Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8) - page 26
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Chapter 1
Table 1-8. Example intelligence requirements for energy infrastructure
General Information
Locate the power generator backup (if any).
Describe the type of power sources.
Locate the substation.
Natural gas.
Evaluate how substations are powered.
Nuclear.
Locate the water storage center.
Coal.
Identify the fuel storage centers.
Hydroelectrical.
Location.
Geothermal.
Size.
Oil.
Capacity
Solar.
Fuel type.
Assess the significance of the power source.
Usage rate.
Economic.
Determine which station or substation is the
Social.
primary power plant for the urban area.
Military.
Determine the best component to disable the
Determine the effect on the urban population
facility and how long it would be disabled.
should power source availability be disrupted.
Determine whether the power plant controls
interconnected energy.
Power Plant Layout
Evaluate plant security measures.
Determine the fuel source.
Military/civilian personnel.
Type.
Fencing and/or other physical security
Location.
obstruction.
Available reserve.
Surveillance devices/mechanisms.
Usage rate.
Evaluate the threat to the surrounding area
Determine who owns and operates the power
should this facility be damaged.
plant.
Inhabitants.
Identify the generators.
Animal life.
Location.
Surrounding ecosystem.
Quantity.
Petroleum and Natural Gas Facilities.
Output.
Identify the turbines.
Petroleum and Natural Gas Facilities
Location.
Identify the facility location.
Quantity.
Identify the facility type.
Identify the exciters.
Identify the facility product.
Location.
Identify the size of the facility.
Quantity.
Identify the owner.
Locate the boiler (steam plant).
Describe the status of the facility.
Locate the compressor (gas power plant).
Assess the general condition of the facility.
Locate the combustion chamber (gas power
Identify the date the facility was constructed.
plant).
Determine the effect that the disruption of the
Locate the diesel engine (diesel power plant).
facility’s operation would have on the urban area
Locate the reactor containment structures
and urban population.
(nuclear power plant).
Determine the easiest method for rendering the
Locate water intakes and outlets (nuclear and
facility inoperable.
coal power plants).
Method.
Locate power transformers.
Length of time inoperable.
Locate switch yards.
Identify the facility specifications.
Locate the power grid that services the power
Level of production.
plant.
- Barrels.
Identify the power generation system.
- Tons.
Identify the power distribution system.
- Cubic feet.
Identify the times street lights are turned on and
Percentage of national production.
off.
Percentage of national refining/cracking.
Locate the power plant step-down transformers
Percentage of infield processing.
used for power distribution.
Percentage of refinery processing.
Identify the control rooms.
Identify the condensers.
Identify the water pumps.
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FM 2-91.4
January 2008 (Draft)
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Intelligence and the Urban Environment
Table 1-8. Example intelligence requirements for energy infrastructure (continued)
Examine the facility layout.
Finished product storage areas.
Producing wells.
- Type.
Reserves.
- Location.
- Proven.
- Function.
- Unproven.
Administration and maintenance facilities.
- Location.
Critical vulnerabilities.
Processing plants.
Obtain facility blueprints or sketch diagrams.
Refinery processing area.
Examine the fuel storage areas.
Type.
Atmospheric distillation towers.
Ownership.
Crude oil feed furnaces.
Storage tanks.
- Type.
- Location.
- Location.
- Displacement (above/below ground).
- Number feeding towers.
- Shape.
Receiving facilities and crude oil storage.
Transportation.
Catalyst vessels.
- Type.
- Type.
- Number
- Location.
- Characteristics.
- Function.
Receiving and distribution facilities.
Nearest refinery (distance).
Support facilities.
Transportation.
Best method for rendering storage facility
- Method.
inoperable.
- Identification.
Identify any planned expansion at the plant.
- Destination.
Expected increase.
Vapor vessels.
Date.
- Type.
Method.
- Function.
- Location.
Plant utilities.
- Water.
- Power.
WATER AND WASTE DISPOSAL
1-101. Water is an essential resource. As populations grow, demand for potable water increases. In some
areas of the world, the supply of fresh water is inadequate to meet these demands. By 2025, between 2.7
and 3.5 billion people may live in water-deficient countries. In developed nations, water companies
provide the population with clean water. In much of the developing world, no formal water authorities
exist. Sewage, industrial waste, and pollution pose threats to the water supply.
1-102. Deliberate acts of poisoning cannot be overlooked where access to the water supply is not
controlled. US forces may gain no marked tactical advantage by controlling this system, but its protection
minimizes the population’s hardship and thus contributes to overall mission success. A buildup of garbage
on city streets poses many hazards to include health threats and obstacles. Maintenance or restoration of
urban garbage removal to landfills can minimize this threat and improve the confidence of the civilian
population in the US friendly mission. (See Table 1-9.)
January 2008 (Draft)
FM 2-91.4
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Chapter 1
Table 1-9. Example information requirements for water and
waste disposal infrastructure
Utilities
Location.
Water Systems
Depth.
Identify the water control center.
Width.
Size/output.
Tide.
Method of purification.
Current.
Grid/pipe layout.
Seasonal changes (time frozen, flooded,
Identify substations.
dried out).
Pumping stations.
Dams.
Water filtration plant.
Water supply towers.
Sewage and Waste Disposal
Wells.
Determine the adequacy of the sewage and
Evaluate the water quality of local streams, rivers,
waste disposal system.
lakes, and oceans (health risks of contact with
Collection.
untreated water).
Transport.
Determine the effectiveness of local leak
Incinerators.
detection.
Dumps/landfills.
Determine whether the urban area is experiencing
Toxic waste.
water shortage.
Medical waste.
Evaluate the local irrigation system and practices.
Identify actions that would lead to the breakdown
Determine reliability of the engineering and
of the waste disposal system.
environmental testing.
Identify those in charge of waste and sewage
Determine whether water treatment is privatized.
management.
Identify the types of pipes installed.
Locate the control center of the sewage system.
Determine the types of security present at the
Determine procedures for the facility.
facility.
Determine the schedule of operation.
Identify rivers/canals that run through the city.
Evaluate the facility’s security.
RESOURCES AND MATERIAL PRODUCTION
1-103. Understanding the origination and storage sites of resources that maintain an urban population can
be especially critical in stability operations and civil support operations. These sites may need to be secured
against looting or attack by threat forces in order to maintain urban services and thereby retain or regain the
confidence of the local population in the US mission. Additionally, military production sites may need to
be secured to prevent the population from gaining uncontrolled access to quantities of military equipment.
(See Table 1-10.)
1-40
FM 2-91.4
January 2008 (Draft)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Intelligence and the Urban Environment
Table 1-10. Example information requirements for resources and
material production infrastructure
Resources and Material Production
Public.
Identify the urban area’s resources.
Military.
Natural.
Locate the manufacturer’s resource centers.
Manmade.
Location.
Evaluate the available fuel resources.
Types.
Storage.
Transportation routes in and out.
Transportation.
Types of transportation.
Emergency supply.
Locate the material-producing factories.
Access.
Location.
Distribution.
Material produced.
Production.
Size of factory.
Type(s).
Number of employees.
Evaluate the region’s mineral resources.
Sector of production.
Types.
Identify any materials produced for military
Use.
purpose.
Storage.
Type.
Extraction.
Purpose.
Locate active mining operations.
Location of military production.
Hard.
Local use or export.
Liquid.
Identify specific strengths/weaknesses of the
Identify materials being mined.
materials and products due to local production
Determine the primary application of these
methods.
products.
Identify the main supply of materials.
Commercial.
Private.
FOOD DISTRIBUTION
1-104. A basic humanitarian need of the local populace is food. During periods of conflict, food supplies
in urban areas often become scarce. Maintaining and restoring normal food distribution channels in urban
areas will help prevent a humanitarian disaster and greatly assist in maintaining or regaining the good will
of the local population for US forces. It may be impossible to immediately restore food distribution
channels following a conflict, and US forces may have to work with NGOs that specialize in providing
these types of services. This may require friendly forces to provide protection for NGO convoys and
personnel in areas where conflict may occur. (See Table 1-11.)
Table 1-11. Example information requirements for food distribution infrastructure
Food Distribution
Who is controlling distribution of food?
Evaluate food production and distribution.
Are there groups or individuals
Distribution point locations (routes normally
getting preferential treatment?
taken to and from distribution points).
Are there groups or individuals that
Production center locations.
are not receiving food distributions?
Ability to feed population.
Determine the involvement of NGOs in food
Extent of the urban area’s reliance on outside
distribution.
food sources.
Organization.
Schedule of distribution.
Number of personnel.
Where is the food warehouse/stored prior to
Type of support.
distribution?
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FM 2-91.4
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Chapter 1
MEDICAL FACILITIES
1-105. While the health services infrastructure of most developed cities is advanced, medical facilities are
deficient in many countries. International humanitarian organizations may represent the only viable
medical care available. The rudimentary care provided in most developing world cities is not up to Western
standards. Compounding this problem is the presence of deadly parasites and diseases. Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is devastating many of the urban centers in the developing world and
therefore the local blood supply must be looked upon with great suspicion. Infectious disease, famine, and
natural disasters can overwhelm a city’s medical infrastructure and create immense suffering. Offering
support to an existing medical system may augment the US mission, as well as foster its legitimacy. (See
Table 1-12.)
Table 1-12. Example information requirements for medical infrastructure
Medical Facilities
Availability of private medical facilities.
Identify medical facilities.
Quality and quantity of local blood supply.
Location.
- Location of blood banks.
Staff.
- Amount of blood stored.
- Doctor-to-patient ratio.
- Blood screening process and its
- Support personnel.
ability to adequately screens for
- Number of staff members who speak
infectious diseases.
English.
Environmental health risk.
- Number of staff members who are Western
- Predicted infectious disease risk
educated.
and occurrence.
- Hospital managers.
- Acquired immune deficiency
Number of patients.
syndrome (AIDS) risk.
Number of beds.
Availability of medical capable transport from
Number of surgical operating rooms.
the host nation.
Number of intensive care rooms.
Local mortuary facilities.
Quality of the medical care provided.
- Morgues.
Quality and quantity of medical supplies.
- Cemeteries.
LOCAL POLICE, MILITARY UNITS WITH POLICE AUTHORITY OR MISSIONS, AND
FIREFIGHTING UNITS
1-106. These elements can be critical in maintaining public order. Their operations must be integrated
with friendly forces in friendly forces controlled areas to ensure that stability and security are restored or
maintained. As discussed in Chapter 3, the precinct structure of these organizations can also provide a good
model for the delineation of unit boundaries with the urban area. It may be necessary for friendly forces to
provide training for these elements. (See Table 1-13.)
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FM 2-91.4
January 2008 (Draft)
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Intelligence and the Urban Environment
Table 1-13. Example of information requirements for law enforcement
and firefighting instructions
Limitations
Police or Military Units with Police
Level of corruption.
Authority/Mission
Describe police or military units with police
Firefighting Units
authority/mission.
Describe the fire fighting units.
Station locations.
Station locations.
Substation locations.
Substation locations.
Headquarters location.
Operating borders and areas.
Organizational structure.
Number of firefighters (active and reserve).
Key leaders.
Full-time or volunteer.
Operating borders.
Number and types of vehicles (pumper,
Jurisdiction borders.
ladder, other).
Number of police (active and reserve).
Other fire fighting equipment.
Number of administrative personnel.
Location and condition of fire hydrants.
Types of units (uniformed, plainclothes,
Communications equipment, procedures,
special).
and frequencies or telephone numbers.
Weapons and equipment.
Training.
Communications equipment, procedures,
Proficiency.
and frequencies or telephone numbers.
Capabilities.
Training.
Limitations.
Proficiency.
Firefighting units outside urban area that
Capabilities.
assist in city emergencies.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CIVIL DEFENSE
1-107. Local crisis management procedures and civil defense structures can aid US forces in helping to
care for noncombatants in areas of ongoing or recent military operations. Additionally, the crisis
management and civil defense leadership will often be local officials that may be able to provide structure
to help restore or maintain security and local services in urban areas under friendly control. Many larger
urban areas have significant response teams and assets to deal with crises. The loss of these key urban
“maintainers” may severely impact not only military operations within the urban environment but also
threaten the health or mobility of those living there. During periods of combat this may also affect the
ability of soldiers to fight as fires or chemical spills remain unchecked or sewer systems back up. This is
especially true when automatic pumping stations that normally handle rising water levels are deprived of
power. It may be necessary for friendly forces to provide training for these elements. (See Table 1-14.)
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FM 2-91.4
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Chapter 1
Table 1-14. Example information requirements for crisis management
and civil defense infrastructure
Crisis Management Procedures
Civil Defense Structure
Describe crisis management procedures within
Describe the civil defense structure.
the urban area.
Civil defense plans.
Decision makers.
Organization of the civil defense agency (key
Status of the civil alert system.
personnel).
- Procedures.
Location of the facilities available for civil
- Effectiveness.
defense.
- Results of previous
- Key industry sites.
alerts/tests.
- Underground shelters.
Existence and details of the civil evacuation
- Food storage sites.
plan.
- Potable water sites.
- Procedures.
- Medical supplies.
- Effectiveness.
- Hospitals.
- Results of previous
Warning and alert procedure.
evacuations/tests.
Evacuation routes and capacities.
SUBTERRANEAN FEATURES
1-108. Subterranean features can be extremely important in identifying underground military structures,
concealed AAs, and maintaining public services. (See Table 1-15.)
Table 1-15. Example information requirements
for subterranean infrastructure
Subterranean Features
Identify choke points (manmade and natural).
Locate other subterranean features.
Location.
Describe the type of feature.
Dimension.
Maintenance access tunnel.
Describe the sewer/drainage system.
Electric grid/utility line.
Location.
Pedestrian passageway.
Power source.
Sewer drainage systems and waterways.
Cross section.
Natural underground passageway.
Sides.
Evaluate the characteristics of the feature.
Bottom.
Shape.
Normal depth.
Dimensions.
Normal current velocity.
Rise of arch.
Identify the ventilation system.
Assess the significance of the feature.
Description.
Connections to the tunnel/passage.
Adequacy.
Result if use of the route is denied.
Describe the lighting facilities.
Alternate routes.
Type.
Describe the adjacent terrain.
Location
Examine the surface features over the tunnel.
Power source.
Examine the surface features over the tunnel.
Locate traffic control markings.
Subterranean Construction
Subterranean Layout
Locate the horizontal and vertical constructions.
Identify the alignment.
Type.
Horizontal (position, curve, radius, curve
Minimum clearance.
location).
Location from portal.
Vertical (grade percent, length, location).
Evaluate the shoring and bracing.
Identify passageways.
Spacing location.
Dimension.
Design.
Spacing.
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FM 2-91.4
January 2008 (Draft)
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Intelligence and the Urban Environment
Table 1-15. Example information requirements for
subterranean infrastructure (continued)
Materials.
Materials.
Dimensions.
Dimensions.
Arrangements.
Arrangements.
Assess the overburden.
Assess the overburden.
Material.
Material.
Depth.
Depth.
Evaluate the features of the lining materials.
Evaluate the features of the lining materials.
Type.
Type.
Thickness.
Thickness.
Condition.
Condition.
Point of change.
Point of change
Identify the year of construction.
Identify the year of construction.
Evaluate the effects of climate and weather on
Evaluate the effects of climate and weather on
the structure.
the structure.
Provide pertinent geological data.
Provide pertinent geological data.
