Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7)

Chapter 5

CLASSIFICATION

Originating Section, Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Date/Time Group

CMO ESTIMATE NUMBER:

REFERENCES: List maps, charts, CMO-related documents, and local command guidance.

1. (U) MISSION. Cite the restated CMO mission from mission analysis.

2. (U) SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.

a. (U) Characteristics of the area of operations. (Key CMO factors derived from the

intelligence estimate and area studies/assessments).

(1) (U) Weather. State how the military aspects of weather affect CMO.

(2) (U) Terrain. State how aspects of terrain affect CMO.

(3) (U) Civil Considerations:

(a) (U) Attitudes of the population (cooperative or uncooperative).

(b) (U) Availability of the population (cooperative or uncooperative).

operations.

(d) (U) Number of dislocated civilians in the area.

(e) (U) Amount and type of war damage suffered by the economy

(particularly in transportation, public utilities, and communications).

(f) (U) Status and character of civil government.

(g) (U) State of health for the civilian populace.

(h) (U) Ability of local police, judicial authorities, and correction officials to

maintain public order.

(i) (U) CMO environment. When working at the tactical level, describe the

areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

b. (U) Enemy Forces. Include key CMO factors from the intelligence estimate and area

assessments. Address enemy capabilities by considering sabotage, espionage, subversion,

terrorism, and movement of dislocated civilians, and their ability to influence or affect planned

military operations and CMO.

c. (U) Friendly Forces.

(1)

(U) Current status of CMO resources (OGA).

(2)

(U) Comparison of CMO assets and resource requirements versus CMO

capabilities available and recommended solutions for discrepancies.

3. (U) COURSE OF ACTION.

a. (U) List the friendly COAs war-gamed.

b. (U) List the evaluation criteria identified during COA analysis. All staff sections use the same

evaluation criteria.

CLASSIFICATION

Figure 5-1. Civil-military operations estimate format

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Employment Considerations

CLASSIFICATION

4. (U) ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION.

a. (U) COA 1.

(1) (U) Analyze the CMO concept of support using the CMO analysis. All staff

sections use the same evaluation criteria.

(2) (U) Estimate the likelihood of accomplishing CMO objectives in the available

time, given friendly CMO capabilities and vulnerabilities, versus those likely threat COAs.

(3) (U) Determine the potential for unintended consequences of CMO tasks and the

possible impacts on both adversary and friendly COAs.

(4) (U) Identify critical subsystems within ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities,

organizations, people, and events) that should be evaluated within COA analysis to assess CMO

requirements.

(5) (U) Assess the effectiveness of CMO-related capabilities in relation to each

other, and the most significant CMO-related vulnerabilities.

(6) (U) Evaluate the risk of failure to reach CMO goals or objectives in terms of

affects on the success of the COA.

(7) (U) Analyze the risk in executing CMO in the COA in terms of nonavailability of

assessments or resources.

(8)

(U) List essential elements of friendly information for this COA.

(U) COA 2. (Repeat the process outlined above for all COAs.)

5. (U) COA COMPARISON. Compare the COAs in terms of the evaluation criteria. Rank-order

COAs for each criterion. Visually support the comparison with a decision matrix.

a. (U) Compare the costs of CMO in each COA based on the resources and time required

to execute them in relation to the operational impact of their success (if a stated evaluation

criterion).

b. (U) Compare the levels of risk to COA success and friendly assets should CMO fail (if a

stated evaluation criterion).

c. (U) Summarize the advantages and disadvantages for CMO in each COA to evaluate

the chance of success in each (as taken from the CMO analysis).

6. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

a. (U) Recommend a COA based on the comparison (most supportable for the CMO

perspective).

b. (U) Present CMO issues, deficiencies, risks, and recommendations to reduce their

impacts.

/signed/

(Designation of staff officer or originator)

APPENDIXES: (As required)

CLASSIFICATION

Figure 5-1. Civil-military operations estimate format (continued)

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FM 3-05.2

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Chapter 5

CLASSIFICATION

Headquarters

Place

Date, time, and zone

MISO ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION NO:

1. ( ) REFERENCES:

a. ( ) List maps and charts.

b. ( ) Include other relevant documents (such as special MISO studies, special MISO

assessments, and intelligence estimates).

(1) ( ) When the MISO estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line

of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the final page of the estimate is

modified to include authentication by the originating section, division, or other official, according to

local policy.

(2) ( ) Normally, MISO estimates are numbered sequentially within a calendar year. The

estimate is usually distributed as an appendix to the operations annex.

2. ( ) MISSION.

a. ( ) Supported unit’s restated mission resulting from mission analysis.

b. ( ) MISO mission statement. Describe the MISO mission to support the maneuver commander’s

mission.

3. ( ) SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.

a. ( ) Characteristics of the area of operations.

(1) ( ) Weather. How will weather affect the dissemination of MISO products, access to

target audiences (winds-leaflet drops, precipitation-print products, and so on)? End product-MISO

weather overlay.

(2) ( ) Terrain. How will terrain affect dissemination of MISO products and movement of

tactical MIS elements? End product-MISO terrain overlay.

(3) ( ) Analysis of media infrastructure (location and broadcast range of radio and television

broadcast facilities, retransmission towers; print facilities, distribution and dissemination nodes);

identification of denied areas (not accessible by particular medium). End product-MISO media

infrastructure overlay.

b. ( ) Key Target Sets. Note: These sets will be further refined into a potential target audience

list. During the target audience analysis process, the target audiences will be analyzed and further

refined. This is not the only target set that MIS will have to deal with. To fully support the supported

unit commander, MISO must consider all key target sets, not solely adversary forces. End product-

MISO key target sets overlays (hostile, friendly, neutral).

(1) ( ) Hostile Target Sets. For each hostile target set, identify strength, disposition,

composition, capabilities (ability to conduct propaganda and ability to help or hinder the MISO effort),

and probable COAs as they relate to MISO.

(2) ( ) Friendly Target Sets. For each friendly target set, identify strength, disposition,

composition, capabilities (ability to conduct propaganda and ability to help or hinder the MISO effort),

and probable COAs as they relate to MISO.

CLASSIFICATION

Figure 5-2. Example of Military Information Support operations estimate

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Employment Considerations

CLASSIFICATION

(3) ( ) Neutral Target Sets. Include target sets with unknown attitudes. For each neutral

target set, identify strength, disposition, composition, capabilities (ability to conduct propaganda and

ability to help or hinder the MISO effort), and probable COAs as they relate to MISO.

c. ( ) Friendly Forces.

(1) ( ) Supported Unit COAs. State the COAs under consideration and the MISO specific

requirements needed to support each COA.

(2) ( ) Current Status of Organic Personnel and Resources.

(3) ( ) Current Status of Nonorganic Personnel and Resources.

(4) ( ) Comparison of Requirements Versus Capabilities and Recommended Solutions.

Compare MISO requirements for each COA with current MIS capabilities. List recommended

solutions for any shortfall in capabilities.

(5) ( ) Key Considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA Supportability. List evaluation

criteria to be used in COA analysis and COA comparison.

d. ( ) Assumptions. State assumptions about the MISO situation made for this estimate.

4. ( ) ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTIONS.

a. ( ) Analyze each COA from the MISO point of view to determine its advantages and

disadvantages for conducting MISO. The level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and

urgency of need determine the detail in which the analysis is made.

b. ( ) The evaluation criteria listed in paragraph 3c(5) above establish the elements to be

analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these factors realistically and include

appropriate considerations that may have an impact on the MISO situation as it affects the COAs.

Throughout the analysis, the staff officer must keep MISO considerations foremost in mind. The

analysis is not intended to produce a decision but to ensure that all applicable MISO factors have

been considered and are the basis of paragraphs 5 and 6.

5. ( ) COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTIONS.

a. ( ) Compare the proposed COAs to determine the one that offers the best chance of success

from the MIS point of view. List the advantages and disadvantages of each COA affecting MISO. The

comparison should be visually supported by a decision matrix.

b. ( ) Develop and compare methods of overcoming disadvantages, if any, in each COA.

c. ( ) State a general conclusion on the COA that offers the best chance of success from a MISO

perspective.

6. ( ) RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

a. ( ) Recommended COA based on comparison (most supportable from the MISO perspective).

Rank COAs from best to worst.

b. ( ) Issues, deficiencies, and risks, for each COA, with recommendations to reduce their

impact.

(signed)

J-3/MIS Staff Officer

ANNEXES:

DISTRIBUTION:

CLASSIFICATION

Figure 5-2. Example of Military Information Support operations estimate (continued)

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FM 3-05.2

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Chapter 5

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

5-28. HSS is generally a noncontroversial and a cost-effective means of using the military element to

support U.S. national interests in another country. Initiatives for HSS cannot realistically improve the entire

health care system for the HN; instead, long-term developmental programs that are sustainable by the HN

are stressed. Short-term surge support of critical areas to the FID program can be pursued and immediate

action in a humanitarian crisis may be the temporary focus of HSS. Routine HSS activities are targeted

toward the health problems facing the HN military and, in conjunction with other U.S. agencies, civilian

health initiatives through CAO and FHA. An additional best practice in FID is to provide HSS in remote or

urban areas in which health care is poor or nonexistent. Possible HSS activities include providing public

health activities, to include preventive medicine and veterinary care, food hygiene, immunizations of

humans and animals, childcare, preventive dental hygiene, and paramedic procedures. This includes—

Providing medical civic action programs.

Providing dental civic action programs.

Providing veterinary civic action programs.

Providing triage, diagnostic, and treatment training.

Developing logistic programs.

Developing education programs.

Developing intelligence and health threat analysis.

Developing HN military field HSS system for treatment and evacuation.

Assisting in the upgrade, staffing, and supplying of existing HSS facilities.

Developing wellness and preventative care, including public information programs.

5-29. Army forces should be employed in HSS programs that are affordable and sustainable by the HN.

This includes pursuing realistic training and acquisition programs. In addition to training HN personnel

during FID operations, medical education opportunities for HN personnel through international military

exchange training may be pursued. Following a course of realistic HSS measures and programs may also

entail mitigating unrealistic expectations among the HN populace. Other effects can emerge from HSS as

well, such as a real or perceived imbalance in health care development. Resources should be shifted to

areas where imbalance exists.

5-30. Army units, even when operating in a robust FID, typically can provide only a small portion of the

HSS needs of the HN; therefore, close cooperation with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs can enhance the support

provided by Army units. Commanders should seek to increase the effectiveness of other USG agency

programs such as USAID whenever possible. Working with or near IGOs and NGOs may be untenable due

to the desire to preserve the reality or perception of neutrality. Units may have to settle for awareness of

IGO and NGO activities and employ themselves so as not to duplicate efforts in HSS.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IN INDIRECT SUPPORT

5-31. HSS indirect support to FID programs is generally accomplished by medical training teams and

advisors. The focus is on identification of medical threats that affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the

HN military forces and the design of programs to train and equip those forces. Typically, the main effort of

such training has been conducted by SF with support from other ARSOF units. However, conventional

force medical personnel often have higher levels of training and may bring greater resources to FID

operations. MISO has historically supported and advised HN counterparts in programs to support HSS. If

public affairs personnel are available, they too can provide public information on HSS. Wellness and

instructional MISO can seek to increase participation in medical or veterinary programs that some portions

of the populace may be reluctant to use due to their cultural bias. In addition, introduction of new

behaviors such as sanitary food or water practices can be pursued. HSS can cross boundaries into direct

support as well because FID operations may involve simultaneous conduct of both indirect and direct

support.

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Employment Considerations

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IN DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS)

5-32. Direct HSS is provided when the HN lacks the capability to provide specific types of care or general

care in a localized area that rises to a level of possibly fueling recruitment, fund-raising, or propaganda for

an internal threat. Army units may provide direct HSS in both small-scale and large-scale FID programs.

Typically this is accomplished by training and by providing direct health care for the military and, when

authorized, for the civilian population. Army units may be the only U.S. forces able to provide direct HSS

in FID operations through de minimis (minimal and inexpensive) HCA. FID operational personnel may

provide varying degrees of transportation, logistic, and informational support to such HSS activities.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

5-33. FHA programs are conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or

other endemic conditions, such as disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or

that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA is limited in scope and duration. The foreign

assistance provided by U.S. forces supplements the efforts of the HN civil authorities and international

organizations that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA programs allow U.S.

military medical personnel to provide care during disasters or to support nonmilitary objectives. Activities

may include any type and level of care based on HN conditions. Some typical areas include—

Triage, emergency, and trauma care in ongoing medical crises.

Epidemic prevention and immunizations.

Displaced person care and preventative measures.

Dental and veterinary screening programs.

Health care infrastructure repair.

Wellness education.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ACTION

5-34. A special condition of HCA operations is to fulfill valid U.S. military unit training requirements.

Although all HCA operations should strive to meet desired MOEs, the benefit to the local populace is

secondary to meeting the training requirements prescribed under law for any such operation. Assistance

provided to HSS under these provisions is limited to—

Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in HN rural areas.

Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems that increase access to health care.

Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

Rudimentary construction and repair of health care facilities.

Detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, which includes

activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect

to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war.

5-35. Many countries’ IDAD programs lack the resources to reach their entire population. HCA combines

HN military, civilian, and international health agencies, and U.S. military efforts to provide care and to

enhance legitimacy and visibility of the HN government. The mandate to train Army personnel as the

primary goal of HCA will entail planning and detailed employment coordination. Coordination is critical

and the use of site surveys is imperative to effectively use all assets to derive a primary training benefit for

the U.S. Army personnel involved.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IN COMBAT OPERATIONS

5-36. HSS in combat operations generally consists of the support provided by U.S. military forces. Army

personnel may advise the HN military on HSS concerns in conjunction with combat- or rear-echelon

operations. In addition, Army units, notably CA and MIS, may be tasked with supporting HSS to displaced

persons. Limited training can occur during lulls or in secure areas in combat operations, provided security

can be maintained. Training of HN personnel may be necessary before they can provide sufficient HSS to

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FM 3-05.2

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Chapter 5

relieve ARSOF or conventional units. As experienced trainers, SF and other ARSOF medics and HSS-

trained personnel may be tasked to provide this training. During authorized combat operations, the force

structure is typically sufficient for allowing conventional force medical personnel to be provided with

adequate security. MISO programs during combat operations may include supporting MIS objectives that

target health-related behaviors. Teams may also disseminate such programs in the mission of supporting

enemy prisoner of war and civilian internee camps.

PLANNING FOR HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

5-37. HSS to FID programs must be an integral part of all U.S. military planning in order to successfully

employ Army units to the greatest effect. In that units can support HN civilian as well as military HSS,

planning may be broader and more in-depth than operations such as noncombatant evacuation operations

or peacekeeping operations. HSS planning is driven by the specific issues of each HN, but the following

requirements should be considered:

Patient movement.

Hospitalization.

HSS logistics.

Laboratory services.

Blood management.

Dental services.

Veterinary services.

Preventive medicine services.

Administration and mission command.

Facilities and maintenance.

FACTORS IN HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT EMPLOYMENT

5-38. The goal of employment of HSS to support FID programs is to achieve a state of development where

the HN can sufficiently provide care to its own population. While providing direct HSS to the HN, units

conducting FID should emphasize the development of the HN internal capacity to meet its needs. Army

units should seek to maximize the effects of their employment in HSS activities through coordinated and

synchronized programs with other Service medical personnel, USAR forces, and other service reserve

forces, when available. Army units may also use American Embassy resources.

5-39. In addition to organic resources of conventional forces and ARSOF units, the HSS capacity of

SB(SO)(A) may be used to support FID HSS operations. SB(SO)(A) force health protection personnel

perform the following functions:

Treat patients with diseases, noncombat injuries, combat stress or battle fatigue, and trauma injuries.

Provide limited sick call, triage of mass casualties, limited advanced trauma management, and

surgical resuscitation and stabilization (with surgical augmentation).

Provide operational, emergency, and essential dental care.

Maintain Class VIII resupply and medical equipment for supported units.

Provide medical laboratory and radiology services commensurate with Level II ARSOF medical

treatment (SB[SO][A]).

Provide veterinary augmentation to supported SOF and conventional units.

Provide extended patient holding for up to 20 patients (full team) until evacuation assets

become available.

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Employment Considerations

Afford limited reinforcement and augmentation to supported battalion medical platoons.

Coordinate with the unit ministry team for required religious support.

Provide preventive medicine consultation and augmentation for supported units.

SITE SURVEY PROCEDURES

5-40. All Army units conducting FID operations need a detailed site survey of the area or areas to which

they are deploying. All site surveys contain some of the same basic information but the level of detail and

the specific data varies by unit and within each unit by mission. For a variety of reasons, the number of

personnel in a site survey team should be as small as possible. When practical, cross-trained personnel may

assess more than one subject; however, the inclusion of some MOSs is desirable. The products of the site

survey vary, but all surveys need to answer the questions deemed necessary to mission success by the unit

during its preparation for deployment. Various tools, including checklists or electronic templates, may be

used. A suggested site survey checklist is shown in Figure 5-3, pages 5-15 through 5-17. Paperless copies

of surveys may be used as long as data is both backed up and safeguarded. Although FID site surveys are

typically overt, the product of the survey may be designated as classified information and should always be

treated as sensitive information.

SITE SURVEY TEAM MISSION

5-41. The mission of the site survey team is to accurately report the existing HN mission, enemy, terrain

and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations, along with any specific

data designated by the commander to its parent unit. The team may establish in-country mission command

systems and logistics relationships for the follow-on unit mission execution; coordinate the reception of the

main body (sometimes termed an advance echelon); and, in all cases, assess these systems. In some cases,

units may redeploy a site survey team or a portion of it to brief commanders and the main body. Typically,

such personnel deploy again with the main body.

Security Assistance Organization

S-2

(1) Intelligence briefing.

(2) Threat briefing.

(3) Maps and photos of the area.

(4) Weather forecast data.

(5) Restricted and off-limits areas.

(6) Local populace (attitudes, customs, and dangers).

S-3

(1) Initial coordination.

(a) Tentative training plans.

(b) Aviation support tentatively available (hours and type of aircraft).

(d) Problem areas.

(e) Evasion plan of action-related directives, guidance, plans, or orders.

(2) Point of contact, phone number list, communications requirements, and systems used.

Figure 5-3. Suggested site survey checklist

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Chapter 5

Security Assistance Organization (continued)

S-4

(1) Transportation requirements.

(2) Special equipment requirements.

(3) Other support requirements.

(4) Construction equipment and supply requirements.

Host Unit

Commander

(1) Training plan.

(2) Current training status.

(3) Units available for training.

(4) Mission command.

(5) Additional training desires.

(6) Unit policies.

S-2

(1) Local civilians.

(2) Security policies and problems.

(3) Populace control requirements (identification cards/passes).

S-3

(1) Training plan.

(2) Support available.

(a) Ammunition.

(b) Weapons.

(d) Aircraft/air items.

(e) Facilities:

z Training areas.

z Classrooms.

z Ranges.

z Training aids.

z Special equipment.

(3) Unit equipment.

(4) Landing zones and drop zones in the area.

(5) Maps.

(6) Rations for field training.

(7) Daily training schedules and status reports.

(8) Point of contact for training problems.

(9) Holidays and unit requirements that may interfere with training.

(10) Medical and dental support.

(11) Communications capabilities.

(12) HN activities.

Figure 5-3. Suggested site survey checklist (continued)

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Employment Considerations

Host Unit (continued)

S-4

(1) Security assistance/FID personnel facilities.

(a) Barracks.

(b) Drinking water.

(d) Secure storage areas.

(e) Electrical power supply.

(2) Fuel supply.

(3) Rations.

(4) Transportation.

(5) Lumber and materials for training aids.

(6) Special equipment.

(7) Ammunition.

(8) Availability of construction equipment/tools and supplies.

Figure 5-3. Suggested site survey checklist (continued)

SITE SURVEY TEAM PROCEDURES

5-42. Specific areas of concern may arise before any FID operation but all site survey teams conduct some

common activities before departure. Among others, the site survey team conducts predeployment activities

in order to—

Secure required travel documents:

Obtain visas and passports.

Furnish a copy of the country clearance message sent by the American Embassy, if

required.

Update medical and immunization records:

Obtain any pharmaceutical prophylaxis.

Receive a medical threat brief.

Conduct finance briefs and obtain (if issued) Class A funds and designated fund sites.

Receive, when applicable, the Security Assistance Training Management Organization briefing.

Confirm with the U.S. HN team that all agencies concerned with the site survey have been

briefed on the team’s itinerary. Ensure the agencies are available for coordination.

Receive updated threat briefing and review the ROE and status-of-forces agreement.

Conduct mission analysis and briefback as directed.

Note: The larger the force package deploying to a FID operation, the more likely that the site

survey team will be acting for and briefing several units or teams.

COORDINATION WITH UNITED STATES AGENCIES AND HEADQUARTERS

5-43. Upon arrival in the HN, the site survey team informs the SAO of its arrival and status. The team

makes immediate contact with the senior military headquarters in-country or the predesignated lower

headquarters. Because conditions in the HN may have changed during transit, the team should obtain

updated threat information. The survey team should arrive ready to brief the mission and program of

instruction to the SAO and any other designated agents for approval or modification.

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FM 3-05.2

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Chapter 5

5-44. The survey team commander and S-3 (if deployed) establish the command relationship with the next

higher in-country U.S. commander if he is not in the team’s normal chain of command. The team

commander also briefs the next higher in-country U.S. commander on the planned execution of the survey

and the required preparations for the main body.

5-45. The survey team commander also obtains any additional guidance from the higher in-country U.S.

commander or the Country Team for the follow-on forces’ mission execution. At a minimum, this guidance

includes confirmation of the ROE, evasion and personnel recovery support, and any limitations on

relationships with HN counterparts. The survey team commander discusses the following areas with the SAO:

Training objectives.

Terms of reference.

Political situation.

Guidelines for official and personal associations with foreign personnel.

Currency control.

Intelligence support procedures.

Administrative support.

Legal issues and status changes.

Procedures for obtaining in-country logistics.

Information gaps remaining on the operational environment.

5-46. The team commander confirms or establishes communications and reporting procedures between the

next higher in-country U.S. commander, the American Embassy, the survey team, and the follow-on unit.

The team commander must also identify the availability of communications equipment needed to support

the mission. The team commander confirms or establishes procedures for obtaining logistics. He identifies

a point of contact at the Country Team crisis management element or at the emergency operations center of

the U.S. military staff. The point of contact then informs the survey team of necessary actions during times

of increased threats or emergencies that require evacuation of U.S. personnel from the HN. The team

commander establishes the procedures to obtain intelligence support from the next higher in-country

commander and other U.S. agencies.

5-47. The survey team establishes direct working relationships with its next higher in-country or out-of

country support element. The survey team—

Identifies the supporting element location.

Contacts the supporting element to determine the limitations of the available support and the

expected reaction time between the initiation of the support request and its fulfillment.

Requests support for the in-country reception of the main body.

Confirms or establishes communications procedures among the supporting element, the survey

team, and the follow-on unit.

Identifies, at a minimum, primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communications

procedures for mission command, all available logistics, and medical evacuation.

Reports the established communications support requesting procedures for the follow-on unit(s).

5-48. The survey team establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and to synchronize

operations. The survey team should use the implementation matrix for an interagency plan as a tool to identify

the location of all HN or U.S. agencies planned for operations in a collaborative environment. Appendix D

provides detailed information on interagency coordination. Initial contact with concerned agencies to establish

coordination is invariably a high priority. Some common areas of coordination are the—

Exchange of information and intelligence.

Confirmation or establishment of communications procedures.

Confirmation or establishment of other coordination protocols:

MIS themes to stress and avoid.

Approval authority of the MISO program.

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Employment Considerations

Parameters of acceptable civil information management and reporting procedures.

Area’s diplomatic constraints and procedures.

Established IGO and NGO coordination procedures.

Multinational (other than HN) coordination mechanisms.

5-49. The site survey team then reports any newly established or changed procedures for inclusion into the

future FID plans.

COORDINATION WITH HOST NATION AGENCIES AND UNITS

5-50. The survey team commander or specified subordinates establish direct working relationships and

rapport with the HN commander or agency director and any key personnel deemed necessary. The survey

team—

Briefs the HN commander or agency director on the survey mission and the restrictions

and limitations.

Obtains the HN commander’s or agency director’s assistance to develop the tentative objectives

for training and advisory assistance.

Deduces or solicits the HN commander’s or agency director’s actual estimate of his unit

capabilities and perceived training, advisory assistance, and materiel requirements including—

Training plans.

Current training status and needs.

Units available for training.

Training facilities.

Obtains the HN approval of the plan and requests linkup with counterparts.

5-51. Lacking any specific authorizations to do so, the team does not make any promises (or any

statements that could be construed as promises) to the HN commander or agency director about

commitments to provide assistance or fulfill materiel requirements. If authorized to communicate any

planned and resourced aid, the team stays strictly within the parameters of resourced aid. In particular, the

survey team does not make any comment to the host government on the possible availability of USG

resources in any form. In addition, the team cannot provide any kind of independent assessment or

confirmation of an external threat, as perceived by the HN; however, internal threats may be assessed by

their external support and are typically releasable to the HN to the degree of intelligence shared. Providing

advice on strategy, doctrine, basing, combat planning, or operations may also be prohibited.

