Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix A

Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)

1. Identified emergency centers (gyms, schools, etc).

2. Hospital surge capabilities.

3. Medical staff requirements (doctors, nurses, etc).

4. Communications systems.

D. Disaster relief.

1. Disaster relief materials and assets available.

a. Supplies and foodstuffs.

b. Materials.

c. Medicine (medical supplies).

d. Heavy equipment (construction).

e. Contractors (transportation, water storage, power generation).

f. Transportation assets (air, ground, water).

g. Mobile power generation (generators and size).

h. Labor.

i. Emergency shelters.

j. Water treatment and storage.

k. Mobile medical units and/or hospitals.

2. Emergency transportation network analysis.

a. Assumptions.

b. Roads, railways, airports, etc., that have sustained damage in previous disasters.

E. In-country POCs by position and telephone number.

1. US POCs (Embassy, US Agency for International Development, Defense Attaché Office

personnel).

2. HN POCs (with telephone numbers).

PRODUCTS

A-24. When conducting operations in the urban environment, many products may be required. These

products may be used individually or combined, as the mission requires. Many of the products listed in this

appendix will be created in conjunction with multiple staff elements.

POPULATION STATUS OVERLAYS

A-25. Population status overlays are a group of products rather than a single product. These products depict

how the population of a designated area is divided based on a single characteristic such as age, religion,

ethnicity, or income. For instance, one population status overlay can show what areas of a city are Catholic,

Protestant, Muslim, Hindu, and so on. Another overlay can indicate income levels or areas of known gang

membership. There is no limit to the number of overlays that can be created to depict the population

characteristics of a chosen area. The benefits of these overlays range from determining possible lines of

contention (that can exist between groups) or identification of the population or location in greatest need of

a certain activity or asset. (See Figure A-8.)

A-30

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Urban Intelligence Tools and Products

Figure A-8. Population status overlay

A-26. Many examples of this type of overlay are produced by the United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and are readily available on its web site at http://www.reliefweb.int.

Population status overlays and descriptions resulting from assessing the demographic characteristics of the

host city population might reveal significant differences between groups which can further enhance

situational understanding.

A-27. These overlays can be useful in identifying critical areas of the urban environment based on cultural

factors such as ethnic breakdown, tribal affiliation, or religious breakdown. One common method of

constructing these overlays is to color code sections of an urban area based on the majority identifications

of that area. This, however, can be misleading in some situations; an alternative method that more

accurately reflects the information that needs to be conveyed to the commander may be necessary. An

alternative method may entail dividing the urban area into sectors (as noted in Chapter 3) using the same

city divisions that local authorities such as the local police precincts or municipal districts can often help

clarify the situation as well as aid in coordination efforts with the local authorities and then inserting pie

charts for each sector showing each group and numbers and/or percentages.

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

A-31

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix A

A-28. Population dispersal can vary significantly throughout the day. Another type of population status

overlay could indicate the location of population groups during the day, and how this changes over time.

This could assist in identifying possibly restrictive operating conditions or reveal times that are most

conducive for completion of a given mission.

CONGREGATION POINTS OR MASS ASSEMBLY POINTS OVERLAYS

A-29. Congregation or mass assembly points overlays depict the numbers, types, and locations of sites

where large numbers of people can be gathered for situations such as demonstrations, protection, feeding,

in the event of a disaster. These sites may be depicted on maps of an urban area. These sites include places

of religious worship, parks, schools, restaurants, squares, recreational centers, sports facilities, or

entertainment centers. If normally used for large gatherings of people, these locations can also be coded

with information on the population group that frequents them, days and hours of operation, and type of

activity that occurs.

URBAN TERRAIN OVERLAYS

A-30. Urban terrain overlays depict specific aspects of terrain unique to the urban environment. These

overlays can depict the details of a single building, a group of buildings, a section of an urban area, or even

an entire urban area. This type of overlay can also depict the different terrain zones apparent in an urban

area. Different types of terrain could be indicated using hatch marks or other indicators on a map or aerial

photograph. Zone types may be defined as close, orderly block, or dense random construction (as they are

in FM 3-06), or by any other designated characteristics required by the mission, such as zones of threat

occupation or zones divided by the types of predicted weapons effects.

A-31. A building type overlay can depict particular types of buildings, such as industrial buildings,

government buildings, military buildings, residential areas, businesses, warehouses or storage buildings,

religious centers, or media locations. Each of the buildings can be numbered or otherwise identified

depending on the needs of the commander and his staff. Additionally, entire sections of a city can be

marked depending on the construction type prevalent in a particular area. For instance, an area of dense

construction or a shantytown can be identified by appropriately labeling it on an overlay or directly onto an

aerial photograph.

A-32. Shantytowns may need to be specifically highlighted because they may be areas with notable food

shortages and where disease and pollution are most prevalent. Shantytowns may lack public utility

infrastructure

(for example, plumbing and electricity). Buildings are often made from miscellaneous

materials, and there is no consistent pattern of streets or corridors, complicating military operations. These

types of conditions result in a concentration of population that is generally dissatisfied and is a potential

source of unrest.

A-33. Unoccupied locations or buildings should also be identified. These locations or buildings can be

used as shelter for troops (friendly or threat) or as locations for friendly forces to demonstrate firepower if

necessary. The latter utility was demonstrated in Kosovo when a tank round was shot into an unoccupied

building in order to quell an increasingly worrisome civil disturbance. Additionally, unoccupied locations

or buildings could be logistics storage sites or meeting sites for threat forces.

A-34. An overlay depicting street widths in terms of major weapon systems can help identify which

formations or routes are most advisable for an area. A street wide enough to allow two Abrams tanks to

advance side by side enables the vehicles to better cover upper floors on opposite sides of the street,

thereby providing security for each other. Also, depicting buildings that exceed the depression or elevation

capabilities of vehicle weapons systems can identify areas of concern and potential enemy ambush

positions. Routes with such “dead spaces” may require convoys with additional or alternative weapons

systems able to eliminate this vulnerability.

A-32

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Urban Intelligence Tools and Products

A-35. Three urban terrain related products that are used primarily in air operations are the roof coverage

overlay, the vertical and lateral references urban terrain feature overlay (UTFO), and the urban terrain

orientation graphic (UTOG). (See FM 3-06.1.) In urban terrain, roof coverage is more meaningful to

aviation operations than a ground-based horizontal visibility (fields of fire) analysis. The roof coverage

overlay depicts concealment from aerial observation and directly relates to the density of structures. (See

Figure A-9.)

A-36. The vertical and lateral reference UTFO is used to prepare aircrews for aviation urban operations. It

annotates prominent navigation features as points (vertical structures), lines (lateral references), or areas.

The altitude in feet above mean sea level (MSL) and, in parentheses, height above ground level (AGL); for

example, “1,460 feet (940 feet), follows vertical features. Elevation data, both MSL and AGL, are

important for mission planning. This overlay may be combined with the UTOG detailed below. The UTFO

identifies and plots:

Dominant vertical features.

Significant linear features.

Prominent, unique structures.

Currently known deliberate hazards or helicopter countermeasures.

Figure A-9. Example roof cover overlay

A-37. The UTOG overlay is used for aircrew orientation. A graphical depiction of urban terrain

characteristics allows a more thorough orientation than map reconnaissance alone. The UTOG is prepared

by dividing the terrain into areas classified by density of structures and building construction. Digital

Feature Analysis Data (DFAD) codes may be used on overlay products to minimize clutter. This product

serves as a substitute for the traditional combined obstacle overlay for aviation operations and may be

combined with the UTFO. (See Figure A-10.) The UTOG provides the following urban area general

characteristics:

Density of structures.

Building construction.

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

A-33

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix A

Street pattern.

Figure A-10. Combined UTOG/UTFO (simplified example)

LINES OF COMMUNICATION OVERLAYS

A-38. LOC overlays identify the major LOCs within and around an urban area. This includes roads,

airfields, waterways, railroads, and foot paths. More advanced versions of these overlays can be combined

with the traffic conditions overlay and long-term surveillance of LOCs to determine what LOCs are most

heavily traveled at different times of the day. Threat forces can take advantage of higher volumes of

civilian traffic to use these LOCs for their own purposes.

A-39. These overlays can provide mobility information to assist planners and operators in determining

what equipment can move along the city’s mobility corridors. Pertinent data would include street widths,

their load capacity, sharp turns, potential ambush positions, potential sniper positions, and overhanging

obstacles.

A-40. Even though aerial surveillance can detect heavy traffic and traffic jams, it cannot predict when or

why they occur or whether or not they were part of the normal traffic pattern in the urban area. Creating an

LOC overlay that depicts normal traffic conditions can help the unit determine best times to operate. It can

also provide an indicator of an unusual event.

A-41. Waterways can play a significant role in the urban terrain. Among other things, they can be obstacles

or LOCs for illicit traffic (arms smuggling, drug smuggling, black marketeering). An overlay of local water

systems can list such important items as the width and depth of the waterway, key crossing sites

A-34

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Urban Intelligence Tools and Products

(depending on the size of the waterway), and key uses of that waterway (such as commerce, water source

for crops, drinking water source for the local population).

LINE OF SIGHT OVERLAYS

A-42. Perhaps even more important in the complex urban environment than in non-complex terrain, line-

of-sight overlays can help define AAs to an objective. Just as important are reverse line-of-sight overlays

that show the friendly AAs from the enemy standpoint. We can expect the enemy to try to cover dead

space from the objective area with other positions or devices such as mines or IEDs. If the enemy on the

objective simply wants to flee, dead spaces may simply be covered by some type of early warning system.

A-43. Line-of-sight overlays can help pinpoint potential sniper positions along each relevant AA based on

the best possible locations given line of sight, elevation, exposure, and other pertinent considerations.

These positions are important because friendly forces can position personnel at these locations to secure

them or observe from them as readily as threat forces.

KEY INFRASTRUCTURE OVERLAYS

A-44. These overlays depict the locations of key infrastructure in an urban environment. Like population

status overlays, this type of overlay is a group of products rather than a single product. These overlays can

be produced by using a map, aerial photography, or graphic design that is appropriately marked with a

numbering or a color-coded system that indicates the type of asset as well as its specific attributes.