Determine the structure’s susceptibilities to
Determine the structure’s susceptibilities to
above-ground demolitions.
above-ground demolitions.
Identify buildings in the urban area that have
Identify buildings in the urban area that have
basements and subterranean spaces.
basements and subterranean spaces.
Residential.
Residential.
Government.
Government.
Military.
Military.
Commercial.
Commercial.
Industrial.
Industrial.
January 2008 (Draft)
FM 2-91.4
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Chapter 2
The Threat in the Urban Environment
2-1. The obligation of intelligence professionals includes providing adequate information to enable
leaders to distinguish threats from non-threats and combatants from noncombatants. This legal
requirement of distinction is the initial obligation of decision makers who rely primarily on the intelligence
they are provided.
2-2. Threats in the urban environment can be difficult to identify due to the often complex nature of the
forces and the environment. In urban terrain, friendly forces will encounter a variety of potential threats
such as conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, insurgents/guerillas, terrorists, common criminals,
drug traffickers, warlords, and street gangs. These threats may operate independently or some may operate
together. Individuals may be active members of one or more groups. Many urban threats lack uniforms or
obvious logistical trains and use networks versus hierarchical structures.
2-3. Little information may be available concerning threat TTP so intelligence staffs must collect against
these TTP and build threat models. The enemy situation is often extremely fluid--locals friendly to us
today may be tomorrow’s belligerents. Adversaries seek to blend in with the local population to avoid
being captured or killed. Enemy forces who are familiar with the city layout have an inherently superior
awareness of the current situation. Finally, US forces often fail to understand the motives of the urban
threat due to difficulties of building cultural awareness and situational understanding for a complex
environment and operation. Intelligence personnel must assist the commander in correctly identifying
enemy actions so that US forces can focus on the enemy and seize the initiative while maintaining an
understanding of the overall situation.
2-4. Potential urban enemies share some characteristics. The broken and compartmented terrain is best
suited to the use of small unit operations. Typical urban fighters are organized in squad size elements and
employ guerrilla tactics, terrorist tactics, or a combination of the two. They normally choose to attack
(often using ambushes) on terrain which canalizes US forces and limits our ability to maneuver or mass
while allowing the threat forces to inflict casualties on US forces and then withdraw. Small arms, sniper
rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, mines, IEDs,
“Molotov cocktails,” and booby traps are often the
preferred weapons. These weapons range from high tech to low tech and may be 30 to 40 years old or built
from hardware supplies, but at close range in the urban environment many of their limitations can be
negated.
2-5. Urban threats may attempt to acquire more dangerous weapons such as chemical weapons, biological
weapons, thermobaric weapons, and possibly even nuclear weapons. Should a proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) occur, the dangers of urban combat greatly increase.
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES
2-6. These threats are the most overt to US and coalition forces. Identifying the capabilities and intent of
these threat forces is standard for intelligence professionals for any type of operation in any type of
environment. In the urban environment, however, more attention must be paid to threat capabilities that
support operations in the urban environment and understanding of what, if any, specialized training these
forces have received in conducting urban warfare. (See Table 2-1.)
January 2008 (Draft)
FM 2-91.4
2-1
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Chapter 2
Table 2-1. Example information requirements for conventional
military and paramilitary forces
Conventional Military
Procedures.
Identify the military orders of battle (OBs).
Compliance.
Ground.
Changes to ROE.
Air.
Naval.
Paramilitary
Electronic.
Determine the nature of the paramilitary force.
Defensive missile.
Name.
Assess the enemy experience in an urban
Goals.
environment.
Ideology.
Experiences in urban combat.
Numbers.
Last conflict.
Leadership.
Previous conflict.
Identification features.
Urban training.
- Clothing/uniforms.
- Amount.
- Propaganda.
- Quality.
- Slogans/songs/chants.
- Facilities.
Determine the group’s COG/critical vulnerability.
TTP.
Determine if the paramilitary group is a threat to
Determine the enemy’s COG and critical
US forces/local government forces/police.
vulnerability in urban warfare.
Determine how the paramilitary group operates.
Evaluate enemy sniper capability.
Command and control.
Training.
- Organization.
Weapons.
- Communication equipment.
TTP of employment.
Types of weapons employed.
Likely sniper sites.
- Firearms.
Identify enemy mechanized assets and intended
- Explosives.
employment.
- Incendiary.
Determine how the enemy will fight in the urban
- Indirect fire.
area.
- Mechanized.
Attack/defend.
- Mines/booby traps.
Types of weapons.
- CBRN.
Tactics.
- Other weapons
Enemy reinforcement plan.
technology (for example, NVDs).
Force size the enemy would employ in an
Tactics.
urban environment.
Primary targets.
Determine the relationship between the enemy
- Location.
and the local populace.
- Type.
Would the local populace cooperate?
Logistical support structure.
- All segments of the populace.
- Location of equipment storage facilities.
- Level of cooperation.
- Transportation.
How the population will be employed?
Locate the organization’s headquarters.
- Intelligence collectors.
Identify allied forces/support groups.
- Logistical support.
International.
- Political activists/demonstrators.
Local security forces.
- Human shields.
Other paramilitary groups.
- Other.
Other factions.
Determine how the enemy will employ crew-
Describe training.
served weapons.
Type.
Duration.
Determine how the enemy employs indirect fire
Quality.
support.
Training facilities.
Determine whether the enemy employs mines
- Location.
and booby traps in the urban area.
- Type.
Type.
Describe the group’s experiences in urban
Typical locations.
warfare.
Identify the enemy’s ROE.
2-2
FM 2-91.4
January 2008 (Draft)
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The Threat in the Urban Environment
INSURGENTS OR GUERRILLAS
2-7. When conducting insurgency or guerrilla operations, the threat will normally conform to six
considerations: security, legitimacy, objective, perseverance, unity of effort, and restraint (FM 3-05.102,
FM 3-07, and JP 3-0). (See Table 2-2.) Under the conditions of insurgency within the urban environment,
the analyst must place more emphasis on—
z
Developing population status overlays showing potential hostile neighborhoods.
z
Developing an understanding of “how” the insurgent or guerrilla organization operates and is
organized with a focus toward potential strengths and weaknesses.
z
Determining primary operating or staging areas.
z
Determining mobility corridors and escape routes.
z
Determining most likely targets.
z
Determining where the threat’s logistical facilities are located and how their support
organizations operate.
z
Determining the level of popular support (active and passive).
z
Determining the recruiting, command and control, reconnaissance and surveillance, logistics (to
include money), and operations techniques and methods of the insurgent or guerrilla
organization.
z
Locating neutrals and those actively opposing these organizations.
z
Using pattern analysis and other tools to establish links between the insurgent or guerilla
organization and other organizations (to include family links).
z
Determining the underlying social, political, and economic issues that caused the insurgency in
the first place and which are continuing to cause the members of the organization as well as
elements of the population to support it.
January 2008 (Draft)
FM 2-91.4
2-3
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Chapter 2
Table 2-2. Example information requirements for insurgent and guerrilla forces
Insurgents/Guerrillas
Tactics.
Assess the nature of the guerrilla force.
Primary targets.
Name.
- Location.
Goals.
- Type.
Ideology/purpose.
Logistical support structure (location of
Numbers.
equipment storage facilities).
Leadership.
Determine the guerrilla influence on the urban
Identification features.
population.
- Clothing/uniforms.
Previous or ongoing attempts to influence the
- Propaganda.
urban population.
- Slogans/songs/chants.
Probability of attempts to influence
- Symbols and/or graffiti.
US/coalition forces.
Nature of the insurgency/instability.
Identify the guerrilla reserve forces (if any)
Determine the guerrillas’ COG and critical
(reinforcement strategy).
vulnerability.
Assess the support network for the guerrilla
Assess the guerillas’ strategy, tactics, and
forces.
operational procedures.
Local.
Command and control.
National.
- Organization.
International.
- Operational size of units.
Determine how the guerrillas gain support.
- Communication equipment.
Exploitation of social and political weakness
Specialized sub-units.
of target society.
- Intelligence.
Use of propagandist-combatant guerrillas.
- Reconnaissance.
Use of armed propaganda.
- Logistics.
Operation in armed propaganda teams..
- Recruitment.
Use of cover organizations.
Weaponry.
Organization of demonstrations.
- Firearms.
Describe the guerrilla training system.
- Explosives.
Type.
- Incendiary.
Duration.
- Indirect fire.
Quality.
- Mechanized.
Training facilities.
- Mines/booby traps.
Locations.
- CBRN.
- Other weapons technology (for example,
NVDs).
TERRORISTS
2-8. The threat of terrorism is a growing concern for the US military. The opportunities for terrorism are
greater in cities due to the presence of large numbers of potential victims, the likelihood of media attention,
and the presence of vulnerable infrastructure. Likewise, many terrorist cells operate in cities because they
can blend with the surrounding population, find recruits to their cause, and obtain logistical support.
Terrorist cells are not confined to the slum areas of the developing world. In fact, many of the intelligence
collection, logistical support, and planning cells for terrorist groups exist in the cities of Western Europe
and even the United States. (See Table 2-3.)
2-9. Counterterrorism efforts will draw US military forces into urban areas and require coordination with
local law enforcement authorities. (For a more detailed discussion on terrorist organizational structure,
methods of operation, and intelligence requirements, see ST 2-91.2 and DOD O-2000.12-H.)
2-4
FM 2-91.4
January 2008 (Draft)
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The Threat in the Urban Environment
Table 2-3. Example information requirements for terrorist threats
Terrorists
Trends/patterns.
Examine the backg3round of the terrorist group.
- Action.
Leaders and prominent members.
- Frequency.
Goals/motivation.
- Timing.
- Political.
- Geographic dispersion.
- Social.
- Duration.
- Criminal.
- Results.
- Religious.
Circumstances under which the group would
Ideology.
likely act.
Arms.
Types of weapons available to the group and
Organization.
what they are likely to use.
Training.
Capability to acquire or produce WMD to
Capabilities/limitations.
include acquisition attempts.
Support.
Employment of PSYOP.
Values.
- Propaganda.
Homeland.
- Internet web sites.
Ethnicity.
- Intimidation tactics.
Identify individual terrorists.
Areas or approaches avoided by the
Biographical data.
terrorists.
Physical description.
Members of the local population avoided by
Sex.
the terrorists.
Photograph.
Safe areas or approaches.
Psychological profile.
Areas to avoid.
Potential informants.
Countermeasures.
Determine the status of incarcerated group
Security measures.
members (if any).
Identify the terrorist support network.
Who.
Local.
Where.
National.
Reasons for incarceration.
International.
Duration.
- Degree of influence that a third-party
Identify the targets of the violence.
government may have on the terrorist
Government.
group.
Civilians.
- Affiliation with US citizens or groups.
Rival factions.
- Ties to other terrorist organizations or
Military.
networks.
Identify the command and control structure.
Terrorist supply network.
Centralized/decentralized.
- National backing.
Hierarchical.
- Charity/NGO support.
How the terrorists communicate.
- Individual.
- Methods/procedures.
Feasibility of and methods for cutting off or
- Equipment.
seizing these supplies.
Affiliation with a parent terror organization.
Feasibility of and methods for cutting off,
Identify the terrorist group’s TTP.
freezing, or seizing financial ties/assets.
Criminal type activities.
- Kidnapping/ransom.
- Bombings.
- Murder/assassination.
- Sabotage.
CRIME AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
2-10. These organizations can threaten the successful completion of US operations both directly and
indirectly. Criminals and criminal organizations may directly target US forces, stealing supplies or
extorting money or contracts. Likewise, increased criminal activity can undermine the US efforts to
January 2008 (Draft)
FM 2-91.4
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Chapter 2
establish a sense of security among the local populace. Additionally, guerillas, insurgents, and terrorists
may take advantage of criminal organizations in many ways ranging from using them to collect intelligence
on US and coalition forces to obtaining supplies, munitions, or services or using their LOCs as logistical
support channels. Terrorist organizations may even have their own separate criminal element or be
inseparable from a criminal group. An enterprise such as narcoterrorism is an example of this.
2-11. Criminal activities will usually continue and may even increase during full spectrum operations in
the urban environment. Criminal organizations often run black markets and illegal smuggling operations in
and around urban areas. These types of activities are often established prior to the arrival of US and
coalition forces and may proliferate prior to or once US and coalition forces arrive, especially if normal
urban services are disrupted by the events that resulted in the US force deployment. For the local
population, these activities may be the only reliable source of jobs which allow workers to provide for their
families. (See Table 2-4.)
Table 2-4. Example information requirements for criminal threats
Crime/Criminal Organizations
Training.
Determine the urban area’s crime rate.
Operations.
Identify criminal organizations in the area of
Identify the degree of cooperation between
operations.
government agencies and
Name.
criminal organizations.
Type.
Determine the extent of illegal narcotics in the
Local/regional/international.
urban area.
Activities.
Types of drugs.
- Narcotics.
Quantity produced within the urban area.
- Arms dealing.
Quantity imported.
- Prostitution.
Traffic patterns of distribution.
- Illegal immigration.
Identify the organization’s command and control
- Illegal gambling.
element.
- Counterfeiting.
Headquarters.
- Money laundering.
Key leaders.
- Illegal technology transfer.
Production and distribution procedures.
- Other.
Facility locations.
Structure and organization.
Shipment routes.
Weapons and equipment.
Front companies involved.
Other technology.
Describe any prior civilian riot activity.
Communications intercept capabilities.
Issue or event that sparked riots.
NVDs.
Location.
Determine criminal territorial divisions.
Level of violence.
Determine the relationship between criminal
Describe ties to legitimate businesses and/or
organizations.
political parties.
Financial ties.
Information sharing.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
2-12. Adversary IO pose a threat to friendly forces. These threats can consist of propaganda, denial and
deception (D&D), electronic warfare (EW), computer network attack (CNA), and, although not a direct
threat, the use of the media to achieve an objective. In general, the purposes of these attacks are to--
z
Erode domestic and international support for the mission.
z
Deny friendly forces information on enemy disposition and strength.
z
Disrupt or eavesdrop on friendly communications.
z
Disrupt the US and coalition information flow.
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The Threat in the Urban Environment
2-13. Through the use of propaganda, adversaries try to undermine the US and coalition mission by
eroding popular support among the local population, the American people, and/or the international
community. This is accomplished through savvy public relations campaigns, dissemination of falsehoods
or half-truths, staging attacks on civilian sites and then passing the blame onto allied forces, and
conducting other operations that make public statements by US leaders appear to be lies and half-truths.
2-14. Urban terrain facilitates adversarial D&D. The urban population provides a natural screen in which
enemy forces can hide their identities, numbers, and equipment. There are other opportunities for D&D in
cities. Enemy forces can hide military equipment in culturally sensitive places—caching weapons in houses
of worship or medical facilities. Threat forces can use decoys in urban terrain to cause erroneous
assessments of its combat capability, strength, and disposition of assets. Decoys can be employed to absorb
expensive and limited precision-guided munitions as well as cause misallocation of limited resources.
2-15. The enemy EW threat focuses on denying friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum to disrupt
communications and radar emissions. Commercially available tactical jamming equipment is proliferating
throughout the world and threatens allied communication and receiving equipment. Ensuring rapid and
secure communications is one of the greatest challenges of urban operations. Allied computer networks
may be vulnerable to hackers.