ANALYZING TRAINING NEEDS

5-52. The survey team analyzes the status of the HN unit to determine their requirements for training and

advisory assistance. The survey team—

Collects enough information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and selects tentative

training and advisory assistance COAs.

Prepares written estimates for training and advisory assistance COAs that are prioritized in order

of desirability.

Determines the unit location and its effect on the populace.

Collects and analyzes all information affecting force protection.

Determines the HN unit’s existing logistics and maintenance support shortfalls and capabilities.

Determines the compatibility of recommended equipment with equipment in the HN inventory.

5-53. The survey team helps the HN unit prepare facilities (training, security, and administrative) for the

execution of the mission. The survey team inspects the HN facilities that the unit and its counterparts use

during the mission. The survey team identifies any deficiencies that prevent the execution of the tentatively

selected training and advisory assistance COAs.

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5-19

Chapter 5

5-54. After the inspection, the survey team commander recommends to the HN commander or agency

director the most desirable COAs to correct any deficiencies found, and the commander also emphasizes

how to achieve the desired training and advisory assistance objectives. The survey team commander—

Ensures the HN understands that the desired COAs are still tentative and contingent on the U.S.

commander’s decision.

Ensures the higher in-country U.S. commander and Country Team are informed of significant

findings in the survey of the HN unit.

Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on units after obtaining HN input.

5-55. The survey team may not be able to finalize some crucial items of the survey before traveling to the

operational environment, such as the HSS site survey. The site survey team gathers information to

complete a detailed HSS threat assessment. This assessment is the base document for HSS planning and

subsequent employment to support the FID program. Other areas could include detailed infrastructure,

media, and local perception assessments. Finally, before departing from the HN, the survey team again

visits all concerned U.S. and HN staff agencies to clarify any unresolved problem areas. All parties,

including the main body at the home station, must be apprised of issues that could deter or substantially

limit the Army’s participation in the mission.

ADVISING THE HOST NATION MILITARY

5-56. Influencing HN military institutions to support a democratic process can only be done practically and

effectually with the long-term presence of U.S. military personnel working alongside HN forces. Personnel

who arrive for short visits typically are treated as visitors and are not able to penetrate the fabric of the HN

culture or its institutions. Although short visits (such as most joint combined exchange visits for training)

can serve other useful purposes, the long-term presence of U.S. military personnel is required to strengthen

HN democratic institutions and effect individual and institutional reform in the HN military. Although the

historical precedent among ARSOF disciplines for long-term dedicated advisors has typically rested with

SF, the possibility also exists of other ARSOF disciplines and conventional force Soldiers providing

advisors on a long-term basis. This chance increases when combat operations are authorized.

BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC HOST NATION MILITARY

5-57. An advisor must strive to transmit the concept of democratization and a subservient military to his

counterpart. These concepts are often considered inherent in the American way and are so basic in the

United States that they are not discussed much in training. The most important mission of an advisor is to

enhance the military professionalism of his counterpart. He must influence the HN military and prepare it

to deal with a changing and typically unfamiliar environment by emphasizing civilian control over the

military and demonstrating the advantages of a democratic system of government. In addition, HN officials

are not normally confused over moral rules; however, because of the dangerous situation confronting the

nation, they may be convinced that their only effectual recourse is to ignore these rules. Therefore, building

professionalism and strictly adhering to the moral rules of a professional Soldier are critical to this process.

5-58. A major cause of an advisor’s failure is his inability to maintain a good working relationship with his

counterpart. The unsuccessful advisor often fails to understand why his counterparts may not feel the sense

of urgency that he does. He is unable to realize that his counterpart may remain and continue to fight the

enemy long after his tour is over and he returns to the safety and comfort of the United States. This lack of

a sense of urgency may be cultural as well. The counterpart may be part of a deliberating culture that is

averse to instituting quick change or quick action.

5-59. The advisor must be aware of the scope and limitations of the principal security assistance programs

authorized by the FAA and AECA. The ROE determine if and how security assistance personnel may

perform their duties near a known combat area, to include any duties related to training and advising that

may result in U.S. personnel engaging in combat activities. It is not prohibited for trainers and advisors to

defend themselves regardless if combat operations have been authorized by the President. Historically and

realistically, for the foreseeable future all FID operations assume risk. The environment plays a big factor in

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Employment Considerations

an advisor’s role. The GCC and the Country Team assume the level of risk necessary and practicable for the

specific environment in the HN relative to the importance of the country to national security and interests.

ADVISOR EMPLOYMENT FACTORS

5-60. In addition to many situational concerns, there are four major advisor employment factors:

The HN stage of development.

Their military organizational makeup.

The status of the advisor.

Rapport.

5-61. Along with proven techniques and certain personal and professional qualities that are typically a

catalyst to successful advising, these factors are key to understanding the challenges an advisor faces.

Advisors must rely on a combination of the predeployment information, intelligence available on the above

factors, and observations of the specifics of the unit being advised. Perhaps most importantly, this combination

includes a read of the personality, professionalism, and competence of the advisor’s counterpart.

Host Nation Stage of Development

5-62. The administrative machinery may still be developing in situations where the HN government may

have been in existence in its present form for centuries or independent only for a short time. The advisor

must be aware of such situations and not be overly critical. In an insurgency or other major internal threat,

the HN government is experiencing major problems. For instance, the money needed for social and

economic programs is mostly directed toward security needs. In an ideal situation, the HN government

would use this money to help restore the society’s economic and social problems. In addition, the new HN

government can be dealing with problems of a previously failed government or with policies that favored

the nation from which they achieved independence. The advisor must be aware that some changes are of a

magnitude that may require change that is only finalized in a generational timeline.

Host Nation Military Organizational Makeup

5-63. The advisor must know HN socio-political and military organizations and their interrelationships, to

include personalities, political movements, and forces involved. Social, political, and economic factors

must also be assessed. Advisors must impress upon their HN counterparts the need for an integrated civil-

military effort to defeat an internal threat. Counterparts must learn that military actions are subordinate to and

supportive of the economic and social actions required for removing the internal threat’s causes and sustainers.

5-64. The advisor must be aware that other military organizations are more stratified than the U.S. military.

The advisor may have a counterpart or trainees that began as recruits. In addition, to a much greater degree,

socio-economic status can vary greatly at each level of the HN military. Many militaries throughout the

world have far less opportunity to advance, especially from enlisted to officer status. Services in the HN

can have varying degrees of support from the HN government and populace with the possibility of

considerable bias for or against one particular service.

Status of the Advisor

5-65. The advisor must fully understand his status in the HN as spelled out in agreements between the

United States and the HN. These agreements may provide full or very little diplomatic immunity. Without

an agreement, the advisor is subject to local laws, customs, and the jurisdiction of local courts. Regardless

of the diplomatic immunity afforded him; the advisor observes local laws, applicable laws of war, and ARs

and directives. Indeed, because of scrutiny, the advisor may need to visibly exceed the observance of laws

and regulations. This can be particularly true when advising a HN military traditionally plagued with

corruption or infidelity to civilian authority.

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5-21

Chapter 5

Rapport

5-66. Rapport is a sympathetic relationship between people based on mutual trust, understanding, and

respect. Personal dislike, animosity, and other forms of friction characterize a lack of rapport. The need to

establish rapport with HN counterparts is the result of a specific military position in which the advisor has

no direct authority or control over the HN unit or individual actions. However, an advisor can influence or

motivate his counterpart to act in certain ways by establishing and maintaining rapport.

5-67. Rapport occurs when each individual perceives the other as competent, mature, responsible, and

willing to work toward a common goal. If the advisor can convey this attitude to his HN counterpart, long-

lasting and effective rapport is possible, and effective rapport must exist to gain the control needed to

execute the mission. The successful advisor establishes rapport that allows influence over the counterpart’s

actions despite the absence of formal authority. Effective advisors also overcome the resentment that might

otherwise arise when advisors substantially or completely change the HN standing operating procedures

and TTP.

Level of Support

5-68. Advisors may be active at all levels of support including combat operations. Advisors must be

cognizant that the level of training or operational advising they provide is at either higher or lower levels of

intensity than the other FID operations going on elsewhere in the HN. A wide range of possibilities

confront an advisor in this regard. An advisor may be working with elite military or paramilitary forces at a

high degree of readiness. This same unit may then be part of a very selective use of lethal force used in a

FID operation primarily focused on nonlethal programs. Conversely, the greatest need for Army advisors

during combat operations may be with conventional HN units far from a state of readiness sufficient to be

operationally deployed. In addition, advisors can be active with HN units in and around U.S. indirect and

direct support not involving combat. Combat operations may concurrently be ongoing elsewhere in the HN

as well. In general, advisors train and advise the HN unit towards a goal of readiness.

ADVISOR TECHNIQUES

5-69. An advisor must always remember that he is an advisor and not a commander. He is not there to lead

troops and may alienate both commanders and the rank and file if he acts as if he is in command. The art of

advising involves empowering commanders and their personnel as much as the tactical situation allows.

The techniques of advising a counterpart successfully are detailed and nuanced. Several sources provide

detailed discussions of advisor techniques and procedures. For detailed discussions of these techniques, see

TC 31-73 or FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance.

PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL QUALITIES

5-70. The traits of a successful advisor encompass all the traits of leadership plus the ability to adapt to the

environment. This environment changes with the assignment area. To gain acceptance, the advisor must

prove his value and present a favorable personality in the eyes of his counterpart. This selling typically

occurs over time by gradually demonstrating his capabilities in an unassuming but firm manner; however, an

advisor may experience the phenomenon of instant credibility. The pitfall of this is that an expectation of

perfection cannot be fulfilled, because inevitably the advised HN force may suffer a shortcoming or defeat.

5-71. Persistence, balanced with patience, is a favorable trait of an advisor. An advisor must be extremely

flexible, patient, and willing to admit mistakes. He must persevere in providing sound advice. He must also

possess the ability to be highly diplomatic and possess a high degree of tact. The advisor avoids rushing

personal acceptance by the counterpart and does not oversell himself as this may arouse suspicion and

delay acceptance.

5-72. The advisor must thoroughly know the organization, equipment, and tactics of the unit he advises.

He must demonstrate an awareness of his counterpart’s problems. The advisor must be unwavering, but not

dogmatic, in his approach to any subject. If, however, the advisor is not sure of the subject matter, he says

so and takes the steps to obtain the correct information rather than trying to bluff his way through a

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Employment Considerations

problem. A successful advisor must have subject-matter expertise, the ability to demonstrate his capabilities in

an unassuming but convincing manner, and the clear indication of his desire to get along with counterparts and

other associates. Receptiveness to learning from a counterpart typically aids this process.

ADVISING DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS

5-73. Generally, personnel participating in advisory activities that fall under security assistance are, by

law, restricted from combat. The AECA

(Section

21) prohibits personnel from being directly or

purposefully tasked with providing defense services (including training) or from performing duties of a

combatant nature. Nevertheless, advisors retain the right to defend themselves. This prohibition does not

mean that advisors cannot be deployed to a HN in which combat is taking place, but rather it means that

advisors must deploy to secure locations. Realistically, under the scope of terrorist tactics and other

aggressive threats, absolute security for U.S. personnel is neither possible nor mandated by statute.

Therefore, security assistance teams shall not engage in or provide assistance or advice to foreign forces

while that unit is engaged in a planned combat operation or in an operation with anticipated contact with an

adversary. However, Soldiers who advise and assist the HN unit are not restricted in secure areas before or

after combat operations. Security assistance teams are further prohibited from performing operational

duties of any kind except as may be required in the conduct of on-the-job training in the operation and

maintenance of equipment, weapons, and supporting systems.

5-74. Once the President has approved combat authorizations, advisors frequently work with HN units

conducting operations. Advising HN units conducting or preparing for imminent combat operations creates

a specific and challenging opportunity. Advisors habitually help HN counterparts at levels above their U.S.

rank. In general, HN commanders accept this disparity if the advisor uses the above advisor techniques

judiciously. HN commanders generally recognize the subject-matter expertise of U.S. advisors, recognizing

that it is not equal to but greater than a member of the HN military with commensurate rank. The advisor

tactfully advises the commander but never usurps his command or authority. Ideally and typically, this is

an established relationship. The advisor does most of his advising while preparing for combat. He bases his

advice on his observations or those of his subordinates during past operations. He holds a private critique

with the commander upon completion of an operation.

5-75. Although less frequent in FID than in major combat operations, the possibility exists for Soldiers to

have formal command of a HN unit as established by a bilateral agreement. In FID, this arrangement

typically is also a vehicle for advising and mentoring a HN counterpart so that he can take command of the

HN unit. For instance, the advisor may lead a company and simultaneously mentor and evaluate the senior

platoon leader for company command. Advising and mentoring in this case should be conducted primarily

or exclusively during planning and after action. Advisors should allow for as much autonomy as possible

with HN subordinates as long as mission success does not suffer. To accomplish the latter, an advisor may

progress from a more directive leadership style to a less directive one or may selectively employ a more

directive leadership style as the situation allows.

5-76. Regardless of the exact circumstances of the unit being advised, the advisor blends the above

techniques with his personal experience and informed judgment to help the HN commander and unit in

improving their state of readiness and their execution of operations.

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5-23

Chapter 6

Operations

We must extend and enhance the transformation of key institutions, both domestically

and abroad... This effort will include improving our capability to plan for and respond to

post-conflict and failed-state situations. The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization

will integrate all relevant United States Government resources and assets in conducting

reconstruction and stabilization operations.

President George W. Bush

National Security Strategy, 16 March 2006

Within a FID program, the military instrument falls into three categories—indirect

support, direct support, and combat operations. The levels are not constrained to a

specific level of involvement. All levels of support can occur independently or

simultaneously, and a specific level of escalation is not required. U.S. support of

successful FID programs consists of many of the elements listed in this chapter

synchronized to fit the situation of a particular country. The type of support is based

on a HN and USG agreement; however, FID combat operations require Presidential

approval. Combat operations may represent an escalation of previous FID support or

may be authorized from the outset of FID.

OVERVIEW

6-1. Indirect support and direct support make up the majority of Army participation in FID programs.

This reflects the majority of USG security assistance training and direct participation in the IDAD

programs of friendly and allied nations. The ultimate goal of IDAD is to empower the HN to effectively

deal with any internal threat using its own resources and to eventually eliminate any subversion,

lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. For ARSOF and conventional forces, the goal of FID

is to provide assistance that negates threats and avoids the need for a higher level of support to the HN.

Ultimately, U.S. involvement with the HN military should only be comprised of routine peacetime

military-to-military training. In general, the chance of personnel facing hostile fire is less for indirect

support than direct support, but when supporting the suppression of an armed internal threat, the security

posture and ROE should always be considered for the most dangerous COA available to that internal

threat.

INDIRECT SUPPORT

6-2. When Army units enter a FID operation to provide only indirect support, the goal is to avoid

escalation of the conflict between the internal threat and the HN and to enable the HN to function

effectively through its own military instrument of power, thereby eliminating the need for further U.S.

military support. As stated previously, building partner capacity, collaborative participation, and often

command authorities are the rule in FID. During indirect support, embassy offices and resources may well

be the bulk of the effort; however, indirect support is not necessarily a stage in a continuum of conflict.

Indirect support is also generally going to be a significant part of FID operations involving direct support

or combat operations. The goal of indirect support is to build strong national infrastructures through

economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. These can include unit exchange

programs, personnel exchange programs, individual exchange programs, and combination programs.

Indirect support, whether a part of a FID program providing other support or a stand-alone program,

enhances the ability of the HN to conduct its own operations.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

6-1

Chapter 6

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

6-3. Security assistance is a group of programs authorized by the FAA of 1961 (as amended) and the

AECA of 1976 (as amended) or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles,

military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of

national policies and objectives. Security assistance is a principal military instrument of the USG in

assisting a friendly country along with other programs to support a country with subversion, lawlessness,

insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. The chief agencies involved in U.S. security assistance activities

are the province of the State Department, Arms Transfer Management Group, DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

the relevant GCC of the subordinate commands, and SAO. These agencies are typically under the auspices

and authorities of U.S. diplomatic missions. Activities associated with indirect support to FID operations

include introductory equipment training, general services, and training across the spectrum of HN units.

Army personnel may be required to support many of these programs and exercises.

6-4. Security assistance provides equipment, services, and training to support HN forces. The equipment

needs of the supported HN to execute a successful FID program are identified in a comprehensive IDAD

strategy. Each SAO coordinates the resulting military equipment requests with the combatant commander’s

staff and the Country Team. Finally, the combatant commander endorses equipment requirements and

provides recommendations to the SecDef. Services support includes any contract, test, inspection, repair,

training, publication, technical or other assistance, or defense information used for furnishing military

assistance. Services support does not include military education and training activities. Services support is

usually integrated with equipment support. FID planners should be aware that contract-funded security

assistance programs under the supervision of a SAO could be substituted for DOD personnel when

necessary and feasible. Contracted FID support activities may only affect HN units outside the training and

support plans of conventional forces or ARSOF or may need to be factored into overall indirect support.

Army units may support the equipping and servicing arms of security assistance with a primary focus on

the training aspects of security assistance as detailed in the following paragraphs.

FOREIGN-MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM

6-5. The principal means of ensuring America’s security is through the deterrence of potential aggressors

that would threaten the United States or its allies. Foreign-military financing is the USG’s program for

financing through grants or loans to acquire U.S. military articles, services, and training. This program

supports U.S. regional stability goals and enables friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities.

FMS are made available under the authority of the AECA of 1976 (as amended). Congress appropriates

FMS funds in the International Affairs Budget; the DOS allocates the funds for eligible friends and allies;

and the DOD executes the program. The FMS program helps foreign partners meet their legitimate defense

needs, promotes U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions with friends and allies

constructing cooperative bilateral military relationships, and enhances interoperability with U.S. forces.

6-6. The Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and Budget,

annually makes specific requests to Congress for the security assistance budget. The annual request is

published in the Congressional Budget Justification. The Congressional Budget Justification, prepared by

the DOS, in coordination with the DSCA and other U.S. agencies, is presented to the Congress for those

countries for which U.S. assistance is proposed. Congress reviews those requests and appropriates the

funds for various international assistance programs; for example, economic support fund; foreign-military

financing; defense administration costs; voluntary peacekeeping operations; IMET; and nonproliferation,

antiterrorism, demining, and related programs.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

6-7. FMS is that portion of U.S. security assistance authorized by the FAA of 1961 (as amended) and the

AECA of 1976 (as amended). This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the IMET

program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. The

FMS program is the government-to-government method for selling U.S. defense equipment, services, and

training. Responsible arms sales further national security and foreign policy objectives by strengthening

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Operations

bilateral defense relations, supporting coalition building, and enhancing interoperability between U.S.

forces and militaries of friends and allies. These sales also contribute to American prosperity by improving

the U.S. balance of trade position, sustaining highly skilled jobs in the defense industrial base, extending

production lines, and lowering unit costs for key weapon systems. This program also fosters training

opportunities for U.S. forces.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6-8. The IMET program is an instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy and a key

component of the U.S. security assistance program. The IMET program provides training and education on

a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. In addition to improving defense capabilities,

IMET facilitates the development of important professional and personal relationships. These relationships

provide U.S. access and influence in a critical sector of society that often plays a pivotal role in supporting

or transitioning to democratic governments. International military education has taken on greater

importance as an effective means to strengthen military alliances and the international coalition against

terrorism by promoting more professional militaries around the world through training.

COUNTERTERRORISM ASSISTANCE

6-9. One program designed to help nations in counterterrorism is the Counterterrorism Fellowship

Program. It is designed to aid GCCs with their counterterrorism programs by providing funds for foreign

military officers and selected civilians to attend U.S. military educational institutions, mobile education and

MTT courses outside the continental United States, selected regional centers for nonlethal training, or other

training and education permitted by Presidential and Congressional authorities. The Counterterrorism

Fellowship Program is designed to educate foreign military officers and selected civilian officials directly

involved in global operations against terrorist networks to build counterterrorism capabilities. This

program is also intended to provide friendly nations with the tools to enable them to sustain and grow their

internal counterterrorism capabilities.

HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAM

6-10. The Humanitarian Mine Action Program assists countries that are experiencing the adverse effects of

uncleared land mines and other explosive remnants of war. Modern U.S. humanitarian mine action began

in 1986, when U.S. Army SF teams in southern Honduras trained Honduran Army engineers to clear land

mines from agricultural land north of the Nicaraguan border. Since then, the Army has been involved in

humanitarian mine action around the globe. The GCCs directly manage this program. It contributes to unit

and individual readiness by providing specific in-country training opportunities that cannot be duplicated

in the United States. A DOD component of the program is a train-the-trainer program for training

indigenous personnel on mine-clearing procedures. Training teams, among others, can include SF, MIS,

CA, explosive ordnance disposal, and conventional force engineers.

NONPROLIFERATION

6-11. A major component of U.S. security strategy is the deterrence of countries and nonstate actors from

acquiring weapons of mass destruction or, if they already possess them, from proliferating them to other

countries or agents. The possibility of an internal threat acquiring weapons of mass destruction is

increasing and counterproliferation are those actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of

mass destruction against the United States, and our forces, allies, and partners. Army-provided training

may encompass active defense, passive defense, and consequence-management training for HN forces. In

addition, education and influence of HN military personnel to encourage conventional approaches rather

than reliance on weapons of mass destruction can be an effective means of curtailing the incipient stages of

a weapons of mass destruction mindset. In FID, particularly those with a large COIN subset, improvised or

poor man’s weapons of mass destruction enter into insurgent tactics (primarily terror tactics), such as the

use of a chlorine-carrier in a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in Iraq.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

6-3

Chapter 6

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES

6-12. Joint and multinational exercises are designed to support the GCC’s objectives within a specific

theater or region. These exercises are conducted to improve relations, enforce U.S. commitment to the

region, improve interoperability with HN forces, and enhance U.S. warfighting skills. These exercises can

be CJCS-, GCC-, and Service-sponsored events. Such exercises can positively affect the FID program of

the HN in which it is conducted and the participating regional countries. Intentional public information and

public diplomacy programs, as well as unavoidable media coverage of large-scale exercises, can bolster

FID programs within an entire region by demonstrating U.S. commitment to allies and friendly nations. In

many instances, unit involvement in CJCS-, GCC-, and Service-sponsored exercises involves working with

counterparts from the HN.

JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING

6-13. The joint combined exchange training program is conducted overseas to fulfill U.S. forces training

requirements and at the same time to exchange the sharing of skills between U.S. forces and HN

counterparts. The joint combined exchange program has provided SOF and ARSOF a stage to train in

austere, culturally, and politically sensitive operational environments. The program’s primary goal is to

train the SOF of the combatant command. The program is authorized under 10 USC, Section 2011, Special

Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces. The DOS, through the Leahy human rights

vetting guidance and international and security tracking procedures, ensures that the joint combined

exchange training program is conducted within a partner nation or with a partner that has no credible

evidence of gross violations of human rights. A historical mission of ARSOF units has been the training of

foreign SOF, foreign conventional forces, and foreign security forces. ARSOF units derive considerable

institutional and individual experience from training HN forces through the joint combined exchange

training program. The joint combined exchange training program enhances SOF skills, such as instructor

skills, language proficiency, and cultural immersion critical to required missions. ARSOF gain regional

familiarity, cross-cultural understanding, and intensive language training, and the HN friendly forces gain

incidental training benefits from the joint combined exchange training program. The release or disclosure

of classified military information including special operations TTP is governed by U.S. law and must be

reviewed along with unclassified official government information before disclosure to non-USG personnel.

All components conducting operations and training activities with foreign units or foreign nationals must

abide by applicable foreign disclosure requirements. The joint combined exchange training program

provides SOF access to numerous countries and regions throughout the world. Combatant commanders

will determine if adequate status of forces agreement protections are in effect for all joint combined

exchange training program activities. Recurring joint combined exchanges for training develop habitual

relationships with foreign military personnel for all Army personnel and foreign SOF (in general) and for

ARSOF units (in particular). USSOCOM Directive 350-3, Joint Combined Exchange Training, addresses

SOF-specific guidance and references DOS guidance.

6-14. One requirement of a joint combined exercise for training is that the HN provides the majority of

training to the U.S. unit while the U.S. unit provides a lesser amount of training to the HN. To achieve this,

training is structured with the HN quantitatively providing more training to U.S. personnel than it receives.

Qualitatively, however, the HN may derive considerable, if not more, benefit than ARSOF elements. The

goal of the joint combined exercise for training program is not to eliminate this qualitative advantage but

rather to derive the maximum overall benefit for both U.S. and HN forces. In addition, successive joint

combined exercises for training, especially those involving the same HN units over a period of years, have

a cumulative effect. Although not pronounced with new members of the HN unit, this effect is often highly

pronounced with professional HN officers and noncommissioned officers. Both the HN and the United

States derive the successive benefit of war-gaming multiple scenarios that might arise in the HN.

MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS

6-15. MTTs are a tailored and typically task-organized element, which is defined in part by JP 1-02,

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as a team consisting of one or more

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Operations

U.S. military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction.

