Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

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The answer to overcoming this challenge is not to exclude religion

from planning but rather to increase the ARSOF’s understanding of

religious factors. They need to examine the application of religious

factors to mission planning and develop a synchronized process within

the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). There is a need to

integrate a new religious factors analysis (RFA) into the IPB process so

that religious factors become actionable elements of the mission plan.

WHY RELIGION MATTERS

Given religion’s complexity and power, it is imperative that ARSOF

understand the way it shapes modern warfare and the modern

battlefield. There are several reasons for religion’s ability to shape the

battlefield:

• Religion answers some of life’s big questions, such as why

there is death and war. Religion is relevant to all conflict.

• Religion adds a higher intensity, severity, brutality, and

lethality to conflict than other factors do.

• Religion offers a stronger identity to participants in conflicts

than nationality, ethnicity, politics, or language.

• Religion can motivate the masses quickly and cheaply, and it

often remains outside the view of nation-state security forces.

• Religion offers an ideology—or a platform for a political

ideology—that resonates more strongly than other forms of

propaganda. Theology will trump ideology in most conflicts.

• Religious leaders are often the last leaders left when states fail,

and they offer a voice to the disempowered or oppressed.

• Religious leaders are often the first to seek peace and

reconciliation after a conflict.

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• Religious factors are fundamental to conflict resolution and

conflict management.

• Religious nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) supply a

major portion of support to humanitarian efforts in military

missions.

Given the nature of ARSOF missions, understanding religious factors is

critical to predicting the human response to these operations. One

definition of religion is “the human response to the perceived sacred.”

As a human response, it can be positive or negative. Understanding the

positive and negative aspects of an operation is critical to explaining

the human response. Trying to win the hearts and minds of local

populations without understanding their religious beliefs deprives

ARSOF of one of the greatest avenues of approach available. In short,

combating religious insurgents without understanding religious factors

limits ARSOF’s abilities.

Although not engaged in a religious war, ARSOF must understand

religious factors if they are to gain a clear view of the battlefield.

Religion has shaped many past conflicts. There are indicators that its

influence will only grow. For this reason alone, ARSOF Soldiers must

seek to understand the impact that religious factors have on their

missions and must learn to leverage those factors. Sometimes the

impediment to understanding is not the lack of tools for analysis but

rather the failure to apply them. The mission of each ARSOF unit calls

for a different emphasis in religious analysis, but a good way to begin

is to examine why religious factors need to be emphasized. If ARSOF

do not know why religion is important to a culture, they may fail to

correctly interpret the culture’s responses to military actions. The first

step in analyzing religious factors is to examine the Soldier’s beliefs.

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A TWO-FRONT WAR

A culturally centric war is fought on two fronts. The first front is within

the Soldier’s view of culture and religion. Biases about religion will

often prejudice his analysis and limit his ability to leverage cultural

understanding. Secular tendencies within Western culture also limit the

Soldier’s ability to understand religion in other cultures. In mission

analysis, a line is frequently drawn between religion—which is

relegated to the private realm—and the rest of the mission. ARSOF

Soldiers commonly quote the misperception that “we don’t do religion”

as evidence of this bias. Not

“doing” religion for fear of

misunderstanding often results in a lack of in-depth religious analysis

in mission planning. If religion is analyzed, it is often skewed by

internal biases, which again limit the ability to leverage cultural

understanding.

The second front in a culturally centric war involves understanding

religion from the standpoint of the indigenous population. Doing this

allows the Soldier to make a predictive analysis of civilian reaction to

military operations. First, the Soldier must compartmentalize his own

belief system to understand the religious practices of the population.

Second, he must comprehend how and to what degree the theology of

the practiced religion influences the indigenous population’s

worldview. To accomplish this, the Soldier needs to have a sense of

self-awareness and a sensitivity to the faith factors of the population. A

reeducation process aimed at fighting a two-front war will allow the

soldier to understand the religious experience.

REEDUCATION PROCESS

The Western education system embraces the idea of the separation of

church and state. This separation often results in a minimalist view of

religious factors. This Western concept is shared by less than one-sixth

of the world’s population, and it is foreign to the indigenous

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populations of most of today’s areas of military activity. This view can

prevent an accurate area analysis in military operations. To prevent

errors from occurring and to increase the understanding of religious

factors in mission planning, ARSOF must develop a basic

understanding of religious worldviews that links spiritual values with

earthly actions. Soldiers must develop a view of religion that erases the

separation between private religion and public action. This does not

mean that the Soldier must convert to a particular religious view, but he

must understand religion if he is to leverage it in mission planning. If

ARSOF do not comprehend religion, they will miss a tremendous

opportunity to use the COG in many conflicts.

Note the line of separation in the Western view and the placement of

religion into the private world

(Figure

1, page

6). In the pure

monotheistic worldview, the line disappears and religion is not

relegated to the private realm. Monotheism, a belief in one god,

represents the theological view of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The

Western religious worldview represents the influence of the

enlightenment or secular thought.

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RELIGION AND POLITICS

A quick study of the link between international politics and religion

will improve the Soldier’s understanding of religion. Providing security

is a major goal of political powers. As Barry Rubin of the Global

Research in International Affairs Center states:

In many areas of the world, religion should be seen as a

central political pillar maintaining the power of any ruler—a

major pole in determining the people’s loyalty—and as a key

ingredient in determining a nation’s stability or

instability.…[R]eligion plays a key role as an important

defining characteristic of politically contending communities.

For many societies, religion is the richest form of public motivation. It

allows unrelated groups to coexist peacefully and gives people a higher

motive for selfless service. U.S. presidents have understood religion’s

power to reassure the nation in difficult times.

Soldiers who have dealt with mass movements or riots started by a

religious leader or a religious ritual understand the power of religion to

shape the mission. Normally, the U.S. Soldier thinks in terms of

providing security through strength and firepower—bringing religion

into the formula requires a deeper understanding of the linkage between

politics and religion. Osama bin Laden has used his understanding of

the link and has exploited it. His fatwas, or religious edicts, against the

U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia and his classification of the Americans

as infidels play to a disempowered populace and provide them the

promise of security through a religious hope. He has linked religious

and political ideology with psychological finesse. How can ARSOF

counter this exploitation of religion for ideological and political

purposes? By understanding how religion interacts with society and

exploiting the weaknesses of bin Laden’s ideology through

unconventional countermeasures and tactical diplomacy.

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In The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, Khaled Abou

El Fadl states: “[N]othing helps the puritans’ cause as much as Western

ignorance, prejudice, and hate.” Promoting a deeper understanding of

religion and political security gives the Soldier a countermeasure to use

against those who believe that he is spreading Americanization—also

labeled as globalization or Westoxification—to other parts of the

world. Leveraging this understanding could help the Soldier find

innovative approaches for helping indigenous people retain their group

identity while working with ARSOF. It would also rob a religiously

motivated insurgency of its ability to use ideology to promote

insecurity and to divide the indigenous population. When Soldiers of

the 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group, were in Afghanistan, they

used money from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program to

refurbish several mosques in Konar Province. Refurbishing the

mosques countered the messages of al-Qaeda and the Taliban that the

Americans hated Islam. It was a psychological action that had deep

resonance with the Afghani people. As members of the local population

observed the U.S.-funded effort, they developed a trust for the ARSOF

units throughout the area. This is an example of the effective use of

religion in a military mission.

WHY RELIGION IS MISSING

In an age when ARSOF should be seeking cultural intelligence to

understand the indigenous society and the insurgent ideology, there

seems to be a tendency to minimize a major human factor—religion.

This minimized dimension of mission analysis could exact a high cost

for the United States and limit the Soldier’s ability to predict future

reactions. As the author Thomas Friedman says,

“While we were

celebrating 11/9 [the fall of the Berlin Wall], the seeds of another

memorable date—9/11—were being sown.” Internationally, ARSOF

missed the impact of religion on world politics. Strategists and futurists

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wrote religion off as a declining factor in society and missed the

implications of a religious resurgence.

There are several reasons for the minimization of religion in mission

planning. First, religion is a complex subject. There are no definitive

templates for religion. Too often, religion is oversimplified with broad

statements, such as

“All religions are basically the same” or

“All

religions share universal beliefs.” Try the simple exercise of defining

religion among a group of people. Each person will have a different

definition. Although an analysis of religion does not fit well within

most analytical studies, this does not mean that religion’s complexity

makes it incomprehensible. Author and professor Marc Gopin offers

several recommendations for governmental and nongovernmental

agencies in performing religious analysis. Summarized, these

recommendations represent a good start for that analysis in military

planning:

1. Study the fears and resentments of religious worldviews that oppose

present civil societies, and develop policies that do not increase those

fears.

2. Study causal chains that link religious violence to both internal and

external religious traditions, and understand how mass traumas affect

groups.

3. Know religious traditions affected by the mission and anticipate the

impact on religious life, religious institutions, and religious leaders.

4. Know when religion or religious figures have influenced social

transformation in a positive sense, and reinforce policies that continue

positive transformation.

5. Know the most negative expression of a religion’s or a culture’s

interpersonal behavior patterns to anticipate causes and develop

counteractive measures.

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6. Study the perceived and remembered traumas of a society from its

religious interpretations, and involve the religious community in

healing any trauma.

7. Bring all parties—no matter how violent or exclusive—into

interactions. Doing so short-circuits the martyr complex.

8. Isolate violent groups not by confrontation, which strengthens them,

but by co-opting; address the grievances of the violent groups through

cooperation with religious leaders and organizations.

The consideration of any one of these recommendations would aid the

Soldier in leveraging religion.

A second reason religion is minimized in mission planning is that it is

often seen as irrelevant. The belief that religion is a cover for other

motivating factors causes the connections between religious ideology

and societal responses to military actions to be underestimated. This

belief still misses the point that even if an insurgent is misusing

religious ideology to gain a political end, he is nonetheless “thinking”

religiously. Until ARSOF gain a better understanding of religious

factors, they will not defeat religiously motivated terror. Bullets will

not defeat

“spiritual warriors,” and the more the Soldier thinks in

purely secular terms, the more the religiously motivated insurgent

becomes empowered. As Professor Mark Juergensmeyer states, “When

governments abandon their own moral principles in responding to

terrorism, they inadvertently validate the religious activists’ most

devastating critique of them: that secular politics are devoid of

morality.”

