boxes, or holds.

(1) Have master or ship’s officer open all doors and hatches and enter all spaces first. Ensure a

suspect vessel officer is present when sealed containers are opened. The vessel may provide

able-bodied seamen to assist in opening containers.

(2) Sealed containers may not contain the cargo with which they are labelled, so check with the

BO before continuing the search. A boresight, which is an inspection device, may assist in de-

termining the contents of a sealed container. Reseal all sealed containers and deliver broken

seals to the master while using a form to document the container opened. Identify the general

contents and list the seal number issued by the inspector.

Do not touch military equipment or anything that appears to be possible explosives,

fuses, or detonators and report them immediately to the BO. If in doubt, call for as-

sistance.

NOTE

As time progresses during prolonged MIO, more creative smuggling techniques

will most likely be employed by vessels attempting to get prohibited cargo to/from

the targeted nation(s).

(3) Additional safety equipment will be brought aboard in the boarding kit. Safety is para-

mount and will not be sacrificed for any reason.

Security Team Procedures.

a. The security team is responsible for containing the suspect vessel’s crew during the boarding. It

has extended personal contact with crewmembers and, as such, should be sensitive to the large

variety of cultural and religious backgrounds often found on merchant crews. It is not uncommon

for women and children to be among the assembled crew of the vessel. Security team members

must exercise mature judgement in dealing with the vessel’s crew. The presence of dogs and

free-roaming animals on board poses a physical and health threat to the boarding party and should

be avoided. Request that the master lock up all animals for the duration of the boarding.

b. Intelligence Collection. Prolonged contact with crewmembers other than the master

should be used to discreetly gather information about the ship’s previous activities and schedule.

Any discrepancies from the information provided in the pre-boarding brief or unusual activity

should be reported to the BO. Care should be taken to prevent the master or other crewmembers

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from overhearing the report. Previous lessons learned suggest the single codeword clear may be

used to inform the BO that there is sensitive information to pass. Once the BO is ready to receive the

report and indicates clear, the report may be completed.

c. Dealing With the Suspect Vessel Crew/Passengers. Merchant vessels often have

multinational crews. The ship’s officers are normally familiar with, if not fluent in, English, and

other English speakers may be aboard. Previous records show that during the vast majority of

boardings, the crew/passengers are cooperative and only desire the boarding to go smoothly so they

can get back to their routine. This does not mean that the security team should assume the crew will

not be hostile. Caution, alert observation, and sound judgement are essential. Whenever feasible, at

least three men should move together to provide cover for one another. The following lists provide

some do’s and don’ts developed from lessons learned in previous boarding operations.

(1)

Do perform the following:

(a) Be firm, but polite in issuing instructions.

(b) Utilize the vessel’s chain of command. Have the master or ship’s officers give orders to

the crew/passengers.

boarding party in mind.

(d) Be very cautious when dealing with women and children.

(e) Place a security team member in position above the assembled crew/passengers to ob-

serve the entire group, if possible.

(f) Keep crew/passengers a safe distance from security team members to prevent being

overpowered or disarmed.

(g) Plan ahead for restroom use. Boarding operations have lasted in excess of 8 hours in the

past.

(h) De-escalate tense situations immediately.

(i) Look for possible planted military or intelligence personnel among the crew.

(j) Try to relax the crew/passengers.

(k) Be cordial and polite at all times.

(l) Allow meals and disrupt ship’s routine as little as possible.

(m) During extended boardings, consider moving crew or passengers to their cabins, mess

decks, or other controllable areas of comfort. If done, direct them to stay in place and main-

tain security in passageways.

(n) Bring along an interpreter, if possible.

(2)

Do not perform the following:

(a) Threaten or provoke the crew or passengers.

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(b) Accept food or drinks.

(d) Allow any crew or passengers to leave the assembly area unescorted.

(e) Give away any information that may be useful to the suspect vessel or the embargoed

nation.

(f) Discuss boarding party procedures or intentions.

(g) Hesitate to call for assistance if any indications exist that a problem may be developing.

0510 Cargo Inspection

The boarding party should be notified immediately upon discovery of any dangerous materials

present, personnel with ties to the country of interest, or crewmembers and passengers with infectious

diseases.

The cargo count verification compares the manifest list description with cargo load plan totals.

Procedures to count may be slightly different for each manifest. On the manifest, review individual ship-

ment descriptions and count each item or good. A container may hold more than one shipment. Some

ships use break bulk cargo. This is cargo stored together and contains a wide variety of items. To count

item by item can be a time-consuming evolution. The number of pallets, barrels, drums, or bundles may

be listed in the quantity or number and kind of package column of some manifests.

Conduct soundings of each tank and verify them against the manifest. Inform the master if the

numbers differ. The BO should explain the procedure used to count. Diversion may be necessary if the

master refuses to cooperate or the numbers remain different. An accurate description and destination of

the cargo, along with a high degree of confidence that the documents are valid, helps ensure a successful

boarding. Close examination of documents helps determine the true intentions of the suspect vessel.

0511 Data/Evidence Collection

Evidence gathering is a critical part of MIO. When a vessel is diverted an evidence package must

be compiled. The CO is responsible for ensuring the package is compiled and completed in a thorough

and professional manner. The completed package is sent to the MIO commander and will be reviewed by

intelligence and legal personnel. This package will be used by nations that may auction seized vessels.

The package is required to be submitted within 72 hours of the boarding. The evidence package, while re-

quired for diverted vessels, is complimentary to the information package, which can be done on any

boarded vessel.

There are nine sections of the evidence package. They are:

a. Sequence of Events. This is a detailed time/event log that details every major activity

conducted during the operation. It needs to cover from time of initial contact through the divert

action. It must also include detailed description of the suspect vessel movements.

b. Vessel Information. Must include vessel name, flag, registry number, ship type, cargo,

vessel particulars (length, draft, breadth, etc.), overall material condition, last and next port of call,

and personnel information.

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c. Photographs. Include photos of hidden compartments, pictures of the master and crew,

8-point view of the vessel and picture of machinery spaces. Ensure to include a photo log that

clearly identifies all photos.

d. Statements. Include statements from the BO, coxswain, boarding party members, and others

as appropriate, concerning:

(1) The suspect vessel’s reaction to the query.

(2) The master’s reaction to his vessel being boarded.

(3) Any attempts to destroy evidence.

NOTE

Statements should be written in the first person and include as much detail as possi-

ble. Identify crewmembers of the suspect vessel that spoke English. Ensure all state-

ments are signed and dated.

e. Tanks and Cargo. Sketch or photocopy all cargo and ship service tanks, showing

dimensions and volumes. Sound each tank and verify sounding against the manifest and ship’s

soundings. Review receipts and documents for all cargo. Be as descriptive as possible and include

all conversions.

f. Documents. These should include copies of deck and engineering logs, registration

documents, crew lists, passports, and charts. (Charts with relevant markings should be seized and

replaced with unclassified National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) charts).

g. Videotape. Videotape interviews (conducted separately) with the master, first mate, chief

engineer and any other appropriate crewmembers. The interview should include the following

critical questions:

(1) Where did the on board cargo come from?

(2) Where did the vessel pick up the gas or oil?

(3) Where did you intend to unload the cargo and to whom?

(4) Who is your owner/manager?

(5) What is your contact information (address, phone number, email, telex, etc.)?

h. Oil Samples. Obtain oil samples from each tank (urine sample bottles are preferred) and seal the

top with evidence tape. Place a label on the front of each bottle (name of vessel, forward storage,

date collected and initialled).

i. Other relevant evidence. Include the types/quantities of food found on board (note if there were

any labels on the food). Include any business cards discovered (marine related information such as

harbour manager). Look for global positioning system (GPS) waypoint data and cellular phone

data (numbers stored and dialled in the phones). Conduct an electronic and communications survey

and detailed descriptions of any hidden compartments that were located (specific location, line

drawings, dimensions and means of access). Last but not least, include any other information/items

that may help build a case.

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It is important to maintain a chain of custody for the transportation of this package to the MIO commander

for processing. Include a chain of custody form and ensure the pilot signs the custody form if sent by

aircraft.

0512 Information Collection

The information package encompasses most of the contents of the evidence package, but it may be

done on any boarded vessel, regardless of whether or not it has been diverted. Recurring information col-

lected from records and ledgers, former terrorists/criminals, and intelligence reporting provides evidence

of the existence of terrorist/criminal-affiliated shipping networks. Some networks have substantial ties to

multiple maritime enterprises, which may form an important part of their global efforts. The terror-

ist/criminal maritime network, including vessels and supporting shore infrastructure, provides a signifi-

cant part of the financial network by generating revenue, facilitating money laundering, and engaging in

fee-for-service relationships with other groups. Further, maritime enterprises may support terrorist/crimi-

nal efforts by smuggling weapons, explosives, and special devices; transporting personnel; creating es-

cape plans and relocation options for terrorists/criminals; and/or using shipping to conduct attacks against

naval forces.

Each MIO boarding is a fleeting event that provides a narrow window of opportunity to collect

unique information. In the past, this information has greatly advanced maritime target development. Data

collected during the search phase of a boarding is later analyzed by intelligence experts to determine if the

crew, parent companies, or related business organizations are conducting operations in violation of the in-

ternational laws or agreements that resulted in the MIO. The OPTASK MIO may specify and should pri-

oritize all EEIs to help boarding parties focus their intelligence collection efforts given the boarding

window of opportunity.

Units will, considering safety and time available, collect information during all VBSS boardings.

The BO will review intelligence collection requirements in the OPTASK MIO and operational guidance,

and implement specific collection goals into pre-boarding briefs as applicable.

In the event the MIO mission also warrants the collection of an evidence package, the MIO com-

mander is to ensure that both the evidence and the information collected is forwarded to the appropriate

authorities as required. The MIO commander is responsible to ensure all applicable replication of evi-

dence/information is completed for forwarding.

0513 Debarkation Procedures

Routine. Routine debarkation procedures will simply be the reverse of the embarkation steps.

Upon completion of the boarding, leave weapons and ammunition separated and in the location where

they were found. The security team is the last to leave the suspect vessel. Be careful not to become lax dur-

ing debarkation of the suspect vessel. Boarding ship should manoeuvre to provide cover for the boarding

party as it debarks.

Emergency/Urgent. The exact method of egress may vary depending on the situation leading

to emergency egress. When the acknowledge decision to egress is made all boarding party members must

be accounted for. Once the order is given, all boarding party members are to receipt for the order. If a pair

does not respond, the BO must endeavour to establish communications with the missing team/member. If

no response is achieved either from a direct call up or a communications relay from another boarding

party member, the options available to the BO will depend upon the reason for egress. In the event of a

medical related extraction sufficient time should be available to notify the OSC and conduct a search. Ad-

ditional ship force or suspect vessel personnel may supplement this search. In the event of non-medical

related emergency extraction the BO will need to make a decision based on the extant and immediateness

of the threat, in order to minimize the danger to the remaining boarding party members. If possible the BO

should seek guidance from the OSC. If the reason to egress is due to seaworthiness concerns, attempts to

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locate missing boarding party members should be made cognizant of the risks, which could affect addi-

tional boarding party member involved in a search. At all times the BO retains the authority to continue

the egress. If the reason for egress is a hostile act, the boarding party should continue with the extraction.

External assets will recover missing boarding party members.

During the conduct of the boarding correct application of basic boarding principles can minimize the risk

of losing contact with a team. Regular voice reports by all teams at predefined intervals, indicating their

present position not only confirms the status of the boarding but also provides timely positional informa-

tion. As teams exit a space and enter a new space, a report should be made to the BO so that situational

awareness can be maintained of team positioning. Each boarding party team is to have a series of

codewords/emergency signals requiring evacuation of a space and reestablishment of communications

with the BO. This can be achieved by using the suspect vessel main broadcast system (1MC equivalent) or

ship whistle (e.g. 5 short blasts).

0514 Non-cooperative and Opposed Boarding Operations

If a suspect vessel is either non-cooperative or has been determined to be opposing a boarding, it may be

necessary to conduct a takedown operation prior to normal boarding. A takedown is accomplished by ap-

propriately trained personnel to force a vessel to stop and secure it prior to search by a normal boarding

party, or come to the aid of a boarding party that has been confronted by a hostile force. The objective of the

takedown will vary according to the mission, but in most cases, it will be utilized to secure the ship control

and communication systems of the suspect vessel. Chapter 7 describes procedures for non-cooperative

boardings, and Chapter 8 describes procedures for opposed boardings.

0515 Helicopterborne Assault Force

Command, Control and Communications of the Heliborne Assault Force. The HAF

may consist of elements from SOF teams, or a variety of other forces from the armed services. Command

and control structures and communications equipment available vary depending on the assault force used.

Surface ships must be prepared to support a wide variety of possible options.

a. Command and Control Structure. Command and control of the HAF by the OSC remains

consistent, while C2 within the assault force may vary. The AFC will report to the OSC as soon as

feasible after departing the assembly point to coordinate takedown preparations. All supporting

aircraft and/or small boats will be under control of the OSC from the time the assault force arrives

on scene until it is detached by the OSC. Whenever feasible, a face-to-face pretakedown brief will

be held on board the boarding ship. The AFC will control the actual assault teams and will

coordinate with the AMC or boat coxswain the use of supporting aircraft and small boats.

Supporting fire from a sniper helicopter will be under direct control of the AFC. Supporting fire

from surface ships or other aircraft will be directed by the AFC.

b. Communications. Communication equipment available to the assault force varies, and the

surface ship must be flexible and creative in the choice of equipment to be used. Reliable

communication between the OSC, AFC, sniper helicopter, small boat(s), support helicopter,

surface combat and patrol aircraft, and assist ship(s) is critical to success of the takedown operation.

Figure 2-2 displays normal communication circuits required to support takedown operations.

NOTE

AFC and aircraft have limited communications equipment available and will only

be up on one or two nets at one time. OSC is net control on all circuits, except sup-

porting fire and assault nets, which are controlled by the AFC.

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Coordination of Assault Force and Boarding Party. Two scenarios may exist that require

use of a takedown force.

a. The first is one in which the assault force is first to board the suspect vessel to secure it. In this

scenario, the normal boarding party will embark the suspect vessel when directed by the OSC. The

AFC remains in charge of the vessel until directed by the OSC to turn control over to the BO. In this

situation, the boarding party will normally have additional security personnel assigned. The assault

force will normally remain on board the vessel until search of it is complete. A common voice

circuit between the BO, OSC, and AFC is not normally required.

b. The second scenario is one in which the normal boarding party or a portion of it is still on board

the suspect vessel prior to arrival of the assault force. This situation requires more complex

coordination. A pre-takedown face-to-face brief is critical and should be conducted if at all

feasible. The AFC and assault team leader should be given radios that are compatible with the

boarding party’s, if not already so equipped, to allow for direct communications during the

takedown. Location and identification data on members of the boarding party still on board the

suspect vessel will be given to the AFC and briefed to all assault force members and snipers. Once

the takedown commences, the AFC will assume control of any boarding party members on board

the suspect vessel. The AFC will remain in control of the vessel until directed to transfer control to

the BO.

