FM 3-39.40 INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT OPERATIONS (February 2010)

Facility Designs and Sustainment Considerations

J-50. Consider the following sanitation standards to help prevent disease and to ensure the cleanliness of

the facility:

Provide adequate space within housing units to prevent overcrowding.

Provide sufficient showers, latrines, and materials for personnel hygiene for detainees, and

ensure that showers and latrines are cleaned and sanitized daily.

Teach individuals working in the dining facility the rules of good food sanitation, and ensure that

the rules are observed and practiced.

Properly dispose of human waste to protect the health of all individuals associated with the

facility according to the guidelines established by preventive medicine.

Provide sufficient potable water for drinking and food service purposes and sufficient water for

bathing and laundry purposes.

Provide information to detainees concerning proper hygiene, sanitation, and food sanitation in a

language that they understand.

SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS

J-51. Planners maintain situational understanding of the needs within the facility through all classes of

supply. In addition, they must forecast 24 to 72 hours ahead to ensure that the facility is properly

maintained. Commanders and planners need to be deeply involved in the sustainment aspects of detention

operations, starting from the initial POC to the DHA and, subsequently, to the TIF or SIF. Failure to

maintain the logistical standards impacts operations and may bring unwelcome attention from the news

media and the ICRC. The following are some of the factors to consider when planning and developing

sustainment standards for an internment facility:

Acquisition law and/or procedures for detainee supply requirements. Planners need detailed

information on how to acquire and maintain supplies to meet the needs of the facility.

Airport and/or seaport throughput capacity (current and projected). Planners need to

determine if there is a standard flow of aircraft and/or ships in a given location and how they can

access those resources to ensure that the internment facility is properly supplied and maintained.

Airfields in the operational area. Planners need the locations of airfields when determining a

suitable location for a facility.

Aircraft line of communications requirements and status. Planners and operators at the

internment facility must ensure that they have visibility of aircraft arriving with detainees.

Multinational support. Planners need to consider what resources multinational support

elements will bring to internment operations.

Area damage control and firefighting resources. Planners must develop an SOP that

addresses the required response of forces in the event of a fire in the detention facility.

Chemical alarms. Planners must develop an SOP that addresses the required response of the

guard force in the event of a chemical attack on the facility or the compound on which the

facility is located.

Clothing for detainees. Planners need to consider how clothing items will be purchased,

supplied, accounted for, and maintained in the facility.

Health, veterinary, and preventive medicine service support. Planners must identify the

status of current medical, optometric, and dental personnel who support the internment facility

and its projected needs.

Medical logistics. Planners need to consider the requirements for Class VIII supplies, medical

equipment, medical equipment maintenance and repair support, dental support, optometric

support, single- and multivision optical lenses fabrication, and spectacle fabrication and repair to

support the I/R population.

Commander’s supply priorities. Planners need to consider internment facility requirements

when recommending supply priorities to the commander.

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

J-13

Appendix J

Support coordination. Planners need to consider the type of day-to-day support (engineer,

medical, dental, religious) needed to run and maintain the facility. Sending those requirements to

higher headquarters ensures that assets will be available.

Food and water consumption factors. Planners must conduct a detailed analysis of the

consumption rates and the projected consumption rates to assist in ordering and maintaining

food and water supplies for detainees. In addition, they must identify food and water

requirements for the guard force and personnel supporting the facility.

Contractor support. Planners must determine what the screening and/or vetting process will be

for allowing contractors with local indigenous personnel in or near the facility. In addition, they

must identify where contractors may be best used.

Echelons-above-corps sustainment unit adequacy. Planners must determine what the

logistical transportation distances are for providing support to internment facility supply

operations.

Emergency resupply plans. Planners need contingency plans for implementation if logistical

needs are not being met within the facility (for example, if Class I supplies do not arrive). They

should anticipate contracting out with local and/or HN personnel for these necessities. They

should identify where these supplies are located and how they can be accessed for use in the

facility.

Engineering and construction standards and/or policies. Planners need the structural

requirements for building and maintaining the facility. Such structures include guard towers,

fencing and/or barriers, isolation facilities, latrine and/or shower facilities, perimeter security

requirements, and construction standards. This information is available in the Theater

Construction Management System database.

Disposable restraint availability. Planners must ensure that disposable restraints are available.

Food service support. Planners need to determine if there are any special religious and/or

cultural requirements for detainees.

Time-phased force deployment data considerations. Planners must identify the force and

Class IV materials necessary to conduct the mission. They must also identify what external

assets are required to run and maintain the facility. Medical and dental personnel, SJA, chaplain

support, and engineer support should be specifically considered. Military police planners,

engineer units, and construction materials must be scheduled on the time-phased force

deployment list early enough during the build up to ensure that facilities are built and operational

before the start of hostilities.

Generator availability. Planners must determine the lighting

(internal and external) and

generator requirements necessary to maintain security within the facility. In addition, they must

determine the number of mechanics needed to maintain the generators. They should walk the

ground in and around the holding area and the corridors along the perimeter to ensure that all

dead space and dark spots are covered with light and covered by guard towers.

Heavy equipment needs. Planners must consider any special equipment requirements necessary

to maintain and sustain the facility. For example, they must determine if trenches are required

for bunkers to mitigate indirect fire and if a latrine trench is needed for detainees.

HN support arrangements. Planners should consider what HN assets are available to support

the facility in terms of food and clothing. This is especially important when meeting religious or

cultural needs.

Key control SOP. Planners need to ensure that key control and accountability are in the SOP

and are properly supervised and checked leadership.

Labor and funding sources. Planners must consider where and how funding is obtained.

Interpreters and translators. Planners must consider the proper number of interpreters and

translators based on the number of detainees within the facility.

Litters. Planners must ensure that SOPs and guard orders identify the locations of litters and

other medical resources in the event of a medical emergency.

Local purchase procedures and theater policy. Planners must identify the requirements for

purchasing food, clothing, and water locally.

J-14

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

Facility Designs and Sustainment Considerations

Sustainment situational understanding at all levels. Planners must maintain situational

understanding of the needs within the facility through all classes of supply. In addition, they

must forecast 24 to 72 hours ahead to ensure that the facility is properly maintained.

Sustainment capabilities. Planners must identify current and projected requirements for the

facility and the means to meet those requirements.

Sustainment shortfalls and/or challenges. The detention facility commander should meet

weekly with all personnel involved in facility operations to identify sustainment shortfalls.

Sustainment infrastructure maturation. Planners must attempt to improve the conditions for

detainees, the guard force, and MI personnel.

Sustainment lessons learned. Planners should consider previous lessons learned when

developing plans and contingencies for detention operations.

Long-lead procurement items. Planners should identify any requirements that may take an

extended period of time to arrive at the facility and identify measures to mitigate risk in the

interim.

Media coverage. Planners should develop a media plan and provide guidance on media

operations to all personnel involved in detention operations. All media plans must be approved

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mortuary affairs. Planners should provide the guidance for related to detainee deaths while in

custody at an internment facility, the notification process, and the media guidance.

Public address system. Planners should consider how to deliver information that needs to be

addressed to all the detainees. They should identify systems available for audio pickup.

Ration cycle for detainees. Planners must ensure that ration cycles for detainees are consistent

with the ration cycle for U.S. or multinational forces, taking cultural and religious requirements

into account.

Initial POC considerations. Planners must determine what additional requirements are needed

at the initial POC, such as—

Sealable bags and/or trash bags.

Disposable restraints.

Type III nylon cord (parachute line).

Duct tape.

DD Forms 2745.

Riot control considerations and equipment. Planners must identify what riot-related

requirements are needed at initial and long-term detention facilities, such as—

NLWs.

Release authority determination.

Shinguards.

Helmet and/or face shields.

Batons.

Body shields.

Groin protectors.

CBRN masks.

Gloves.

CLOTHING

J-52. When dealing specifically with enemy combatants, clothing, underwear, and footwear should be

supplied to them in sufficient quantities. Allowances will be made for the climate where they are housed.

Captured uniforms of enemy armed forces will, if suitable for the climate, be made available to clothe

them. The detention facility commander ensures the regular replacement and repair of detainee clothing.

Detainees who work will receive clothing appropriate to the nature or location of the work demands.

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

J-15

Appendix J

Clothing worn by detainees at the

time of capture may be worn

until it is no

longer serviceable, and then

is exchanged for replacement clothing.

J-53.

Except for hats and other accessories, all outer garments

worn by detainees will be marked with the

letters

“PW” across

the back and on the front of each sleeve, between

the elbow and the shoulder.

(See figure J-6). The

letters will be black in color and 4 inches in height. If the clothing

is a dark color,

white

lettering is used. Trousers, walking shorts,

and like items

will be similarly marked just below the belt

on the

back and front of both legs just above the

knees. RP and

CIs may be issued clothing that is similar to

the items worn by enemy combatants and it will be marked the

same as show

in figure J-6.

Note. Detainees being categorized as enemy combatants, RP, and CIs

are clothed according to

AR 190-8.

Figure J-6. Clothing markings

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT

J-54.

Table J-1 is an

example of individual equipment that may be issued to

detainees when their clothing

becomes unserviceable. Commanders may refer

to CTA 50-900 when determining what clothing to issue.

Sundry

packs and recreational equipment will also be needed,

and the military police facility commander

may arrange for these items through unit supply

or a local purchase. In addition to unit supply operations

personnel, the I/R battalion requires sufficient unit supply support to operate

a separate supply facility for

each 1,000-person enclosure and sufficient staff to oversee this complex supply operation.

J-16

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

Facility Designs and Sustainment Considerations

Table J-1. Sample individual equipment

Allowances

Line

Item

Item, Basis of Issue, and Remarks

Unit

Zone

No.

III

VII

Belt, trousers, cotton webbing, 1¹/₄inch, per

B60252

Each

detainee.

Boot, combat, men’s, leather, black, 8^1/2 inch high,

C06886

Pair

per detainee.

Buckle, belt, trousers, brass, lacquered finish, per

C32182

Each

detainee.

Cap, hot weather, polyester and rayon, olive green

C03750

Each

shade 106, per detainee.

C04000

Cap, wool, knit, per detainee.

Each

Drawers, men’s, cotton, thigh length, white, with

G48939

Pair

elastic waistband, per detainee.

Drawers, men’s, wool, knit, ankle length, silver

G49213

Pair

gray, per detainee.

Glove inserts, wool and nylon, knit, olive green

J62858

Pair

shade 108, per detainee.

J63269

Glove shells, leather, black, per detainee.

Pair

Helmet, sun, adjustable chin strap, adjustable

K35007

Each

head size, per detainee.

Liner, wet weather, poncho, camouflage color, per

L70789

Each

detainee.

Poncho, coated, nylon, olive green shade 207, per

P17415

Each

detainee.

Shirt, men’s, cotton or sateen, olive green shade

T03520

Each

107, per detainee.

Shirt, men’s; wool, nylon, flannel, olive green

T04205

Each

shade 108, per detainee.

Socks, men’s, wool, cushion sole, olive green

T93335

Pair

shade 408, stretch type, per detainee.

Trousers, men’s, cotton or sateen, olive green

X36358

Pair

shade 107, per detainee.

Trousers, men’s, wool serge, olive green shade

X37180

Pair

108, per detainee.

B72225

Blanket, bed, wool, olive green, per detainee.

Each

–

Brassard, red cross, per RP

Each

F54817

Cup, water, canteen, steel, per detainee and RP.

Each

N53095

Pan, mess kit, per detainee.

Each

Zone I - Warm or hot all year.

Zone V - Warm or hot summers, cold or very cold winters.

Zone II - Warm or hot summers, mild winters.

Zone VI - Mild summers, cold winters.

Zone III - Warm or hot summers, cold winters.

Zone VII - Mild summers, very cold winters.

Zone IV - Mild summers, cool winters.

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

J-17

Appendix J

ELECTRONIC SEARCHING DEVICES

J-55. Nonintrusive devices can be used to conduct a body search of detainees to identify weapons or other

objects used as weapons. These devices may be used to screen personnel during combat and noncombat

operations, apprehensions, field interviews, detainee operations, and CI operations and at access control

points.

PRISONER TRANSPORT PROTECTIVE SYSTEM

J-56. The Prisoner Transport Protective System is designed to incorporate existing leg irons and full-body

restraint systems. This system includes—

Improved handcuffs.

Temporary cinch strap.

Disposable wrist restraints.

J-57.

Additional equipment may include—

Batons and holders.

Patrol baton (9999-01-499-9918).

Patrol baton holder (9999-01-499-9923).

Riot control baton (9999-01-499-9924).

Riot control baton holder (9999-01-499-9927).

Handcuffs and restraints.

Handcuff (8465-01-515-3151).

Cinch strap (8465-01-515-3155).

Full-body restraint (8465-01-514-8739).

Trifold disposable restraint (8465-01-514-8590).

Double-cuff disposable restraint

(white

[8465-01-515-1158]

and

black

[8465-01-515-

1156]).

Metal detectors.

Super Scanner ™ 0ELZ7 1165180 (6350-01-520-5942).

Metal detector (compact) 0ELZ7 1165900 (6350-01-520-5825).

Law enforcement frisk/search gloves.

Size 7 (8415-01-505-2346).

Size 8 (8415-01-505-2347).

Size 9 (8415-01-505-2348).

Size 10 (8415-01-505-2350).

Size 11 (8415-01-505-2351).

Size 12 (8415-01-505-2352).

Size 13 (8415-01-505-2354).

CANTEENS

J-58. When directed by the CDO or a senior military police officer in the internment facility chain of

command, canteens will be installed in the facility so that detainees can procure foodstuffs, soap, tobacco,

and ordinary articles that are used daily. When authorized, canteens will be operated according to the GPW.

Canteens will be installed in long-term internment facilities that normally intern docile detainees who not

pose a significant security risk to themselves, other inmates, or the military police security force.

J-59. The tariff on items available to detainees will never exceed local market price. Procedures regarding

detainee payment for canteen purchases are contained in DFAS-IN 37-1. Detainee representatives may

make suggestions regarding the management of the canteen and the special fund.