A third reason for the minimization of religion in mission planning is a

limited cultural understanding by Soldiers and staff members. As one

senior Special Forces Soldier stated about his initial understanding of

the operational environment of Fallujah, Iraq:

“I didn’t know the

difference between Shi’a and Sunni when I deployed into the area …

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and I didn’t know enough to ask about it. … You don’t know to ask

about what you don’t know.”

Too often, cultural briefs on religion are either limited to one

practitioner of a faith or conducted by a staff that is not religiously

oriented. The unit chaplain should be used to give the Soldier a broader

view of religion’s influence on the mission. Although chaplains are not

subject-matter experts in world religions, they are an internal resource

that can aid the staff in exploring and bringing into focus factors that

might affect mission planning. Chaplains provide the staff with a

religious perspective that can assist in exploring the religious impacts

on mission planning, and they provide a theological voice throughout

the mission-planning process. Their role as religious and military

leaders and their education in religious schools uniquely position them

to understand religion from an insider’s view.

One word of caution in this area is in order, however, because some

chaplains—and other religiously oriented Soldiers—often lack the

theological flexibility to advise the command on religious issues. Too

often, individual and theological prejudices overshadow religious and

cultural considerations in mission planning. Still, it is better to have

some understanding of religion than to have none, and the inclusion of

chaplains in the planning process enhances the understanding of

religious factors.

A NEW APPROACH

The current doctrinal guidance for mission analysis gives credence to

religious factors. The formal doctrine of each ARSOF branch includes

a mention of

“religious analysis” as part of the overall mission-

assessment process. None of these doctrines give much detail to the

process or attempt to align the assessment process with IPB. The

doctrine for chaplains on RFA contains several steps that help in an

overall assessment. However, the lack of alignment with the IPB

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decreases the harmony of the process. (See Field Manual [FM] 1-05,

Religious Support, Appendix G,

“Religious Area Assessment,” or

Training Circular [TC] 1-05, Religious Support Handbook for the Unit

Ministry Team, Table D, “Religious Area/Impact Assessment.”)

A new approach to templating and integrating religious factors into

mission planning would need to consider critical religious factors. It

would need to align these factors with the rest of the IPB process and

would require the evaluation of implicational considerations. Since

religious factors are so difficult to encapsulate into a process, the

approach would need to have a measure of flexibility in understanding

religious conditions unique to the area of operations (AO). Religious

factors do not exist in a vacuum, but too often, the considerations for

inclusion leave them outside mission planning. For this reason, two

critical factors for RFA in mission planning are imperative:

intentionality and interpretation. Intentionality is the vital commitment

to continual consideration of religious factors in all stages of the IPB

process. Interpretation of the religious factors is the most difficult step

in the planning process, because religious meaning is subjective.

Translating religion through only anthropological or social-science

disciplines of study leaves the process incomplete. Triangulating the

interpretation of religious factors through the additional study of

theology yields a more accurate picture of how religion affects the

military mission and allows commanders to properly understand their

enemies and potential allies on the ground (Figure 2, page 13). This

triangulation requires careful consideration of the local applications of

a religious worldview.

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ARSOF approach the subject of religion in an analytical manner.

Synchronizing religious analysis with the present IPB process would

give the military planner the best approach to the integration of

religious factors and allow the reexamination of assumptions

throughout the total process, which would keep the process transparent

and applicable to the final mission.

INTEGRATED APPROACH

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, gives the

following steps for an abbreviated IPB process: work ahead, focus on

the essentials, stay objective-oriented, and use minimal essentials.

Adapting these steps to the RFA would give the mission planner the

following advantages:

• Work ahead. Working ahead to recognize religious factors in

the AO would save time and give an understanding of how

religious factors may affect the mission. Building an analysis

of religious factors would give the staff flexibility during

contingency planning and save time in mission planning.

• Focus on the essentials. Religion is complex, but the essentials

for understanding the reaction of a religious group are similar,

regardless of the AO. Thinking through the essential religious

factors begins the integration process.

• Stay objective-oriented. If the intent is to help commanders

and staffs plan a mission efficiently, then integrating the

religious factors must begin early in the process. Including the

effect of religious factors on the mission objective requires

continual integration by the staff. When oriented on the

mission objective, religious factors integration includes:

Understanding the impact of religion on the mission

objective.

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Understanding the risks involved.

Factoring religious risks into the COA development

process.

• Use the minimum essentials. In the case of religious factors,

identifying the minimum essentials for planning begins with

the most obvious factors and moves to the most difficult.

In synchronizing these factors within the four-step IPB process, the

intentionality and skill of the commander and staff determine the

usefulness of the factors in mission execution. Building a model for

RFA can ensure that the process stays objective-oriented while using

the minimum essentials for planning.

RELIGIOUS TERRAIN ASSESSMENT

The terrain of religion is vast and sometimes restrictive, but it is open

to understanding. Navigating the terrain requires an understanding of a

few basic factors before beginning the analysis process. It is the nature

of religion to espouse beliefs and to endow the physical world with a

transcendent reality. Where the sacred affects the physical world is a

beginning point for terrain assessment in the IPB process. Using three

areas (Figure 3, page 16, and Figure 4, pages 17 and 18) in which

religion intersects with the physical world in a visible, somewhat

measurable focus would allow ARSOF Soldiers to begin navigating the

religious terrain.

The first area of religious terrain is the visible expression of religion.

This stage of assessment asks where religion is practiced in the AO.

Assessment in this area locates religious sites and seeks to understand

their use, their priority to the populace, and their symbolism to the

community. It is the first stage in the RFA and the easiest to assess.

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The Abbreviated RFA Process

For an abbreviated process, the concept focuses on meanings.

In the physical terrain, the Soldier should identify the following:

• Location of holy sites and sacred places to the religious

group.

• Prioritization of the value of these sites to the group.

• Determination of the uses of the sites by the group.

• Description of the symbolism of the site, past and

present.

• Prediction of reactions by the group to actions near the

sites.

In the human terrain, the Soldier should identify the following:

• Determination of the position, rank, and educational

level of the religious leader.

• Locations of the leadership.

• Role of the religious leader.

• Area of influence of the religious leader.

• Resources of the religious leader.

• Relationship of the religious leadership with outside

groups, such as the regime, political leaders, and other

religious group leaders.

Figure 4. The abbreviated RFA process

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• Prediction of the reactions of the religious leadership.

In the ideological terrain—perhaps the hardest to assess—the

Soldier should identify the following:

• Central beliefs of the religious group.

• Codes—written and unwritten—of the group.

• Central practices of religious expression.

• Prioritized holy days and calendar events.

• Symbols and meanings of the belief.

• Historic narratives.

• Heroes and villains.

• Interconnectedness to society and other groups.

• Variances between orthodox beliefs and local beliefs.

• Prediction of responses to the mission objectives.

Figure 4. The abbreviated RFA process (continued)

The third area of religious terrain is ideology. Identifying religious

ideology includes gaining knowledge of the values, codes, practices,

holy days, symbols, history, heroes, and villains of the religious

population. Ideological factors are the most difficult to assess in an

RFA, but they yield a deeper understanding of the culture’s core

elements. Understanding the way that religious ideology shapes

individuals and the larger society can provide the commander with the

greatest ability to shape the battlefield of the hearts and minds.

This level of assessment often requires reaching out to local cultural or

academic specialists to gain deeper insight. All three levels require an

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effects-based assessment. This is the most difficult skill to develop in

assessing religion. Identifying religious sites is easier than

understanding their meaning, but a thorough assessment is required to

accurately predict the impact of religion on the mission. Continually

asking the “So what?” question keeps the RFA relevant to the mission

for the ARSOF Soldier.

In summary, the consideration of religious factors will not guarantee

mission success. It has been said that all politics are local, and so it is

with religion. Those who engage in religious analysis must understand

that religion is too broad a subject to predict accurately, but that does

not eliminate the need to study and interpret religion’s impact on the

mission. A cursory glance at religion as part of cultural awareness is

often the training solution, but this solution’s lack of depth often leads

to errors in the analysis.

GAP IDENTIFIED IN CURRENT PSYOP

ANALYSIS MODEL

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are planned operations to convey

selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence

the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the

behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and

individuals

(Joint Publication

[JP]

3-53, Doctrine for Joint

Psychological Operations). The foundation of any PSYOP effort to

change a behavior in a target audience (TA) is target audience analysis

(TAA). TAA is an in-depth analysis of historical, cultural, and, to a

limited degree, religious factors that shape the TA. Basically, TAA is a

tool that enables PSYOP personnel to provide a commander with sound

advice on the psychological implications of conducting military

operations and an effective means to change TA behavior within his

AO. As part of planning, PSYOP personnel can help devise the best

possible course of action (COA) to modify the TA’s behavior and

achieve mission objectives. However, unless religious factors specific

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to a particular society are examined, TAA alone may not provide the

depth and breadth of information necessary for sound decision making.

RFA builds upon TAA by specifically assessing the degree religion

influences TAs. The results of RFA provide essential information that

is vital to evaluating the operational environment. In essence, PSYOP

assesses TAs in order to monitor the adversary situation and how

changes may impact the current COA; identify and select key friendly,

adversarial, and neutral TAs; determine the key communicators and

agents of influence; and define the current situation (who, what, where,

when, and why). Addressing the shortfalls of current analysis is

necessary to determine how to change the undesired behavior.

PSYOP TAA examines groups of people and defines current behavior

and its causes. It also specifies procedures to establish and maintain

desired behavior. The ultimate goal of TAA is to determine the best

way to change behavior in a given group. However, military planning

gives inadequate emphasis to religion, a key component in many of the

conflicts the United States is involved in. It is vital to the success of

PSYOP, in particular, that religious factors be assessed to avoid

inadvertent operational mistakes that can undermine months or years of

intensive work. RFA is a good supplement to TAA, enabling PSYOP

personnel to more effectively advise commanders on the psychological

impact of military operations in religiously focused regions. The

information the RFA provides can help commanders avoid mistakes

that may have strategic implications.

Mistakes related to violations of religiously based customs and taboos

have infrequently occurred in military operations. However innocent

the relatively few incidents may or may not have been is irrelevant.