This broad definition indicates what MTTs have become—any Service or civilian element conducting

training at the trainees’ home station. Originally pioneered by ARSOF, the term MTT is now used broadly,

including by other USG agencies, as well as civilian industry and enterprises. The preponderance of

conventional force MTTs in a HN has and continues to be typical in FID. ARSOF MTTs are specific in the

capabilities they train, with the common exception of training general light infantry tactics and some other

combat arms tasks. Frequently, MTTs train selective or elite HN military or paramilitary elements. All

Army units fall under the funding laws and regulations of either the FAA or AECA.

6-16. MTTs are used to train a HN element that requires on-site instruction and to conduct surveys and

assessments of training requirements. A MTT may be single Service or joint, SOF, or conventional forces.

Employment of a MTT is on a temporary duty basis for a period not to exceed 179 days, including travel;

however, a MTT may deploy for shorter periods, including deploying and training select HN units during a

joint combined exercise for training. A MTT may teach one or more iterations of the many short, intensive

conventional force or ARSOF specific courses. If HN forces require training for longer than 179 days,

training in the United States should be considered as an alternative. Frequently, an in-country MTT is

under the supervision of the Country Team and is generally under OPCON or administrative control of the

SAO. Preexisting joint and Army mission command relationships are maintained in cases where a GCC is

on the ground in the HN.

6-17. JP 1-02 states the mission of a MTT “is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and

employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill.” In

general, a MTT trains a HN unit in more than one area, to include self-sufficiency in some specific tasks.

Shorter MTTs tend to train one specific area or mission set. Several factors may be considered in deciding

to employ a MTT, and deployment of a MTT may not be the best option to accomplish HN training.

Frequently the decision to deploy a MTT is based on the following factors:

The training must take place as rapidly as possible or in response to a specific threat or adverse

condition affecting the security of the HN.

The training is inclusive and accomplishable within the time mandated.

The training reaches either large numbers of trainees or critical upper-tier or elite HN forces to

materially affect the situation in the HN.

The training is in specific tasks or common tasks trained to a high level.

The training requires use of language-qualified Soldiers or expertise in the use of interpreters in

a teaching environment.

The training can only practically be executed (typically because of the HN fiscal situation) in

the HN.

6-18. MTTs follow the same principles as all FID trainers and ideally have HN linguistic experience.

Regional cultural experience is necessary for MTT personnel. Typically, the MTT coordinates with the

SAO or regional security officer for logistic, training, security, and other needs. Under the legal guidelines

for MTTs, some portion of the costs associated with MTTs may be funded by the embassy or the HN.

Some of these expenses can legally be satisfied by several agencies; coordination is done on a case-by-case

basis.

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

6-19. Exchange programs primarily increase military contacts and military-to-military understanding and

interoperability. Exchange programs can range from the exchange of a single person to a battalion.

Exchange programs allow for the use of operations and maintenance money for the exchange of units or

individuals. They may be used to enhance the efforts of the security assistance programs funded under

IMET that allow HN personnel to train in the United States.

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6-20. These exchange programs foster greater mutual understanding and familiarize each force with the

operations of the other. Exchange programs include the following:

Reciprocal Unit Exchange Program. This program is for squad- to battalion-sized elements.

Each force trains the other nation’s force in their respective TTP. The proficiency of the units

must be comparable to preclude exchanging fully trained U.S. forces for untrained HN forces.

This requirement may preclude involvement.

Personnel Exchange Program. The personnel exchange program is a 1- to 3-year program in

which one person from the HN is exchanged with a U.S. member. This program, like reciprocal

unit exchanges, requires that the exchanged personnel be of comparable proficiency in their area

of expertise.

Individual Exchange Program. This program is similar to the personnel exchange program. The

difference is that it is a temporary duty assignment in-theater. The shorter duration of this assignment

may make it a more viable option to commanders than the personnel exchange program.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

6-21. ARSOF’s role as trainers significantly increases the likelihood that ARSOF units are the first U.S.

forces to begin conducting direct support. Because of the nature of ARSOF’s capabilities and core tasks,

ARSOF units may be the only units conducting direct support in some FID operations. Conversely,

ARSOF units may also be the only elements conducting indirect support (training) during FID operations

involving combat operations. The most frequent combination of types of support by ARSOF units is the

instance of simultaneously training HN personnel while conducting activities such as de minimis (minimal)

HCA, civic action programs, and MISO. ARSOF personnel in these instances train and participate in the

action. For instance, a joint combined exercise for training may train toward and culminate in a medical

civilian assistance program that involves U.S., HN, SF, CA, SOAR, and MIS personnel.

DIRECT SUPPORT

6-22. In the course of direct support, U.S. forces provide direct assistance to the HN by actually

conducting operations to support the civilian populace or the military. This support can be evaluation,

training, limited information exchange, and equipment support. The 10 USC authorities usually fund direct

support. Direct support may continue to include training local military forces as well as logistic,

intelligence, or MIS support conducted by Army forces. The intent of direct support is to increase support

to the HN, which may be in conjunction with indirect support. Typically, direct support is conducted when

the HN is not yet self-sufficient against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats or

when it faces a security challenge beyond its ability to overcome. Direct support may not involve combat

operations conducted with HN forces. The goal may be to keep U.S. forces from participating in combat

operations, which may stem from political concerns, or to ensure the HN remains in the forefront of all

operations to ensure or gain legitimacy. Strict ROE guide U.S. forces should they become involved in

unplanned combat operations when conducting direct support activities. Typically, without the

authorization of combat operations at the Presidential level, Army units are constrained to self-defense

actions in the event of hostile action.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

6-23. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and FM 3-05.40 define CMO. These operations include assisting

host or friendly countries in bringing about political, economic, and social stability while encouraging the

development of a country’s material and human resources. CMO are a range of possible activities that are

considered based on the desired level of civilian support, availability of resources, and inadvertent

interference by the local population.

6-24. The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and achieve operational

U.S. objectives. CMO integrate civil and military actions while conducting support to civil administration,

PRC, FHA, nation assistance, and civil information management. CMO support the internal development

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of the HN during FID operations. They focus on the indigenous infrastructure and population in the

operational environment. Successful CMO support the development of favorable attitudes, feelings, or

behaviors among the populace toward the HN IDAD projects.

6-25. Soldiers, other than CA personnel, frequently become involved with CMO activities because of their

association with civil and military leaders within their operational environment through the conduct of their

missions. In general, other Army elements can aid CA units to help HN military forces develop effective

civil programs that generate interest in the populace to support the IDAD programs of the HN government.

In some instances, CA units may be more effective, more credible, or both if the population perceives them

as independent of other Army activities.

6-26. During mission analysis, the overall commander of FID operations may determine the need for

augmentation by one or more CA teams. A large-scale FID operation could involve a much larger force

structure and possibly the standing up of a CMO center. Any such contingency is likely to involve some

USAR CA units.

6-27. Early CA augmentation builds on the unit’s understanding of the political, economic, social,

religious, and cultural factors that influence their operations in the HN. CA teams are responsible for

producing the unit CMO estimate and CA annex to the unit OPLAN. CA teams also help the unit with a

postdeployment area assessment to update area studies.

6-28. CA personnel working with other units on a FID mission provide expertise and advisory capabilities

in the area of CMO. They—

Review U.S. security assistance program and HN IDAD goals.

Plan CMO to support the HN plan.

Plan CMO in accordance with JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations.

Train HN military to plan, prepare for, and conduct MCA programs, PRC operations, nation

assistance, and other CMO appropriate to the IDAD of its country.

Establish and maintain contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.

Identify specific CMO missions conducted by the HN military.

Train on the TTP required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency,

terrorism, and other threats.

Develop indigenous individual leader and organizational skills to isolate insurgents from the

civil population and protect the civil population.

6-29. CMO are the responsibility of military commanders at all levels. The successful military unit

establishes a good working relationship with appropriate civil authorities and nonmilitary agencies in its

operational environment. Army units must demonstrate how supported HN forces can integrate CMO into

their military operations.

Populace and Resources Control

6-30. Military operations are not conducted in a vacuum that is free of civilian presence or influence. No

matter the operational environment, operations can be disrupted by the movement of frightened civilians in

the environment, as well as movement of civilians conducting legitimate activities. PRC operations consist

of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. These controls are

normally a responsibility of indigenous civil governments. For practical and security reasons, military forces

use PRC measures of some type and to varying degrees across the full spectrum of operations. PRC operations

can be executed in conjunction with and as an integral part of all military operations, to include FID.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

6-31. FHA encompasses short-range programs, such as disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation

operations, HCA, nation assistance, and dislocated civilian operations, aimed at ending or alleviating

present human suffering. FHA is usually conducted in response to natural or manmade disasters, including

combat. FHA is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies

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that have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance in their country. The GCC’s

military strategy may include FHA to support FID operations as a component of the overall program to

bolster the IDAD capability of the HN.

6-32. Humanitarian civic action programs can be valuable to the GCC’s support of FID programs and in

training U.S. forces. HCA programs are specific programs with funding authorized under Section 401 of

10 USC, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations.

Humanitarian civic action programs, in conjunction with a military exercise, help the HN population.

6-33. FID units, in conjunction with HN units, may be directly involved in providing FHA to a needy

populace. Section 401 of 10 USC, governs the use of U.S. military forces in HCA. Some forms of FHA

may not extend to individuals or groups engaged in military or paramilitary activities.

6-34. In FID operations, units may also act as the coordinating or facilitating activity for FHA provided by

the NGOs that respond to the emergency needs of a community in the operational environment. The unit

should get its HN military counterparts involved in this activity as early as possible to foster public support

for the HN military. Exploitation of FHA completed by the HN military through MISO, public affairs, and

public diplomacy is generally beneficial.

Nation Assistance

6-35. Nation assistance is civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that

nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded

between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, other

10 USC programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or IGOs. Nation

assistance operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive

institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. All nation assistance activities are usually

coordinated with the U.S. Ambassador through the Country Team. Nation assistance subtasks are security

assistance, FID, and MCA.

6-36. Successful MCA projects win support of the local population for government objectives and for the

military forces in the area. Projects must conform to the national plan and fit the development program for

the area. Examples of these projects are farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range education programs,

basic hygiene, medical immunization programs, and simple irrigation projects. MCA employs mostly

indigenous military forces for these short-term projects.

6-37. For a MCA program to be successful, the local populace, benefiting from the projects, must have a

voice in the selection of projects and the establishment of priorities. Units must review (pretest) all projects

with the populace before the project begins. They must also conduct a posttest with the local people to

determine whether the project met the objectives. Failure to follow up can negatively impact the overall

IDAD mission in the area.

Support to Civil Administration

6-38. Support to civil administration encompasses military operations that help stabilize or continue the

operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established

government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil

administration occurs most often in stability operations. Some civil administration support is accomplished

as an adjunct to other CAO, namely PRC, FHA, and nation assistance. Support to civil administration

consists of two distinct mission activities—civil administration in friendly territory and civil administration

in occupied territory.

Civil Information Management

6-39. Civil information management is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a

central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, and other agencies

in the collaborative environment. Civil information is developed from data relating to civil areas, structures,

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Operations

capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) within the civil component of the commander’s

operational environment. This data can be fused or processed to increase the situational awareness, situational

understanding, or situational dominance of the DOD, interagency, international organizations, NGOs, and

indigenous populations and institutions. Civil information management ensures the timely availability of

information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to

both military and nonmilitary partners throughout the operational environment. Civil information management

subtasks are civil reconnaissance and the civil information grid.

Note: The civil information grid provides the capability to coordinate, collaborate, and

communicate to develop the civil components of the common operational picture. The civil

information grid increases the situational understanding for the supported commander by

vertically and horizontally integrating the technical lines of communication. This framework

links every CA Soldier as a sensor and consumer to the civil information management cell of the

civil-military operations center and the civil-military operations cell.

Other Considerations

6-40. Cultural characteristics in the operational environment are important to the local populace and

require protection from military operations. In FID operations, units may need to tactfully approach HN

forces to locate and identify religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated places and seek recommendations

against using them for military purposes. This may be a sensitive subject if either the HN or an internal

threat has violated religious or historic sites in past operations. It is incumbent upon the unit to help the HN

forces determine methods and operational techniques that are most acceptable to the populace and still

allow for completion of the military mission.

6-41. If required, Army units, with CA support, may support civil administration missions with the HN

government. Typically, this support is in areas reclaimed from the control of the insurgency or other

internal threat. Direct support helps HN military forces plan and conduct MCA. Since MCA is part of the

overall U.S. security assistance program, formal agreements between the HN and the United States govern

this support.

6-42. Public affairs support to CMO primarily informs the populace about the many things the HN

government and military are doing for the people. Public affairs products can also keep the people abreast

of the political, economic, and social situation in other parts of the country and tactical and strategic

successes of the government over insurgent forces. In addition, MISO may use such successes to

encourage or discourage behaviors in target audiences at other locales. Various media, such as

loudspeakers, leaflets, and radio broadcasts, may be used to prepare, induce, or exploit the populace to

obtain answers to questions such as—

How effective are the PRC measures that are in use?

What behaviors will bring PRC measures to an end?

What civic action projects are being conducted in the area?

How can target audiences access or support programs?

How effective is encouraging the reporting of threats at interfering with or sabotaging

programs?

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

6-43. MISO typically must be an integral and vital part of a HN IDAD program. The only exception to this

rule would be if the HN has employed MISO in the past and lost credibility with target audiences or with

the majority of the population as a whole. However, this may not preclude U.S. MISO forces from

executing programs in the HN if they have credibility with intended target audiences. At the other extreme,

Soldiers may have to educate their HN counterparts in the value and role of MISO in FID. MIS elements then

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must advise and help HN forces in developing and implementing an effective MISO program. An effective

MIS plan depends on timely information, as well as intelligence, that includes knowledge of the—

History, culture, background, current environment, and attitudes of potential target audiences.

Organization, motivation, and sources of personnel and materiel supply of the internal threat.

Strengths and weaknesses of ideological and political proponents and opponents.

6-44. MISO can be used to gain the cooperation or noninterference of critical target audiences within the

populace. MISO programs target not only internal threats or foreign groups but also target audiences

within the HN. Planners tailor MISO to meet specific needs for each area and operation. They evaluate the

psychological impact of all military actions. A strict approval process governs MISO programs. In FID,

MIS approval may be maintained at the highest levels, namely at the Presidential or SecDef levels.

However, even in a politically sensitive or volatile FID operation, approval is frequently delegated at least

to the COM or GCC. Approval can be delegated as low as brigade level. Soldiers, as a whole, must be

aware that MISO are sensitive, strictly controlled activities that produce mid- to long-range results. They

must communicate these facts to the HN chain of command and any unfamiliar elements within the

collaborative environment of FID operations.

6-45. MISO sustain the achievement of U.S. national objectives and target specific audiences. A common

misconception is that MISO can target mass audiences with blanket programs. MISO target specific

audiences to induce a specific behavioral change. Mass public information programs are a function of

public affairs; however, MISO can support in the dissemination of command information. MISO are

employed to influence adversary decisionmakers or groups.

6-46. MISO can support the FID mission by seeking to encourage or reinforce behaviors that discredit the

internal threat to the supporting or neutral groups. MISO can also induce withdrawal of support for

subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to prevent recruitment of new members

from neutral target audiences. Other frequent supporting information operations objectives intend to

provoke dissension among the internal threats and to encourage defections at all levels of support for and

within the threat. Divisive programs create or exploit dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion,

and defection within the internal threat. Target audience analysis may show that internal threats are

susceptible to national programs to win insurgents over to the government’s side with offers of amnesty or

rewards. Typically, this target audience analysis reveals potential motives for returning to lawful

participation in society or government that can range from personal rivalries and bitterness to

disillusionment and discouragement. Target audience analysis may also reveal that pressure from the

security forces is exploitable as a persuasive agent.

6-47. MISO should ultimately strive to identify the cause of internal threat behaviors or the contributing

factors that drive those behaviors. By isolating the cause, MISO can target the perceptions and beliefs that

fuel the internal threat’s operations. MISO programs can also influence and change behaviors to indirectly

deal with an insurgency or other internal threat, such as the reporting of internal threat activity through

various means.

Civilian Population

6-48. Various target audiences in the HN civilian populace are frequently the main or critical target

audiences to the overall MISO program during FID. Sometimes these are large target audiences or several

large target audiences with similar vulnerabilities and susceptibilities. Conversely, sometimes only a small

proportion of the populace confined in a limited number of target audiences are the base of support for an

internal threat, such as in a minority ethnic separatist movement. In such instances, target audiences may be

less susceptible to MISO directed toward them and may require programs of longer duration. Other goals

for civilian target audiences may be to actively demonstrate the resolve of the HN and U.S. forces to prevent

mistrustful behaviors, such as giving false reports. MISO may also seek to gain the civilian population target

audiences’ support of security measures that restrict the population, such as curfews and checkpoints.

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Operations

Host Nation Military and Paramilitary Forces

6-49. The HN military or paramilitary forces may be an important target audience in the overall MISO

program. The loyalty, discipline, and motivation of these forces are critical factors in FID operations.

Programs can emphasize building the morale and professionalism of military and paramilitary forces by

encouraging or discouraging specific behaviors. Frequently, these programs are double-edged; for instance,

a military target audience might be exposed to MISO discouraging graft and corruption while

simultaneously being exposed to other programs that encourage participation in off-duty charitable or

community programs.

Neutral and Third-Party Elements

6-50. Information operations support FID operations by encouraging participation in activities that project

a favorable image of the HN government and the United States. This can include programs that both seek

to induce a behavior in neutral target audiences and concurrently highlight the successes or benefits

incurred by other participants. MISO can indirectly inform the international community of U.S. and HN

intent and goodwill through such programs. The effects can be multiplied through coordination with public

affairs activities that have the express goal of informing only. MISO can also gain the support of

uncommitted groups inside and outside the threatened nation by revealing the nature of the internal threat’s

subversive activities.

External Hostile or Enabling Powers

6-51. Strategic MISO can seek to bring international pressure to bear on any external hostile or enabling

power sponsoring or condoning internal threats or enabling powers that supply materiel or services for a

profit. MISO programs are designed to cause any hostile or enabling power or organization supporting the

internal threat to cease supporting them. The comprehensive approach dictates diplomatic pressure as well,

and this pressure typically can be very effective against those nation-states pursuing financial motives.

Assessment

6-52. MIS personnel conduct a psychological assessment for all FID operations, which is completed when

a MIS element is deployed. In the event MIS personnel are not part of the FID deployment package, a

thorough predeployment assessment should be provided and augmented with site survey data; however,

this solution is not preferable. Units facing this second situation should consider requesting assets from the

regionally oriented MIS battalion during predeployment or isolation to help in mission analysis. To

determine MIS requirements during mission analysis, the unit assesses the psychological impact of its

presence, activities, and operations in the operational environment. The unit reviews the OPLAN or

operation order to ensure it supports U.S. and HN psychological objectives. This factor is critical. Unit

personnel analyze all official duties and consider the psychological impact on the populace when an Army

unit participates in events, such as military ceremonies, religious services, and social gatherings. In

addition, units must determine the practicality of planning and conducting direct support during national or

religious holidays.

Coordinated Efforts in the Host Nation

6-53. The potential exists for all units to integrate relevant MIS themes into their normal activities with

HN civilians and military. Trained MIS personnel conduct face-to-face communications, and all units can

reinforce these products by repeating the same core ideas to their counterparts or to the public they are

dealing with. In a JSOTF or SOTF setting, this can be highly synchronized with the MIS staff or element

providing coordinated talking points to other Army units. In addition, other elements can disseminate

approved MIS products to target audiences they may encounter.

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Protocol

6-54. During FID operations, all deployed personnel must conduct themselves in a culturally appropriate,

professional manner. They must observe local customs and local traditions and properly balance them so as

not to violate U.S. Army standards of conduct. All units conducting FID must understand HN and local

customs, courtesies, and taboos. It is frequently incumbent upon ARSOF Soldiers as the knowledgeable

regional specialists to impart this knowledge to conventional forces and partners in the collaborative

environment of FID operations. As U.S. representatives to the HN, Americans can have a psychological

impact on the mission by their actions (whether good or bad, or on- or off-duty). The supporting regional

MIS battalion, along with the appropriate Country Team offices, can help ARSOF and conventional units

with cultural mores and development of a rapport-building program.

Host Nation Considerations

6-55. In addition to MIS units, all units may have to advise or help HN forces in gaining or retaining the

support of the local populace by discrediting the internal threats and isolating the insurgents or other threats

from the populace. In this instance, unit personnel can greatly influence the HN forces in conducting

themselves in accordance with acceptable military norms, mores, and professionalism. ARSOF personnel and

conventional force officers may train the HN military or government leadership in the advantages and

techniques of maximizing public opinion in favor of the HN. However, this may entail first correcting obvious

behaviors in these leaders that are alienating potential supporters among the HN civil populace.

6-56. The use of MIS assets and techniques greatly enhance the effectiveness of FID programs. However,

it is necessary to have a planned, proactive approach in MIS units, other Army units, and any partner

agencies. All units potentially may advise and help HN forces in how to use MISO to assist their FID and

IDAD objectives and to integrate MIS capabilities. In some instances, the first step in this process may be

to curtail behaviors in the HN military or government that contradict the MISO program. This first stage

may be analogous to the medical Hippocratic Oath of “first doing no harm,” and units must be prepared to

spend considerable effort in some cases at this stage.

MILITARY TRAINING TO HOST NATION FORCES

6-57. During direct support to FID operations training of HN military does not completely cease. On the

contrary, the HN situation during direct support FID operations typically represents an escalation of

internal threat capability or, at a minimum, an increase in the intensity and frequency of internal threat

attacks. Therefore, an increased need for military training beyond that of indirect support may emerge.

During direct support, this may translate into a greater focus on training HN SOF and elite paramilitary

forces as conventional forces step up training of HN counterparts. Situational realities dictate the proper

allocation of types of units to be trained.

6-58. During an escalating situation, an increased emphasis on IDAD becomes important and training may

focus on specific subversion, insurgency, or other complex internal threat-incited situations encountered by

the HN that may be beyond its capabilities to control. At this point, units may increase forces or

reconfigure current deployment packages to both continue training of HN forces and to conduct direct

support in areas that the HN is unable to execute or does not have sufficient resources to execute at

adequate levels. Deployment of additional capabilities may be necessary to train and conduct more

complex direct support operations.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

6-59. FID direct support (not involving combat operations) typically involves some increase in logistic

support to the HN military. The logistic support discussed here does not include activities authorized under

security assistance. U.S. law limits these logistic support operations, which usually consist of transportation

or limited maintenance support. Appendix A provides detailed legal and policy concerns. Authorization to

provide this type of support is contingent upon a major emergency that threatens the internal security of the

HN. Normally, this type of support is authorized for limited periods to accomplish very narrow objectives.

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In some cases, the President or SecDef may direct a show of force exercise to demonstrate support for the

HN and to exercise the mechanisms and processes of logistic support. ARSOF may provide expertise,

intelligence, security, CAO, MISO, or other direct support for aspects of such a show of force, especially if

the situation has not previously escalated to direct support. However, such a show of force is typically most

efficacious with a demonstration of considerable conventional force power.

6-60. Planners integrate logistic support into the overall theater FID plan. This is even more important if

the supported nation is involved in an active conflict with U.S. forces conducting direct support. Major

employment considerations that should be considered when providing logistic support as part of the theater

FID program (both indirect and direct support) include the following:

Review and update definitive ROE and protection measures.

Educate all members of the command on permissible activities for the logistic support mission.

Determine whether more- or less-restrictive protection measures and site security are necessary.

Determine new or heightened operations security and essential elements of information.

Ensure understanding that equipment and supplies may not be transferred to the HN military.

Ensure understanding of procedures and limitations of logistic support allowed.

Update a logistics assessment file on logistic resources available in-country, including any

changes in—

Local supply availability.

Warehousing and maintenance facilities.

Transportation assets and lines of communication.

Labor force availability.

ARSOF and other unit-specific equipment and supply issues.

Ensure equipment maintenance and training packages meet the needs of the HN and

are sustainable.

INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS SHARING

6-61. An active intelligence liaison should be ongoing among the HN, Country Team, interagency, and

DOD intelligence staff. The sharing of U.S. intelligence is always a sensitive area that must be evaluated

based on each FID situation. Cooperative intelligence liaisons between the United States and HN are vital;

however, disclosure of classified information to the HN or other multinational FID forces must be

authorized. Any element within the collaborative environment can restrict intelligence sharing to lower

levels. FID operators should strive to include the HN as much as possible. This may be easier to

accomplish with HN-specific intelligence than with regional or global intelligence. Similarly, CI elements

can provide support in addition to the HN counterparts, security service, and police forces when deployed

to support FID operations.

ASSISTING THE HOST NATION FROM INDIRECT TO DIRECT SUPPORT

6-62. The initial focus of assistance in this area is to evaluate HN intelligence and communications

architecture. The United States considers the needs of the HN, as well as its technical expertise and

equipment, when evaluating HN systems. The HN intelligence and communications systems must reflect

the HN environment, threats, and resources.

6-63. Following the evaluation, the United States determines how the FID program may help the HN. The

assessment indentifies HN equipment deficiencies. During indirect support, the security assistance process

normally provides U.S. assistance in equipment; however, this may change during direct support to the

greater use of U.S. equipment and expertise.