J-18

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

Facility Designs and Sustainment Considerations

J-60. Profits made by the facility canteen will be used for the benefit of detainees; a special fund will be

created for this purpose. The special fund will benefit detainees of the same nationalities as those who

contribute to it. When an internment facility is closed, the credit balance of the special fund will be turned

over to another U.S. internment facility operating in the theater. When all canteen facilities close,

commanders should consult the SJA regarding the remaining funds.

SPECIAL PROGRAMS

J-61. As a general policy, active education, visitation, employment, and agricultural programs for

detainees are encouraged and supported. Adequate facilities, instructional material, and agricultural

equipment will be provided for such activities as soon as practical.

EDUCATION PROGRAM

J-62. Education programs are developed according to DA policy guidance. Within the framework of this

guidance and implementing directives issued by other responsible headquarters, a separate education

program is developed for each internment facility. Each program must be developed to reflect the

individual attitudes and political orientations of those interned in that facility. Factors and considerations

that may influence education programs are—

Various education levels throughout the detainee population.

Detainee attitudes toward education and the education program.

Requirements for essential and necessary detainee work details.

Availability of qualified instructors, which may include—

Detainees.

Indigenous personnel.

U.S. armed forces and/or civilian personnel.

Security considerations, which may restrict or prohibit the use of detainees or indigenous

personnel.

J-63. In addition to an academic program, vocational training should be an integral part of the education

program. The immediate objective of vocational training is to develop skills within the population that are

immediately useful for full employment of detainees during internment. The long-range goal is to allow

detainees to learn a trade that is transferable to civilian life.

VISITATION PROGRAM

J-64. Detention facility commanders should consider a visitation program for detainees. A visitation

program can help maintain general detainee discipline. When planning a detainee visitation program, I/R

commanders and staffs should establish procedures and policies to preclude the interaction of detainee

visitors and U.S. or multinational personnel who conduct missions in the I/R facility.

EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM

J-65. Detainees constitute a significant labor force of skilled and unskilled individuals. These individuals

should be employed to the fullest extent possible in work that is needed to construct, manage, perform

administrative functions for, and maintain the internment facility. Per AR 190-8, detainees may be

employed in other essential work only when other qualified civilian labor is not available. Detainee labor,

external to the DOD, is regulated through contracts. For a complete discussion on employment and

compensation for detainees, see AR 190-8.

J-66. The I/R battalion requires enough military police personnel to plan and supervise work details and to

provide adequate guards to supervise detainees during work performance. Additionally, the I/R battalion

requires adequate personnel to assist in the planning and coordination of facility maintenance requirements

and to train and supervise detainees performing facility maintenance. This requirement includes the

operation of engineer equipment, light road maintenance vehicles, and equipment to maintain the road

network, fencing, and gray water management.

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

J-19

Appendix J

J-67. Commanders must organize and manage detainees in such a manner as to permit the proper and

ready employment of each detainee. Consider—

Establishing and maintaining a current occupational skill record for each detainee. Include new

skills as they are acquired.

Assigning individual detainees to a work detail or job on a regular or permanent basis.

Establishing vocational training projects and encouraging detainees to study and develop needed

skills to the maximum extent possible.

LABOR CONSIDERATIONS

J-68. Detainee labor may be used to perform the following:

Camp administration and installation maintenance.

Agricultural work.

Public works, public utilities, and building operations that have no military character or purpose.

Transportation and handling of stores that are not military in nature or purpose.

Domestic services.

J-69. Certain labor restrictions apply when using detainee labor. These restrictions are as follows:

An officer EPW may not be compelled to work.

An NCO EPW can only be required to supervise the work of enlisted personnel.

Detainees may not be compelled to engage in work that is purely military in nature and purpose.

Detainees may not be employed on a labor detail that is unhealthy or dangerous because of the

inherent nature of the work or the individual’s lack of physical fitness or technical skill. GPW

and AR 190-8 provide guidance on this type of employment.

Detainees may not be assigned to labor that would be looked upon as humiliating or degrading

for members of the U.S. armed forces. This prohibition has no effect on the performance of

unpleasant, but necessary, tasks connected with the administration and maintenance of the

internment facility.

Detainees may not be employed or retained in an area where they may be exposed to the dangers

of the POC.

J-70. In case of doubt as to whether certain work is authorized, the next higher headquarters SJA will

review the proposed tasks to ensure that they are consistent with AR 190-8 and the law of war.

Restrictions

J-71. Detainees will not be employed in positions that require or permit—

Access to classified defense information or records of other personnel.

Access to telephones or other communication systems.

Authority to command or instruct U.S. military personnel.

Paid Work

J-72. Detainees will be compensated for performing work for which pay is authorized. The rate of pay will

not be less than that prescribed in the GPW. Compensation for all such work will be made as authorized

from U.S. Army appropriated funds, canteen funds, or internment facility detainee funds. Only detainees

with EPW, RP, or CI status are eligible for compensation (members of armed groups are not authorized

compensation within the provisions of AR 190-8). Detainees are paid for various types of authorized work

such as—

Labor performed for a contract employer or federal agency.

Services as orderlies and cooks for officer enemy combatants.

Services to construct, administer, manage, and maintain internment facilities, branch facilities,

and hospitals when such services are performed by enemy combatants permanently assigned to

certain duties or occupations.

J-20

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

Facility Designs and Sustainment Considerations

Spiritual or medical duties required to be performed by RP for fellow detainees.

Service as a prisoner representative or assistant.

Work as detail leaders or interpreters.

Note. For a complete discussion on compensation for work by detainees see AR 190-8.

ADVANCE PAY

J-73. The GPW states that the detaining power will grant all prisoners of war a monthly pay advance, the

amount of which will be fixed by conversion into the currency of the said power, in the following amounts:

Category I. Detainees ranking below sergeant: 8 Swiss francs.

Category II. Sergeants and other NCOs or detainees of equivalent grade: 12 Swiss francs.

Category III. Warrant officers and commissioned officers below the grade of major or detainees

of equivalent grade: 50 Swiss francs.

Category IV. Majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels, or detainees of equivalent rank: 60 Swiss

francs.

Category V. General officers or detainees of equivalent grade: 75 Swiss francs.

J-74. The facility commander should consult with the SJA and financial management officer when setting

up EPW advance pay accounts. The I/R battalion requires enough MOS 44C personnel to coordinate these

activities with the supporting financial management unit.

AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM

J-75. Where practical, detainees will be required to raise vegetables for their use. This work is classified as

paid work. Agricultural and gardening projects are particularly desirable because they provide gainful

employment for large numbers of individuals. The food produced by the gardening projects provides a

valuable supplement to detainee diets at a minimal expense. The produce from gardens is U.S. property. It

will be used for the benefit of detainees and U.S. armed forces and will not be sold or traded in civilian

markets.

J-76. The agricultural supplies required (seeds, fertilizers, implements) will be procured through local

purchase or Army supply channels. The importance of developing an active agricultural program should

not be overlooked, and care should be taken to order the necessary supplies in a timely manner.

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

J-21

Appendix K

Psychological Operations Support to Internment and

Resettlement Operations

Tactical PSYOP forces are capable of supporting all I/R operations, except the

handling of U.S. military prisoners. The tactical PSYOP unit assigned to support an

I/R operation will plan and conduct PSYOP in support of Army or joint task force

operations in any mission environment across the spectrum of conflict. PSYOP

personnel support units assigned to the I/R mission. The mission of the supporting

PSYOP unit is twofold—to help maintain order within the facility and to provide the

PSYOP task force or PSYOP support element with information relevant to the

ongoing PSYOP programs.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

K-1. Tactical PSYOP units provide the PSYOP task force and/or support element with a unique and useful

capability by collecting timely PSYOP-relevant information from representatives of actual target audiences

within an I/R facility. In addition, tactical PSYOP units provide the geographic combatant commander or

joint task force commander with a valuable asset by executing PSYOP programs that pacify I/R facility

populations. These programs assist the I/R facility guard force with control of the facility population during

emergencies and intertheater transfers.

K-2.

To effectively support I/R operations, tactical PSYOP units perform essential tasks that include—

Developing a PSYOP program and conducting PSYOP to pacify, obtain cooperation from, and

condition the I/R facility population to accept U.S. authority.

Assisting the guard force control of I/R populations during emergencies and intercompound

transfers.

Collecting, analyzing, and reporting PSYOP-relevant intelligence. Examples of PSYOP-relevant

intelligence includes, but are not limited to—

Identification of PSYOP vulnerabilities.

Indications of the effectiveness of themes, symbols, products, and current and previous

PSYOP operations.

Verification of PSYOP targeting effectiveness

(determine if PSYOP is reaching the

intended target audience and if PSYOP operations are having collateral effects on intended

or unintended target audiences).

Testing PSYOP products as directed by the PSYOP task force or PSYOP support element.

Developing and providing PSYOP products in support of PSYOP task force operations, such as

recorded detainee surrender appeals.

Collecting and confirming or denying demographic information about PSYOP target audiences.

Ascertaining targets and objectives of propaganda.

Determining the effectiveness of enemy internal propaganda, such as propaganda directed at

opposing forces.

Planning and conducting PSYOP to achieve other multinational and/or joint PSYOP task force

or PSYOP support element objectives, such as reorienting or reeducating the I/R facility

population or setting the stage for acceptance of future operations.

Assisting in improving relations with the local population (in the vicinity of the I/R facility) to

prevent or minimize interference with I/R facility operations.

Conducting tactical PSYOP missions as directed by the PSYOP task force or support element, or

the supported commander.

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

K-1

Appendix K

MISSION PLANNING

K-3. Since I/R operations vary greatly (including PSYOP support requirements), each mission must be

planned and supporting units task-organized to meet the unique mission requirements. The basis for

planning support to I/R operations is the tactical PSYOP detachment. One tactical PSYOP detachment of

16 personnel is capable of supporting an I/R facility operated by an I/R battalion with a maximum facility

capacity of 4,000 compliant detainees or 8,000 DCs. The tactical PSYOP detachment assigned to support

an I/R mission will task-organize internally to meet mission requirements. Normally, the tactical PYSOP

detachment consists of tactical PSYOP teams that include—

Interview team.

Enclosure team.

Quick-reaction force support team.

Audiovisual team.

COORDINATION AND LINKUP

K-4. If possible, the tactical PSYOP detachment should deploy to the supported I/R facility during the

construction phase. Arrival at the I/R facility during the construction phase ensures adequate time for the

tactical PSYOP detachment to coordinate operating procedures, communications, and necessary

sustainment support with the supported battalion and ensures that PSYOP considerations are included in

I/R facility construction decisions. Early arrival also allows time to develop and produce the products

necessary to support I/R facility operations, such as printed and recorded I/R facility rules in the

language(s) of the facility population before the facility population arrives.

K-5. The tactical PSYOP detachment commander serves as the PSYOP staff officer for the I/R facility

commander. The tactical PSYOP detachment commander is responsible for advising the I/R commander on

the psychological impact of all actions inside and outside the I/R facility that may affect the facility

population. This support is critical to prevent misunderstandings that may lead to disturbances by the

facility population. Differences in culture, customs, language(s), religious practices, and dietary habits can

be of such a magnitude that misunderstandings are not always completely avoidable. However, if I/R

facility personnel follow the advice of the PSYOP officer, these situations may be minimized.

K-6. Upon arrival at the I/R facility, the tactical PSYOP detachment commander briefs the I/R battalion

commander and subordinate enclosure commanders on the tactical PSYOP detachment mission and

capabilities. The tactical PSYOP detachment commander or a designated representative attends all facility

command and staff meetings. These meetings provide the most effective means to communicate on a daily

basis with the facility commanders, their staffs, and other supporting units.

MISSION-SPECIFIC TRAINING

K-7. All PSYOP personnel must be familiar with the laws, regulations, and current policies governing the

treatment of detainees and current doctrinal publications on detainee operations. Among these are—

Law of war.

Code of conduct.

Geneva Conventions.

AR 190-8.

DODD 2310.01E.

DODD 2311.01E.

FM 27-10.

FM 3-05.30.

K-8. All PSYOP personnel observe rules to validate the tactical PSYOP detachment’s credibility with the

I/R facility population and with I/R facility guards. Following these rules prevents embarrassing incidents

that can be exploited by the enemy or bring discredit on the United States. These rules apply (and may be

more important) when hostilities are not declared. Special rules apply for handling civilians during stability

operations and civil support operations. PSYOP personnel should coordinate procedures for treating CIs

and DCs with the facility commander and the SJA.

K-2

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

Psychological Operations Support to Internment and Resettlement Operations

COMMAND INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PRODUCT DISSEMINATION

K-9. The tactical PSYOP detachment conducts operations based on command information and PSYOP

pacification programs using a variety of media. Music and news (from approved sources), I/R facility rules,

and in-processing instructions are broadcast using facility loudspeaker systems augmented by loudspeaker

systems organic to the tactical PSYOP detachment. If available, supporting audiovisual teams produce and

disseminate audio and/or video products. Printed products will be produced by attached print teams or

contracted print support, or through reachback capabilities. Products not directly related to I/R facility

command information are subject to the PSYOP task force established approval process.

K-10. The Geneva Conventions and ARs require that all information presented to an I/R facility population

be in the language of the facility’s population. To facilitate this requirement, translators must be integrated

into PSYOP (down to the team level). Translators must be able to address the I/R population in their native

language and to screen products for language accuracy and content. U.S. or multinational forces, contracted

civilians, or cooperative detainees may provide translator support. Tactical PSYOP detachment members

must exercise caution to safeguard classified material and sensitive PSYOP task force operations at all

times, especially in the presence of translators. Ideally, translators should be permanently attached to

PSYOP teams so that they can be closely supervised and learn to function effectively within the PSYOP

structure.

LOUDSPEAKER SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

K-11. The tactical PSYOP detachment commander should ensure that enclosure commanders include

PSYOP loudspeaker support in activities involving mass transfers between facilities and other activities

(health and welfare inspections) or in circumstances where a facility has the potential of becoming

overcrowded. Limitations on resources available for I/R facility construction, combined with large surges

of detainees arriving at the I/R facility, may result in temporary overcrowding. The potential for

disturbances increases dramatically when I/R facilities are overcrowded.