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CHAPTER 6

Diversion Procedures

0601 Overview

There are numerous reasons that may require a vessel to be diverted; inaccessible or prohibited

cargo, incomplete or falsified paperwork or intelligence exploitation potential. Vessels with inaccessible

cargo and incomplete paperwork can be diverted to a designated holding point, usually in international

waters, given the opportunity to correct discrepancies, and be subject to re-inspection without prejudice.

The decision to divert a vessel is made by the MIO commander. Diversions are conducted as follows:

a. Inbound vessels believed to be carrying prohibited cargo will not be allowed to proceed but will

be diverted to a non-prohibited port of the vessel’s choice.

b. Outbound vessels believed to be carrying prohibited cargo will not be allowed to proceed but

will be diverted to their port of origin or a port or anchorage designated by the MIO commander.

c. Vessels of intelligence value may be allowed to proceed or diverted to a port or anchorage

designated by the MIO commander.

The BO should ensure that the master of the suspect vessel is aware the decision for diversion is

carried out at the direction of higher authority. There are three possible diversion scenarios that the BO

may encounter after the decision has been made to divert the suspect vessel. They are voluntary diversion,

involuntary diversion, and opposed diversion.

During a diversion a ship control team (SCT) capable of serving as an underway watch team to

safely navigate, operate ship control and propulsion systems on a variety of merchant craft and maintain

security throughout the transit may need to be embarked on the suspect vessel. The SCT must be capable

of maintaining control for a sustained period of time, as during a transit of a diverted ship to a custodial

port. The SCT is composed of personnel who are capable of manning the suspect vessel’s ship control and

engineering systems and safely operating the ship without the assistance or cooperation of the crew, until

such time as the ship can be safely brought to anchor or delivered to safe harbour. This team should con-

sist of personnel experienced and qualified in navigation and piloting, steering, main propulsion (diesel

and steam driven), electrical distribution, stability and hull material (sea worthiness assessment), and an

appropriate security team. The SCT should be augmented as necessary, to include linguist support and/or

medical personnel. The minimum equipment requirements for the SCT are included in Annex A.

0602 Voluntary Diversion

A voluntary diversion is one in which a voluntary agreement by the suspect vessel’s master to divert is ob-

tained. Having acquired the master’s agreement to divert from his intended port of call or to return to

LPOC, the BO may request permission from the OSC to depart and return to the parent ship. Tracking and

monitoring of the suspect vessel should be the responsibility of the boarding ship until this responsibility is

passed to another unit. The MIO commander or sector MIO coordinator determines when tracking and

monitoring of the suspect vessel is no longer required.

0603 Involuntary Diversion

An involuntary diversion is when the suspect vessel is non-cooperative but once the suspect vessel

has been boarded and secured the use of force is not required to gain compliance of the suspect vessel

crew. The MIO commander designates an escort ship that will typically provide a SCT. Diversion of a

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suspect vessel may be achieved without the use of a SCT, however it will require an escort ship to ensure

the suspect vessel does not attempt to escape. In order to prevent the escape of the suspect vessel, or the

destruction of evidence, a SCT may be required to take physical control of the suspect vessel, and in cer-

tain cases, man the ship’s navigation and engineering systems.

There have been cases where the suspect vessel’s master and crew have retired to their staterooms

and left the SCT in control of the suspect vessel. Turnover procedures for a SCT are included in Chapter

0604 Opposed Diversion

An opposed diversion requires a SOF boarding to gain compliance. Deadly force may have been

used prior to the boarding party’s arrival. The suspect vessel’s crew should be subdued or may even be in

a state of shock. Their conduct may become non-compliant as time elapses and their composure returns.

The suspect vessel crew may not voluntarily assist the boarding party in accomplishing any task. How-

ever, the suspect vessel’s master may be convinced to provide help from the suspect vessel’s crew to en-

sure no further damage is incurred by the ship SOF will expect to turnover to a SCT as soon as the suspect

vessel is secure. Turnover procedures for a SCT are included in Chapter 8.

Boarding Party in an Opposed Diversion. The BO requires an exceptionally large board-

ing party (20-30 men) to establish an underway watch bill that will provide security for all in the boarding

party. Two-man watch teams are required to ensure security. The recommended minimum watch stations

include:

a. Bridge and main accesses to the bridge.

b. Main engineering spaces and accesses.

c. Boarding party sleeping quarters. The important thing to remember during an opposed diversion

is to constantly stay on guard.

0605 Possible Cargo Seizure

In accordance with the governing sanctions, the vessel and/or its cargo may be seized if a suspect vessel has

prohibited cargo. The United Nations sanctions are considered equal to civil law as opposed to criminal

law. The master and crew are not being arrested, even though the vessel/cargo is being seized. The master

is still responsible for the suspect vessel and the well-being of the crew and cargo and should be treated

with the same respect due the CO of any ship.

0606 Other Considerations

It may take weeks for the vessel to receive clearance to enter an alternate port. The OPTASK MIO may re-

quire daily health and comfort inspections to be

performed on the diverted vessel. This inspection may be no more than an inquiry over BTB radio of the

vessel’s fuel, water, and stores percentages, but will often involve boarding the vessel. The boarding ship,

in accordance with local guidance, may designate health and comfort teams to transport stores and fresh

water, conduct seaworthiness inspections, administer medical assistance, and verify fuel and water levels.

0607 Postboarding Procedures

Sanitation. Designate a location where postboarding sanitation is conducted. The VBSS team

will be required to remove clothing for laundering (sanitary temperatures must be used). Their equipment

must also be properly cleaned to ensure any germs that may have been brought back are destroyed.

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Weapons Return. The armoury personnel must be standing by to receive the weapons used

during the operations (both VBSS team and boat crews). All weapons and ammunition must be properly

accounted for and secured immediately following the boarding party’s return (unless it is scheduled to do

an immediate turn around).

Reporting. It is critical that the entire chain of command is kept informed at all times. Due to the

administrative nature of the MIO reports, web-based communications such as secure e-mail or chat are

the reporting methods of choice. When these are not available, or the report is time critical, reports should

be made over nominated voice circuits. The BO will debrief the VBSS team upon their return and provide

the CO and Operations Officer a post mission debrief. The BO is responsible to the CO for the completion

of the required boarding and after-action reports. Specific requirements and formats for these reports are

to be provided in the OPTASK MIO.

a. Boarding Officer to Supporting Ship. The BO should conduct all communications

between the boarding party and the ship. When practical the BO should contact the ship at least

every 30 minutes during a cooperative boarding. The frequency of these reports should be

shortened when warranted and should be agreed on during the specific mission planning. The

CO/OSC should also assign communications guard and monitoring duties to responsible watch

officers during the mission planning. This will ensure that the operations centre and bridge stay

apprised of the boarding’s progress and eliminates confusion relating to which station the BO is

communicating.

b. Supporting Ship to OSC/MIO Commander. In order to ensure the OSC/MIO commander

maintains the proper situational awareness the supporting ship needs to provide sufficient

information during the course of the MIO. Initial query information should be relayed on

completion of the query, with the supporting ship recommendation as to whether a boarding is

required. If a boarding is required, the supporting ship should relay items of the boarding report to

the OSC on receipt from the BO. The supporting ship should immediately report the discovery of

prohibited cargo, incorrect paperwork or items of intelligence value, with a recommendation for

diversion to the OSC/MIO commander.

c. OSC to MIO Commander. In most cases the supporting ship will report the status of the

boarding to the MIO commander. When the C2 arrangement requires the OSC to make these

reports, the OSC will relay the supporting ship reports to the MIO commander. The OSC will

recommend diversion to the MIO commander, if applicable.

d. MIO Commander to Higher Authority. The MIO commander will ensure higher

authority is kept properly informed.

Restore and Recondition Equipment. All equipment must be cleaned, restored and recon-

ditioned immediately following the completion of MIO.

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CHAPTER 7

Non-cooperative Boardings

0701 Introduction

Navy vessels may be directed to have ship’s force VBSS teams conduct non-cooperative

boardings of suspect vessels, or while conducting an unopposed boarding, the situation may deteriorate

into a non-cooperative scenario. In either case, the ship must be able to recognize the non-cooperative

case and respond with the appropriate procedures and actions. The definition of a non-cooperative board-

ing must be clearly understood. A non-cooperative boarding is one in which there is no intelligence to in-

dicate a threat, and any one or combination of the following conditions listed below are met:

a. Suspect vessel fails to comply with the OSC’s directions

b. Passive measures intended to delay, impede, complicate, and/or deter search and seizure of

suspect vessel can be overcome by mechanical means

c. Passive resistance measures in place are intended only to delay, impede, complicate, and/or

deter search and seizure of suspect vessel and can be overcome by mechanical means

Rules of engagement should be carefully reviewed, scenarios discussed and procedures rehearsed

so that the ship’s VBSS team, C2 organization, and ship’s MIO support structure are fully prepared to

conduct the mission.

Ship’s conducting numerous unopposed boardings can easily fall into complacency in performing

MIO. Boardings may become monotonous and appear routine causing the VBSS team and ship’s force

support personnel to take shortcuts or become lax in their procedures. Personnel must remember that each

boarding is unique and inherently risky. An unopposed boarding can quickly degrade into a non-coopera-

tive situation for a variety of reasons, and MIO teams must be ready to respond.

There are three basic scenarios involving non-cooperative boardings: an unopposed boarding that

becomes non-cooperative; an anticipated non-cooperative boarding that becomes unopposed; and an an-

ticipated non-cooperative boarding that is in fact non-cooperative. Many things could trigger a change

from unopposed to non-cooperative including mistreatment or perceived mistreatment or disrespect of

the boarded ships crew, fear, anger, and political motives.

Vessels may not initially respond to queries or directions due to a malfunctioning radio, language

difficulties, mechanical problems, or simply being unaware that they are the vessel being addressed, until

confronted by either non-violent, deterrence, or show of force. At this point they may become compliant.

For vessels that remain non-compliant, ship’s force may have to resort to disabling fire or methods to foul

the suspect vessel’s screws to stop the vessel and allow the BT to board and search. Additional discussion

is contained further in this chapter.

The definition of an opposed boarding (as discussed in Article 0108.3), and when a non-coopera-

tive boarding becomes an opposed boarding must also be clearly understood. Opposed boardings are SOF

missions and are not authorized to be conducted by ship’s force VBSS teams. In the event that the board-

ing party finds itself in an opposed boarding situation the party must immediately abort the mission and

begin extraction procedures.

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0702 Command Relationships and Responsibilities

For all boardings the chain of command must establish clear lines of authority for control of the

VBSS team and all supporting elements, but for non-cooperative boardings this is critical. Lines of au-

thority should be streamlined as much as possible. Requirements for communications and logistics sup-

port should not dilute the energies of the team from training or rehearsal for the operation.

The MIO commander or OTC has primary authority for VBSS within the area of operations and

authorizes boardings. The MIO commander or OTC designates the supporting ships, air assets, and sup-

port teams (EOD and SAR, etc.). This commander also provides all available intelligence products, as-

signs communications frequencies required, and designates the OSC who will exercise TACON of the

VBSS operation. The MIO commander or OTC may assume the responsibilities of OSC and exercise

TACON of all the forces and assets.

The OSC assumes TACON, conducts surveillance, maintains accurate position data, and provides

EEI on the suspect vessel. The OSC reports progress of the operation to the MIO commander and decides

whether to go ahead with the mission or abort.

The BO directs and leads the VBSS team, plans the actions to be performed and, on order, boards

the suspect vessel. The BO directs the search and inspection and the detainment of personnel, and if nec-

essary has the authority to abort the boarding. The BO exercises control of the boarding party through the

ABO.

0703 No-Go Criteria

No-Go criteria are established for aborting the mission. These criteria must be fully understood and in-

stinctive to all boarding party members. No-Go criteria must be reviewed prior to each boarding mission.

Everyone involved in MIO must be trained to recognize potential trouble and to effectively manage the sit-

uation and disengage as required. No-Go criteria should be continuously evaluated throughout the entire

mission, especially during non-cooperative boardings where there is an increased level of uncertainty. The

No-Go criteria described in article 0502 apply to non-cooperative boardings.

0704 Detection and Surveillance

Detection and surveillance assets and techniques are the same as those described in Chapter 3 for unop-

posed boardings. However, if there is a case where intelligence or cueing indicates that a suspect vessel

poses no threat but is anticipated to be non-cooperative, consideration should be given to conducting the

surveillance phase in a covert manner for as long as possible for tactical reasons.

0705 Query and Approach

Procedures for querying and approaching a suspect vessel overtly are the same as those discussed

in Chapter 4. If the operation is to be done covertly, there may be tactical advantage to maintaining sur-

prise and conducting the query from the ship’s boat (loaded and en route to do the boarding) or from a he-

licopter, depending upon whether the ship and helicopter can approach undetected from astern of the

suspect vessel. In any event, the ship should take a defensive posture and increase its combat and material

readiness condition, and man additional damage control and weapons stations. Use of the forward gun

mount, if available, as the main battery allows the ship to remain abaft the beam of the suspect vessel.

Other details should be manned as required, such as flight quarters, SAR boat, and ship’s small calibre

gun stations. Remain alert for sudden or radical manoeuvring by the suspect vessel.

When conducting a covert approach, the suspect vessel’s track must be maintained in order to de-

termine its probable future location and potential intercept positions. The tracking ship will plan to

shadow the suspect vessel along its mean line of advance (MLA) while remaining undetected. A

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continuous and accurate radar picture is absolutely essential to successful covert tracking. The tracking

ship must stay outside of visual and, if possible, radar range of the suspect vessel. Once the MLA is

known, the tracking ship moves into position to covertly shadow the suspect vessel, ideally astern along

its MLA to take advantage of radar blind arcs and typically poor stern lookout procedures. If ordered to

board the suspect vessel, a covert approach should be attempted. Covert approaches require consideration

of the visual horizon, the electronic detection (both radar and communications intercept) capability of the

suspect vessel, and the shipping density in the vicinity of the suspect vessel. Some ship emitters are

known to cause electro-magnetic interference and may need to be shut down before making an approach.