6-64. Security assistance normally requires training support for intelligence operations, which is indirect

support. Exchange programs and daily interaction with HN military intelligence and communications

assets may provide some limited informal training benefits. During direct support, a similar training

support of other HN military personnel may take place with personnel dividing efforts between conducting

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direct support operations and training select intelligence specialties. If U.S. assets, such as unmanned aerial

platforms are used, restrictions on training HN personnel may apply even when the data (for example,

video feed) is releasable.

CONSIDERATIONS

6-65. The following items summarize the major considerations that commanders and planners must be

aware of as they conduct intelligence- and communications-sharing activities in direct support of the FID

program:

An evaluation of the effectiveness of HN intelligence systems is necessary to determine if

assisting or rebuilding existing intelligence systems is necessary.

Forcing U.S. systems on the HN may not be the best COA. Assess and determine what works

best for the HN, and, if legal, use those systems.

Direct most U.S. intelligence and communications assistance efforts toward creating a self-

sufficient HN intelligence and communications capability. U.S. assistance that creates a long-term

reliance on U.S. capabilities may damage the overall HN intelligence and communications system.

Scrutinize any training assistance provided to ensure it is within legal authorizations and ensure

that information or processes are not revealed without authorization.

Use conventional force and ARSOF-specific assets and capabilities appropriately and in

situations beyond the capabilities of the HN.

Tailor assistance to the level of the threat, equipment, and technology within the HN.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

6-66. If the situation of the HN government deteriorates during FID operations to the point that vital U.S.

interests are in jeopardy, the President may commit U.S. forces in a combat role to effect a decisive change

in the conflict. Should combat operations become necessary in the course of FID operations, it represents

an escalation of internal threat capability or a deterioration of the HN ability to counter an insurgency or

other virulent internal threat. Combat operations (by U.S. forces) are not the norm in FID operations;

however, FID operations that involve combat operations have historically also been long term and

expended a great amount of resources in defense of essential U.S. interests or grievous violations of basic

human rights.

6-67. It is unlikely that FID operations begin with combat operations. Nevertheless, FID operations that

have grown out of a successfully completed stability, security, transition, and reconstruction contingency

may again degenerate to the point of U.S. involvement. Regardless of the process by which combat

operations come about, it represents the extreme edge of FID operations where the situation in the HN can

decrease in intensity or escalate from FID up the continuum to major combat operations and, perhaps, regional

conflict. Application of decisive but simultaneously discriminate U.S. combat power can prevent this latter

contingency. Units can provide a vital component of combat power and engage the threat discriminately.

6-68. Direct U.S. military intervention can provide HN forces with the time and space to regain the

strategic initiative and resume control of tactical operations. In this situation, the committed U.S. combat

force is likely to find in-country conventional forces, SF, MIS, CA, and other ARSOF teams with a myriad

of formal and informal arrangements and relationships. The GCC fully exploits this experience and

relationships during the critical transition period when a larger force is deploying into the country.

Incoming forces immediately exchange liaison personnel with the FID headquarters (which may be relatively

small in a rapid escalation of threat) to exploit their advice and assistance. In addition, in an escalating

situation, these liaisons can help the GCC in determining the total Army force structures needed and then

request those assets. The FID headquarters provides all possible advice and assistance, to include providing—

Situation and intelligence updates for incoming SOF and conventional force commanders and

their staffs.

In-place FID elements for initial coordination with HN and U.S. mission agencies.

Coalition support teams to facilitate integration of the HN forces into the overall plan.

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Operations

Real-time intelligence and operational reporting along with training status and operational

capability assessment of HN units.

Advisors to HN units to facilitate relief-in-place once specific objectives are met in selected

sectors within the HN.

Supervision of humanitarian civic action efforts in remote areas to support the HN IDAD strategy.

FID headquarters staff assistance to plan coordinate and liaise for broad CMO and CAO to

alleviate civilian crises or interference.

Preparation of friendly and neutral target audiences in the HN or region for greater U.S. or

coalition presence through shaping of the operational environment.

Counterpropaganda support.

Aggressive MISO programs and psychological actions planning that stress the inevitability of

dismal failure and defeat of the internal threat.

Immediate MISO that outline methods of defection and surrender.

Time-sensitive interdiction of strategic and operationally critical targets through direct action by

SF, Rangers, or national forces.

Immediate capability to support personnel recovery.

6-69. Generally, personnel participating in activities that fall under security assistance are restricted by law

from combat. The AECA (Section 21) prohibits personnel who provide defense services (including

training) from performing duties of a combatant nature. Training and advising activities that may engage

U.S. personnel in combat activities outside the United States are prohibited. Specifically, security

assistance teams shall not engage in or provide assistance or advice to foreign forces in a combat situation.

Security assistance teams are prohibited from performing operational duties of any kind except as may be

required in the conduct of on-the-job training in the operation and maintenance of equipment, weapons, and

supporting systems. Therefore, even if combat operations are ongoing in the HN, security assistance teams

will continue security assistance operations. Security assistance teams would have to be formally relieved

from security assistance duties and be reassigned under 10 USC authorities to conduct combat operations.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

6-70. The manner in which U.S. forces conduct combat operations does not change in FID operations.

Nevertheless, the United States must consider certain areas at the operational and strategic levels of war

when conducting combat operations that support a HN IDAD program. Many of the considerations

discussed in indirect and direct support remain important in tactical operations. Because the civilian

populace remains a focus in FID operations even during authorized combat, the United States considers the

coordinated use of MISO and CA, along with SF or conventional force advisors, during coordination with

partner agencies operating within the HN.

HOST NATION ORGANIZATION

6-71. If a nation receiving FID support reaches a point in its internal affairs that requires FID direct

support involving combat operations from the United States, it may typically already have a comprehensive

IDAD strategy. In addition, the Country Team, the GCC, and Army units usually also have long histories

of supporting the IDAD program and interacting with the relevant HN IDAD organizations. At this point,

these organizations must maximize all instruments of power to defeat the subversion, lawlessness,

insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. USG agencies, including Army elements, must be involved in this

coordination and control process at the appropriate levels. The HN IDAD organization may become

broader and larger at the point that the President authorizes combat operations.

Force Structures

6-72. Historically, SOF elements (principally ARSOF with a majority of SF, MIS, and CA) initially lead

COIN efforts, including those in FID operations. In some instances, this force structure, when released to

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Chapter 6

conduct combat operations, may be sufficient to put the HN back in a dominant position. If the HN

situation takes a rapid turn toward favoring the threats (for instance, if there is a sudden influx of new

armed elements across a porous HN border) or the internal threats continue to gain strength, the

deployment of additional SOF elements and typically larger units from the conventional forces may be

required. This typically includes a surge type capacity that is normally a joint force. Army aviation and a

brigade combat team(s) as well as select additional logistic and intelligence support are typically part of

this force structure. Conversely as opposed to a surge, SOF units on the ground may only require an

increased air interdiction capacity.

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Focus

6-73. When FID operations include combat operations, it is probable that these operations may be joint

oriented (perhaps from the outset) and include multinational operations involving the HN and the United

States. If the HN requests broader support from mutual defense partners, regional defense associations, or

the United Nations, other multinational forces may be involved at this point as well. An increase in

interagency coordination should also be anticipated, with the possibility of the involvement of more

government agencies than in indirect or direct support operations.

Transition Points

6-74. U.S. forces establish transition points for combat operations. These are situation dependent rather

than time dependent. Transition points establish conditions for the return of combat operations to the HN

forces. These can be different in various geographic locations. One subnational area or city of the HN may

be entirely under government control while another would be in serious peril of falling under internal

threat control without U.S. forces to help restore control and maintaining security.

COMBAT OPERATION PRIORITIES

6-75. An early priority for U.S. combat operations is to identify, integrate, and, where necessary, restore

mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. In an

undeveloped FID operation, this may be a chief issue, as the HN may not yet have built these capabilities

to the levels set out in their IDAD program. Although Army trainers and advisors may have had limited to

no involvement in assisting the HN in these areas, they may have evaluated the need and shortcomings in

these areas. When tactically feasible, HN forces should conduct the irregular warfare activities and

warfighting functions. This increases the legitimacy of the HN government and reduces their dependency

on U.S. forces to conduct both combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Internal threat attacks

may affect all of warfighting functions, notably protection and sustainment.

Offensive Operations

6-76. Army FID units conduct combat operations with the same goal as indirect and direct support

operations, namely, to help local governments and HN military forces gain self-sufficiency against

subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. Combat operations provide time and

security to regroup and refit as necessary and then regain the initiative. In most cases, the objective of FID

is protection operations rather than destruction of adversary forces. Gaining the strategic initiative is the

responsibility of the HN. Proactive control of the psychological fight shapes a perception that the HN is—

Capable of defeating threats.

Not subservient to the United States or the coalition.

Responsive to its citizens.

Committed to defending its citizens.

6-77. In addition, commanders must evaluate all operations to ensure they do not create the impression that

the United States is executing a war for a nation that has neither the will nor the public support to defeat

subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. For instance, commanders plan operations in

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Operations

which HN counterparts are either a significant or lead player. If not, units operate unilaterally until

counterparts can fulfill this role. Unilateral action in combat operations is, however, the least desirable COA.

6-78. As learned from T.E. Lawrence, it is better for HN forces to execute combat actions tolerably than

for FID advisors to execute them perfectly, because it is their war.

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that

you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.

Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be

as good as, perhaps, you think it is.

Twenty-Seven Articles, Arab Bulletin

T.E. Lawrence, 20 August 1917

Human Rights Considerations

6-79. Human rights considerations are central to all FID operations. Successfully deterring abuses

typically requires greater vigilance during combat operations. Forces must maintain strict respect for

human rights. This includes U.S., HN, and other participating multinational forces. Repression and abuses

of the local population by the legitimate government reduces the credibility of and popular support for the

HN government and causes the consideration for withdrawing U.S. support. Therefore, commanders must

consistently reinforce human rights policies. In many FID combat situations, the moral high ground may be

just as important as the tactical high ground.

Use of Force

6-80. Because of their universal proximity to civilians, carefully balanced ROE are required in all irregular

warfare operations. ROE for FID combat operations may be the most restrictive of any irregular warfare

operation. Forces must reach a balance between protection, danger to innocent civilians, and damage to

nonmilitary areas. Close contact with civilians requires that Soldiers are trained on when to use force, what

type of force to use, and the degree of force to use. This training is a great enabler of successful FID

combat operations. Balanced responses to internal threat attacks can be achieved with Soldier training,

coupled with leaders cognizant of the need for proportional and, when tactically feasible, minimal force.

6-81. Balanced force requires restraint. ROE that are too lenient may quickly destroy the infrastructure

gains of previous IDAD development programs and cause civilian casualties that alienate the HN

government and military from the people. Commanders must prevent the indiscriminate use of force. Army

commanders may not only have to find precise methods of interdiction, but may frequently have to advise

frustrated HN commanders against reacting with disproportional force.

6-82. Balanced force requires resolve. ROE that are too restrictive may unnecessarily limit interdiction of

subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats that have no self-imposed restrictions on

the use of violence. If the ROE prevent effective self-protection of U.S. and HN forces, they further an

insurgency or other undermining threat in the goal of wearing down those forces. In this situation, the

internal threat begins to win the battle of perception with the civilian populace that the U.S. and HN

military cannot provide a secure environment. Commanders, therefore, must closely monitor the

operational environment and provide subordinate commanders with clear and enforceable ROE, as well as

the flexibility to modify these ROE as the situation changes. Local populations in many cultures may

expect grievously disproportional violence in the interdiction of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency,

terrorism, and other threats. Skillful use of MISO, public diplomacy, and public affairs before and after

lethal and, perhaps more importantly, nonlethal interdictions may improve this feeling in the populace.

Intelligence

6-83. The U.S. intelligence network must tie into the Country Team, the local HN military, paramilitary,

and police intelligence capabilities, as well as the intelligence assets of other nations participating in the

operation. Deployed military CI elements can provide liaison with local HN military CI and security and

police services.

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6-84. Typically, information required for FID combat operations places a greater emphasis on human

intelligence efforts than on technical collection capabilities. In addition, large portions of the intelligence

process in combat operations focuses on determining key personalities and cells for lethal interdiction.

Nevertheless, the intelligence process cannot neglect social, economic, and political information because

the needs, perceptions, and sympathies of the civilian populace are similar to key terrain in FID operations.

Units must be aware of changes in the operational environment that might require a change in tactics, not

only in the lethal sphere, but also in the nonlethal area.

Defensive Operations

6-85. Under full spectrum operations, offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations occur

simultaneously. FID advises the HN to address the civil situation directly and continuously, combining

tasks directed at the populace with tactical tasks directed against adversaries. The nature of the mission and

operational environment determines the appropriate weighting and combination of tasks. Experience has

shown that many HN militaries or portions thereof are more effective in the defense than on the offense. In

addition, the mindset of civilian populations is inherently defensive. Civilians typically seek security. They

may be willing to participate in activities that secure their own neighborhoods or homes but may never be

willing to participate in anything other than home defense. Establishing secure areas using HN forces,

civilian watches, and other static means can be balanced with Army units and select HN (typically

designated elite) forces conducting patrols and offensive operations. In addition, MISO programs can

influence the HN to adopt behaviors and attitudes that gain popular support for offensive operations;

however, this may have to be accomplished in stages.

Ongoing Foreign Internal Defense Programs

6-86. The initiation of combat operations does not equal the suspension of other FID. In actuality, MISO,

CMO, security assistance, FHA, intelligence, and logistic support are all likely to increase dramatically.

Training of HN SOF and conventional elements by SFODAs and other Army teams, along with additional

deployments of trainers, may actually increase as well. In addition, during combat operations the

distinction between trainer and advisor is nullified by 10 USC. The FID planning imperatives of taking the

long-term approach, tailoring support to the HN needs, and bearing IDAD responsibility remain important

throughout the combat operations phase. One way of infusing others with this belief in self-reliance is to

create a sense of urgency and accomplishment by increasing the goals of previously initiated FID

programs. However, even if the HN seeks to do so, this must not be done by compromising training

standards in the interest of speed. Culturally, some nations may still possess the mindset that rapidly

conscripting and mobilizing a large force equates to capability, but an unskilled force is problematic. FID

programs (with advisors assisting in equipping and training the foreign forces) mitigate humanitarian

violations or other problems associated with unskilled forces, furthering legitimacy for the HN political

leadership and military.

MISSION COMMAND

6-87. In FID combat operations, as in all operations, the chain of command from the President to the

lowest U.S. commander in the field remains intact. The President retains command authority over U.S.

forces. In some instances, it may be beneficial to place appropriate U.S. forces under the OPCON of a

foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In FID, this is typically a commander from the

HN, but it conceivably could be from another coalition partner to demonstrate regional resolve to back the

legitimate HN government. In making that determination, the President carefully considers such factors as

the mission, size of the proposed U.S. force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE. In addition, the

choice typically also serves to delegitimize the insurgency or other internal threat as much as possible.

6-88. Planners tailor mission command relationships for FID combat operations to the situation based on

the size and composition of the U.S. force committed and the political, social, and military environment of

the HN. Whether holding the top command of combat operations or not, the HN government and security

forces must remain in the forefront. HN security forces must establish strategic policy and objectives.

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Operations

Typically, these will have evolved from an earlier IDAD strategy and will have involved input from U.S.

planners or advisors. Planners should establish a single multinational headquarters to control combat

operations. Planners help the integration of Army elements into a JTF or a combined joint SOTF or other

established mission command structure. It is also possible that some or all Army units remain under U.S.

mission command while other U.S. forces remain part of a combined command under HN mission

command. ARSOF and conventional forces in FID must tolerate and plan for adaptable mission command

relationships; however, all mission command relationships must be clearly and unequivocally established

before Army units conduct combat operations.

SUSTAINMENT

6-89. The sustainment requirements of combat operations during FID operations are similar to those for

other types of operations. Like all irregular warfare operations, the chief variable in FID operations is the

support available from and in the HN. Political sensitivities, concern for HN legitimacy, and the overall

desirability of a minimum U.S. presence affects the complexion of sustainment operations in FID. These

general principles should be considered in planning and executing sustainment of combat operations in FID:

Maximize the use of HN capabilities, including routine services, supplies, facilities, and

transportation. This approach reduces U.S. overhead and the number of U.S. and third-nation

personnel required in the HN.

Maximize the use of existing facilities, such as ports, airfields, and communications sites. New

or expanded facilities, if built, should be in keeping with the original development portion of the

IDAD plan.

Minimize the handling of supplies for short duration operations (90 days or less). Provide

support through existing organic support packages and through air lines of communication.

Establish medical self-sufficiency. Many areas of the world where the United States is likely to

conduct FID operations do not have adequate medical capabilities. Since commanders typically

cannot rely on local capabilities, they must plan for self-sufficient HSS for combat operations

during FID. At a minimum, commanders must establish adequate hospitalization, medical

logistics resupply, patient movement, and preventive medicine to support these operations.

Optimize the use of mobile maintenance capabilities that stress repair as far forward as possible.

Minimize the evacuation of equipment for repair.

Use both intertheater and intratheater airlift routinely to deliver supplies.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

6-90. COIN is the comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address

any core grievances. U.S. combat involvement in FID operations has traditionally focused on COIN.

Although the potential exists for other threats to become dangerous enough to require combat operations to

be conducted against them, generally only an ideologically-motivated insurgency sufficiently unites and

draws enough support for this possibility. In addition, this ideological motivation can be based in political,

religious, or cultural identifiers. Insurgents by definition are willing to use violence to secure their goals;

however, insurgents are willing to use a broad continuum for degrees of violence. The United States may

authorize combat operations against insurgencies that strike principally military targets or those that

deliberately target innocent civilians. The principal center of gravity and most common lapse in focus for

COIN forces is the HN civilian populace. The insurgency that loses focus of this center of gravity quickly

fails.

6-91. An insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to

overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.

Insurgents who target civilians generally do so for three reasons:

To lead the HN populace or portions of it to erroneously believe that HN or U.S. forces

deliberately target civilians.

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Chapter 6

To demonstrate that the HN does not have the capacity to provide adequate security to

the populace.

To promote sectarian violence.

6-92. Insurgencies target civilians either as a general destabilizing tactic or as genuine partisans of one

subgroup of the population. Quite often, the latter is a historically disenfranchised group. Army elements

conducting COIN during FID combat operations must constantly track and counter sectarianism by all

parties. As the situation deteriorates in the early stage of FID combat operations, this may mainly consist of

preventing HN counterparts from becoming sectarian in their words or actions. It should be noted that al

Qaeda has adopted a third form of dividing homogenous populations. The tactic was adopted from Soviet

World War II counter-collaboration and resistance recruiter units that deliberately targeted their own

citizenry to cause distrust and destroyed working infrastructure in occupied areas to drive citizens to

partisan camps. This tactic necessarily recognizes the inherent probability of counter productivity and

attrition of its own citizens.

6-93. Although COIN is executed in numerous operations, COIN techniques to some degree are an

inherent subset of all FID operations. Clearly, not all COIN techniques are going to translate directly to an

internal threat that is predominantly motivated by and pursuing crime. Should such an internal threat

attempt to take on the trappings of a political or religious ideology, it is frequently useful in the influence

fight to characterize the internal threat as to what it truly is—a criminal element masquerading as

revolutionaries or holy warriors. At the tactical level, interdicting criminal elements may closely resemble

COIN techniques against a classic insurgency. Detailed information concerning insurgents and the

ideological narrative behind insurgencies is located in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

6-94. The underlying principals of FID operations and the TTP for them do not change during combat

operations. Such is also the case when those combat operations involve COIN. The primary pitfall for

Army units engaged in COIN during FID combat operations is to shift from a balanced FID program to an

over-allocation of resources on lethal COIN at the expense of separating the insurgents from the civil

populace and, more importantly, securing the support of the HN populace for their government.

TERRORISM

6-95. If a nation is susceptible to any one type of internal threat, the possibility of terrorism or

organizations intent on conducting terrorist activities occurring in conjunction with that internal threat or

independent of it exists. As stated above, although much of the FID effort remains focused on COIN, U.S.

FID programs may aim at other threats to the internal stability of a HN, such as terrorism. It must be noted

that terrorism is a tactic, not a strategy. For instance, narcoterrorism, which is linked to illicit drug

trafficking, often uses both acts of terror on individuals and full terrorist assaults on large targets. Emphasis

should be on helping the HN address the root cause of instability in a preventative manner rather than

reacting to threats. Unemployment, drug trafficking, violent crime, social unrest, and internal conflicts all

promote violent tactics like terrorism. Terrorism affects all aspects of a nation’s defense and development.

FID programs of all types, such as humanitarian assistance, antiterrorism programs, and especially

counterterrorism, can prevent, reduce, or stop mitigating factors that can contribute to the start or spread of

terrorist tactics.

6-96. Fighting global operations against terrorist networks is an effort the United States cannot do alone. It

must be a global, collaborative effort. The DOS leads this collaborative effort and the DOD supports it

through numerous programs, which include military FID operations. These programs either directly or

indirectly deter threats of terrorism within a HN and prevent the spread of a global threat by—

Training and advising HN forces to deter crime and subversive activities.

Sharing intelligence and communication to increase international awareness of terrorist

organizations.

Supporting counterdrug (programs, initiatives) to stop or minimize narcoterrorism.

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Chapter 7

Redeployment

FID is a long-term effort that requires persistent rather than episodic engagement. A

comprehensive strategy must be developed for providing training and assistance to host

nation security forces. Civilian and military efforts to build partner capacity to perform

security functions should be a multi-year program of synchronized civilian and military

activities and engagements. GPF [conventional forces], SOF, and other interagency

partners may conduct missions focused on assessing, training, advising, and assisting

host-nation security forces to include ground, air, and maritime military forces as well as

police, boarder forces, and other relevant divisions of the host-nation’s security

apparatus.

Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats

Joint Operating Concept, 17 May 2010

Redeployment of Army units conducting FID operations does not typically indicate

the end of all FID operations in the HN. In long-term FID operations, as security and

other conditions improve and internal threats become manageable for HN personnel,

direct military-to-military training by Army and sister-Service units continues;

however, this training may become more intermittent with gaps between regular

exercises. In ongoing FID operations, continuous coverage by units generally

involve, whenever possible, mission handoff from one unit to its replacement unit.

Redeployment, if conducted haphazardly or prematurely, can set FID operations back

substantially. Ideally, an internal threat becomes a HN law enforcement issue or is

completely interdicted. However, FID-relevant military-to-military training, for

example joint combined exercise for training, should continue. In the case of key

strategic partners, FID operations may continue to make a strong ally stronger. In

most instances the term redeployment is a misnomer. This chapter therefore deals

with a general continuum of individual units redeploying from FID operations.

OVERVIEW

7-1. Commonalities exist between redeployments that involve direct handoff and redeployments that

involve intermittent deployments. In the latter case, the possibility always exists that situations during

routine training and military-to-military contact may arise, causing handoff to a relieving force. Typically,

this involves the original unit or select members of it, who extend their presence in-country to provide

continuity or to stay in place as part of a more robust force. Redeployment may also involve a transition

from DOD execution of programs to DOS or OGA execution of programs. In both immediate, continuous-

mission handoff and intermittent FID operations, capturing lessons learned

(thorough observations,

insights, and lessons), after action reviews, and debriefings is essential to continue to build institutional

Army FID knowledge and refine keystone doctrine, TTP, and training.

TERMINATION OF OPERATIONS

7-2. The nature of the termination shapes the future of the HN and regional countries. It is essential to

understand that termination of operations is a vital link between national security strategy, national defense

strategy, national military strategy, and the national strategic end state. A poorly conducted termination of

FID operations can have a long-term impact on USG relations in the HN, the region, and, potentially, in

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Chapter 7

more than one region. Some level of operations normally continues well after intensive FID support has

ended. The possibility of an extended presence by U.S. military forces to help FID operations should be

considered during the initial planning and recommendation for execution.

TERMINATION APPROACHES

7-3.

There are three approaches for achieving national strategic objectives by military force:

The first approach forces an imposed settlement by the threat of or the actual occupation of an

enemy’s land, resources, or people. Destroying critical functions and assets, such as mission

command or infrastructure or making the adversary unable to resist the imposition of the United

States, supports the threat of occupation or actual occupation. In FID, this approach is typically

only taken with intransigent threats and the approach differs from other operations, in that it still

involves a preponderance of HN effort in any imposed settlement.

The second approach seeks a negotiated settlement through coordinated political, diplomatic,

military, and economic actions, which convince an adversary that to yield will be less painful

than to continue resistance. In FID, military power alone rarely compels an internal threat to

consider a negotiated conclusion. Also, a political settlement may be unacceptable to both HN

and U.S. national policy objectives. Rather, military success in providing security to the

majority of the populace, coupled with the other functions of the HN IDAD program, may

induce an internal threat to negotiate under terms acceptable to the HN government. Negotiating

an advantageous conclusion to operations requires time, power, and the demonstrated will to use

both. Nevertheless, some internal threats by nature may not be viable candidates for negotiation.

In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there may be an armistice or truce, which is a

negotiated intermission in operations, not an agreement or peace. In effect, it is a device to buy

time pending the negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. The

efficacy of a truce must be weighed against the potential damage done by legitimizing an

internal threat. In short, enfranchisement of an internal threat may remain impossible.