TASK-ORGANIZED TEAM ROLES AND FUNCTIONS

K-12. The task organization of PSYOP teams is described in paragraph K-3. The roles and functions of

these teams are further described below.

INTERVIEW TEAM

K-13. The interview team is comprised of tactical PSYOP detachment personnel who are trained to conduct

interviews. If available, interview teams should be augmented with qualified MOS 97E interrogators to

increase team effectiveness. The interview team normally operates in the I/R facility processing area,

screening all or a representative sample of incoming detainees and DCs. Although MI units will likely be

present in the facility, it is important for the interview team to maintain a separate operation. Nevertheless,

the team must coordinate closely with MI personnel and other assets to obtain any PSYOP-relevant

information gathered in interrogations and must provide information of intelligence value gained from

passive collection by PSYOP personnel.

K-14. The team uses interview notes and database software to collect information about each detainee and

DC. The data is compiled and forwarded to the tactical PSYOP detachment or support element or directly

to the PSYOP task force for TA analysis. Information gained in PSYOP product pretests may be reported

directly to the CONUS-based product development company to accelerate the product development and

approval process. Information collected in PSYOP interviews should include the following information

about detainees and DCs:

Race or ethnicity.

Sex.

Age.

Political affiliation.

Religious affiliation.

Geographic origin.

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Appendix K

Education level.

Length, depth, and type of involvement during the conflict.

Previous or current occupation.

Standard of living and financial state.

Previous military training.

Political and military indoctrination.

PSYOP vulnerability and susceptibility.

K-15. The initial interview, conducted on arrival at the I/R facility, should include a numerical score or

code that indicates the desirability to conduct a follow-up interview as time and the situation permit.

Detainees and DCs who are cooperative or possess information, skills, or characteristics of interest to the

tactical PSYOP detachment should be interviewed in depth. The interview team specifically looks for—

Malcontents, rabble-rousers, trained agitators, and political officers who may attempt to organize

resistance or create disturbances within the I/R facility. Once these individuals are identified,

guards will normally confine them in isolated enclosures to deny them access to the general

population.

Detainees and DCs willing to cooperate in setting up informant networks. These detainees and

DCs should be referred to MI counterintelligence personnel, since as it is their responsibility to

run informant networks within the I/R facility.

Detainees and DCs with special skills who can assist with I/R facility operations. Such skills

include language; construction; engineering; and training in medicine, education, and

entertainment. Other skills may be useful based on the facility location and conditions.

Detainees and DCs willing to assist with product development, such as taping audio surrender

appeals.

Detainees and DCs willing to participate in PSYOP product testing.

K-16. Access to members and former members of the designated PSYOP target audiences allows the

interview team to conduct product testing that provides accurate, meaningful feedback to the PSYOP task

force and product development company. Data collected during the surveys is passed to the PSYOP task

force through the tactical PSYOP detachment and the PSYOP support element. The interview team must

maintain secure, reliable communications with higher headquarters and ensure the timely, secure transport

of product prototypes and testing results.

K-17. The interview team, along with other facility personnel, must take precautions to safeguard the

identities of cooperative detainees and DCs to protect them from reprisals. PSYOP personnel must always

exercise discretion when dealing with cooperative detainees and DCs. Guards must be thoroughly briefed

on proper handling procedures.

K-18. Discovering detainees and DCs with false identities is an important security measure that can reduce

potential problems and ensure smooth I/R facility operations. The interview team can discover false

identities during initial processing or subsequent interviews. The team should look for—

Documents that do not match.

Interview responses that do not match those given during an earlier interview.

Identification cards or tags that contradict other documents or information.

Slow verbal responses to simple questions, such as a date of birth. The detainee or DC may be

making up responses or trying to remember false information.

Detainees and DCs without documentation. This situation requires careful investigation. For

example, the detainee or DC may have thrown away their identification to avoid discovery.

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Psychological Operations Support to Internment and Resettlement Operations

Detainees and DCs who suddenly refuse to cooperate at any point during processing.

Names that appear in the list of sought after persons (sometimes called the “black list”).

ENCLOSURE TEAM

K-19. The tactical PSYOP detachment assigned as an enclosure team conducts face-to-face PSYOP and

collects vital information within the I/R facility. To perform its mission, members of the enclosure team

must have unrestricted access to the I/R population. The enclosure team conducts close coordination with

the guard force commander to ensure that its activities do not jeopardize the safe operation of the I/R

facility and to ensure that they are safe.

K-20. The enclosure team builds a rapport with detainees and DCs by distributing recreational equipment,

conducting morale support activities, and performing other actions designed to gain the trust of detainees or

DCs. Although it is important for the enclosure team to maintain close communication with other PSYOP

team elements, such communication should be discreet and conducted away from the view of the I/R

population. The enclosure team will usually enjoy a greater rapport with the I/R population if it is not

identified with the authoritarian elements of the facility administration.

K-21. The enclosure team capitalizes on its access to the I/R population to collect information about

individuals and to watch for potential problems. The enclosure team should look for—

Formal and informal leaders.

Individuals who are the center of attention in a group.

Loners.

Unusual groups.

Items passed from one person to another.

Contrasting soil in the compound.

Lookouts.

Signals and codes.

Individuals who move from one group, to another and whose presence forces the topic of

conversation to change.

Individuals who speak for a group but maintain eye contact with another person in that group.

Individuals who immediately make friends with military police guards.

Detainees and DCs who express interest in I/R facility construction or materials and equipment

used in facility construction.

QUICK-RESPONSE FORCE SUPPORT TEAM

K-22. In addition to providing loudspeaker support inside the facility, the tactical PSYOP detachment

commander and quick-reaction force support team coordinate with enclosure commanders to include

loudspeaker support to PSYOP as part of the I/R facility response capability. The quick-reaction force

support team is a predesignated element that serves as an emergency tactical response force for the

compounds or other locations determined by the facility commander.

K-23. The tactical PSYOP detachment commander maintains contact with the quick-reaction support force

team through the supported unit’s communications network or by other means. The team designated to

support the quick-reaction support force team must be prepared to support the quick-reaction force mission

and should remain physically located with the quick-reaction support force team to facilitate a rapid

response. The tactical PSYOP detachment commander or quick-reaction force support team leader must

accomplish the following premission tasks:

Brief the quick-reaction force commander on PSYOP capabilities and employment.

Coordinate a reaction plan and preplanned routes with the quick-reaction force team.

Rehearse operational procedures with each new quick-reaction force team.

Rehearse likely emergency scenarios and perform reconnaissance of the sites.

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Appendix K

Prepare audio products and scripts to be used during likely scenarios.

Ensure that translators are briefed and available if a translator is not attached to the quick-

reaction force team.

AUDIOVISUAL TEAM

K-24. The audiovisual team can support three or more tactical PSYOP detachments when supporting I/R

operations. The audiovisual team uses organic equipment to produce and disseminate products to the I/R

facility population. The team supports the facility PSYOP program by disseminating entertainment

products, such as videos and music. This team gives the tactical PSYOP detachment the ability to influence

detainee and DC behavior by providing or withholding something of value to the population. When

directed, the team disseminates products that support other PSYOP task force programs (reeducation,

reorientation, posthostility themes).

K-25. At a minimum, the audiovisual team should have the capability to edit audio and video products in

digital formats, provide edited audio products in compact disc and minidisc formats, disseminate video

products in video home system and digital video disc formats, project video with sound to large audiences

within the facility, record and edit digital still photographs, and print limited numbers of PSYOP products

in various sizes for use within the internment facility.

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Appendix L

Guidelines for Handling Evidence

This appendix provides general guidelines for handling captured materiel and

documents that could be used as evidence in legal proceedings against captured

persons suspected of crimes against humanity, terrorism, war crimes, and/or other

crimes. Detailed procedures for identifying, handling, storing, transferring, releasing,

and disposing of captured materiel and documents should follow accepted legal

standards and should be documented in local regulations or SOPs.

EVIDENCE CUSTODY

L-1. Capturing units should report captured material and documents constituting evidence as soon as

possible to military police or other personnel specially trained and authorized to handle evidence to ensure

proper handling.

L-2. It is the responsibility of all military police Soldiers or other law enforcement personnel to take every

precaution to preserve the integrity of evidence in its original condition. Evidence must be entered into the

custodial system as soon as possible after its collection, seizure, or surrender.

L-3. The PM should establish and operate an evidence custodial system consisting of—

Primary and alternate evidence custodian (designated, in writing by the PM).

Evidence storage facilities.

Evidence log.

Active evidence custody record or file.

Final evidence disposition record or file.

EVIDENCE RESPONSIBILITIES

L-4. Evidence custodian responsibilities cannot be further delegated. The evidence custodians should—

Ensure that evidence is properly inventoried, tagged, packaged, and marked before acceptance

for storage. DA Form 4137 should include the associated detainee’s name, date of birth, rank

and service number (if applicable), and an identifying number that connects the evidence to the

detainee.

Ensure that military police personnel who deliver the evidence for safekeeping properly

complete DA Form 4137 before acceptance for storage.

Properly safeguard evidence.

Properly maintain the evidence log, active evidence custody record, and final evidence

disposition files.

Conduct inventories of evidence holdings regularly.

Properly dispose of evidence.

SUBMISSION

L-5. The capturing unit completes DA Form 4137 and attaches it to captured materiel and documents.

Required information provided on that form includes—

National identifying letters of the capturing unit.

Designation of the capturing unit, to include the branch of Service.

Date-time group of capture.

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Appendix L

Location of capture, to include the eight-digit grid coordinates.

Unit captured from (enemy or warring faction), to include national identifying letters as

appropriate.

Summary of capture circumstances.

Associated captured person, if any.

L-6. The law enforcement person first assuming custody of evidence will subsequently mark it for future

identification as evidence. If it is not possible to mark the evidence, it is put in a container that can be

marked. The evidence is marked with the date-time group of acquisition and the rank and name of the

person who assumed custody of it. When any person submits evidence to the evidence custodian, it will be

properly tagged and placed in appropriate containers as necessary.

L-7. The evidence custodian will carefully examine, count, and weigh (as appropriate) all evidence being

submitted. The submitting person must ensure that items being retained have some evidentiary value. The

submitting person will promptly return or dispose of any items that do not have evidentiary value, according

to authorized procedures.

L-8. The evidence custodian should not accept items that are not evidence nor accept evidence that is not

properly tagged and accompanied by the stipulated documentation, such as DA Form 4137. Each item of

evidence should have a case control number or an equivalent designator identifying the police report that

pertains to the seized evidence.

STORAGE

L-9. Physically safeguard and store all evidence received in a separate, and distinct evidence room. The

evidence room should be large enough for handling, storing, and processing volumes of evidence, consistent

with the size of the law enforcement operation. It must also provide for the secure storage of evidence.

When a room has been designated as an evidence room, other equipment and property (personal or official)

will not be stored in it under any circumstances.

INVENTORY

L-10. When evidence is first received into custody by law enforcement personnel, whether confiscated

during an investigation or received from a unit or command representative, the evidence custodian must

personally inventory the evidence. Subsequently, when evidence is transferred between custodians for any

reason, the evidence custodians must verify the inventory unless it has been placed in a sealed container by

law enforcement personnel. Verify money and controlled substances even if they are in a sealed container.

The evidence custodian and a disinterested officer (outside the PM office) will conduct the inventory. An

entry is made in the evidence log reflecting the inventory and participating personnel.

TRANSFER AND SHIPMENT

L-11. When physical evidence in the possession of military law enforcement personnel is transferred or

shipped to another agency, the chain of custody must be maintained. Ship by reliable and secure means, and

maintain documentation to prove an unbroken chain of custody.

DISPOSAL

L-12. The evidence custodian will obtain approval for the final disposal of evidence from the proper

authority and enter it on DA Form 4137.

L-13. Any evidence used in any court action will be retained until the initial trial and subsequent appeals are

complete. Obtain authorization for disposal from the commander, appropriate legal officer, or a

representative of either. Any evidence entered into the evidence custodial system that is not used in a

judicial or administrative action may be disposed of upon authorization from the PM or a designated

representative.

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Guidelines for Handling Evidence

L-14. Evidence obtained during the course of an investigation that is the personal property of an individual

will, when possible, be returned to that individual, with the exception of unlawful items. Examples of

unlawful items include narcotics, unlawfully obtained drugs, illegal firearms, explosives, counterfeit

currency, or counterfeit identification papers cards. When personal property is returned to the owner or an

authorized representative, the individual receiving the property will be required to sign for it on DA Form

4137.

L-15. Evidence which, by its nature, cannot be returned to the owner or entered into a national supply

system for disposal (narcotics, illegal firearms, other contraband) will be destroyed. This evidence will be

destroyed by, or in the presence of, the evidence custodian and a staff NCO or commissioned officer

assigned to the PM office. Destruction will be of a nature so as to make the evidence unusable for any

lawful or unlawful purpose other than residual scrap.

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L-3

Appendix M

Biometrics

Biometrics are measurable physical and behavioral characteristics that enable the

establishment and verification of an individual’s identity. The term biometrics

includes, but is not limited to, finger, face, hand, eye, voice, and DNA characteristics.

Biometrics are integrated to achieve the management, protection, and control of

identity information for friendly, neutral or unknown, and adversary personnel. This

appendix provides an overview for the employment of biometrics and highlights

them as key enablers in support of I/R operations.

OPERATIONS

M-1. A biometric is a measurable physical characteristic or personal behavioral trait used to recognize the

identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual. Biometrics is the process of recognizing an individual

based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics. (JP 2-0.)

M-2. Biometric terms (recognition, verification, and identification) are sometimes used interchangeably.

This usage is not only confusing, but incorrect. Each term has a different, unambiguous meaning. The

meaning of specific, biometric-related terms includes:

Recognition. Recognition is a characteristic relating to the fundamental functions of

identification or verification. Recognition is a generic term in the description of a specific

biometric application (for example, facial or iris recognition). Recognition does not equate to

verification.

Verification. Verification is a task in which a biometric application confirms a subject’s

biometric sample by matching it against his stored biometric file. This is also known as

authentication.