Any incident can make world headlines. A series of such incidents can

seriously undermine otherwise successful military operations. RFA can

help prevent such incidents in two ways. In the near-term, such analysis

better determines limits for U.S. forces during operations in religiously

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focused societies. In the long-term, the TAA/RFA linkage provides a

comprehensive framework for PSYOP addressing religious issues,

should restrictions on such activities be relaxed in the future.

Many conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, can be viewed as

regional wars between local leaders who are striving to modernize their

societies and radicalized religious movements or factions that are

seeking to impose a more extreme, restrictive vision onto those same

societies. Viewed in this context, these conflicts can be characterized as

discordant interpretations of religion. However, this analysis is not

exclusively useful in the Middle East. It has application to any

religiously focused society, whether TAs are Jainists in Asia or

animists in Africa. PSYOP personnel must know how religion affects

societies in order to provide the depth and breadth of advice necessary

to support operations.

PSYOP change behavior through Psychological Operations actions

(PSYACTs) and products. PSYACTs are usually conducted by non-

PSYOP personnel in an effort to influence the behavior of the TA.

These agents of action must understand the motivations that drive

human behavior. This knowledge, in turn, enables tactical- and

operational-level units to understand the impact military operations

have upon TAs. PSYOP personnel must thoroughly understand what

influences affect TA behavior, assess any barriers to behavior change,

and determine how to overcome those barriers, or changing undesired

behavior will largely be unsuccessful. Identifying religious barriers is

critical to achieving specific behaviors and to providing essential

information for developing tailored PSYACTs and PSYOP products to

overcome them.

In-depth analysis yields specific information that aids sound decision

making during mission planning and execution. RFA is helpful in step

two of the military decision-making process and in the formulation of

the commander’s critical information requirements. The information

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gathered to meet these requirements directly affects mission success

and provides specific direction on targeting and targeting objectives.

For ARSOF, RFA augments target value analysis and aids in the

determination of high-value targets. In addition, RFA is very relevant

to mission analysis when conducting IPB.

RELIGIOUS LEADER ASSESSMENT

Perhaps the most powerful influence in religion is the leadership.

Whether he is called priest, reverend, monk, bishop, mullah, imam, or

mufti, the leader possesses great power to persuade. The factors that

influence a religious leader are determined by three indicators; what is

the popularity of the regime in its local area; what is the agenda of the

opposition; and what are the resources of the leader and his

organization. Often, the higher-ranking religious leader is more likely

to cooperate with the local government than the religious leader who

serves a smaller group in the community. The lower-ranking leader

may oppose the local government on a social issue and gain support

among his congregation for opposing the larger dominions of society.

An example is to apply these indicators to Grand Ayatollah Ali Hussein

al-Sistani and Shi’i cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq to determine their

cooperation or opposition with the government.

To assess religious leadership, Soldiers should use the following matrix

(Figure 5, page 23) to determine the religious leader’s cooperation or

conflict with the mission.

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RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN CIVIL-MILITARY

OPERATIONS

Throughout U.S. history, chaplains have supported commanders by

advising them on the interface between religious-support operations

and civil-military operations

(CMO). The necessary guidelines for

chaplains to engage in this role as required by their commanders are

outlined below. Figure 6, pages 25 through 27, list religious support

tasks in CMO.

ADVISING THE COMMAND

Chaplains will advise the commander in the following areas that may

influence CMO:

• Indigenous religious, ethnic, and cultural influences.

• Beliefs, practices, and customs of religious groups in the AO.

• Religious issues of displaced civilians.

• NGOs and international organizations (IOs).

• Relations with indigenous religious leaders when directed by

the commander.

Chaplains should not—

• Directly participate in negotiations or mediations as the sole

participant.

• Conduct human intelligence collection.

• Perform target acquisition.

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•

Advise the command of moral considerations affected

by religion.

•

Advise the command on accommodating religious

practices in the AO. Monitor the care of displaced

civilians to ensure it is moral and ethical.

•

Advise the command on the religious support plan for

displaced civilians.

•

Plan religious support activities. Assist CMO personnel

in coordinating with local religious leaders for

implementation of CMO activities.

•

Assist the command in meeting human welfare needs in

conjunction with religious NGOs and IOs (clothing, food,

and shelter).

•

Advise CMO personnel on the role and influence of

religion in cultural affairs.

•

Assess distinct religious, cultural, ethnic, and gender

ministry needs.

•

Brief the commander of religious influences on

contingency operations.

•

Advise the command of the impact of local religions,

sites, and facilities that could affect the mission.

•

Advise the command on the training of Soldiers with

respect to religious beliefs, practices, sites, and

facilities.

Figure 6. Religious support tasks in CMO

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• Implement religious support in combined or joint areas

of operation with consideration to host-nation religious

background.

• Perform analyses of local religions as they affect the

mission.

• Prepare the religious support annex to the operations

order, which includes the impact of indigenous religions

on the AO and mission.

• Provide input to CMO personnel regarding local

religions.

• Advise leadership on negative changes in Soldier

attitude and how those changes affect the local

population.

• Coordinate religious support for enemy prisoners of

war.

• Provide religious support for humanitarian assistance

survey team operations.

• Coordinate religious support activities with CMO

personnel and local religious leaders.

• Provide religious support to CMO personnel.

Figure 6. Religious support tasks in CMO (continued)

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• In coordination with the CMO center, provide certain

religious support to refugees and displaced persons

when directed by the commander after consultation with

the office of the Staff Judge Advocate.

• Make every effort to include indigenous religious

leadership in meeting these needs.

Figure 6. Religious support tasks in CMO (continued)

ALIGNMENT WITH IPB

During IPB, RFA results are important in determining the influence

religious leaders and institutions exert over a given society and its

members. This assessment allows for a more thorough understanding of

religiously based power relationships within a TA’s society and shows

how to exert influence over them. An RFA may even aid in

determining relationships between religious entities and the

government, and potentially in revealing exploitable discord.

RFA improves the quality of advice PSYOP personnel provide to

commanders. The RFA is particularly useful in determining operational

constraints, such as which human and geographic targets should be off-

limits or handled with great care. For example, a relatively small

percentage of the congregation may actually be involved in weapons

storage at a religious site chosen for a raid. Avoiding alienation of

members who are uninvolved is crucial to preventing strong negative

reactions within the congregation. U.S. and allied forces may also use

the incident as a way to divide the members of the congregation from

the hostile forces that misused their place of worship and endangered

their lives. While determining constraints, RFA leads planners to

certain critical facts and assumptions that affect all subsequent

activities.

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As planners identify this key information (Figure 7, pages 29 through

31), RFA can increase the number of facts and decrease the number of

assumptions. The facts will allow for more effective mission planning.

Although assumptions will always exist, RFA-based assumptions fall

into the realm of educated guesses derived from specific information.

Consequently, RFA helps achieve a higher degree of accuracy. The

review of key facts and assumptions in follow-on planning will be

easier as long as the analysis is kept current. RFA will have established

the baseline data that defines the battlefield.

A risk assessment is more accurate if the quantity of known facts

exceeds the number of assumptions. Knowledge of expected population

reaction to combat operations weighs heavily in determining if the

amount of force is adequate for the planned operation. Whether the

attitude of the people is for, against, or indifferent to the operation

greatly affects the operational scope and dangers that friendly forces

may encounter.

Finally, when conducting the mission analysis briefing, the use of

specific facts gleaned from the RFA will increase the likelihood that

well-devised plans are approved. RFA also aids contingency planning,

since the population’s reaction will be thoroughly assessed. At that

point, potential pitfalls will have been considered and countermeasures

devised to offset potential undesired consequences. As a result, RFA

provides facts that clarify the briefing and address outstanding issues.

Overall, RFA will help PSYOP personnel achieve success, which

means success for the supported force, as well.

January 2008

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1. Define the battlefield environment. Breakdown the area of

interest and AO by—

• Dominant religions.

• Demographic layout of—

Religious groups.

Tribes.

Sects, divisions, and overlaps.

• External and internal influence.

• Exploitable norms, values, beliefs, and traditions.

Religious groups.

Tribes.

Sects, divisions, and overlaps.

• Government’s vulnerability to being influenced by religion.

Key events and celebrations (daily, weekly, monthly,

and annually).

Religious biases and problems.

2. Describe the battlefield effects. The determination of how the

battlefield environment affects both enemy and friendly operations.

How do ARSOF actions affect religious factors in and around the

battlespace? The Soldier must determine cause and effect. Based

upon previous actions, the Soldier can determine a specific

reaction that the enemy or the local population is likely to have.

How do these reactions benefit or hinder military activities?

Figure 7. Religious factors in the IPB process

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• What is the sentiment of religious leaders, both external

and internal to the conflict COG

(positive, negative,

neutral, or passive)?

• How does the sentiment of religious leadership affect

the local populace?

• Will certain actions cause religious “no-go” areas?

• What is the impact on ethnic and cultural beliefs?

• How will sects or denominations fracture or align based

upon military actions? Is there a way to exploit the

situation?

• Are there targeting considerations that may restrict

engagement?

• Specific clergy or leadership.

• Religious structures or holy sites.

3. Evaluate the Threat. What are the—

• Religious capabilities and methods used to influence

the populace? (Examples of methods and means are

rallies, propaganda, rhetoric, radio, and fliers.)

• Is there corruption in the religious entities? If so, can it

be exploited?

• Goals? Specifically, what goals are against U.S. or rival

religious sects’ efforts?

Figure 7. Religious factors in the IPB process (continued)

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• Motivations? Are the motivations ideological

(jihad),

monetary, or power-based?

• Limitations? Is there an insufficient support network or a

lack of resources?

4. Determine Threat COA. Determine how religious entities or

groups will act based upon the activities conducted by U.S.

forces. (This might not be applicable for determining religious

aspects, since this factor was covered in previous paragraphs.)

Figure 7. Religious factors in the IPB process (continued)

INTEGRATED APPROACH

To overcome the deficiencies of current analysis systems, Civil Affairs,

PSYOP, ARSOF, and the chaplaincy combined their individual

assessments and tailored the new RFA format to a religious context.