The third approach for achieving national security objectives in relation to the irregular

challenges posed by nonstate actors is an indirect approach that erodes an adversary’s power,

influence, and will; thereby, undermining the credibility and legitimacy of his political authority.

Additionally, undermining an internal threat’s influence and control over and support by the

indigenous population is also affected. This approach is necessary with an internal threat

unwilling to enter into discussion.

7-4.

These approaches to termination of FID operations represent a commitment of time, resources, and

potentially U.S. Soldiers’ lives. The paradox of this brief discussion of termination of operations is, again,

the lack of operational and tactical closure in which there is effectively strategic closure. Termination of

FID operations typically involves a somewhat nebulous end state for a large FID commitment that meets

U.S. national strategic objectives (at least nominally) without a final interdiction of an internal threat.

NATIONAL STRATEGIC END STATE

7-5. The first and primary political task regarding termination of intensive FID operations is to determine

an achievable national strategic end state based on clear national strategic objectives. For specific situations

that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major operations), the

President and SecDef typically establish a set of national strategic objectives. Achieving these objectives is

necessary to attain the national strategic end state—the broadly expressed diplomatic, informational,

military, and economic conditions that should exist after the conclusion of an operation. In FID, this is

determined with the HN leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state that is mutually

beneficial. Specified standards are approved by the President or the SecDef that must be met before a FID

operation can be concluded or transitioned to a less intensive level of support.

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Redeployment

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

7-6. In its strategic context, military success is measured in the attainment of military objectives that

support the national strategic end state and associated termination criteria. The termination criteria for a

negotiated settlement may differ significantly from those of an imposed settlement. Military strategic

advice to USG and HN leadership regarding termination criteria should be reviewed for military feasibility,

adequacy, and acceptability; as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to reach the

criteria. An essential consideration is ensuring that the longer-term stabilization and the enabling of civil

authority needed to achieve national strategic objectives continue upon the conclusion of sustained

operations. Premature reduction of FID support can trigger a rapid and dramatic upsurge in internal threat

activity, strength, and political viability. Proper use of the informational instrument of national power

mitigates the possibility of any undeveloped internal threat elements characterizing a reduction in military

commitment to a U.S. or HN strategic or tactical reversal.

MISSION HANDOFF PROCEDURES

7-7. During long-term continuous FID operations, Army commanders may elect to replace teams and

units for a variety of reasons. Time is not the only governing factor. Changes in the HN political or military

dynamic may require reshaping force packages as situations change for better or worse. In addition,

internal administrative concerns might prompt or support a commander’s decision to rotate teams or units;

for example, new equipment may be fielded to an incoming unit that the outgoing unit lacks. Regardless of

reason, mission handoff is necessary and is defined as the process of passing an ongoing mission from one

unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity.

7-8. The overall authority for the handoff and assumption of command rests with the commander

ordering the change. The authority for determining the handoff process lies with the incoming commander

since he assumes responsibility for the mission. This changeover process may affect the conditions under

which the mission continues. In FID this may not entail an in-country relief transition of authority. In small

FID operations, work-arounds for direct continuity can be virtual, video teleconferences, or preferably

commander and staff meetings between transitioning teams or units. Ideally, all Army units execute these

procedures in the HN and unit to unit. During episodic engagements with a gap and indirect handoff

between FID units, the considerations list is used as an aid for planning, and the postmission debriefing

provides a historical record that assists in bridging the gap between FID operations. During the FID

operation, units are encouraged to populate the debriefing checklist while information is relevant as a guide

for incoming units. The postmission debriefing can serve as an inbriefing for incoming units. The

postmission debriefing should be reviewed prior to a predeployment site survey; together in combination

with the considerations list and the training plan, these all serve to assist an incoming unit with episodic or

indirect handoff of FID engagements. Commanders and staffs must be adaptive in their thinking when

portions of—or the entire mission handoff is indirect (for example, from the historical record).

Note: The following discussion is based on a high threat environment. All measures, however,

are applicable to a low threat FID operation as well.

7-9. The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander on the tentative handoff process and the

assumption of the mission directly or through a liaison. If this advice conflicts with the mission statement

or the incoming commander’s intent and design and the conflict cannot be resolved with the authority

established for the incoming commander, the commander ordering the relief resolves the issue.

7-10. As a rule, the commander ordering the change does not automatically place the outgoing unit under

the incoming unit’s OPCON during the changeover process. Although this procedure would present a clear

and easily defined solution for establishing the incoming commander’s authority, it is not the most

effective control for U.S. forces should hostile contact occur during the process. A break in U.S. troop

presence in FID also routinely makes this process a less desirable COA.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

7-3

Chapter 7

7-11. If the incoming Army unit or the HN unit is in direct-fire contact with insurgents or another internal

threat during the handoff, the advisory team or unit immediately notifies the higher headquarters ordering

the exchange. If the incoming unit commander has not assumed responsibility, his unit immediately comes

under OPCON of the outgoing unit and is absorbed into that unit position. (Possible exceptions include a

rapidly evolving noncombatant evacuation operation or the underlying crisis that triggers it.) The outgoing

unit commander and his HN counterpart control the battle. If the outgoing unit commander has passed

responsibility to the incoming unit commander, the outgoing unit comes under the OPCON of the

incoming unit, and the HN unit coordinates its movements with the new unit. Army units in advisory or

FID direct support involving combat operations roles may need to follow these same procedures.

POSTMISSION DEBRIEFING PROCEDURES

7-12. Commanders conduct a debriefing that provides an overview of the mission and all relevant

informational subsets. The range of topics can include military geography; political parties; military forces;

insurgents; security forces; undergrounds, lethal and nonlethal targets and target audiences; ongoing CAO;

logistic and HSS issues; ongoing joint, multinational, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental partner

projects or operations; and survival, evasion, escape, resistance and personnel recovery. In addition, HN-

specific concerns that are relevant in one FID operation may not be in another. The commander should also

codify and debrief any informational subset that may affect mission success.

POSTMISSION DEBRIEFING

7-13. Redeployment is not the end of the mission. Upon arrival at the redeployment location, units

undergo an extensive debriefing. The battalion intelligence staff section (G-2 or S-2) officer typically

organizes and conducts the debriefing subject to unit standard operating procedures. The G-2 or S-2

coordinates with higher-level intelligence organizations to take part in the returning unit’s debriefing,

particularly if other organizations tasked the unit to obtain information. All deployed personnel, to include

attachments, must be available for the debriefing. In addition, an operational debrief should be conducted

by the G-3 or S-3 to continue to build best practices to the shifting conditions in the FID area of operations

and the HN.

DOCUMENTATION

7-14. After the debriefing, the unit or team commander, with the assistance of other members of the team

and attachments, prepares two documents: an after action report and a report of lessons learned. The unit

historian or other designated person prepares a third document—the unit history of the operation. Leaders

conduct after action reviews following the completion of operations and intermediate tasks to capture

lessons learned for future operations. An after action review is a guided analysis of an organization’s

performance, which is normally conducted after a training event or an operation with the objective of

improving future performance. The Center for Army Lessons Learned has developed an After Action Final

Report Guide that can be used to assist in documenting after action reviews or lessons learned. CJCS

Instruction 3150.25D, Joint Lessons Learned Program, provides additional information.

7-15. The after action report states the who, what, when, where, and how of the operation. It is a

permanent record of the major activities of the team or unit from receipt of mission to debriefing. As such,

it is an extremely important template to compare past missions and to plan future missions. Organizations

conduct after action reviews and reports to identify successes and challenges and to apply observations,

insights, and lessons learned to future training and operations. If necessary, organizations conduct after

action reviews and reports after intermediate actions are completed, not just at the end of the event. Soon

after being debriefed, the ARSOF element normally submits an after action report through command

channels to the higher command. The intelligence and operations officers at each echelon keep copies of

team or unit after action reports. The unit historian also reviews the after action report and prepares a draft

report for entry into the unit history. Commanders are responsible for the creation, collection, and

preservation of historical records and for the preparation and publication of historical reports. The

operations data report is an annotated chronology of the unit’s operations that will be fully supported by an

7-4

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Redeployment

indexed set of key historical documents. FM 1-20, Military History Operations, provides historical

reporting information. AR 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP), establishes a system for the

collection, analysis, archiving, and dissemination of observations, insights, and lessons; TTP; after action

reviews; operational records; and lessons learned from actual Army operations, experiments, and training

events. ARSOF units refer to the USASOC/ARNG Regulation 350-1, Training: Army Special Operations

Forces (ARSOF) Active Component and Reserve Component, for details on submission of written after

action reports.

7-16. Shortly after completion of the after action review or simultaneously with its submission, the leader

submits a report of lessons learned. This report is the leader’s reflection on his most recent operation and

his recommendation for the future. One preparation method is to organize the lessons according to the

eight elements of combat power—

Mission command.

Movement and maneuver.

Intelligence.

Fires.

Sustainment.

Protection.

Leadership.

Information.

The six warfighting functions, multiplied by leadership and complemented by information, make up the

eight elements of combat power.

7-17. This preparation method addresses what worked and what did not work on the operation, why it did

or did not work, and what changes or substitutions are needed for existing TTP in the unit.

7-18. The unit historian researches reports and lessons learned and then documents the unit history for the

operation to be reviewed by the commander. The historian issues an official historical report of the

operation in classified and unclassified versions, as appropriate, within 90 days after the completion of the

operation.

7-19. Figure 7-1, pages 7-6 through 7-11, provides a general mission debriefing checklist. It is intended as

an overview of areas of interest to all Army units. It might serve as the basis for the combined ARSOF or

conventional forces mission debrief, where the efforts of units or teams are inbriefed to incoming units in a

JTF, JSOTF, or SOTF. In such instances, the briefing can be tailored as needed, including by echelon, to

cover relevant areas for the incoming units. The checklist is not considered proscriptive, limiting, or

definitive.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

7-5

Chapter 7

MISSION



Brief statement of mission by Army commander.

EXECUTION



Brief statement of the concept of operation developed before the deployment.



Record the FID operations and tasks accomplished, to include deployment, routes, activity in HN areas, and

redeployment.



Uniforms and equipment used.



Weapons, demolitions, and ammunition used and results.



Communications and media equipment used and results.

Organic.

HN force.

Contract.



Casualties (friendly or enemy) sustained and disposition of bodies of those killed in action.



Friendly contacts established, to include descriptions, locations, circumstances, and results.

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY



Geographic name, Universal Transverse Mercator or geographic coordinates, and locations.



Boundaries (north, south, east, and west).



Distance and direction to nearest major cultural feature.



Terrain.

What type of terrain is dominant in this area?

What natural and cultivated vegetation is present in the area?

What is the density and disposition of natural vegetation?

What is the approximate degree of slope?



What natural obstacles to movement were observed and what are those locations?



What natural or manmade obstacles to media and humanitarian distribution are in the area?



What natural or manmade drainage features are in the area?

Direction of flow.

Speed.

Depth.

Type of bed.



What is the physical layout of rural and urban settlements?



What is the layout of various houses within the area?



What is the description of any potential landing zones or drop zones?



What is the description of any beach landing sites, if applicable?



What is the description of any areas suitable for cache sites and what are those locations?



People.

What major ethnic groups or tribes populate each area?

What was (or is) their attitude toward other ethnic groups or tribes in the area?

What are the principal religions of the area and how are they practiced?

o Main, secondary, and relationships or conditions between different religions.

o Influence on people.

o Influence and control on political or judicial processes.

o Religious prayer times, regular observed days, and holidays.

o Constraints, laws, and taboos.

o Conflicts in or between religions and denominations or sects.

o Religious themes, symbology, allegory, and folklore.

o View on conflict, apocalypse, twelfth imam, and martyrdom.

What is the description of the average citizen of the area (height, weight, hair color, characteristics)?

o Is there a physically differentiated minority?

o Is there a minority differentiated by other visual cues such as dress or hairstyle?

Figure 7-1. Postmission debriefing guide

7-6

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Redeployment

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY (continued)

What type clothing, footwear, ornaments, and jewelry do they wear?

Is symbolism status attached to certain items of clothing, headdress, jewelry, body art, or ornaments?

What are the local traditions, customs, and practices?

o Between males and females?

o Between young and old?

o Toward marriage, birth, adult initiation and death?

o Between the populace and local officials?

What is the ordinary diet of the people?

o Self-imposed restrictions.

o Chronic dietary deficiencies.

o Cyclic, seasonal, or localized deficiencies.

What was the attitude of the populace toward U.S. and HN forces?

o Friendly target groups or specific target audiences.

o Neutral or uncommitted target groups or specific target audiences.

o Hostile target groups or specific target audiences.

o Specific behavioral changes.

o Anecdotal occurrences and spontaneous events during current deployment.

What was the general feeling and attitude of the populace and the HN troops toward the government and

leaders, government policies, and general conditions within the country?

How did the populace cooperate with Army units?

What is the approximate wage and economic status of the average citizen?

What formal and informal educational practices were observed?

Internal threat interference.

Internal threat sponsorship.

What is the state of health and well-being of the people in the area?

Did the populace in the area speak the national language differently from others in the country? If so,

how?

What percentage of the populace and the indigenous forces speak English or other foreign languages?

Did any member of the populace approach or ask questions about Army presence or the mission? If so,

describe in detail. Give names, if possible.

POLITICAL PARTIES (Major, Minor or Illegal Parties)



Targeted by HN or Army.

For IDAD support or as FID target.

Lethal, nonlethal, or both.



Fundamental ideology.

Authoritarian, elitist, populist, or democratic.

Secular, theocratic, or mixed.

Attitude toward HN government.

Attitude toward USG or Army.



Leaders.

Key communicators.

Willing or unwilling to support MISO program.

Effectiveness as spoiler or anti-government or anti-U.S. firebrand.



Policies.



Influence on government.



Influence on the people.

Peaceful, cooperative, militant group.

Cooperative to MISO program.



Overall effectiveness.

Percentage of electorate: claimed versus actual turnout.

Money, real influence, covert influence, spoiler, and so on.

Figure 7-1. Postmission debriefing guide (continued)

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

7-7

Chapter 7

POLITICAL PARTIES (Major, Minor or Illegal Parties) (Continued)



Foreign influence.

Ethnic or ideological.

Regional.

International.

Stability, strengths, and weaknesses.

MILITARY



Friendly forces.



Disposition.



Composition, identification, and strength.



Organization, armament, and equipment.



Degree of training and combat effectiveness.



Morale (general and specific).

General psychological strengths and weaknesses.

Degree of stratification—number of target audiences.

Psychological vulnerabilities or susceptibilities.

Targeted by HN or U.S. MISO—effectiveness.

Targeted by internal threat and foreign propaganda—effectiveness.



Mission.



Leadership and capabilities of officers and noncommissioned officers compared with those of the United

States.



Logistics.



Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.



Methods of resupply and their effectiveness.



General relationship between HN military forces, the populace, and other forces (paramilitary, police, and

so forth).



Influence on local populace.

Credibility.

Lingering effects of past bad acts or incompetence.

Anecdotal or empirical evidence of improvement(s).

Leaders or rank and file as used as key communicators or disseminators.

Significant operations or psychological actions with outcomes.



Recommendation for these forces (military or paramilitary) for ARSOF unconventional warfare contact.

INSURGENT OR OTHER INTERNAL THREAT FORCES



Disposition.



Composition, identification, and strength.



Organization, armament, and equipment.



Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.



Mission.



Leadership capabilities.



Logistics.



Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.



Method of resupply and its effectiveness.



Psychological strengths and weaknesses.



Relationship between insurgent forces, Army units, and the populace.



Influence on local populace.

POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES (Friendly and Adversary)



Disposition, strengths, and location.



Organization, armament, and equipment.



Logistics.



Motivation, reliability, and degree of training.



Psychological strengths and weaknesses.



Relationship with the government and local populace.

Figure 7-1. Postmission debriefing guide (continued)

7-8

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Redeployment

AUXILIARY AND UNDERGROUND (Friendly and Adversary)



Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.



Morale and general effectiveness.



Motivation and reliability.



Support.

Logistics.

Intelligence.

TARGETING (Describe the Area)



Rail system.

General route.

Importance to the local and general area.

Bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.

Bypass possibilities.

Key junctions, switching points, and power sources.

Location of maintenance crews who keep the system operational during periods of large-scale

interdiction.

Security.



Telecommunications system.

Information systems infrastructure, gateways, routers, switches, network hubs, server and relay systems.

Internet, television, and voicemail.

Location and description of routes, lines, and cables.

Location of power sources.

Location and capacity of switchboards.

Critical points.

Importance to the local, general area.

Capabilities of maintenance crews to keep the system operating at a minimum.

Security.



Petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage and processing facilities.

Location.

Capacity of storage facilities.

Equipment used for the production of petroleum, oils, and lubricants.

Power source.

Types and quantities of petroleum, oils, and lubricants manufactured.

Methods of transportation and distribution.

o Rail.

o Truck.

o Ship.

o Air.

Pipeline routes and pumping station capacities.

Security.



Electrical power system.

Location and description of power stations.

Principal power lines and transformers.

Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.

Critical points.

Capacity (megawatts).

Principal users.

Security.



Military installations and depots.

Size.

Activity.

Location.

Units.

Figure 7-1. Postmission debriefing guide (continued)

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

7-9

Chapter 7

TARGETING (continued)

Equipment.

Reaction time.

Security.



Highway and road system.

Name and number.

Type of surface, width, and condition.

Location of bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.

Bypass possibilities.

Traffic density.

Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.

Security.



Inland waterways and canals.

Name and number.

Width, depth, and type of bed.

Direction and speed of flow.

Location of dams and locks, power source, and other traffic obstructions.

Location and descriptions of administrative, control, maintenance crew, facilities, and reaction crew.

Location and description of navigational aids.



Natural and synthetic gas system.

Location and capacity of wells and pipelines.

Storage facilities and capacity.

Critical points.

Maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.

Principal users.

Security.



Industrial facilities.

Capabilities of plants to convert their facilities in wartime to the production of essential military materials.

Type of facilities.

Power sources.

Locations.

Sources of raw materials.

Number of employees.

Disposition of products.

General working conditions.

Critical points.

Security.



Lethal and nonlethal actions. MIS experts nominate specific targets and target audiences to influence by

advising the commander on the effects of lethal and nonlethal actions on target audiences.



Restricted targets for cultural, infrastructural, or psychological value.



Nonlethal targets:

CAO only targets.

CAO with MISO.

Initial MISO program.

Major series.

Initial target audiences.

Target audiences dropped.

Target audiences added.

HEALTH AND SANITATION



To what degree does hunting and fishing contribute to the local diet?



What cash crops are raised in the area?



What domestic and wild animals are present?



What animal diseases are present?

Figure 7-1. Postmission debriefing guide (continued)

7-10

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Redeployment

HEALTH AND SANITATION (Continued)



What is the availability and quality of water in populated and unpopulated areas?



What systems are used for sewage disposal?



What sanitation practices were observed in populated and unpopulated areas?



What are the most common human illnesses and how are they controlled?

SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, ESCAPE AND PERSONNEL RECOVERY



SERE debriefers intend to gather information on the evasion or captivity environments encountered such as the

following:

What, if any, safe houses or areas for evasion and recovery purposes can be recommended?

From which element of the populace is assistance most likely?

What types of local transportation are available?

What is the operational environment?

What HN police or military support is available?

What are the types of tribal support?

What are the lines of communications?

What type of information operations exist?

CAO



Has the end state been achieved for CAO supporting CMO?

HN transition plan.

Has coordination for handoff been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other

organizations?



Have the underlying causes of the conflict been ameliorated?

To what degree?

If still existing, how do they influence future planning?



What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish remaining CA activities?



What are any new emerging humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?



Will any ongoing operations (for example, engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted?



What are the CA functional specialists that remain behind and residual requirements for:

Rule of law?

Economic stability?

Infrastructure?

Governance?

Public education and information?

Public health and welfare?



Who will support CA forces that remain behind?

MISCELLANEOUS*



Weather.

Wind speed and direction.

Temperature.

Effect on personnel, equipment, and operations.

* This section could detail any miscellaneous topics or subject of interest such as improvised explosive device installation

techniques.

Figure 7-1. Postmission debriefing guide (continued)

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

7-11

Appendix A

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

This appendix provides general guidance on legal, regulatory, and policy

considerations for FID operations. Army forces conducting FID must accept legal

and political constraints to avoid strategic failure. Significant legal and policy

considerations apply to FID operations. This guidance serves as a base document of

law and policy existing as of the publishing of this manual. Precedents and USC

citations are also those in existence and in force at the time of publication. Law and

policy are subject to rapid change because of new U.S. congressional legislation,

National Defense Authorization Act, and Presidential executive policy changes. In

addition, the concept of international law is even more fluid and far less codified

outside the realm of certain international treaties, such as the Geneva and Hague

Conventions. Law and policy concerns have potential long-term organizational

impact for the Army. A single violation, real or perceived, can have a profound

impact on multiple areas of concern in FID operations. This situation may warrant the

building of a hedge around the letter of the law with plans and policies that exceed

minimum standards. Aggressive pursuit, prosecution, and interdiction of subversion,

lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats must be conducted lawfully,

thereby enabling the commander to project legitimacy throughout the HN during the

conduct of FID. Commanders must draw on the expertise of their legal staff and the

organic or attached sociopolitical expertise of SF, MIS, and CA personnel as well as

the law enforcement expertise of military police before establishing FID plans and

policy. Army legal advisors must review all sensitive aspects of FID planning and

execution. Constant monitoring of the legal ramifications of operations is also

necessary. This is ultimately not only because of letter of the law compliance but also

because of the impact on the perceptions of the HN populace.

JUST WAR AND HOST NATION PERCEPTIONS

A-1. The concept of a just war has likely had as many interpretations as there have been combatants

throughout the history of conflict. In the West the concept of jus ad bellum (war that is started for just

reasons) and jus in bello (just conduct by combatants waging a war) was first articulated by Saint

Augustine in the 5th century and systematically outlined by Saint Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century.

However, in the West both liberators and tyrants have used these writings. Typically, all just war theory in

all cultures has an ideological or theological component and often becomes very fluid, even in the course

of a single conflict. Frequently, an internal threat tries to use the concept that it is conducting a just war by

reasonable means. This is especially true with insurgents or other internal threats. As FID is conducted in a

highly political milieu that relies on securing the support of a HN populace, the perceptions of the local

populace are often a key enabler to success in FID. During the conduct of FID, perceptions of the populace

can be a center of gravity. Although perceptions are not law or policy, during the conduct of FID the USG

must ensure the United States and the HN uphold legitimacy and rule of law. U.S. law, policy, and

regulations are always directive to U.S. forces; however, they are often not mirrored in all HN law and

policy. As FID operations may have a very small footprint in a host country, leaders must be empowered

with a comprehensive body of knowledge and skills to execute day-to-day operations in an environment

where tactical decisions may well have strategic implications. Ultimately, international and HN law must be

interwoven with a plan to secure positive perceptions the HN is, with U.S. or coalition support, justly restoring

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

A-1

Appendix A

the rule of law. Many rule-of-law activities occur as components of stability operations, irregular warfare, and

FID, and help to establish or reestablish the HN capacity to maintain the rule of law. Many activities

conducted in rule of law involve the practice of law, and therefore by statute, are performed by judge

advocates or other attorneys under the statutory technical supervision of the Judge Advocate General. Thus, in

addition to the input from the staff judge advocate to a commander’s FID legal planning, a combined team of

staff and attachment subject-matter experts may be helpful in the development of a legal perceptions

management plan.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

A-2. The term international law bears the inherent connotation of being hierarchically above national law.

In practice, this is rarely practicable if a nation remains intransigent. Conceptually, much of the developed

world looks at the ideal of international law as functioning much like Federal and State law function in the

United States. Jurists, political scientists, and members of the legal academic community attempt to define

what international law should consist of, and various bodies debate how international law might be

enforced. New standards of law and policy may emerge very quickly on a conceptual level. However, the

historical precedent is that international treaties regarded as having the weight of law are often difficult to

develop, slow to gain widespread acceptance, and largely unenforceable until after a conflict. In FID, the

USG conducts foreign assistance within the rule of law. The USG can equip and train foreign partners

under security cooperation or security assistance programs, and through these programs, the USG

demonstrates the legitimacy and sovereignty of the HN. The FID concept is the USG preferring to build

partners and enable those partners through foreign assistance to defeat subversion, lawlessness, insurgency,

terrorism, and other threats with internal military capabilities. The FID end state is to enable foreign

partners to conduct actions within an absolute legal basis. The HN has a legal basis as a sovereign state

with laws and the responsibility to police frontiers. Enabling the HN to uphold the rule of law through

indirect FID is far superior to the USG conducting direct FID or combat operations. The goal is a self-

sufficient lawful HN that abides human rights.