Identification. Identification is a task in which a biometric application compares a submitted

biometric sample against all of the biometric samples on file to determine whether it matches

any of the samples within the database and, if so, provides the known identity of the biometric

subject whose sample was matched. Identification is “closed set” if the person is known to exist

in the database; it is an “open set” if the person is not known to exist in the database.

M-3. Biometric-enabled intelligence operations enhance military capabilities to dominate, protect, and

manage individual identities. Current and emerging technologies continue to provide increased biometric

capability for military police and military forces. Biometric technology can be leveraged to collect and

maintain evidence for criminal investigation and subsequent prosecution. It can also be used to for identify

personnel for vetting, access, or other security or accountability requirements. This technology is also

leveraged by HUMINT personnel within the MI community. There are two major types of biometric data

that are especially useful to military police and HUMINT collectors. These are personal identification data

(fingerprint, palm print) and other biological information (voiceprint, facial scan, retinal scan). This data is

documented in databases that can be compared to identify the individual upon collection of biological

data/evidence at a later date. Another type is biometric data that indicates source truthfulness (polygraph

data). Polygraph evidence requires certified polygraph operators to administer and interpret the data.

M-4. Biometric-enabled intelligence operations integrate biometrics applications with operational and

tactical missions to fulfill identified protection requirements. Several key activities are conducted when

applying biometric technology. These activities are typically conducted independently of one another;

however, they are all interconnected and interdependent. For example, an analyst at the strategic level may

conduct analysis by querying databases and establishing linkages and patterns while at the tactical level, a

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Appendix M

Soldier on a patrol may be collecting biometric data on individuals subsequent to a raid or criminal

apprehension. All activities depend on each other for success. The activities include—

Collect. Capture biometric and related contextual data from an individual, with or without his or

her knowledge. Create and transmit a standardized, high-quality biometric file consisting of a

biometric sample and contextual data, to a database for recording or matching.

Match. Accurately identify or verify the identity of an individual by comparing a standardized

biometric file to an existing source of standardized biometrics data and scoring the level of

confidence of the match.

Store. Enroll/input, update, and maintain biometric files to provide standardized, current

biometric information of individuals when and where required. Biometrics files are enrolled or

updated before they are stored.

Share. Exchange standardized biometric files and match results among DOD, interagency, and

multinational partners according to applicable laws and policies.

Analyze. The analyze activity provides the answer to the “so what” question of all other

activities. Link an individual’s biometric file with available associated information in an effort to

identify patterns and linkages, clarify status, and better inform the decisionmaking process.

Reference. Access databases of information on individuals for the purposes of analysis.

Decide/act. Decide/act is the response by the operations owner (automated or human-in-the-

loop) to the results of the analysis of biometrics and referenced associated information described

in the DOD biometric process. Personnel reaching a conclusion and take action based on the

analysis results of biometric data, combined with corroborating analysis or nonbiometric

information on individuals.

ANALYSIS

M-5. Analysis is paramount biometrics-enabled operations. The analysis of biometric data fuses

information obtained from biometric applications and information obtained from operational sources. It

leverages both sources of information to increase situational understanding, create a holistic common

operational picture, and better support the decisionmaking process. Analysis links individual biometric files

(biometric samples and contextual data) to associated information to reveal patterns and clarify status.

COLLECTION

M-6. Collection begins with the user requirement to capture a biometric sample (finger, face, hand, eye,

voice, or DNA prints) and related contextual data from an individual (with or without the individual’s

knowledge) with a biometric collection system. A biometric collection system may be a manual or

automated tool for measuring and evaluating a biometric for the purpose of human recognition. Contextual

data are elements of biographical and situational information (who, what, when, where, how, why) that are

associated with a collection event and permanently recorded as an integral component of the biometric file.

Collection can occur at the point of contact with a target individual or as the result of biometric partners

sharing biometric samples. The individual data sets that result from a collection action (biometric sample

and contextual data) are referred to as a biometric file and are structured according to appropriate standards.

The objective is to collect standardized, high-quality biometric files.

M-7. The execution of a collection action must be simple enough that any Service member, DOD civilian,

or contractor can complete it with minimal training and equipment. Once a biometric sample and its

contextual information are collected, thereby creating a standardized biometric file, the file is transmitted to

the appropriate database for matching. The biometric source that receives the biometric file will

acknowledge receipt of the transmitted biometric information.

DECISION

M-8. Decision is a fundamental component of successful biometric-enabled operations. A decision to act is

the response by an analyst when the results of biometric analysis establish connections or linkages that

support information requirements and decision points. The objective is to use biometrics to enable more

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Biometrics

accurate decisionmaking when it is combined with other sources of information. Biometric data should be

fused with nonbiometric data to ensure that a full picture and situational understanding is achieved.

MATCHING

M-9. Matching begins with the receipt of a collected, standardized biometric file. Matching is the process

of accurately identifying or verifying the identity of an individual by comparing one or more standardized

biometric files to existing biometric databases and scoring the level of confidence of the match by

establishing multiple positive points of comparison. In some automated biometric applications, a user may

be notified of a prompt, which refers to additional information available in databases of nonbiometric

information on individuals. This notification can provide information or links to information that assist

decisionmaking.

M-10. Matching consists of a one-to-one (verification) or one-to-many (identification) search. Verification

and identification are described below:

Verification. In the case of a closed set (one-to-one) match to verify an individual’s claimed

identity, the subject’s biometric data is compared to known biometric data within the database. If

the two samples/files match, the verification is confirmed. If the subject’s biometric data is

compared to known biometric data within the database and the samples do not match,

verification cannot be confirmed. Typically, a verification decision is rendered by the computer.

The result will be in the form of a “yes” or “no” decision associated with a specified level of

confidence. A failure to verify means that the collected sample cannot be matched to any of the

stored biometric samples within the biometric files. A verification means that the sample

matches one or more stored biometric samples on a given individual.

Identification. In the case of an open set (one-to-many) identification match, the computer may

determine that there is no match, one match, or multiple match candidates. In some cases, the

final decision may be rendered by a computer; in other cases, the final decision may be verified

by a human expert. When multiple candidates are indicated by the computer, a human expert

will typically be called upon to determine if there are zero, one, or multiple true matches. The

result of the completed matching process is conveyed back to the search originator.

M-11. Once matching is complete, the collected biometric sample and contextual data are recorded into a

database as a new biometric file or to update an existing biometric file. The database is updated with a new

file every time a one-to-many match result is negative, except where restricted by laws or policies. An

existing biometric file is updated every time an identification or verification match result is positive, except

where limited by laws and policies.

REFERENCING

M-12. Referencing is integral to the successful analysis of biometrics data. It is the process of querying

various databases of collected, associated information on individuals

(intelligence, medical, human

resources, financial, security, education, law enforcement) for the purpose of analysis. As described in

paragraph L-5, associated information can, where applicable, be linked to a biometric file. This linkage can

be placed within the biometric file in the form of a prompt and can occur outside of a collection event.

SHARING

M-13. Sharing is the exchange of biometric files (biometric samples, contextual data) or match results with

other organizations. For the purpose of this manual, authorized sharing of biometric files among entities is

applied as follows:

Among DOD-approved sources to ensure consistency across the enterprise.

Among DOD, interagency, and multinational partners, as appropriate.

STORING

M-14. Storing describes actions to enroll, maintain, and update biometric files within designated databases

to support desired capabilities. The purpose is to provide standardized, comprehensive, and current

biometric information on individuals where and when required.

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M-3

Appendix M

M-15. Storage requirements can be as complex as a data megacenter or as simple as a laptop computer,

depending on operational requirements and available technology. This appendix, therefore, accommodates

three levels of biometric storage:

An authoritative source is the primary database of biometric information on a person. The DOD

may designate more than one authoritative source, consistent with applicable laws, policies, and

directives. The authoritative source provides a strategic capability for accessing to standardized,

comprehensive, and current biometric files within DOD and sharing of biometric files with joint,

interagency, and designated multinational partners. Requisite connectivity is needed. All

biometric files will be input into the appropriate authoritative source database at the earliest

possible opportunity, except where limited by laws, policies, or directives. If there is no match,

the biometric file is entered as a new enrollment within the database. If there is a match, the new

information updates a current enrollment.

A local trusted source is a subset of the authoritative source and is established to accomplish a

specific requirement in support of a specific operational mission. The reasons for establishing a

local trusted source might include insufficient network connectivity to provide immediate access

to the authoritative source database or an operational need for closed-loop access. If a match is

not made against a local trusted source database, then the file should be queried against the

authoritative source database for a match.

A local untrusted source is a local database of biometric files that has not been connected with

an authoritative or local trusted source database. In many cases, local untrusted sources are

established for short-duration missions or to satisfy political, policy, or legal restrictions related

to the sharing of biometric information.

M-16. The authoritative databases and procedures for handling information on friendly forces are very

different from the ways in which data on our adversaries are handled. By laws, regulations, and policies,

DOD must manage these populations separately. The context and application of these authoritative sources

and constraints on the use of data from these databases are distinct.

BIOMETRICS AUTOMATED TOOLSET

M-17. The Biometrics Automated Toolset is a suite of peer-to-peer enterprise network applications which

consolidates an evolving set of biometric software and hardware that is capable of capturing, storing, and

disseminating information and biometric data on threat personnel for the CI, HUMINT, military police, and

MI communities.

M-18. The Biometrics Automated Toolset is designed with a peer-to-peer architecture that is networked over

secure TCP/IP for maximum flexibility. The Biometrics Automated Toolset client and server can be

installed on a single machine for a stand-alone configuration, or on separate machines that allow biometrics

data to be collected in several field workstations and stored at a central server. The architecture also allows

for Biometrics Automated Toolset data to be shared with integrated services, such as the Discovery and

Synchronization Service which propagates new and updated records throughout a network of Biometrics

Automated Toolset servers, Detainee Management System, and the Biometrics Registration Center that

allows the remote tracking and setting of registrations and other Biometrics Automated Toolset settings in

Biometrics Automated Toolset client machines. Biometrics Automated Toolset 4.0 also features data

compatibility with the Detainee Reporting System, Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment,

Biometric Identification System for Access, and the human domain.

DETAINEE OPERATIONS

M-19. Detainees within a detention facility are a lucrative source of information. Detention facilities use the

Biometrics Automated Toolset as the primary biometric collection and storage device. Biometrics data that

is captured during collection can be rapidly searched and is continually accessible through an automated

comparison process for new subject data files and access control. The recent employment of Biometrics

Automated Toolset has generated a significant number of reports from information provided by the

detainees within detention facilities, much of it corroborated by other intelligence reporting. This

unprecedented body of information has expanded our understanding of terrorist organizations and continues

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Biometrics

to prove invaluable. It has provided insights into their leadership structures, recruiting practices, funding

mechanisms, and relationships; and the cooperation between terrorist groups and training programs; and

plans for attacking the U.S. and other countries. Military police forces must leverage existing biometrics

technologies to support the overall mission through enhanced situational understanding and support to the

commander’s decision cycle.

ENROLLMENT INTO THE DETAINEE REPORTING SYSTEM AND BIOMETRICS AUTOMATED

TOOLSET

M-20. The in-processing into an internment facility is a two-part process. It involves enrollment into the

Detainee Reporting System and Biometrics Automated Toolset Systems. Elements of detainee in-processing

operations include the following—

The process begins in a Secure Internet Protocol Router Biometrics Automated Toolset System

to conduct an identity check. Based on the results of the identity check, a decision has to be

made.

The detainee may have been enrolled at a lower echelon prior to being transported to the next

level internment facility, or he or she may have been previously enrolled into the biometric

database.

DETAINEE REPORTING SYSTEM

M-21. The first task is to enroll the detainee into the Detainee Reporting System. The Detainee Reporting

System will create an ISN that needs to be exported to the unclassified Biometrics Automated Toolset

System where it will be imported as a text file into the enrollment wizard. As detainees are collected and

processed, international laws require that such information be forwarded to the appropriate authorities. The

NDRC is the executive agent designated by the OPMG as the recipient and archive for all detainee

information.

M-22. The NDRC’s principal responsibility is to the ensure collection, storage, and appropriate

dissemination of detainee information as required by AR 190-8 and DODD 2310.10E. The NDRC provides

detainee information to the ICRC to fulfill U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1956. The

NDRC directs the development of the Detainee Reporting System. It issues blocks of ISNs to the TDRC.

DETAINEE TRACKING

M-23. Detainee tracking is a continual process, from capture to incarceration. The detainee tracking program

is a web application that allows for the tracking of new detainees from the very first day of capture. This

initiative was started by Marine Corps elements in Iraq. A web-based application that ties into the

Biometrics Automated Toolset database allows the processing of individuals to determine their detention

necessity. The detainee tracker was developed to address the specific needs of managing a transient

population of temporarily detained individuals in short-term facilities (those where detainees are generally

held for up to 14 days). It complements the Detainee Management System, which was developed to manage

larger, long-term internment populations.

M-24. It is necessary to collect as much information as possible to determine whether detainee is to be

released, detained locally for intelligence exploitation, or transferred to a facility for internment. This

provides a basis and foundation of documentation that will follow the detainee from initial capture to final

internment in a facility.

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M-5

Appendix N

Foreign Confinement Officer Training Program

This appendix addresses aspects of developing confinement officers in other

countries. For the purposes of this appendix, the terms foreign and HN confinement

officers are synonymous. Development of a training program begins with a

discussion of the challenges involved and the resources required. This appendix

provides a framework for organizing the development effort. Foreign confinement

officer training is not always

(or only) conducted in nations with ongoing

insurgencies, but this appendix will focus on that scenario because it will be more

challenging than providing support to HNs without ongoing or impending

insurgencies.

CHALLENGES, RESOURCES, AND END STATE

N-1. Each instance of developing confinement officers will be as unique as the detention facility they will

operate. Many factors influence the amount and type of aid required. These factors include—

Capabilities of the current HN confinement officer force.

Terrain.

Level of commitment and sovereignty of the HN.

Level of commitment from the United States and other nations.

N-2. While U.S. and multinational forces may be required to assist the HN in improving detainee operations,

an insurgency will typically use the presence of foreign forces as another reason to question the legitimacy of

the HN government. A government reliant on foreign forces for detainee operations runs the risk of not being

recognized as legitimate. While combat operations with significant U.S./multinational participation may be

necessary, U.S. combat operations are secondary to enabling HN ability to provide for its own competent and

effective confinement officers.