2-16. The media can alter the course of urban operations and military operations in general. While not a
direct threat, the increasing presence of media personnel during military operations can create special
challenges. Media products that can be seen real time without perspective can erode US military support
both internationally and domestically. Enemy forces will attempt to shape media coverage to suit their own
needs. For example, by escorting media personnel to “civilian casualty sites,” they attempt to sway
international opinion against friendly operations. The media may also highlight errors committed by allied
forces. In this age of 24-hour media coverage, even the death of a single noncombatant can negatively
affect a military campaign. (See Table 2-5.)
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Chapter 2
Table 2-5. Example information requirements for information operations threats
Denial and Deception (D&D)
Evaluate any previous enemy deception
Determine whether the adversary has a D&D
operations.
strategy.
Method.
Determine what organization(s) implement D&D
Level of success.
policy.
Psychological Operations
Determine the structure of the organization(s).
Determine whether the enemy conducts PSYOP.
Determine the key personnel in the
Type.
organization(s).
Methods.
Assess the enemy’s capability to perform
Effect.
deception operations.
Targets.
Type (IMINT, MASINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, CI,
Identify enemy PSYOP units (if any).
open-source information).
Location/designation.
Equipment (concealment, EW, decoys,
Doctrine.
dummy, derelict, radar-absorbing materials/
Training.
paints, visual and thermal/ radar
Capabilities/limitations.
absorbing/scattering camouflage nets,
Identify propaganda being disseminated.
obscurants, smoke, thermal paints, live
Type.
vegetation, underground facilities,
Dissemination process.
electrochromic technology/ signature
Effect of the propaganda.
management materials).
Training (offensive and defensive)
Computer Network Operations (CNO)
- If previous D&D training
Evaluate the enemy’s ability to conduct computer
was noted⎯
network attack (CNA) and cyber attacks.
Determine what methods were displayed
Capabilities/limitations.
during exercises.
Training.
Determine the organization(s) involved.
Doctrine.
Determine which intelligence disciplines
Describe previous attempts by the enemy to
were targeted.
conduct CNA.
Doctrine (offensive and defensive).
Intrusion attempts.
Determine foreign advisors/involvement.
Denial of service attacks.
Determine probable D&D missions and targets.
Web defacements.
Determine confirmed D&D missions and targets.
Propaganda
HEALTH ISSUES
2-17. Urban centers provide favorable conditions for the spread of debilitating or deadly diseases.
Sanitation is often poor in urban areas. Local water and food may contain dangerous contaminants. During
military operations in the urban environment, sewage systems, power generating plants, water treatment
plants, city sanitation, and other services and utilities are vulnerable. When disabled or destroyed, the risk
of disease and epidemics increases, which could lead to unrest, further disease, riots, and casualties. “In
Vietnam, over two-thirds of US Army hospital admissions were for disease. In 1968, disease cost US
forces some 943,809 man days--roughly the equivalent of an infantry division for 2 months.” [Source:
Spurgeon Neel, Medical Support of the U.S. Army-Vietnam 1965-1970, (U.S. Army Historical Series),
Washington: USGPO, 1972] “Medical records of one Russian Brigade in Chechnya show that 15 percent
of the brigade was down with hepatitis at one time. Dirty water was the main culprit in the transmission of
hepatitis.” [Source: Lester W. Grau and William A. Jorgensen, “Viral Hepatitis and the Russian War in
Chechnya”, Army Medical Department Journal, May-June 1997, 2-4.]
2-18. The closely fought nature of urban warfare causes greater psychological stress than any other type of
combat. Russian soldiers returning from fighting in Grozny suffer from abnormally high rates of
psychological disorders.
2-19. Environmental considerations are an important factor to incorporate into IPB to ensure the
commander has a complete picture of the urban environment. Industrial areas may include large storage
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areas of chemicals, petroleum products, fertilizers and other toxic materials. The following are some
factors that should be considered:
z
Hazardous material storage areas.
z
Hazardous waste storage areas.
z
Chemical holding tanks.
z
Petroleum storage tanks.
z
Sewage treatment plants.
z
Cultural and historical sites.
2-20. Other types of hazards in and around urban environments are TIMs. These include such materials as
aviation fuel, pesticides, ammonia, chlorine, radioactive materials, methane, and propane. Those fighting in
or around structures housing these chemicals might see them splinter, burn, or explode if hit by fire,
creating the “toxic corridor,” a theoretical space affected by a chemical threat and one that poses severe
problems on anyone there. In such situations, even if no contaminants have been released, soldiers must
still wear protective gear, further degrading capabilities.
2-21. Improperly stored hazardous materials and pollution can both affect operations and injure troops.
Cities in China have levels of sulfur dioxide five to ten times the level found in major Western cities,
which could adversely affect troops operating in those environments. In some parts of Poland, the land and
water is so poisoned by toxic waste that ten percent of babies are born with defects. Such toxicity affects
any military personnel deployed in such regions.
2-22. The typical urban environment includes potential biological or chemical hazards that fall outside the
realm of WMD. Operations within confined urban spaces may see fighting in sewers and medical facilities
and the subsequent health problems that exposure to contaminants may cause. There may also be deliberate
actions to contaminate an enemy’s food or water or infect an enemy. Today’s biological threats include
Ebola, Smallpox, and Anthrax.
OTHER URBAN CONCERNS
2-23. There are additional concerns regarding the conduct of military operations within the urban
environment. The analyst should, to some extent, also focus on the aviation and fire hazards discussed
below.
AVIATION HAZARDS
2-24. Operations in urban environments present unique and complex challenges to aviation units. The
following factors can affect aviation operations in the urban environment:
z
Restricted or limited LZs and PZs.
z
Increased tower, antenna, and wire hazards.
z
Foreign object damage to aircraft from flying debris.
z
Operating in areas with high concentrations of civilians.
z
Collateral damage to property.
z
Night vision system operations in the vicinity of city lights.
z
Degraded communications.
z
Irregular and unusually strong air currents, especially when flying low in and around urban
canyons. Increased risk of collateral damage to property.
z
High risk to aircraft from close-range, small arms, and MANPADS fire complicated by the
proximity of noncombatants.
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FIRE HAZARDS
2-25. The threat of fire has always gone hand-in-hand with combat operations. Within urban areas fire is
one the greatest hazards. During the structural analysis process, an assessment must be made of the fire
threat that a structure poses. Special attention should be paid to the type and location of storage tanks, gas
lines, and other dangerous elements as well as their proximity to other structures and threats (such as a gas
station or propane plant). Decision makers must consider increased risk and impact of fire in assessing the
potential collateral damage in an operation. Fire threats include—
z
Isolated fires: Restricted to a single building or part of a building.
z
Area fires: Consume from building-to-building to an entire block. Generally, streets will act as
firebreaks and help to contain this type of fire within a single block.
z
Fire storms: The most violent and dangerous fire, capable of rapidly consuming large areas by
creating windstorms and intense heat. Firestorms are uncontrollable until they exhaust the
available flammables.
z
Explosive hazard: Present in areas containing fuel and chemicals.
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Chapter 3
Information Sources in the Urban Environment
3-1. In the urban environment, every soldier is an information collector. Soldiers conducting patrols,
manning observation posts, manning checkpoints, or even convoying supplies along a main supply route
serve as the commander’s “eyes and ears.” The challenge for the intelligence professional is to understand
what types of information soldiers performing different tasks and missions can provide to an awareness of
the overall situation, how to get them to report, and how to leverage that information into situational
understanding.
3-2. This chapter briefly discusses some of the types of information that soldiers on the battlefield with
different specialties can provide to the intelligence staff. It is essential to properly brief these assets so that
they are aware of the intelligence requirements prior to their missions and to debrief them immediately
upon completion of their missions; this is to ensure the information is still current in their minds and any
timely intelligence they may provide is available for further action. Some examples of debriefing
techniques are listed in Chapter 5 and FM 2-91.6. This cycle (brief-mission-debrief-intelligence/awareness
of the current situation) is continuous throughout operations.
SCOUTS, SNIPERS, RECONNAISSANCE
3-3. Scouts, snipers, and other surveillance and reconnaissance assets can provide valuable information
on people and places in the urban environment. Traditionally, scouts, snipers, and reconnaissance assets are
often used in surveillance roles (passive collection) from a standoff position. Operations in the urban
environment, especially stability operations, may require a more active role (reconnaissance) such as
patrolling for some of these assets. When employed in a reconnaissance role (active collection), these
assets tend to be most useful when accompanied by an interpreter who allows them to interact with people
that they encounter, which allows them to better assess the situation.
3-4. Additionally, the presence of patrols in urban areas, particularly in stability operations, may directly
influence what they observe. Insurgent and local nationals may change their habits or actions either
consciously or subconsciously when friendly patrols are in their area.
3-5. Scouts and reconnaissance patrols can also provide grid coordinates of key locations for future use.
It is often useful to have 10-digit Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) coordinates for key locations
within urban areas for contingency operations. However, without a physical description of the location, a
10-digit grid can be useless when sending personnel or delivering remote weapons fire to that location.
Because of the closeness of the urban environment, a physical description of the key location is essential to
ensure accuracy. Additionally, the use of landmarks--preferably ones that are visible from overhead (such
as road intersections)--are highly desirable in order to confirm the location.
3-6. Snipers are trained observers who can provide clear size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment
(SALUTE) spot reports that may help clarify a situation. Sniper teams operate in a stealthier mode with the
intent that they remain unobserved. For example, in a gathering of people, snipers can identify the probable
leaders, the gender of individuals and size of the group, and any equipment they may be carrying.
Additionally, specialized optics and NVDs make snipers valuable information collection in a wide range of
conditions. Snipers are also trained as trackers and may be able to use those skills to give the commander
valuable information on which to act immediately.
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Chapter 3
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
3-7. SOF usually enter a joint operations area prior to the deployment of conventional Army units. They
may conduct covert operations or overt operations (such as foreign internal defense missions). Their ability
to observe and report can provide invaluable intelligence on the current situation in the AO. SOF personnel
usually live among the local nationals and must get to know and understand in great detail the culture of
the local national population within their AO.
3-8. SOF liaisons, such as a special operations command and control element (SOCCE), can provide
commander and intelligence staff with access to this information as well as valuable real-time intelligence.
Additionally, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) maintains a historical database of after-action
reviews and lessons learned--the Special Operations Debrief and Retrieval System--for every mission that
a SOF team conducts.
ENGINEERS
3-9. Engineers can provide significant amounts of information to the Intelligence staff. They support
mobility, countermobility and survivability by providing maneuver and engineer commanders with
information about the terrain, threat engineer activity, obstacles, and weather effects within the AO. During
the planning process engineers can provide specific information on the urban environment such as
information on the effects that structures within the urban area may have on the operation, bridge weight
class and conditions, and information on most likely obstacle locations and composition. Engineers can
assist in assessing potential collateral damage by analyzing risks of damage caused by the release of
dangerous forces, power grid and water source stability, and the viability of sewage networks. Engineers
provide a range of capabilities that enhance collection efforts. Each of the engineer functions may provide
varying degrees of technical expertise in support of any given assigned mission and task. These capabilities
are generated from and organized by both combat and general engineer units with overarching support
from geospatial means.
3-10. Topographic teams can provide both standard urban IPB products and operational decision aids.
They can create or assist staffs in creating such products as No-Fire Area (NFA) overlays (hospitals,
churches), trafficability overlays, target packages, refugee tracking products, line-of-sight surveys, reverse
line-of-sight overlays, slope overlays, and critical infrastructure overlays. Additionally, topographic teams
can provide specialized maps in scales that are needed for operations in urban environments. Topographic
teams can also assist in creating special enemy decision support template products in conjunction with the
intelligence staff, including those that contribute to IED defeat (see FM 3-90.119). Topographic team
products may be produced in either vector or digital format. Vector products can be disseminated digitally,
but are much smaller than digital products. Topographic teams function as a conduit for the broader range
of geospatial products that may be available to the unit from joint, DOD, and other sources.
3-11. Further information on topographic Engineer products and services can be found at the Topographic
Engineering Center (TEC) website: http://www.tec.army.mil.
MEDICAL
3-12. Health issues, as described in Chapter 2, are a potential threat in the urban environment, and the
commander must be advised of potential health threats that may impact operations. Outbreaks of disease
may not only affect friendly and enemy personnel directly but also require US forces to provide medical
support to civilians within the AO; this can potentially cause a major drain on or even require the
reallocation of resources.
3-13. The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) is responsible for producing finished
intelligence on foreign military and civilian medical capabilities, infectious disease and environmental
3-2
FM 2-91.4
January 2008 (Draft)
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Information Sources in the Urban Environment
health risks, and scientific and technical developments in biotechnology and biomedical subjects of
military importance. Staffs can obtain Medical intelligence information through their intelligence channels
or directly from AFMIC via their website http://mic.afmic.detrick.army.mil/. In an emergency, up-to-date
medical intelligence assessments can be obtained by contacting Director, AFMIC, 1607 Porter Street, Fort
Detrick, MD 21702-5004. The message address is DIRAFMIC FT DETRICK MD. Medical intelligence
elements and AFMIC can provide the following reports:
z
Medical Capabilities Studies.
z
Disease Occurrence—Worldwide Reports.
z
Foreign Medical Materiel Studies.
z
Disease and Environmental Alert Report.
z
Foreign Medical Facilities Handbook.
z
Scientific and Threat Intelligence Studies.
z
Foreign Medical Materiel Exploitation Reports.
z
Quick Reaction Responses.
z
AFMIC Wire.
3-14. The AFMIC 24-Hour Service/Request for Information (RFI) telephone number is commercial (301)
619-7574 or DSN 343-7574. The email address is afmicops@afmic.detrick.army.mil.
3-15. During the planning process, Medical support personnel at individual units can provide information
on the nature of local health risks associated with the urban environment in which operations will take
place and provide preventive measures that the unit or unit personnel may take to mitigate or avoid these
risks. Medical personnel can also help coordinate a medical survey to pinpoint existing hospitals, clinics,
sanitariums, blood banks, pharmaceutical industries, medical supply warehouses, and veterinary and public
health facilities, as well as to identify key indigenous Medical personnel within the urban area.
3-16. During an operation, Medical personnel will monitor and report any new health risks that emerge.
Intelligence on the enemy medical status is also valuable. Not only does it disclose enemy strengths and
weaknesses it can also alert friendly medical units as to what diseases and conditions for which
EPWs/detainees might require treatment.
3-17. Medical personnel are a prime source of intelligence provided that they are trained on how to
observe and report pertinent data. Types and frequency of wounds and disease, attitudes of enemy
prisoners/detainees undergoing treatment, type and utility of captured enemy medical supplies, and
observations of the local populace are all important sources of information that medical personnel should
provide.
3-18. Medical personnel can also be invaluable in detecting the use of chemical or biological weapons by
seeing their effects on people. These agents may be more difficult to detect in urban areas specifically
because of the closeness of the population, the sanitary problems associated with cities, and the general
breakdown of support services and infrastructure.
AVIATION
3-19. When determining enemy capabilities and COAs, aviation units can provide intelligence personnel
with information on what air operations are feasible in any given urban environment. During operations,
gun camera video and surveillance systems carried by aircraft can provide timely, thorough, and on-
demand information to intelligence personnel. The stand-off capability of most aircraft can allow
observation of threat forces and activities from tracking individual vehicles through city streets to
determining locations of enemy obstacles in the urban environment.