A-45. Key infrastructure required to sustain a city can be used as a tool of warfare both in the physical and

information domains. Securing key infrastructure from destruction will often be key to gaining and

maintaining a positive perception of friendly forces by the local populace. The most important part of the

key infrastructure is the critical infrastructure. This may include electricity generation plants, hydroelectric

dams, pumping stations, water purification plants, sewage treatment plants, and anything that, if harmed,

can affect the living conditions of the population.

A-46. Key infrastructure overlays can be useful for identifying protected urban terrain. Protected terrain

encompasses areas that should not be destroyed, attacked, or occupied, or that have other use restrictions

based on international treaties, ROE, and common sense—such as schools, hospitals, areas with large

amounts of phone and/or electrical wiring, and buildings with many stories. For example, medical facilities

may be depicted on their own key infrastructure overlay. Medical facilities are generally NFAs for friendly

forces and should be protected from damage or destruction so that they can continue to take care of the

local population once friendly forces have secured the urban area. Inadequate health care for the local

population can lead to both a negative perception of friendly forces and an uncontrolled increase in disease

which can affect friendly forces personnel working in the urban environment directly.

A-47. Other types of key infrastructure overlays may depict media facilities, transportation facilities,

resource sites, culturally significant structures, dangerous facilities or subterranean infrastructure. Media

facilities include locations of transmission stations, antennas, newspaper production and distribution sites,

and television and radio stations. Transportation facilities include rail hubs, major bus connection sites,

subway lines, freeways, major thoroughfares, and intersections that are significant to the operation. A

resource sites key infrastructure overlay can depict locations where resources or supplies can be obtained,

such as building material locations, car lots, and appliance warehouses. This can include petroleum and

natural gas processing plants. Generally, these are the resources and infrastructure that are used to support

the critical resource needs of a population.

A-48. A key infrastructure overlay could highlight culturally significant structures such as places of

religious worship

(for example, churches, temples, mosques), all relevant government buildings and

internationally significant buildings (for example, embassies and consulates), and other structures or areas

of notable cultural importance. A key infrastructure overlay of dangerous facilities could depict structures

with known chemical, biological, or incendiary features. These are primarily TIM sites, such as

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

A-35

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix A

pharmaceutical plants, oil refineries, or fertilizer plants, but can include military-related areas like

ammunition storage sites. Finally, an overlay depicting key subterranean infrastructure can include

underground railways, sewer systems, electrical wiring, or any other underground feature of significance

for the operation.

URBAN MODELS

A-49. Operations within the urban environment follow standard Army doctrine regarding the wargaming

process. Because of the level of detail, however, there is a need for a modeling tool. These tools can range

from plastic or wooden models to overhead images to sand tables. Probably the best is the combination of

overhead imagery and 3D models. Figure A-11 is an example of the imagery and urban models. It reflects

the Shugart-Gordon Urban training site at Fort Polk, LA, and includes an aerial imagery and a 3D Model

with a multiple perspective view. These products should be used together.

IMAGERY

A-50. Analysis of any urban environment would be incomplete without the use of imagery. Imagery

products for the urban environment include both aerial photography and satellite imagery. In many cases,

tasked aerial reconnaissance platforms, such as UASs, respond directly to the commander, thus ensuring

timely and focused data collection. Because of technical limitations or priorities established at the higher

echelons, space-based and other national collection assets may not be available to the commander and staff.

Additionally, as each collection system has its own unique capabilities, traditional black and white or

infrared imagery may offer the best view of the target in a given situation.

Figure A-11. Example of imagery and urban models

A-36

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Urban Intelligence Tools and Products

A-51. A key element in future urban operations may be the real-time imagery downlink capabilities of

space-based intelligence collection platforms. Employing state-of-the-art multispectral, infrared, EO

imagery, and synthetic aperture radar

(SAR) imaging, space-based systems can provide important

information in the urban environment. Data collected from such sources is transferred in digital format,

which then can be manipulated to address specific requirements. Intelligence staffs must be fully aware of

the capabilities and limitations of these systems as well as the procedures necessary to request this support.

A-52. Advanced geospatial intelligence products are produced using any combination of imaging

platforms: visible, infrared, radar, or spectral depending on the requestor’s needs. Due to the versatility of

these products, they have a wide range of applications in the urban environment. Presenting imagery in an

oblique perspective by combining it with digital terrain elevation data provides a perspective view. Using

spectral imagery can accomplish discovery and identification of manmade and indigenous activity from

patterns of heat distribution and determination of changes in a scene imaged at various times. Other uses

include facility analysis, structural analysis, target detection, soil analysis, and damage assessment.

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

A-37

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Non-US Small Arms and Light Weapons Effects in the Urban Environment

Table B-8. Acronyms used in the tables

Armor Piercing

APE

Armor Piercing Explosive

APFSDS-T

Armor Piercing, Fin Stabilized, Discarding Sabot-Tracer

API

Armor Piercing Incendiary

API-T

Armor Piercing Incendiary-Tracer

ATGM

Anti Tank Guided Missile

AT-HE

Anti Tank-High Explosive

Cargo Carrier

CMU

Concrete Modular Unit

Duplex T

Duplex Tracer

FRAG

Fragmentation

FRAG-HE

Fragmentation-High Explosive

High Explosive

HEFI

High Explosive Fragmentation Incendiary

HEI

High Explosive Incendiary

HEI-T

High Explosive Incendiary-Tracer

HEAT

High Explosive Anti Tank

HEAT-FS

High Explosive Anti Tank-Fin Stabilized

HVAP-T

Hypervelocity Armor Piercing-Tracer

Incendiary-T

Incendiary-Tracer

Reactive Armor

RPG

Rocket Propelled Grenade

Target Practice

Note. The CMU used in the worst case scenario is a cinderblock filled with concrete and

reinforced with one-half inch rebar placed at 8- to 10-inch intervals. The limited test data that is

available is primarily focused on perpendicular engagements. Engagements at reasonable

oblique angles (less than 45 degrees) would have the biggest impact on small arms, probably

some limited impact on medium caliber AP rounds and no impact on large caliber rounds,

missiles, or RPGs.

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

B-9

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and other selected terms. Where Army

and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Terms for which FM 2-0 is the proponent

FM (authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) and followed by the number of the paragraph (¶) where they are

discussed. For other terms, the number of the proponent FM follows the definition. JP 1-02 and FM 1-02 are

posted in the Joint Electronic Library, which is available online and on CD-ROM.

SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

three dimensional

avenue of approach

Active Component

ACE

Analysis Control Element

ACT

Analysis Control Team

ADA

air defense artillery

AFMIC

Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center

AGL

above ground level

AIDS

acquired immune deficiency syndrome

AKO

Army Knowledge Online

AMD

air and missile defense

area of operation

AOI

area of interest

ASCOPE

areas, structures, capabilities, organization, people, and events

BDE

brigade

battalion

command and control

CAT

See also pattern analysis.

in multidimensional

3-10, 3-11, 3-41, 3-42,

battlefield, 1-26, 1-27,

4-12, 4-18, 4-30, 4-33,

Urban Terrain Overlay, A-31

1-37, Figure 1-4

4-45, 4-51, 5-1, 5-6,

Urban Terrain Orientation

Intelligence disciplines in,

5-9, A-2 through A-52,

Graphic (UTOG), A-35

4-50, Table 2-5

Table A-1

through A-37, Figure A-10

Line of sight in, 1-37, 1-45,

Society effects, 1-21, 1-57,

Urban Terrain Feature Overlay

1-49, A-42, A-43,

1-62, 1-69, 1-70, 1-91

(UTFO), A-35 through A-37,

Table 5-1

Terrain, 1-1 through 1-26,

Figure A-10

LOC in, 1-10, 1-18, 1-19,

1-30, 1-33, 1-38, 1-41,

1-27, 1-33 through

1-42, 1-44, 1-49, 1-55,

45, 1-53, 1-71, A-38,

1-73, 2-2, 2-4, 2-14,

Vietnam, 1-74, 2-17, 3-47,

A-40, Table 1-3

3-9, 3-38, 3-41, 3-54,

Table 1-6

5-4, 5-10, A-30, A-35,

MASINT in, 4-15, 4-20

A-37, A-41, A-46, A-52,

through 4-25, Table 2-5

Tables 1-6, 1-7, and

Mobility corridors, 1-27,

5-1

1-37, 1-38, 2-7, A-39,

Water and Waste Disposal,

Threat in, 2-1 through 2-6,

1-101. See also

Table 5-1

2-14, 3-12, 4-1, 4-6,

Infrastructure.

Patterns, 1-55, 1-60, 1-71,

4-19, A-5

1-72, 4-5, 4-21, 4-45,

Weapons effects, 1-53, 1-54,

Use of systems in, 1-7

A-30

A-14, A-52, Tables 2-4

through 1-14, 1-23,

and 5-1

Weapons of Mass Destruction

1-29, 1-36 through

Planning in, 1-6, 1-13,

(WMD), 2-5, 2-22, 4-27,

49, 1-54, 1-99, 2-17, 3-

1-52, 1-54, 1-56, 1-72,

Table 2-3

19 through 3-22, 4-9

3-9, 3-15, 3-20, 3-32,

Weather,

through 4-15, 4-22

3-38, 3-40, 3-42, 4-12,

through 4-44, 5-10,

Analysis, 1-55

4-18, 4-22, 4-51, 5-6,

A-34, A-41, A-48, A-51,

Effects, 1-55, Table 5-1

5-12, 5-13

Tables 1-3, 1-7, A-1,

websites, 3-11, 3-13, 4-40,

Population in, 1-1 through

and B-7

4-42, 4-44, 4-46, 4-48

1-16, 1-40, 1-57 through

Weapons effects in, 1-53,

1-100, 2-3 through 2-14,

1-54, Appendix B

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

Index-7

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

*TC 2-91.4

Training Circular

Headquarters

Department of the Army

No. 2-91.4

Washington, DC, 23 December 2015

Intelligence Support to Urban Operations

Contents

Page

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

INTELLIGENCE AND THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

1-1

Overview

1-1

Civil Considerations (ASCOPE)

1-1

Terrain

1-1

Weather

1-16

Society (Socio-Cultural)

1-17

Chapter 2

THE THREAT IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

2-1

Overview

2-1

Conventional Military and Paramilitary Forces

2-1

Insurgents or Guerrillas

2-3

Terrorists

2-4

Crime and Criminal Organizations

2-5

Information Operations

2-6

Health Issues

2-7

Other Urban Concerns

2-8

Chapter 3

INFORMATION SOURCES IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

3-1

Overview

3-1

Scouts, Snipers, and Reconnaissance

3-1

Special Operations Forces

3-2

Engineers

3-2

Medical

3-2

Aviation

3-3

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

3-3

Air Defense Artillery

3-4

Civil Affairs

3-4

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FM 2-91.4, dated 20 March 2008.