DISTINGUISHING SENTIMENT, POLICY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

A-3. The underlying international sentiment as to what is acceptable behavior in conflict and war often

rapidly outpaces formal treaty adoption and ratification. In short, the collective, largely unwritten will of a

majority of the international community can become de facto international law long before it is codified. In

addition, the USG often formulates and upholds this emerging law and policy. In the current global

operations against terrorist networks, international policy and sentiment have been debated among the

legitimate nation-states of the world. Violent extremist or transnational criminal organizations and

sympathizers have attempted to shape and exploit that debate to their advantage. According to FM 1-04,

Legal Support to the Operational Army, FID is a principle operation of irregular warfare. Legal issues with

irregular warfare are numerous and complex because U.S. forces participate in operations with HN consent

and sometimes among the civilian population. FID legal issues are governed by U.S. Federal law,

international law, and HN law. Commanders conducting FID operations face convoluted and controversial

legal issues until international law definitively codifies terrorism, insurgency, transnational criminal

organizations, and other forms of violent lawlessness. Even as such codes, laws, and conventions emerge,

units conducting FID operations will likely face disinformation and propaganda that vilifies legitimate

military, reconstruction, and law enforcement efforts as violations of what the adversary refers to as

international law.

TREATIES WITH THE WEIGHT OF LAW

A-4. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, lists the treaties relating to the conduct of land warfare that

have been ratified by the United States. FM 27-10 provides authoritative guidance to U.S. military

personnel on the customary and treaty law applicable to the conduct of warfare on land and to the

relationships between belligerents and neutral states. The Hague Convention developed the branch of law

concerned with armed conflict. The purpose of the law of war is to regulate by law (written and unwritten)

warfare to include protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering;

A-2

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy,

particularly prisoners of war, the wounded, sick, and civilians; and facilitating the restoration of peace. The

Lieber Code of 1863, prepared by Francis Lieber for President Lincoln during the Civil War between the

states, was an order entitled Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.

Francis Leiber was an international lawyer who immigrated to America. The Lieber Code provided

detailed rules on the conduct of land warfare and the treatment of the civilian population to include

prisoners of war. The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 (predecessor of the Hague) along with the Lieber

Code formed the foundation for the discussion of peace and war at The Hague Convention in 1899. The

laws of humanity are attributed to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 for inclusion in The Hague. The

International Committee of the Red Cross was formed from the International Committee for Aid to the

Wounded in 1863, and a diplomatic conference was held in Geneva Switzerland in 1864 that adopted the

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. The second

Hague Peace Conference convened in 1907 and addressed naval warfare. By invitation of the Swiss

Government and instigation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the law of Geneva in 1949

addressed the protection of civilian persons in time of war during internal armed conflict, and not just wars

between states. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, when the Republic of

Montenegro adopted the four sections of the Geneva Convention in 2006, it was the 194th country to do

so. More than any other documents, the Geneva and Hague accords, and their protocols hold acceptance as

international law. This has not prevented rogue elements and nations from ignoring the basic humanitarian

precepts of these conventions. According to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, the joint force

staff judge advocate advises the joint force commander and staff on legal authority to include the Geneva

Convention. There is no guarantee that international law of armed conflict will be applied or upheld just

because it exists. It is likely that selective violation of these international law conventions will continue for

some time to come. However, even when faced with adversaries who ignore the principles and codes of

international law, like the Geneva and Hague Conventions, the United States has remained steadfastly

committed to upholding the conventions since their inception.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

A-5. A declaration of war and an invasion of one country by the armed forces of another clearly result in

international conflict. United Nations enforcement of a resolution authorizing armed intervention in an

offending nation also carries this weight in law. The definition of an international conflict is broader,

however. As a rule, if the combat effects of a conflict go beyond a nation’s boundaries and seriously

impact other countries, the conflict is international. All the customary laws of war on hostilities between

states govern international armed conflicts. The Geneva Convention and all other treaties that make up the

laws of war also apply. An important concern of the Soldier fighting in this type of war is his right to

prisoner of war status if captured.

NONINTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

A-6. Noninternational conflicts are typically called insurgencies. Insurgent forces are often covert or

clandestine although they may adopt the overt trappings of a legitimate armed force, such as rudimentary

uniforms. Their purpose is not to hold fixed territory or to engage government troops in direct combat but

to wage a guerrilla-type war. In this war, they can hide in the civilian populace by posing as

noncombatants. Insurgents, therefore, are organized bodies of people who, for public political purposes,

are in a state of armed hostility against the established government. An important legal aspect of a

noninternational conflict is that captured, illegal combatants do not attain the rights of a prisoner of war.

The HN can prosecute these combatants as criminals. The fact that an insurgent follows the rules of war or

is in uniform will not give him prisoner of war status under international law. Article 3 of Geneva

Conventions of

1949 provides the primary source of rights and duties of persons involved in

noninternational conflicts. Common Article 3 has two parts.

1 September 2011

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A-3

Appendix A

First Part

A-7. The first part of Article 3 provides that persons take no active part in the hostilities, including

members of the Armed Forces who have laid down their arms, and those out of combat because of

sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely. Humane

treatment specifically excludes—

Committing violence to life and person; in particular, murder, mutilation, torture, or any cruel

treatment.

Hostage taking.

Conducting outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.

Subjecting anyone to any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth,

wealth, or any other similar criteria.

Passing of sentences and carrying out executions without previous judgment pronounced by a

regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees that are recognized as vital.

Second Part

A-8. The second part of Article 3 requires collecting and caring for the wounded and sick. As previously

stated, Common Article 3 does not grant prisoner of war status to insurgents; however, it requires the

government to grant them a fair trial in a regularly constituted court before carrying out the court’s

sentence after a guilty verdict. There is a legal gray area for determining whether a HN could execute a

lawful capital sentence on an insurgent or other inactive duty training personnel who may be either ill or

wounded. Army Soldiers should advise HN counterparts of the potential propaganda value of such an

action to a threat organization.

ARMY PLANNING CONCERNS

A-9. Army planners and Soldiers conducting FID operations may often need detailed knowledge of

international law, such as the Geneva Convention, for two principal reasons. The first is to educate HN

military staff and Soldiers. The second is to counter very specific points of adversary disinformation and

propaganda. Army advisors and trainers may have to build either a knowledge base on international law in

HN military personnel or an adherence to portions that the HN military has routinely ignored in the past. In

addition, this may carry over to transgressions of their own laws or building acceptance of new laws

safeguarding human rights. International humanitarian law, reaching out into the areas of human rights has

expanded in scope since it was developed as treaty law during the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The

expansion includes two protocols that were adopted in 1977 during the Diplomatic Conference on the

Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts;

Protocol I has 102 articles and Protocol II has 28 articles. In 1987, President Ronald Reagan rejected

Protocol I and stated, “United States should not ratify Protocol I, thereby reaffirming its support for

traditional humanitarian law, and its opposition to the politicization of that law by groups that employ

terrorist practices.”

A-10. The Charter of the United Nations as successor to the League of Nations in 1945 legitimizes the

authorization of use of the Armed Forces by the Security Council in order to restore peace. The United

Nations does not hold a monopoly on the use of force and leaves the possibility for individual actors to

have recourse to armed action.

A-11. In the 1960s and 1970s, the United Nations began to take interest in the development of the law of

armed conflict, under the heading human rights in armed conflict. According to JP

3-29, Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance, the purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and

security and promote human rights. Human rights are discussed in Chapter IV of the United Nations

Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General. In 1948, the United Nations formally defined

human rights by adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is a bulwark against

oppression defined in 30 concise articles. Article 1 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is “all

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Article 7 promotes all being equal before the

law, upholding that equal protection is an essential component of the rule of law. The DOS speaks of

promoting human rights, the rule of law, and good governance as a form of security assistance. On

11 March 2009, the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, “…human rights will always be central to our

foreign policy.” The DOS publication Principles of Democracy states, “For much of human history, rulers

and law were synonymous—law was simply the will of the ruler. A first step away from such tyranny was

the notion of the rule by law, including the notion that even a ruler is under the law and should rule by

virtue of legal means. Democracies went further by establishing the rule of law.”

A-12. The DOS is the lead agency in the executive branch for foreign affairs. According to JP 3-07.3,

Peace Operations, the peacekeeping objective is that the HN will establish a self-sustaining public law and

order system in accordance with internationally recognized standards with respect for human rights.

FM 1-04 describes human rights vetting and how Congress limits funding for training or equipment for

foreign security forces. Congress prohibits funding if the DOS has credible information that the foreign

security force (to receive training or equipment) has committed a gross violation of human rights. DOS and

DOD must vet proposed recipient units against a database of credible reports of human rights violations.

Because of the concerns of international and U.S. law, U.S. personnel who notice suspected violations of

basic human rights must report the facts to their chain of command. Under U.S. law, the President makes

the decision whether to cut off security assistance to any country with a documented pattern of human

rights abuses. JP 1-04, Chapter II, Legal Support to Joint Operation Planning, explains the role of the legal

advisors in the planning process in detail. Security cooperation planning is a subset of joint strategic

planning and legal advisors are necessary in assisting FID decisionmakers in translating policy decisions

into legally acceptable plans and orders that support national security objectives.

A-13. Internal threat propagandists increasingly use factual, partially factual, or fictitious violations of

international law, policy, or even sentiment to discredit HN governments and U.S. forces. As seen in

Figure A-1, page A-6, these attempts are frequently graphic to have the maximum incendiary effect. They

often address third countries or international agencies and may cite specific articles of the Geneva

Conventions. If successful, they appear to have legitimate status as a state actor and they make the HN look

like a nation that ignores civil rights and the laws of war. Soldiers must infuse an acceptance of the basic

tenants of international law among the HN personnel they work with, advise, and train.

A-14. Treaties and international law dealing primarily or solely with nonmilitary matters can be

contributory factors to an internal defense issue that necessitates conducting FID operations as well. An

internal threat can arise or grow substantially more dangerous from something as innocuous as the HN

becoming a signatory to environmental or economic treaties that adversely affect one sector of the

economy. FID planners must develop a comprehensive FID plan that psychologically and economically

mitigates these effects. Anticipating security threats to symbolic targets of these treaties, such as

compliance or monitoring offices or their personnel, and developing proactive security measures for such

sites is a necessity.

A-15. The global operations against terrorist networks have demonstrated significant deficiencies in the

concept of what constitutes lawful combatant status. The need to further codify the concept of lawful

combat, as well as the collective international policing of armed belligerent forces, violent extremist

organizations, and transnational criminal organizations by nation-states, continues to lag behind efforts of

the international community to eradicate those elements. Army commanders and planners must constantly

communicate the status of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats through the

application of MISO during interdiction. Certain TTP may be appropriate against armed belligerent forces

but not transnational criminal organizations and vice versa.

HOST NATION LAW

A-16. The laws of the HN in which FID operations are conducted can greatly impact plans, deployment,

and operations. In most cases, HN law is applicable to U.S. personnel and units conducting FID

operations. Beyond this, the political mechanisms, parties, and other influencing agents within the HN can

have considerable impact on FID planning and execution.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

A-5

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

Environmental law.

Military law.

Emergency and martial law powers.

Intellectual property law.

Narcotics law.

Special interest groups.

Shadow governments and leaders.

Political front groups.

Unwritten law and political conventions.

Political history of the HN.

Religious or social policing powers.

HN international treaty participation.

Agreements and treaties with United States and third parties.

A-18. Army commanders must be apprised of recent changes to HN law that have come about to support

the IDAD strategy. Such changes may be in the early stages of implementation in the beginning of FID

operations. As the HN implements these legal measures, security situations may change dramatically.

Planners must anticipate the reaction of the public to political, social, or economic changes in the HN

because of new laws or policies. Opposition or widespread acceptance of new laws can create problems

with military significance. For instance, an amnesty program that generates large numbers of defectors

from an insurgent group can present logistical and administrative challenges.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Philippines

In January 2002, JTF 510 made up in large part by SOF personnel deployed to the

southern Philippines to assist the Republic of the Philippines (RP) Government in the

destruction of the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group. The initiation of OEF-P was only

accomplished after considerable debate within the RP Government and in the

national press. The issue was debated on a constitutional level as the RP

constitution banned foreign soldiers on Philippine soil except in time of war. Despite

the ardent support of President Corazon Aquino and much of the government and with

widespread public support, there was still considerable opposition to the presence of

U.S. troops. An eventual compromise had operational effects on JTF 510. A cap was

placed on the number of U.S. troops who could deploy, and troops were prohibited from

conducting anything other than self-defense. Supplemental understandings to existing

agreements were necessary.

Early in the operation, political sensitivities among the populace were challenged

when U.S. personnel (in uniform and carrying weapons) used an automated teller

machine outside their base in Zamboanga City, Mindanao while being photographed

by the Philippine media. Further restrictions on U.S. personnel were necessary to

placate those politically opposed to the presence of the United States. A culturally

attuned approach allowed JTF 510 to assist and advise the AFP in early tactical and

operational successes against the Abu Sayyaf Group. Slowly, an expansion of the

role of U.S. forces to include combined CAO was possible because of early

sensitivity to HN laws and political realities.

A-19. Changes in HN law or the enforcement of existing HN law may require drastic changes in how

intelligence, military, paramilitary, or police forces operate. Planning for training to address the changes in

HN standing operating procedures may be an early priority for all elements conducting FID.

Documentation of HN violations of their own law is necessary along with specific guidelines and

procedures to react to such violations. Such violations may remain an internal matter for the HN; however,

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

A-7

Appendix A

violations that also constitute a human rights violation will have consequences for Army elements, up to

and including terminating FID operations. Such violations may constitute an unacceptable breach of the

imperative to ensure the legitimacy and credibility of U.S. forces. The purpose of legitimacy is to develop

and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state. Legitimacy is based on the

legality, morality, and suitability of the actions undertaken, as well as the will of the U.S. public to support

the actions. FID operations must sustain the legitimacy of the host government, where applicable.

Communicating U.S. intent to the civilian populace is critical to establishing and maintaining legitimacy.

MISO, in conjunction with public affairs, help communicate the U.S. humanitarian intent and emphasize

the role of the HN government. Security actions must be balanced with legitimacy concerns so that actions

of forces on the ground match the stated intent. Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and

maintaining internal and international support, and consistency in legitimacy lends credibility to the United

States and the HN.

UNITED STATES AND HOST NATION TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

A-20. The status of Army personnel and units is one of the most important legal concerns. Usually, anyone

present in a nation’s territory is subject to its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the legal power a sovereign nation

makes and uses to enforce its laws without foreign dictation. When a nation’s troops enter a friendly

foreign country, international law subjects them to the territorial jurisdiction of that nation and any

jurisdiction that the sending state wishes to exercise. U.S. military forces are always subject to the Uniform

Code of Military Justice. U.S. policy is to maximize U.S. jurisdiction over the Armed Forces it may deploy

to a HN. However, U.S. forces performing a FID operation are not automatically immune from HN

jurisdiction. The legal status of U.S. forces with a partner is usually defined in one or more of the

following types of international agreements:

Emergency wartime agreements.

SAO agreements.

Status of forces agreements.

Status of mission agreements.

Diplomatic notes.

A-21. During military emergencies, the United States normally obtains exclusive jurisdiction over its

troops in foreign countries. Emergency agreements have normally been short and uncomplicated. The 1950

Korea, the 1968 Lebanon, and the 1984 Grenada are classic examples of these types of stationing

agreements.

A-22. SAO agreements provide a degree of diplomatic immunity to U.S. troops stationed in countries

under these agreements. The United States negotiates each agreement individually with the country in

question; therefore, each agreement is usually different. Usually, the United States attaches Soldiers on

temporary duty in these countries (for example, a FID operation) to the SAO, and automatically accords

them the same protection as SAO personnel. Agreements of this type normally provide diplomatic

immunity for anything done in the performance of official duty. Personnel performing a FID operation may

come within the scope of the SAO agreement itself or be included by the terms of a security assistance

contract entered into between the United States and the HN.

A-23. Status of forces agreements and status of mission agreements are the most comprehensive type of

international agreement. Status of forces agreements are usually used where the United States has stationed

many forces for an extended period (Germany and Korea). Because of current operations, several status of

forces agreements are in place in countries without U.S. bases.

A-8

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

A-24. Status of forces agreements usually provide for a sharing of jurisdiction over U.S. forces, with the

United States having the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over offenses solely involving—

U.S. citizens, military forces, or property.

Security of U.S. forces.

Actions occurring in the performance of official duty.

A-25. Status of mission agreements typically cover the same points as status of forces agreements. The

term status of mission agreements is used frequently in the case of international monitoring or peace

operations. It may be used in United Nations, European Union, or other internationally sponsored operations.

A-26. In any given mission, there may be agreements short of status of forces agreements or status of

mission agreements, such as diplomatic notes. Diplomatic notes cover a wide range of issues, which

typically address a specific situation that has arisen between nations. This may include the sort of natural or

manmade crises that spark the need for FID operations. Coordination with the American Embassy reveals

the existence of relevant diplomatic notes.

A-27. Planners must be familiar with any agreements that may be applicable. It is not always easy to locate

all the relevant international documents affecting a mission. Planners may start by researching State

Department publications, such as Treaties in Force. In addition to the relevant GCC’s or subordinate

command’s legal office, the defense attaché, SAO, or military assistance group at the embassy can provide

the text of HN or other relevant agreements. Army planners often need the details of not only the status of

forces agreements and agreements in force but also knowledge of the genesis of such agreements, because

points within them may reflect long-held sensitivities of the HN populace and government to the presence

of U.S. or other outside forces in their country. This is often true in any nation that has been under colonial

rule.

UNITED STATES LAW AND POLICY

A-28. FID is authorized without receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or SecDef,

and U.S. forces may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve FID.

If the Secretary of State requests and the SecDef approves, U.S. forces can participate in FID. The request

and approval go through standing statutory authorities in 22 USC because it contains the FAA, the AECA,

and other laws that authorize security assistance, developmental assistance, and other forms of bilateral aid.

The request and approval might also occur under 10 USC to authorize certain types of military-to-military

contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of HCA in coordination with the U.S. Ambassador to the

HN. In such FID operations, the U.S. forces work as administrative and technical personnel as part of the

U.S. diplomatic mission pursuant to a status of forces agreement or an exchange of letters with the HN.

The U.S. Army has been subordinate and subject to civilian authority slightly longer than the United States

has been a nation. Unlike many nations of the world, the Army and the other Services have never

attempted to intervene in the political processes of our nation. During FID operations, the HN military may

have the opposite history. In fact, the HN military may still be undergoing transition from holding some

sort of political power in the country. The attitude and words of Army professionals as they speak about

the U.S. political system is a subtle but nonetheless powerful training tool for any HN military, as is the

manner in which they speak and act in an interagency environment. Commanders and Soldiers, therefore,

must have a good layman’s understanding of sometimes complex USC, Presidential directives, and

congressional legislation. ARSOF careerists as Army professionals conducting FID are trained to be

diplomatically astute.

MONEY AS A WEAPON SYSTEM

A-29. The historical precedents of countries using monetary resources in warfare go back to ancient times.

In our own history, evidence suggests that the British Government covertly introduced counterfeit Colonial

currency into the fight against the American Revolution. In addition, the British Armed Forces used the

carrot (in part) of money to win away American patriots from the cause of liberty, notably Benedict

Arnold. By World War II, the U.S. Army fully used the power of currency applied directly to individuals

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

A-9

Appendix A

and more commonly through collective reconstruction through CA. Current lessons learned in Operation

IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM have produced the contemporary maxim that

economics are indeed an influencing instrument of power. Resources, particularly money have a central

role in military operations. FID operations have long been intertwined legally and in terms of TTP in the

use of resources. FID operations employ money as a weapons system with the ultimate goal of winning the

population through legitimacy to facilitate defeating the insurgents. As stated before, FID operations

clearly delineate 10 USC and 22 USC, the National Defense Authorization Act, and other USC authorities

within the HN. Title 10 USC authorities include the potential of FID combat operations. The complex mix

of the FID operational framework can include 22 USC authorities and National Defense Authorization Act

temporary authorities as well. Much of the following discussion details primarily on the funding and

authorities of utilizing monies in FID operations.

FISCAL LAW CONCERNS

A-30. Security cooperation programs are governed by U.S. statute. The primary laws of concern are the

AECA (as amended), the FAA (as amended), and various sections of 10 USC and 22 USC. A central legal

consideration for commanders conducting FID operations is using the proper funding authorizations for the

type of mission. There are numerous types of authorities—10 USC, 22 USC, or Title XII of the National

Defense Authorization Act

(Matters Relating to Foreign Nations). In most instances, commanders

encounter problems in this area when they use operations and maintenance funds for projects that require

FAA funding. The Judge Advocate General should always be consulted to translate authorities especially

fiscal authorizations and appropriations. FM 1-06, Financial Management Operations, is a good source for

fiscal law, appropriations, authorities, and agreements to include the principles of time, purpose, and

amount. Commanders must operate within the constraints of fiscal law and understand funding sources to

avoid Antideficiency Act violations, accomplish the mission, and be able to maximize all resourcing

options. The U.S. Government Accountability Office publishes the Principles of Federal Appropriations

Law (commonly referred to as the Red Book), which explains the power of Congress to appropriate funds

and how that power was derived from Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States.

Title 31 of the USC presents permanent funding statutes that show how Congress exercises its control of

the “power of the purse” and its design to prevent abuses. Budget authority is not money but rather the

authority to spend money that has been appropriated. The following key statutory directives should be

observed when conducting FID operations to ensure that all activities are conducted within the limits of

authority:

A statute will not be construed as making an appropriation unless it expressly so states—

31 USC Section 1301(d). (31 USC Chapter 13, Appropriations.)

Agencies may not spend, or commit themselves to spend, in advance of or in excess of

appropriations—31 USC Section 1341, Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amounts

(commonly referred to as the Antideficiency Act).

Appropriations may be used only for their intended purposes—31 USC Section 1301(a).

Appropriations made for a definite period of time may be used only for expenses properly

incurred during that time—31 USC Section 1502(a) (31 USC Chapter 15, Appropriation

Accounting.)

Unless authorized by law, an agency may not keep money it receives from sources other than

congressional appropriations, but must deposit the money in the Treasury—31 USC Section

3302(b). (31 USC Chapter 33, Depositing, Keeping, and Paying Money.)

TITLE 10 UNITED STATES CODE (ARMED FORCES)

A-31. FID operations in which U.S. forces employ lethal force to further national objectives fall under the

same 10 USC authorities as any other employment of U.S. forces. The United States ultimately derives all

ROE from 10 USC. Typically, Army units receive existing ROE before conducting FID operations. The

President or SecDef may apply specific applications or cautions regarding 10 USC provisions for FID

operations on a case-by-case basis to best support U.S. national objectives in the HN.

A-10

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

TITLE 10 FUNDING

A-32. The following paragraphs discuss 10 USC and other DOD-pertinent authorities for specific programs

and activities. In the course of FID operations, monies and authorities authorized for use in some countries

and operations may not apply to other HNs or FID operations and are subject to change annually through

the appropriations process in Congress.

Operations and Maintenance Funds

A-33. The USG appropriates these funds for day-to-day expenses of the Army to include garrison,

exercises, deployments, and military operations. The DOD has a good deal of discretion in how to spend

these general-purpose funds however, there are threshold dollar limitations for certain types of

expenditures, such as purchases of major end items of equipment and construction of permanent facilities.

Under fiscal law principles, DOD cannot spend general-purpose funds for any foreign assistance activity

for which Congress has specifically appropriated funds. Some operations and maintenance-funded DOD

activities are on the periphery of security assistance programs. Commanders must be alert to the differences

between operations and maintenance and security assistance activities.

Coalition Operations

A-34. Coalition operations—knowing how to fight alongside the armed forces of friendly countries—are

conducted by forces of two or more nations. The U.S. Comptroller General has established the following

fiscal law principles on combined training:

Combined exercises that provide overseas training opportunities for U.S. personnel and support

the goals of U.S. coalition operations may use operations and maintenance funds despite

providing training to HN forces.

The permissible scope of HN training includes safety, familiarization, and interoperability training.

Combined exercises assume the involvement of comparably proficient units. Operations and

maintenance funds may not be used to provide the level of training available through security

assistance programs.

Operations and maintenance funds are provided for U.S. forces to take advantage of

opportunities to train with foreign forces. Security assistance funds are intended for U.S. forces

to provide concentrated training for foreign forces.

Special Operations Forces Exception

A-35. Section 2011, 10 USC, is directed toward funding expenses of training SOF assigned to the

command in conjunction with training, and training with, armed forces and other security forces of a

friendly foreign country. The Comptroller General has acknowledged that SOF Soldiers have a mission to

train foreign forces. The United States must pay the incremental expenses incurred by a country as the

direct result of training, to include reasonable and proper cost of rations, fuel, training ammunition,

transportation, and other goods and services consumed with exception of pay or allowance of a country’s

personnel. SOF may train a foreign military force to test their ability to accomplish their mission. The

primary goal or benefit must be to test SOF training capabilities. The purpose of the training shall be to

train the SOF of the combatant command. This training is permissible as long as it is not comparable to or

intended as security assistance training; that is, the training must be conducted to benefit SOF. SOF include

CA and MIS forces.