CHALLENGES

N-3. There have been a number of common problems and issues in training missions undertaken by U.S.

forces since the end of World War II. These problems generally fall under differing national perspectives in one

of four broad categories:

Resources.

Leadership.

Exercising power.

Organizational structures.

Resources

N-4. Governments must properly balance national resources to meet the expectations of the people. Funding

for services, education, and health care can limit the resources available for confinement officers and facilities.

Undeveloped countries generally lack the resources to maintain sustainment units, resulting in chronic

sustainment problems. Conducting effective I/R operations requires an allocation of resources that ensures the

integration of efforts to develop all aspects of detainee operations. Recognizing the interrelationship of security

and governance, the central HN government must also ensure that adequate resources are devoted to meeting

such basic needs as health care, clean water, and electricity.

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Appendix N

Leadership

N-5. The existing HN approach to leadership may need to be adjusted. HN leaders may be appointed and

promoted on the basis of family ties or on the basis of membership in a party or faction, rather than on

demonstrated competence or performance. Leaders may not seek to develop subordinates. The need to ensure

the welfare of subordinates may not be a commonly shared trait. In some cases, leaders enforce the obedience of

their subordinates by pure fear and use their position to exploit them. Positions of power can also lead to

corruption, which may also be affected by local culture. The ultimate goal is to develop leaders at all levels who

possess sound professional standards and appropriate military values, and are selected and promoted on the

basis of competence and merit.

Exercising Power

N-6. The behavior of HN confinement personnel is often a primary cause of public dissatisfaction. The

corrupting influences of power must be prevented. Cultural and ethnic differences within a population may lead

to significant discrimination in the selection of confinement officers, which further contributes to discrimination

against minority groups within the overall body of detainees. In more ideological struggles, the prejudicial

treatment may be manifested against personnel of other political parties, whether in a minority cultural group or

not. Confinement officers who abuse detainees do not win the trust and confidence of the population. A

program of comprehensive confinement officer development requires identifying and addressing biases along

with improper or corrupt practices.

Organizational Structures

N-7. Perhaps the biggest hurdle for U.S. forces to overcome is accepting that the HN may be able to ensure

security using practices that work, but are different from established U.S. practices. The typical American bias

of the “American way is best” must be recognized as unhelpful and continuously addressed. Training teams

must be flexible in their approach and demonstrate the ability to incorporate successful local practices into the

training. While the American relationship between police, customs, and the military works for the United

States, it usually does not work for other nations that have developed differently. Variations in legal systems

must be understood and applied for the training to be useful in each given situation.

RESOURCES

N-8. For the U.S. military, the mission of developing HN personnel, (in this case confinement officers), has

grown to be more than just a task assigned to a few specialists. Training foreign forces is now a core

competency of regular and reserve units of all Services. Multinational partners are often willing to help a nation

fight insurgency by assisting with training HN forces even if they are reluctant to support other needs. Partner

nations may develop joint training teams or assign teams to a specific element of the security force or a

particular specialty. Training resources may be received from a number of organizations and programs, some of

which are highlighted below.

Joint Forces

N-9. Although other Services normally play smaller roles than the Army, they can still make significant

contributions because of their considerable experience in training their counterparts. The Navy, Air Force, and

Marine Corps should be used, when possible, for training their HN counterparts. Standard joint practices should

ensure that the training conducted by all Services is in concert with one another. In the case of confinement

officer training, training teams may consist of trainers from more than one Service.

Interagency/Intergovernmental Resources

N-10. There are many legal restrictions about training nonmilitary forces, and the Department of State normally

has the lead in such efforts. However, there have been occasions when military forces were assigned that

mission by the President. U.S. military forces must be prepared to conduct HN training when required.

Interagency resources can be applied in numerous ways to support the training of HN confinement officers. The

Department of Justice also has the capability of sending corrections specialists overseas to train and advise HN

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Foreign Confinement Officer Training Program

confinement officers, who are best trained by other police rather than military trainers. The quick-reaction

capability of this agency is limited, although they can typically attain the necessary level of trainers when

provided adequate time to do so. Select Department of Justice corrections specialists trainers to accomplish the

mission is typically more expensive than the use of military trainers. During intensive counterinsurgencies, the

effectiveness of civilian corrections advisers and trainers may be limited by the high-threat nature of the

environment. These forces are most effective when operating in a benign environment or when separate security

is provided for these trainers.

Multinational Resources

N-11. Although their support frequently plays a legitimizing role for U.S. efforts, multinational partners may

also be willing to materially assist in training HN confinement officers. Some nations may be more willing to

train HN forces than to provide troops for combat operations. Some multinational forces come with significant

employment restrictions. Each international contribution is assessed on its own merits, but decisions to decline

such assistance are rarely made. Good faith efforts to integrate multinational partners and achieve optimum

effectiveness are required.

International Military Education and Training Program

N-12. For more than 50 years, the U.S. military has operated the International Military Education and Training

program to provide opportunities for foreign personnel to attend U.S. military schools and courses. Most of

these commissioned officers and NCOs are provided English language training before attending the U.S.

courses. The United States does instruct courses in Spanish to support the training of Latin American (and other

Spanishspeaking) armed forces. Competency in the language of the HN is critical for optimal training. While it

is ideal for the actual trainer to possess the necessary language skills, this will often not be the case; and

translator support is typically required.

Contract Support

N-13. In some cases, additional training support is contracted to enable uniformed forces to be more efficiently

utilized. Contractor support can be used to provide HN training and education to include—

Training personnel at the institutional level.

Developing corrections systems.

Establishing administrative and logistic systems.

Providing translators.

U.S. Forces Organization

N-14. Developing HN confinement officers is a complex and challenging mission. The U.S. and multinational

partners can only succeed if the mission is approached with the same deliberate planning and preparation,

energetic execution, and appropriate resourcing as are combat aspects of the I/R operation. Accordingly, the

joint force commander and staff consider potential requirements for developing HN confinement officers as part

of their initial mission analysis. If required, this task becomes an integral part of all assessments, planning,

coordination, and preparation.

N-15. As planning unfolds, mission requirements drive the initial organization for the unit charged with

developing HN confinement officers. To achieve the unity of effort, a single military police headquarters should

be given the overall responsibility for mission.

N-16. For large, multi-Service, long-duration missions, a separate organization which has the sole responsibility

of developing confinement officers and that is subordinate to the joint force commander may be required. Such

an organization may be multi-Service, multinational, and interagency.

N-17. The military police headquarters who is responsible for these programs requires adequate staffing to C2

of the functions required to support the development of HN confinement officers. In addition to traditional

military police unit organic staff functions and capabilities, some or all of the following may be required

augmentation:

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N-3

Appendix N

Comptroller. The comptroller, manages the significant monetary resources required for

training, equipping, and building HN confinement officer forces. A separate internal auditor may

be required check to ensure that HN resources are safeguarded and effectively managed.

SJA. The SJA, with specific specialties and a robust capability for contract laws, military justice,

and law of land warfare.

Construction engineer management. Construction engineer management to oversee and

manage the construction of necessary infrastructure, such as bases, ranges, and training areas,

depots, and logistics facilities, and detainee facilities.

Political-military advisors. Political-military advisers to ensure the integration of the

development of confinement officers with the development of civilian ministries and

capabilities.

Public affairs. Public affairs, with a focused capability to build confidence of the population in

their confinement officers and to develop the public affairs capabilities of the HN forces.

Antiterrorism and intelligence staff. Antiterrorism and focused intelligence staff to address the

challenge of and threats to the relatively small teams that may be embedded with HN detention

facilities and not colocated with robust U.S. or partner forces or bases.

Materiel management. Materiel management, until such a capability is developed in the HN

forces. The equipping and sustaining of HN confinement officers and their equipment and

facilities is critical to their development and employment. The HN may not be able to wait until

their capability for materiel management is developed.

Health affairs. Health affairs, since most developing countries have poor health care systems.

HN personnel will be more likely to stay in new detention facilities if they are confident that

they will receive proper medical treatment. Additionally, disease is a significant threat that must

be addressed with preventive medicine and robust care.

N-18. An effective confinement officer training program is flexible and adaptive. The requirements for

developing the type, character, composition, and quantity of HN confinement officers will be affected by the

change and potential growth of HN detention facilities.

END STATE

N-19. To ensure long-term success, the end state of foreign confinement officer training programs must be

clearly stated and understood at the beginning of the process. Necessary changes that occur during the process

must be analyzed against the desired end state. A well-trained HN confinement officer force should—

Be able to provide reasonable levels of internal security without infringing on citizen civil

liberties or providing “fuel” that support insurgent rhetoric.

Be founded upon the rule of law.

Be sustainable by the HN after U.S. and multinational forces depart.

N-20. To achieve the end state and intermediate objectives, the HN should develop a plan with multinational

assistance, when necessary, that holistically addresses all aspects of confinement officer development. U.S.

doctrine divides force development into the domains of DOTMLPF. Doctrine is listed first, but these elements

are tightly linked, simultaneously pursued, and difficult to prioritize. The commander who is responsible for the

overall training monitors progress in all domains. There is always a temptation for Soldiers, Marines, and

Airmen involved in such programs to impose their own doctrine and judgment on the HN. HN I/R doctrine, like

the remaining DOTMLPF domains discussed throughout this appendix, must be appropriate to HN capabilities

and requirements.

N-21. The objective of development programs is to create HN confinement officers with the following

characteristics:

Flexibility.

Proficiency.

Professionalism.

Capability of working effectively in close coordination with other confinement officers.

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Foreign Confinement Officer Training Program

Competency in maintaining civil order, enforcing laws, and detaining criminal suspects.

Modern police ethos training and procedures, to include a demonstrated understanding of the

basics of investigation, evidence collection, and proper court and legal procedures.

Capability of operating and maintaining necessary equipment.

Honesty, impartiality, and commitment to protecting and serving the entire population, operating

under the rule of law, and respecting human rights.

Loyalty to the central government and serve national interests, recognizing their role as servants

of the people and not their masters.

FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT

N-22. A framework for the development of HN confinement officers training programs is essential and can

generally be organized around these processes:

Assess.

Organize.

Build.

Train.

Equip.

Advise.

N-23. Each of these processes considers and incorporates all relevant DOTMLPF functions. Although

described sequentially, some of these processes will actually be conducted concurrently. For example, training

and equipping operations must be integrated, and as the operation progresses, assessments will lead to changes.

A training program may also need to include a transition period during which major I/R operations are handed

over to HN security forces if U.S. forces were required to establish a confinement system for the HN due to the

collapse of governmental functions or if no viable system existed when U.S. trainers became involved.

ASSESS

N-24. As with every major military operation, the first step is to assess the situation. The assessment should be

one part of the comprehensive program of analyzing the current situation, and it normally includes a social and

economic analysis. From the assessment, planners develop short-, mid-, and long-range goals and programs.

Those goals and programs must remain flexible enough to be responsive to changing circumstances. Some

existing confinement officers might be discovered to be so dysfunctional or corrupt that they have to be

removed rather than rehabilitated. In some cases, leaders may need to be replaced for successful training to

occur.

N-25. The following indicators are continuously updated and assessed throughout the planning, preparation,

and execution of the training mission:

Structure of social values, organization, demographics, interrelationships, and education level of

the confinement officer force.

Methods, successes, and failures of HN I/R efforts.

State of training at all levels and the specialties and education of leaders.

Equipment status and the priority placed on maintenance.

Sustainment and support structure and its ability to meet the requirements of the force.

Level of sovereignty of the HN government.

Extent of acceptance of ethnic and religious minorities and the role and treatment of women

within the society.

Laws and regulations governing the security forces and their relationship to national leaders.

N-26. The mission analysis should provide a basis for determining the scope of effort required for mission

accomplishment. HN confinement officer programs may require complete reestablishment, or they may only

require assistance to increase quality and/or capacity. They may be completely devoid of a capability, or they

may only require temporary reinforcement. As with other military operations, efforts to assist confinement

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N-5

Appendix N

officers should reinforce success. For example, instead of building new detention facilities in every town,

improve the good facilities and use them as a model for weaker organizations.

ORGANIZE

N-27. The best organization for HN forces depends on the social and economic conditions of the country, and

the cultural and historical factors and the security threat that the nation faces. The aim is to develop an effective

and efficient organization with a C2, intelligence, logistic, and operational structure that makes sense for the

HN. The organization must facilitate the collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence across and

throughout all detainee operations.

General Organizational Considerations

N-28. To the maximum extent possible, decisions on the structure of a confinement officer force organization

should be made by the HN. The HN may be amenable to proposals from U.S. or multinational forces, but

should at least approve all organizational designs. As the HN government gets stronger, U.S. leaders and

trainers should expect increasingly independent organizational decisions. These may include changing the

number of forces, types of units, and internal organizational designs. Culture and other shaping conditions may

result in confinement officers performing what U.S. citizens might consider to be nontraditional roles and

missions.

N-29. A thorough review of available HN military and police doctrine is a necessary first step in setting up a

training program. Advisers should review corrections regulations to ensure that they provide clear and complete

instructions for discipline, acquisitions, and support activities. Doctrine (including tactics, techniques, and

procedures) should be reviewed and refined to address I/R operations. Regulations should be appropriate for the

level of education and sophistication of confinement officer personnel. The treatment of DCs, detainees, and

suspected persons should be spelled out clearly and be consistent with the norms of international and military

laws.

Human Resources Issues

N-30. Organizing a confinement officer training program requires resolving human resources issues related to

the areas of—

Recruitment.

Promotion screening/selection.

Pay and benefits.

Leader recruitment and selection.

Personnel accountability.