Contents

Military Information Support Operations

3-5

Military Police

3-5

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

3-6

Transportation and Logistics

3-6

Civilian Linguists and Local Hires

3-6

Joint and Department of Defense

3-6

Multinational

3-8

International and Intergovernmental Organizations

3-8

Nongovernmental Organizations

3-9

Local National Authorities

3-9

Chapter 4

OPERATIONS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

4-1

Overview

4-1

Plan

4-1

Prepare

4-4

Execute

4-4

Assess

4-4

Appendix A

URBAN INTELIGENCE TOOLS AND PRODUCTS

A-1

SOURCE NOTES

Source Notes-1

GLOSSARY

Glossary-1

REFERENCES

References-1

INDEX

Index-1

Figures

Figure 1-1. Keys to understanding the urban environment

1-2

Figure 1-2. Urban layout patterns

1-4

Figure 1-3. Funnel-fan effect

1-6

Figure 1-4. The multidimensional urban battlefield

1-9

Figure A-1. Example pattern analysis plot sheet

A-2

Figure A-2. Example link diagram

A-3

Figure A-3. Example association matrix

A-4

Figure A-4. Example relationship matrix

A-5

Figure A-5. Example activities matrix

A-6

Figure A-6. Example time event chart

A-7

Figure A-7. Perception assessment matrix

A-9

Figure A-8. Population status overlay

A-11

Figure A-9. Example roof cover overlay

A-13

Figure A-10. Combined urban terrain orientation graphic/urban terrain feature overlay

(simplified example)

A-14

Figure A-11. Example of imagery and urban models

A-16

TC 2-91.4

23 December 2015

Contents

Tables

Table 1-1. Urban pattern effects

1-6

Table 1-2. Street patterns and effects

1-8

Table 1-3. Some key urban structural types

1-13

Table 1-4. Example information requirements for individual buildings

1-15

Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations

1-20

Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—

airfields

1-25

Table 1-7. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—

helicopter landing zones

1-27

Table 1-8. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—

roadways

1-28

Table 1-9. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—

railroads

1-29

Table 1-10. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—

bridges

1-30

Table 1-11. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—

subways

1-31

Table 1-12. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure—ports

and harbors

1-32

Table 1-13. Example information requirements for communications infrastructure

1-35

Table 1-14. Example intelligence requirements for energy infrastructure—general

information and power plant layout

1-37

Table 1-15. Example intelligence requirements for energy infrastructure—petroleum

and natural gas facilities

1-38

Table 1-16. Example information requirements for water and waste disposal

infrastructure

1-39

Table 1-17. Example information requirements for resources and material production

infrastructure

1-40

Table 1-18. Example information requirements for a food distribution infrastructure

1-40

Table 1-19. Example information requirements for medical infrastructure

1-41

Table 1-20. Example of information requirements for law enforcement and firefighting

infrastructures

1-42

Table 1-21. Example information requirements for a crisis management and civil

defense infrastructure

1-42

Table 1-22. Example information requirements for a subterranean infrastructure

1-43

Table 2-1. Example information requirements for conventional military and

paramilitary forces

2-2

Table 2-2. Example information requirements for insurgent and guerrilla forces

2-3

Table 2-3. Example information requirements for terrorist threats

2-4

Table 2-4. Example information requirements for criminal threats

2-5

Table 2-5. Example information requirements for information operations threats

2-7

Table 4-1. Basic intelligence consideration factors in the urban environment

4-2

23 December 2015

TC 2-91.4

iii

Preface

TC 2-91.4 provides intelligence professionals a basic framework within which to focus on providing

commanders with effective intelligence support for operations in the urban environment. This manual

incorporates intelligence and operational doctrine and terminology from FM 3-06 and ATTP 3-06.11.

The principal audience for TC 2-91.4 is intelligence staffs and Soldiers of units conducting intelligence support

to operations in the urban environment. It can also be used by commanders, staffs, and intelligence personnel at

all echelons.

TC 2-91.4 focuses on techniques used during offensive, defensive, and stability operations. See ATP 2-91.7 for

doctrine for defense support to civil authorities operations.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,

international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their

Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

TC 2-91.4 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the

glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent

publication follows the definition. TC 2-91.4 is not the proponent publication (the authority) for any terms.

TC 2-91.4 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and

United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of TC 2-91.4 is the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is the

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. Send

comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank

Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZS-CDI-D (TC 2-91.4), 550

Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, Arizona

85613-7017; by e-mail to usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.doctrine

@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

TC 2-91.4

23 December 2015

Introduction

URBAN AREAS AND MODERN OPERATIONS

With the continuing growth in the world’s urban areas and increasing population concentrations in urban

areas, the probability that Army forces will conduct operations in urban environments is ever more likely.

As urbanization has changed the demographic landscape, potential enemies recognize the inherent danger

and complexity of this environment to the attacker. Some may view it as their best chance to negate the

technological and firepower advantages of modernized opponents. Given the global population trends and

the likely strategies and tactics of future threats, Army forces will likely conduct operations in, around, and

over urban areas—not as a matter of fate, but as a deliberate choice linked to national security objectives

and strategy. Stability operations--where keeping the social structure, economic structure, and political

support institutions intact and functioning or having to almost simultaneously provide the services

associated with those structures and institutions is the primary mission--may dominate urban operations.

This requires specific and timely intelligence support, placing a tremendous demand on the intelligence

warfighting functions for operations, short-term planning, and long-term planning.

Providing intelligence support to operations in the complex urban environment can be quite challenging. It

may at first seem overwhelming. The amount of detail required for operations in urban environments, along

with the large amounts of varied information required to provide intelligence support to these operations,

can be daunting. Intelligence professionals must be flexible and adaptive in applying doctrine (including

tactics, techniques, and procedures) based on the mission variables: mission, enemy, terrain and weather,

troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

As with operations in any environment, a key to providing good intelligence support in the urban

environment lies in identifying and focusing on the critical information required for each specific mission.

The complexity of the urban environment requires focused intelligence. A comprehensive framework must

be established to support the commander’s requirements while managing the vast amount of information

and intelligence required for urban operations. By addressing the issues and considerations listed in this

manual, the commander, G-2 or S-2, and intelligence analyst will be able to address most of the critical

aspects of the urban environment and identify both the gaps in the intelligence collection effort and those

systems and procedures that may answer them. This will assist the commander in correctly identifying

enemy actions so that Army forces can focus on the enemy and seize the initiative while maintaining an

understanding of the overall situation.

FM 3-06 and ATTP 3-06.11 provide supporting material relevant to this manual.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

The doctrine in TC 2-91.4 is essentially unchanged from the doctrine established in the publication it

supersedes. The manual has been reformatted to comply with publication standards established under

Doctrine 2015. In addition, it contains the following changes:

Terminology has been updated.

References have added or updated as appropriate.

The descriptions of civil affairs and military information support operations in chapter 3 have

been revised.

Chapter 4 has been removed. See ADRP 2-0 for an overview of the intelligence disciplines. For

doctrine on an intelligence discipline see the appropriate Army techniques publication.

The example of a civil affairs assessment has been removed from appendix A. See ATP 3-57.60

for the formats of civil affairs products, including the civil affairs area study.

Appendix B has been removed. Tables portraying information on threat weapons effects are

available in command publications posted on the Intelligence Knowledge Network Web site.

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Chapter 1

Intelligence and the Urban Environment

OVERVIEW

1-1. The special considerations that must be taken into account in any operation in an urban environment

go well beyond the uniqueness of the urban terrain. JP 3-06 identifies three distinguishing characteristics of

the urban environment: physical terrain, population, and infrastructure. Also, FM 3-06 identifies three key

overlapping and interdependent components of the urban environment: terrain (natural and manmade),

society, and the supporting infrastructure.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS (ASCOPE)

1-2. Normally the factors used in the planning and execution of tactical military missions are evaluated in

terms of the mission variables: METT-TC. Due to the importance of civil considerations (the letter “C” in

METT-TC) in urban operations, those factors are discussed first in this manual. Civil considerations are the

influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders,

populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (ADRP 5-

0). They are a factor in all types of military operations: offense, defense, stability, and civil support. If the

military’s mission is to support civil authorities, civil considerations define the mission.

1-3. An appreciation of civil considerations and the ability to analyze their impact on operations enhances

several aspects of urban operations--among them, the selection of objectives; location, movement, and

control of forces; use of weapons; and force protection measures. Civil considerations comprise six

characteristics, expressed in the acronym ASCOPE:

Areas.

Structures.

Capabilities.

Organizations.

People.

Events.

1-4. Civil considerations, in conjunction with the components of the urban environment, provide a useful

structure for intelligence personnel to begin to focus their intelligence preparation of the battlefield and

organize the huge undertaking of providing intelligence to operations in the urban environment. They

should not be considered as separate entities but rather as interdependent. Understanding this

interrelationship of systems provides focus for the intelligence analyst and allows the commander a greater

understanding of the urban area in question. (See figure 1-1 on page 1-2.)

TERRAIN

1-5. Terrain in the urban environment is complex and challenging. It possesses all the characteristics of

the natural landscape, coupled with manmade construction, resulting in a complicated and fluid

environment that influences the conduct of military operations in unique ways. Urban areas, the populace

within them, their expectations and perceptions, and the activities performed within their boundaries form

the economic, political, and cultural focus for the surrounding areas. What military planners must consider

for urban areas may range from a few dozen dwellings surrounded by farmland to major metropolitan cities.

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1-1

Chapter 1

Figure 1-1. Keys to understanding the urban environment

1-6. Prior to conducting operations in urban areas, it is critical to understand the terrain. Much of the

difficulty and confusion with planning and conducting operations in the urban environment results from a

basic lack of understanding of the common characteristics of urban terrain. Order does exist in the urban

environment and characteristics can be quantified, or at least described sufficiently, to enable planning.

1-7. Density of construction and population, street patterns, compartmentalization, affluent and poor

sections, modernization, and presence of utility systems characterize all cities of the world. The differences

in urban areas are in size, level of development, and style.