The RFA format provides the necessary depth and breadth of

information needed to address the religious implications of military

operations. RFA provides specific information that goes further in

predicting how a population may react to military operations involving

religious figures and sites. RFA then serves as a model for predicting

potential behavior that must be addressed in mission planning.

Furthermore, RFA provides information for ARSOF intelligence on

where and how to reach the TA through key communicators that

influence the battlefield. Using PSYOP capabilities, ARSOF can be

more attuned to psychologically resonant images, symbols, and

language that elicit compliance, if not cooperation, from the population.

Conversely, RFA may reveal important information about what actions,

symbols, and language the Soldier should avoid, because of possible

negative behavioral effects. In essence, RFA allows PSYOP to better

define and understand the specific TAs and enables ARSOF to be more

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cognizant of the psychological consequences of their actions. This

knowledge directly affects mission analysis and subsequent planning.

Comprehensive and well-conducted planning determines success, and

RFA aids in both analysis and planning.

RELIGIOUS FACTORS ANALYSIS—EXPEDIENT

ASSESSMENT

Crisis action planning often necessitates modification of either the

military decision-making process or joint operation-planning process,

either because of time constraints or the direction of the commander.

Whatever the cause, expedient planning should never totally omit an

initial, even if abbreviated, RFA of the targeted AO. Available

information may come from either classified or open sources, may be

dated, or may be unverifiable, forcing the development of planning

assumptions prior to deployment.

In a time-constrained planning environment, certain key RFA

information will—

• Contribute to the overall civil considerations analysis and the

IPB process.

• Enhance cultural awareness of the AO.

• Identify key leaders, communicators, and spheres of influence.

• Contribute to both the lethal and nonlethal targeting process.

• Assist in populace and resource-control planning.

• Provide the basis for a more in-depth analysis.

Figure 8, pages 33 through 36, is a suggested expedient RFA template.

It uses the complete template (Figure 9, pages 37 through 44) as a

source document. As with any assessment and analysis process,

January 2008

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continuous information gathering is essential upon entry into the AO to

validate the initial assessment and satisfy identified information gaps.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS

FORCES IMPLICATIONS

Religious awareness will not always enable ARSOF to predict what the

enemy and noncombatants will do, but it will help Soldiers better

understand the motivations behind the actions. A well-conducted RFA

will assist with mission preparation before, during, and after

deployment. It will also help the operational detachment-A, as well as

follow-on forces, with their overall mission.

Religious Group

Country

Regional Area

Prepared By

Date Prepared

1. Religious entities in the area

a. What religions are indigenous?

b. Are the religious entities associated with specific families,

clans, tribes, ethnic groups, or races?

2. History and background

a. What are the past conflicts involving religion?

b. What is the historical relationship with the government?

Figure 8. Religious factors analysis—expedient format

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Holy days, rituals, and customs

a. What holy days or festivals may affect military operations?

b. What are important religious “dos and don’ts” to observe?

c. What are the sexual customs and mores (interrelationships

and intermarriages)?

d. What are the dietary habits and restrictions?

e. What are the group’s distinctive symbols and colors, and

what is their significance?

How does the group worship? What are the forms, nature,

location, frequency, and traits of worship?

g. How many forms of worship are there? What are the

different sects or denominations?

h. What is the role of women within the religion?

Sites and shrines

a. What and where are the places of worship, pilgrimage, and

memorial sites? Why?

b. Where are the cemeteries and sacred areas located? What

is the character of their makeup?

c. Is there a distinctive architecture unique to the group’s

gathering place? What do these distinctions represent to the

group?

d. What religious sites are off-limits? When? Why?

Figure 8. Religious factors analysis—expedient

format (continued)

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e. How do the locations, architecture, or uses of holy spaces

support or detract from the mission objectives?

What is the location and composition of religious records

(property, marriage, birth, and death)?

g. What is the location and makeup of ecclesiastic archives or

relics?

Primary values

a. What are the major tenets and beliefs of the religion?

b. How are beliefs initially formed (family, tribe, or religious

center)?

c. What are the religious members willing to die for?

d. What subjects incite emotional responses in the religion’s

members?

e. What value is placed on women, children, ancestors,

animals, or objects?

Leadership

a. Who are the religious leaders (official and unofficial), and

what are their affiliations?

b. What is the political role of religious leaders?

c. What is the relationship of religious leaders to government

officials?

d. What is the scope of the government’s influence on religious

leaders (and vice versa)?

Figure 8. Religious factors analysis—expedient

format (continued)

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e. What is the religious leader’s scope of influence on the

populace and area?

What is the relationship among religious leaders, other

religions, and NGOs?

Tolerance and religious intensity

a. What is the degree of religious commitment or conviction in

each group (nominal, mild, strong, inclusive, exclusive,

pluralistic, radical, or fanatical)?

b. How do they perceive modernization, globalization and

secularization?

c. How do they view the United States and Western society?

Relationship to society

a. What is the relationship of religious or spiritual leaders to

government officials?

b. What political influence do religious or spiritual leaders have?

c. What is the socioeconomic influence of the religion on the

society?

Organization

a. What are the locations of the religious learning centers?

b. What is the size, attendance, and influence of each center?

10.

Doctrine and myths

a. What are the sources of doctrinal authority?

b. What is the spiritual focus or COG for the religion’s belief

system?

Figure 8. Religious factors analysis—expedient

format (continued)

January 2008

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Local religious entities

a. What religions are indigenous?

b. Are religious entities organized or unorganized?

c. Are the religions national, regional, or local?

d. Are the religions predominately rural or urban?

e. Are the religious entities associated with specific families,

clans, tribes, ethnic groups, or races?

History and background

a. What is the religious history of the area?

b. What ethnic groups came into the area and when?

c. Did the religion arrive by trade, conquest, or some other

manner?

d. How were the religions affected by colonization?

e. What past conflicts involved religion?

What are the historical relationships of the entities with the

government?

g. How were they affected by recent history, major shifts,

social changes, and status in society (in the past 100

years)?

h. How did groups weather changes?

Holy days, rituals, and customs

a. What holy days or festivals may affect military operations?

b. What are important religious “dos and don’ts” to observe?

Figure 9. Religious factors analysis

January 2008

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What are the sexual customs and mores (interrelationships

and intermarriages)?

What are the dietary habits and restrictions?

What are the group’s distinctive symbols and colors, and

what is their significance?

How does the group worship? What are the forms, nature,

location, frequency, and traits of worship?

What are appropriate protocols for issues related to birth,

marriage, and death?

How do these protocols affect the local culture?

How many forms of worship are there? What are the

different sects or denominations?

What are the membership requirements?

Are distinct rites of passage observed for conversion,

initiation, youth-to-elder, single-to-married, baptism,

confirmation, warrior induction, and commissioning? If so,

what observances and customs mark their passing?

Are there unique festival celebrations that may affect military

operations?

How are religious observances prioritized?

What is the role of women within the religion?

What are the rituals for mediation, forgiveness (cleansing of

guilt), reconciliation, and retribution?

Figure 9. Religious factors analysis (continued)

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Sites and shrines

a. What and where are the places of worship, pilgrimages, and

memorial sites? Why?

b. Where are cemeteries and sacred areas located? What is

the character of their makeup?

c. Is there a distinctive architecture unique to the group’s

gathering place? What do these distinctions represent to the

group?

d. What religious sites are off-limits? When? Why?

e. How do the locations, architecture, or uses of holy spaces

support or detract from the mission objectives?

What is the location and composition of religious records

(property, marriage, birth, and death)?

g. What is the location and makeup of ecclesiastic archives or

relics?

Primary values

a. What are the major tenets and beliefs of the religion?

b. How are beliefs initially formed (family, tribe, or religious

center)?

c. What are religious members willing to die for?

d. What subjects incite emotional responses in the religion’s

members?

e. What behaviors does the group reward? What behaviors are

punished? What are accepted rewards or punishments?

Figure 9. Religious factors analysis (continued)

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What value is placed on women, children, ancestors,

animals, or objects?

g. How are values transferred (oral, written, symbolic, or other

means)?

h. How do outside influences threaten (real or perceived) these

values?

Is the religion or group more focused on the individual or the

community?

Leadership

a. Who are the official and unofficial religious leaders?

b. How many leaders are there, and where are they located?

c. What is the political role of religious leaders?

d. What is the relationship of religious leaders to government

officials?

e. What is the scope of the host-nation government’s influence

on religious leaders (and vice versa)?

What are the motivations of the religious leaders? Are they

theological, ideological, or politically driven?

g. How are they organized (administration, clergy, ranks, titles,

roles)?

h. What does their jurisdiction cover, and how are they

connected to a higher organization?

What is the religious leader’s scope of influence on the

populace and area?

Figure 9. Religious factors analysis (continued)

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Do the religious leaders have an impact on the armed forces?

k. What is the level of religious integration in the military?

What do religious leaders wear to symbolize their position?

m. How are leaders selected and trained?

n. What methods of religious education, legitimization, ordination,

and discipline are in place?

o. How are religious leaders monitored? What missionary efforts

are present? What is their base support?

p. What is the relationship among religious leaders, other

religions, and NGOs?

q. What role do religious leaders play in the cultural society?

Tolerance and religious intensity

a. What is the degree of religious commitment or conviction in

each group (nominal, mild, strong, inclusive, exclusive,

pluralistic, radical, or fanatical)?

b. How accepting are the group’s leaders of conversion of their

members to other groups?

c. How are competing groups viewed and received?

d. How easily can others join and quit the group? Are there

repercussions?

e. How tolerant are adherents if other members convert to

different groups or religions?

How do members react to bad behavior within their own ranks?

g. How do they perceive modernization, globalization, and

secularization?

Figure 9. Religious factors analysis (continued)

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What is the socioeconomic influence of the religion on the

society?

What is the relationship of a secular education to a religious

education? How are they legally distinct from each other?

Organization

a. What is the official hierarchy within the religious institutions?

If in name only, what is the de facto power structure?

b. What subgroups (sects) are present within the religion?

c. What are the locations of religious learning centers? What is

the size, attendance, and influence of each center?

10.

Doctrine and myths

a. What are the sources of doctrinal authority?

b. What are the sources of ethics?

c. What are the group’s concepts of justice?

d. Who are the historical heroes, villains, friends, foes, and

rivalries (past, present, future) of the group?

e. What are its concepts of the afterlife and salvation?