Any decision to secure a radar must be made with due regard to other potential threats in the area of opera-

tions. The aim of a covert approach is surprise. In areas of high shipping density, known shipping routes

should be used to mask own ship’s movement. In areas of high fishing boat density, irregular courses and

slow speeds should be used to close the suspect vessel. If possible, a stern approach at night with ship

fully darkened should be attempted in order to minimize potential for detection by the suspect vessel and

any picket network screening the suspect vessel; however, the boarding window of opportunity or rela-

tive velocity situation may dictate a different closing course. The position that the tracking ship launches

its RHIB(s) during the approach phase needs to be balanced against the requirement for the ship to pro-

vide uncompromising protection to the boarding party. RHIBs may be launched during a covert ap-

proach, remaining under the lee of the tracking ship until either the covert approach is successfully

concluded or the element of surprise has been forfeited.

For non-cooperative boardings conducted by a ship’s boarding party, the boarding party’s RHIBs

shall not approach suspect vessel within small arms range (nominally 500 yds) until the support ship is

within most effective range of the crew-served weapons, such as the MK 38 25-mm chain gun and

.50-caliber machinegun. Additionally, continuous communications connectivity between OSC and small

boats must be maintained.

0706 Stopping Suspect Vessel and Boarding

Non-cooperative vessels will not respond to OSC direction. The suspect vessel may not respond to

or simply ignore queries, or seek to delay the stopping process with comments such as that it must check

with home office, or that it cannot stop/slow because of engineering configuration. Some ships need more

than an hour to stop. Give a time limit to the suspect vessel. Make clear that, at the end of the given time, if

it has not complied, the actions to encourage it to stop to allow an inspection will escalate. In cases where

the suspect vessel ignores queries the OSC may authorize a non-cooperative boarding. The key determi-

nant will be freeboard. In low freeboard suspect vessels, a ship force non-cooperative boarding should be

conducted. In suspect vessels with high freeboard, HVBSS if available, should be used. When either a

ship force or SOF team is in control of the suspect vessel, the vessel should be stopped, thus allowing the

inspection process to commence. When the non-cooperative boarding option is not possible the following

level of force may be used. The order suggests a possible sequence of events; however implementation

will depend on the geopolitical situation. These actions may have to be cleared through the chain of com-

mand, depending on the ROE in force and specific guidance in the relevant OPORD, OPGEN, or

OPTASKs.

Levels of Force. The use of force to stop and board a vessel should be predictable, proportional,

and scalable. The non-compliant vessel should be given the opportunity to comply before the level of

force is increased. This should be reflected in planned levels of force. It is advisable to record BTB com-

munications when implementing levels of force. The levels of force are:

a. Non-violent.

(1) Voice communications, flashing lights, flaghoist (in accordance with the International Sig-

nal Book), loudhailer, and attention signal on the ship’s whistle or a horn. The use of simple,

clear, and pronounced English is important, as it depends upon the nationality of the suspect

vessel whether English is understood. Other commonly used languages at sea may include

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Spanish, Russian, or Arabic. An additional warning should be given. In the absence of guidance

in the governing OPTASK MIO, use the following to inform the master that the suspect vessel

is not complying with directions and that the intention is to board:

“Merchant vessel ________________, this is (nation) Navy ship. It does not appear

that you are responding to my directions. Your failure to cooperate with my instruc-

tions is making the situation unnecessarily hazardous. I am prepared to use those

means necessary to compel your compliance with my orders. I will not allow you to

proceed. I urge you to comply immediately and stand by to accept a (nation) board-

ing party.”

(2) Aggressive manoeuvres by ships, tactical air (TACAIR) support, or helicopters (if avail-

able). Remain slightly astern of the suspect vessel to enable early observation of course changes

by watching the wake.

b. Deterrence. In the sequence of increasing levels of violence, the following methods of

deterrence can be used:

(1) If authorized by the ROE, firing warning shots across the bow may produce the intended re-

sults. Warning shots can be fired by ships, TACAIR, or helicopter (if available). Guns should be

optically controlled to ensure proper targeting. Consult ROE for authority to fire warning shots.

(a) Fire 25-mm or .50-caliber machineguns.

(b) Fire main battery guns utilizing inert or point detonating rounds. Rounds should be

placed so the effect of the blast does not damage the suspect vessel.

pect vessel:

“Merchant vessel___________________, this is (nation) Navy ship. I now intend

to fire across the bow of your ship. Stop and permit us to board and inspect your ship

now.”

The use of ammunition with oscillating fuses (i.e., IR or VT) has the potential to fuse

off the suspect vessel if warning shots land too close to the target.

c. Show of force. If the actions listed above fail to gain compliance, the vessel is now

considered to be opposing the MIO. At this point, a decision has to be made by the cognizant

authority whether to use small arms fire, use disabling fire, and effect a takedown operation or not

board.

(1) Non-disabling Fire. Small arms fire to the bow, the masts, cargo on deck, or other area

may be directed to persuade compliance without seriously damaging the suspect vessel. A

warning should be issued to the suspect vessel so the area to be taken under fire may be evacu-

ated. In the absence of other guidance, the following warning may be used:

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(a) Consider the following, although not all inclusive, when disabling fire is a possible

course of action:

(i) Threat of major oil spill from ship’s service tanks or cargo tanks

(ii) Threat of major fire from engineering space or cargo holds

(iii) Manoeuvrability of ship following disabling fire

(iv) Possibility of casualties

(v) Damage to cargo

(vi) Ability to insert HAF by fast rope or ship’s boarding party by small boat following

the disabling fire

(vii) Proximity of shoals or TTW

(viii) Weather forecast

(ix) The number of hours of daylight remaining.

(b) If the decision is made to use disabling fire, targeted areas may include the rudder, stern

area, or machinery spaces (if the location of spaces is known). Heat sensing or IR devices

may be used to locate the machinery spaces. The ammunition used should be inert blank

load and plug, if feasible. Weapons systems should be optically sighted.

of command. The process of informing the chain of command may take time, so the posi-

tion of the suspect vessel should be monitored to ensure it will not enter TTW while the

OSC is awaiting a response.

(d) Prior to commencing disabling fire, a warning, such as the following, should be issued

to the suspect vessel:

“Merchant vessel ___________________, this is (nation) Navy ship. I now intend

to fire on your vessel. I am now giving you an opportunity to evacuate your crew

from the (stern/engine room). You have one minute to clear the stern/engine room.”

Full Force. Full force is the use of available weapon systems or munitions to sink the suspect

vessel. The use of full force in support of the MIO mission will be strictly controlled by the relevant

fleet commander. The ship should open from the suspect vessel to the optimum range for available

weapon systems. The weapon system used should be cognizant of surrounding shipping in order to

prevent collateral damage. The ship should be ready to provide humanitarian assistance after the

suspect vessel is destroyed.

e. Breaching. In situations where the vessel has a low freeboard and the weather conditions and

the vessel’s configuration permit, the VBSS team may be authorized to breach the vessel while it is

underway by placing the ship’s small boats alongside the vessel such that the boarding party can

climb aboard and take control of the vessel. This method is extremely dangerous and the risks must

be thoroughly assessed before it is attempted. The team must also anticipate that once on board they

may encounter obstacles such as barbed wire, missing deck plates or welded hatches to delay or

discourage their progress. The BO must assess the situation and decide whether to continue or abort

the mission.

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The objective is to swiftly gain control of the vessel. Upon boarding, establish security at the initial rally

point and then move to quickly take control of the pilothouse and the engineering control station. Move to

secure the steering gear equipment space or to take steering control from that position if it cannot be gained

at the pilothouse. Establish a secure holding area for the passengers and crewmembers and maintain a

watch over them while the inspection takes place. Commence the security sweep of the remainder of ves-

sel. Large vessels may require supplemental boarding party personnel to establish security, watch over the

passengers and crewmembers, and do the inspection. Boarding party members may be replaced in the pilot

house and in engineering by SCT members as deemed necessary, once control of the vessel is established

and the security sweep has been completed. All movement on board is conducted using approved small

unit tactics and the buddy system. Boarding party members are assigned buddies or partners who remain

together at all times.

0707 Search and Inspection

Search and inspection procedures are the same for an unopposed boarding with the following

exceptions:

a. The SCT may have to be deployed.

b. The search team must exercise greater caution and care while conducting inspection and survey

of the ship. The search should be more thorough due to suspicions being aroused by the situation.

c. The security team may have to apply a greater level of control in response to a higher level of

resistance by the vessel’s crew or passengers.

0708 Debarkation Procedures

Debarkation procedures are conducted in the same manner as with an unopposed boarding, however, extra

caution and vigilance is advised due to the circumstances. If the vessel is found to be not in compliance

with the MIO sanctions and is to be diverted, a security team or SCT may be required to remain on board.

Debarkation will then take place following turnover to the next team.

0709 Diversion Procedures

Diversion procedures are the same as for compliant vessels. While failure to stop for inspection resulting in

a non-cooperative boarding does not guarantee that a vessel is a sanctions violator, its actions may cer-

tainly be an indicator that it is carrying prohibited cargo and thus has a greater likelihood of diversion.

0710 Postboarding Procedures

Postboarding procedures are the same as described in Article 0607.

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CHAPTER 8

Support for Embarked Special Operations Forces

during Maritime Interdiction Operations

0801 Introduction

Ships may be tasked to provide support, or embarked SOF, to conduct MIO beyond the capability of nor-

mal ships force VBSS teams. As in any operation, commanders considering opposed and non-cooperative

boardings must have timely intelligence of the threat and associated degree of risk and weigh this against

the benefits of apprehension and capabilities of the forces to be employed. The purpose of this chapter is to

provide guidance on supporting embarked SOF.

0802 Command Relationships and Responsibilities

Supporting Elements. Clear lines of authority for control of embarked MIO teams and all sup-

porting elements must be established. The lines of authority should be streamlined, and clearly under-

stood by all forces involved in the conduct of the MIO. If possible, training and rehearsals for the VBSS

operation should be conducted to validate the C2 arrangement and overall integration of forces. Key ele-

ments include:

MIO Commander. The OTC of forces assigned to conduct MIO. For certain MIO missions

MIO commander may be assumed by a higher command. Preconditions for transfer of responsibility will

be provided in theatre specific OPTASK MIO. MIO commander duties include:

a. Primary authority for VBSS within the area of operations and exercises TACON of all MIO

forces within the operations area.

b. Authority to conduct boarding operations.

c. Designates the supporting ships, supporting air assets, and SAR team.

d. Provides all available intelligence products to support the VBSS operation.

e. Assigns communication frequencies as required.

f. Designates an OSC to exercise TACON of the VBSS operation. If located in the vicinity of the

suspect vessel, the OTC may assume the responsibilities of OSC.

On-Scene Commander. Assumes TACON at the scene of all forces assigned to conduct or

support the boarding of the suspect vessel. For SOF boardings, TACON shifts to the AFC at the last

go/no-go criteria checkpoint. OSC duties include:

a. Maintains accurate positioning data of the suspect vessel prior to the HVBSS/VBSS operation.

b. Makes final determination to proceed with or abort the HVBSS/VBSS operation.

c. Provides screen protection for assault force from hostile air, surface, or subsurface threats.

d. Conducts surveillance of the suspect vessel and provides EEI from the most recent higher

authority to the assault force prior to the operation.

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e. Forwards voice and message SITREPs to the MIO commander on the progress of the operation.

f. Directs an assigned ship to be ready to escort suspect vessel to diversion location on completion

of opposed or non-complaint boarding, if required.

g. Directs an assigned ship to conduct full search of suspect vessel once turnover to a SCT is

complete, if required.

h. Directs an assigned ship to provide a standby medical team. Ideally the assigned ship should

have an embarked doctor. If no doctor is available, the supporting ship may be required to provide

the medical team.

i. Directs aircraft and boats with trained rescue personnel, as required, to be ready to conduct SAR

operations for members of the boarding force. In the event of a SAR mission, OSC will act as SAR

coordinator.

Support Ship(s). One ship will usually be assigned to embark the assault force. The supporting

ship may also act as OSC. Support duties include:

a. Reports to OSC.

b. Provides logistics support to the designated VBSS force.

c. Operates communications electronic support measures (CESM) (if so configured) to monitor

suspect vessel communications.

d. If supporting allied teams, forwards voice and message SITREPs to the OSC on the progress of

the operation.

e. Provides organic weapons as required.

Escort Ship. The escort ship is tasked to escort any diverted vessel to the nominated diversion

port or anchorage. The escort ship may be the supporting ship. Escort ship duties are to provide:

a. SCT to relieve the boarding party.

b. Logistic support to the SCT during passage.

c. Reports to the MIO commander.

d. Tow for suspect vessel, as required.

Medical Team. The medical team provides medical assistance, as required, to all members of

the VBSS force or to the detainees of the suspect vessel.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team. If explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team personnel

are involved as a direct support element to SOF, the EOD team leader is to report to the AFC. On all other

occasions, unless otherwise directed, EOD personnel will report to the OSC.

Special Operations Forces. If SOF are employed as the HVBSS/VBSS force, a SOF com-

mander will command the unit. SOF commander responsibilities include:

a. Reports to the OSC for the readiness, positioning, and employment of SOF.

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b. Determines communications plan with OSC.

c. Determines insertion method.

A SOF team will typically consist of an AFC, AMC, assault team leader (ATL), assault team and sniper

team.

NOTE

The supporting ship will usually receive a SOF capability brief from the SOF pla-

toon commander during an advance visit to the ship.

0803 Force Packages

Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat. SOF may use specialist RHIBs or in some cases, the supporting

ship’s RHIBs to conduct a VBSS mission. The key determinant will be ability of supporting ship to pro-

vide logistic support for SOF RHIBs. Typically they will provide their own boat crews.

Helicopters. Airborne surveillance is a critical element of assessing suspect vessel hostile intent

and ascertaining preferred insertion method (HVBSS/VBSS) and insertion points. During the actual in-

sertion, helicopters provide sniper support for the assault team and provide the supporting ship and OSC

with real time information concerning the progress of the boarding. Lack of helicopter support may con-

stitute no-go criteria for most SOF missions. The helicopter support requirements are dictated by the in-

sertion method.

Personnel. SOF assault teams normally consist of 16-20 man operational elements. Ideally,

personnel support issues will all be determined during ship visit prior to operation.