1-8. Due to the historical impact of colonization over centuries, most major cities throughout the world

have European characteristics. They have combinations of street patterns, distinct economic and ethnic

sections, and areas known as shantytowns--all of which present potential obstacles, or at least challenges,

to operations.

1-9. Variations in cities are caused mainly by differences in economic development, government policies,

and cultural needs. Some urban trends include high-rise apartments, reinforced concrete construction, truck-

related industrial storage, shopping centers, detached buildings, suburbs at outer edges, apartment

complexes, and major subterranean infrastructure that support the city.

1-10. Urban topography is an elaborate combination of horizontal, vertical, interior, and exterior forms

superimposed on a landscape’s natural relief, drainage, and vegetation. Urban areas may range from a few

dozen dwellings to major metropolitan areas. A city may be technologically advanced or developing. Most

cities feature many construction styles and building materials, each with its own texture and strength.

Concrete and steel high-rise structures may stand alongside tin or wooden shacks. Additionally, lines of

communications (LOCs) often consist of a confusing array of roads, alleys, bridges, elevated roadways,

subway tunnels, rail systems, drainage canals, and sewer networks.

1-11. In the close confines of urban areas, small arms and light weapons (such as rocket-propelled

grenades) can have a dramatic effect. Urban operations can radically alter the physical nature of the terrain.

For example, the walls and roofs may collapse on some buildings, or whole city blocks may be destroyed or

burned down, leaving only piles of rubble. These effects can be tactically significant, as some key terrain

features completely disappear and fields of fire open and close.

1-2

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Intelligence and the Urban Environment

1-12. Buildings affect wave propagation, thus degrading friendly communication systems and some

information collection efforts. While streets provide the means for rapid advance or withdrawal, military

vehicles moving along streets are often channeled by buildings and have little space for maneuver. Because

they are more difficult to bypass, obstacles on streets in urbanized areas are usually more effective than

those on roads in open terrain. Forced to maneuver through congested city streets, U.S. forces must account

for the volume of vehicle and pedestrian traffic. Operating forces should expect noncombatants to

inadvertently or intentionally constrain fire and movement.

1-13. Small teams of enemy combatants can rapidly assimilate themselves within the urban population. In

order to limit the possibility of excessive collateral damage in relation to the direct military advantage

anticipated, U.S. forces may use conservative collateral estimation methodologies and fire control measures

which may limit some lethal options and require more detailed planning and coordination, as well as

authorization from higher levels of command.

1-14. Urban areas are usually regional centers of finance, politics, transportation, industry, and culture.

They have population concentrations ranging from several thousand up to millions of people. The larger the

city, the greater its regional influence. Because of their psychological, political, or logistic value, control of

regionally important cities has often led to pitched battle scenes. In the last 40 years, many cities have

expanded dramatically, losing their well-defined boundaries as they extend into the countryside.

Transportation systems (highways, canals, and railroads) are built to connect population centers. Industries

grow along these connectors, creating strip areas. Rural areas, although retaining much of their farm-like

character, are connected to towns by a network of secondary roads. Not all connecting roads are paved, let

alone depicted on maps.

1-15. Urban terrain is a unique environment that provides both attacker and defender with numerous

avenues of approach and fields of fire. Urban terrain is divided into four basic levels: air, supersurface,

surface, and subsurface. Operations can be conducted from all of these levels, and most operations will

include actions on all levels simultaneously.

URBAN AREAS

1-16. As defined in FM 3-06, urban areas are generally classified as--

Megalopolis (population over 10 million).

Metropolis (population between 1 to 10 million).

City (population 100,000 to 1 million).

Town or small city (population 3,000 to 100,000).

Village (population less than 3,000).

URBAN PATTERNS

1-17. Manmade terrain in the urban environment is overlaid on the natural terrain of the area, and manmade

patterns are affected by the underlying natural terrain. It can be useful to keep the underlying natural terrain

in mind when analyzing the manmade patterns of the urban environment. For example, roads will often

follow the contours of the underlying terrain and parks may be built in areas unsuitable to building

construction such as flood plains. Four major urban patterns can influence operations in the urban

environment. (See figure 1-2 on page 1-4.)

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Chapter 1

Figure 1-2. Urban layout patterns

Hub and Satellite Patterns

1-18. Central to two of the patterns (satellite and network) is the hub, or dominant urban area or pattern,

around which outlying urban areas or patterns radiate. (A segmented urban area, because it tends to be a

larger urban area, can often be a hub.) In offensive and defensive operations, the hub serves as a pivot or

strong point; as such, it often becomes a major obstacle to an attacker. If the attacker chooses to bypass the

urban area (hub) located along his axis of advance without first isolating the area, he may expose his flank

to attack from the hub as well as dependent urban areas or subordinate satellite patterns. Because stability

operations focus on people, commanders understand the value and influence of the hub to the economic,

political, or cultural well-being of the surrounding area. Whether or not a hub, commanders must remember

that urban areas are not islands; all are connected to the surrounding rural (and other urban) areas through

fluid and permeable boundaries and LOCs.

1-19. The satellite pattern consists of a central hub surrounded by smaller, dependent urban areas. LOCs

tend to converge on the hub. The natural terrain throughout this pattern is relatively homogenous. Outlying

areas often support the principal urban area at the hub with means of reinforcement, resupply, and

evacuation. In some instances, they may serve as mutually supporting battle positions. Commanders should

consider the effects of the outlying urban areas of operations (AOs) within the hub and, conversely, the

effects of operations within the hub on outlying urban areas. For example, military information support

operations targeted primarily at the hub of a satellite pattern may subsequently influence outlying urban

areas and achieve necessary effects without having to commit specific resources to these areas.

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Intelligence and the Urban Environment

Network Pattern

1-20. The network pattern represents the interlocking of the primary hubs of subordinate satellite patterns.

Its elements are more self-sufficient and less supportive of each other, although a dominant hub may exist.

Major LOCs in a network extend more than in a satellite pattern and take more of a rectangular rather than a

convergent form. Its natural terrain may vary more than in a single satellite array. Operations in one area

may or may not easily influence, or be influenced by, other urban areas in the pattern.

Linear Pattern

1-21. Potentially a sub-element of the network and satellite patterns, the linear pattern may form one ray of

the satellite pattern or be found along connecting links between the hubs of a network. Most frequently, this

pattern results from the stringing of minor urban areas along a confined natural terrain corridor, such as an

elongated valley, a body of water, or a manmade communications route. In offensive and defensive

operations, this latter form of the linear pattern facilitates developing a series of strong defensive positions

in depth, effectively blocking or delaying an attacking force moving along the canalized terrain.

Segment Pattern

1-22. When dominant natural terrain (such as a river) divides an urban area, it creates a segmented pattern.

This pattern often makes it easier for commanders to assign AOs to subordinate commanders. However, this

pattern may fragment operations and increase risk to an operation requiring mutual support between

subordinate units. The segmented urban areas may allow commanders to isolate threats more easily in these

areas and focus operations within segments that contain their decisive points. Although an integral part of

the whole (the urban area), each segment may develop distinct social, economic, cultural, and political

characteristics. This social segmenting may benefit commanders faced with limited assets to influence or

control the urban populace. A thorough analysis of the society may allow the intelligence analyst to help the

commander focus military information support operations and populace and resources control measures

against only specific segments that affect decisive operations. Analysts should consider how isolating

segments or just monitoring segments for any significant changes in the attitudes, beliefs, or actions of the

civilians located there may aid in mission accomplishment.

PATTERN EFFECTS

1-23. There are three major urban pattern effects: blocking, funnel, and funnel-fans. (See table 1-1 on page

1-6.) The consequences of maneuvering military units within the urban patterns identified in table 1-1 will

significantly affect combat operations. In addition to the basic blocking action caused by the hub

phenomenon, other effects can be associated with urban patterns. (See figure 1-3 on page 1-6 for an

example of the funnel-fan effect.)

URBAN FUNCTIONAL ZONES

1-24. To provide an accurate depiction of an urban area, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of its

numerous physical subdivisions or zones. These zones are functional in nature and reflect

“where”

something routinely occurs within the urban area. The structure of these zones will vary from country to

country. For example, a country book may describe Yongin, South Korea, as “a typical Korean city with

cities within a city, a city core, urban sprawl, and outlying industry.” Another country book might describe

Cologne, Germany, as “a typical German city with narrow streets, circular configuration, and low terrain.”

Both definitions are accurate but provide little practical use to the analyst. What is required is a more

substantial definition of these urban zones as well as employment of standardized terminology. (See FM 3-

06 for a more detailed discussion of the zones.) The following paragraphs describe the urban functional

zones.

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1-5

Chapter 1

Table 1-1. Urban pattern effects

Effect

Description

Blocking effect

Often the shape and density of the hub, width of major streets, and proximity of

side streets have, either individual or in combination, the effect of blocking or

degrading movement into and out of an urban zone.

Funnel effect

Funnel or concentration and canalization of forces may occur without immediate

fanning. This occurs most frequently when the linear pattern is encountered. The

linear pattern limits the number of maneuver units that may be applied against a

series of hubs. This situation requires confronting hubs in succession and forces a

greater reliance on long-range and indirect fire weapons.

Funnel-fan effect

The funnel-fan effect normally occurs when the hub is located between terrain

features that are unsuitable for mounted operations. Movement of units into the

hub area results in the unwanted concentration of units, loss of offensive

momentum, and canalization, Beyond the hub, units are required to spread or fan

out before full combat power can be achieved. The funnel-fan effect favors the

defense because it creates an accordion effect in units moving through the hub,

making control difficult and reducing operational command effectiveness.

Figure 1-3. Funnel-fan effect

Core

1-25. The core is the heart of the urban area, the downtown or central business district. It is relatively small

and compact, but contains a larger percentage of the urban area’s shops, offices, and public institutions. It

will also normally house the highest density of multistory buildings and subterranean features.

Core Periphery

1-26. This area is located at the edges of the core. Generally, it has undergone less change than the core

resulting in buildings of uniform height (generally two to three stories in towns and five to ten stories in

larger cities).