Recruitment

N-31. Recruitment is critical to the establishment of a confinement officer training program. The recruitment

program should be crafted by the HN and take local culture into account, using themes that resonate with the

local population. It should ensure that all major demographic groups are properly represented in the

confinement officers. U.S. and multinational partners should encourage and support HN efforts to recruit from

among the minority populations. A mobile recruiting capability should be established to target specific areas,

ethnic groups, or tribes to ensure demographic distribution within the body of confinement officers. Moderate

groups and factions within hostile or potentially hostile ethnic groups should be contacted, and members of

minority factions should be encouraged to support recruitment of their group members into the confinement

officer training program. Recruitment of disaffected ethnic groups into the confinement officer training program

will likely become a major issue of contention and be resisted by most HN governments. However, even

moderate success in recruiting from disaffected ethnic groups provides an enormous payoff in terms of building

the legitimacy of the confinement officers and in quieting the often legitimate fears of such ethnic groups

regarding their relationship with the government. Cultural sensitivities toward the incorporation of women must

be observed, but efforts should also be made to include women as correction officers.

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N-32. A clear set of appropriate mental, physical, and moral standards needs to be established and enforced.

Ideally, recruits are centrally screened and inducted. Recruitment centers need to be in areas that are safe and

secure from insurgent attacks, as these centers are attractive targets for insurgents. All recruits undergo a basic

security check and be vetted against lists of suspected insurgents. As much as possible, this process should be

conducted by HN agencies and personnel. Membership in illegal organizations is carefully monitored. Past

membership need not preclude joining the confinement officers, but any ongoing relationship of a recruit with

an illegal organization needs constant monitoring. Ensure that no single group of confinement officers or a

facility contains many prior members of an illegal unit, tribal militia, or other militant faction.

Promotion Screening/Selection

N-33. The selection for promotion based on proven performance and aptitude for increased responsibility is

essential. Objective evaluations ensure that promotion is by merit, not through influence or family ties. Two

methods may be worth considering for selecting leaders. One is to identify the most competent performers, train

them, and recommend them for promotion. The second is to identify those with social or professional status

within the training group, train them, and recommend them for promotion. The first method may lead to more

competent leaders, but could be resisted for cultural reasons. The second method ensures that the new leader

will be accepted culturally, but may sacrifice competence. The most effective solution is often a combination of

the two methods.

Pay and Benefits

N-34. Appropriate compensation levels help prevent a culture of corruption in confinement officer forces. It is

cheaper to spend money for adequate wages and produce effective confinement officers than it is to pay less and

end up with corrupt and abusive forces that alienate the population. This is especially important for the police,

who have the greatest opportunity for corruption in the nature of their duties and contact with the civilian

community. Some important considerations concerning pay include the following:

Pay for commissioned officers, NCOs, and technical specialists should be competitive with other

professions in the HN. Confinement officers need to be paid a sufficient wage so that they are

not required to supplement their income with part-time jobs or to resort to illegal methods to

otherwise supplement their salary.

Pay should be disbursed through HN government channels, not U.S. channels.

Cultural norms should be addressed to ensure that any questionable practices, such as the

“taxing” of subordinates, are minimized if not eliminated.

Good pay and attractive benefits must be combined with a strict code of conduct that allows the

immediate dismissal of corrupt confinement officers.

Pensions should be available to compensate the families of confinement officers in the event of a

service-related death.

N-35. Effective confinement officers can help improve the social and economic development of the nation

through the benefits that each member receives. Every recruit should be provided a basic level of literacy, job

training, and morals/values training.

Leader Recruitment and Selection

N-36. Leadership standards should be high. Candidates should be in good health and pass an academic test that

is set to a higher standard than those for enlisted recruits. Officer candidates should be carefully vetted to ensure

that they do not have close ties to any radical or insurgent organization. Those selected for leadership roles

should already have demonstrated leadership potential.

Personnel Accountability

N-37. The accountability of confinement officer personnel must be carefully tracked. Proper personnel

accountability reduces corruption, particularly in manual banking systems where pay is provided in cash. In

addition, the number of personnel failing to report for duty can be an indicator of possible attacks, unit morale,

or insurgent and militia influences upon the confinement officer forces.

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N-7

Appendix N

Demobilization of Security Force Personnel

N-38. Programs should be developed to prevent the formation of a class of impoverished, disgruntled former

confinement officers who have lost their livelihood. It may be necessary to remove officers from the detention

facility for poor performance or for failure to meet the new, higher standards of the force. Some form of

government-provided education grants or low-interest business loans will enable them to earn a living outside

the military. Confinement officers who have served for several years and are then removed should be given a

lump sum payment or a small pension to ease their transition to civilian life. These programs should not apply

to those who are guilty of human rights abuses or major corruption.

BUILD

N-39. This process may be build and/or rebuild. Requirements include the infrastructure necessary to support

the force: barracks, ranges, motor pools, and other military facilities. Because of the long lead times required for

construction, early investment in such facilities is essential if they are to be available when needed. Any

infrastructure design (including headquarters facilities) may attractive targets for insurgents, and protection

considerations will be of critical importance. (See chapter 6 and appendix I for more information on facility

design and sustainment considerations.)

N-40. During an insurgency, the HN confinement officers and police forces are likely to be operating from

local bases. A long-term, force-basing plan needs to be established for building training centers and unit

garrisons. If possible, garrisons should include government-provided medical care; housing for the

commissioned officers, NCOs, enlisted, and families; and other amenities that make national service attractive.

N-41. The extensive investment of time and resources may be required to restore or create the infrastructure

necessary to effectively train and use HN confinement officers. In addition to building I/R facilities and police

stations, the HN will need functional regional and national headquarters and ministries.

TRAIN

N-42. U.S. and multinational training assistance should address shortfalls at every level with the purpose of

establishing training systems that are self-sustaining. The ultimate goal is to replace U.S. or multinational

trainers with HN trainers.

Training U.S. Trainers

N-43. Soldiers and Marines who are assigned training missions receive a course of preparation to deal with the

specific requirements of developing the target HN confinement officers. The course should emphasize the

cultural background of the HN, introduce its language (to include specific confinement-related terms and

phrases) and provide insights into cultural tips for developing a good rapport with HN personnel. The course

should also include protection training for those U.S. trainers focused on the specifics of working with the HN

forces. U.S. trainees must become familiar with the HN organization and equipment, especially weapons not

found in the U.S. inventory. Key points to be emphasized to U.S. trainers who support their training mission

include, but are not limited to, the following:

Ensure that training is sustained and includes reinforcement of individual and team skills.

Use the smallest possible student-to-instructor ratio.

Develop HN trainers who meet the specific requirements for the focused HN mission.

Train so that standards—not time—are the driving factor.

Provide immediate feedback; use after-action reviews.

Respect HN culture, but be able to tell the difference between cultural practices and excuses.

N-44. U.S. personnel should show respect for local religions and traditions and willingly accept many aspects

of the local/national culture, including the local food (if sanitation standards permit). U.S. personnel need to

make it clear that they are not in the HN to undermine or change the local religion or traditions. On the other

hand, U.S. personnel have a mission to reduce the effects of dysfunctional social practices that affect the ability

to conduct effective I/R operations. U.S. trainers and advisers must have enough awareness to identify

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Foreign Confinement Officer Training Program

inappropriate behavior and see that it is stopped or, at the very least, reported to the multinational and HN

chains of command.

Establishing Training Standards

N-45. Effective training programs require the establishment of clear and detailed individual, leader, and unit

performance standards, taking into account cultural factors that directly affect the ability of the individual or

unit to operate. For example, training a group of confinement officers to conduct effective operations requires

more time in a country where the average confinement officer is illiterate. Similarly, staff training is more

difficult in a country with a low educational level. Building a force of confinement officers from scratch

typically takes far more time than when there is a cadre of HN personnel already available. With this in mind, it

is usually valuable to take advantage of existing military personnel with a basic understanding of discipline and

organizational structure to form units and cadres for units, rather than starting from the beginning with raw

recruits. As previously mentioned, a vetting process may be required, but this is still usually better than the

alternative.

N-46. Poorly trained leaders and units are far more prone to human rights violations than well-trained, well-led

units. Leaders and units unprepared for the pressure of active operations tend to employ indiscriminate force,

target civilians, and abuse prisoners—all actions that can threaten the popular support and government

legitimacy. Badly disciplined and poorly led confinement officers have served very effectively as recruiters and

propagandists for the insurgents, rather than shining examples for the legitimate government.

N-47. The confinement officer training program must take into account the culture, resources, and short-term

security needs of the HN. No firm rules exist on how long particular training programs should take, but previous

or existing U.S. or multinational training programs can be considered as starting points for planning. To a

certain extent, the insurgent threat may dictate how long training can take. As security improves, training

programs can be expanded to facilitate longer-term end state goals.

Training Methods

N-48. Training programs are designed to prepare HN personnel to eventually train themselves. Indigenous

trainers are the best trainers and should be used to the maximum extent possible. There are a number of possible

training methods that have proven successful, many of which also enhance the development of HN training

capability. These include—

Formal schools operated by U.S. forces, with graduates selected to return as instructors. This

includes entry-level individual training.

Mobile training teams to reinforce individual or collective training on an as-needed basis.

Partnership training, with U.S. combat units tasked to train and advise HN units with whom they

are partnered. An military police unit provides support to the HN unit. As training progresses,

HN squads, platoons, and companies may work with their U.S. military police partners in I/R

operations. In this manner, the whole U.S. unit mentors their partners. Habitual training

relationships should be maintained between partners until HN units meet established standards

for full capability.

Advanced partnership training with U.S. or international civilian policing and correctional

organizations.

Advisor teams detailed to assist HN units with minimal segregation between U.S. and HN

personnel.

Embedding U.S. personnel (initially) in key billets in HN detention facilities. This may be

required where HN confinement officers are needed, but leader training is still in its early stages.

This approach has the disadvantage of increasing dependency on U.S. forces and should only be

used in extreme circumstances. As HN capabilities improve, their personnel should be moved

back into those key positions.

Selected use of contractors may also be used to assist with training, though care must be taken to

ensure that the training is closely supervised and meets standards.

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N-9

Appendix N

Soldier Training

N-49. Foreign confinement officers must be developed through a systematic training program that first builds

their basic skills, then teaches them to work together as a team, and finally allows them to function as a unit.

Confinement officers should train to standard for conducting the major missions that they will likely face.

Requirements include, but are not limited to, the following:

Managing their own security.

Handling weapons.

Employing special weapons.

Providing escort/guard duties.

Controlling riots.

Providing effective personnel management.

Conducting logistic (planning, maintenance, and movement) operations.

Conducting police intelligence operations tasks.

Handling and processing prisoners/detainees.

Providing effective medical support.

N-50. Confinement officers should be trained to handle and interrogate detainees and prisoners according to

internationally recognized human rights norms. Prisoner and detainee management procedures should provide

for the security and fair and efficient processing of detainees.

N-51. I/R operations need effective support personnel to be effective. This requires training teams to ensure that

training in support functions is established. Specially trained personnel required by confinement officers include

the following:

Armorers.

Supply specialists.

Communications specialists.

Administrative specialists.

Vehicle mechanics and other equipment and facility maintenance personnel.

N-52. Effective confinement operations are also linked to an effective justice system with trained judges,

prosecutors, defense counsel, prison officials, and court personnel who can process arrests, detentions, warrants,

and other judicial records. These elements are important components for establishing the rule of law.

N-53. Advisers should assist the HN in establishing and enforcing the roles and authority of the police. The

authority to detain and interrogate, the procedures for detention facilities, and human rights standards are

important items for instruction during this process.

Leader Training

N-54. The effectiveness of the confinement officer training program is directly related to the quality of their

leadership. Building an effective leadership cadre requires a comprehensive program of officer, staff, and

specialized training. The ultimate success of any U.S. involvement depends on the ability to create viable HN

leadership that is capable of carrying on the mission at all levels and participating in the building of their nation

without continued U.S. presence.

Operational Employment of Newly Trained Forces

N-55. Building the morale and confidence of confinement officers should be a primary strategic objective.

Operational performance of inexperienced organizations should be carefully monitored and assessed so that

weaknesses can be quickly corrected. The employment plan for HN confinement officers should allow

considerable time for additional training. By gradually introducing units into I/R operations, poor leaders can be

weeded out, while the most competent leaders are identified and given greater authority and responsibility.

N-10

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

Foreign Confinement Officer Training Program

EQUIP

N-56. The strategic plan for confinement officer development should outline requirements for appropriate HN

equipment for the. Equipment should meet the specific needs and requirements of the HN. Equipment meets the

standard when it is affordable and suitable against the given requirements and threats. The HN must also be able

to train on the equipment. Interoperability may be a desired goal in some cases. A central consideration for

equipment provided must be the HN’s long-term ability to support and maintain the equipment.

N-57. The requirement to provide equipment may be as simple as assisting with existing equipment

maintenance or as extensive as providing everything from shoes and clothing to vehicles, communications, and

investigation kits.

N-58. Maintainability, ease of operation, and long-term sustainment costs should be primary considerations

because few developing nations have the capability to support highly complex equipment. In I/R operations, it

may be better to have a large number of versatile vehicles that are easy to maintain and operate than a few

highly capable vehicles or systems that require extensive maintenance to keep operational. Developing an

effective maintenance system for the HN may include a major maintenance program conducted by contracted

firms to bring equipment up to functional standards. The program would then progress to partnership

arrangements with U.S. forces as HN personnel are trained to carry out the support mission.

N-59. Sources for HN materiel include U.S. foreign military sales, multinational or third-nation resale of

property, HN contracts with internal suppliers, or HN purchases on the international market. The HN should

have the flexibility necessary to obtain equipment that meets the indigenous force needs for quality, timeliness,

and cost.

ADVISE

N-60. Military police advisers that serve within HN detention facilities are a very prominent group. Advisers

need to live, work and fight with their HN confinement officers, and keep segregation to an absolute minimum.

The relationship developed between advisers and HN confinement officers is critical to success. U.S. leadership

must be aware that these advisers are not just liaison officers, nor do they command HN units.

N-61. Effective advisers are an enormous force enhancer. The importance of the job means that the most

capable individuals should be picked to fill these positions. Advisers should be Soldiers known to take the

initiative and who set the standards for others. (See FM 3-05.202.)

N-62. More than anything else, professional knowledge and competence win the respect of HN confinement

officers. Effective advisers develop a healthy rapport with HN personnel but avoid the temptation to adopt HN

positions contrary to U.S. or multinational values or policy.