What is the spiritual focus or COG for the religion’s belief

system?

g. What are the central truths of the group’s most famous

myths?

h. What are the local interpretations of their myths?

Figure 9. Religious factors analysis (continued)

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How can these truths and interpretations affect operations?

How much variance is there between official and folk

doctrine and teachings?

11. References/sources

Figure 9. Religious factors analysis (continued)

PROVIDING INFORMATION FOR TARGET

ANALYSIS

The first steps of an effective assessment include an analysis of the

operational area’s predominate religions, their influence on the

instruments of national power, and the effect this influence has at the

regional and local levels. Emphasis should be given to how enemy

forces leverage religion to influence these instruments and how ARSOF

can guide friendly operations to counter this influence. Considerations

include:

• Diplomatic: Define the boundaries of a religion versus that of

the state to define AO and area of interest for an operational

detachment-A.

• Information: Analyze any religious influence on media to

determine methods of effecting change in those outlets.

Include popular perceptions of media organizations, verbal

and visual religious symbols used, and common religious and

political myths.

• Military/Law: Determine the effect of religious law on

military operations to understand religious restraints and

limitations for indigenous troops in both foreign internal

defense (FID) and unconventional warfare (UW).

January 2008

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• Economic: Analyze the effect of religion on the state and local

economics in order to understand potential influence as it

relates to religious structures, organizations, and individuals.

The human terrain—the location and loyalties of the population—

becomes as important as the physical terrain in shaping the operational

environment. Military and intelligence planners need detailed

intelligence on the human terrain to conduct effective operations.

In accurately defining the religious considerations of the operational

environment, there is an apparent need to develop a keen understanding

of the religious intricacies that drive the population. These include—

• Identifying the linkages between influential religious leaders

and leaders of tribes, clans, and local governments as well as

their influence in the media.

• Defining the linkages between religious influence and the

economic, political, and social conditions of the AO.

• Defining the areas controlled by influential religious leaders

and their organizational structure.

On the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, enemy forces commonly

have leaders playing the dual role of religious and military leader,

which often involves a complex chain of command. Identifying

linkages will help mission planners determine not only the relationships

but also the weight of those relationships. Leader analysis includes—

• Identifying religious leaders who support legitimate

government efforts (FID or counterinsurgency missions).

• Identifying religious leaders who support a resistance

movement

(during UW missions) and the reasons for

resistance to government).

• Reducing the resistance to U.S. operations.

January 2008

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Targeting friendly infrastructure. ARSOF must assess who supports

what efforts. They need to know which leaders support the resistance

movement, insurgency (potential government), or current government.

This information is valuable in targeting through lethal and nonlethal

means and to synergize, align, and leverage friendly or neutral forces to

support the mission. Targeting includes—

• Identifying religious leaders who support an insurgency (in

support of FID or counterinsurgency operations).

• Identifying religious leaders who support government efforts

(during UW missions).

Targeting hostile infrastructure. In ARSOF, targeting does not always

equate to destroying. A situational analysis is done to develop possible

COAs that will have a desired effect. To achieve this effect, COAs may

be lethal, such as a direct action strike, or they may be as nonlethal as

having tea with a local sheikh. The purpose of an analysis is to identify

intelligence gaps that need to be filled to develop a plan of execution.

CIVIL AFFAIRS IMPLICATIONS

Analysis of the civil considerations of the operational environment is a

capability that Civil Affairs (CA) Soldiers provide to the supported

commander. Through the area assessment process, CA describes the

civil components of the operational environment both in general terms

and definitively by CA functional specialty concentration. The goal of

any CA analysis is to identify key and decisive ASCOPE present in an

AO and to determine how they interact with one another.

Analysis of the religious aspects of an area has always been a

consideration in the development of the cultural relations section of the

CA area assessment. In-depth RFA is necessary at the lowest echelons

to clarify the interactions between religious influence and the

January 2008

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population’s leadership, politics, economics, rule of law, and

governance.

Conducting a detailed RFA has the potential to further clarify the

overall cultural environment of the AO and provide the information

necessary to—

• Identify the linkages between influential religious leaders and

tribal, clan, and local government leaders.

• Identify those religious leaders to empower. Determine which

leaders support legitimate government efforts to provide a

secure environment and a better quality of life to the populace.

• Identify those religious leaders to isolate from the populace in

support of counterinsurgency operations as part of an overall

populace- and resource-control plan.

• Define the linkages between religious influence and the

economic condition of the AO.

• Provide a more detailed perspective of the civil components of

the supported commander’s common operational picture.

• Define the areas controlled by influential religious leaders and

their organizational structure.

• Provide additional data to the targeting process through the

identification of local holy sites and shrines for inclusion to

the list of restricted fire locations.

• Increase cultural awareness information for dissemination to

Soldiers.

January 2008

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• Increase the supported unit’s situational understanding of the

impact of religion on the local populace.

• Continually monitor the RFA process, and update and

disseminate new information as it becomes available.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IMPLICATIONS

Contemporary perspectives of current conflicts are heavily influenced

by a worldview that does not recognize separation between religion and

politics, economics, or other facets of human society. Such a belief

system significantly influences TA thought, beliefs, attitudes, and,

ultimately, behavior. To reach those audiences, PSYOP personnel must

thoroughly understand the influences affecting TA behavior; otherwise,

attempts at behavioral modification will be unsuccessful. RFA, as a

supplement to TAA, can increase the ability of PSYOP to specifically

address behavior. Identifying religious barriers is critical to achieving

specific changes in behavior and provides essential information that

aids in developing effective PSYACTs and products.

January 2008

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RECOMMENDED SOURCES

Appleby, R. Scott. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion,

Violence, and Reconciliation. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,

1999.

Christian-Muslim Encounters. Edited by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad

and Wadi Z. Haddad. University Press of Florida, 1995.

Cragg, Kenneth. The Call of the Minaret. Oneworld Publications,

2000.

El Fadl, Khaled Abou. Islam and the Challenge of Democracy.

Princeton University Press, 2004.

El Fadl, Khaled Abou. The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the

Extremists. HarperOne, 2007.

Gopin, Marc. Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of

World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking. Oxford University

Press, 2002.

Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding. Edited by David R.

Smock. United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002.

Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. Edited by Alex de

Waal. Indiana University Press, 2004.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise

of Religious Violence. University of California Press, 2003.

10.

Kimball, Charles. When Religion Becomes Evil: Five Warning

Signs. HarperOne, 2003.

11.

Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa. Edited by Benjamin F.

Soares. Brill Academic Publishers, 2006.

January 2008

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12. Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A Historical Survey,

Edited by Jacques Waardenburg. Oxford University Press, 1999.

13. Nakash, Yitzhak. The Shi’is of Iraq. Princeton University Press,

2003.

14. Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. Sacred and Secular: Religion

and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

15. Oliver, Roy. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah.

Columbia University Press, 2006.

16. Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam: Precept and Practice.

Edited by Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and S. Ayse

Kadayifci. University Press of America, 2001.

17. Religion and African Civil Wars. Edited by Niels Kastfelt.

Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

18. Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations.

Edited by Robert A. Seiple and Dennis R. Hoover. Rowman &

Littlefield Publishers, 2004.

19. Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft. Edited by Douglas

Johnston and Cynthia Sampson. Oxford University Press, 1995.

20. Smith, Huston. Why Religion Matters: The Fate of the Human

Spirit in an Age of Disbelief. HarperOne, 2006.

21. The Battle of Algiers. Directed by Gillo Pontecorvo. 1966.

22. The Oxford Handbook of Global Religions. Edited by Mark

Juergensmeyer. Oxford University Press, 2006.

23. The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics.

Edited by John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owens. Palgrave

Macmillan, 2003.

January 2008

FM 3-05.132

Army Special Operations Forces Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations

November 2009

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only

to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange

Program or by other means. This determination was made on 30 October 2009. Other requests for this document

must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,

ATTN: AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or by e-mail to JAComments@soc.mil.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the

document.

FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product developers in

coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign disclosure

authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

*FM 3-05.132

Field Manual

Headquarters

No. 3-05.132

Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 30 November 2009

Army Special Operations Forces

Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

and Nuclear Operations

Contents

Page

PREFACE

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1-1

ARSOF CBRN Mission

1-1

Passive Defense

1-1

Active Defense

1-6

Offensive Operations

1-6

Spectrum of Conflict

1-6

Operating Environments and Potential CBRN Threats

1-7

CBRN Support Available at Direct Reporting Units

1-11

Chapter 2

SPECIAL FORCES GROUP CHEMICAL DETACHMENTS

2-1

Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment

2-1

Chemical Decontamination Detachment

2-3

CBRN Staff Elements

2-4

Chapter 3

75TH RANGER REGIMENT DECONTAMINATION

AND RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS

3-1

Mission

3-1

Manning

3-1

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only

to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange

Program or by other means. This determination was made on 30 October 2009. Other requests for this document

must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,

ATTN: AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or by e-mail to JAComments@soc.mil.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the

document.

FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product developers

in coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign

disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only.

*This publication supersedes FM 3-05.132, 31 August 2007.