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Intelligence and the Urban Environment

Industrial Area

1-27. Industrial areas often developed on the outskirts of the urban areas where commercial transportation

is easiest (along airfields and major sea, river, rail, and highway routes). The dispersed pattern of the

buildings provides sufficient space for large cargoes, trucks, and material-handling equipment. These areas

may provide ideal sites for logistic bases and maintenance sites. Multistory structures usually have

reinforced concrete floors and ceilings. Additionally, the industrial area may include large storage areas of

chemicals, petroleum products, fertilizers, and other toxic materials. In the more advanced states many of

these areas have been abandoned or have undergone change to another type of zone as the industrial areas

have moved.

High-Rise Area

1-28. High-rise areas consist of multistoried apartments, commercial offices, and businesses separated by

large open areas such as parking lots, parks, sports arenas, and smaller single-story structures. High-rise

buildings are framed, light-clad construction, with thin walls of brick, lightweight concrete, or glass.

Residential Area

1-29. Residential areas can be found dispersed throughout the urban area; however, large suburban areas

(or sprawl) normally form on the outskirts of the city proper. Residential areas often consist of row houses

or single-family dwellings set in a grid or ringed pattern within a planned development project. It may also

include many of the urban area’s supporting infrastructure (power, water, and communications).

Commercial Ribbon Area

1-30. Commercial ribbon areas include rows of stores, shops, and restaurants built along both sides of

major streets that run through and between urban areas and often serve to connect one urban area to

another. Structures here are usually smaller than those found in the industrial and high-rise areas but larger

than those found in residential areas (three to five stories).

Military Areas

1-31. Fortifications and military installations are found everywhere in the world and should be given

special consideration because they have been specifically built for military purposes. Permanent-type

fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick, concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or any

combination of these. Some of the latest variants have been built underground and employ heavy tank or

warship armor, major caliber and other weapons, internal communications, service facilities, and chemical,

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) overpressure systems. Many of the Baltic States possess long

coastlines relative to their overall size. To meet their defensive needs, they have developed coast defense

works that include extensive subterranean facilities, many contiguous to urban areas. Other nations share

borders with potentially hostile neighbors. North Korea is a prime example, with numerous hardened

artillery, missile, and command and control facilities along both of its coasts as well as along the

demilitarized zone. The analyst should also realize that even if depicted as “inactive,” these fortifications

might be rapidly modified to their original role and even if not activated they may still serve as choke points

and obstacles. Finally, even if hardened fortifications are not present, many cities include large military

garrisons. Examples of cities with large military garrisons include Capetown, South Africa

(Table

Mountain), and Seoul, South Korea.

STREET PATTERNS

1-32. The development of street patterns within a given urban environment can be attributed to an

architect’s deliberate design, natural features, and manmade structures that serve in various capacities.

Geographers have identified at least eight major street patterns with any number of variations. Table 1-2 on

page 1-8 shows these major street patterns.

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Chapter 1

1-33. These patterns exist for trafficability in daily life but also can be significant during military

operations. The core areas of both Paris and Washington, DC, were originally laid out in a rayed pattern to

maximize the defensibility of the government buildings. These were later modified to radial and radial-ring

patterns. During Russian operations in Grozny, the Chechnyans used the city’s street patterns to maximize

their ability to strike at Russian armor while at the same time minimizing the Russians’ ability to return

massed fires.

Table 1-2. Street patterns and effects

MULTIDIMENSIONAL BATTLEFIELD

1-34. Commanders operating in unrestricted terrain normally address their AO and area of interest in terms

of air and ground. However, operations within the urban environment provide numerous manmade

structures and variables not found in unrestricted terrain. Commanders conducting urban operations must

broaden the scope of their thinking, looking not only at the air and ground but also at the threats that may

appear from a structure’s top, exterior or interior, as well as subsurface areas.

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Intelligence and the Urban Environment

1-35. FM 3-06 addresses the multidimensional battlefield and identifies the dimensions that must be

considered as air, supersurface, surface, and subsurface. Although spatially separated, each dimension is

interrelated and may be used as an avenue of approach or mobility corridor, LOC, or engagement area.

Figure 1-4 depicts the elements of the multidimensional urban battlefield.

Figure 1-4. The multidimensional urban battlefield

Supersurface and Airspace

1-36. For analytical purposes, the supersurface and airspace consist of all areas above the surface level in

an urban environment. These areas include the internal floors or levels (intrasurface areas), external roofs or

tops of buildings, stadiums, towers, or other vertical structures, and the airspace. They can provide cover

and concealment; limit or enhance observation and fields of fire; and restrict, canalize, or block movement.

However, forces can move within and between intrasurface areas creating additional, although normally

secondary, avenues of approach. Buildings--

Provide cover and concealment.

Limit or increase observation and fields of fire.

Canalize, restrict, or slow movement of forces, especially mechanized forces.

Can adversely affect the employment of special operations forces and airmobile insertion of

infantry due to the number of power lines, clotheslines, antennas, and other obstructions that may

exist, especially on rooftops.

Provide optimal locations

(via roofs and intrasurface areas) with excellent cover and

concealment for snipers, lightweight, handheld antitank weapons, and man-portable air defense

systems, enabling top-down attacks against the weakest points of armored vehicles and

unsuspecting aircraft.

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Chapter 1

1-37. Engineers must provide an analysis of buildings for their structural integrity and obstacles. Such

obstacles include electrical wires, antennas, and enemy emplaced mines (although personnel may be

inserted by jumping, rappelling, or fast roping from a hovering helicopter and extracted by hoist

mechanisms). Rooftops may offer ideal locations for landing helicopters for employment of anti-helicopter

mines. Some rooftops are designed as helipads. Overall, elevated firing positions reduce the value of any

cover in surrounding open areas and permit engagement at close range without risk of immediate close

assault. The supersurface and subsurface dimensions require commanders to think, plan, and execute

ground operations vertically as well as horizontally. The complex terrain aspects of urban operations share

strong similarities with mountain operations. (See FM 3-97.6.)

1-38. Aircraft and aerial munitions use the airspace as rapid air avenues of approach in urbanized areas.

Forces can use aviation assets for observation and reconnaissance, aerial attack, or high-speed insertion and

extraction of Soldiers, supplies, and equipment. Some surface obstacles, such as rubble, do not affect

aviation assets. However, buildings of varying height and the increased density of towers, signs, power

lines, and other urban constructions create obstacles to flight and the trajectory of many munitions

(masking). These obstacles can limit low-altitude maneuverability in the urban airspace. Excellent cover

and concealment afforded enemy gunners in an urban area increase aviation vulnerability to small arms and

man-portable air defense systems, particularly when supporting ground forces.

Surface

1-39. FM 3-06 defines surface areas as exterior ground level areas such as parking lots, airfields, highways,

streets, sidewalks, fields, and parks. For purposes of analysis, the ground floor of buildings should also be

considered as part of the surface dimension. Because ground vehicles can directly access a structure’s

ground floor, analysts must consider them part of the surface dimension. Analysts must also consider the

surface of waterways as part of the surface dimension.

1-40. Streets often provide primary avenues of approach and the means for rapid advance. However,

buildings and other structures often canalize forces moving along them. As such, obstacles on urban surface

areas usually have more effect than those in open terrain since bypass often requires entering and transiting

buildings or radical changes to selected routes. Where urban areas abut the ocean or sea, large lakes, and

major rivers, the surface of these bodies of water may provide key friendly and threat avenues of approach

or essential LOCs and, therefore, may be a significant consideration for Army commanders. As such,

amphibious and river-crossing operations may be an integral part of the overall urban operation.

1-41. Larger open areas--such as stadiums, sports fields, school playgrounds, and parking lots--are often

critical areas during urban operations. They can provide locations for displaced civilians, interrogation

centers, and enemy prisoner of war holding facilities, and detainee holding areas. These areas also can

afford suitable aircraft landing zones and pickup zones and artillery firing locations. They can provide

logistic support areas and aerial resupply possibilities because they are often centrally located.

Subsurface

1-42. These areas are below surface level. This dimension includes areas both below the ground and below

water. (For example, the Han River is a major avenue of approach in Seoul and can be infiltrated at the

surface level or subsurface level.) These areas may serve as secondary and, in fewer instances, primary

avenues of approach at lower tactical levels. When thoroughly reconnoitered and controlled, they offer

excellent covered and concealed LOCs for moving supplies and evacuating casualties. These areas may also

provide sites for caching and stockpiling supplies.

1-43. Subsurface areas include the subways, tunnels, sewers, drainage systems, cellars, civil defense

shelters, and other various underground utility systems. In older cities, they may include ancient hand-dug

tunnels and catacombs. Both attacker and defender can use subsurface areas to gain surprise and maneuver

against the rear and flanks of a threat and to conduct ambushes. However, these areas are often the most

restrictive and easiest to defend or block. Their effectiveness depends on superior knowledge of their

existence and overall design. Army commanders and analysts may need to consider potential avenues of

approach afforded by the subsurface areas of rivers and major bodies of water that border urban areas. This

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Intelligence and the Urban Environment

particularly applies when operating as part of a joint task force task organized with special operations forces

or when opposing a threat with similar capabilities.

MOBILITY CORRIDORS

1-44. Each element of the urban environment’s multidimensional battlefield identified in figure 1-4 (on

page 1-9) may be used as avenues of approach, mobility corridors, and LOCs. They are predominantly used

as mobility corridors within a larger avenue of approach. Mobility corridors areas that are relatively free of

obstacles where a force will be canalized due to terrain restrictions allowing military forces to capitalize on

the principles of mass and speed (JP 2-01.3). In the urban environment, mobility corridors (supersurface [to

include air], surface, and subsurface) are used individually, in any combination, or simultaneously. Multiple

vertical mobility corridors can combine to form a horizontal avenue of approach. Finally, their use as

mobility corridors, either in offensive or defensive roles, can trigger other battlefield effects (either lethal or

nonlethal) across any or all dimensions. For example, Soldiers may move from the roof of one building to

that of another. Depending on the exact location of the Soldiers involved, they may acquire an extended line

of sight, be subjected to increased dead spaces, or just the opposite, be able to establish an engagement

area. This situation is enhanced if multiple mobility corridors are opened (for example, simultaneous attacks

from rooftops, through interior walls, along the street, and through access tunnels).

Creating a Mobility Corridor

During Israeli operations against the Palestine Liberation Organization in the summer

of 2002, Israel Defense Force commanders found that casualties were reduced and

operations conducted more efficiently if Soldiers breached the outer walls of

structures and entered buildings on their interior floors. This is an example of

reducing an obstacle and creating a mobility corridor.