January 2008 (Draft)
FM 2-91.4
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Chapter 3
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR
3-20. During the planning process, chemical corps personnel can provide estimates on the effects of
CBRN use in urban environments as well as the location, types, and potential effects of TIMs. Due to the
prevalence of biological hazards and TIMs in many urban areas, chemical corps personnel may be crucial
in identifying CBRN hazards that soldiers may not normally recognize as a threat. They can also assist in
determining if a CBRN hazard exists as part of the urban environment or is a deliberate weaponized attack.
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY
3-21. Air Defense Artillery (ADA) personnel may be assigned multiple missions in the urban environment,
especially when the enemy air threat is assessed as low or nonexistent. Air and Missile Defense (AMD)
units can provide an awareness of the air picture either with their organic systems or indirectly through
adjacent AMD units. The air picture can provide units in the urban environment with an understanding of
the current threat posed by enemy UASs, cruise missiles and rockets, mortars, and missiles. ADA
personnel who are deployed in the urban environment to provide air defense protection may have
secondary non-AMD missions such as performing observation of named areas of interest (NAIs) or
conducting urban patrols with the units into which they are integrated.
3-22. AMD systems, such as the Avenger, have acquisition systems and capabilities that can be used for
other purposes. For example, the forward looking infrared
(FLIR) system on the Avenger may be
employed along parts of the urban perimeter to detect unusual or unauthorized traffic into or out of the
urban area at night, such as insurgent or guerrilla infiltration and exfiltration or smuggling operations.
CIVIL AFFAIRS
3-23. Civil Affairs personnel will be a key asset in any operation undertaken in the urban environment.
The missions of Civil Affairs personnel keep them constantly interacting with the local population. They
can keep intelligence staffs apprised of local national sentiments towards US and coalition forces and
policies. Civil Affairs personnel are tasked with writing local area assessments whenever they deploy to an
AO. These reports focus on the local geography, political geography, history, people, labor situation, and
legal system. These reports should be continuously updated as the mission in that AO continues.
(Appendix A contains an example outline of a Civil Affairs assessment.) Intelligence personnel may be
able to provide Civil Affairs personnel with initial information in many of the categories of the Civil
Affairs assessment.
3-24. Intelligence personnel should ask their local Civil Affairs team for a copy and updates on their local
area studies. The fact that Civil Affairs teams will be constantly traveling throughout the AO in order to
conduct their missions make them good providers of combat information if they are properly debriefed by
G-2/S-2 sections.
3-25. They can provide some insight to avoid potential problems especially in stability operations. For
example, a commander may decide to support the local populace by building a local school and providing
book and other learning materials. The locals may initially be grateful for the gesture, but Civil Affairs
personnel working with the commander and intelligence staff may help avoid a more serious issue in the
minds of the local nationals. Such an issue could arise if the US forces contract the building of the school
to a non-local contractor rather than to allow a fully capable local contractor to do the job--thus negating
the good will engendered by the gesture of building the school in the first place.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TEAMS
3-26. Due to the nature of PSYOP, PSYOP soldiers must have a thorough understanding of the local
populace, to include cultural information, and must fully understand the effects that their operations are
having on the local populace. They inform the supported commander about the psychological effects that
3-4
FM 2-91.4
January 2008 (Draft)
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Information Sources in the Urban Environment
US military activities may have on the local national population. Intelligence personnel can leverage this
information which can provide key insights into the current mood of local nationals.
3-27. PSYOP studies are prepared by the US Army 4th Psychological Operations Group, strategic studies
detachments, and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). There are three types of PSYOP
studies:
z
The PSYOP annex to military capabilities study, which summarizes PSYOP relevant issues.
z
The special PSYOP study which addresses such subjects as specific target groups, regional or
geographical areas, social institutions, and media analysis. The SPS may also discuss
perceptions towards the US or issues important to specific population groups.
z
The special PSYOP assessment, which is a time-sensitive intelligence memorandum (usually an
electronic message) providing assessments of significant crisis situations, events, or issues from
a PSYOP standpoint.
3-28. Requests for any of the three PSYOP studies are made through PSYOP or SOF units or staff liaison
elements supporting the joint forces commander. Some of these studies are also available from the
intelligence link of the Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System
(SOCRATES).
MILITARY POLICE
3-29. Whether they are conducting area security operations, maneuver and support operations, internment
and resettlement, or law and order operations, Military Police personnel normally have a presence across
large parts of the battlefield. During stability operations, they will normally maintain a liaison with local
national law enforcement officials. In some cases, they may temporarily assume Customs duties, as they
did at the main airport outside Panama City during Operation JUST CAUSE. Generally, Military Police are
better trained in the art of observation than regular soldiers; with their presence at critical locations on the
battlefield, they can provide a wealth of battlefield information provided that they are properly briefed on
current intelligence requirements.
3-30. Military Police conduct Police Intelligence Operations
(PIO), which ensure that information
collected during the conduct of Military Police functions is provided as input to the intelligence collection
effort. PIO supports, enhances, and contributes to the commander’s FP program, the common operational
picture, and situational understanding.
3-31. Military Police also maintain a detainee information database which can also track detainees in
stability operations and civil support operations. Information from this database can be useful to
intelligence personnel, especially when constructing link diagrams and association matrixes. Military
Police personnel must be synchronized with Military Intelligence personnel when determining whether or
not individual detainees should be released.
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
3-32. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel can provide valuable information to intelligence
personnel on the types of munitions that threat forces may use in the urban environment as well as their
effects, recommended stand-off distances, and possible methods of employment. These munitions may
range from conventional land mines to all sorts of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) such as car bombs,
booby-trapped artillery shells, remotely detonated homemade bombs, and suicide vests. EOD personnel
can be a valuable asset during ISR planning, especially when IEDs are a significant FP issue.
TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS
3-33. Transportation and logistics personnel are constantly moving personnel and supplies up and down
LOCs and throughout the AO. For that reason they are valuable sources of current information. These
January 2008 (Draft)
FM 2-91.4
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Chapter 3
personnel provide information regarding the status of LOCs, civilian population movements, the impact of
weather on movement and notable activity in populated areas. In order to leverage these sources for
intelligence purposes, intelligence staffs must ensure that procedures are in place to brief transportation
personnel on the current intelligence picture, the intelligence requirements, reporting procedures for getting
critical information into the unit intelligence channels, and to ensure that transportation personnel are
debriefed as soon as possible upon completing their missions.
CIVILIAN LINGUISTS AND LOCAL HIRES
3-34. While not formal intelligence sources, US-hired linguists and local hires can provide keen insights
into local cultural awareness and the current sentiments of the local population and local national
authorities; they can also identify key individuals or groups that are a threat to the successful completion of
the US mission.
3-35. As with open-source intelligence and NGO information, for example, all information provided by
these sources must be carefully evaluated and placed into context based on the reliability, credibility, and
biases of the individual.
JOINT/DOD
3-36. Most US Army operations in urban environments are likely to be Joint operations. Army Intelligence
staffs at all levels must make sure that they are familiar with the intelligence collection capabilities and
methods of Navy, Air Force, and Marine units operating in and around their AO. Joint operations generally
bring more robust Intelligence capabilities to the AO, but require significantly more coordination to ensure
that resources are being used to their fullest intelligence collection capabilities across the spectrum.
Intelligence reporting procedures must be established to ensure that critical intelligence is reported to the
end user in a timely manner.
3-37. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) produces intelligence support packages (ISPs). The product
includes graphics, land satellite
(LANDSAT) and LANDSAT-digital terrain evaluation data (DTED)
merge imagery, maps, target line drawings, photography (when available), and multiscale electro-optical
(EO) imagery. A target summary provides data on target significance, description, imagery annotations,
node functions, air defenses, and critical nodal analysis. The ISP is produced in response to the theater or
joint task force (JTF) target list or an RFI. The ISP supports targeting of specific military and civilian
installations.
3-38. Additionally, the DIA produces contingency support studies
(CSSs) and contingency support
packages (CSPs). The CSS has a large format imagery product (17 by 21 inches). It supports planning for
theater operations and contingency planning. Text information includes weather and climate data,
oceanography and landing beaches (amphibious operations), terrain analysis, and significant facilities. An
overview map and a large-scale map of the target areas are included. The CSS focuses on an urban area,
military facility, or significant terrain. It includes high-resolution EO and LANDSAT imagery.
3-39. The CSP is a large format (17 by 21 inches) and a small format (8 by 13 inches) imagery product. It
is produced in response to a specific crisis. The CSP is a mission-oriented product, typically supporting
noncombatant evacuation operation
(NEO). Imagery includes embassy, the ambassador’s residence,
evacuation routes, AAs, HLZs, beaches, ports, and airfields. The format is similar to that of the CSS. It
includes high-resolution imagery that supports the Section 1500 Department of State Emergency Action
Plan.
3-40. The DIA also produces Gridded Reference Graphics (GRGs). This large format imagery product (17
by 21 inches) provides an overview map, a small-scale imagery mosaic, and large-scale individual prints of
a specific target area. GRGs are typically focused on urban areas but are also produced to cover large
maneuver areas and LOCs. The GRG complements National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
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(formerly National Imagery and Mapping Agency) city graphics (1:25,000 to 1:10,000 scales) and provides
excellent detail for urban mission planning.
3-41. According to NGA GEOINT Publication 1 dated June 2004, the NGA produces a range of products
which can be useful in the urban environment. These products include city graphics, urban features
databases, gridded installation imagery (SECRET-level products), the geographic names database, terrain
analysis products, imagery intelligence (IMINT) briefs, and annotated graphics.
3-42. One product that has proven to be very useful in recent multinational operations is the unclassified
1-millimeter resolution imagery with grid overlaid, a street names index, and an index of numbered (key)
features. Classified NGA products are available through intelligence channels and NGA representatives
through Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) at nga.ic.gov. Classified image
product libraries can be accessed through the SIPRNET and JWICS terminals. Unclassified NGA products
are available through the unit supply system, topographic teams, and NGA representatives and support
teams. Some products, such as the geographic names database (on the GEOnet Names Server) are available
through the NGA website (www.nima.mil ). For assistance with download issues from NGA websites, call
the Customer Help Desk at 1-800-455-0899.
3-43. A NEO intelligence support handbook (NISH) is prepared by the unified commands to support NEO
and hostage recovery operations planning. One is available for every American Embassy. These documents
are classified SECRET. Contents include small format imagery (8 by 11 inches) and a text product. The
NISH includes overhead imagery of ports, airfields, HLZs, potential evacuation routes, and beaches as well
as photography and diagrams of pertinent US government facilities in the country.
3-44. Intelligence personnel must consider the currency of this information during planning.
MULTINATIONAL
3-45. Due to classification issues, sharing intelligence during multinational operations can be challenging.
It may be the case that US forces are working in a coalition-type force which contains both member
countries with whom the US has close intelligence ties and others with whom the US has few or no
intelligence ties. In many cases intelligence personnel from other countries have unique skills that can
significantly contribute to the friendly intelligence effort.
3-46. Establishing methods of exchanging battlefield information and critical intelligence as well as
coordinating intelligence collection efforts can be crucial to the overall success of the mission. Reports
from coalition members will fill intelligence gaps for the US forces and the coalition as a whole.
3-47. The unique perspective of some of the coalition forces may provide US intelligence analysts with
key insights. (For example, during the Vietnam War, Korean forces used to living in environments similar
to Vietnamese villages often noticed anomalies that Americans missed such as too much rice cooking in
the pots for the number of people visible in the village.) Likewise, few countries have the sophisticated
intelligence collection assets available to US forces, and information that the US may provide could be
critical both to their mission success and to their FP.
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
3-48. International organizations (not NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) will often have
a presence in areas in which US forces may conduct operations, especially if those areas experience some
type of unrest or upheaval prior to US operations. International organizations and IGOs include such
agencies as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When providing support or considering offering support to
the local populace, international organizations and IGOs usually conduct assessments of the local areas that
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focus on understanding the needs of the local populace, the ability of the infrastructure to enable their
support or aid to be effectively provided, and the general security situation and stability of the area.
3-49. Understandably, urban areas will be a primary focus of these reports since they are the central
locations through which international and intergovernmental support will flow into an area. Copies of these
reports may be available upon request.
3-50. During US operations in an urban environment, international organizations and IGOs may continue
to maintain a presence. If they are willing to continue to provide copies of their assessments, their third-
party view of the situation may provide intelligence analysts with valuable insights. This information of
sharing--in both directions--could be integral for the success and/or legitimacy of friendly operations.
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
3-51. As with international organizations and IGOs, NGOs will often have a presence in areas in which US
forces may conduct operations. Since most of these organizations are concerned with providing support to
the local populace, their presence tends to be especially prominent in areas experiencing or that recently
experienced some type of unrest or upheaval prior to US operations, during US operations, or following
US operations. These organizations include such agencies as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), and the Red Crescent. When providing or preparing
to provide support to the local populace, these organizations usually conduct assessments of the local areas
that focus on understanding the needs of the local populace, the ability of the infrastructure to enable their
support or aid to be effectively provided, and the general security situation or stability of the area. As with
international organizations and IGOs, NGOs usually focus on urban areas at the hubs into which their
support will flow and from which it will be distributed to the areas with the most urgent need.
3-52. NGOs strive to protect their shield of neutrality in all situations and do not generally offer copies of
their assessments to government organizations, but it is often in their interest to make US forces aware of
their operations in areas under US control. Representatives of individual NGOs operating in areas under
US control may provide US forces with their detailed assessments of those areas in order to gain US
support either in the form of additional material aid for the local populace or for security considerations.
3-53. Individual NGO members are often highly willing to discuss what they have seen during their
operations with US forces personnel. Some NGOs have been used in the past as fronts for threat
organizations seeking to operate against US forces. Intelligence analysts must therefore carefully evaluate
information provided by NGO personnel.
LOCAL NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
3-54. Local national authorities and former local national authorities know their populations and local
infrastructure best. Key information can be gained from cooperative local national authorities or former
authorities. Analysts must always be careful to consider that these authorities may be biased for any
number of reasons. Some examples of the types of information that local national authorities can provide
are discussed below.
z
Politicians usually know their populations very well or they would not be able to remain in
office. They can provide detailed socio-cultural information on the populace within their region
of control (for example, economic strengths and weaknesses or religious, ethnic, and tribal
breakdowns). They are also usually aware of the infrastructure. Obviously, intelligence analysts
must be aware that information provided by these personnel generally will be biased and almost
certainly slanted in the long-term favor of that individual.
z
Police can provide information on local criminal organizations, local ethnic breakdowns, and
key terrain within their AOs. During stability operations, it would be useful to pay attention to
the local police precinct boundaries when designating unit boundaries within an urban area.
Dividing local national police boundaries between multiple US unit boundaries can cause liaison
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problems and confusion on both sides whenever US forces have to work with local national
police forces. Additionally, local national police forces will have been conducting operations in
their urban environment prior to US operations and will have adjusted precinct boundaries into
manageable sections based on the number of police personnel available, areas requiring
concentration based on high criminal activity or unrest, and, where applicable, religious, ethnic,
or tribal breakdowns.
z
Fire department personnel often have ready access to blueprints of the structures within their
precincts, information on fire escapes, and other building safety-related information as well as
detailed information on their structural composition (and the fire threat in individual buildings or
whole blocks of a city).
z
Public works personnel are uniquely familiar with the infrastructure of the city. They can
provide information on the critical points in the city that must be secured in order for public
services to be maintained; they can provide key information on AAs throughout the city
(especially underground service passages and sewer and drainage systems).
z
City halls in many parts of the world are also repositories of key records on the infrastructure of
the city. They may contain detailed maps of the city, key city infrastructure information, and
blueprints of the buildings in the city.