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid

A-36. Sections 402, 404, 407, 2557, and 2561 of 10 USC, and Public Law 110-329, Consolidated Security,

Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act,

2009, Title II, Other Supplemental

Appropriations, enable the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid appropriation funds for the

Humanitarian Assistance Program, the Humanitarian Mine Action Program, and the Foreign Disaster

Relief and Emergency Response Program. The Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funds are

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

A-11

Appendix A

used to purchase humanitarian daily rations, and inventories of rations are stored in anticipation of their

need in a disaster relief situation. Funds are provided to the U.S. Transportation Command for delivering

humanitarian daily rations. The Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funds provide unfunded

space-available transport of privately donated relief supplies, foreign disaster relief to nations in need,

excess nonlethal DOD property, humanitarian assistance projects and activities, and training for eligible

personnel in demining techniques and mine risk education. The Office of Humanitarian Assistance,

Disaster Relief, and Mine Action manages, coordinates, and monitors execution of the DOD Humanitarian

Mine Action training operations and related program activities. The Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster

Relief, and Mine Action Division assists the CJCS, USSOCOM, GCCs, HNs, and other organizations in

planning for, establishing, and executing mine action programs. The Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster

Relief, and Mine Action Division, in coordination with the Assistant SecDef for Stability Operations/Low-

Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, reviews budget proposals for all demining related

activities. The Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action Division provide program

management and general oversight of DOD Humanitarian Assistance projects executed by Combatant

Commands worldwide. The Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action Division also

provide program management oversight, procurement, storage, and transportation of DOD nonlethal excess

property and the total program. The Comptroller (Business Operations Directorate) provides total financial

management of this program as part of the DSCA DOD baseline budget. The lead is the Deputy Assistant

SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations for policy and guidance, the DSCA manages, and

the GCCs implement.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction With Military Operations

A-37. 10 USC 401 and Public Law 110-329, Title VIII, General Provisions, Section 8012, authorizes

projects that are among the most effective instruments for dealing with HN conditions conducive to the

emergence of internal threats. Until the fiscal year 1987 DOD Authorization Act, HCA was not a DOD

mission. Instead, HCA was funded as a form of security assistance undertaken by the USAID. DOD

authority was limited to HCA provided from DOD assets to USAID on a reimbursable basis or to HCA

provided incidental to exercises directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the Authorization Act, Congress

specifically authorized DOD-provided HCA activities. Humanitarian assistance operations use DOD

personnel, equipment, and supplies to promote welfare, to reduce pain and suffering, and to prevent loss of

life or destruction of property from the aftermath of natural or manmade disasters. HCA is a subset of

humanitarian assistance. HCA activities shall promote the foreign policy and national security interests of the

United States and the specific operational readiness skills of the Armed Forces of the United States who

participate in the activities. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and

Stability Operations and the DSCA Centers Management Office, Programs Directorate, are responsible for

HCA activities, to include the following:

Earmarked HCA. Earmarked HCA activities are funded HCA (using specifically appropriated

funds) in conjunction with authorized military operations in a foreign country in order to

promote security interests of the United States and the foreign country, and to improve specific

operational readiness skills of U.S. Armed Forces members who participate in the activities. The

Secretary of State must specifically approve the HCA to be given to any foreign country and the

SecDef has to report HCA activities to Congress no later than 1 March each year.

De minimis HCA. The DOD may spend minimal operations and maintenance funds for de

minimis HCA. DOD can use other funding (not clearly specified) for minimal expenditures

incurred in furnishing funded HCA. However, operations and maintenance funds may only be

obligated for “incidental costs” of carrying out funded HCA. Normally expenses incurred as a

direct result of providing HCA to a foreign country shall be paid for out of funds specifically

appropriated for such purpose. Minimal expenditures by DOD for the purposes of HCA out of

funds other than appropriated for such assistance may be obligated for HCA for incidental costs

of carrying out such assistance only. The following describe incidental cost in relation to

de minimis HCA:

It has to meet the “reasonability” standard; therefore, a reasonable person would consider it

“incidental to the exercise.”

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

Generally, it cannot be the sort of foreign assistance provided by the USAID. However, in

certain cases, U.S. forces can perform assistance and be reimbursed by USAID under the

Economy Act.

These activities should not significantly impact the readiness training of the deploying unit.

Operations and maintenance funds expended for de minimis HCA should represent only a

minor or reasonably small percentage of the total operation and maintenance funds for

the exercise.

Note: A congressional example of de minimis HCA is a unit doctor’s exam of local villagers for

a few hours with administration of several shots and issuance of some medication would be

appropriate, but it would not be appropriate to dispatch a medical team for mass inoculations.

Another congressional example of HCA is the opening of an access road through trees and

underbrush for several hundred yards would be appropriate, but asphalting of any roadway

would not be appropriate.

DOD Instruction 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities, discusses HCA

activities for DOD in detail. HCA activities shall be conducted in conjunction with authorized

military operations of the U.S. Armed Forces in a foreign country (including deployments for

training). HCA shall be conducted with the approval of the HN national and local civilian

authorities. HCA shall complement, not duplicate, other forms of social or economic assistance

provided to the HN by other U.S. Departments or Agencies.

DOD Manual 5105.38-M, Chapter 12 Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action Programs,

defines HCA programs for DOD in detail. The DSCA’s Humanitarian Assistance and Mine

Action programs are aimed at alleviating economic or infrastructure deficiencies or other

endemic conditions including disease, hunger, pain, or privation that threaten human life,

damage to or loss of property, or social or political stability in developing nations. The programs

are designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authority and support U.S.

forces in their efforts to enhance regional security stability, promote positive public relations and

goodwill, improve access and influence the HN counterparts, and bolster the indigenous

capacity to respond to disasters. These programs also provide an example of how a professional

military can positively impact the civilian population of the HN and provide training

opportunities in operational skills of U.S. forces.

Interagency transactions. Under the Economy Act, Section 1535, 31 USC, Agency Agreements,

DOD personnel may conduct humanitarian activities for another Federal agency, primarily, but

not limited to the DOS. The DOD must make prior arrangements for the DOS to reimburse it for

any costs incurred.

Statute. 10 USC 401 specifically authorizes DOD to provide HCA. HCA is specifically defined

as medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a

country, to include:

Education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.

Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

Statute. Section

407, 10 USC, Humanitarian Demining Assistance: Authority; Limitations,

specifically authorizes the Secretary of a Military Department to carry out humanitarian

demining assistance in a country if the Secretary concerned determines that the assistance will

promote the security interests of both the United States and the HN or the specific operational

readiness skills of the members of the Armed Forces who participate in the activities.

Humanitarian demining assistance is limited. No member of the Armed Forces, while providing

humanitarian demining assistance under this section, shall engage in the physical detection,

lifting, or destroying of landmines or other explosive remnants of war (unless done in support of

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Appendix A

U.S. military operations). No member of the Armed Forces, while providing humanitarian

demining assistance under this section, shall provide assistance as part of a military operation

that does not involve the Armed Forces. Under 10 USC 407, the term humanitarian demining

assistance as it relates to training and support, means detection and clearance of landmines and

other explosive remnants of war, including activities related to the furnishing of education,

training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of landmines and

other explosive remnants of war.

Statute. Section 2557, 10 USC, Excess Nonlethal Supplies: Availability for Homeless Veteran

Initiatives and Humanitarian Relief, specifically authorizes the SecDef to transfer excess

nonlethal supplies to the Secretary of State for distribution of such supplies to foreign

governments for humanitarian relief purposes when requested by the local American Embassy.

The DOD processes, refurbishes, stores, and transports the property, and the DOS (American

Embassy in the HN) distributes the property to the intended recipients for humanitarian

purposes. Examples of property available through this program include medical equipment and

supplies, construction equipment, trucks and other vehicles, generators and other electrical

equipment, school supplies, tools, furniture, tents, blankets, and clothing. Excess nonlethal

supplies must primarily benefit the recipient country civilians. These supplies are donated with

no warranties or guarantees and without any post donation support. The excess nonlethal

supplies cannot be sold by the recipient government, but can be donated to the HN military if

used for civilian purposes.

A-38. The Secretaries of Defense and State must specifically approve in advance HCA rendered pursuant

to this authority. An important limitation is that HCA may not be provided to any military or paramilitary

individual, group, or organization. However, incidental or ancillary benefits of HCA that improve the

quality of life of military families also living in the community being rendered humanitarian and civic aid

does not preclude HCA projects.

Title 10 Humanitarian Assistance

A-39. 10 USC 2561, Humanitarian Assistance, authorizes use of funds for transportation of humanitarian

relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide. FID operations may be triggered by humanitarian

crises, or such instances may arise during the course of FID operations. If so, CA units may provide and

coordinate humanitarian assistance that supports FID operations. Although not necessarily factored into an

IDAD strategy, timely humanitarian experience may greatly facilitate internal security. The statute does not

define other humanitarian purposes worldwide. The most common types of humanitarian cargo moved in

this program are medical and hospital supplies, educational supplies, food items, clothing and shoes,

household items, tools and machinery, and other quality of life items. Cargo must be humanitarian in nature

and may not include any hazardous, political, or religious material. Cargo cannot be sent to a military or

paramilitary organization unless the organization provides a specific service to the civilian population.

A-40. 10 USC 2561 gives a much broader authority than 10 USC 401 and allows more flexibility in

emergencies to include natural or manmade disasters. However, HCA generally require preplanned activities

that promote operational readiness skills of the U.S. participants. Generally, if the contemplated activity falls

within the parameters of HCA under 10 USC 401, then the more specific HCA authority is used.

A-41. 10 USC 2561 does not require the promotion of operational readiness skills of the U.S. military

participants and allows contracting for goods and services if necessary for mission execution. In addition,

unlike HCA, which must be conducted in conjunction with an exercise or ongoing military operation,

humanitarian assistance can be conducted as a stand-alone project.

A-42. The transport of USG-donated goods to a country in need often falls under this authority.

10 USC 2561 has been amended to allow the SecDef to use this authority to transport supplies intended for

use to respond to or mitigate the effects of an event or condition that seriously threatens the environment

(such as an oil spill) if other sources of transportation are not readily available. CA Soldiers and their

servicing judge advocates must obtain and review current DOD guidance for humanitarian assistance

activities.

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

Note: 10 USC 402, Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries

(commonly called the Denton Amendment or Space Available Program) applies when relief

supplies are supplied by NGOs.

Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries

A-43. 10 USC 402 authorizes the transportation of nongovernmental, privately donated humanitarian relief

supplies on a space-available basis. DOD resources provide the space-available transportation, primarily by

air, on U.S. Air Force aircraft from an aerial port in the continental United States to the aerial port in the

recipient country at no cost to the donor or recipient. The State Department and DSCA administer the

program. Relief supplies are transported on a space available basis under certain conditions:

The transportation of such supplies is consistent with the foreign policy of the United States.

The supplies to be transported are suitable for humanitarian purposes and are in usable condition.

There is a legitimate humanitarian need for such supplies by the people or entity for whom they

are intended.

The supplies are in fact to be used for humanitarian purposes.

Adequate arrangements have been made for the distribution or use of such supplies in the

destination country.

A-44. DOD may not use this authority to supply a military or paramilitary group. Since transportation of

the supplies is on a space-available basis, no separate funding is necessary. However, the DOD must

submit reports to Congress.

A-45. 10 USC 402 has been amended to allow the SecDef to use this authority to transport supplies

intended for use to respond to or mitigate the effects of an event or condition that threatens serious harm to

the environment if other sources of transportation are not readily available.

Foreign Disaster Assistance

A-46. Under 10 USC 404, Foreign Disaster Assistance, the President may direct the SecDef to provide

disaster assistance outside the United States to respond to manmade or natural disasters when necessary to

prevent loss of lives or serious harm to the environment. The President delegated disaster relief authority to

the SecDef with concurrence of the DOS (except in emergencies). Executive Order 12966 of 14 July 1995,

Foreign Disaster Assistance, provides additional information. The SecDef shall provide disaster assistance

only at the direction of the President, with concurrence with the Secretary of State, or in emergency

situations in order to save human lives. In situations where there is not sufficient time to seek the prior

initial concurrence of the Secretary of State, the SecDef shall advise and seek the concurrence of the

Secretary of State as soon as practicable thereafter. The SecDef shall consult with the Administrator of the

USAID. The USAID is the lead agency for foreign disaster relief, with the primary source of authorization

and appropriations being under Section 2292a, USC 22, Authorization of Appropriations. DOD has limited

authority to engage in disaster assistance. Assistance should take the form of support to the overall civilian

effort. Transportation services are authorized in response to a manmade natural disaster to prevent serious

harm to the environment, when human lives are not at risk, only if other sources to provide such

transportation are not readily available.

Personnel Recovery Assistance

A-47. Section 408, 10 USC, Equipment and Training of Foreign Personnel to Assist in DOD Accounting

for Missing United States Government Personnel, authorizes the SecDef to provide assistance to any

foreign nation to assist the DOD with recovery of and accounting for missing USG personnel. The

assistance may include equipment, supplies, services, and training of personnel. The Secretary of State

must also approve the assistance and the amount may not exceed $1,000,000 in any fiscal year.

1 September 2011

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Appendix A

Combatant Commander Initiative Funds

A-48. Section 166a, 10 USC, Combatant Commands: Funding Through the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of

Staff, provides the combatant commanders with a great deal of legal flexibility to conduct activities from

funds made available in any fiscal year for the budget account in DOD known as the “Combatant

Commander Initiative Fund.” The CJCS may provide funds to the commander of a combatant command,

upon request. FID related authorized activities for the “Combatant Commander Initiative Fund” include—

Joint exercises (including activities of participation foreign countries).

HCA, in coordination with the relevant COM to the extent practicable, to include urgent and

unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.

Military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries

(including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses).

Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements

A-49. Sections 2341-2350, 10 USC, Subchapter I, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, provide

logistics support, supplies, and services on a reciprocal basis to foreign military forces, North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), or other organizations as set out in law. Acquisition and cross-servicing

agreements must not circumvent FMS or other established processes. There is an annual fiscal year dollar

ceiling, except during a period of active hostilities involving the Armed Forces or when used to support

contingencies, humanitarian assistance, and foreign disaster assistance efforts. The peacetime ceilings do

not apply to petroleum, oils, and lubricants agreements. Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements cannot

be used to provide significant military equipment, with the exception of ammunition. Flexible

reimbursements include cash, replacement-in-kind, or exchange of supplies or services of equal value. The

Office of the Under SecDef for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Office of International Cooperation

is the lead office and the SecDef, in consultation with the Secretary of State, designates countries eligible

for agreements. The CJCS authorizes GCCs to negotiate and implement the Acquisition and cross-

servicing agreements.

Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program

A-50. Section 2249c, 10 USC, Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program: Authority to

use Appropriated Funds for Costs Associated with Education and Training of Foreign Officials; Public

Law 110-417, Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 1209,

Increase in Amount Available for Costs of Education and Training of Foreign Military Forces Under

Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, authorize a tailored operational and strategic

level education and training program to international partners in support of U.S. efforts to combat

terrorism. Additionally, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program was developed to help counter

ideological support for terrorism and to create a global community of counterterrorism experts and

practitioners who share values and a common language in the fight against terrorism. The lead for

management and execution is the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Special Operations and Combating

Terrorism. The DSCA manages the finances.

Defense Institution Reform

A-51. Section 168, 10 USC, Military-to-Military Contacts and Comparable Activities; and Section 1051,

10 USC, Multilateral, Bilateral or Regional Cooperation Programs: Payment of Personnel Expenses,

provide for the Defense Institution Reform framework to develop effective, accountable, professional, and

transparent partner defense establishments in partner countries that can manage, sustain, and employ

national forces. The Defense Institution Reform program helps ensure institutional reform requirements are

prioritized across the department on a global basis and that resources applied to Defense Institution Reform

are utilized in the most efficient and effective manner to induce positive change in partner defense

institutions. The Defense Institution Reform incorporates DOD, GCC, and Country Team goals to develop

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

integrated execution plans that achieve shared objectives. The lead is the Deputy Assistant SecDef for

Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations: the DSCA Centers Management Office, Programs

Directorate. The Defense Institution Reform principally focuses on six critical areas for building partner

institutional capacity:

Defense policy and strategy.

Human resource management.

Defense planning, budgeting, and resource management.

Logistics and infrastructure.

Civil-military relations and interagency coordination.

Professional defense education.

Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services

A-52. As authorized in Section 127d, 10 USC, Allied Forces Participating in Combined Operations:

Authority to Provide Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services, the SecDef may provide logistic support,

supplies, and services to allied forces participating in a combined operation with the Armed Forces, used in

accordance with the AECA and other export control laws of the United States. This subsection may only be

used for a combined operation that is carried out during active hostilities or as a part of a contingency

operation or a noncombat operation (including an operation in support of the provision of humanitarian or

foreign disaster assistance, a country stabilization operation, or a peacekeeping operation). The SecDef

must decide whether the allied forces to be provided logistic support, supplies, and services are essential to

the success of the combined operation.

Warsaw Initiative Funds Supporting Partnership for Peace

A-53. 10 USC 168; 10 USC 1051; Section 2010, 10 USC, Participation of Developing Countries in

Combined Exercises: Payment of Incremental Expenses; and Public Law 108-375, Ronald W. Reagan

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Section 1224, Availability of Warsaw Initiative

Funds for New NATO Members, provide funds as the primary DOD tool to bilaterally support NATO’s

Partnership for Peace program. Warsaw Initiative Fund objectives are based on the goals of the Partnership

for Peace Framework Document and are as follows:

Assist Partnership for Peace partners in building defense institutions that are transparent,

accountable, and professional.

Improve U.S. and NATO Partnership for Peace interoperability to enhance partner contributions

to coalition operations.

Support Partnership for Peace partner integration with NATO.

A-54. Partnership for Peace activities include seminars and workshops that support defense reform

initiatives, functional seminars, and events to assist partner nations to build capacity, develop capabilities,

and improve interoperability with NATO and U.S. coalition forces. Partnership for Peace funds can be

used for transportation costs to and from Partnership for Peace exercises, incremental expenses in

combined exercises, and conferences (seminars, exchanges, and studies). The lead is the Deputy Assistant

SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations for policy, and the DSCA for plans and

execution.

DOD Regional Centers for Security Studies

A-55. Public Law 110-417, Section 941, Enhancement of Authorities Relating to Department of Defense

Regional Centers for Security Studies, amended 10 USC, Section 184, Regional Centers for Security

Studies. The Deputy SecDef Memorandum of 29 September 2005 established the DOD Regional Centers

for Security Studies. These centers serve as forums for bilateral and multilateral research, communication,

and the exchange of ideas involving military and civilian participants.

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Appendix A

A-56. In accordance with the Office of the SecDef Policy Guidance, the core tasks are to—

Counter ideological support for terrorism.

Harmonize views on common security threats.

Build the capacity of partners’ national security institutions consistent with the norms of civil-

military relations.

A-57. The five regional centers include-

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

The Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies.

A-58. The lead for directing policy is the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability

Operations, and GCCs identify requirements in coordination with the embassy Country Team. The DSCA

serves as the Executive Agent. DOD Directive 5101.1, DoD Executive Agent, and DOD Directive 5200.41,

DoD Centers for Regional Security Studies, provide detailed direction and information.

TITLE 22 UNITED STATES CODE FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE

A-59. Title 22 USC covers the entire range of instruments of national power. Of particular relevance to

FID planners is Chapter 32, Foreign Assistance, which covers aspects of funding FID operations. The

following paragraphs cover parameters of USC 22 funding and other DOD pertinent authorities for

programs and activities. In the course of FID operations, monies and authorities authorized for use in some

countries and operations may not apply to other HNs or FID operations and are subject to change annually

through the appropriations process in Congress.

Title 22 Funding and other Authorities

A-60. The legislative authorities for security assistance are provided primarily under public laws; the FAA

of 1961 (as amended); the AECA of 1976 (as amended); and The Foreign Operations, Export Financing,

and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002. Many aspects of FID operations fall under the FAA and

AECA. Each year, the administration submits a security assistance appropriations budget request as part of

the President’s budget submission. Congress reviews the request, authorizes and appropriates funds, and

enacts necessary legislative amendments for carrying out security assistance programs. In the event

appropriations are not enacted before the beginning of the fiscal year, essential activities are usually carried

out under a continuing resolution authority as a temporary stopgap appropriation made by Congress. Each

year the DSCA solicits input from the Military Departments, other defense agencies, and combatant

commands, through the Chairman the Joint Chiefs of Staff, regarding the security assistance legislative

initiatives for the upcoming year. Annual foreign aid and defense legislation is forwarded to the Office of

the General Counsel of DOD that submits the initiatives to the Office of Management and Budget for

approval before it is submitted to Congress. Detailed security assistance requirements are also found in

Executive Order 11958, which allocates authority and responsibility for security assistance principally to

the SecDef and the Secretary of State. The SecDef authority is further delegated to the Under SecDef,

Policy, and to the Director, DSCA, in DOD Directive 5105.65, Defense Security Cooperation Agency

(DSCA). Security assistance programs and activities must be in compliance with law, the DOD Manual

5105.38-M, and policy guidance issued by the DSCA, the SecDef, and the Secretary of State.

Foreign Assistance Act

A-61. The FAA provides economic, agricultural, medical, and disaster relief, as well as other forms of

assistance to developing countries. The FAA also assists foreign countries in fighting internal and external

aggression by providing various forms of military assistance upon request (and subject to Congressional

approval). Despite a large DOD role in providing defense-related articles and services, the DOS controls

A-18

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

the FAA. The FAA mandates close coordination and cooperation between the DOD and U.S. civilian

agencies at all levels of the security assistance process.

Arms Export Control Act

A-62. The AECA provides for the transfer of arms and other military equipment, as well as various defense

services (such as training), through government-to-government agreements. This program sells defense

articles and services. It does not give them away. The law prohibits personnel providing services under this

program from engaging in any duties of a combat nature. This prohibition includes any duties related to

training and advising that may engage U.S. personnel in combat activities. Although they may engage any

hostile force in self-defense, training teams or personnel should withdraw as soon as possible.

Direct Commercial Sales

A-63. Direct commercial sales authority under the AECA is delegated to the Secretary of State, with the

SecDef concurrence for the designation of items as defense articles and services. Direct commercial sales

are sales by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer. These sales are not administered by DOD and do not

require a government-to-government agreement, but they require Congressional oversight and technology

release similar to FMS. Direct commercial sales are executed by U.S. industry with the DOS, and the

Directorate of Defense Trade Controls administers licenses.

Leases of Defense Articles

A-64. Under the AECA, chapter 6, the President may lease DOD defense articles to eligible foreign

countries for international organizations for a period not to exceed 5 years and a specified period of time

required to complete major refurbishment work before delivery. The President has delegated this authority

to the DOD. There must be compelling foreign policy and national security reasons for providing such

articles on a lease basis and the articles must not be needed for public use at the time. A lease may provide

defense articles for testing purposes, assist foreign countries in determining whether to purchase defense

articles, allow the USG to respond to an urgent foreign requirement, or for other purposes as approved by

the DSCA. The Building Partnership Capacity programs director manages program execution.

End-Use Monitoring

A-65. In 2001, Golden Sentry was established in the DSCA as a result of Congress’ 1996 enactment of

Section

40A of the AECA. Section 40A requires the President to establish a program for end-use

monitoring of defense articles sold, leased, or exported under the AECA or the FAA. The program must

provide reasonable assurance that recipients comply with U.S. export control requirements regarding the

use, transfer, and security of defense articles and services and ensures end-use verification of defense

articles and services for sensitive technology. The focus of the Golden Sentry Program is on government

to-government transfers. U.S. personnel, assigned to security cooperation organizations, perform routine

end-use monitoring as part of their normal security assistance functions and interaction with HN personnel.

This function is performed through visits to the HN installations and is documented on embassy and

interagency reports. For specified defense articles, the DSCA has established a regime of physical security

and inventory checks, referred to as enhanced end-use monitoring. Security cooperation organization

personnel conduct enhanced end-use monitoring through planned and coordinated visits to the HN

installations. The DSCA works with the combatant command to train end-use monitoring personnel

through regional end-use monitoring forums and conducts several compliance assessment visits annually.

The lead is the DSCA, Building Partnership Capacity Programs Directorate.

Security Assistance Programs

A-66. Security assistance is a group of programs, authorized by law, that allows the transfer of military

articles and services to friendly foreign governments. Security assistance transfers may be carried out via

sales, grants, leases, or loans and are authorized under the premise that if these transfers are essential to the

security and economic well-being of allied governments and international organizations, they are equally

1 September 2011

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A-19

Appendix A

vital to the security and economic well-being of the United States. Security assistance programs support

U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. Security assistance programs increase the ability of

U.S. friends and allies to deter and defend against possible aggression, promote the sharing of common

defense burdens, and help foster regional stability. When assisting other nations in meeting their defense

requirements, the United States contributes to its own security. Security assistance can be—

The delivery of defense weapon systems to foreign governments.

U.S. Service schools training international students.

U.S. personnel advising other governments on ways to improve their internal defense capabilities.

U.S. personnel providing guidance and assistance in establishing infrastructure and economic

bases to achieve and maintain regional stability.

Security Assistance Programs and Activities

A-67. The major types of security assistance programs with the respective department for administration are—

FMS (DOD).

Foreign military construction services (DOD).

Leases (DOD).

Military Assistance Program (DOD).

IMET program (DOD).

Economic Support Fund (DOS).

Peacekeeping operations (DOS).

International narcotics control and law enforcement (DOS).

Nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs (DOS).

Commercial export sales licensed under the AECA (DOS).