AVENUES OF APPROACH

1-45. An avenue of approach is an air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its

objective or to key terrain in its path (JP 2-01.3). Within a single urban avenue of approach, there may

literally be hundreds of mobility corridors. This level of complexity will require analysts to develop

(through extensive analysis) a thorough understanding of the size, pattern, and types of maneuver space

available in their area of interest.

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

1-46. A line of communications is a route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military

force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move (JP 2-01.3). All key

LOCs bordering on or within the urban environment must be identified. Analysts must consider obstacles

and rubble that may reduce mobility within a given LOC. The advent of digital communications has further

expanded this definition to reflect telegraph and telephone lines, cell phones, radio (all types), television,

digital satellite links, the Internet, data passed to and from other satellite systems (signals intelligence and

Global Positioning System [also called GPS]), and laser communications.

1-47. In the larger cities, manmade LOCs may include hundreds of streets, alleys, rail lines, subways,

tunnels, and even canals. Analysts must prioritize their effort by focusing on those LOCs most critical to

mission success. They must identify key LOCs as they apply to friendly, enemy, and the civilian population.

1-48. LOCs often cross terrain that is relatively impractical for off-road vehicular traffic and as such are

heavily dependent on bridges, ramps, and overpasses. If these support systems (choke points) can be

destroyed, damaged, or blocked, the LOCs may become useless. LOC trafficability estimates must consider

information from all available sources to include reconnaissance reports, imagery, and combat assessments.

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Chapter 1

ENGAGEMENT AREAS

1-49. An engagement area is an area where the commander intends to contain and destroy an enemy force

with the massed effects of all available weapons and supporting systems

(FM 3-90-1). In the

multidimensional urban environment, defenders can position forces in protected and mutually supportive

positions. This allows defending forces to maximize the effects of their combat power in the complex

terrain.

1-50. Engagement areas can be located almost anywhere in the urban environment, for example—

Narrow streets.

Turns in a road.

T intersections in roads.

Bridges.

Tunnels.

Split-level roads.

Open city squares or plazas.

Rubbled areas.

Individual buildings.

Individual floors in buildings.

1-51. Engagement areas can also be created in less obvious locations by using demolitions, mines, or

obstacles. These can shape an engagement area by creating impassable (countermobility) obstacles in urban

canyons as well as clearing fields of fire that may not otherwise be available.

1-52. Urban combat is often characterized by very short ranges and denser and smaller engagement areas.

Relatively few well-positioned defenders can generate significant combat power. Without the positional

advantage and the corresponding protective effects of the terrain, attacking forces often must mass numbers

to achieve necessary combat power.

LINE OF SIGHT

1-53. Line of sight is the unobstructed path from a Soldier’s/Marine’s weapon, weapon sight, electronic

sending and receiving antennas, or piece of reconnaissance equipment from one point to another.

(ATP 2-01.3/MCRP-2-3A). Digital or analog communication LOCs have important line-of-sight issues.

Depending on the situation, these LOCs may or may not be affected by line-of-sight limitations. This may

mean that because of an obstacle (hill or building) between two points, it may be impossible to acquire line

of sight on a target or communications emitter. Failure to anticipate interference with line of sight can have

catastrophic results. This occurred at Grozny where Russian forces were trapped among the city’s taller

buildings and lost their line of sight. Subsequently, they lost or experienced degraded communications with

their supporting units. Line of sight also impacts observation and fields of fire. Finally, line-of-sight

constraints within the urban environment are not one but three-dimensional and must be addressed from all

directions, both vertically and horizontally.

1-54. Unmanned aircraft systems can prove instrumental in overcoming many of the ground-based line-of-

sight restrictions. During Israel’s incursion into Lebanon in 1983, the Israel Defense Force employed

unmanned aerial vehicles as digital retransmission platforms, among other roles.

1-55. The use of satellite and landline communications may mitigate many line-of-sight problems. Satellite

phones, such as International Maritime Satellite phones, tend to provide more consistent communications in

urban areas. Additionally, suitcase digital, satellite, and burst transmission systems have proven effective in

the urban environment. Some of these systems have the added capability of allowing real-time imagery of

selected targets to be passed to the user.

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STRUCTURAL TYPES

1-56. While the city’s structures serve as the focal point of the inhabitant’s work and living areas, religious

or cultural facilities, and sports arenas, they may also be significant to military operations conducted there.

Some of the most important structures and their importance are identified in table 1-3.

Table 1-3. Some key urban structural types

Structural type

Importance

Churches, hospitals, medical

These are protected places under the Geneva Conventions

facilities, and cemeteries

and usually declared no-fire areas. However, intelligence

which indicates the misuse of these and other protected

places may make them lawful targets. Additionally, the

location of hospitals is important planning information for

both civilian and military casualties.

Sewer systems, subways,

These underground systems can provide infiltration routes.

underground water systems,

Elevated systems and mass transit routes provide exposed

elevated railways, utilities, mass

lines of communications between city sectors while also

transportation routes

offering points for good observation and fields for fire. Utility

facilities are key targets for insurgents, terrorists, and others;

their destruction can hinder the capabilities of defending

forces, destabilize an area and affect the civilian population.

Stadiums, sports fields, playgrounds

These can provide excellent detainee holding areas. Can be

used as helipads, sheltered petroleum, oils, and lubricants

(also called POL), and ammunition storage areas.

Public baths, swimming pools,

These can serve as an alternate water source in case public

cisterns and reservoirs

water supplies break down. Allows water for washing and

other sanitary needs.

Construction sites, lumber yards,

These can serve as machine repair, obstacle construction

other commercial operations

facilities and material, and supports general engineer

operations.

Hazardous material, industrial

These present a hazard to both sides in an operation and

manufacturing and storage facilities,

must be accounted for. Dams, dikes, levies, and nuclear or

and other work and installations

electrical generating stations need to be protected from

attack. The attack or destruction of these facilities can cause

containing dangerous forces.

excessive civilian injury or damage by the release of

dangerous forces.

Purpose-built fortifications

These can range from fortresses built by the Crusaders

through modern underground facilities built to survive the

Cold War’s nuclear scare. The build of these, however, will

be of the period 1870 to 1914. They may include both

missiles and heavy caliber weapons and may pose a variety

of threats to any military force.

1-57. Today, especially in many third-world nations, the mix of new and old structures could create

problems for any military force operating there. Ancient temples and fortifications may stand back-to-back

with modern skyscrapers and high rise apartments. Port facilities, unique themselves, may stand next to the

remnants of huge defensive walls that in turn may encircle all or part of the city.

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Chapter 1

Signal Degradation in Urban Areas

Signal degradation is proportional to structural density, the height of the buildings, and

other urban terrain factors. For purposes of audio and video line of sight, the linear

distances are less important than the structural density and disruption of the line of

sight between given points. This means it is difficult to maintain consistent

communications (for example, in the heart of a major metropolitan area). Even when

the situation does not involve armed conflict, effective use of frequency modulation

(also called FM) and ultrahigh frequency (also called UHF) radios may be impaired by

interference from trolley and other electrical lines. Some of these systems can

generate up to 300 times the interference over normal atmospheric interference on

the ultrahigh frequency band. Russian experience in Grozny showed that it was better

to dedicate one radio to communicate with each separate subunit rather than to try

communicating over a net. As for the use of wire-based systems, they are as they

have always been: effective but susceptible to intrusion, damage, or destruction—

especially in a large city where digging them in is not an option.

1-58. Structural composition is also important. Tank rounds fired into rooms occupied by snipers may pass

all the way through buildings without exploding but in the process killing and wounding noncombatants in

other rooms.

1-59. As another example, some of the ancient churches and other structures in the area, made of thick

stone blocks, proved resistant to even heavy machine gun fire while the walls of more modern business and

apartment complexes were easily penetrated by rifle fire and shrapnel.

1-60. Finally, there are differences in floor plans. Many structures, especially older ones, have intricate

passageways, underground tunnels, exceptionally low or high ceilings, and other features not common in the

United States. Local nationals--especially individuals that work in the buildings (for example, maintenance

personnel), individuals involved in city planning, individuals having access to building plans, assistance

from combat engineers, and other means--may prove valuable when obtaining information and conducting

intelligence analysis on key structures.

1-61. Detailed information is usually required when planning, preparing, and executing operations on

individual buildings. The degree of detail needed in such missions is reflected in table 1-4. The design and

construction of buildings within a particular urban area are influenced by numerous factors to include

climate, materials available, function, and cultural development of the region. Combat engineers can usually

provide information on the key characteristics of a building. Some of these key characteristics may be--

Relative protective value offered by building construction materials.

Level of force required to breach a building’s external and internal walls, roof, or floors.

Availability of internal LOCs.

Potential fire hazards.

1-62. Understanding the potential effects of threat (non-U.S.) small arms and light weapons on structures

and materials commonly found in the urban environment can be extremely important for planning purposes.

Tables portraying this information are available in command publications posted on the Intelligence

Knowledge Network Web site.

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Intelligence and the Urban Environment

Table 1-4. Example information requirements for individual buildings

General building information

 Identify basements and cellars.

 Provide general building information.

Location of entrance.

Location.

Staircase location.

Type.

Dimensions.

Number of stories.

Use.

Date of construction.

 Identify attic spaces.

Type of building construction.

Location.

Ownership.

Location of staircase.

Occupants.

Dimensions.

 Obtain building blueprints or documents.

Use.

 Obtain photographs or other imagery of the

Field of view from the attic.

outside of the building and surrounding area.

 Identify ventilation system.

 Identify individuals with knowledge of the

Location.

building interior (building engineer, building

Exhaust fans.

maintenance personnel, other).

Pipes.

 Note the general proximity to other structures.

Chimney.

- Location.

Identify building specifications

- Dimension.

 Identify building dimensions.

- Composition.

- Opening inside.

 Identify the external and internal doors.

Location.

 Identify stairwells.

Dimensions.

Location.

Type of material.

Type.

Composition.

 Identify roof.

Size.

Windows.

Location of hinges.

Material.

Method of opening. (Determine whether

Access to interior.

the doors open outwards or inwards.)

Obstructions.

Locks.

 Identify elevators.

Location.

 Identify windows.

Locations.

Dimensions.

Type of construction materials.

Location of control box.