Contents

Command Relationships

3-1

CBRN Staff Elements

3-3

Chapter 4

160TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT

4-1

CBRN Staff Elements

4-1

Chemical Defense

4-2

Nuclear Defense

4-2

Decontamination

4-3

Chapter 5

SITE EXPLOITATION SUPPORT

5-1

Phases of a Site Exploitation Operation

5-1

Site Exploitation Support

5-1

Special Operations Forces Site Exploitation Collection Teams

5-3

Exploitation Analysis Center—Organic

5-4

Employment

5-5

Chapter 6

CBRN STAFF CONSIDERATIONS AND PLANNING TOOLS

6-1

Mission Analysis

6-1

Mission Planning

6-5

CBRN Staff Responsibilities

6-7

Mission Preparation

6-8

Planning for CBRN Support and Interface

6-11

Chapter 7

PASSIVE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

7-1

Contamination Avoidance

7-1

Individual Protective Equipment

7-2

Collective Protection

7-2

Early Warning Systems

7-2

Decontamination

7-3

Appendix A

UNIT AND CBRN ORGANIC SUPPORT

A-1

Appendix B

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

B-1

Appendix C

ADVANCED CBRN TRAINING

C-1

Appendix D

CBRN SAMPLING TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

D-1

Appendix E

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ELEMENT

DECONTAMINATION OPTIONS

E-1

GLOSSARY

Glossary-1

REFERENCES

References-1

INDEX

Index-1

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Contents

Figures

Figure 1-1. CBRN CWMD core task crosswalk

1-2

Figure 2-1. Chemical reconnaissance detachment organization and manning

2-1

Figure 2-2. Chemical decontamination detachment organization and manning

2-4

Figure 3-1. Decontamination and reconnaissance team organization and manning

3-1

Figure 5-1. Site exploitation support cycle

5-2

Figure 5-2. Exploitation Analysis Center organization and manning

5-4

Figure 6-1. Support assets

6-2

Figure 6-2. Host nation interoperability considerations

6-6

Figure 6-3. PCISE tasks

6-12

Figure B-1. Levels of personal protective equipment use

B-1

Figure D-1. Sampling guidance issues

D-1

Figure D-2. Air and vapor sampling with Draeger kits

D-11

Figure D-3. Storing samples in the amber sample bag

D-12

Figure D-4. Storing samples in the blue sample bag

D-14

Figure D-5. Sample label

D-18

Figure E-1. Operational element decontamination procedures

E-1

Figure E-2. Expedient personnel decontamination site

E-3

Figure E-3. One-piece cutout

E-4

Figure E-4. Two-piece cutout

E-5

Figure E-5. EPDS rucksack component data

E-6

Figure E-6. Aircrew decontamination stations

E-7

Tables

Table B-1. Required protective equipment

B-2

Table B-2. Equipment level requirements

B-4

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

iii

Preface

Field Manual (FM) 3-05.132 is an Army special operations forces (ARSOF) Tier 2 publication. The acronym

ARSOF represents Special Forces (SF), Rangers (RGR), special operations aviation (SOA), Psychological

Operations (PSYOP), and Civil Affairs (CA)—all supported by the Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations)

(Airborne) (SB[SO][A]).

PURPOSE

FM 3-05.132 serves as a reference document for ARSOF commanders and staff, training developers, and

doctrine developers throughout the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). It provides

commanders with doctrinal considerations for organizing their individual CBRN operations and putting them

into action to accomplish missions.

SCOPE

This publication describes ARSOF CBRN missions and tasks for the chemical reconnaissance detachment

(CRD), chemical decontamination detachments (CDDs), ARSOF CBRN reconnaissance and survey operations,

decontamination and reconnaissance teams

(DRTs), and ARSOF sensitive site exploitation

(SSE), and

discusses reachback capability. This publication provides a basis for understanding the requirements of

individual special operations forces

(SOF) personnel operating in CBRN environments, as well as the

requirements of ARSOF staff planners across the range of military operations. The manual also provides

guidance for commanders who determine force structure, equipment, material, and operational requirements

necessary to conduct SOF CBRN missions described herein.

APPLICABILITY

FM 3-05.132 provides CBRN mission guidance to the CRD, CDD, and DRT commanders, and all CBRN

personnel throughout ARSOF. This manual gives ARSOF commanders and staffs a capabilities manual of what

the new assets can provide ARSOF in the CBRN environment. FM 3-05.132 also functions as a reference

document for training and doctrine developers throughout USASOC. This publication applies to the Active

Army, Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and United

States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

This manual is unclassified to ensure Armywide dissemination and to facilitate the integration of ARSOF in the

preparation and execution of campaigns and major operations. Unless this publication states otherwise,

masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. The proponent of this manual is the United

States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and

recommended changes on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly

to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or by e-mail to

JAComments@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Chapter 1

Introduction

This chapter illustrates how ARSOF CBRN units and capabilities support the

National Military Strategy for combating weapons of mass destruction (NMS-CWMD).

It serves to familiarize conventional staffs with the dynamics of SOF operational

support. It describes tactics, techniques, and procedures

(TTP), and capabilities

tailored to the CBRN dimension in special operations (SO) missions and activities.

ARSOF CBRN MISSION

1-1. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is responsible for synchronizing

planning for global operations against terrorist networks, which it does in coordination with other combatant

commands, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate United States (U.S.) government agencies. As

directed, USSOCOM executes global operations against terrorist networks. As a subordinate unit, the

USASOC has an important role in CWMD operations and recognizes that the probability of operating in a

CBRN environment exists; therefore, ARSOF must specifically organize, train, and equip to be successful in

a CBRN mission. The term CBRN environment includes the deliberate, accidental employment, or threat of

CBRN weapons and attacks with CBRN or toxic industrial materials (TIMs). ARSOF CBRN forces provide

CBRN reconnaissance, surveillance, and exploitation support for SOF in support of strategic, operational, and

tactical objectives in all environments (permissive, uncertain, and hostile) to support the geographic and

functional combatant commanders’ (CCDRs’) intent and objectives. This section defines the relationships

between ARSOF core tasks and the military mission areas identified in the NMS-CWMD and describes how

ARSOF CBRN units support the execution of the ARSOF core tasks across the spectrum of combating

weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) operations (Figure 1-1, page 1-2). Joint Publication (JP) 3-40,

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chapters 1 and 4, provide a complete description of the

NMS-CWMD.

PASSIVE DEFENSE

1-2. ARSOF units are capable of providing a wide range of specialized support to CWMD operations but

are generally not resourced to conduct large-scale CWMD operations. As such, the CBRN capabilities within

ARSOF are mostly used for passive defense and to support the execution of ARSOF core tasks. CBRN

capabilities are aligned with the four subtasks of CBRN passive defense: sense, shape, shield, and sustain. In

addition to minimizing the vulnerability to and effects of WMD attacks, the ARSOF CBRN capabilities also

minimize vulnerability to the effects of TIM accidents or events.

SENSE

1-3. CBRN “sense” is defined in JP 3-11, Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and

Nuclear (CBRN) Environment, as “activities that provide CBRN threat and hazard information and

intelligence to support the common operational picture.” ARSOF units’ primary defense against CBRN

contamination is to avoid becoming contaminated. Thus, the primary focus of ARSOF staff elements and

the specialized ARSOF CBRN units (CRD, CDD, DRT) is to prevent the contamination of ARSOF units

by providing them with the most relevant information and intelligence products. CBRN sense covers the

tasks of contamination avoidance and reconnaissance/detection. Executed together, these tasks produce the

initial intelligence picture of what potential threats and environmental considerations exist in the area of

operations (AO). Additionally, the reconnaissance/detection capabilities of ARSOF CBRN units provide

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

1-1

Chapter 1

the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and SOF commanders with an effective, deep CBRN

strategic-reconnaissance capability to detect and assess WMD in any environment.

Figure 1-1. CBRN CWMD core task crosswalk

Contamination Avoidance

1-4. Reducing ARSOF vulnerability to a CBRN event (whether accidental or threat initiated) begins with

the contamination avoidance process during the planning phases of an operation. Contamination avoidance

begins during the intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) process. The unit CBRN

officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) examine map data, geospatial imagery products, meteorological

data, and intelligence products, such as target information packets, human intelligence (HUMINT) reports,

or site surveys, to determine which areas have the greatest probability for force contamination. The unit

officer can then provide the commander with knowledge concerning what areas in the AO present the

greatest risk of contamination to the force.

1-5. Contamination avoidance is not a static process. The CBRN officer and NCO must continually

update their assessment of CBRN hazards in the AO to provide the commander with the most relevant

information of the greatest potential for the force to avoid being contaminated should a CBRN event occur.

1-2

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Introduction

Example Scenario

SFODA XXXX has developed a target packet on a suspected insurgent leader with

ties to heroin production. In preparation for a strike, the battalion S-2 section reviews

available imagery of the site and notices a large collection of metal barrels outside of

the compound. Due to the target’s ties to heroin production, the battalion CBRN cell

also reviews the imagery and is able to identify the barrels as potentially containing

the hazardous chemicals required for refining opium into heroin.

Reconnaissance and Detection

1-6. Every company-level organization within USASOC possesses a limited capability to conduct CBRN

reconnaissance and detection. The Army common equipment issued to each unit will detect the presence of

most military chemical compounds and high levels of beta and gamma radiation. Still, this equipment only

alerts the unit to the presence of significant levels of military chemical compounds and radiation, may

show false positive readings, and maintains extremely high detection thresholds. Only the CRD, CDD, and

DRT possess the specialized equipment and training to deliver a presumptive analysis of a potential CBRN

substance. It is the presumptive analysis that gives the commander data of such quality that operational

decisions can be made relying on this data.

1-7. The ARSOF core tasks special reconnaissance (SR) and counterproliferation of weapons of mass

destruction (CPWMD) are supported by the CBRN core task sense. CRDs and DRTs provide operational

support to SR and CPWMD missions.

Example Scenario

At 0330L, a massive explosion rocks the desert in western Iraq. The explosion is of

such magnitude that seismic detectors in Baghdad recorded the event; however, no

imagery assets were available to record what happened. As word spreads, there is

concern that the explosion might have been a low-order nuclear detonation. SFODA

XXXX is tasked with infiltrating to the vicinity of the explosion site and confirming or

denying the presence of residual radiation. A 2-man element from the CRD is

attached to the SFODA to provide technical assistance in determining the presence,

type, and strength of radiation.

SHAPE

1-8. CBRN “shape” is defined in JP 3-11 as “the command and control (C2) activity that integrates the

sense, shield, and sustain operational elements to characterize CBRN hazards and threats and employ

necessary capabilities to counter their effects.” Given the unique capabilities of ARSOF CBRN units,

CBRN shape is broken down into two subtasks—CBRN staff functions and exploitation. CBRN shape is

the most critical of the four core elements as this is the integration and fusion of CBRN-related information

into the decision-making and mission-planning processes to minimize the effects of a CBRN threat or

event.