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Intelligence Collection Disciplines in the Urban
Environment
4-1. The fluid nature of the urban environment creates a need for reliable and timely intelligence. This
intelligence is difficult to acquire. A lack of human intelligence (HUMINT) assets in place, the effects of
concentrations of buildings on the ISR efforts, the complexity and difficulty of providing specific details
on the urban threat, and the lack of cultural information can compound the challenges to the collection of
intelligence in an urban environment.
4-2. With knowledge of US collection techniques, enemies can use the environment to complicate allied
intelligence-collection techniques. The amount of detail that needs to be collected in the urban environment
and constant attention to focusing on the details that are significant in urban analysis in a particular
situation creates further challenges for intelligence professionals. Current analysis tools and methods must
be appropriately focused and developed to the level of detail required for the urban environment.
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
4-3. HUMINT may be the most important and the most prolific type of intelligence gathered in the urban
environment due to the population density. HUMINT collectors are trained to obtain information from
people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics,
equipment, personnel, and capabilities within and affecting the urban area. HUMINT can help establish
and understand the socio-cultural characteristics of the urban environment.
4-4. HUMINT sources can provide early warning of deep-rooted problems awaiting US forces in the
urban environment. HUMINT collectors can conduct debriefings, screenings, liaison, HUMINT contact
operations, interrogations, tactical questioning, and support document exploitation (DOCEX) in support of
the commander’s intelligence requirements.
4-5. Information provided by HUMINT assists the intelligence staff in deducing critical patterns and
trends within the urban environment to assist with successful mission accomplishment. HUMINT
collection team personnel provide these types of capabilities in support of tactical forces. The S-2X/G-
2X/J-2X coordinates these capabilities between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and can
provide their units with access to pertinent national level HUMINT.
4-6. Intelligence staffs must be aware that operational environment cannot generally be defined in
geographical terms for purposes of intelligence collection. This is especially critical when determining the
allocation of HUMINT assets. Concentrations of humans on the battlefield do not necessarily denote a
need to concentrate HUMINT assets in those locations. Threat actions outside an urban area may be a
source of significant events inside the urban area. Additionally, information from sources in one city may
impact operations in a distant city. Creating arbitrary intelligence boundaries can result in a lack of timely
fusion of all critical elements of information that may be available.
4-7. During all combined arms operations, HUMINT collectors focus on collecting as much battlefield
information as possible and pass it up the chain of command. In order to gain information from captured
enemy personnel and pass it up the chain of command as quickly as possible, HUMINT collectors will
need to be pushed forward to areas where we expect enemy personnel to be captured. During stability
operations, HUMINT must be focused on providing quality reporting, not quantity reporting. In these
operations, a large part of the information that HUMINT collectors will collect will be culture-related
information, as well as perceptions and attitudes.
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IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE
4-8. Analysis of any urban environment would be incomplete without the use of geospatial intelligence.
Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe,
assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. It
encompasses what has traditionally been categorized as imagery, IMINT, and geospatial data and
information.
4-9. Imagery systems allow the commander to achieve both battlefield visualization and an awareness of
the current situation. Imagery provides a visual situation report that can often identify the who, what, when,
and where elements of intelligence analysis. As analytical tools, images help verify or refute key elements
of a situation and given modern communication systems can often accomplish this in real time. After
employing every precaution against deception, imagery analysis may provide the friendly commander with
a distinct advantage over an adversary.
4-10. Organic imagery sensors respond directly to the tasking of the tactical commander. However,
because of technical limitation or priorities established at the higher echelons, space-based and other
national collection assets may not be available to the staff. Imagery may be collected either by overhead
platforms or ground-based systems.
4-11. The conventional battlefield’s requirement for high altitude and low oblique imagery is replaced by
the need for close-up, nearly vertical overhead shots within the close surroundings of a major urban area.
This forces collection managers and system operators to move expensive and scarce imagery collection
systems closer to the target or to employ flight profiles that place them at greater risk from threat air
defense systems.
4-12. UAS imagery may be one of the fastest, least risky methods by which to conduct reconnaissance of
specific urban areas and to update and verify current maps of that urban area, showing clear routes,
obstacles such as damaged and destroyed buildings, and intact and destroyed bridges. The topographical
team can use this imagery to create updated mapping products for planning and operational uses.
4-13. Overhead imagery collection platforms face some serious challenges in the urban environment.
Current systems are unable to see “inside” or “around” densely packed structures. Employing infrared or
EO systems helps, but not to the extent necessary to adequately support urban operations. New systems—
those able to see through walls and roofs or even micro-UASs capable of flying through openings in the
structures then moving around freely to image building’s interiors—are being designed but are still years
away from fielding.
4-14. Overhead imagery, with some (minor) exception for infrared and EO, is only effective on exposed
areas (for example, rooftops and streets). From the perspective of the ground assault force, overhead
imagery only fulfills part of the ground combatants’ requirements, forcing analysts to rely on hypotheses
regarding approaches and the enemy’s ability to defend given structures. Windows, doorways, and angled
and recessed areas will not normally appear on overhead imagery or, if they do, offer somewhat distorted
views. This leaves a requirement to supplement overhead imagery in the urban environment with a reliable
vehicle-mounted or handheld imaging system.
4-15. Cameras collocated with measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) systems, such as the
remotely monitored battlefield surveillance system (REMBASS), and activated when those systems are
triggered can give the commander additional “eyes on” NAIs without wasting manpower by continuously
staffing an observation post in those locations.
4-16. Providing patrols with a digital camera or video camera can greatly assist in the debriefing process
and allow the intelligence staff personnel to make their own judgments about items of interest that the
patrol reports. Videotaping of events, such as a demonstration, can allow analysts who were not on the
scene to identify key elements, leaders, and potential indicators to help preclude future incidents. Gun-
camera images from aircraft that can provide a stand-off reconnaissance platform may give valuable insight
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into enemy TTP. Thermal sights on a vehicle patrolling an urban street late at night may note the hot
engine of a vehicle on the side of the road, possibly indicating suspicious activity.
4-17. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) could provide such information as the
amount of vehicular traffic entering and leaving a city via multiple avenues; this information could be
useful when trying to determine if the enemy is shifting forces into or out of the city or if there is a covert
attempt to exfiltrate or infiltrate the city via lesser-used avenues.
4-18. The NGA can provide a wide range of imagery products for use prior to and during operations in the
urban environment. These products are usually easier to obtain prior to deployment and are often critical to
the initial planning stages of an operation. Chapter 3 listed some of the available products.
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
4-19. As noted in Chapter 1, the urban environment has a significant effect on signals, both friendly and
threat. Structures and infrastructure can affect such things as signal strength and direction. In terms of
collecting SIGINT, this means that comprehensive electronic preparation of the battlefield must be
developed during the military decision-making process (MDMP). Refer to TC 2-22.602 and TC 2-2603
(both classified) for a discussion of SIGINT uses in the urban environment.
MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE
4-20. MASINT technology has the potential to be used in all types of military operations. This capability
will enable Commanders to effectively detect adversary actions; accurately assess the actions in order to
begin working inside the adversary’s decision cycle to develop actionable intelligence; warn friendly
forces in a timely manner; direct focused tasks in order to defend against adversary attacks.
4-21. In urban operations it may be impossible to place an area under manned surveillance because the
mere presence of soldiers alters the patterns of activity in a given area; because the dangers present in a
given area preclude constant soldier presence; or for other reasons. Unattended ground sensors provide
units with the means to surveil areas where it may not be possible or desirable to employ troops for this
purpose. As the sensors are triggered they report information which includes personnel and vehicle
numbers, movements, activity, and direction of travel. The sensors can be used to monitor entry point
activity and cleared area activity (for example, around buildings of interest). The sensors can also be
organized into a network that is capable of target detection, location, tracking, classification, and
identification.
4-22. MASINT systems must be incorporated into the ISR plan in order to be employed effectively.
Incorporation into a comprehensive ISR Plan ensures that the systems are tied to a collection plan that
supports the commander’s intent and is focused on answering priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
When employing MASINT systems, units must conduct comprehensive mission planning. Personnel
employing the MASINT systems must be aware of the specific indicators that the sensors are intended to
detect so that the sensors can be emplaced appropriately, as well as being properly trained on emplacing
the sensors.
4-23. MASINT technology can be used in both ISR and protection roles. Examples include the Weapon
Surveillance System (WSS), which has the capabilities to provide a 120-degree field of view, and can be
set up either stationary or mounted on a moving vehicle. The WSS detects, isolates, and provides lines of
bearing (LOBs) for azimuth and elevation, and geo-locates sniper fires. There are currently systems
deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The WSS can be deployed stand-alone; queued by other
sensors; or used to queue other sensors or weapon systems.
4-24. MASINT technology is also being used with the Unattended Transient Acoustic MASINT Sensor
(UTAMS). UTAMS is a 2- to 4-sensor array linked via radio to a base station that provides LOBs from
each array on the map display of the base station. Each sensor station consists of a 4-microphone acoustic
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array, GPS antenna, radio w/antenna, humidity sensor, signal processing box, and power box. The base
station consists of a Panasonic Toughbook laptop, radio, and antennas. The system is useful in tracking
events such as gunfire, IED and vehicle-borne IED explosions and localizing their location before reports
can be received from troops on the ground.
4-25. REMBASS and ground surveillance radar (GSR) systems are still in the inventory but are actively
being replaced by unattended ground sensors. Unattended ground sensors use MASINT technology to
obtain information concerning the operational environment by locating, tracking, identifying, and
describing unique characteristics of fixed and moving targets. This capability will move intelligence
collection capabilities forward into the tactical maneuver forces.
4-26. The set of unattended ground sensors are modular providing a tailorable group of sensors utilizing
multiple ground sensing technologies. These systems include the Omni Sense, which includes the
following systems and capabilities: acoustic, seismic, magnetic, passive-infrared, imaging EO camera,
imaging infrared camera, and is supported through iridium satellite communications architecture. The
Scorpion has EO and infrared cameras (long-range imager), seismic, acoustic, passive-infrared, and
magnetic cueing sensors, and communicates via the iridium satellite network; and the Silent Watch (non-
imaging activity detection sensor) has seismic and passive-infrared activity sensors and communicates via
a gateway through the iridium satellite network. These systems are currently being fielded to both
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom units.
4-27. Units may employ unattended ground sensors in a variety of roles and missions to shape the AO, set
conditions for maneuver, and perform economy of force missions. The mission sets include remote early
warning (including CBRN early warning); non-contiguous area overwatch; reconnaissance, surveillance,
and target acquisition perimeter security; protection, and survivability. Examples of how units may employ
unattended ground sensors include--
z
Coverage of point and area named areas of interest (NAIs) either as a single asset or in
conjunction with other manned and unmanned sensors.
z
Integrated CBRN smart sensors to provide detection capability of a release from WMD
production or storage facilities as part of ISR coverage of an NAI or post-strike battle damage.
z
Surveillance of mounted and dismounted AAs outside urban areas to facilitate condition setting
for the tactical assault.
z
FP and area observation, and ISR operations within urban and jungle areas for dismounted
infantry operations.
z
Ground reconnaissance efforts by maintaining sensor contact and allow soldiers to continue
performing other reconnaissance tasks.
z
Flank security for more static key assets such as the forward support base, aviation assembly
areas and forward arming and refueling points..
z
Screen missions, deception actions and gray space coverage within the unit’s area of influence
as an economy of force role.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
4-28. Counterintelligence (CI) is focused on countering threat intelligence collection activities against US
forces. In urban operations, CI personnel will primarily investigate collection threats and, in conjunction
with other elements (Provost Marshal’s Office, Engineers, others) provide protection assistance (see
AR 525-13 and related manuals). CI agents will conduct screening operations to identify personnel that
may be of CI interest or have CI leads. (NOTE: As appropriate, those inquiries will be pursued separate
from standard collections and debriefings, if they become investigations or operations.) CI teams are most
effective when provided with properly cleared linguist support when operating with the local populace
4-29. CI screening is also conducted during the process of hiring host nation (HN) citizens (such as
linguists) for Army or DOD employment; however, the Army CI screening is a supplement to the
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screening that is to be conducted by the employer--the employer is not relieved of screening
responsibility. CI investigations and operations may cross-cue the other intelligence disciplines, but are
more likely to be cross-cued by the other disciplines. CI personnel work in conjunction with the Military
Police, Engineers, Medical Service personnel, and others as required, to create threat assessments and
vulnerability assessments which provide commanders with a comprehensive FP assessment, comparing
pertinent threat capabilities to existing conditions.
4-30. CI as a discipline provides analysis of the threat’s HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT capabilities in
support of intelligence collection, terrorism, and sabotage in order to develop countermeasures against
them. However, with the elimination of the 97G MOS, these actual functions transfer to theater analytical
centers, not agents on the ground in a specific theater. CI analytical products are an important tool in
enemy COA and COA development in the MDMP.
4-31. CI technical services that may be available and of use in the urban environment include the
following:
z
Surveillance.
z
Computer network operations (CNO); for example, assisting in protecting US information and
information systems while exploiting and/or attacking adversary information and information
systems. However, this support is at theater level, through such elements as the Information
Dominance Center.
z
Technical surveillance countermeasures, which is the identification of technical collection
activities conducted by adversary intelligence entities.
4-32. The counter-signals intelligence (C-SIGINT) is a CI disciplinary function carried out by the SIGINT
community.
GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE
4-33. There are many producers of Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), and the users of GEOINT extend
from the national level down to the lowest tactical level. The overall GEOINT enterprise that supports
operations extends across all Services, multinational partners, and other organizations during joint
operations and unified action. GEOINT requirements, methods of collection (and associated systems), and
products vary widely based on the echelon of support and the various types of operations including daily
cooperative security, pre-hostility crisis, major combat operations, and post-conflict stability operations.
4-34. The goal of Army GEOINT operations is to provide products that facilitate the commander’s gaining
an improved situational understanding. As stated in NGA Publication 1:
Advances in technology and the use of geospatial data have created the ability to
integrate and/or combine elements of any or all of the areas, along with other elements
of information, resulting in many new, more sophisticated capabilities for producing
products and conducting analysis… Advanced technology now provides the capability to
use and combine geospatial data in different ways to create interactive/dynamic,
customized visual products. It allows analysts to quickly make more connections
between different types of data and information than previously possible.
4-35. GEOINT is major step toward improving Army intelligence and intelligence operations.
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TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
4-36. Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) can be critical to intelligence analysis in the urban environment.
TECHINT is intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of threat and foreign military equipment
and associated materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific
and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s
technological advantages.
4-37. Weapons technical intelligence (WTI), which is a subcomponent of TECHINT, focuses on weapons
(such as IEDs) exploitation, and is an instrumental facet of intelligence support in an urban environment.
Each weapons intelligence team (WIT), as a part of WTI, conducts scene analysis of weapons usage
incidents and collects forensic evidence and device components, rendered safe by EOD personnel, from
locations where weapons are discovered. WITs serve as advisors on WTI to local area commanders and are
trained in the collection of latent fingerprints and DNA evidence. WITs conduct initial review of collected
material and then forward the material to the combined explosives exploitation cell for further exploitation.