Foreign Military Sales

A-68. Section 2761, 22 USC, Sales from Stocks; Section 2762, 22 USC, Procurement for Cash Sales;

Section 2769, 22 USC, Foreign Military Construction Sales; and AECA, Sections 21 and 22, authorize

FMS as a nonappropriated program administered by the DSCA through which eligible foreign

governments purchase defense articles, services, and training from the USG. The purchasing government

pays all costs that may be associated with a sale. In essence, there is a signed government-to-government

agreement, normally documented on a LOA between the USG and a foreign government. Each LOA is

commonly referred to as a case and is assigned a unique case identifier for accounting purposes. Under the

FMS program, military articles and services, including training, may be provided from DOD stocks

(Section

21, AECA) or from new procurement (Section 22, AECA). The FMS program promotes

responsible arms sales to further national security and foreign policy objectives by enabling allies and

friends to better defend themselves. The FMS program establishes long-term relationships between U.S.

forces and militaries of friends and allies that convey U.S. values, and by developing relationships and

interoperability necessary for coalition building and operations. The DOS provides policy supervision and

must approve all FMS that the DOD and the DSCA execute.

Foreign-Military Financing

A-69. 22 USC Section 2763, Credit Sales; and AECA, Section 23, authorize foreign-military financing to

provide grant dollars to partner countries or organizations, which can be used for FMS purchases (articles,

services, training, and design and construction services). Ten countries are authorized to use foreign-

military financing for direct commercial contracts with DSCA approval:

Israel.

Egypt.

Jordan.

Morocco.

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1 September 2011

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

Tunisia.

Turkey.

Portugal.

Pakistan.

Yemen.

Greece.

The DOS allocates with DOD input and the DSCA executes.

International Military Education and Training

A-70. Section 2347, 22 USC, Part V, International Military Education and Training: General Authority;

Public Law 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 541, General Authority, Chapter 5, Internal

Military Education and Training; Public Law 111-8, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009; Public Law

111-32, Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, and the DOS International Affairs Budget authorize the

IMET program to provide grant funding to approximately 133 specific countries to purchase U.S. military

education and training. The DOS allocates with DOD input, and the DSCA executes. The objectives of the

IMET program are to—

Further regional stability through mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that increase

understanding and defense cooperation between the USG and foreign countries.

Provide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations’ military forces to support

multinational operations and interoperability with U.S. forces.

Increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain basic

democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own government

and military.

Expanded IMET programs—

Promote effective defense resource management.

Foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military

and the proper role of the military in a civilian-led democratic government.

Contribute to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to

counternarcotics law enforcement efforts.

Promote improved and effective military justice systems and procedures in accordance with

internationally recognized human rights.

Coalition Solidarity Funds

A-71. Section

2392,

22 USC, Government Agencies; Public Law 109-13, Emergency Supplemental

Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005; and Memorandum

of Agreement between DOS and DOD, dated 28 December 2005, entered into pursuant to Section 632(b)

of the FAA of 1961 (as amended), provide coalition solidarity funds. In accordance with the policies and

procedures, terms, and conditions set out in the DOS-DSCA cosigned grant agreement, these funds may

only be used to finance the purchase of defense articles and services by the grant recipient through LOA

with the USG. Coalition funds may only be used for military and other security assistance to coalition

partners in Iraq and Afghanistan as set out in Public Law 109-13, under the heading “Peacekeeping

Operations.” Funds appropriated under this heading shall be subject to the regular notification procedures

of the committees on appropriations, except that such notifications shall be submitted at least 5 days before

the obligation of funds. The lead is the DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Plans, Policy,

and Analysis.

Drawdowns

A-72. Section 2318, 22 USC, Special Authority; FAA, 506; Section 2348, 22 USC, Part VI, Peacekeeping

Operations: General Authorization; and FAA, 552(c)(2), authorize the President to draw down up to $200

million of commodities and services annually from DOD stocks. Funds may be used to address

1 September 2011

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A-21

Appendix A

emergencies and nonemergencies relating to disaster, counternarcotics, and refugee assistance;

peacekeeping operations; antiterrorism and nonproliferation assistance; and other contingencies deemed in

the national interest. The FAA can also include training by SOF personnel. The President may also direct

drawdowns under other special legislative authorities that are outside the FAA ceiling. The President issues

a Presidential Determination, the DOS processes, and the DSCA and other Federal agencies execute.

Peacekeeping Operations

A-73. Section 2348d, 22 USC, Data on Costs Incurred in Support of United Nations Peacekeeping

Operations; FAA, Section 551; and Public Law 111-8 authorize peacekeeping operations to promote

human rights, democracy, and regional security, and to facilitate humanitarian responses to natural

disasters. Peacekeeping operations also promote increased involvement in conflict resolution, multilateral

peace operations, and sanctions enforcement. Peacekeeping operations leverage fair-share contributions to

peacekeeping efforts from those countries with greater potential to pay, while facilitating increased

participation of poorer countries with resource constraints. The focus is on regional security operations,

multilateral peace operations, and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security

interests of the United States. The DOS is the overall program manager.

Global Peace Operations Initiative

A-74. 22 USC Part VI, Peacekeeping Operations, Sections 2348-2348d; FAA, Sections 551-554; and

Public Law 111-8 authorize the Global Peace Operations Initiative providing for funds to increase the

capacity of countries to participate in and deploy to international peace support operations. The Global

Peace Operations Initiative addresses gaps in global peacekeeping capacity by—

Training 75,000 peace support troops worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa.

Increasing the number of stability police units for peace operations through support to the

Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units.

Facilitating deployment of peace support operation units through a transportation and logistics

support arrangement.

A-75. The Global Peace Operations Initiative incorporates the African Contingency Operations Training

and Assistance program and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program. The DOS

manages with support from the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations.

The DSCA executes a portion of the funds.

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

A-76. 22 USC 2348; 22 USC Section 2349aa-10, Part VIII, Antiterrorism Assistance: Antiterrorism

Assistance; 22 USC Section 2349bb, Part IX, Nonproliferation Export Control Assistance: Purposes;

FAA, sections 551, 571-575, 581-586; Public Law 102-511, The Freedom Support Act, Section 503,

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Activities in the Independent States, and Section 504, Nonproliferation

and Disarmament Fund; and Public Law 111-8 authorize the nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and

related programs as appropriated grant programs administered by the DOS and provide resources to

support critical security and humanitarian-related foreign policy objectives. The nonproliferation,

antiterrorism, demining, and related programs support demining activities, the clearance of unexploded

ordnance, the destruction of small arms, border security, and related activities. Related defense articles,

services, and training can be provided through this program. One of the objectives is to reduce civilian

landmine casualties through mine awareness, mine clearance training, and development and deployment of

demining technology to establish an indigenous, sustainable humanitarian demining capability that will

continue after the U.S. involvement is complete. Destruction of man-portable air defense systems, a

weapon sought after and used by terrorist groups, is the priority. The lead is the DOS Bureau of Political-

Military Affairs, Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis.

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

TITLE 50 UNITED STATES CODE, WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

A-77. Title 50 USC is a far-reaching document covering areas as diverse as the establishment and scope of

the Council of National Defense and the disclosure of classified information. Chapter 22 of Title 50 contains

the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Title 50 also covers several legal aspects of the intelligence warfighting

function. FID planners should coordinate with J-2/G-2/S-2s, as well as staff legal personnel, to ensure that

communications regarding Army personnel executing Title 50 responsibilities are properly classified.

MONIES AND AUTHORITIES FROM ANNUAL BUDGETARY SOURCES

A-78. The President may request special monies and authorities in the annual defense appropriations bill

through the National Defense Authorization Act. If Congress passes such budgetary proposals, the

resultant measures are initially temporary and require annual renewal. Typically, such monies and

authorities are both requested and enacted to allow higher levels of security assistance to key partners and

allies facing a particular threat. The other typical situation in which such budget measures are made is

during times of intense and far-reaching conflict. FID operations and the planning for them should use such

special monies and authorities whenever possible. However, like legal, political, and informational

constraints, operations against terrorist networks in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines

have been empowered through the renewal of several such sections of the National Defense Authorization

Act (as amended). In the course of FID operations, National Defense Authorization Act monies and

authorities approved for use in some countries and operations may not apply to other HNs or FID

operations and are subject to change annually through the appropriations process in Congress.

Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements—Significant Military Equipment

A-79. In Public Law 110-417, Section 1204, Congress grants temporary authority to extend and expand the

acquisition and cross-servicing agreements to lend military equipment for personnel protection and

survivability. The temporary authority includes nation’s participation in multinational operations with the

United States in peacekeeping operations under United Nations Charter or another international agreement.

This authority is extended to

30 September 2011. Section

1204 amended Section 1202 to add a

requirement for semi-annual reports on equipment not returned to the United States with a description of

the terms of disposition of the equipment provided to the foreign forces. The Office of the Under SecDef

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Office of International Cooperation is the lead office and the

SecDef, in consultation with the Secretary of State, designates countries eligible for agreements. The CJCS

authorizes GCCs to negotiate and implement the acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.

Global Train and Equip (1206)

A-80. Public Law 110-417, Section 1206, extends Public Law 109-163, National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Section 1206, Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces.

Collectively, these laws allow the SecDef the authority to provide equipment, supplies, and training for

building the capacity of foreign national military forces, to conduct counterterrorist operations, and to

support military and stability operations in which U.S. forces participate. All programs must promote

human rights and respect for legitimate civilian authority. Section 1206 is funded via Defense-wide

operation and maintenance funds. Both the SecDef and the Secretary of State must approve funding. A

quarterly report to Congressional Defense Committees is required. DOD and DOS form the lead for this

program jointly—the Deputy Assistant SecDef for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia leads—the

DSCA executes. Illustrative training and equipment include—

Training

(not exhaustive): counterterrorism; air assault training and doctrine; CMO;

infrastructure security; intelligence analysis and sharing; maritime operations, security, and

interdiction; equipment maintenance; border security; and operator training.

Equipment (not exhaustive): coastal surveillance stations, patrol boats, various spares and

replacement parts, avionics and communications upgrades, small-arms weapons, small and large

caliber ammunition, radios, computers, night vision devices, riverine assault and support craft,

and utility vehicles.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

A-23

Appendix A

Security and Stabilization Assistance (1207)

A-81. Public Law 110-417, Section 1207, clarifies Public Law 109-163, Section 1207, Security and

Stabilization Assistance, by prohibiting use of funds for budget support to any foreign country. The SecDef

may provide services to, and transfer defense articles and services to, the Secretary of State to facilitate

DOS’s provision of reconstruction, security, and stabilization assistance to a foreign country that involves

the provision of services or transfer of defense articles or funds, bringing civilian expertise to bear

alongside or in lieu of U.S. military forces. This is a flexible authority with no earmarks. The lead is the

Deputy Assistant SecDef for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, and is executed by the DOS

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism

A-82. Section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act extended and expanded the authority for

support of special operations to combat terrorism with foreign partners. The work of USSOCOM in this

very important area includes the development of policy and legislative proposals to improve the efficiency and

effectiveness of international military assistance programs. One method by which the USSOCOM is now able

to assist in the development of foreign special operations capabilities is through the re-allocation of funds

under Section 1208 authorities.

A-83. The period of authority for Public Law 108-375, Section 1208, Support of Military Operations to

Combat Terrorism, was from 2005 through 2007; Public Law 110-417, Section 1208, Extension and Expansion

of Authority for Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism, extended the period of authority from

2008 through 2013. These laws were further amended by Public Law 111-84, National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 1202, Expansion of Authority and Modification of Notification and Reporting

Requirements for use of Authority for Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism.

Department of Defense Counterdrug Program

A-84. The following public laws and various National Defense Authorization Act provisions provide the

DOD Counterdrug Program support to foreign countries to stop the flow of illegal drugs:

Public Law 101-510, National Defense Authorization Act of 1991, Section 1004, Additional

Support for Counter-drug Activities.

Public Law 105-85, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Section 1033,

Authority to Provide Additional Support for Counter-drug Activities of Peru and Colombia.

Public Law 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Title X,

Counterdrug Activities, Subtitle C, Sections

1021 through

1023; Title XIV, Other

Authorizations, Section 1405, Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities, Defense-wide.

Public Law 110-417, Sections 1021 through 1026, and Section 1405.

Public Law 111-84, Sections 1011 through 1016, Section 1404, and Section 1515.

Public Law 111-383, Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,

Sections 1011-1015, 1407, and Section 1514.

A-85. The program is designed to manage drug detection and monitoring; maintenance of counterdrug

equipment; training; counterdrug training facilities; command, control, and communications networks; and

aerial and ground reconnaissance. The program also provides support for the counterdrug activities of

federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies. The lead is the Deputy Assistant

SecDef for Counternarcotics and Global Threats; the DSCA executes a portion of the funds via FMS

system.

United States Department of Defense Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune

Deficiency Syndrome Prevention Program

A-86. Public Law 108-25, United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of

2003, and Public Law 108-287, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, enable the DOD human

A-24

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) prevention program, based

at the Naval Health Research Center in San Diego, California. The Naval Health Research Center is the

DOD executive agent for the technical assistance, management, and administrative support of the global

HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment for foreign militaries. The DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program

administers funding, directly conducts training, and provides technical assistance for focus countries and

other bilateral countries. The staff actively serves on most of the technical working groups and core teams

through the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. The DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program

oversees the contributions to the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief of a variety of DOD

organizations, which fall under the various regional military commands, as well as specialized DOD

institutions whose primary mission falls within the continental United States. The lead is the Secretary of

the Navy as the DOD Executive Agent and the Assistant SecDef for Stability Operations/Low-Intensity

Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities provides policy guidance.

Note: In the course of FID operations, National Defense Authorization Act monies and authorities

authorized for use in some countries and operations may not apply to other HNs or FID operations

and are subject to change annually through the appropriations process in Congress.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS LEGAL AND

REGULATORY CONCERNS

A-87. In addition to the USC constraints listed above, MIS units operate under Presidential and DOD

regulatory constraints. Three principal areas of concern for MISO in FID operations are relevant intellectual

property statutes, exposure of U.S. citizens to MISO, and the authority to approve MIS products.

A-88. The United States has well-established intellectual property laws, such as copyright and trademark.

Typically, U.S. intellectual property law has driven international intellectual property law. USG agencies,

including the DOD, rigidly comply with copyright and other intellectual property laws. The HN in which

FID operations take place may have different internal intellectual property laws. The staff legal team

conducting FID planning needs to identify HN intellectual property issues that may affect MIS product

parameters. In addition, many subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats routinely

disregard intellectual property rights to further their propaganda products and to raise funds. Both of these

actions may be exploitable through MIS series. Care must be taken to not violate intellectual property laws

in countering internal threat propaganda or exploiting the distribution of pirated goods by internal threats.

A-89. Section 1461(a), USC 22, Dissemination of Information Abroad; Executive Order S-12333, United

States Intelligence Activities; DOD Directive S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the

Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War; and National Security

Decision Directive 130, United States International Information Policy, direct that U.S. MIS forces will

not target U.S. citizens at any time, in any location globally, or under any circumstances. Ancillary

exposure of U.S. citizens in the HN to MIS products targeting HN audiences does not constitute a violation

of these directives.

A-90. The precedent for the limited use of MIS forces to present public information to a U.S. audience was

set during the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992. There was no challenge to this precedent during the

support provided after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. If a noncombatant evacuation operation should become

necessary during FID operations, information support by MIS forces to provide evacuation information to

U.S. nationals would also adhere to the order.

A-91. The majority of MISO aid during FID operations falls under the normal parameters of influencing

and, more importantly, changes foreign target-audience behavior. Clearly delineated approval authority for

MISO themes and series begins at the Presidential level; however, the President can delegate this authority.

In FID operations, approval authority may be retained at high levels because of the potential political

ramifications of any U.S.-produced informational product.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

A-25

Appendix A

A-92. In all MIS activities, commanders need to be aware of the levels of MIS approval. The levels and

differences are as follows:

Themes and Objectives. The key to centralized planning and decentralized execution of MISO is

clarity in the statement of objectives and themes. Broad objectives and themes establish the

parameters for the development of series that reach foreign target audiences. They also ensure

products reflect national and theater policy and strategy. Approval of objectives and broad

themes are reserved by policies and the JSCP at levels

(President or SecDef, combatant

command, joint force command, and the U.S. Country Team) where the interagency process can

invest MIS plans with a broad range of considerations.

Series. A series is all the MIS products and actions to change one behavior of one target

audience. Commanders subordinate to the JTF or the JSOTF can use an approved series to

achieve their specific objectives. Approval authority to modify an existing series or to develop a

new series can be delegated to the division commander level.

Attribution. U.S. attribution openly acknowledges U.S. involvement. This disclosure must be

made in the content of the product or in the initial phase of engaging in online exchanges.

Concurring HN attribution allows MIS products and activities to be attributable to a concurring

HN. Both the HN and the appropriate COM must agree to this attribution method before it is

used. Nonattribution allows a combatant commander to disseminate information without clear

attribution. When asked if the USG or DOD is the source of the specific activity, the DOD will

acknowledge its involvement as soon as operationally feasible as determined by the combatant

commander. If a combatant commander believes that it will not be possible to attribute the activity

to the DOD because of operational considerations, he will request an exception to policy. This

method is only authorized from named operations or when specified in orders.

A-93. In many FID operations, the MIS approval authority will be the U.S. Ambassador. Normally, the

U.S. Ambassador designates a Country Team member as approval authority for MIS forces deployed in

support of FID. This representative is normally the deputy COM, with reviewing authority to appropriate

Country Team members, such as the SAO, PAO, and the DEA representative.

A-94. During FID operations in which a combined joint task force (CJTF) or JSOTF has been stood up, the

SecDef normally delegates MIS approval authority to the supported GCC in the Joint Chiefs of Staff

execution order and, in accordance with the JSCP, the GCC retains approval authority following the

approval of the MIS plan by the President or SecDef. The supported GCC may, in turn, delegate approval

authority to the designated CJTF or JSOTF and even down to a maneuver commander (a division

commander) with SecDef approval.

INTERAGENCY REGULATIONS, POLICIES, AND PROTOCOLS

A-95. Army units may or may not conduct FID operations with other Service personnel depending on the

scale of FID operations. Typically, some aspect (other than transportation in/out of the HN) of even a

small-scale FID operation will be a joint operation. Invariably FID operations involve interagency

cooperation to some degree. Interagency regulations may be directive in nature, applicable to all USG

agencies, and be based on policy or law. Protocols may not be based on policy or law. The general maxim is

to adhere to another USG agency’s policies and protocols to the greatest extent possible as long ARSOF

policy is followed and mission success is not compromised. Interagency cooperation is affected through a joint

interagency task force, joint interagency coordination group, or the American Embassy Country Team.

A-26

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Appendix B

Internal Defense and Development Strategy

The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its

growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Every

nation’s IDAD strategy is specific, but the end state of every nation’s IDAD strategy

is universal—a responsible and accountable local, state or provincial, and national

government that ensures the personal safety of its citizens by providing a climate and

institutions that demonstrate the ability to improve their material well-being. In

addition, those governments must ensure the basic freedoms that the world

community has come to regard as fundamental. For the Army planner who has been

born in or naturalized into a nation founded on those principles, one of the

fundamental truths he must remember is that the above end state is frequently

contradictory to the government the HN has experienced in the past or even from its

inception. In some cases, one of the objectives of FID may be to help the HN to

formulate an appropriate IDAD strategy. This may mean instilling values in HN

authorities that heretofore have not been present.

CONCEPT

B-1. An internal threat in the HN or changing conditions that may produce internal threats require an

IDAD strategy. IDAD is ideally a proactive and preemptive strategy in which the HN must win and

motivate the population to participate in the local efforts that are part of the larger strategy. In developing

nations, an IDAD strategy may focus on preventing regression to a previous state of instability. However,

if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat

that threat. FID planners must understand the HN IDAD strategy if they are to plan effectively to support

it, and they must be prepared to help build that strategy from the ground up. Common pitfalls for FID

planners are to ignore the HN naming convention for the IDAD plan and to downplay military support to

the IDAD plan. FID planners should place greater emphasis on HN and State Department development

plans as the primary focus of the IDAD program.

B-2. The IDAD strategy should integrate security force and civilian programs into a coherent,

comprehensive effort. The success of both security and civilian programs hinge on the ability of the HN to

gain and maintain the support of its citizens. Security force actions provide a level of internal security that

permits and supports growth through development that the populace regards as balanced and secular. This

development may require change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in

turn promote unrest in the society. The concept, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under

which orderly development can take place.

B-3. Often a government must overcome the inertia and shortcomings of its own political system before it

can cope with the internal threats it may be facing. This may involve the adoption of reforms during a time

of crisis when pressures limit flexibility and make implementation difficult. During the adoption and

implementation of previously nonexistent institutions and procedures, a freely-elected and constitutional

government may face mistrust and fear among the electorate, particularly in the case of any minority. A

history of authoritarian minority rule can exacerbate this situation. The successful IDAD strategist must

realize that the true nature of the threat to the government lies in the adversary’s political strength and will

to persevere rather than in military power. Although the government must contain the armed elements,

concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Short of regression to or

development of authoritarian or sectarian government, any strategy that does not redress the political

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

B-1

Appendix B

claims and demands of the opposition is at best severely handicapped. This is not to say that complete

compliance with the demands of the opposition, especially an armed insurgency, is necessary, but allowing

dialog with unarmed elements of the opposition, however contentious, is typically warranted. Military and

paramilitary programs are necessary for success, but if employed in an environment deprived of the other

instruments of national power, military force alone will fail. They are in fact a means to the greater political

ends with a successful FID gaining the political buy-in of not only HN military and paramilitary personnel,

but a majority of the population.

FUNCTIONS

B-4. The IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter subversion,

lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats

(Figure B-1). The functions are executed

simultaneously, and a single project conducted during FID operations may exercise all four functions. No

function is ever executed in a vacuum, because all actions the HN and U.S. personnel take will have a

psychological impact on some portion of the population.

Figure B-1. Functions of internal defense and development

BALANCED DEVELOPMENT

B-5. The people of the HN must perceive the balanced development as equitable. Its end state is a society

with an egalitarian ethos and basic political, economic, and social institutions and mechanisms in place to

achieve equality of access. Realistically, this is not something achieved overnight, especially in terms of

economic disparity between groups. Nevertheless, a successful IDAD strategy does not have to produce an

instant balance, but it does have to begin addressing unreasonable inequalities betweens groups, races, or

B-2

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Internal Defense and Development Strategy

ethnicities within the HN. The perception must be that the HN is making positive strides to resolve

disparities and discrimination. FID planners and executors must stress to HN officials they are advising and

training that this perception will only come if development truly is balanced.

B-6. Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and economic

programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development, thus

alleviating some frustration. Difficulties typically arise when a tide of rising expectations among the

populace triggers an expectation of quick or even instant gratification of their demands for change. This

can be further complicated when success in one arena, for instance national politics, is accomplished

quickly. Afterward, correcting the remaining conditions that make a society vulnerable is still a long-term

process. The challenge for Army planners and Soldiers is to communicate to individuals and groups that

results in other areas (typically economic progress) may be slow in coming. Failure to adequately prepare

societies, groups, and individuals (in particular key communicators) for a long period of slow change may

doom a HN to lose the support of the population it governs, including individuals who previously supported it.

This can be even truer if supporters have made concessions or sacrifices to support an IDAD strategy.

SECURITY

B-7. Security in FID operations represents a return to a state of physical security that is acceptable to the

populace. An acceptable security situation for a HN populace, intimidated by insurgents at the village or

district level, may well be a level of physical security superior to that present before an escalation in

violence. To gain the support of the populace, the populace must be convinced that the local district or

central government can protect their social or business interests better than that of the insurgency or other

threats. Planners must remember that although FID and any IDAD strategy may typically fail if hard

targets are not destroyed effectively, it is virtually impossible to successfully achieve security without the

support of the HN populace.

B-8. Security in FID operations encompasses all activities implemented to protect the populace from the

threat and to provide a safe environment for national development. It involves success on the military,

paramilitary, and criminal justice fronts. Security can be difficult to achieve because of a reactive focus on

interdicting adversaries, amassing captured weaponry, or reducing the number of successful employments

of particular adversary TTP. The linchpin to obtaining security for the populace is to involve its members

in providing their own security.

B-9. Successful interdictions against those who perpetrate violence must be reinforced by a concerted

effort to involve the populace in the following:

Denying internal threats with safe havens and support.

Identifying threats with the full knowledge and confidence of their elimination.

Securing buy-in that the elimination may involve lethal force.

Instilling a belief that any sacrifice to eliminate internal threats is beneficial in the long term to

their physical, economic, or even spiritual security.

B-10. ARSOF Soldiers are uniquely qualified to provide this sense of security, because this effect may

only be achieved when HN security forces and ARSOF personnel are collocated with the populace and

share the same basic hazards that the populace shares. In this way, ARSOF Soldiers and HN forces instill

an us-versus-them mentality that includes the civilian populace in the us. Responsible use of civil defense,

neighborhood watch, home guard, or any otherwise irregular force from the populace may be considered as

long as they are employed commensurate with their abilities. This may mean the contribution of the force

is negligible in military terms; however, the psychological effect of the force can be great.

Note: Civil defense or other HN citizen guard or watch organizations should not be confused or

affiliated with the civilian advisory councils described in paragraphs B-47 through B-48.

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