Staff Functions

1-9. The ARSOF CBRN staff has a critical role in ensuring that CBRN-related information is thoroughly

analyzed and developed to provide CBRN situational awareness of potential areas of vulnerability within

the SOF area of responsibility (AOR). The ARSOF CBRN staff will then develop a CBRN risk assessment

and vulnerability analysis in accordance with (IAW) FM 3-11.14, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Vulnerability Assessment. To enhance situational

awareness, the SOF CBRN staff establishes and maintains open lines of communication between the

different staff sections; CBRN cells at higher, subordinate, and adjacent units; and the leadership of all

assigned or attached CBRN units. The staff integration part of CBRN shape is used to support FID,

counterterrorism (CT), PSYOP, Civil Affairs operations (CAO), and information operations (IO) ARSOF

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

1-3

Chapter 1

core tasks. The commonality of these tasks is that none of them have active CBRN roles; however, if the

CBRN cell is not fully integrated with the other staff sections, indicators of CBRN activity or vulnerability

may be missed. In addition, PSYOP, when properly planned, are a valuable capability that may be used to

not only shape the operation, but mitigate possible negative effects of an adversary’s use of CBRN. The

following scenario further explains the importance of CBRN cells.

Example Scenario

SFODA XXXX has developed a target packet on a suspected insurgent leader with ties to

heroin production. In preparation for a strike, the battalion S-2 reviews available imagery

of the site and notices a large collection of metal barrels outside of the compound. Due to

the target’s ties to heroin production, the battalion CBRN cell also reviews the imagery

and is able to identify the barrels as likely containing the hazardous chemicals required for

refining opium into heroin. This information is passed to the SFODA prior to the strike.

The SFODA is then able to update its protection measures in the event that the barrels

are destroyed during the strike and/or an operational heroin lab is discovered, thus

reducing the possibility of casualties received from inhaling any hazardous fumes

released.

Exploitation

1-10. The primary ARSOF organic asset that supports special operations forces site exploitation (SOFSE)

operations is the CRD. ARSOF CBRN assets support SOFSE by providing tactical situational awareness

concerning the contents of the objective to the maneuver commander, packaging that information for

transmittal to higher echelons, and ensuring an uninterrupted chain of custody for any items removed from

the objective. This information provides intelligence assets at higher echelons high-quality data to analyze,

which in turn will assist maneuver commanders in determining future mission priorities. Exploitation

support is associated with direct action (DA) and CPWMD SOF core tasks. Chapter 5 outlines specific

topics concerning ARSOF CBRN asset support to SOFSE. The following scenario also further explains

exploitation.

Example Scenario

SFODA XXXX has developed a target packet on a suspected insurgent leader with ties to

heroin production. In preparation for a strike, the battalion S-2 reviews available imagery

of the site and notices a large collection of metal barrels outside of the compound. The

battalion CBRN cell is able to identify the barrels as likely containing the hazardous

chemicals required for refining opium into heroin. This information is passed to the

SFODA prior to the strike. The SFODA is then able to update its protection measures in

the event that the barrels are destroyed during the strike and/or an operational heroin lab

is discovered, thus reducing the possibility of casualties received from inhaling any

hazardous fumes released. Additionally, the SFODA requests a 4-man CRD team to

confirm/deny the presence of drugs on the objective. At the appointed hour, the mission

proceeds. The SFODA is successful in securing the compound and detaining the target.

With the objective secured, the CRD team conducts a sweep of the compound. A swipe

test of the target’s hands shows positive for heroin, which allows the team intelligence

sergeant (18F) to ask more direct questions during a tactical questioning of the target.

Additionally, once the photographs, site sketches, samples, and evidence collected are

sent to higher headquarters (HQ) for analysis, it is determined that the SFODA has

disrupted a primary source of income for a regional insurgent network, which in turn will

help shape future operations to further disrupt insurgent activity in the region.

SHIELD

1-11. CBRN “shield” is defined in JP 3-11 as “individual and collective protection measures essential to

mitigating the effects of CBRN hazards.” ARSOF units place the priority of effort for CBRN defense on

1-4

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Introduction

active denial operations, counterproliferation (CP) operations, and contamination avoidance to significantly

reduce the threat capability to use CBRN materials in an attack against SOF lines of effort. However, these

efforts cannot be relied upon exclusively to eliminate the threat of a CBRN attack; therefore, ARSOF units

maintain limited passive CBRN protection and operational protection measures. Should an ARSOF unit be

forced to continue operations in a contaminated environment, the ARSOF unit will depend entirely on

collocated conventional units for life support and collective protection (COLPRO) requirements. This

section is subdivided into passive protection measures and operational protection measures. Passive

protection measures differ from operational protection measures by accounting for naturally occurring

events, such as malaria outbreaks or industrial contamination and deliberate attacks while operational

protection measures are only used to protect friendly forces against a CBRN attack. All SOF core tasks are

somewhat supported by CBRN shield as ARSOF will always have access to protective measures against

CBRN threats wherever they go. Specifically, though, CBRN shield supports unconventional warfare

(UW) and FID, especially since ARSOF units conducting these missions will be working with indigenous

forces that may request protective equipment from SOF elements if their government or organization is

unable to provide it. These types of requests could present a challenging problem if there is limited

stockage of U.S. protective equipment in the theater.

Passive Protection Measures

1-12. ARSOF use passive protection measures to avoid CBRN contamination. The passive protection

measures used are developed by the CBRN staff in conjunction with the S-3 and S-2 sections during

predeployment planning. Based upon the threat capabilities, naturally occurring hazards, indigenous

activities in the AO, and any other relevant concerns, the staff sections will make a recommendation to the

commander on which passive protection measures to employ.

1-13. Medical surveillance of U.S. forces and indigenous populations is a critical part of a passive

defense. ARSOF units, especially CA elements, excel at conducting medical surveillance of indigenous

populations through the conduct of medical civic action program (MEDCAP) and veterinary civic action

program (VETCAP) operations. These operations can provide early warning of a biological or radiological

event. Should any unusual events or trends be identified by medical personnel, the CBRN staff along with

the S-2 can aid in determining if the event was a naturally occurring event or a biological/radiological

attack and advise the command on the best course of action (COA) in conjunction with the medical

personnel.

Operational Protection

1-14. ARSOF units only possess COLPRO equipment at the battalion level and higher. Thus, any ARSOF

personnel operating away from these locations will depend entirely on collocated conventional units for

COLPRO requirements. The only operational decontamination assets organic to ARSOF units are held in

the CDD, DRT, and at battalion-level or higher HQ. Appendix A provides additional information about

unit and CBRN organic support.

SUSTAIN

1-15. Due to the constantly changing and highly mobile mission set performed by ARSOF, the organic

capabilities to restore combat power after a CBRN attack are somewhat limited. The best defense against a

CBRN attack for an ARSOF element is generally avoidance. If, however, an ARSOF element becomes

contaminated either during a CBRN attack or accident, the unit’s combat power must be restored as

quickly as possible. To that end, the ARSOF element would implement one or all of the main tenets of

CBRN “sustain,” which include decontamination, resupply, medical support, and site remediation. Similar

to CBRN shield, CBRN sustain supports all ARSOF core tasks in general, but only UW and FID

specifically, and for the same reasons.

Decontamination

1-16. Decontamination is the process by which contamination is removed from a contaminated surface.

The primary decontamination units in ARSOF are the CDDs organic to SF groups and the DRTs organic to

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

1-5

Chapter 1

the Ranger regiment. The primary decontamination capability that ARSOF units have is the expedient

personnel decontamination system (EPDS). This capability allows ARSOF to conduct immediate and

operational-level decontamination; however, SOF must be supported by conventional CBRN units for

thorough decontamination.

Resupply

1-17. To reconstitute an ARSOF unit quickly, an effective resupply/refit mechanism must be in place.

This function is primarily handled through existing ARSOF logistics channels. The reconstitution process

begins with a thorough decontamination of equipment as soon as operationally feasible after the

contaminated unit completes EPDS procedures. If thorough decontamination is not feasible, all

contaminated equipment is destroyed in place to render it useless to enemy forces and to prevent the spread

of contamination. Logistics channels must be able to replace major end items of equipment assigned to that

contaminated unit in order to restore combat power.

Medical Support and Site Remediation

1-18. ARSOF units are not manned or equipped to provide large-scale medical support to indigenous

populations or U.S. forces if a CBRN accident or attack occurs. Similarly, SOF units are not equipped to

conduct contaminated site remediation operations. Both of these functions of CBRN sustain are beyond the

scope of ARSOF missions and must be handled by units specifically trained and equipped to conduct those

types of operations. In the absence of U.S. or coalition medical or area decontamination support, ARSOF

personnel may act as advisors to host nation (HN) agencies as they conduct operations.

ACTIVE DEFENSE

1-19. The ARSOF core task DA directly supports this military mission area. ARSOF units are only

capable of diverting, neutralizing, or destroying WMD or their delivery means on the ground. If the WMD

are being delivered by aerial means (aircraft spray, missile, bomb, or indirect fire), ARSOF units have no

organic capability to actively defend against the WMD attack.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1-20. These missions are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive surgical actions by SOF or

SO-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, or recover a WMD threat. DA missions include raids;

ambushes and direct assaults; standoff attacks; terminal guidance operations; precision destruction

operations; recovery operations

(including noncombatant evacuation); and antisurface, mine, and

amphibious warfare. ARSOF units perform the following:

WMD interdiction. If directed, SOF can conduct or support DA, SR, CT, CP, and IO missions to

deter or prevent the acquisition of WMD, neutralize proliferation where it has occurred, and

operate against the threats by WMD to defeat them. ARSOF are tasked with organizing,

training, equipping, and otherwise preparing to conduct operations in support of United States

Government (USG) CP objectives.

WMD elimination. ARSOF units are not organized to conduct WMD elimination operations.

However, the highly specialized capabilities of ARSOF CBRN units can provide unique types

of support to a WMD elimination mission.

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

1-21. Where proliferation has occurred in regions of potential conflict, deterrence of an adversary’s

CBRN weapons employment is a principal U.S. national objective. USASOC trains and prepares forces to

meet the requirements for planned, contingency, and unexpected (but plausible) operations in CBRN

environments in the GCC’s AOR. ARSOF CBRN assets provide the GCCs and SOF commanders with an

effective, deep CBRN strategic-reconnaissance capability to detect and assess WMD in any environment.