4-38. In an urban environment, TECHINT can--
z
Collect weapons components or materials for further analysis.
z
Populate databases that track different types of weapons and can link weapons to a known or
suspected maker based on materials and methods used in its construction.
z
Analyze found or captured materials to determine if they are in fact weapons precursors.
z
Analyze current weapons construction and initiation methods.
z
Predict weapons trends and likely future construction and initiation methods.
z
Assess possible sources of weapons components based on forensic analysis.
z
Assist in linking captured personnel to weapons activity based on forensic evidence.
OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
4-39. Although Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is considered an intelligence discipline, there are no
Army intelligence personnel specifically trained as open source intelligence operators or analysts. OSINT
can be an important source of information for intelligence analysts. There are numerous sources of open
source information. The difficulty for analysts is being able to narrow down their searches to specific
information that is relevant to ongoing or future operations. FMI 2-22.9 provides a good reference for
open source resources.
4-40. Open sources and publicly available information may include but are not limited to--
z
Academia. Courseware, dissertations, lectures, presentations, research papers, and studies in
both hardcopy and softcopy on economics, geography (physical, cultural, and political-military),
international relations, regional security, science, and technology.
z
Governmental, Intergovernmental, and NGOs. Databases, posted information, and printed
reports on a wide variety of economic, environmental, geographic, humanitarian, security,
science, and technology issues.
z
Commercial and Public Information Services. Broadcasted, posted, and printed news on current
international, regional, and local topics.
z
Libraries and Research Centers. Printed documents and digital databases on a range of topics as
well as knowledge and skills in information retrieval.
z
Individuals and Groups. Handwritten, painted, posted, printed, and broadcasted information (for
example, art, graffiti, leaflets, posters, and websites).
4-6
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Intelligence Collection Disciplines in the Urban Environment
4-41. The Internet offers quick access to numerous types of information on urban environments, especially
during the initial IPB conducted immediately following a warning order that identifies a potential AO that
consists of or includes urban areas. Maps and general urban information generally are available on all
major urban areas of the world. The open-source information available on these urban areas ranges from
tourist-type information to detailed governmental and military information, as well as detailed urban
studies (for example, population distribution and movement, infrastructure evaluations) of all sorts for
many urban areas.
4-42. A good first site at which to begin your search for open source content is the Intelink-SBU (sensitive
but unclassified) homepage. Intelink-SBU is a virtual private network managed by the Intelink
Management Office which provides authorized users access to unclassified and for official use only
information from both the US Government and commercial sources. If your unit does not already have
access to the Intelink-SBU network, contact them at info@center.intelink.gov, and they can assist you in
gaining access. For operations security reasons, the site is not accessible directly from the Internet and
requires password authentication for access.
4-43. Several US government-run sites are accessible from the Internet, but require registration to obtain a
username and password for site access:
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OPEN SOURCE CENTER
4-44. The Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center (OSC) (formerly the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service) was created in November 2005. The OSC monitors open sources in more than 160
countries in over 80 languages and acquires open source data worldwide for organizations across the
military and government, down to local law enforcement. The OSC analyzes the content and behavior of
the media and Internet websites of nations and other international actors of significant policy interest to the
US Government. These contextual and analytical products, categorized as OSC Analysis and OSC Media
Aids, are available on Opensource.gov (the site requires a registration to obtain a username and password),
the OSC websites hosted on government-sponsored communications systems, including SIPRNET and
JWICS.
4-45. OSC products and services include--
z
Analysis. OSC analyses range from short, time-sensitive products that explain the media
treatment of issues on the US Government policy agenda to longer analytic pieces that examine
issues or the content and behavior of a set of media over time to detect trends, patterns, and
changes related to US national security interests.
z
Media Aids - Media Guide. Media guides offer a comprehensive characterization of the media
of a country or region and provide an overview or characterization of the larger media
environment, including what makes up the media of a country, how that media operates, who
uses the media and how they use it, and other factors (such as literacy rates, press laws,
economic status, and demographics) that affect the media and their behavior or use.
z
Media Aids - Commentator Profile. Commentator profiles provide detailed information on one
or more media personalities in a particular country, outlining their influence, backg3round, views,
and biases on key topics. The focus is on personalities who speak or write about issues of
importance to the United States or who have influence with their government, businesses, or
large segments of the general population.
z
OSC Reports. Through its worldwide access to foreign media and other publicly available
material, the OSC provides translations and transcriptions of the latest political, military,
economic, and technical information gleaned from foreign open sources. Reports gist from
select sources, such as jihadist websites or daily editorials, on topics related to the National
Intelligence Priorities.
z
Video Services. Video Services Division collects, analyzes, and disseminates more than 550
channels of foreign and domestic television and Internet video for 24 hours a day, 7 days a week
January 2008 (Draft)
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Chapter 4
to military and Intelligence Community customers. Video Services Division can access, via
OSC’s international collection network, between 16,000 and 34,000 additional channels. Video
Services Division archives over 1.6 million hours of video per year and has a library containing
10,000 hours spanning 45 years. The Video Server System provides access to foreign video at
the desktop. The capabilities of the system include keyword searching, English closed
captioning, speech-to-text transcripts, thumbnail program scanning, video on demand, unlimited
archive capability, still photographs from video, multiple customizable topic profiling, and
online ordering. The Video Server System hosts a nearly 2-year archive of web-accessible
video. Military customers can access the unclassified Video Server System hosted on the Open
Source Information Service network or request delivery via videotape, digital video device, or
compact disc.
z
Map Services. OSC geographers are experts on foreign mapping, geographic information, and
geospatial technologies. The Maps Services Center provides maps, data, information, analytical
products, training and a host of related geographic services to those on the front lines of
intelligence. Map Services Center maintains the community’s central repository of hundreds of
thousands of foreign maps and geographic data.
EARLY BIRD
4-46. The DOD also publishes a daily (weekday) summary of US print media stories of interest to DOD
personnel called the Early Bird. The Early Bird is published online at http://ebird.afis.mil/.
4-47. Early Bird summaries can provide intelligence analysts with an insight into the views of local
nationals and government in an urban area and its surroundings, as well as the views of other countries and
factions within the region which could impact those operations.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SERVICE
4-48. The Department of the Army Intelligence Information Service (DA-IIS) maintains a webpage with
links to multiple open-source intelligence websites. The DA-IIS Portal on the AKO website is located at
https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/132281 (the site requires an AKO username and password). The Portal
has links to News Media websites, country research sites, Intelligence Community websites, Analyst
Reference websites, and Unified Command websites.
4-49. When dealing with open-source intelligence, intelligence professionals must consider the reliability,
credibility, and biases of each source of information as well as whether the collection or retention of the
information through open sources is done in compliance with AR 381-10.
GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION
4-50. In the urban environment, map reconnaissance is insufficient to provide all of the information
necessary to conduct operations. Analysts of all intelligence disciplines will need to supplement their
intelligence with information from geospatial sources in order to conduct mission analysis and support
tactical operations. This information will be critical to successful planning and execution of operations in
the urban environment.
4-51. Geospatial information sources can provide the following:
z
Terrain databases.
z
Special terrain studies and products prepared by US or HN agencies, and special maps, charts,
and geodetic studies.
z
Real-time terrain reconnaissance.
z
Terrain factor matrices.
4-8
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Chapter 5
Operations in the Urban Environment
5-1. In the urban environment, different types of operations (offense, defense, and stability) will often
occur simultaneously in adjacent portions of a unit’s AO--this has sometimes been referred to as the three-
block war. Intelligence support to operations in this extremely complex environment often requires a
higher degree of specificity and fidelity in intelligence products than required in operations conducted in
other environments. Intelligence sections have finite resources and time enabling them to accomplish their
support mission. Realistically, intelligence sections may not always expect to be able to initially provide
the level of specificity and number of products needed to support commanders.
5-2. Using METT-TC, G-2s/S-2s must start prioritizing by focusing on the commander’s and operational
requirements to create critical initial products. Requests for information to higher can assist lower-level
intelligence sections in providing critical detail for these products. As lower-level intelligence sections
create products or update products from higher, they must provide those products to higher so that higher
can maintain an awareness of the current situation. Once initial critical products have been built,
intelligence sections must continue building any additional support products required. Just as soldiers
continue to improve their foxholes and battle positions the longer they remain in place, intelligence
sections must continue to improve and refine products that have already been built.
5-3. When preparing for operations in the urban environment, intelligence analysts must consider the
three primary characteristics of the urban environment as well as the threat. These factors have been
discussed throughout this manual, but a general review is provided in Table 5-1. Commanders and their
staffs must have a good understanding of the civil considerations for the urban area as well as the situation
in the surrounding region. This includes the governmental leaders and political organizations and
structures, military and paramilitary, economic situation, sociological backg3round, demographics, history,
criminal organizations and activity, and any non-governmental ruling elite (for example, factions, families,
tribes). All are key factors although some are more important than others depending on the situation in the
target country. Intelligence personnel must assist the commander in correctly identifying enemy actions so
that US forces can focus on the enemy and seize the initiative while maintaining an understanding of the
overall situation.
5-4. Since urban areas are often closely connected with other urban areas and surrounding rural areas by
physical terrain, socio-cultural factors, and/or infrastructure, operations within any given urban area should
not be considered in isolation. Events or activities that occur in other urban or rural areas may have a direct
impact on events or activities in the urban AOs for which a unit is responsible.
5-5. Most operations in urban environments will be conducted by brigade-size or smaller units and often
in a joint context. This chapter focuses primarily on these tactical units.
PLAN
5-6. During the planning phase of operations in an urban environment, intelligence plays a major role.
Initial collection of information and IPB is undertaken to provide intelligence products for the MDMP.
5-7. The basic factors that must be considered in the complex urban environment remain the same
regardless of the type of mission that US forces are conducting. The priority given to individual factors,
however, will change based on the type of mission and specific situation.
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Chapter 5
Table 5-1. Basic intelligence consideration factors in the urban environment
Terrain
• OAKOC Factors - Observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain,
avenues of approach.
• General Urban Description - Large or small city, town, village, strip area.
• Zoned Areas - Core, residential, high rise, industrial.
• LOCs - Roads, rivers or canals, railways, subways, airfields, ports, line of sight and rubble effects.
• Urban Patterns - Hub and satellite, linear, network, segment, pie-slice patterns.
• Street Patterns - Type of pattern.
• Street Pattern Effects - Blocking, funnel-fan, funnel effect.
• Structural Types - Type, construction and layout of buildings.
• Mobility Corridors - Air, intrasurface (buildings and rooftops), surface, and subsurface characteristics of
the urban area.
Weather - Weather effects in the urban terrain (wind, visibility, wind chill).
Socio-cultural factors - Religious, ethnic, cultural, political, and demographic.
Infrastructure - Transportation, fuel, electricity, water, communications.
Threat - Snipers, Molotov cocktails, squad size engagements, bunkers, reserves, IO, health threats, OB,
COA.
MAPS
5-8. Acquisition of maps at the beginning of or prior to the planning phase is critical. While not an
intelligence function, intelligence staff personnel often are the first to obtain maps simply because they are
required in order to conduct the initial IPB. For urban operations, maps in the normal military scales of
1:250,000, 1:100,000 or even 1:50,000 are not usually adequate given the level of detail and specifics
required in urban operations. Smaller-scale maps are usually required.
5-9. NGA produces 1:25,000 scale maps down to about 1:10000 scale maps for specific urban areas.
Maps are normally procured through the unit supply system. The unit supply section should have the NGA
standard products catalog on compact disk (NSN: 7644-01-478-4783). Updates to this catalog are sent out
monthly from the Defense Logistics Agency to units. In addition, Engineer topographic teams normally
have the latest digital products for the specific AO and can produce many specialized products. Also, the
NGA representative (normally at Corps and Regional Combat Command levels) or NGA support team--
deployed to support specific operations--can obtain digital map and imagery data on compact disks for the
AO specified by the customer.
5-10. Commercially available civilian or tourist maps may show greater and more current urban detail than
military maps. While street maps and tourist maps do not normally show terrain, they often provide useful
information on current street and bridge locations, street names, shapes of prominent buildings, and
cultural features. Civilian maps usually have a reference grid overlay that, if available in sufficient
quantities, may be useful as a supplemental terrain reference during urban operations. However, these maps
do not come marked with the MGRS or Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) references. Although
marked with a common reference grid, commercial maps or charts should not be used as a reference for
employing munitions. Ensure all units disseminate any approved nonstandard reference systems to enable
proper target identification and fratricide prevention.
5-11. Always check the reference system used to prepare a map or chart (for example, World Geodetic
System 1984 [WGS-84], Tokyo Special). Different datum can cause significant confusion and errors.
5-2
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Operations in the Urban Environment
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-12. When planning for intelligence support to operations in the urban environment, the following must
be accomplished:
z
Define priorities for intelligence collection.
z
Coordinate for movement of ISR assets.
z
Coordinate for information and intelligence flow with all military intelligence (MI) units, non-
MI units, other service components and multinational organizations.
z
Establish liaisons with all elements, organizations and local nationals necessary for mission
accomplishment and FP.
5-13. One of the major factors when planning for most operations in urban environments is the local
population and their potential effect on US operations. Intelligence personnel must be cognizant of local
national perceptions of US forces, their environment, and the nature of the conflict. To engage successfully
in this dynamic, US forces must avoid mirror imaging; that is, imposing our own values on the threat
COAs. This can be done through careful study of the threat country, collaboration with country experts,
and through the use of people with pertinent ethnic backg3rounds in the wargaming process.
5-14. The relative interests of population groups in and around the urban environment must be identified
and a continuous process employed to immediately identify changes in the environment that may result in
changes to the population group’s relative interests. Population groups and the relationships among them
are not static. Group intentions and relationships change as conditions and other relevant relationships
change. The local population in the urban environment will usually need to be protected and sustained by
friendly forces.
5-15. The ISR plan must be as detailed as possible and must be regularly reviewed for changes during
operations in constantly changing urban environments. The finite intelligence collection resources
available to any command must be feasibly allocated and reallocated as often as necessary in order to keep
up with the fluid urban environment. Employing these assets within their capabilities, taking into
consideration their limitations within the urban environment, is critical to ensuring that a focused
intelligence effort is successful. The ISR plan must be synchronized with the air tasking order, as air
platforms are coordinated on the same timeline.
PREPARE
5-16. During the preparation phase of the operations process, intelligence staffs and collection assets must
further refine their products, collection plans, and reporting procedures. Establishing and testing the
intelligence architecture (to include joint and multinational elements) is a critical activity during this phase.
Intelligence staffs must ensure that all intelligence personnel are aware of the current situation and
intelligence priorities are fully trained on both individual and collective tasks, and are aware of any
limitations within the intelligence architecture that are relevant to them.
5-17. Additionally, intelligence staffs must ensure that targeting procedures are well-defined and executed.
In urban environments, non-lethal targeting may be more prevalent than lethal targeting and must be fully
integrated into the process.
EXECUTE
5-18. Execution of operations in urban environments requires continuous updating and refining of
intelligence priorities and ISR and collection plans as the situation changes in order to provide the
necessary intelligence to the commander in a timely manner. Timely reporting, processing, fusion, analysis,
production, and dissemination of critical intelligence often must be done within a more compressed
timeline in the fluid and complex urban environment than in other environments.
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Chapter 5
5-19. Large amounts of information are generally available for collection within the urban environment.
Procedures must be set in place to sort the information to determine what is relevant and what is “noise.”