Equipment. The supporting ship will be required to store hazardous material (HAZMAT) and

other special equipment required by the SOF team. All teams would expect to be able to utilize supporting

ships armoury personnel for small arms, ammunition and demolitions storage and from support ships

communications department for storage of lithium batteries/TAC Lite batteries and communication

equipment. Ideally all lithium batteries should be stored in HAZMAT safe containers.

NOTE

Additional SOF equipment stowage requirements will all be determined during ship

visit prior to operation.

0804 Operations

Rehearsals and Training. As practicable, a rehearsal should be conducted prior to the opera-

tion involving the nominated VBSS team, supporting ship and mission C2 elements. No matter how well

forces understand the mission, experience in past VBSS operations has shown that rehearsals contribute

directly to mission success. The embarked boarding party and supporting ship should develop a pre-

planned response (PPR) to ensure that in the event of a contingency all participants are familiar with the

immediate actions that will be carried out by the SOF team and the expected requirements of the support-

ing forces. The scope of the rehearsal will depend on the familiarity and currency of the embarked SOF

team with boarding procedures. The rehearsal should include:

a. Communication drills with all assigned forces

b. Exercise mission C2

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RHIB operations

Integration of air support

(1) Covert surveillance

(2) Sniper control

(R)

(3) Fast rope landing zone selection and practice insertion

(4) Flight deck coordination

Validate PPRs and insure they include:

(1) Lost communication drills

(2) Emergency reinforcement

(3) Alternate extraction procedures

(4) Medical support

(5) Fire/flood/toxic hazard aboard suspect vessel

(6) Discovery or release of weapons of mass destruction.

Embarked forces specific MIO skill sets to include:

(1) Hull breaching

(2) Initial search procedures

(3) Initial safety inspection

(4) Crew search and detention

(5) Ship familiarization and damage control

(6) Bridge, engine room, aft steering familiarization

SCT handover procedure

SAR plan

EOD integration

CBRN integration

In addition to rehearsals prior to mission execution, forces involved in VBSS operations should schedule

and execute VBSS training on a recurring basis. Supporting ships may be required to provide adequate re-

sources to embarked SOF teams in order to enable the following proficiency training to occur on a regular

basis:

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a. Marksmanship, small arms, day and night

b. Sniper with helicopters, day and night

c. Close quarters battle

d. Fast rope

e. Breaching (explosive/mechanical)

f. Medical

g. Detainee handling/defector control

h. EOD training

i. Language, basic phrases

j. Maintenance training facilities

k. Suspect vessel manifests/bill of lading (administrative aspects of boarding)

l. Accompany a ship force team conducting complaint boarding.

Interception Phase. When preparing for interception the supporting ship should endeavour to

remain covert in order to maximize the potential for surprise. The suspect vessel’s track must be main-

tained in order to determine its probable future location and potential intercept positions. The supporting

ship should shadow the suspect vessel along its MLA track while remaining undetected. A continuous

and accurate radar picture is absolutely essential if a covert tracking is to be accomplished successfully.

The supporting ship must stay outside of visual and, if possible, radar range of the suspect vessel. Once

the MLA of the suspect vessel is determined, the ship moves into optimal position to shadow the suspect

vessel. A covert approach should be made cognizant of the visual horizon, the electronic detection (both

radar and communications intercept) capability of the suspect vessel and the shipping density in the vicin-

ity of the suspect vessel. Some ship emitters are known to cause electromagnetic interference and may

need to be secured before making an approach. Any decision to secure a radar must be made with due re-

gard to other potential threats in the area of operations. The aim of a covert approach is surprise.

The distance to which the supporting ship closes the suspect vessel will be dictated by the preferred inser-

tion method. The choice of insertion method will be determined by the physical characteristics of the sus-

pect vessel, window of opportunity for the boarding, potential for counter detection, meteorological

conditions and visibility (day/night/fog/sandstorm). If conditions support HVBSS and adequate resources

are available, this will usually be the preferred insertion method. When HVBSS cannot be achieved, RHIB

insertion is the remaining option. In order to achieve surprise, an over-the-horizon (OTH) RHIB insertion

may be required. SOF OTH methods should be discussed during the advance ship visit.

Boarding Phase. Once approval to board has been given, the HVBSS/VBSS should commit to

achieve intercept. As the boarding forces commit, the supporting ship should proceed at maximum speed

towards the suspect vessel in order to be in a position to provide mutual support. As with unopposed

boardings, key events in the boarding process should be reported to the OSC. Boarding tactics will be ex-

ecuted in accordance with SOF standard operating procedures. The distance to which the supporting ship

closes the suspect vessel is to be determined prior to mission execution.

Turnover Procedures. After SOF has taken control of the suspect vessel and determined that a

thorough search, or detention of the vessel, is required, the boarding party will request relief by the

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nominated escort SCT. The SCT is responsible for ensuring the suspect vessel obeys instructions and for

the continued security of the evidence and suspect vessel crew. Ideally the SCT will supervise a compliant

crew sail the vessel to the required diversion destination. If the suspect vessel crew is uncooperative, the

SCT may have to operate the vessel. A VBSS team may conduct a complete search underway, at anchor

or at the nominated diversion port.

The SCT may accompany the SOF boarding party in the RHIB or may remain in the escort ship until the

completion of the boarding. The minimum equipment requirement for the SCT is included in Annex A.

Prior to departure from the escort ship, the SCT officer in charge (OIC) briefs the SCT. A sample SCT

pre-mission brief is provided in Annex E.

Before the SCT boards the suspect vessel, a pre-boarding seaworthiness assessment should be conducted

from the RHIB. The RHIB is to circle the suspect vessel, noting draft markings. The boarding party should

manoeuvre the suspect vessel onto a course to provide a lee (may not be possible if the suspect vessel has to

steer a certain course to remain in international waters), and reduce speed to minimum steerage way to al-

low the SCT to board the vessel. Once the SCT is on board, the turnover process can commence. AFC and

SCT OIC are to conduct a walk through of boarded vessel to assess its seaworthiness and identify any po-

tential safety hazards. The SCT turnover checklist is provided in Annex E.

SCT members should conduct the elements of the turnover applicable to their responsibilities. All SCT el-

ements report to the SCT OIC when the initial inspection is complete.

Upon completion of the walk through assessment, the SCT OIC will report the results of

seaworthiness/safety assessment check and recommended corrective action to the escort ship. When SCT

OIC and escort are satisfied that the SCT is in a position to safely operate the suspect vessel, the SCT OIC

will relieve the AFC and assume responsibility for the suspect vessel. The SCT OIC will station watches.

The SCT will need to develop a daily routine to include watch rotation, meal/resupply schedule and hourly

reports to the escort ship.

A qualified bridge watchkeeper will be stationed on the bridge of the suspect vessel at all times. Whenever

possible, communications with the escort ship should be via secure radio. If unable to use a secure radio,

use of brevity codewords will limit potential for communications intercept.

The SOF boarding party will extract and recover to the supporting vessel, or reset for additional boardings,

if required. The escort ship and suspect vessel will then begin transit to diversion port or anchorage.

Once in control of the vessel the SCT OIC should review PPRs and adopt them to the physical characteris-

tics of the suspect vessel.

0805 Integration of Embarked Augmentation Team and Assets

Meteorology and Oceanography. Meteorological and oceanographical (METOC) data will

be used in determining the optimum insertion method. The METOC Det should provide updated meteo-

rological forecast during the preplanning phase and pre-boarding brief. Range predications for RHIB ra-

dars (if fitted) and communications are important planning considerations for OTH RHIB operations.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal. If intelligence indicates possibility of encountering an EOD

during a boarding, the boarding will be classified an opposed boarding. EOD will be pre-positioned with

the SOF. If during the course of an unopposed or non-cooperative boarding explosive material is discov-

ered, the discovering boarding party member is to initiate the appropriate PPR and request EOD support

in accordance with applicable OPTASKs.

Liaison Officers. A special operations liaison element (SOLE) will provide liaison between

MIO forces and SOF. If at all possible liaison officers should be present for pre-mission ship visit.

8-6

CHANGE 2

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

0806 Communications Considerations

Prowords and Codewords. When supporting SOF teams, the supporting ship and embarked

team are to adopt a common set of agreed codewords and prowords.

Reporting Formats. If no specific guidance is given, reports are to be submitted by the sup-

porting ship in accordance with the OPTASK MIO. They may be supplemented by an intelligence mes-

sage if sufficient intelligence information is obtained.

Shipboard Communications. When supporting SOF, the communications architecture of the

supporting vessel and OSC will need close review. Ships may not possess the SOF crypto necessitating its

delivery prior to the mission. The number of circuits required to support the SOF mission may result in the

loss of some existing operational circuits. Available bandwidth for information systems will need to be

reviewed. The intelligence requirements to support SOF boardings may result in inability to regularly ac-

cess other information systems. The communications architecture needs to be determined early in the

planning phase, with potential circuit priority conflicts identified and workarounds established. Exact

communications support requirements will be addressed during ship visit prior to the operations.

Communications Electronic Support Measures. During the interception and pre-inser-

tion phase of the boarding, the CESM (if fitted) should be directed to monitor the suspect vessel for any

emissions. The detection of transmissions just prior to insertion may indicate an attempt by the suspect

vessel to report its impending boarding to an external agency, thereby providing a link to a known organi-

zation. The detection of such an intercept could provide valuable indications and warnings to the SOF

boarding party that the suspect vessel is aware of their presence and may even attempt to oppose the

boarding

8-7

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

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d. Uniform:

(1) Coveralls (no rank insignia).

(2) Ball cap (no rank insignia).

(3) Steel-toed safety shoes.

e. Extra weapons:

(1) Shotgun (minimum of four members of security team).

(2) Rifle (boat engineer).

In addition to the equipment above, the BO and ABO should have the following additional

equipment:

a. Radio/holder.

b. Checklists.

A002

Radios

At least six UHF secure voice portable radios, or VHF FM secure radios if UHF is not feasible.

Hand-held radio distribution:

a. OSC.

b. BO.

c. ABO.

d. One search team member from each team.

e. Security team leader.

f. Boat coxswain.

A003

Ship Control Team Equipment

Team equipment:

a. One life ring with strobe light for every 10 personnel onboard suspect vessel

b. Pilot’s ladder

c. Two hand-held VHF radios with spare batteries

d. Two hand-held GPS units with spare batteries

e. Navigation charts

f. Two pair of binoculars

A-2

CHANGE

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

MANIFESTO OF CARGO

GENTS:

Almarjan Shipping

VESSEL:

VOY:

SAILING DATE:

PORT OF LOADING:

PORT OF DISCHARGE:

PAGE NO:

P.O. Box 6716

Mv Andrea Gail

Umm Qasr

Abu Dhabi

Ajman, U.A.e.

NATIONALITY OF SHIP:

MASTER'S NAME:

PORT OF ORIGIN:

PORT OF FINAL DESTINATION:

Tel:32-203000, Fax: 32-20333

United Arab Emirates

TOBYOR ORIFE

Umm Qasr

Abu Dhabi

DATE OF ISSUANCE: 07-04-00

SHIPPER / CONSIGNEE / NOTIFY

PREF. B/L

MARKS & NUMBERS

CARGO DESCRIPTION

WEIGHT

FREIGHT TONS

CARRIAGE

REMARKS

B/L NO

CONTAINER NUMBER

PLACES OF RECEIPT / DELIVERY

OF CARGO

MEASUREMENT

WEIGHT

TERMS

) Abdulla's Fertilizer Company

001

175 Nosrat Ave.

375.00 NET METRIC TONS OF Sheep Manure

375.45 MT

Baghdad, Iraq

WITH THE FOLLOWING SPECIFICATIONS

) Yesle Associates

POLARIZATION : 99.8 DEGREES MIN

P.O. Box 8768

HUMIDITY : 0.04 PCT MAX

Dubai, United Arab Emirate

COLOR : 45 - 60 ICUMSA UNITS MAX

ASH CONTENTS : 0.04 PCT MAX

) Yesle Associates

SO2 : 20 P.P.M. MAX

P.O. Box 8768

AS. : 1 P.P.M. MAX

Dubai, United Arab Emirate

PB. : 2 P.P.M. MAX

CU. : 3 P.P.M. MAX

NPN STAPH AUREUS : NIL

NUMBER OF BAGS : 15,000 EMPTY BAGS : 100

LC NUMBER K711040 AND BUYER REFERENCE

NUMBER 98/44/293

AS PER INDENT NO. 07-04-00

GROSS WEIGHT : 375,45 METRIC TONS

NET WEIGHT : 375,000 METRIC TONS

ADDRESS OF THE IMPORTER/BUYER

Yesle Associates, P.O. Box 8768

Dubai, United Arab Emirates

CLEAN BOARD : 07-04-00

FREIGHT PREPAID

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

COMPAGNE MARITIME D'AFFREMENT

CARGOMANIFEST

4. QUAI DARENC

13002 MARSEILLE

AT THE PORT OF

MASTER

ROTTERDAM

TEL 9130 30 00

TELEX 401 087

BOUND TO

AQABA

TRANSHIPPEDAT THE PORT OF

TELEFAX 91.36 30 05

FREIGHT PREPAID

SHIPPED ON BOARD MV. "RED SEA EUROPA"

DATED: 04.12.1990

FREIGHT

RIM010274 SH. CMA,4 QUAI D ARENC. MARSEILLE

PAID

IKSU 715790/9 1 LOT GROUPAGE

7.000 2.300 9.300 30.00

ANYWHERE

CO. AL-HALAL SHIPPING CO. LTD.