N-63. Advisers who understand the HN culture understand that local politics have national effects. It is

important to recognize and employ the cultural factors that support HN commitment and teamwork. Part of the

art of the good advisor is to employ the positive aspects of the local culture to get the best performance out of

each confinement officer and leader.

N-64. Important guidelines for advisers are as follows:

Learn enough of the language used by the HN to allow, at the very least, simple conversation.

Be patient, adaptable, and subtle. In guiding counterparts, explain the benefits of an action and

convince them to accept the idea as their own. Respect the rank and position of counterparts.

Be diplomatic in correcting HN confinement officers. Praise each success, and work to instill

pride in the unit.

Understand that the U.S. advisory team is not the unit command team, but enablers. The HN

commander must make decisions and command the unit, and military police are there to help

with this task.

Keep all counterparts informed, trying not to hide any agendas.

Be prepared to act as a liaison to multinational assets, especially in the areas of maintenance and

logistics.

Maintain liaison with CA and humanitarian teams in the operational area and specific AOs.

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

N-11

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms/abbreviations and terms with Army or joint definitions,

and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army)

follows the term. Terms or acronyms for which FM 3-39.40 is the proponent manual

(the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*).

SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

5 S and T

search, silence, segregate, speed, safeguard, and tag

AFI

Air Force instruction

AJP

Allied joint publication (NATO)

area of operations

Army regulation

BCT

brigade combat team

command and control

C-2X

coalition force human intelligence and counterintelligence staff

element

civil affairs

CBRN

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CBRNE

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield

explosives

CDO

commander, detainee operations

civilian internee

CID

criminal investigation division

CJCS

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CONUS

continental United States

CTA

common table of allowances

dislocated civilian

Department of the Army

DCP

detainee collection point

Department of Defense

DFAS-IN

Department of Finance and Accounting Service-Indiana

DHA

detainee holding area

DIAM

Defense Intelligence Agency manual

DNA

deoxyribonucleic acid

DOD

Department of Defense

DODD

Department of Defense directive

DODI

Department of Defense instruction

DOTMLPF

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,

personnel, and facilities

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

Glossary-1

Glossary

engineer publication

EPW

enemy prisoner of war

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCF

field confinement facility

FDF

field detention facility

field manual

FRAGO

fragmentary order

G-1

assistant chief of staff, personnel

G-2

assistant chief of staff, intelligence

G-2X

assistant chief of staff, human intelligence and counterintelligence

G-4

assistant chief of staff, logistics

G-9

assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations

Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War

GPW

Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of

War

GWS

Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the

Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field

general schedule

GWS SEA

Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of

Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea

HIV

human immunodeficiency virus

host nation

HUMINT

human intelligence

ICE

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

IFRC

International Federation of the Red Cross

international organization

I/R

internment and resettlement

ISN

internment serial number

J-2X

joint force human intelligence and counterintelligence staff element

JFTR

joint federal travel regulations

JIDC

joint interrogation and debriefing center

joint publication

MCM

Manual for Courts-Martial

MEB

maneuver enhancement brigade

military intelligence

MOS

military occupational specialty

MPC

military police command

MWD

military working dog

MTTP

multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Glossary-2

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

Glossary

NCO

noncommissioned officer

NDRC

National Detainee Reporting Center

NGO

nongovernmental organization

NLW

nonlethal weapon

operation area

OCONUS

outside the continental United States

operational environment

OPMG

Office of the Provost Marshal General

provost marshal

PMG

Provost Marshal General

POC

point of capture

POW

prisoner of war

PSYOP

psychological operations

ROE

rules of engagement

ROI

rules of interaction

retained personnel

RUF

rules for use of force

S-2X

human intelligence and counterintelligence staff officer

S-4

logistics staff officer

S-9

civil affairs staff officer

standard form

SIF

strategic internment facility

SJA

staff judge advocate

SOP

standing operating procedure

STP

Soldier training publication

TB MED

technical bulletin, medical

TDRC

theater detainee reporting center

TIF

theater internment facility

UCMJ

Uniform Code of Military Justice

United Nations

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USC

U.S. Code

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

Glossary-3

Glossary

SECTION II - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

*enemy prisoner of war

A detained person who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, was captured

by the armed forces of the enemy.

*internment and resettlement operations

Conducted by military police to shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for populations (detainees

or dislocated civilians) as a result of military or civil conflict, natural or man-made disaster, or to

facilitate criminal prosecution. Internment involves the detainment of a population or group that pose

some level of threat to military operations. Resettlement involves the quartering of a population or

group for their protection. These operations inherently control the movement and activities of their

specific population for imperative reasons of security, safety, or intelligence gathering.

*[members of] armed groups

Persons who engage in or support acts against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of

the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict that do not meet the criteria of prisoners of war

as defined within the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

*lawful enemy combatant

A person entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions, combatant immunity, and immunity

from prosecution for lawful acts as a belligerent.

*U.S. military prisoner

A person sentenced to confinement or death during a court-martial and ordered into confinement by a

competent authority, whether or not the convening authority has approved the sentence.

Glossary-4

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

References

SOURCES USED

These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

AR 15-6. Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers. 2 October 2006.

AR 20-1. Inspector General Activities and Procedures. 1 February 2007.

AR 25-30. The Army Publishing Program. 27 March 2006.

AR 40-5. Preventive Medicine. 25 May 2007.

AR 40-66. Medical Record Administration and Health Care Documentation. 17 June 2008.

AR 40-400. Patient Administration. 27 January 2010.

AR 40-501. Standards of Medical Fitness. 14 December 2007.

AR 190-8. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees.

1 October 1997.

AR 190-14. Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties.

12 March 1993.

AR 190-45. Law Enforcement Reporting. 30 March 2007.

AR 190-47. The Army Corrections System. 15 June 2006.

AR 195-2. Criminal Investigation Activities. 15 May 2009.

AR 195-5. Evidence Procedures. 25 June 2007.

AR 210-130. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Operations. 22 February 2005.

AR 215-1. Military Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Programs and Nonappropriated Funds

Instrumentalities. 31 July 2007.

AR 600-20. Army Command Policy. 18 April 2008.

AR 633-30. Military Sentences to Confinement. 28 February 1989.

AR 700-84. Issue and Sale of Personal Clothing. 18 November 2004.

AR 710-2. Supply Policy Below the National Level. 28 March 2008.

AR 715-9. Contractors Accompanying the Force. 29 October 1999.

DA Pamphlet 350-38. Standards in Training Commission. 13 May 2009.

FM 1. The Army. 14 June 2005.

FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 September 2004.

FM 1-06. Financial Management Operations. 21 September 2006.

FM 2-22.3. Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006.

FM 3-0. Operations. 27 February 2008.

FM 3-05.202. Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations. 2 February 2007.

FM 3-05.30. Psychological Operations. 15 April 2005.

FM 3-05.40. Civil Affairs Operations. 29 September 2006.

FM 3-07. Stability Operations. 6 October 2008.

FM 3-19.13. Law Enforcement Investigations. 10 January 2005.

FM 3-19.15. Civil Disturbance Operations. 18 April 2005.

FM 3-19.17. Military Working Dogs. 6 July 2005.

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

References-1

References

FM 3-22.40. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Tactical Employment of

Nonlethal Weapons (NLW). 24 October 2007.

FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency. 15 December 2006.

FM 3-34.400. General Engineering. 9 December 2008.

FM 3-39. Military Police Operations. 16 February 2010.

FM 3-100.21. Contractors on the Battlefield. 3 January 2003.

FM 4-02. Force Health Protection in a Global Environment. 13 February 2003.

FM 4-02.1. Combat Health Logistics. 28 September 2001.

FM 4-02.10. Theater Hospitalization. 3 January 2005.

FM 4-02.12. Health Service Support in Corps and Echelons Above Corps. 2 February 2004.

FM 4-02.17. Preventive Medicine Services. 28 August 2000.

FM 4-02.18. Veterinary Services Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 30 December 2004.

FM 4-02.19. Dental Service Support Operations. 21 July 2009.

FM 4-02.2. Medical Evacuation. 8 May 2007.

FM 4-02.21. Division and Brigade Surgeons’ Handbook (Digitized) Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures. 15 November 2000.

FM 4-02.25. Employment Forward Surgical Teams Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 28 March

2003.

FM 4-02.283. Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological Casualties. 20 December 2001.

FM 4-02.285. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Chemical Agent

Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries. 18 September 2007.

FM 4-02.4. Medical Platoon Leaders’ Handbook Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 24 August

2001.

FM 4-02.43. Force Health Protection Support for Army Special Operations Forces. 27 November

2006.

FM 4-02.51. Combat and Operational Stress Control. 6 July 2006.

FM 4-02.56. Army Medical Field Feeding Operations. 29 April 2003.

FM 4-02.6. The Medical Company, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 1 August 2002.

FM 4-02.7. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support in a Nuclear,

Biological, and Chemical Environment. 15 July 2009.

FM 4-25.12. Unit Field Sanitation Team. 25 January 2002.

FM 5-0. Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005.

FM 5-34. Engineer Field Data. 19 July 2005.

FM 5-415. Fire-Fighting Operations. 9 February 1999.

FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.

FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009.

FM 8-10-6. Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

14 April 2000.

FM 19-10. The Military Police Law and Order Operations. 30 September 1987.

FM 21-10. Field Hygiene and Sanitation. 21 June 2000.

FM 22-6. Guard Duty. 17 September 1971.

FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

FM 100-10-2. Contracting Support on the Battlefield. 4 August 1999.

STP 19-31E1-SM. Soldier’s Manual, MOS 31E, Internment/Resettlement Specialist, Skill Level 1,

Soldier’s Manual. 23 October 2007.

References-2

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

References

STP 19-31E24-SM-TG. Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, MOS 31E, Internment/Resettlement

Specialist, Skill Levels 2/3/4. 5 March 2009.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

AJP-2.5. Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents. August 2007.

CJCSI 5810.01C. Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. 31 January 2007.

DIAM 58-12. (S//NF) DOD HUMINT Management System (U). 30 June 1997.

DODD 1325.04. Confinement of Military Prisoners and Administration of Military Correctional

Programs and Facilities. 17 August 2001.

DODD 2000.13. Civil Affairs. 27 June 1994.

DODD 2310.01E. The Department of Defense Detainee Program. 5 September 2006.

DODD 2311.01E. DOD Law of War Program. 9 May 2006.

DODD 3000.3. Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons. 9 July 1996.

DODD 3025.1. Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). 15 January 1993.

DODD 3115.09. DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning.

9 October 2008.

DODI 1100.22. Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix. 7 September 2006.

DODI 1325.7. Administration of Military Correctional Facilities and Clemency and Parole Authority.

17 July 2001.

DODI 3020.41. Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces. 3 October 2005.

DODI 6055.6. DOD Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES) Program. 21 December 2006.

DODI 7000.14. Department of Defense Financial Management Policy and Procedures. 23 June 2006.

JFTR Volume 1. Uniformed Service Members,.Volume 1 of Joint Federal Travel Regulations.

1 September 2009. Available online at

<http://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/perdiem/trvlregs.html >.

JFTR Volume 2. Department of Defense Civilian Personnel, Volume 1 of Joint Federal Travel

Regulations. 1 September 2009. Available online at

<http://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/perdiem/trvlregs.html >.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001.

JP 3-28. Civil Support. 14 September 2007.

JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 12 February 2007.

JP 3-57. Civil-Military Operations. 8 July 2008.

JP 3-63. Detainee Operations. 30 May 2008.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

AFI 31-304. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees.

1 October 1997.

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

Article 2. 10 December 1984. Available online at

<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm#art2 >.

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 28 July 1951. Available online at

<http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf >.

CTA 50-900. Clothing and Individual Equipment. 20 November 2008.

CTA 50-970. Expendable/Durable Items (Except Medical, Class V, Repair Parts, and Heraldic Items).

28 January 2005.

Defense Medical Standardization Board Web site. Available online at <http://www.jrcab.army.mil >.

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. 30 December 2005.

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

References-3

References

Executive Order 11850. Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot

Control Agents. 8 April 1975.

Food and Nutrition Board, National Institute of Medicine Web site.

<http://www.nal.usda.gov/fnic/etext/000105.html >.

Geneva Conventions. Available online at <http://www.genevaconventions.org/ >.

Geneva Conventions, Convention I, Common Article 3. 12 August 1949. Available online at <

http://www.genevaconventions.org/ >.

Geneva Conventions, Convention I (GWS). For the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick

and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949. Available

online at < http://www.genevaconventions.org/ >.

Genova Convention Convention II (GWS SEA). For the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,

Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949. Available

online at < http://www.genevaconventions.org/ >.

Geneva Conventions, Convention III (GPW). Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva,

12 August 1949. Available online at <http://www.genevaconventions.org/ >.

Geneva Conventions, Convention IV (GCP). Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons, 12 August

1949. Available online at < http://www.genevaconventions.org/ >.

Hague Conventions. Available online at < http://hcch.e-

vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.listing>.

MCM. Manual for Courts-Martial United States. 2008. Available online at

<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf>.

Military Medical Ethics Volume I and Volume II. Available online at

<http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil >.

Geneva Conventions, Protocol I. Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and

Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, 8 June 1977. Available

online at http://www.genevaconventions.org/.

Geneva Conventions, Protocol II. Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and

Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977.

Available online at http://www.genevaconventions.org/.

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 4 October 1967.

Public Law 106-523. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000. 22 November 2000. Available

online at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-

bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ523.106.pdf>.

TB MED 530. Occupational and Environmental Health Food Sanitation. 30 October 2002.

UCMJ. Uniform Code of Military Justice. Available on;line at

<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj.htm >.

War Crimes Act. 1996. Available online at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:H.R.3680 >.

DFAS-IN 37-1. Finance and Accounting Policy Implementation. Available online at

<http://asafm.army.mil/offices/BU/Dfas371.aspx?OfficeCode=1200 >.

EP 1105-3-1. Base Camp Development in the Theater of Operations. 19 January 2009. Available

online at <http://140.194.76.129/publications/eng-pamphlets/ep1105-3-1/toc.pdf >.