5-20. Reported information must always be carefully assessed and verified with other sources of
intelligence and information to avoid acting on single-source reporting. In stability operations and civil
support operations where HUMINT is the primary source of intelligence, acting on single-source reporting
is a constant pitfall. Situations may occur, however, where the consequences of not acting on unverified,
single-source intelligence may be worse than any potential negative consequences resulting from acting on
that unverified information.
ASSESS
5-21. As previously stated, operations in the urban environment, especially stability operations and civil
support operations, can be extremely fluid. The intelligence staff must constantly reevaluate the TTP of US
forces due to the rapid changes in the situation and the threat’s adaptation to our TTP. New threat TTP or
potential changes to threat TTP identified by intelligence analysts must be quickly provided to the
commander and operations staff so that US forces TTP can be adjusted accordingly.
5-22. Intelligence staffs must continue to evaluate and update ISR plans based on changes in the urban
environment, changes in enemy TTP, and assessments of what ISR operations were successful in the urban
environment. Continuous IPB updates and constant reevaluation of the relative interests of potential threats
are essential.
5-23. It is essential to regularly brief and debrief personnel who will collect and report information of
potential intelligence value (see Chapter 3). All military personnel should be clearly briefed on intelligence
collection priorities and why those collection priorities are important so that they will be alert to these
items while they are conducting their missions. They must be encouraged to report anything they determine
might be unusual and reminded of their reporting chain of command. Critical information that S-2s/G-2s
obtain from this reporting must be passed up the chain of command in a timely manner so that higher
maintains an awareness of the current situation.
5-24. Debriefing military personnel is crucial to getting information that they obtained into intelligence
channels for evaluation and analysis. It is not necessary or even possible for MI personnel to personally
debrief everyone in the unit on a regular basis; however, it is important to develop a standard debriefing
format for the unit to ensure that persons conducting debriefings are thoroughly familiar with both the
intelligence requirements and the standard debriefing format.
5-25. There are multiple methods of debriefing personnel. (Refer to FM 2-91.6.) One method is a walk-
through of the mission from start to finish with the persons being debriefed simply being coached by the
debriefer using checkpoints along the route taken to divide the discussion into specific terrain slices. An
example debrief format, based on the patrol report format shown at Figure B-8, is set up for patrols that are
sent out with digital cameras that can take pictures of relevant items (route conditions, vehicles of interest,
unusual items encountered during the patrol) and then be downloaded in the S-2 section upon completion
of the patrol.
5-26. Debriefing must occur as soon as possible after the completion of a mission to ensure that the
information is obtained while it is still fresh in the soldiers’ minds and to ensure that time-sensitive
information is reported to intelligence channels immediately.
5-4
FM 2-91.4
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Appendix A
Urban Intelligence Tools and Products
A-1. The urban environment offers the analyst many challenges normally not found in other
environments. The concentration of multiple environmental factors (high rises, demographic concerns,
tunnels, waterways, and others) requires the intelligence analyst to prepare a detailed plan for collecting
information within the urban environment.
A-2. There are numerous products and tools that may be employed in assessing the urban environment.
Due to the complex nature of the urban environment, these tools and products normally will be used to
assist in providing an awareness of the current situation and situational understanding.
A-3. The tools and products listed in this appendix are only some of the tools and products that may be
used during operations in an urban environment. For purposes of this appendix items listed as tools are
ones generally assumed to be used primarily within intelligence sections for analytical purposes. Products
are generally assumed to be items developed at least in part by intelligence sections that are used primarily
by personnel outside intelligence sections.
TOOLS
A-4. There are numerous software applications available to the Army that can be used as tools to do
analysis as well as to create relevant intelligence products for the urban environment. These software
applications range from such programs as Analyst Notebook and Crimelink which have link analysis,
association matrix, and pattern analysis software tools to the Urban Tactical Planner (UTP), which was
developed by the Topographic Engineering Center as an operational planning tool and is available on the
Digital Topographic Support System. The focus of this section, however, is on the types of tool that could
be used in the urban environment rather than on the software or hardware that may be used to create or
manipulate them.
PATTERN ANALYSIS
A-5. Pattern analysis includes multiple map overlays and text assessing military, terrorist, or other threat
activity in an urban area. These events can be related by any of several factors to include location and time.
These events can be analyzed by plotting them on maps over time, using multiple historical overlays
(analog or digital) that can be compared to one another over time, and using a time-event wheel or other
analysis tools. (See Figure A-1.)
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Appendix A
Figure A-1. Example pattern analysis plot sheet
LINK ANALYSIS TOOLS
A-6. Link analysis is used to depict contacts, associations, and relationships between persons, events,
activities, and organizations. Five types of link analysis tools are--
z
Link Diagrams.
z
Association Matrices.
z
Relationship Matrices.
z
Activities Matrices.
z
Time Event Charts.
Link Diagrams
A-7. This tool seeks to graphically depict relationships between people, events, locations, or other factors
deemed significant in any given situation. Link diagrams help analysts better understand how people and
factors are interrelated in order to determine key links. (See Figure A-2.)
A-2
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Urban Intelligence Tools and Products
Figure A-2. Example link diagram
Association Matrix
A-8. The association matrix is used to establish the existence of an association between individuals.
Figure A-3 provides a one-dimensional view of the relationships and tends to focus on the immediate AO.
Analysts can use association matrices to identify those personalities and associations needing a more in-
depth analysis in order to determine the degree of relationship, contacts, or knowledge between the
individuals. The structure of the threat organization is formed as connections between personalities are
made.
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Appendix A
Figure A-3. Example association matrix
Relationship Matrix
A-9. Relationship matrices are intended to depict the nature of relationships between elements of the
operational area. The elements can include members from the noncombatant population, the friendly force,
international organizations, and an adversarial group. Utility infrastructure, significant buildings, media,
and activities might also be included. The nature of the relationship between two or more components
includes measures of contention, collusion, or dependency. The purpose of this tool is to demonstrate
graphically how each component of the city interacts with the others and whether these interactions
promote or degrade the likelihood of mission success. The relationships represented in the matrix can also
begin to help the analysts in deciphering how to best use the relationship to help shape the environment.
A-10. The example relationship matrix shown in Figure A-4, while not complete, is intended to show how
the relationships among a representative compilation of population groups can be depicted. This example is
an extremely simple version of what might be used during an operation in which many actors and other
population elements are present. For instance, the section marked “Population” might include considerably
more population subgroups than the two included in this sample. When used during a deployment, it is
important for the analysts to realize what groups, subgroups, and other elements should be represented in
the matrix. In addition, it should be noted that the matrix could be used to depict the perceived differences
in relationships. For example, in Figure A-4 Political Group 3 is shown to have a dependent relationship
A-4
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Urban Intelligence Tools and Products
with Economic Group 1. The complementary relationship (a similar mark in the corresponding box linking
Political Group 3 and Economic Group 1) is not indicated because it might not exist.
A-11. To illustrate the usefulness of the matrix, consider the relationship of the government with the
infrastructure. In this case, the relationship is “friendly,” perhaps because the government is in control of
the infrastructure without contest from the owners or suppliers of the infrastructure. For example, this
could be considered the case when Slobodan Milosevic controlled the electricity supply for Kosovo. He
apparently used the infrastructure at his disposal to supply electricity to the population, but intermittently
threatened to deny the service in order to maintain control over a possibly hostile population. How can this
information be used by the commander and his staff? Perhaps by understanding the nature of two
components of the operational environment, the link between the two elements can either be eliminated or
leveraged in order to suit the needs of the friendly unit.
A-12. Using Figure A-4, there is a relationship of possible collusion that exists between the government
and Political Group 3, and a friendly relationship between the government and the media. Some questions
the intelligence analyst might ask when reviewing this information include:
z
How can the government use the media to its advantage?
z
Will the government seek to discredit Political Group 3 using the media?
z
Will the population view the media’s reporting as credible?
z
Does the population see the government as willfully using the media to suit its own ends?
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Appendix A
Figure A-4. Example relationship matrix
Activities Matrix
A-13. Activities matrices help analysts connect individuals (such as those in association matrices) to
organizations, events, entities, addresses, and activities—anything other than people. Information from this
matrix, combined with information from association matrices, assists analysts in linking personalities as
well. (See Figure A-5.)
A-6
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Urban Intelligence Tools and Products
Figure A-5. Example activities matrix
Time Event Charts
A-14. Time event charts are chronological records of individual or group activities designed to store and
display large amounts of information in a small space. Analysts can use time event charts to help analyze,
for example, larger-scale patterns of activity and relationships. (See Figure A-6.)
LISTS AND TIMELINES OF KEY DATES
A-15. In many operations, including most stability operations and civil support operations, key local
national holidays, historic events, and significant cultural and political events can be extremely important.
Soldiers are often provided with a list of these key dates in order to identify potential dates of increased or
unusual activity. These lists, however, rarely include a description of why these dates are significant and
what can be expected to happen on the holiday. In some cases, days of the week themselves are significant.
For example, in Bosnia weddings were often held on Fridays and celebratory fire was a common
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Appendix A
occurrence on Friday afternoons and late into the night. Timelines—a list of significant dates along with
relevant information and analysis—seek to provide a context to operational conditions. These timelines
could include descriptions of population movements or political shifts that are relevant to the operational
area. They could also include a brief historical record of the population or area, highlighting the activities
of a certain population sector. As analytic tools, timelines might help the intelligence analyst predict how
key sectors of the population might react to given circumstances.
Figure A-6. Example time event chart
A-8
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CULTURE DESCRIPTION OR CULTURE COMPARISON CHART OR MATRIX
A-16. In order for the intelligence analyst to avoid the common mistake of assuming that only one
perspective exists, it may be helpful to clearly point out the differences between local ideology, politics,
predominant religion, acceptable standards of living, norms and mores, and US norms. A culture
comparison chart can be a stand-alone tool, listing just the different characteristics of the culture in
question, or it can be comparative—assessing the host country population relative to known and familiar
conditions.
PERCEPTION ASSESSMENT MATRIX
A-17. Perception assessment matrices are often used by PSYOP personnel and can be a valuable tool for
intelligence analysts. Friendly force activities intended to be benign or benevolent might have negative
results if a population’s perceptions are not considered, then assessed or measured. This is true because
perceptions--more than reality--drive decision making and in turn could influence the reactions of entire
populations. The perception assessment matrix seeks to provide some measure of effectiveness for the
unit’s ability to reach an effect (for example, maintain legitimacy) during an operation. In this sense, the
matrix can also be used to directly measure the effectiveness of the unit’s Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, and
PSYOP efforts.
A-18. One proposed PSYOP campaign developed for Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti
illustrates why perception assessment is necessary. Prior to deployment, leaflets were published informing
the Haitian populace of US intentions. The original leaflet was published in French, the language of the
Haitian elite. The one actually used for the PSYOP campaign was published in Creole, the official
language of Haiti, because an astute PSYOP team member realized the need to publish to the wider
audience.
A-19. If the French flier had been dropped on Port-au-Prince, it could have undermined the American
mission to the country in several ways. The majority of the population would have been unable to read the
flier. The subsequent deployment of US forces into the country, therefore, could have been perceived to be
hostile. The mission itself, which was intended in part to restore equity within the nation’s social structure,
could have backfired if the Haitians viewed the French flier as an indication of US favoritism to the Haitian
elite.
A-20. Perception can work counter to operational objectives. Perceptions should therefore be assessed both
before and throughout an operation. Although it is not possible to read the minds of the local national
population, there are several means to measure its perceptions:
z
Demographic analysis and cultural intelligence are key components of perception analysis.
z
Understanding a population’s history can help predict expectations and reactions.
z
HUMINT can provide information on population perceptions.
z
Reactions and key activities can be observed in order to decipher whether people act based on
real conditions or perceived conditions.
z
Editorial and opinion pieces of relevant newspapers can be monitored for changes in tone or
opinion shifts that can steer or may be reacting to the opinions of a population group.
A-21. Perception assessment matrices aim to measure the disparities between friendly force actions and
what population groups perceive. A sample matrix is shown in Figure A-7.
A-22. In addition to trying to assess the perceptions of each population group within an operational area, it
might serve the interests of the unit to assess its own perceptions of its activities. All of the following
questions can begin to be addressed by the unit’s scrutinizing its view of an operation:
z
Are members of the unit exhibiting decidedly Western or American values that are not
appreciated by the host country population?
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Appendix A
z
Are embedded American beliefs preventing the unit from understanding the host country
population or its coalition partners?
z
Is what the intelligence and command staff perceives really what is going on in the operational
area?
z
Does the population believe what the unit believes?
z
Is there something that is part of the population’s (or a subgroup’s) perception that can be
detrimental to the unit?
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Figure A-7. Perception assessment matrix
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Appendix A
CIVIL AFFAIRS ASSESSMENTS
A-23. As mentioned previously in Chapter 3, when deployed, Civil Affairs teams normally create an
assessment of the AO to which they are assigned. These assessments can provide intelligence personnel
with more detailed and more up-to-date information on the local situation. Civil Affairs teams begin initial
assessments upon deployment to an AO and continuously update them throughout the duration of the
mission. Table A-1 is an example outline of a Civil Affairs assessment. While the information may initially
be sparse, the categories of information that the Civil Affairs teams are attempting to obtain clearly
coincide with information that is of interest to intelligence staffs as well.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment
I. GENERAL
A. Geography.
1. Location and size.
a. General.
b. Total land area.
2. Physical features.
a. Waterways and ports.
b. Topography.
c. Natural resources.
d. Road and rail networks.
3. Climate.
4. Political geography.
B. History.
C. People.
1. Population.
2. Culture and social structure.
a. Culture.
(1) History, government, and geography as they affect the cultural makeup of the people.
(a) Events and facts considered most important.
(b) Traditionally conducted activities, beliefs, or situations.
(2) Heroes and leaders of groups, with reasons for special esteem.
(3) Ethnic groups (racial, tribal, or religious) and population distribution (rural or urban with ratios
of age, sex, and imported and exported labor forces.)
(4) Majority or minority groups (unique challenges or conditions).
(5) Moral codes.
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Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
(6) Attitudes toward age, sex, race.
(7) Influences on personality development.
(8) Individuality.
(9) Privacy.
(10) Nature of people’s perceptions.
(11) Clothing.
(12) Fatalism or self-determination.
(13) Values of economic philosophy (for example, cooperation, competition, respect for personal
or private property).
b. Social structure.
(1) Status of male, female by age.
(2) Humor, entertainment.
(3) Community participation.
(4) Giving and receiving gifts.
(5) Public displays of emotion.
(6) Lines of authority.
(7) Cooperation versus competition (to include economics).
(8) The family.
(a) Roles and status of family members.
(b) Nuclear or extended.
(c) Authority, obedience, place, and expectations of members.
(d) Place in society.
(e) Inheritance customs.
(f) Entrance rites and rituals.
(g) Markers of social change, adulthood, special activities.
(9) Dating and marriage.
(a) Age standards.
(b) Influence of family and peers.
(c) Common dating practices, courtship activities.
(d) Chaperones, group dating. None.
(e) Engagement customs.
(f) Divorce, separation, aloneness.
(g) Sexual mores.
(10) Greetings.
(a) Conversation and gestures on meeting.
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Appendix A
(b) Distinctive approaches for greetings.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
(c) Compliments given or received.
(d) Space and time (standing, sitting, distance between people).
(e) Farewell and leave talking.
(f) Use of first name versus titles.
(g) Favorite, familiar, or pleasing phrases.