FT: 20 TYPE:ST

SERVICE

SEAL:26949

P.O. BOX 3157

THIS CNTR IS A T/S ONIR FOR

SANAA STREET

FURTHER INFO. ;OL SEE CMA

HODEIDAH

BELGIUM B/L

TOTAL CONTAINER FCL TO BE DISCHARGED AT AQABA/:

TOTAL 20 FT

TOTAL 40 FT

TOTAL GLOBAL=

TOTAL CONTAINER TO BE DISCHARGED AT AQABA/:

*** FCL CONTAINERS

*** LCL CONTAINERS

*** IMCO CONTAINERS

*** ALCMO CONTAINERS

20 FT

40 FT

TOTAL

Figure C-1. Sample Cargo Manifest (Sheet 2 of 4)

C-3

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

Stowed into container no. CTIV 433.057-2

Taisier Nassar

pcs secondhand:

2.750

KOS

14,919

CBM

AQABA

Volvo 600

(ZARQA FREEZONE)

Chassis No.:

T600-7909

CHASSIS NO.:

Motor No.:

17000-54230

T600-7909

Built:

1971

Taisier Nassar

pcs secondhand:

2.750

KOS

14,919

CBM

AQABA

Volvo BM 600

(ZARQA FREEZONE)

Chassis No.:

600-1607

CHASSIS NO.:

Motor No.:

17000-44921

600-1607

Built:

1970

Taisier Nassar

pcs secondhand:

2.750

KOS

14,919

CBM

AQABA

Volvo 600

(ZARQA FREEZONE)

Chassis No.:

T600-11038

CHASSIS NO.:

Motor No.:

17000-58868

T600-11038

Built:

1971

Stowed into container no. ITLU 545.724-2

Taisier Nassar

pcs secondhand:

2.750

KOS

14,919

CBM

AQABA

Volvo 600

(ZARQA FREEZONE)

Chassis No.:

T600-6051

CHASSIS NO.:

Motor No.:

17000-52025

T600/6051

Built:

1970

Taisier Nassar

pcs secondhand:

2.750

KOS

14,919

CBM

AQABA

Volvo BM 600

(ZARQA FREEZONE)

Chassis No.:

T6007930

CHASSIS NO.:

Motor No.:

17000-54352

T6007930

Built:

1971

Taisier Nassar

pcs secondhand:

2.750

KOS

14,919

CBM

AQABA

Volvo 600

(ZARQA FREEZONE)

Chassis No.:

T600-7676

CHASSIS NO.:

Motor No.:

17000-53855

T600-7676

Built:

1971

Figure C-1. Sample Cargo Manifest (Sheet 3 of 4)

C-4

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

DANGEROUS GOODS CONTAINER PACKING CERTIFICATE

Name and Address of Shipper/Packing Depot

Booking Ref. Number

ASICO B.V., RHOON

213148610106

Vessel and Voyage Number

RED SEA EUROPA VOY. 238 SB

Container Number

SOXU 690935-7 20' box

Container Operator

Ships Call Position

Originating CFS

Distribution:

WHITE COPY

TERMINAL

YELLOW COPY

ACCOMPANY CONTAINER

PINK COPY

REGIONAL OFFICE

(CONTAINER OPERATOR)

HEAD OFFICE

GREEN COPY

Discharge Terminal

Destination CFS

(CONTAINER OPERATOR)

AQABA

BLUE COPY

PACKER

Marks and Numbers

Numbers and Types of Packages

D.G. Consec

U.N. No.

IMCO Class and

Gross Wt (k)

Name and Description of Goods

Number

Flash Point (C)

1 X 20' CTR S.T.C.

60 IRON DRUMS

6234

1897

6.1

21.240

PERCHLORETHYLENE

NETT WEIGHT: 20.100 KOS

FLASHPOINT ----

EMS 6.1-02

MFAG 340

60 DRUMS

21.240

Total No. of Packages

Figure C-3. Sample Dangerous/Hazardous Cargo Manifest

C-7

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

CODE NAME: "CONGENBILL" EDITION 1978

Shipper

BILL OF LADING

Addulla's Fertilizer Company

TO BE USED WITH CHARTER-PARTIES

175 Nosrat Ave,

Reference No. 001

Baghdad, Iraq

Consignee

Yesle Associates

P.O. Box 8768

Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Notify address

Yesle Associates

P.O. Box 8768

Dubai, United Arab Emirates

ORIGINAL

Vessel

Port of loading

Mv Andrea Gail

Umm Qasr

Port of discharge

Abu Dhabi

Shipper's description of goods

Gross weight

375.00 NET METRIC TONS OF Sheep Manure

375.45 MT

WITH THE FOLLOWING SPECIFICATIONS

POLARIZATION : 99.8 DEGREES MIN

HUMINITY : 0.40 OCT MAX

COLOR : 45 - 60 ICUMSA UNITS MAX

ASH CONTENTS : 0.04 PCT MAX

SO2 : 20 P.P.M. MAX

AS. : 1 P.P.M. MAX

PB. : 2 P.P.M. MAX

CU. : 3 P.P.M. MAX

NPN STAPH AUREUS : NIL

NUMBER OF BAGS : 15,000

EMPTY BAGS : 100

LC NUMBER K711040 AND BUYER REFERENCE NUMBER

98/44/293

AS PER INDENT NO. 07-04-00

GROSS WEIGHT : 375.45 METRIC TONS

NET WEIGHT : 375.00 METRIC TONS

ADDRESS OF THE IMPORTER / BUYER

Yesle Associates, P.O. Box 8768

Dubai, United Arab Emirates

CLEAN ON BOARD : 07-04-00

FREIGHT PREPAID

Freight payable as per

at the Port of Loading in apparent good order and

SHIPPED

condition on board the vessel for carriage to the

C H A R T E R-P A R T Y dated

On Receipt

Port of Discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get the goods

specified above. Weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition, contents

FREIGHTADVANCE

and value unknown.

IN WITNESS whereof the Master or Agent of the said Vessel has signed

Received on account of freight:

the number of Bills of Lading indicated below all of this tenor and date,

any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void.

$1500.00

FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF.

Time used for loading

days

hours.

Freight payable at

Place and date of issue

Abu Dhabi

Umm Qasr, 07-04-00

Number of original Bs/L

Signature

TOB YOR OR I F E

THREE

Figure C-4. Sample Bill of Lading

C-8

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

CERTIFICATE OF

United Arab Emirates REGISTRY

(Issued under the provisions of the Sections 8-35 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1982)

Certificate of Registry NR: 4790

WHEREAS,

The Government of United Arab Emirates, has considered and approved the application of the:

*** Andrea Gail ***

Owned by:

Almarjan Shipping

Of Ajman, U.A.E.

THEREFORE:

Be it resolved, that there be issued, pursuant to the terms of the Merchant Shipping Act, a982, this Certificate of registry to

the said vessel entitling her to engage in foreign trade under the flag of United Arab Emirates and be accorded the rights

and the privileges of a United Arab Emirates vessel in accordance with the terms of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1982.

The vessel is a Dry Cargo.

Issued by the authority of the Government of United Arab Emirates,

Under my hand and seal, this 12 Jul 2000.

On behalf of the Government of United Arab Emirates,

The Commissioner for Maritime Affairs

Rex Neptunus

This Certificate is permanent

Figure C-7. Sample Certificate of Registry

C-13

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

ANNEX D

Boarding Procedures

D001 Introduction

MIO boarding operations are potentially hazardous and require attention to detail by all boarding party

members.

D002 Embarkation

Initial Embarkation. The security team should board first and set up security in the vicinity of

the ladder prior to the embarkation of the remainder of the boarding party. The boat engineer (equipped

with a rifle) should be positioned to provide cover for the boarding party as it embarks. The suspect ves-

sel’s pilot ladder may be in poor condition, so no more than two men should be on the ladder at the same

time. Remain clear of the area under the pilot ladder during embarkation to avoid objects that may fall

from other members on the ladder. Once the boarding party is on board, use the 20-metre line with snap

hook to hoist the boarding kit and any other bulky equipment on board.

Security Positioning. The following three principles for establishing security positions must

always be considered:

a. Observation. Security positions should be selected that provide unencumbered observation

of the entire area. Consider climbing onto a deckhouse or other high point to provide maximum

visibility. The security position should be established so that every guard is within the field of view

of at least one other guard.

b. Line of Fire. Security positions should provide a clear line of fire in the direction of the threat

at all times. Personnel moving within the security area should be careful not to mask the line of fire

of established security positions.

c. Triangulation. Forming triangularly oriented security positions should provide overlapping

fields of view while providing a relatively clear line of fire for all members.

NOTE

These three principles not only apply to guards, but should be fully employed by all

boarding party members as they move throughout the vessel.

Boarding Party Introduction. The boarding party will normally be greeted by the vessel’s

first mate or another officer. The BO should introduce himself and ask to speak to the ship’s master. The

BO should introduce himself to the vessel’s master and clearly state the procedures that will be used to

conduct the boarding. Every effort should be made to relay to the master that the BT is simply following

orders and that no harm to his vessel or crew is intended. The BO must be cordial, yet maintain control of

the conversation.

Command Presence. Command presence is the psychological process (conduct, speech, and

procedure) used by the BO to convince others that the situation is under control. The BO’s initial instruc-

tions may make all the difference. The BO should clearly communicate expectations to the master and

crew from the outset.

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ORIGINAL

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Boarding Party Safety. The safety of the boarding party is paramount. It is essential that the

presence, if any, of weapons aboard the vessel be determined as soon as possible. (The OSC may have in-

quired about weapons aboard the vessel prior to the arrival of the boarding party.) Recommended courses

of action for dealing with weapons aboard the vessel are as follows:

a. Secure weapons in the boarding bag.

b. Post a guard on the weapons.

c. Lock the weapons in a safe place.

d. Separate weapons and ammunition and secure them on the body (least desirable method).

D003 Crew Control

Every member of the boarding party must display the command presence described above when dealing

with the crew of the suspect vessel. The following principles for crew control have been established:

a. Adjust the security response as necessary.

b. Keep the vessel’s crew together.

c. Observe the vessel’s crew for signs of anger or resistance.

d. Be aware of and recognize changes in the degree of risk. If the degree of risk becomes

unacceptably high, don’t hesitate to call for help or depart the vessel and wait for help.

D004 Inspection

Based upon previous intelligence, checking the documentation and identification of the vessel will help to

determine the type of sweep or search to be conducted.

D005 Completion/Debarkation

Upon completion of the boarding, the following options are recommended for the return of

weapons:

a. Leave weapons and ammunition separately with the master.

b. Leave them where they were found.

security team is the last to leave the suspect vessel. Caution must be exercised by the entire board-

ing party not to become lax or let its guard down during the debarkation.

D006 Tactical Sweep Procedures

A security and personnel sweep is a function of the operational environment. The sweep should be

routinely performed at the onset of every boarding. A sweep is done to locate and neutralize all weapons,

search for unaccounted personnel, and detect all obvious safety hazards. The security and personnel

sweep should include an inspection of all common spaces and man-sized compartments aboard the vessel.

Security and personnel sweep normally should be performed by the search team. The master

should be informed by the BO of a sweep with a statement similar to “Captain, a couple of men will now

make a sweep of your vessel to check for obvious safety hazards, verify the identity of your vessel, and

D-2

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

ATP-71

account for all crew members. They will not disturb the personal effects of your crew.” The importance of

a good sweep cannot be overly emphasized. There have been repeated instances where security sweeps

have discovered that the master lied about the number of persons on board and found people hiding in

staterooms, bilges, and even in holds. Additionally, unreported weapons and safety hazards are not un-

common and may be discovered with a proper sweep.

In any high-risk boarding, two aspects of tactical competence are tested: the physical mechanics of

the movements made and the decision-making or tactical thinking that initiates them. In searching a ves-

sel for unaccounted personnel who may be primed to attack, be competent in both aspects.

Tactical sweep procedures include observing proper safety precautions, light and sound discipline,

appropriate entry and movement techniques, and a thorough examination of the vessel. The following

mental preparations are important for safety:

a. Never feel completely safe in securing any vessel. Complacency tempts fate. Always think and

expect an attack, then base actions on tactics that will counter it.

b. Keep in mind that no tactical concept is perfect. (Each involves a tradeoff: sacrificing something

to gain something else.) If a procedure does not work favourably, then think of something else.

Remember that it is impossible to achieve total immunity from risk. Employ proved techniques that

minimize risk.

c. Be flexible. As each new problem on the search is approached, assess the threat potential it

presents and select the tactical techniques that buy the greatest safety in that location at that time.

Think about each situation before moving into it. Be able to change plans completely as matters

progress and things are encountered.

d. Do not try to search a vessel alone. A two person team is required to search most vessels with any

degree of safety. A very large vessel will require additional personnel.

When entering a compartment that may be occupied by an hostile suspect, the risk of injury is in-

creased. If there is any other reasonable option, don’t go in.

The greatest hazard when boarding is the ability of a person to hide and wait in an almost limitless

number of spaces. Within the maze of doorways, passageways, ladders, furnishings, cargo, closets, false

compartments, nooks and crannies in a vessel, the natural odds overwhelmingly favour the hunted over

the hunter. Yet, despite the infinite variables presented by a vessel at sea, be tactical in approaching any of

them. It is true that there is no standard vessel, but there are standard movements that can be adapted to the

multitude of tactical problems encountered on a vessel.

Have the appropriate equipment when searching a vessel. In addition to the items on the belt, con-

sider carrying:

a. A piece(s) of cord with a loop on the end for tying to doorknobs.

b. A tactical mirror. (A good mirror (for sweeps) can be made by gluing a convex fisheye mirror to

a regular inspection mirror with a telescope handle. The mirror can then be used in lieu of the quick

peek in all tactical sweep situations.)

c. Extra cuffs (thumb or flex cuffs).

d. An ear mike for the radio.

D-3

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

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e. A pen light in case the bulb burns out on the primary flashlight or it may be used as a door prop.

(Rubber doorstops can also be carried for this purpose.)

f. A small roll of masking tape for marking previously searched compartments.

g. A small notebook for recording information such as serial numbers, etc.

When deciding to enter a vessel on a personnel sweep, enter as tactically sound as any subsequent

movement inside. Keep in mind that a hostile suspect can always be waiting just on the other side. Always

expect the unexpected and always do the unexpected. If someone is waiting, his territory is being moved

into.

Approaching and Entering a Compartment. A key consideration is the proper use of

search patterns. While moving up or down stairways or ladders, along hallways, and through rooms, keep

your back toward, but slightly away from the bulkhead. Although the hostile suspect may be able to shoot

through some bulkheads, this search pattern will generally provide some cover for the backside. Not ex-

posing your back will cause a comfortable feeling and provide the ability to concentrate on advancing.

Remember, the potential threat locations are ahead. Team members should be physically oriented to do

the best fighting forward. Proper procedures were not used if a team member finds himself in a compart-

ment where he feels his back is not covered.

The Fatal Funnel.

(1) The fatal funnel concept (see Figure D-1) is usually thought of in terms of standing in or

through the opening. If a suspect is hiding along the same wall that the door is on, the arc of visi-

bility through the opening door may be such that the suspect can see (and shoot) even if some-

one is standing to the side of the actual doorway. To be truly clear of the fatal funnel, stand as far

back from the doorway as possible while it is being opened.

(2) When crossing a doorway, especially if the door is open, consider leaping rather than walk-

ing or crawling. It is noisier, but creates a faster moving target. Be sure to start up and end well to

the sides of the doorframe. Don’t mimic movie police by swinging into the centre of the door-

way with the weapon pointed into the room, then pivoting to the other side. That slow-motion

move prolongs exposure to the fatal funnel. When going to move, move quickly. When going to

shoot, shoot quickly. Do not try to accommodate both with the same tactic.