10 USC. Armed Forces.

18 USC, Sec 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus.

22 USC, Sec 2151. Congressional findings and declaration of policy (Foreign Assistance Act).

32 USC. National Guard.

42 USC Chap 68. Disaster Relief (Robert T. Stafford Relief and Emergency Act).

UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies. Third Edition, February 2007. Available online at

<http://www.the-ecentre.net/resources/e_library/doc/ThirdEdition.pdf >.

References-4

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

References

UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations, First Edition. 1 January 1995.

Available online at <http://www.unhcr.org/3d5122884.html >.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 10 December 1948. Available online at

<http://ddsn.sc.gov/providers/manualsandguidelines/Documents/Human_RightsCommittee/7.

Universal%20Declaration%20of%20Human%20Rights.pdf>.

DOCUMENTS NEEDED

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. DA forms are available on the

Army Publishing Directorate Web site <www.apd.army.mil>.

DA Form

31. Request and Authority for Leave (EGA).

DA Form

1124. Individual Receipt Voucher Personal Deposit Fund.

DA Form

1125-R. Summary Receipt and Disbursement Voucher Personal Fund (LRA).

DA Form

1128. Petty Cash Voucher-Personal Deposit Fund.

DA Form

1129-R. Record of Prisoners’ Personal Deposit Fund (LRA).

DA Form

1134-R. Request for Withdrawal of Personal Property (LRA).

DA Form

1135-R. Personal Property Permit (LRA).

DA Form

1594. Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer’s Log.

DA Form

2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

DA Form

2662-R. United States Army EPW Identity Card (LRA).

DA Form

2663-R. Fingerprint Card (LRA).

DA Form

2664-R. Weight Register (Prisoner of War) (LRA).

DA Form

2665-R. Capture Card for Prisoner of War (LRA).

DA Form

2666-R. Prisoner of War Notification of Address (LRA).

DA Form

2667-R. Prisoner of War Mail (Letter) (LRA).

DA Form

2668. Prisoner of War Mail (Post Card).

DA Form

2669. Certificate of Death.

DA Form

2670-R. Mixed Medical Commission Certificate for EPW (LRA).

DA Form

2671-R. Certificate of Direct Repatriation for EPW (LRA).

DA Form

2672-R. Classification Questionnaire for Officer Retained Personnel (LRA).

DA Form

2673-R. Classification Questionnaire for Enlisted Retained Personnel (LRA).

DA Form

2674-R. Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee Strength Report (LRA).

DA Form

2675-R. Certification of Work Incurred Injury or Disability (LRA).

DA Form

2677-R. United States Army Civilian Internee Identity Card (LRA).

DA Form

2678-R. Civilian Internee Natl-Internment Card (LRA).

DA Form

2679-R. Civilian Internee Letter (LRA).

DA Form

2680-R. Civilian Internee Natl-Post Card (LRA).

DA Form

2823. Sworn Statement.

DA Form

3078. Personal Clothing Request.

DA Form

3955. Change of Address and Directory Card.

DA Form

3997. Military Police Desk Blotter.

DA Form

4137. Evidence/Property Custody Document.

DA Form

4237-R. Detainee Personnel Record (LRA).

DA Form

4459. Parole Action Record.

DA Form

5162-R. Routine Food Establishment Inspection Report (LRA).

DA Form

5456. Water Point Inspection.

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

References-5

References

DA Form

5457. Potable Water Container Inspection.

DA Form

5458. Shower/Decontamination Point Inspection.

DA Form

5513. Key Control Register and Inventory.

DD Form

2. Armed Forces of the United States Geneva Convention Identification Card.

DD Form

214. Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty.

DD Form

499. Prisoner’s Mail and Correspondence Record.

DD Form

503. Medical Examiner’s Report.

DD Form

504. Request and Receipt for Health and Comfort Supplies.

DD Form

506. Daily Strength Record of Prisoners.

DD Form

509. Inspection Record of Prisoner in Segregation.

DD Form

510. Request for Interview.

DD Form

515. Roster of Prisoners.

DD Form

1131. Cash Collection Voucher.

DD Form

1380. U.S. Field Medical Card.

DD Form

2064. Certificate of Death Overseas.

DD Form

2707. Confinement Order.

DD Form

2708. Receipt for Inmate or Detained Person.

DD Form

2710. Inmate Background Summary.

DD Form

2711-1. Custody Reclassification.

DD Form

2712. Inmate Work and Training Evaluation.

DD Form

2713. Inmate Observation Report.

DD Form

2714. Inmate Disciplinary Report.

DD Form

2715-3. Inmate Restoration/Return to Duty, Clemency and Parole Statement.

DD Form

2716. Parole Acknowledgement Letter.

DD Form

2716-1. Department of Defense Certificate of Parole.

DD Form

2718. Inmate’s Release Order.

DD Form

2745. Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag.

DD Form

2A. Active Duty Military Identification Card.

SF 558. Medical Record-Emergency Care and Treatment.

SF 600. Medical Record-Chronological Record of Medical Care.

SF 1402. Certificate of Appointment.

READINGS RECOMMENDED

These sources contain relevant supplemental information.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

AR 15-130. Army Clemency and Parole Board. 23 October 1998.

AR 25-400-2. The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS). 2 October 2007.

AR 40-3. Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Care. 22 February 2008.

AR 190-12. Military Working Dog Program. 4 June 2007.

AR 385-10. The Army Safety Program. 23 August 2007.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

DODD 5100.46. Foreign Disaster Relief. 4 December 1975.

DODI 2310.08E. Medical Program Support for Detainee Operations. 6 June 2006.

References-6

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

Index

releases, 1-16, 4-19, 5-15,

6-38

Army Corrections System, 9-1

religion, D-3, D-4

definition.

representation, 5-10, D-4

retained items, 4-13

DCPs, 6-4

battlefield facilities, 7-2

screening, I-7

location, 6-6

FCFs, 7-3

shelter, D-3

medical support, 6-9

FDFs, 7-2

special programs, 5-22, J-

planning, 6-6

biometric-enabled intelligence,

security, 6-9

M-1

status determination, 1-8

DCs

transfers, 1-16, 5-15, 6-38

boards, 9-8

exercise, D-4

treatment, I-2

refugees, 1-11

treatment policy, 1-10

subcategories, 1-7

water, D-3

treatment policy, 1-11

activities, 10-5

detention facility commander,

detainee

personnel, 3-16, 10-1

9-5, 9-6, 9-8

clothing, J-16

support, 10-2

DHA, 6-10

definition, 1-5

transportation of DCs, 10-8

location, 6-11

detainee operations, 4-1

CDO

medical support, 6-14

planning considerations, 5-2

responsibilities, 3-4

operating units, 6-10

Detainee Reporting System, 6-

planning considerations, 6-

chaplains, 1-6, 3-14, 5-11, 6-

15,

37, 7-6

detainees, 1-5

security, 6-14

children

abuse, I-2

displaced person definition, 1-7

detainee processing, 4-12

activities, 8-1

processing, 1-11

disposition boards, 8-2

basic standard of care, D-2

unaccompanied, 10-10, 10-

categories, 1-5

clothing, D-3

under the age of 15, 10-13

emergency medical treatment,

correspondence, 8-1

under the age of 18, 10-15

I-5, I-7, I-9

deaths, 5-13

EMT.

evacuation, 6-7

clothing, J-16

exercise, D-4

enemy combatant

definition, 1-5

false identities, K-4

definition, 1-6

civil support

food rations, D-2, J-11

engineer support, 10-6, J-1

definition, 2-8

full processing, 6-24

EPW

general protection and care,

civilian organizations, 1-12

clothing, J-16

1-10

types, 1-13

health, J-11

EPWs

confinement

humane treatment, D-2

determination of status, 1-7

definition, 1-2

hygiene facilities, D-3

escapes, 3-17, 5-16, 6-14, 6-

contractors, C-1

immunizations, I-7

33, H-3

expectations of, C-4

impounded items, 4-14

evacuee definition, 1-7

international agreements,

internment, 6-14

C-3

interrogations, 5-3

evidence custodial system, L-1

management, C-2

mail, D-4

evidence custodian, L-1, L-2

policy, C-3

medical and dental care, D-

expellee

training considerations, C-3

definition, 1-7

counterinsurgency

medical monitoring, I-8

external agency involvement,

definition, 2-4

medical support, 5-6

1-12

medications, I-9

counterintelligence, 3-16

movement, 4-15

crowd, H-9

personnel file, 5-14

dynamics, H-8

facility commanders, 8-7

photographing, I-8

crowd tactics

processing, 4-5

FCF, 7-3

control measures, H-6

property, 4-12, D-3

alarms, 7-12

commander, 7-7

crowds, H-9

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

Index-1

Index

construction, 7-3

minimum force, 1-4

MPC, 2-8, 3-10

emergency plans, 7-11

nongovernmental agencies,

MWDs, 5-3, 5-5, 6-9, 6-33, I-11

facility guards, 7-8

E-1

location, 7-3

planning, 1-14

reaction force, 7-11

reporting agencies, 3-1

NDRC, 1-12, 3-1, 5-14, 5-15,

shift supervisor, 7-8

segregation, 1-4

6-15, 6-24

use of force, 7-12

U.S. military prisoner

NGOs, 1-13

operations, 7-1

FDF, 7-2

I/R populations, 1-5

FDFs, 7-2

IG, 3-15

operational environment, 1-1

Federal Emergency

hostile, 2-7

Management Agency, E-1

indigenous penal system, 9-11

operations officer, 3-12, 6-17,

field hygiene, I-12

inmate classification, 8-2

6-37

food service personnel, 10-13,

intelligence, 3-12

I-11, J-11, J-12

internally displaced person

definition, 1-7

PAO, 1-16, 3-15

internment facilities, H-7

parole board, 9-1, 9-3, 9-4

Geneva Conventions, 9-8

construction phase, K-2

penal program, 9-11

guard, 3-6

construction requirements,

force, 3-18

penal system template, 9-10

J-4

towers, J-8

disciplinary punishment, 6-

personal hygiene, I-12

pest management, I-11

internment facility, 5-10

humane treatment, 1-3, 1-10,

PM, 3-12

1-11, 5-16, 6-3, D-1, I-1

interpreter, 3-7, 4-11, 4-15, 6-

POC, 2-9

20, I-5, J-14

humanitarian assistance

protected person

domestic, E-3

ISN, 1-15, 4-12, 5-14, 5-15, 6-

definition, 1-5

foreign, E-1

7, 6-15

PSYOP, 3-16, K-1

UN, E-3

access to, K-4

humanitarian-assistance, 10-9

enclosure team, K-5

juvenile, 9-11

forces, E-3

interview team, K-3

HUMINT, 1-15

loudspeaker support, K-3

collectors, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 5-3,

quick-reaction force support

labor, I-7, J-19

5-5, 6-8, 6-13, C-4

team, K-5

availability, 6-3

considerations, J-20

public affairs officer, 9-5

pay, 3-14

I/R facilities, J-5

policy, 3-13

generators, J-9

quick-reaction force teams, H-

requirements, 3-14

infirmary, J-12

restrictions, J-20

6, H-7, H-8, K-5

sanitation, J-13

linguists, 6-26

site selection, J-5

logistical support, 5-2, 7-2, J-1,

reaction force, 7-11

I/R facility construction

J-5, J-6

minimum requirements, J-6

refugee

pedestrian entrance (sally

definition, 1-7

port), J-8

medical officer, 9-5

refugees, E-3

site selection, J-5

rights, 1-11

towers, J-8

medical support, 5-6, 5-20, 6-3,

6-35, I-1, I-2, I-7

rehabilitation program, 8-9

I/R facility service

DCPs, I-6

resettlement facilities

requirements, J-10

restrictions, I-2

civilian involvement, 10-15

I/R operations, 1-1

medical surveillance, I-8

ROI, 10-16

accountability, 1-4

RUF, 10-16

care, custody, and control,

medical treatment facilities, I-6

1-4

Level II, I-6

resettlement operations, 10-1,

close contact, 1-4

Level III, I-6

10-2, 10-8, 10-10

DCs, 10-11

commanders responsibility,

migrant

planning, 10-6, 10-12

3-3

definition, 1-7

support, 10-9

evacuation, 1-14

military decisionmaking

humane treatment, 1-3

restraints

process.

military police support

use of, 5-18

organizations, 3-10

military police companies, 3-11

Index-2

FM 3-39.40

12 February 2010

Index

review boards, 8-2

stateless person

handcuffs, J-18

definition, 1-7

metal detectors, J-18

riots, H-6

supply, 7-11

ROI, 5-19, 6-28

accountability, 7-11

RP, 1-5

U.S. Army Corrections

physical inventories, 7-11

clothing, J-16

Command

support

definition, 1-5

mission, 3-3

personnel, 7-10

privileges, 1-6

U.S. military prisoners, 1-7, 7-3

support units

RUF, 1-14, 7-3, H-3

classification, 7-4

MPC, 2-8

resettlement, 10-16

clothing, 7-5

sustainment support, K-2

correspondence, 7-10

custody guidelines, 7-7

searching devices, J-18

facilities, 7-1

tactical psychological

food, 7-5

security forces, 5-17, 6-17, 10-

16, J-9

operations detachment.

identification, 7-4

TDRC, 1-12

operation planning process,

security measures, 3-11, 3-18,

7-1

6-9, 6-31, 6-32, 6-38, 7-7, 7-

technical channels

operation principles, 7-1

8, 7-11, B-3, I-6

definition, 2-8

operations, 7-1

SIF, 6-37

TIF, 6-17

personal property, 7-10

HUMINT support, 6-38

emergency action plans, 6-

processing, 7-3

location, 6-37

treatment policy, 1-11

medical operations, 6-38

location, 6-19

UN, 1-12, 1-13

planning considerations, 6-

operations, 6-26

planning considerations, 6-

use of force, H-2

records and reports, 6-38

NLWs, H-4

security considerations, 6-

records and reports, 6-26

transport protective system, J-

transfers or releases, 6-38

work details, 6-33

SJA, 3-13, 9-5

batons, J-18

frisk/search gloves, J-18

socialization, 8-12

12 February 2010

FM 3-39.40

Index-3

FM 3-39.40 INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT OPERATIONS (February 2010) - page 4