(11) Visiting practices.
(a) Conversations.
1. Topics.
2. Appropriate part of visit.
3. Attitude, rate, pitch, and tone.
(b) Gifts.
(c) Compliments on possessions, family, and children.
(d) Parties and other social events.
(e) Business discussions.
(f) Mannerisms, gestures, posture, eye contact, and facial expressions.
(12) Eating practices.
(a) Table manners (before, during, and after the meal).
(b) Average diet, meal size, and scheduling.
(c) Specific foods reserved for special occasions or rituals.
(d) Forbidden foods.
(e) Social and other occasions.
(f) Unique problems and challenges.
(13) Work and recreation.
(a) Age, sex, status of hierarchy.
(b) Schedules.
(c) Obligations, successes, or failures.
(d) Business codes.
(e) Bribes.
(f) Family, cultural, social recreation, vacation, and sports.
(g) Individual recreation (with age or sex exclusions and variations).
(h) Distinctive arts and sciences.
(i) Well-known artists and athletes, others.
3. Languages.
D. United States interests.
1. US military units and teams in the area and their activities.
2. US Government organizations in the area and their interests.
3. US civilian organizations and interests in the area.
4. Legal agreements and treaties.
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Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
5. Trade and commercial interests.
II. CIVIL DEFENSE
A. Organization.
1. Civilian or military jurisdiction.
2. Organization - rural and urban.
3. Areas of responsibility.
B. Plans.
1. Status of planning.
2. Evacuation and dispersal plans.
C. Equipment.
1. Warning and communication systems.
2. Shelter capacity, location, adequacy, and status of equipment.
3. Training facilities.
4. Rehabilitation capabilities.
D. Correlation with Other Civic Agencies (such as fire, police, medical, military).
III. LABOR
A. Organization.
1. National level.
2. Other levels.
3. Key personnel with biographical sketches.
B. Labor force.
1. Employment data and trends.
2. Available manpower and labor supply by special classes.
3. Ages and distribution.
4. Unemployment.
5. Labor productivity.
C. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
1. Government labor policy.
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a. Labor laws and working conditions.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
b. Wages and other incentives.
2. Labor organizations.
a. Organizations (type, size, location, leadership, and political influence).
b. Membership.
c. Relations with foreign or international labor organizations.
d. Total potential labor force (type, distribution, mobility, and ages).
3. Social insurance.
4. Labor disputes (including mechanisms for settling).
D. Wages and standards (including hours and working conditions).
IV. LEGAL
A. System of laws.
1. Civil and criminal codes.
a. Origins.
b. Procedures.
c. Penalties.
2. Political crimes.
3. Personnel.
a. Judiciary.
b. Prosecutors.
V. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
A. General system of public administration.
1. Political traditions.
2. Political stability.
3. Standards and effectiveness.
4. Constitutional system.
5. Civil rights and practices.
6. Political factions, movements, and dynamics.
B. Structure of national government.
1. Executive branch.
a. Organization.
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b. Powers.
c. Policies.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
d. Administration.
2. Legislative branch.
a. Organization.
b. Powers.
c. Composition of membership.
d. Pressure groups.
3. Judicial branch.
a. Organization.
b. Powers.
4. Methods of selection of key officials.
5. Biographical sketches of key officials.
C. The armed forces.
D. Political parties.
VI. PUBLIC EDUCATION
A. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
1. Government agencies and policies.
2. Educational system/facilities.
a. Administration and controls.
b. Preschool, kindergarten, and primary schools.
c. Secondary schools.
d. Vocational and special schools.
e. Higher education.
f. Teacher education.
g. Private schools.
h. Adult education.
B. Evaluation of educational system.
C. Private and public organizations.
1. Influential and pressure groups (for example, family, school, other kids, religious organizations).
2. Youth organizations.
3. Religious groups.
D. Influence of politics of education.
VII. PUBLIC FINANCE
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A. Organization.
1. Municipality level.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
2. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
B. General conditions and problems. Fiscal and economic policies.
C. Monetary system. Currency.
D. Budgetary system and current budget. Current budget.
E. Sources of government income. Analysis of taxation (amount of taxes collected, method of collection, and
type of taxes).
VIII. PUBLIC HEALTH
A. Organization.
1. National level.
2. Other levels.
3. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
B. General conditions and problems.
C. Agencies and institutions.
1. Hospitals.
a. Number.
b. Capacity (number of beds).
c. Location and condition of facility.
2. Other medical facilities.
a. Public.
b. Private.
D. Medical personnel.
1. Numbers (doctors and nurses).
2. Location.
3. Training.
4. Traditional medical practices (native medicine, theory of disease, and religious beliefs).
E. Medical equipment and supplies.
1. Surgical and dental equipment.
2. Testing equipment.
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3. Drugs.
a. Availability.
b. Shortages.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
4. Other supplies.
F. Diseases.
1. Predominant types.
2. Control programs.
G. Environmental sanitation.
1. Regulations governing food and drugs.
2. Water control and supply.
3. Disposal of sewage and waste.
IX. PUBLIC SAFETY
A. General conditions and problems. (The primary consideration in this area is whether the existing
institution [police, fire, and penal] may be used to carry out the combat commander’s primary mission and to
provide the day-to-day control and bodily protection of the local population.)
B. Police system.
1. Organization at all levels.
a. Types of police forces and criminal investigative agencies.
b. Organization.
c. Areas of responsibility and/or jurisdiction.
d. Chain of command.
e. Names and biographical sketches of key personnel.
2. Equipment.
a. Arms and special equipment.
b. Modern crime-fighting equipment.
c. Traffic control equipment.
d. Riot control equipment.
e. Police communications.
f. Transportation.
3. Personnel.
a. Strength
b. Method of selection.
(1) Political, racial, and religious requirements.
(2) Reliability.
(3) Moral and state of training.
c. Promotion basis.
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4. Functions and authority.
a. Criminal action.
b. Civil ordinances.
c. Disorder and disaster control.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
5. Police regulations that differ from the traditional American concept of law and order.
a. General.
b. Identification system.
c. Restrictions on travel, gatherings, and curfews.
d. Restrictions on ownership of firearms.
6. Miscellaneous.
a. Other methods of enforcing law and order such as the influence of religious leaders, family ties,
and role of the military.
b. Psychological effect on the local population.
X. PUBLIC WELFARE
A. Organization.
1. National level. (NA)
2. Other levels.
B. General conditions and problems.
1. Availability and sources of consumer goods and services.
2. Housing.
3. Standard of health, facilities, and supplies.
4. Major social problems.
a. Juvenile delinquency.
b. Alcohol and narcotics abuse.
c. Health problems (malnutrition and disease).
d. Unemployment.
e. Poverty and dependency.
5. Public assistance.
a. Basis upon which granted.
b. Types of relief and medical care provided.
6. Welfare services (government and private).
a. Child welfare (adoption, maternal).
b. Emergency and war relief.
c. Relief and public assistance.
XI. CIVILIAN SUPPLY
A. General conditions and problems. (Peculiarities of climate, geography, etc., which might influence civilian
supply).
B. Storage, refrigeration, and processing facilities.
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1. Storage space, available and required.
a. Food.
b. Other supplies
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
2. Refrigeration, available and required.
a. Food.
b. Other supplies.
C. Distribution channels.
1. Food.
2. Clothing.
3. Essential durables.
D. Dietary and clothing requirements and customs.
1. Food.
a. Available.
b. Required.
2. Clothing.
a. Available.
b. Required.
3. Customs that might influence civilian supply.
E. Production excesses and shortages.
XII. ECONOMICS AND COMMERCE
A. General conditions and problems.
1. Brief coverage of natural and developed resources.
2. Self-sufficiency or dependency of the area on other sources of food, machinery, or vital minerals
and supplies.
3. Extent of development and capability of railroads, canals, and the civil aviation system.
4. Development of industry, agricultural pursuits, and natural resources.
5. Developed and potential power sources.
6. Summary of important trade agreements and extent of participation in world trade.
B. Description of economic system.
1. National policy and controls.
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2. Private enterprise.
3. Public enterprise.
C. Structure, key officials, and business leaders.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
D. Resources.
1. Human.
2. Natural.
E. Statistics.
1. Per capita (for example, income, savings, consumer spending).
2. Aggregate (for example, gross national product, national income, etc).
3. Ratios (for example, unemployment, productivity, occupations).
4. Validity of statistics (when compiled).
F. Goals and programs.
1. Short-range.
2. Intermediate-range.
3. Long-range.
G. Internal movement of goods.
H. Exports/Imports.
1. Type.
2. Quantity.
3. Market.
4. Influence.
I. Commerce.
1. Domestic trade.
a. Wholesale and retail distribution system.
b. Markets and fairs.
c. Weights and measures standards.
d. Cooperatives and public markets.
2. Foreign trade.
a. Principal items of exports and import.
b. Tariff system, customs, and duties.
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c. Balance of payments.
J. Industries.
1. General.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
a. Location of main industrial centers.
b. Names of important companies.
c. Labor (skills and distributions).
d. Power sources and capacities.
2. Manufacturing industries.
a. Types (machinery, chemical, textile, etc).
b. Locations (province, city, etc).
3. Processing industries (types, locations, and capacities).
K. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
1. Government organization.
2. Trade associations and chambers of commerce.
3. Laws governing commerce and industry.
4. Subsidies, monopolies, etc.
L. Price control and rationing.
1. Stabilization.
2. Variation of prices.
3. Control measures and techniques.
4. Commodities under price control.5. Distribution.
a. Essential commodities.
b. Imports and exports.
c. Ration controls.
d. Production and distribution.
e. Effect on demands.
f. Types and status of markets.
6. Control systems.
a. Price control program.
b. Rationing program.
c. Raw materials.
d. Financial.
7. Legislation.
a. Price control legislation and items subject to price control.
b. Rationing legislation and items subject to rationing.
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XIII. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
A. General conditions and problems.
B. Agricultural products and processing.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
1. Livestock and dairy products (types, amounts, methods of processing, refrigeration,
warehousing, etc).
2. Crops (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage, refrigeration, etc).
3. Poultry (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage, refrigeration, etc).
C. Agricultural practices.
1. Extent of mechanization.
2. Pest and disease control.
D. Land holding system and reform programs.
E. Fisheries.
1. Commercial (number, companies, location, type of fish, type of crafts, fishing areas, methods of
processing, storage, annual production).
2. Private (policy, rules, regulations, type of fish, fishing areas, etc).
F. Forestry.
1. Reforestation programs.
2. Importance of forestry to the country.
H. Food production.
XIV. PROPERTY CONTROL
A. General conditions and problems.
B. Agricultural and industrial property.
XV. PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS
A. General conditions and problems.
B. Postal system. Extent and frequency of service.
C. Radio and television.
1. Transmitting stations (number, type, and location).
2. Channels, frequencies, and trunk lines.
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3. Hours of operation.
4. Censorship.
5. Propaganda usage.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
6. Foreign influence.
7. Foreign broadcasts.
8. Programming.
D. Applicable laws governing communications systems.
XVI. PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
A. General conditions and problems.
B. Rail transport.
C. Vehicular transportation.
D. Water transportation.
1. Size, location, type, use, and ownership of all floating vessels.
2. Location of all port facilities and services.
3. Identification of sea routes.
4. Location and use of inland waterways.
E. Air transportation.
XVII. PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES
A. Public utilities.
1. Power system, including nuclear reactors and power-generating plants and distribution systems.
2. Water system, including source dams, degree of pollution, filter plants, and ownership.
3. Gas works (size, location, source, and ownership).
4. Sewage collection systems and disposal plants.
5. Radioactive waste, garbage, and refuse disposal.
XVIII. ARTS, MONUMENTS, AND ARCHIVES
A. General conditions and problems.
1. Description of conditions of the arts and monuments.
2. Art advancements over the past ten years.
3. Art influence of outside countries.
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B. Arts.
1. Location, type, use, and significance of the fine arts.
2. Population attitude toward art treasures.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
3. Government policies and agencies dealing with the arts.
4. Agencies through which arts are performed (government, civil agencies, etc).
C. Monuments.
1. Location of historic monuments and sites.
2. Present significance of these monuments and sites.
D. Archives.
XIX. CIVIL INFORMATION
A. Newspapers, periodicals, and publishing firms.
XX. CULTURAL AFFAIRS
A. Religions in the area.
1. National.
2. Organized.
3. Unorganized (sects).
4. Relations among religions and religious leaders, both indigenous and missionary.
B. Clergy.
1. Number, location, and education of the clergymen.
2. Influence of religious leaders.
C. Religious beliefs.
1. Major tenets of each religion, to include as a minimum, such concepts as⎯
a. Faith.
b. Impact of faith on life.
c. Concept of the hereafter.
d. Means of salvation.
e. Rites of cleaning and purification.
f. The impact of religion(s) on value systems.
2. Degree of religious conviction in lives of indigenous populace.
D. Worship.
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1. Forms and significance of worship on each religion.
2. Places of worship.
3. Frequency of worship.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
E. Relationship between religion and motivation of local people.
F. Relationship between religion and transcultural communication.
G. Socioeconomic influence of religion.
1. Influence of religion(s) on society.
2. Economic influence of religion(s).
a. Religious ownership of property and other possessions.
b. Teachings of religion(s) about private property.
H. Interrelation with government.
1. Relationship of religious leaders and government officials.
2. Role of religion(s) and religious leaders in armed forces.
3. Political influence of religious leaders.
I. Religious schools.
1. Location, size, and attendance.
2. Influence.
3. Relationship to nonsecular schools.
XXI. DISLOCATED CIVILIANS
A. Existing dislocated civilian population (if any).
1. Existing camps.
a. Health and welfare.
b. Responsible agency (national/international).
c. Population (number, nationality).
2. Anticipated duration of need for dislocation camps.
B. Potential population dislocation.
1. Volume of dislocation by region.
2. Direction of major flow.
3. Troop support required per thousands of population.
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4. US logistical support required (D-day plus 30, 60, 240).
5. Special problems.
Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment (continued)
C. Care and control of dislocated civilians.
1. Government and private agencies involved in displaced persons and refugee activities.
a. Organization.
b. Scope and powers.
c. Relationship to international organization.
d. Emergency reserve personnel adaptable to displaced persons and refugee activities.
2. Policies and operations of area agencies handling dislocated civilians by agency (if any).
a. Policy and procedures concerning⎯
(1) Evacuation and control.
(2) Assembly center (or other grouping) administration.
(3) Camp or village security.
(4) Camp physical plant layout.
(5) Construction, materials, and engineering of physical plants.
(6) Health and medical care facilities.
(7) Supplies and food.
(8) Welfare services.
(9) Screening and indoctrination.
(10) Resettlement.
(11) Resources expenditure (available, used by area agencies, required by US
standards.
(12) Steps needed and resources required to convert existing facilities to US standards
for similar use.
b. Biographical analysis of agency personnel.
XXII. DISASTER PREPAREDNESS/RELIEF
A. Disaster preparedness (Country’s history of disasters [by type]).
B. Organization.
1. Government agency responsible for disaster preparedness.
2. Government agency responsible for disaster relief operations. Public services such as--
a. Communal.
b. Health.
c. Transportation.
d. Veterinary.
3. NGOs with which prior coordination has been effected (for example, Lions Club, church groups,
Rotary Club).
4. HN organizational diagram.
5. Role of the military in disaster relief.
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C. Emergency procedures and relief facilities.
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