(3) Be certain to avoid doing a tactical sweep alone, whenever possible. However, if it becomes

necessary to go alone, keep the following in mind:

(a) If a compartment whose door opens inward is in the path, approach the door on the side

opposite the hinges.

(b) Take cover behind the bulkhead and quietly, but forcefully shove the door open. If pos-

sible, look through the crack between the door and the bulkhead to see if anyone is behind

the door. Inspect as much of the compartment as possible from the covered position.

enough to see, then quickly ducking back. This is referred to as a quick peek. When doing a

quick peek, do so at a higher or lower than normal level by stooping or standing on the

tiptoes.

(d) When approaching a compartment whose door opens outward, approach the door on

the side opposite the hinges. Take cover behind the bulkhead and quietly pull the door open.

Inspect as much of the compartment as possible from the covered position.

D-4

ORIGINAL

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(e) If the door opens out, the man on the knob side should loop a cord around the knob and

throw the end to his partner, staying back along the wall as far as possible from the door-

way, reaching out full arms length, and unlatching the door.

(f) After having pulled back and readied his weapon, the other man should pull the door

open.

(g) If the door opens in, the person on the knob side should try to unlatch the door. First,

open the door an inch, back away, and listen for a moment. Next, shove the door open with

enough force to strike the wall or a person hiding behind it.

(h) When entering the door, the following should be performed:

(1) Strive for speed, surprise, and safety.

(2) Quick peek before moving, then get in and get low, protect the back, and get the area of re-

sponsibility under control as quickly as possible.

(3) Don’t dally in the doorway.

(4) For speed, move in high with nothing lower than a slight crouch. (Going in low with the

knees radically bent will be too slow.) Move in high, and then get low.

(5) Once across the threshold, get away from the door.

(6) In essence, use a pattern, a tactical way of entering in minimum time with minimum expo-

sure. Patterns are not absolutes, and getting in fast is more important than executing a perfect

entry movement. Some of the more common methods are described below.

The Buttonhook. The buttonhook (see Figure D-2) can be used when working alone or in a

two-man team. After visual inspection from outside the door, quickly enter the compartment,

hooking away from the door and keeping back to the bulkhead while entering. In a two-man team,

normally enter together on signal. If the doorway is too narrow to enter together, decide by signal

who will go first, and then quickly enter one after the other. In cases where furniture or other objects

obstruct the view of the entire room, after entering, slowly move further into the room keeping the

back towards the bulkhead until the compartment seems to be safe. Two-man teams usually work

down opposite bulkheads. Commonly on vessels, doorways are located at the ends of passageways,

thereby preventing both men from getting on either side of the door. In this instance, wrap around

the door to the other side of the wall (one at a time, from the same side of the door and keeping the

backs close to the frame).

c. The Crisscross. The crisscross (see Figure D-3) is the entry of choice for a dynamic entry.

With the door closed, take up positions on opposite sides of the door. On signal, the man opposite

the hinges opens the door and using the door as a shield during the initial arc of 70°, quickly enters

the compartment, assuming a position to the side of the doorway. Once clear of the doorway, the

second man enters to the opposite side of the room.

When the doorway is too narrow to enter simultaneously, the crisscross is an effective nondynamic room

entry because, unlike the buttonhook, it is possible to see the destination before getting there.

d. The Special Air Service. The special air service (SAS) pattern can be used as a non-dynamic

room entry when it is impossible to stand on each side of the doorway for entry. (See Figure D-4.) It

is a technique where two or more men position themselves heel to toe on one side of the door, and

one man holds onto the belt of the man in front of him. On signal, both men simultaneously rush into

D-6

ORIGINAL

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Figure D-2. The Buttonhook

the room. As each man in line enters the compartment, he lets go of the belt and positions himself at

a predetermined location inside the room.

e. The Israeli. Many search teams do an Israeli move (see Figure D-5) before they enter a

compartment. The position for a quick peek into a compartment is the same position as for an Israeli

move. On signal, immediately follow a quick peek with another quick peek with handgun being the

third eye. In other words, swing only the gun hand into the compartment from the barricade

position, sweeping the area of responsibility, then move back outside to set up for a standard entry.

f. For all entry techniques, if the right hand is the stronger hand and the right side of the doorway is

being entered, switch weapon to the left hand. This minimizes exposure of the body in case it

becomes necessary to engage a suspect hiding against the wall. The same holds true for a

left-handed person on the left side of a doorway.

g. All entry tactics, while infinitely better than impulsively rushing the room, are tricky to perform

and require practice.

D-7

ORIGINAL

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Figure D-3. The Crisscross

10.

Tactical Movement. Nothing is more important to surviving vessel sweeps than the principle

of concealment that can minimize the risk. This can help in constructing a systematic plan rather than re-

lying on random movement. Yet, ironically, when conducting tactical sweeps, often many of these tacti-

cal principles cannot be applied because of constraints in manpower, the impulses of human nature, or the

realities of vessel design. Adhere to these principles as if they were the moral principles of life and appre-

ciate their value. Try to adhere to them as often as possible and understand that there will be times when

they will have to be compromised because of uncontrollable elements. At the very least, be aware when

they are violated and why. The following are some specific tactical movement strategies:

a. Clearing the Room. After entering a room and establishing the areas of responsibility, clear

the room with the same amount of safety used to enter it. Threat locations typically include under

beds, behind large pieces of furniture, in closets, or around corners within the room. Look

especially for doors that are open and doorways that lead to adjoining rooms. The primary area of

interest will be that spot which, if a hostile person were hiding there, would give him the greatest

opportunity to attack.

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Figure D-4. The SAS.

b. The Most Immediate Threat. Always take care of the most immediate threat first, even if it

is not the greatest threat. The rules of the room says one ought to always move around the

perimeters of rooms with back to the wall. In reality, furnishings or other obstacles often prevent

this, especially on vessels. In large holds, mess decks, or other large spaces, it is tactically sound for

decreasing the chance of exposing the back to a suspect. Stay low to reduce the possibility of being

a target.

c. Stationary/Moving Man. No matter which partner chooses to negotiate the same side of the

room or along opposite sides, only one should move at a time. The other should provide security.

Usually, the stationary man performs most of the searching. The moving man will be able to open

closet doors or lift void covers so the stationary officer can see into them.

d. Weapon Preparation. While moving, ready weapon to meet force with force. Forcefully

challenge noises or movement not identifiable from the nearest cover by saying (for example),

“You in the closet! Come out! Hands first!” Command the crewman to come. Do not approach what

may turn out to be an armed crewman waiting.

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Figure D-5. The Israeli Move

e. Adversary’s Field of View. While moving, think constantly about the cover and the

adversary’s field of view. Could a crewman be hidden in a spot from which he could see (or shoot)?

As a tactical minimum, never enter a field of view that a partner cannot cover.

f. Positioning. Remain aware of own position relative to where a crewman may be and the

position relative to that of the partner. Partners getting into each other’s crossfire are a major risk,

especially in the close quarters of a vessel and where high stress tends to keep them engrossed in the

search process.

g. Bunching Effect. Avoid the bunching effect, the tendency to cluster together in the illusion

of safety in preparation to move, enter, or search. The closer partners are, the easier it is for an

adversary to shoot both of them. Tactical separation buys time for proper reaction. However,

partners should not distance themselves apart to a point where they cannot keep in visual contact.

They should be able to see each other at all times, except in extreme circumstances.

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h. Triangulation. Strive for the principle of triangulation, which promotes tactical separation,

minimizes crossfire and bunching, and maximizes the impact of defensive fire by directing it to a

central point. (See Figure D-6) To understand triangulation, think of the potential hiding places in

the field of view as being at the apex of a triangle. Ideally, both partners should be positioned so as

to form the other corners of the triangle relative to each of these hiding places. If a threat presents

itself, it is then possible to direct fire at it from different angles, while the adversary will be forced to

separate his fire power in order to hit both partners. While moving to clear areas of responsibility,

one partner shifts his position to maintain triangulation on new potential threat locations.

(1) Two movement techniques that accommodate this principle of triangulation are follow the

leader and leapfrog. They are described as follows:

(a) Follow the leader is a technique where one man moves, and then stops, then the second

man moves to his position (maintaining tactical separation). The second man also has rear

guard responsibilities.

(b) Leapfrog is a technique where one man searches an area, then signals when it has been

secured. The second man then moves past him into a new area and secures it.

(2) These two methods are used at various times during a vessel search. If one partner insists on

moving about in a careless manner, the other partner should cover and not be lured into joining

him in untactical movements.

11.

Movement Strategies During a Search. Employ the following during a search:

a. Make sure that only one man moves at a time. (One covers while one moves.) This principle

ensures that someone is always maintaining control and is prepared to provide reliable defence.

b. Look before leaping. Spot a covered or concealed position and plan the route to it prior to

moving. Move by short bounds from one covered or concealed location to another. Keep low and

don’t hesitate to creep or crawl.

c. Take full advantage of shadows and dark areas after making certain that no one is hiding in a

potential moving spot.

d. Shift slowly while moving. Don’t wave the arms or rapidly turn the head.

e. Be conscious of self-made noises. The crewman will probably know of the team’s presence,

especially once the team enters the compartment where he’s hiding. Breathing alone may be

enough to alert him. It is amazing how acute the senses can be when someone is hiding and waiting

for someone. Don’t help him by jangling keys, jingling coins in the pocket, carrying squawky

radios, or wearing watches with alarms.

f. Minimize noise by using the sides of the feet to lightly feel the floor, rolling forward with the

whole length of the outer edge of the foot before putting any weight on it.

g. Consider eliminating visual noise, such as ball caps with protruding bills. At least turn it around

backward if it is worn at all. Besides announcing the team’s presence in manoeuvres like the quick

peek, a hat bill will restrict the peripheral vision and may discourage the team from looking up, an

important and often neglected part of searching.

h. Get rid of the loudness of unnecessary odours, too. The scent of cologne can give locations away

as easily as being heard.

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Figure D-6. The Triangulation Concept

i. Search with a gun on hand. It is disadvantageous enough to encounter a threat without being slow

to respond by having to draw a weapon. Keep the following in mind:

(1) When standing or moving, avoid the movie cop syndrome by holding the gun beside the

head. There is a risk of shooting off a partner’s head.

(2) Move with the gun pulled back snugly in a two-hand hold against the waist, at the belt

buckle, and with the muzzle pointed slightly downward. Having the gun in this position pro-

vides good stability, even to release one hand to open doors or balance against a rocking ship.

Then, if a threat comes unexpectedly from either side, the team member(s) will be on target (re-

ferred to as the third eye concept).

(3) Employ the third eye concept because as the body turns toward a threat, the gun (lined up in

the centre) turns, too. This turning is the essence of instinct shooting: what the gun sees as a third

eye, it can hit.

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When searching for a suspect:

(1) Avoid passing any potential hiding place without first checking and securing it. Do not dis-

miss any space for being too small or too unlikely. Motivated by the fear of being caught, hu-

mans can squeeze into amazingly small spaces.

(2) When searching an area of a vessel without having found someone, keep the senses sharp

by thinking “I didn’t find anyone” and not “There is no one in there.”

(3) While searching, pause frequently and just listen. Remember, the crewman is excited and

under stress, too. He may make a noise because his throat is dry, or he may get a muscle cramp.

(4) Do not rush the search. Because the mind may be accelerating under stress does not mean

the movements have to accelerate to match.

(5) If a person is found, perform the following:

(a) Move him to a secure area.

(b) Handcuff and search him for weapons (one team member only, while the other pro-

vides cover).

to get him.

(d) Remember that if both team members leave the area, they will have to search their way

to their previous location. Finding one unaccounted-for crewman should be a flag to search

for more.

After clearing a room, be sure that all doors and accesses behind have been closed and locked, if

possible, before moving on. Place pieces of masking tape across the top of the door and collect them

when passing these places on the way out. Also, make sure that none of the tape has been disturbed.

l. If a barricaded crewman is encountered and cannot be talked out, try to wait him out, smoke him

out, or starve him out. Do not try to go in and get him. Leave that to the professionals. Lock him in, if

possible, or post a guard and leave him.

12.

Tactical Communications.

a. Communications with other team members during the conduct of a sweep should be

accomplished by using nonverbal signals. See Figure D-7 for a few of the standard signals and their

meanings.

b. Decisions dealing with who will go first, who will be high, who will be low, etc., are made

simply by pointing and directing with the hands. Normally, the person in charge of a search team

initiates the communication.

c. The sounds partners make while communicating should be soft, also. Instead of speaking out

loud (a hard sound that can easily be pinpointed), whisper (a soft sound whose precise location

cannot be so easily placed). Obviously, if a threat is imminent, shout out loud so there is no doubt

that the warning is heard. While moving through the interior of the vessel, keep in mind that

everyone may not always hear or see the same things, even though it may seem impossible that they

wouldn’t.

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LEGEND

1. SAS

2. BUTTONHOOK

3. CRISSCROSS

4. QUICK PEEK

5. ISRAELI

6. COVER ME

Figure D-7. Nonverbal Signals

In addition to the above, employ the following:

(1) Be sure that communication does not require either partner to look away from his area of re-

sponsibility. Hand and head signals should be used only when they can be seen in direct or pe-

ripheral vision while attention is kept on the potential threat location. Normally, the man in

front uses hand signals, while the man at the rear whispers, because his whisper will project for-

ward. If in front, resist the impulse to look back to see if the other person got the message. When

either partner receives a message, whisper or signal back to the other person that the message

was received. Signals need to be very simple so they won’t be forgotten or confused under

stress.

(2) Do not rub against walls while moving from one spot to another due to possible exposure

and ricochet fire. To avoid being ambushed or surprised by someone on a different level, take

care to check openings above and below while moving. In a situation where close attention must

be given to the level above, cover the area into which the team is moving (see Figure D-8) while

one partner, walking backwards and guided by the other partner, covers the higher level away

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Figure D-8. The Cover Concept

from the area into which the team is moving. If a possible threat is detected, the team should take

cover and confront the threat.

(3) Enter the passageways cautiously because they are ready-made for an ambush. Due to the

possibility of an ambush, employ the following:

(a) Take a quick peek to clear the passageway before entering it. Instead of peeking around

a corner, move to the opposite wall and peek out. (If someone is just around the corner, this

will maximize the distance between them and the team member(s).)