Dimensions.

Mechanism for opening elevator inside

Method of locking.

shaft.

Maintenance access routes.

Determine whether the windows open in,

out to the side, or up and down.

 Describe the subterranean spaces.

Mouse holes.

Sewers.

- Location.

Subways.

- Dimensions.

Basements and cellars.

Other utility tunnels.

 Identify hallways.

Location.

 Examine the building’s utility and

Width.

communication systems.

Length.

 Determine types of utilities used in the building.

Number of doors.

 Determine whether utilities can be regulated

from outside the building.

Overhead openings.

 Locate the utility control box or switches.

Areas the hallway connects.

 Identify closet spaces.

 Identify the building’s telephones.

Location.

Dimensions.

Number.

Type.

Method of opening.

 Describe other means of communication.

 Identify crawl spaces.

Location.

Radios.

Dimensions.

Internet.

Openings.

Cell phones.

Description.

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Chapter 1

Table 1-4. Example information requirements or individual buildings (continued)

Support structure.

 Examine building construction.

Insulation used in the walls (whether it is

Pattern of construction.

flammable).

Composition of the outer wall (whether

small arms fire will penetrate).

Composition of inner walls.

- Whether small arms will penetrate.

- Whether walls are reinforced.

WEATHER

1-63. Terrain analysis and weather analysis are inseparable in most situations. Operations in the urban

environment, however, present some unique concerns. Inclement weather can affect the availability of food

supplies. Mass demonstrations use good weather to get maximum turnout. Bad weather further degrades

poor road networks. Rain and heavy winds may disrupt or stop a military information support operations

(MISO) effort, such as a leaflet drop. Some common considerations include--

Winds.

Precipitation.

Visibility.

Cloud cover.

Temperature and humidity.

WINDS

1-64. Wind patterns and effects are important concerns in nearly all environments; however, the larger

urban areas offer some unique challenges that may otherwise be found only in rugged mountain areas.

Depending on weather conditions, when compared with unrestricted terrain, the wind may be blocked,

reduced, or enhanced in areas bordered by large structures. These in turn may cause a buildup of smog (or

lethal chemicals if present), enhance the fire threat, restrict the use of helicopters (swirling winds), and

others. These factors will make downwind predictions for CBRN and toxic industrial materials difficult.

(See paragraphs 2-17 through 2-22.) Finally, there may be radical temperature changes associated with the

combination of wind, precipitation, and structures (such as tunnels or high rises). Urban operations during

cold and wet periods may be significantly affected by the wind chill factor.

PRECIPITATION

1-65. City engineers and urban sanitation workers are well aware of the artificial changes manmade

structures make on the topography. Rain or melting snow often floods basements, underpasses, tunnels,

sewers, and subway systems; streets become impassable with water, snow, or ice; and exposed or weathered

electrical systems may short out. Chemical agents and toxic industrial material are washed into underground

systems by precipitation. Some areas may in fact become impassable or “toxic corridors,” and drinking

water supplies may be affected. As a result, these systems may contain toxic concentrations higher than

surface areas and become contaminated hot spots. These effects become more pronounced as chemical

agents and toxic industrial material are absorbed by brick or unsealed concrete sewer walls. Chemical

detection and decontamination crews will be required when operating in these areas.

VISIBILITY

1-66. Visibility is critical at any time but even more so during operations in urban environments.

Traditionally, night and periods of reduced visibility favor surprise, infiltration, detailed reconnaissance,

attacks across open areas, seizure of defended strong points, and reduction of defended obstacles. There

may be some areas where the tremendous amount of artificial and backg3round light created in even the

smallest urban areas puts unobserved movement at risk. The urban area’s numerous structures, easily

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Intelligence and the Urban Environment

identifiable during the day, may not be so visible at night and compound the problem of disorientation.

Technology enhancements (such as night vision devices or Global Positioning System receivers) may be not

only desired but also essential for Soldiers operating there. Additionally, many urban areas are located

along canals or rivers which often create a potential for fog in low-lying areas. Industrial and transportation

areas are the most affected by fog due to their usual proximity to waterways. In heavy industrial areas, smog

can also limit visibility under all light conditions. Both fog and smog can affect ground operations by

limiting illumination and reflective heating as well as degrading many target acquisition systems and

limiting the use of infrared-guided artillery rounds and general aviation.

CLOUD COVER

1-67. In the urban environment, cloud cover can have some significant tactical effects. In addition to

visibility effects as stated above, cloud cover above an urban area may combine with shadows from

buildings to affect observation. Intermittent cloud cover may cause shadows on the ground which could

confuse observers. Low cloud cover over urban areas can restrict air operations due to the numerous

vertical manmade obstructions in these areas.

TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY

1-68. Air inversion layers are common over cities, especially cities located in low-lying bowls or river

valleys. Inversion layers may trap dust, pollutants, or even chemical agents and reduce visibility. These

layers can also create a greenhouse effect which may cause a rise in ground and air temperature. The

heating of buildings during the winter and the reflection and absorption of summer heat make built-up areas

warmer than surrounding open areas during both summer and winter. This difference can be as great as 10

to 20 degrees and may significantly add to the problems faced in urban operations. Summer heat, combined

with the very physical requirement of urban combat, can cause severe heat exhaustion problems and in the

winter Soldiers may fall victim to exposure in nominally protected areas such as tunnels or causeways.

Changes in temperature as a result of air inversions can also affect thermal sights during crossover periods

of warm to cold and vice versa. Air inversions can also trap pollution, smoke from fires, or gases closer to

the ground. This period should be identified, as it may differ from urban area to urban area. Extremely cold

temperatures and heavily constructed buildings many affect target identification for thermal sights. For

example, thick walls may make combat vehicle identification difficult by distorting hotspots, and increased

use of heaters and warming fires may clutter thermal sights with numerous hotspots.

WEATHER SUPPORT

1-69. Before Soldiers are sent into an urban area, especially those with an urban center composed of

numerous large structures, staff planners must have a good understanding of the weather and the effects of

the weather in the urban environment. The staff weather officer provides the basic weather forecasts for

planning purposes.

SOCIETY (SOCIO-CULTURAL)

1-70. When local support is necessary for success, as is often the case in operations in the urban

environment, the population is central to accomplishing the mission. The center of gravity for operations in

urban environments is often human. To effectively operate among an urban population and maintain their

goodwill, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, to include

values, needs, history, religion, customs, and social structure.

1-71. U.S. forces can avoid losing local support for the mission and anticipate local reaction to friendly

courses of action by understanding, respecting, and following local customs when possible. The history of a

people often explains why the urban population behaves the way it does. For example, U.S. forces might

forestall a violent demonstration by understanding the significance of the anniversary of a local hero’s

death.

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Chapter 1

1-72. Accommodating the social norms of a population is potentially the most influential factor in the

conduct of urban operations. Unfortunately, this is often neglected. Social factors have greater impact in

urban operations than in any other environment. The density of the local populations and the constant

interaction between them and U.S. forces greatly increase the importance of social considerations. The

fastest way to damage the legitimacy of an operation is to ignore or violate social mores or precepts of a

particular population. Groups develop norms and adamantly believe in them all of their lives. The step most

often neglected is understanding and respecting these differences.

1-73. The interaction of different cultures during operations in the urban environment may demand greater

recognition than in other environments. This greater need for understanding comes from the increased

interaction with the civilian populace. Norms and values could involve such diverse areas as food, sleep

patterns, casual and close relationships, manners, and cleanliness. Understanding these differences is only a

start in developing cultural awareness.

1-74. Religious beliefs and practices are among the most important, yet least understood, aspects of the

cultures of other peoples. In many parts of the world, religious norms are a matter of life and death. In many

religious wars, it is not uncommon to find suicidal acts in the name of their god. In those situations,

religious beliefs are considered more important than life itself.

1-75. Failure to recognize, respect, understand, and incorporate an understanding of the cultural and

religious aspects of the society with which U.S. forces are interacting could rapidly lead to an erosion of the

legitimacy of the U.S. or multinational force mission. When assessing events, intelligence professionals

must consider the norms of the local culture or society. For example, while bribery is not an accepted norm

in our society, it may be a totally acceptable practice in another society. If U.S. intelligence professionals

assess an incidence of this nature using our own societal norms and values as a reference, it is highly likely

that the significance of the event will be misinterpreted.

1-76. Some U.S. military missions will require U.S. forces to operate in support of the local government.

While it is important to articulate U.S. contributions to a given mission, it is also important to highlight the

accomplishments of the local national government for long-term success. U.S. military planners must

identify key government officials early in the operation. These individuals can provide valuable information

needed for successful completion of the operations to include city infrastructure, locations of enemy

concentration, and a common picture of cultural norms.

1-77. Many developing country governments are characterized by nepotism, favor trading, sabotage, and

indifference. Corruption is pervasive and institutionalized as a practical way to manage excess demand for

city services. The power of officials is often primarily based on family and personal connections, economic,

political or military power bases and age, and only after that on education, training, and competence.

1-78. A local government’s breakdown from its previous level of effectiveness will quickly exacerbate

problems of public health and mobility. Attempts to get the local-level bureaucracy to function along U.S.

lines will produce further breakdown or passive indifference. Any unintentional or intentional threat to the

privileges of ranking local officials or to members of their families will be stubbornly resisted. Avoiding

such threats and assessing the importance of particular officials requires knowledge of family ties.

1-79. U.S. military planners must also recognize that the urban populace will behave according to their own

self-interest. The urban populace will focus on the different interests at work: those of U.S. or multinational

forces, those of elements hostile to U.S. or multinational forces, those of international or nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs) that may be present; those of local national opportunities and those of the general

population. Friendly forces must be constantly aware of these interests and how the local national

population perceives them.

1-80. Another significant cultural problem is the presence of displaced persons within an urban area. Rural

immigrants, who may have different cultural norms, when combined with city residents displaced by urban

conflict, can create a significant strategic problem. Noncombatants and refugees without hostile intent can

stop an advancing unit or inadvertently complicate an operation. Additionally, there may be enemy troops,

criminal gangs, vigilantes, paramilitary factions, and factions within those groups hiding in the waves of the

displaced.

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Intelligence and the Urban Environment

1-81. The enemy knows that it will be hard to identify the threat among neutral or disinterested parties.