1-6

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Introduction

1-22. Proliferation of CBRN weapons places an increased reliance on intelligence-collection efforts. The

evidence from such efforts defines the threat capability to develop, produce, stockpile, and employ CBRN

weapons. U.S. foreign policy decisions and initiatives depend heavily on the evidence of using (or

preparing to use) CBRN weapons in conflicts not directly involving the United States.

1-23. SOF are deployed worldwide across the range of military operations in peace and war. Since the

1960s, the United States has dealt with a series of asymmetric threats that have increased in lethality

exponentially over time. The evolution of terrorism has shown trends over time that evolved conventional

Cold War threats into asymmetric threats. Foreign terrorism continues to be active against U.S. targets

overseas. This activity mandates allocating additional resources to combat asymmetrical threats and protect

U.S. national interests.

1-24. Emerging asymmetric threats (such as WMD) challenge the safety of this nation and its coalition

partners. In response to these emerging threats, U.S. forces must be capable of conducting special CBRN

reconnaissance activities to provide security assistance and support to interagency or joint operations; FID,

UW, and CT operations; and CPWMD.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS AND POTENTIAL CBRN THREATS

1-25. CBRN weapons and hazards can directly influence the operational environment in which ARSOF

operate. The most notable influences of the physical environment are weather and terrain. Weather

conditions are the “uncontrollable wild card” of CBRN employment and provide useful clues to probable

times and places for CBRN use. Diligent tracking of weather conditions aids in the assessment of risks to

SOF from CBRN weapons, as well as TIM hazards. In concert with weather conditions, the terrain

influences where CBRN effects may concentrate (for example, chemical agents in low-lying areas) and in

many cases, it influences enemy CBRN targeting, such as exploiting or creating chokepoints. The AORs in

which SOF operate may contain several environments, each with a distinct set of CBRN planning factors

and considerations.

URBAN AREAS

1-26. Urban structures such as sewers, storm drains, reinforced concrete buildings, subways, and

basements can protect against spray attacks of chemical or biological agents and the effects of nuclear blast

and radiation. However, this exchange for overhead cover creates other problems. Chemical agents tend to

act differently in urban areas and will tend to collect in low areas; nonpersistent agents may enter buildings

or seep into piles of rubble. ARSOF personnel should avoid these low areas. Also, ARSOF personnel

should attempt to shut down ventilation systems in urban structures to prevent the spread of vapor or

aerosol hazards. The persistency of an agent can greatly increase when it has settled in these areas. Once an

attack has occurred, detection of chemical contamination becomes very important. Personnel must

thoroughly check areas before attempting to occupy or traverse them.

1-27. The stable environment of an urban area may increase the persistency of live biological agents and

the effectiveness of toxins. Existing food and water supplies are prime targets for biological agents.

Personal hygiene becomes very important. Leaders must establish and consistently enforce sanitary and

prophylactic measures, including immunizations. They must also ensure that all personnel drink safe water

and never assume that any local water is safe.

1-28. The population density of an urban area must be considered. During planning, the potential of

encountering a large number of contaminated, panicked, injured, and dying people must be considered.

Urban areas can be susceptible to an adversary’s use of TIMs as a weapon, especially if there is a sizable

chemical industry or storage facilities associated with the area. SOF should be aware of potential hazardous

materials (HAZMAT) they may encounter. FM 3-11.4, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection, provides additional information.

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

1-7

Chapter 1

DESERT AREAS

1-29. Desert operations may present additional problems. Desert daytime temperatures can vary from

90° Fahrenheit (F) to 125°F resulting in unstable temperature gradients that are not particularly favorable

to chemical or biological (CB) attacks. Evaporation of chemical agents during the day will rapidly create a

downwind hazard and an inhalation problem. However, with nightfall, the desert cools rapidly, and a stable

temperature gradient occurs, creating the possibility of night or early morning attacks. FM 3-11.4 provides

further information.

LOW-TERRAIN, TEMPERATE ZONE AREAS

1-30. An adversary’s use of CB or TIMs can be effective in this environment when forces are not

prepared. These weapons (nonpersistent) are more efficient when used at night and during periods of

inversion conditions. Terrain features, such as tall grass or scrub brush, have the tendency to retard the

flow of an agent cloud, thus reducing the overall size of the contamination. Also, the grass and brush may

absorb the chemical agent, which would not pose a significant effect on the mission. However, movement

through the area requires care, as the absorbed agent may be released when the vegetation is disturbed or

crushed, creating a secondary toxic hazard. Persistent agents can cling to vegetation, creating surface

exposure and an off-gassing during daylight. TIMs, such as chlorine, may tend to meander, as would a fog.

1-31. Movement of a biological aerosol over grass and brush reduces the concentration as the particles

impact on vegetation and settle out of the air. However, the cover provided by vegetation protects the

biological agent from the weather and, thus, favors the agent’s survivability, specifically the wet aerosols.

FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC Agents

(Including Smoke and Incendiaries), provides additional

information.

MOUNTAIN AREAS

1-32. Terrain and weather in mountainous areas magnify the requirement for a high degree of CBRN

defense preparedness. Rugged terrain limits the employment of large forces, reduces maneuver, and

impedes logistical support. Shelters are difficult to dig and may require improvisation using existing rocks,

snow, and timber. However, this same terrain may also provide caves, ravines, and cliffs as a natural

source of protection.

1-33. Chemical agents are heavier than air and will settle in valleys and depressions. Subject to mountain

breezes, agents will move down and within the valley. Thus, high dosages are less likely on crests or sides

of ridges or hills.

1-34. Radiation contamination will be erratic due to rapid changes in wind patterns, but at the same time,

the range of thermal effect increases with the clarity of mountain air. The location of hot spots may be

erratic. Additionally, a nuclear blast can produce rock and snow slides.

JUNGLE AREAS

1-35. Tropical climates require the highest degree of individual discipline and conditioning to maintain

effective CBRN defensive readiness. Leaders and staff planners must expect and plan for a rapid decrease

in unit efficiency. They must also anticipate heat casualties. Strict adherence to field sanitation is

necessary. In addition, they must ensure that special precautions are taken to maintain unit CBRN defense

equipment in usable condition. The rapid mildew, dry rot, and rust inherent in jungle areas necessitate this

requirement.

1-36. Dominant climatic features of jungle areas are high, constant temperatures; heavy rainfall; and very

high humidity. These features increase the survivability of biological agents. In thick jungle, there is

usually little or no wind, and the canopy blocks most of the sunlight from the ground, thus providing

excellent conditions for adversary use of biological agents and toxins. The same canopy that may provide

slight shielding from radiation may also enhance blast effect with tree blow-downs and projectiles. Also, a

lack of penetrating wind may result in decreased downwind hazards.

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FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Introduction

1-37. A jungle canopy creates good overhead cover from aircraft spray. However, persistent agents

delivered by artillery or bombs may penetrate the canopy before being released, thus creating a hazard in

the immediate area of impact. Additionally, rains can wash radiation into water collection areas, producing

hot spots.

COLD-WEATHER REGIONS

1-38. Cold-weather conditions create many added problems in CBRN defense. During the winter months,

45 percent of the North American landmass and 65 percent of the Eurasian landmass are characterized by

extreme cold and deep snow. These areas include Korea, China, Bosnia, Kosovo, Russia, Ukraine,

Kazakhstan, and the United States. The former Soviet Union developed procedures to weaponize a series

of agents to be effective in extreme cold weather. Some of those agents do not have known freezing points.

In temperatures from -20°F to -40°F, agents such as Sarin (GB) become like a thickened Soman (GD).

Choking agents have increased persistency from 0°F to -40°F. Even hydrogen cyanide (AC), which

solidifies at -14°F, can be disseminated as fine particles, thereby increasing its effective time and threat.

Mustard agents employed through pyrotechnic devices create effective vapor hazards far below the

freezing point of mustard.

MARITIME ENVIRONMENTS AND RIVERINE AREAS

1-39. ARSOF operating in maritime environments have the potential of encountering chemical, biological,

or radiological attacks from the shoreline. However, a chemical attack is considered the most likely. Delivery

of a nonpersistent chemical agent, in favorable climatic conditions, is no different across open water from

that of low, rolling terrain. The effects of wind and heavy surf tend to disperse a chemical cloud. Direct use

of persistent agents against deploying forces is not considered feasible, but contamination of a beach would

provide a formidable barrier. Mustard agents can remain for extended periods of time on the surface of the

water. Surface vessels operating in support of SOF risk being attacked by artillery, missile, or air depending

on their offshore location. The feasibility of using biological agents, except against large targets, is low.

However, radiological contamination as a barrier should be considered in any plan.

1-40. Operations on and around rivers present situations that have a potential to disrupt operations. Use of

both persistent and nonpersistent agents will require ARSOF to establish mission-oriented protective

posture (MOPP) levels that could degrade personnel effectiveness. During inversion climatic conditions,

nonpersistent chemical agent clouds have the tendency to follow a river’s path when channeled by the high

grass and brush along the banks. Persistent agents could be used to contaminate the riverbanks. FM 3-6

provides additional information.

CHEMICAL AGENTS

1-41. Chemical warfare (CW) agents produce both immediate and delayed effects that will degrade

operations through lethal, incapacitating, or other damaging effects to individuals as well as contamination

of equipment, supplies, and critical terrain features. The types of CW agents that could be encountered by

USSOCOM forces can be classified according to their physiological effects or their military use. These

types of CW agents include choking, nerve, blood, blister, and incapacitating agents. Agents may exist as

solids, liquids, or gases. In addition, TIMs and potentially dangerous herbicides or pesticides could be

encountered accidentally or employed by an adversary.

1-42. Choking, nerve, blood, and blister agents are chemical substances intended for use in military

operations to kill, seriously injure, or hinder military operations through their physiological effects. They

are classified as nerve, choking, or blood agents. Nerve agents are considered the primary agents of threat

to the U.S. military because of their high toxicity and effectiveness through multiple routes of entry. Nerve

agents attack the body’s nervous system. Even small quantities are extremely toxic and can cause death in

less than 15 minutes if personnel are not treated.

1-43. Incapacitating agents include blister (mustards) and compounds that affect the nervous system

(quinuclidinyl benzilate and lysergic acid diethylamide [LSD]).

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8) - page 9