(b) Utilize the slicing the pie option (see Figure D-9) while entering passageways or a cor-

ner and a threat may be on the other side. When near the corner, move away from the wall as

far as possible, face the corner, and, while shuffling to the side, gradually increase the arc of

visibility around it. Once the decision has been made to enter the passageway, only one man

should enter at a time. Again, one man should move and one should cover. While moving

around, always try to keep some cover in sight: a place to retreat if trouble explodes.

(crouching low) while the other covers him. When the first man gets to his destination, the

other may advance.

(d) While moving up a ladder (see Figure D-10), one team member should slide up the lad-

der on his back, using his heels to push himself. The second team member should provide

cover to the front. When moving down the ladder, take one or two steps down, exposing

only the feet, and then do a quick peek before proceeding. Use a mirror to look into a com-

partment to prevent being exposed.

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Figure D-9. Slicing the Pie

(e) Remember that there are two objectives when approaching a search: To move through

the passageway to reach a more distant area that was intended to be entered and searched, or

to position one’s self in the passageway to enter a room that opens off the passageway.

13.

Tactical Lighting.

a. One method of expanding the field of view is through the manipulation of light in darkened

locations. Where there is controllable lighting, move from dark areas into lighted ones and never

the reverse, if possible. If, prior to entering a compartment, it is impossible to turn on its lights, turn

the lights out in the occupied room. Do not form a silhouette by moving with bright light behind.

Light switches in most compartments are opposite the hinge side of the door about chest height off

the floor. Don’t linger around the switch too long, though; the other guy probably knows where it is,

too.

b. Use the following procedures prior to entering compartments in which the lights cannot be

turned on:

(1) Take cover together on the same side of the doorway with the partner standing and facing

the wall as far back from the doorway as possible and holding his flashlight pointing into the

compartment near the top of the doorway.

(2) Lay on the deck and peek into the compartment with weapon ready. On signal from one

partner, the other partner should turn the light on.

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Figure D-10. The Ladder Concept

(3) Send signals to the partner by pulling either up, down, left, or right on his pants leg. The

partner should then correspond by slowly moving the flashlight in the direction of the pull.

c. When performed properly, a person inside the compartment can only see a bright light near the

top of the door. Use of this technique and slicing the pie should provide a look at most of the

compartment.

d. When moving about a dark compartment, consider using the harries flashlight technique. The

flashlight is held with the back-of-flashlight hand meeting the back-of-gun hand. The two press

together to create dynamic tension that stabilizes the pistol. Depending on hand and flashlight

shape, the light button may be controlled by the little finger, index finger, or thumb. The idea is to

flash momentarily, change position, and do it again, leaving the light out while moving. Regardless

of the illumination created, before passing any corner or entering any doorway, see what may be

waiting on the other side.

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E007 Ship Control Team Turnover Checklist

ITEM

COMPLETE

Suspect vessel crew mustered and under control

Review crew security measures in place

Determine compliance of master and crew

Identify key crew members (master, mates, engineer, deckhands etc)

Determine primary language(s) of master and crew (request linguist

support if necessary and available)

Determine any crew special medical considerations

Determine any crew special religious considerations

Review location of crew containment area, relocate if necessary

Inspect crew messing and berthing arrangements and food/water

stores. If insufficient stores for transit to diversion port, request

re-supply from escort

Establish primary and secondary rally points

Check primary and secondary ship communications circuits, including sus-

pect vessel BTB

Review suspect vessel internal communications arrangements

Inspect navigation equipment

Test/inspect navigation lights

Inspect liferafts

Identify and locate any potential fire/flood or toxic hazards

Determine proposed fire/flooding/gas boundaries (transverse bulkheads/

doors/watertight hatches)

Ensure water and fuel integrity is satisfactory and sufficient for expected

transit

Conduct seaworthiness assessment

Ensure adequate DC equipment is available

Ensure engineering plant functioning and stable. If sabotages request spe-

cialist assistance from escort

Check for throttle control satisfactory

Ensure steering arrangement/control is satisfactory

Test/inspect deck equipment, in particular anchor, cable and capstan

Take custody of any weapons discovered by initial take down team

Verify there is no apparent damage/casualty/sabotage that would make the

vessel unseaworthy (as per seaworthiness assessment criteria) or unsafe

Conduct deck/ship control/engineering equipment familiarization

Review engineering plates/blueprints (if available)

Ensure SCT is familiar with suspect vessel deck and engineering layout

Verify that SCT manning is sufficient to operate suspect vessel

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E008 Boarding Officer Task List

ITEM

COMPLETE/VALUE

COMMS Checks

Channel __________ (CO, OOD, Boat, BO)

Channel __________ (ABO, Search Team, Security Team)

Embark time

Security team aboard time

ABO aboard time

Establish triangulated security perimeter

BO aboard time

Boarding Officer greet Master

Confirm vessel crew muster

Notify supporting ship of status

Post watch over suspect vessel crew

Conduct sweep

Inspect papers

Certificate of registry

Logs

Crew and passenger list

Bill of Health

Clearance papers

Invoices or Cargo Manifest

Bill of Lading

Ship's Charter

Receipts documenting on load of cargo/stores

Tank sounding data

Tank capacity (metric tons)

Intelligence collection requirements

Documentation which establishes a link to sanctions violators

Charts

Notify teams of dangerous cargo discovered

Compare papers for inconsistencies

Verify cargo count

Give recommendations to CO

Make appropriate Deck Log entries

Extradition method

Disembark suspect vessel time

Recover to supporting ship time

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Annex F

OPTASK MIO and Information

to be Included in OPTASK MIO SUPP

F001 OPTASK MIO

The OPTASK MIO will be promulgated by the designated MCC. An example follows:

A1/REFERENCES (REF)

A2/PERIOD COVERED (PERIOD)

A3/ADMINISTRATIVE

/1/DEFINITIONS

/2/PURPOSE

A4/TASKING (TASKING)

C2/THREAT

/2/ROE (THREAT)

D1/MISSION (MISSION)

I1/AIR TASKING (AIRTASK)

X1/REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS (REPINST)

/1/GENERAL

/2/INITIAL QUERY AND BOARDING REPORT

Y1/SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (SPECINST)

/1/OPGEN/OPTASK MIO SUPP GUIDANCE

/2/SEAWORTHINESS ASSESSMENT

/3/SECURITY TEAM

/4/SEARCH LIMITATIONS

/5/ASYLUM AND SAFE HAVEN

/6/SAFETY

F002 OPTASK MIO SUPP

The OPTASK MIO will be amplified by the appointed MIO commander through promulgation of an

OPTASK MIO SUPP. The OPTASK MIO SUPP should address the following topics:

a. Definition/designation of contacts of interest

b. Intelligence/information collection guidelines including priority of EEIs.

c. Self-defence/collective self-defence

d. Query/BTB COMMS guidance

e. Authority to determine compliant, non-compliant, opposed boarding

f. Authority to conduct compliant, non-compliant, and opposed boarding

g. CONOPS for ship support of SOF and/or interagency participation in MIO

h. CONOPS for integration of allied forces

i. Entry/pursuit into territorial waters and airspace

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GLOSSARY

This Glossary contains abbreviations and acronyms used in this document as well as others commonly

used in joint and combined operations. A comprehensive list of NATO abbreviations is contained in

AAP-15, the NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications.

ABO

assistant boarding officer

assault force

AFC

assault force commander

AMC

air mission commander

anti-terrorism

ATL

assault team leader

boarding officer

boarding party

boarding team

BTB

bridge-to-bridge

command and control

CESM

communications electronic support measures

CIC

combat information centre

commanding officer

COMMS

communications

damage control

DIW

dead in water

EEBD

emergency egress breathing device

EEI

essential elements of information

EMCON

emission control

electro-optical

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

ESM

electronic warfare support measures

Glossary-1

CHANGE 2

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RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

N°

Reference/date of

Date entered

Signature

Amendment

EXPLANATORY NOTES

AGREEMENT

This NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) is promulgated by the Director

NATO Standardization Agency under the authority vested in him by the NATO

Standardization Organisation Charter.

No departure may be made from the agreement without informing the tasking

authority in the form of a reservation. Nations may propose changes at any time to the

tasking authority where they will be processed in the same manner as the original

agreement.

Ratifying nations have agreed that national orders, manuals and instructions

implementing this STANAG will include a reference to the STANAG number for purposes

of identification.

RATIFICATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESERVATIONS

Ratification, implementation and reservation details are available on request or

through the NSA websites (internet https://nsa.nato.int; NATO Secure WAN

http://nsa.hq.nato.int).

FEEDBACK

Any comments concerning this publication should be directed to NATO/NSA -

Bvd Leopold III - 1110 Brussels - BEL.

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

STANAG 1444

(Edition 2)

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT

(STANAG)

MARITIME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CONDUCT

OF FAST ROPING AND RAPPELLING (FRR)

Annex:

FRR BRIEFING GUIDE FOR AIRCREW/BOARDING PARTY

AIM

The aim of this agreement is to specify the detailed requirements for the safe

conduct of maritime cross deck fast roping and rappelling (FRR) utilising national and/or

another nation’s aircraft and personnel.

AGREEMENT

The participating nations agree to adhere to, as a minimum, the requirements and

procedures specified in this STANAG.

GENERAL

The requirement exists for NATO nations to be able to conduct combined joint

maritime FRR operations. This may include FRR of a national helicopter and crew

composition to another nation’s deck as well as mixing aircraft and crews from different

nations for a specific operation.

Before using mixed nation FRR teams for operational missions the formal bi- or

multi-lateral agreement(s) of each participating nation is required. Pre briefing is a

mandatory requirement before conducting cross deck FRR Operations, specifically hand

signals, emergencies and method of descending are to be briefed. An intensive training

phase prior to conducting multinational FRR on an operational level is mandatory. FRR

operations in general should only be undertaken when it is viewed as the most efficient

and practical method of completing a task. The decision to FRR will be decided based on

such constraints as hover height, team member weight, etc.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

FRR operations require thorough planning and a high degree of cockpit/cabin

crew co-ordination. Whilst the aircraft commander retains overall responsibility for the

aircraft and the conduct of the operation, the rope master is responsible to the aircraft

commander for the execution of the FRR operations. Within the cabin of the aircraft the

rope master is normally under the supervision of a qualified aircrew-member.

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Specific responsibilities are as follows:

Aircraft commander:

retains overall responsibility for the aircraft and the conduct of

operations.

ensures general safety of the operation.

ensures that aircraft hardware is inspected by qualified personnel

before flight.

ensures that all personnel are adequately briefed.

studies obstacles/hazards on the receiving ship and briefs

crew/boarding party accordingly.

determines hover-height for FRR operations in agreement with the

rope master.

selects drop zone.

authorises deployment of the rope and dispatch of boarding party.

Qualified cabin aircrew-member:

conducts aircraft safety briefing to boarding party personnel.

demonstrates hand-signals used for:

prepare for FRR.

next person to the rope.

GO.

break off.

emergency stop.

adopt crash position.

carry out emergency jump.

ensures correct attachment of FRR equipment and rope(s) to the

helicopter.

inspects equipment available (e.g. rappelling device, rope, aircraft

hook) and checks its compatibility (dependant on national

procedures).

is responsible for compliance to flight safety aspects within the cabin.

deploys rope(s) after being cleared by aircraft commander.

carries out the following checks after rope is deployed:

no knots in the rope(s).

sufficient rope lying on the drop zone iaw national procedures.

hover position and height appropriate for the operation.

retrieves/releases the rope after boarding party insertion.

continuously informs aircraft commander about the progression of

the FRR process.

indicates completion of FRR after final team member is on the

ground and clear of the rope(s).

Qualified Rope master (also referred to as dispatcher in some countries):

discusses conduct of FRR operations, national FRR procedures and

limitations of the team (if applicable) with aircraft commander /

aircrew.

is responsible for currency of team members.

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ensures correct attachment of FRR equipment and rope(s) to the

helicopter (dependant on national procedures).

inspects equipment available (e.g. rappelling device, rope, aircraft

hook) and checks its compatibility (dependant on national

procedures).

attends briefing of the aircraft commander on the operation.

conducts the briefing of team members after the aircrew briefing.

ensures that all team members are correctly dressed.

determines sequence of descent of the team member and reports it

to the qualified helicopter aircrew.

orders team members to the rope.

passes rope to rappellers and assists them in hooking up.

In case the rope master is a team member, he should be the final team

member to descend.

Team members:

check their specific dressing and equipment to ensure no loose

items or unsecured straps.

hook up to the rope.

clear the area underneath the helicopter immediately after descent.

Receiving ship during training only:

Ensure deck and personnel preparation is completed.

Maintain communications with helo for co-ordination.

Maintain suitable course and speed for helo to hover safely.

Be prepared to recover helo in an emergency if flight deck fitted.

Be prepared to render medical and emergency services if required.

TRAINING/CURRENCY

Aircrew and boarding party personnel are to be qualified and current in

accordance with National requirements.

All personnel are to have completed a brief on the agreed procedures before

commencing cross deck FRR operations.

Completion of the relevant national underwater escape trainer for boarding party

members is to be iaw the flying nation’s regulations.

EQUIPMENT

10.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for the team members during transit shall be

agreed to prior to mission brief. Team member operational dress shall be iaw national

standards.

11.

The FRR equipment (ropes, harnesses, rappelling devices, etc) shall be

compatible and authorized with the airframe and individual equipment of team members.

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PLANNING AND BRIEFING

12.

Besides the individual briefings of the aircrew and the FRR team, each

FRR operation will be preceded by a general planning briefing conducted in a language

understood by all participants. The briefing must be attended by the aircraft

commander, aircrew and the team leader and has to cover, as a minimum, the following

items:

conduct of the operation in general.

FRR drop zone (size, obstacles etc.).

probable hover height, maximum and minimum acceptable hover height.

actions in case of emergencies:

aircraft (engine failure, control malfunction, etc).

FRR (team member hung up during descent, fouled rope(s).

medical (team member injury).

number of team members to descend.

limitations of the FRR team / aircraft if applicable.

hazards caused by external equipment, if applicable.

method of team member recovery.

The aircrew and team members shall be briefed on the entire operation separately by the

aircraft captain and team leader as guided covering the details in Annex A. For FRR

training it is the aircraft commander’s responsibility to brief the receiving ship’s CO.

RIGGING AND INSPECTION

13.

The team leader and/or the cabin aircrew are responsible for the inspection of the

aircraft and rope prior to commencing operations. This will include:

Inspect the aircraft anchoring point(s) and attachment hardware.

Inspect the rope(s) for wear, moisture, dirt/grease and general condition.