Local combat situations can change rapidly as the seeming neutrals become the threat within close quarters

and friendly forces find themselves suddenly in an indefensible position. Chechen rebels and the Hezbollah

effectively used the cover of refugees to attack occupying forces and counted on heavy civilian casualties in

the counterattack to gain support with the local population. The goal is to place incalculable stresses on the

Soldiers in order to break down discipline and operational integrity. From Belfast to Lebanon, the constant

pressure of identifying the threat amongst nonbelligerent or disinterested parties taxed and sometimes

undermined rules of engagement, and in some cases, entire missions.

1-82. Defining the structure of the social hierarchy is often critical to understanding the population.

Identifying those in positions of authority is important as well. These city officials, village elders, or tribal

chieftains are often the critical nodes of the society and influence the actions of the population at large. In

many societies, nominal titles do not equal power--influence does. Many apparent leaders are figureheads,

and the true authority lies elsewhere.

1-83. Some areas around the world are not governed by the rule of law, but instead rely upon tradition.

Often, ethnic loyalty, religious affiliation, and tribal membership provide societal cohesion and the sense of

proper behavior and ethics in dealing with outsiders, such as the U.S. or multinational partners. It is

important to understand the complicated inner workings of a society rife with internal conflict, although to

do so is difficult and requires a thorough examination of a society’s culture and history.

1-84. Every city has discrete and discernible patterns of daily activity. The time of rush hour activity along

an LOC is one case in point. Business transactions, market sales, religious practices, governmental

functions, and criminal activity are other examples of daily behavior that can be analyzed for consistencies.

Disruptions or irregularities in these patterns serve as a warning that something is amiss in the city.

Identifying and understanding trends and patterns of activity provide critical information for intelligence

analysts and mission planners.

1-85. While certain patterns do exist, most urban centers are normally composed of a multitude of different

peoples, each with their own standards of conduct. Individuals act independently and in their own best

interest, which will not always coincide with friendly objectives. The presence or actions of the different

population components of an urban area cannot be ignored when conducting mission planning. Treating the

urban population as a homogenous entity can lead to false assumptions, cultural misunderstandings, and

poor situational understanding.

POPULATION

1-86. A population of significant size and density inhabits, works in, and uses the manmade and natural

terrain in the urban environment. Civilians remaining in an urban environment may be significant as a

threat, an obstacle, a logistics support problem (to include medical support), or a source of support and

information. The most significant problem regarding the local population is the fact each person is a

potential threat and can participate in an insurgency, terrorism, or other disruptive activity.

1-87. One of the most violent examples in U.S. military history was the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong laid

mines and demolitions, conducted ambushes and sniping, performed information collection missions for

Hanoi, and even participated in force-on-force engagements, primarily during the Tet Offensive in 1968.

The difficulty for the U.S. and coalition forces operating there lay in the fact that the Viet Cong looked like

their neighbors, often held jobs, and raised families in pro-government neighborhoods, and, in some cases,

even served in the South Vietnamese Army.

1-88. Another consideration when dealing with the local population is their ability to hinder military

operations. Regardless of causes or political affiliations, civilian casualties are often the focal point of press

coverage, often to the point of ignoring or denigrating any previous accomplishments. Within the

operational continuum, and especially during the conduct of urban operations, commanders can expect to

encounter restrictions on their use of firepower and challenges in their ability to conduct sustainment

missions. In the current operational environment, it is unacceptable to our leaders and the American

population to inflict large numbers of civilian casualties.

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Chapter 1

1-89. Another issue is the local population’s requirement for logistic or medical support. U.S. troops

deployed to Somalia and the Balkans immediately had to deal with providing logistic support to starving

populations until local and international organizations could take over those functions. Disease and wounds

were also a problem among the local population, most notably in Somalia, Haiti (disease), and Bosnia and

Kosovo (wounds). The burden of caring for the locals was initially placed on the deployed commanders

until local national and international organizations could establish treatment facilities.

1-90. From an intelligence standpoint, the local population can be a valuable information source. This was

especially effective during U.S. operations in Bosnia and Kosovo when locals told of minefields, weapon

caches, infiltration routes, mass burials, and other proof of war crimes.

1-91. Some of the key requirements to identify when analyzing the local population in an urban

environment are shown in table 1-5.

Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations

General information

 Identify the extent (if any) of anti-American

 Identify the values of the urban population.

sentiment in each of the following:

Family relations.

Individuals.

Religious values.

Society’s privileged.

Political views.

Lower class.

Ethnic tribal ties.

Government.

Nationalism.

Military.

 Identify the current issues/problems facing the

Extremists.

urban population.

The media.

Economics.

 Evaluate the city by geographic locations.

Politics.

Slums and shantytowns.

Religious conflict.

Areas where criminal gangs operate.

Crime.

Areas of the city where U.S. or

Drug or alcohol addiction.

multinational forces are likely to be

Ethnic strife.

unwelcome.

Housing.

Areas in the city where demonstration or

 Assess the history of conflict in the state.

riots typically occur.

Internal and external.

 Identify the social aspects/traits of the urban

Recent conflicts.

population.

 Describe the significance of the urban area.

Family structure.

International.

Role of elders.

National.

Role of men.

Religious.

Role of women.

Military.

Role of children.

Economic.

Opposite sex interaction.

Historical.

Same sex interaction.

 Identify key figures in the society.

Significance of pets and animals.

Government leaders.

Eating habits.

Religious leaders.

Sanitary practices.

Military leaders.

Alcohol and drug use.

Opposition leaders.

Firearm ownership.

Tribal chiefs/elders.

Crime/drug figures.

Other.

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Intelligence and the Urban Environment

Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations (continued)

 Identify the influence of the media.

Males and females age 65 and older.

By form (print, radio, television).

Males age 15 to 49 (potential military age).

By origin (local, national, international).

 Identify the trends in migration.

Media bias.

Number of migrants.

Groups or individuals that control the

Cause(s) of migration.

media

Average age of migrants.

Key media personnel.

Refugee situation.

 Identify taboos or insulting social actions.

Origin of the refugees.

Verbal.

Size of the refugee population.

Nonverbal (such as, body gestures or

Size of the original population.

manner of dress).

 Describe the relationship between refugees

 Identify significant dates.

and the city populace.

Importance.

Supporting.

Dates or holidays significant to one portion

Hostile.

of populace but offensive to another.

Indifferent.

Effect on city.

 Identify segments of the population that fled the

Violence.

city.

Demonstrations.

Cause.

Types of celebrations.

Region of resettlement.

Number of participants.

Circumstances that will afford their return.

 Identify cultural landmarks and structures.

 Identify the population of the rural areas

Location.

surrounding the urban area.

Type.

Numbers.

Religious.

Location and distance from urban area.

Historical.

Relationship to/with urban population.

Stadiums.

Travel.

Shopping centers.

Employment.

Other.

Interdependence.

Role in conflict (if any).

Demographics

 Assess the urban area’s demographics.

Social structure

Ethnicity.

 Identify the ethnic structure.

Race.

Percent of population by ethnic group.

Religion.

Physical boundaries of influence.

Economic status.

Dominant ethnic group (if any).

Political affiliation.

Reason for dominance.

Other.

Biases of the groups.

 Identify languages spoken.

Role of ethnicity in conflict (past and

Official.

present).

Social.

Key personnel and location.

Business.

 Identify the racial structure.

Dialects.

Percentage of population by race.

Slang.

Dominant racial group (if any).

 Identify the urban population and population

Reason for dominance.

density.

Physical boundaries of influence.

Total.

Biases of the races.

By city area.

Role in conflict.

Center city.

Key personnel and location.

Residential.

Slum and shantytown.

Area of operations.

 Identify the age structure.

Males and females age 0 to 14.

Males and females age 15 to 64.

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TC 2-91.4

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Chapter 1

Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations (continued)

 Identify the religious structure.

Voting practices.

Beliefs.

- Suffrage.

Percentage of population.

- Election turnout.

Importance and influence in society.

- Election fraud.

Practices.

- Other voting irregularities.

Physical boundaries of influence.

Physical boundaries based on political

Biases.

beliefs.

Dominant religious group (if any).

Boundary overlap or possible areas of

Reason for dominance.

friction.

Role of religion in conflict.

Key leaders or personnel and location.

Key personnel and location.

Role of politics in conflict.

 Identify the tribal and clan structure.

Issues motivating the political behavior of

Basis of affiliation.

each segment of society.

Percentage of population.

- Economic benefits.

Physical boundaries of influence.

- Social prestige.

Dominant tribe/clan (if any).

- Ethnic ties.

Reason for dominance.

- Religious affiliation.

Biases of the tribes/clans.

- Other.

Role in conflict.

 Identify the city government structure.

Key personnel and location.

Executive branch.

 Identify the economic class structure.

Legislative branch.

Distribution of wealth.

Judicial branch.

Per capita income.

Key personnel and location.

Percentage of population by economic

Administrative divisions.

sector (industry, service, other).

Physical boundaries of administrative

Percentage of population living in poverty.

divisions.

Percentage of population dependent on

Whether officials are elected or appointed.

economic aid.

Extent of the local government’s authority.

Type of aid.

 Determine whether the urban area is the seat

Unemployment rate.

of the national government.

Underemployment rate.

Branches of the national government in the

Status of trade unions.

urban area.

Whether membership in the unions is

Relationship between city and national

compulsory.

governments.

Influence of unions in the urban area

Key personnel and location.

(politically, economically, other).

 Identify the educational structure.

Key union personnel and location.

Literacy (percentage of total population,

Management class.

over age 15, male, female).

- Management class influence in the urban

Whether education is tuition-free and to

area.

what level.

- Key management class personnel and

Percentage of total population by

location.

education level (preschool or kindergarten,

Economic elite.

primary, secondary, university or college,

- Economic elite influence in the urban

postgraduate).

area.

Education level by sex.

- Key economic elite personnel and

Education level by type (academic,

location.

technical or vocational).

Physical boundaries based on economics.

Whether access to education is based on

Role of economics in the conflict.

class or other social affiliation.

 Identify the political structure.

Effect that the conflict has had on

Political parties or political factions.

education.

Percent of population belonging to a

 Identify the presence of nongovernmental

political faction or party.

organizations in the urban area of operations.

Dominant political party (if any).

Organizations name and country affiliation.

Reason for dominance.

Types of services provided.

Political factions, parties, or beliefs in the

Food.

urban area.

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8) - page 27