Caution

If there is any doubt regarding the condition, compatibility or authorization of the

equipment, it shall not be used.

14.

For fast roping operations it is recommended that the fast rope be rigged with a

minimum of one safety line (where possible) which must bypass all possible primary

hardware failures. The safety line should be tied or spliced through the fast rope. This

safety line will be secured to a secondary strong point in the aircraft so that quick release

by the aircrew/team leader is possible in the case of emergency.

Note: Certain nations do not use a safety line.

CONDUCT

15.

The procedures used for FRR from helicopters may vary according to the different

types of aircraft used. There are, however, basic procedures that are common to all types

of helicopters.

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16.

The team members are only to approach the aircraft on the command of the

aircraft commander. Personnel are to walk to the aircraft and approach the door as

previously briefed.

17.

The rope master must embark first, secure him/herself with his/her harness and

ensure that the intercom (if required) is working properly

18.

All personnel should be seated in the appropriate exit order keeping movement in

the aircraft to a minimum; however, for particular circumstances (short transit/ bulky

equipment) this can be impractical and team members may be seated on the cabin floor.

Whenever possible, every effort should be made to secure the team. All personnel are to

remain seated until directed to exit.

19.

In the event of an in flight emergency, personnel are to remain seated and secure.

They are to wait until the rotors have stopped turning before exiting the aircraft, unless

directed otherwise by the aircrew.

20.

At night the helicopter landing lamp may be used (if appropriate) to facilitate the

boarding.

21.

Specifics for Fast rope and Rappelling differ and are described separately below.

FAST ROPE SPECIFICS

22.

Fast Ropers are to descend iaw their national procedure.

23.

The aircraft commander will specifically direct the deployment of the team. After

receiving permission to deploy the team the cabin aircrew/fast rope leader will direct the

release of personnel using the following sequence:

unfasten seat belts/harness (in suitably equipped aircraft).

stand by (designated personnel move to the door).

take position (roper closest to the rope rotates towards rope and grasps it at

eye level.

exit the aircraft.

Note: The sequence may be conducted using pre-briefed hand signals.

24.

If night fast roping is required a cylume is to be place at the end of the rope with

another 6 ft from the end. Additionally a third cylume should be placed at the top of the

rope just above the position where the team member would grab the rope to commence

the descent.

Caution

If the rope becomes entangled it may become a hazard to the aircraft. If this is the case,

the entangled rope will be jettisoned as soon as possible.

WARNING

The fast rope is NEVER to be secured to the deck or surface that it has been deployed

to.

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RAPPELLING SPECIFICS

25.

Rappellers are to descend in accordance with their national procedure.

26.

For safety reasons, the first rappeller should steady the line when reaching the

ground.

27.

Single/Multi-Point Rappelling

-The maximum number of ropes should be

determined by national procedures.

Although the basic procedures are the same as

those described in single rappelling procedures, there are additional drills that the rope

master must use.

WARNING

The rappelling rope is NEVER to be secured to the deck or surface that it has been

deployed to.

ACTIONS AFTER FRR

28.

After the team is deployed, the rope(s) will be retrieved or released clear of

personnel.

29.

If rope(s) is (are) to be released, the aircrewman checks that all team members

and stores are on the ground and clear of the rope(s). He may then drop the rope(s) and

allow it (them) to fall clear of the aircraft. If the aircrewman cannot clearly see each team

member on the ground for each rope, he must not drop the rope. If any doubt exists, the

rope must be pulled up until the end of the rope can be clearly seen above the ground

before jettisoning.

30.

The cabin aircrew will clear the pilot to depart before the aircraft leaves the hover

position.

FRR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

31.

Anyone can stop the procedure at anytime if it is thought that something is wrong or

unsafe.

32.

In case of an emergency the helicopter may have to depart from the FRR area

immediately to perform a flyaway or ditching manoeuvre. In this case the FRR process has

to be stopped immediately, team members in the cabin have to remain in the helicopter

and adopt the briefed crash position. In case of any minor emergencies training missions

are to be aborted. During operational FRR the further course of action will be decided by

the aircraft commander.

33.

Should a rappeller become hung up on the rope, the helicopter must descend

keeping clear of the obstacles.

34.

In the event of a FRR hardware failure, no further descents will be permitted.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX A to

STANAG 1444

(Edition 2)

FRR BRIEFING GUIDE FOR AIRCREW/BOARDING PARTY

Administration

•

Identify key personnel - Aircraft Commander/pilot/dispatcher (team leader).

•

Complete manifest.

•

Check qualification of aircrew, dispatcher and currency of team members.

Situation

•

Weather forecast.

- sea state/swell/visibility/wind/precipitation

•

Personnel involved.

•

Type of insertion/number.

•

Aircraft description.

•

Target ship

- name/type/size.

- landing zone details/obstacles.

- Required hover height.

•

Timings.

•

Threat/hazards.

•

Other aircraft (where they are approaching from and in what order).

Mission

•

Aim of FRR deployment.

Equipment

•

Equipment.

- personal/stores.

•

Rope length.

Execution

•

Loading order.

- stick order - load in reverse.

•

Embarking in aircraft.

- safe approach lane to aircraft.

- seat belts - thumbs up when secure in aircraft.

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•

Hand signals used.

- prepare for FRR.

- next person to the rope.

- GO.

- HOLD.

- break off.

- adopt crash position.

- carry out emergency jump.

•

Deploying team.

- exit location.

- do not move until instructed by dispatcher.

body/hand position for exit.

- clear rope below.

- make positive braking.

- clear area immediately after landing.

- assign positions for insertion.

- safety - stay alert/follow instruction.

- upon reaching the ground, the first rappeller should act as a brakeman.

Emergency Procedures

•

Helicopter emergency landing.

- Terminate FRR procedure.

boarding party member on rope complete descent as rapidly as possible.

once on ground clear from under aircraft immediately.

•

Altitude gain above rope length.

team member to apply braking action - lock off on rope.

wait for rope to return to ground before continuing.

immediately notify the Aircraft Commander.

•

Entangled rope.

Boarding party member will complete descent as rapidly as possible.

Rope master to release rope when all boarding party are off the rope.

•

If team member is ‘hung’ on to the rope, the dispatcher will make every effort to

recover the rope, however the likely option will be to descend to the lowest

possible altitude and place the roper on the deck in order that they may be freed.

Post Operation Procedures

•

Return/Secure equipment.

•

Muster for debrief - who, where, when.

•

Comments on SOPs.

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MTP 1(D), Vol. I

CHAPTER 8

Antisurface Warfare

SECTION 1 — GENERAL

8100 GENERAL

a. This chapter contains tactical and procedural instructions for ships (including submarines) and

aircraft when operating against enemy surface forces. Its purpose is to:

(1) Specify tactics and procedures in antisurface operations.

(2) Enable commanders to issue orders and instructions to fulfill their responsibilities.

(3) Enable subordinates to understand and comply with orders and instructions received.

b. NOT RELEASABLE

8101 COMMAND IN ANTISURFACE WARFARE

The OTCs functions in surface warfare, including those that may be delegated to the antisurface

warfare commander (ASUWC), are summarized in Table 1-3.

8102 FORCE TRACK COORDINATOR (FTC) SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE

The OTC may delegate surface and subsurface surveillance to one of the warfare commanders.

They in turn can assign a FTC. In principle the designated force track coordinator surface and subsurface

performs the tasks as described in Chapter 6, Article 6314.

8103 CONCEPT OF ANTISURFACE WARFARE

a. Antisurface warfare must make full use of the offensive potential of own surface, submarine, and

air forces in order to deny the enemy effective use of his surface forces.

b. Antisurface operations by surface ships and submarines include all actions to combat enemy sur-

face forces. In the case of an offensive antisurface action, a SAG will be formed. A SAG may be comprised

of surface ships and/or submarines. If the action is of a defensive nature, the OTC may either detach a SAG

to counter the surface threat, maintain the integrity of the force, or avoid any action by altering course with

the whole force, depending upon the significance of the surface threat as compared to the air and

subsurface threats.

c. Forces Employed. Antisurface operations may be carried out by:

(1) Ships.

(2) Fast patrol boats.

(3) Fixed-wing aircraft.

(4) Helicopters.

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MTP 1(D), Vol. I

(5) Submarines.

(6) Coastal batteries (tactics and procedures are a national responsibility).

(7) Mining (see ATP 6).

NOTE

Submarine operations are not dealt with in this chapter. Safety precautions to be observed when

cooperating with submarines are prescribed in Chapters 6 and 9.

NOT RELEASABLE

d. Coordinated Operations. Antisurface operations may be carried out by a combination of

any of the single types of forces listed in paragraph c, in order to exploit the different advantages of their

sensor, weapon, and command capabilities. The most important combinations in coordinated operations

are dealt with in this chapter. The cooperation of those combinations not described must be arranged for ad

hoc using the procedural principles of this chapter.

8104 SURFACE POLICY

a. Surface Threat. Whenever a surface threat is deemed to exist, the OTC should promulgate a

policy for surface action. An early and comprehensive statement of intentions in an Operation Order/

OPGEN/OPTASK will reduce the requirement for messages, unless the situation changes.

b. Surface Policy. The Surface Policy can be stated in broad terms only, or specified in detail as

required. Table 8-1 contains a checkoff list, based on the phases of surface action outlined in Article 8105.

They may be used to prepare orders and to update and execute them.

c. Success of Surface Action. The success of surface action depends on a thorough under-

standing of the Surface Policy, a good initial plan, and the initiative of commanding officers.

8105 SURFACE ACTION

a. Phases of Surface Action. Surface action can be broadly stated as taking place in the follow-

ing phases.

(1) Phase 1 — Preparation.

(a) Events leading to the detection, localization, identification, and recognition of the enemy.

(b) A review of the situation against the established policy, planning, and tasking.

(2) Phase 2 — Detection, Localization, Identification, Recognition, and Target

Assignment.

(a) Assuming the optimum force offensive and defensive posture.

(b) The decision to join the enemy in battle.

(d) Decision to request area commanders assets or to use force assets.

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ORIGINAL

MTP 1(D), Vol. I

Table 8-1. Surface Action Checkoff List

PHASE 1 — PREPARATIONS

PHASE 2 — DETECTION, IDENTIFICATION, AND

TARGET ASSIGNMENT

a. Evaluate updated threat intelligence, SSM ships

a. Determine employment of available surveillance

will be primary threat; SAM ships must also be con-

assets, including provision of extra helicopters and

sidered. Decide enemy’s most dangerous likely

tasking of ESM equipment of all aircraft.

courses of action, having determined whether he has

already been targeted by other friendly forces.

b. Determine employment of air, surface, and

subsurface units, and other support facilities to pro-

b. Consider surface surveillance priority in relation to

vide timely, continued, and accurate target localiza-

ASW and AAW.

tion, identification, and recognition data.

c. Consider stationing of pickets, bulging the screen,

c. If appropriate, request support from area com-

and/or detaching SAGs or submarines.

manders’ forces.

d. Consider use of deception and evasion.

d. In light of available target localization, identifica-

tion, and recognition data, review force weapon re-

lease criteria.

e. Consider best use of assets, links, and communi-

cations for targeting.

e. Consider employment of air, subsurface, and sur-

f. Ensure emission policy is appropriate to surface

face units for attack.

threat priority.

f. Review previously ordered, or order appropriate

g. Consider retention or delegation of authority to ini-

Surface Action Plans.

tiate and coordinate OTH attacks by LR ASSM.

g. Review Emission Policy.

h. Consider target identification criteria, required

recognition level, required recognition confidence

h. Consider SSM Missile Seeker Free Zone (MSFZ)

level, and weapons expenditure.

and Missile Seeker Tight Zone (MSTZ).

i. Consider target priorities and damage criteria.

i. Determine SAG composition after considering dis-

position and capabilities.

j. Determine likely units to coordinate and conduct

OTH action, after considering disposition, capabili-

j. Assign targets and promulgate clear directions to

ties, etc.

participating units.

k. Consider methods of damage assessment.

l. Reevaluate jamming tasking.

m. Consider effects of weather, e.g., on ship’s ma-

neuverability and flying operations.

n. Determine the execution of gridlocks, ensuring a

matched picture with all participating units.

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MTP 1(D), Vol. I

Table 8-1. Surface Action Checkoff List (Cont.)

PHASE 3 — LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENT

(CONT.)

INITIATION.

(a) SAG uses appropriate HF/UHF/Secure

Voice circuits or visual signals, for maneuver-

(1) Engage with air or, if appropriate, subsurface

ing and picture compilation.

assets.

(b) Establish communications with cooperat-

(2) Unless tasks have already been assigned, the

ing submarines, MPA, AEW, or helicopters on

OTC or ASUWC may:

their previously assigned nets, ordering shift

to SAG net as necessary.

(a) Detach a SAG with LR SSM assets and

consider redisposition of remaining forces.

position and intentions to friendly attack air-

(b) Order LR SSM attacks without forming a

craft deployed against assigned target.

SAG.

(d) Establish communications on the TF/TG

OTH Command Net if necessary.

not already specified:

(3) SAGC may assume duties of LAAWC,

FTC-S, and ACU for the SAG.

1. Target to be engaged.

(4) Reassess threat, open-fire range, expected

2. When LR SSM are to be fired, or time

time of coming under fire, and missile advantages

on target (TOT) for missiles.

and disadvantages.

3. Communications/links to be used.

(5) Reassess current electronic warfare policy.

(d) Order any other, or combination of,

(6) Employment of allocated air, surface and sub-

Standard Surface Action Plan(s).

surface assets to optimize OTH attacks. Consid-

erations include:

(3) If detaching a SAG, consider shifting remain-

der of force to alternate SAG net.

(a) Assessment of OTHT information.

SAG APPROACH.

1. Single passive bearing.

(1) SAG Commander (SAGC) orders formation,

2. Triangulation.

disposition, course, and speed in accordance with

Action Plan(s). If no Plan is detailed, considera-

3. Deploying a TRU.

tions are:

4. Other sources.

(a) Formation/disposition.

(b) Updating of plots, identification/recognition,

(b) Freedom to maneuver.

and target selection.

diate area around target for selection of opti-

(d) Separation to avoid single jammer beam

mum missile seeker settings (e.g., weather,

width.

clutter, and proximity of other units).

(e) Concealment of identities of

(d) Selection TRU for passing accurate data

missile-armed ships.

by link or voice.

(2) Communications (unless specified otherwise):

(e) Stationing and protection of TRU.

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NATO ANTI–PIRACY MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE (2008) - page 4