Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7)

Chapter 1

Introduction

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear

any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, [and] oppose any foe to assure the

survival and the success of liberty.

President John F. Kennedy

Inaugural Address, 20 January 1961

Foreign internal defense

(FID) is a comprehensive approach, involving the

interaction of multinational, joint, Army and interagency efforts. Military efforts may

involve multiple services and conventional forces. Army efforts, in general, include

Army special operations forces (ARSOF) units, particularly Special Forces (SF),

Military Information Support (MIS), and Civil Affairs (CA), because they are well

suited to conduct or support FID operations. Army and ARSOF units possess the

capability to support a host nation (HN) in creating a military shield (through FID) in

which interagency efforts can comprehensively operate to remove the root causes

behind HN problems of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other

threats to its security. The Army critical tasks and resultant military occupational

specialties

(MOSs) provide the foundation for FID operations through a diverse

offering of training (individual and collective) to assist a HN in achieving its internal

defense and development (IDAD) military objectives and goals. Army cultural and

language training enable and enhance the conduct FID operations. FID is a

legislatively directed operation attributable to Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols

Department of Defense-Reorganization Act of 1986, Section 212, Initial Review of

Combatant Commands. The amendments to the Goldwater-Nichols Act established the

office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations and low-intensity

conflict, and United States Code

(USC) Section

167 established the unified

combatant command for special operations forces, to include activities in which FID

is included.

FID existed prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but it was not included in doctrine

until 1976. FID operations included advisory roles in Southeast Asia to train and

equip the civilian irregular defense groups and regular units of the Armed Forces of

the Republic of Vietnam. The task of training and equipping the Armed Forces of the

Republic of Vietnam was colossal, and therefore conventional forces played a major

role in training and equipping under the Military Assistance Program authorized by

the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. In 1962, Army advisors were educated

under the military assistance training advisor (MATA) course at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina. Because FID doctrine applies across the Army full spectrum and joint range

of military operations, the Army has retained FID as a task during times of peace and

war. Historically and in the future, Army forces have and will take part in FID

operations, and depending on the HN needs and operational environment,

conventional forces may outnumber in-country SOF personnel. Army forces have a

role in FID operations just as they do in stability or counterinsurgency (COIN)

operations. In FID scenarios, native language abilities and cultural awareness are

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Chapter 1

important to advisors and trainers and the proper use of interpreters will also be a

viable mission option. FID operations require Army personnel trained for prolonged

operations in austere environments. The Army FID practitioner must be a subject-

matter expert to provide military education and training, whether it be a military

occupational specialty (MOS); tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); advanced

military education; or technical assistance. FID involves the ability to teach particular

skills and to foster friendly relations with HN counterparts and agencies other than

Department of Defense (DOD). Army advisors teach their HN counterparts to

perform tasks, develop processes, and implement procedures. The FID advisor must

be an adaptive problem solver and a creative thinker and must also possess the ability

to work in a collaborative environment, building interagency and international

partner capacity and applying a comprehensive approach.

OVERVIEW

1-1. The Army may conduct FID operations unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort or may

support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts. The National Security Strategy of the United

States (2010) establishes that the United States (U.S.) military will continue strengthening its capacity to

partner with foreign counterparts, to train and help security forces, and to pursue military-to-military ties

with a broad range of governments. U.S. policy currently deals with these threats through the indirect use

of military force in concert with the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of

national power. FID may include financial, intelligence, and law enforcement assistance authorized by the

Department of State (DOS) and administered by the DOD. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of

the government of the nation in which the problem develops. Army forces are qualified to operate in a FID

operation that takes place under a regional or global media and political microscope. Culturally and

politically attuned ARSOF Soldiers know that in the contemporary environment, the smallest misstep (or

perceived misstep) in any arena can quickly expand into an international political media spectacle. In

addition, ARSOF Soldiers, who are trained in the HN language and culture, are cross-trained on the culture

and history of their unit’s aligned region. Therefore, ARSOF Soldiers are uniquely qualified to advise their

HN counterparts and trainees on how best to approach regional or transnational rivalries or how to deal

with outside pressures from potential transnational spoilers. Conventional force units conducting FID may

require specific training for not only the local culture but also for the inherent political pitfalls of tactical

operations having regional, transnational, or international implications. Planners must be mindful that all

FID operations, to include small contingents have the potential to move quickly from obscurity to the

center stage of global media. Planners must also keep in mind that regional issues (and beyond) can be

mitigated if properly identified.

1-2. The key differentiating factor between FID and many other operations is the involvement,

engagement, and support of the HN government. Historically, because of some similarities between the

TTP used to conduct FID and those used to conduct other ARSOF core activities, there has been confusion

and incorrect usage of the term. FID involves the support of a standing government and its lawful military

and paramilitary forces. FID is usually conducted in HNs in which the embassy Country Team is not only

present, but is also frequently the lead agency in the operation. The American Embassy Country Team

develops measures to promote security in conjunction with the HN through the development of a yearly

theater security cooperation plan (TSCP). The TSCP is what links the geographic combatant commander’s

(GCC’s) regional strategy to military operations. The Country Team coordinates synchronization of

military operations with interagency initiatives and activities. The embassy Country Team validates the

FID mission desired and determines manning requirements with the GCC. The comprehensive approach is

represented by the Country Team as the Ambassador’s first line of effort overseas to plan, direct, and

integrate the policies of the United States Government (USG). Additional confusion has recently arisen

between the complementary tasks relevant to both FID and security force assistance. Where applicable, the

balance of this manual will discuss the intertwined nature of FID and security force assistance. In addition

to other FID operations in the HN region that require planning coordination to reduce concerns, security

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Introduction

force assistance operations are inextricably connected to FID and therefore may have a tremendous impact

on FID operations. Such impact is inherently congruent with the result of contiguous and noncontiguous

FID operations. Just as a robust FID operation conducted in a bordering nation rather than a nonbordering

nation may affect the HN Country Team and task force planning, so too will security force assistance

operations. Security force assistance, whether using the brigade combat team concept, small conventional

forces teams, or SOF, will require coordination between ongoing FID operations in a bordering HN. For

instance, FID and security force assistance planners should collaborate for the use of the logistical enablers

in the region. If planned for and used effectively, this is the comprehensive approach to regional security

that facilitates the security cooperation plan.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

1-3. Army FID support is only one component of a HN IDAD policy and program. Although always an

important (and frequently critical) part of a nation’s IDAD strategy, FID may be one of the smaller programs

within the IDAD strategy in terms of funding, focus, facilities, and the number of personnel committed. The

effect of a successful FID can be inversely proportional to the amount of resources expended. Equally true,

however, is that an unsuccessful FID may cause the failure of far larger and more intensive programs

conducted by other instruments of national power. For instance, an insurgency can destroy the progress of the

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Illicit Crop Monitoring Program; the U.S. DOS’s Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Sustainable Development; and the United States

Agency for International Development (USAID), Alternative Development Program; and deny the area to

future programs, resulting in the loss of both major funds and perhaps years of effort. In nations in which

the military has been the disproportional focus of national resources, to the detriment of civilian institutions

and development, the FID portion of the IDAD strategy and program may be deliberately downsized. As a

result, nations that have failed to donate adequate resources to military and paramilitary institutions may

need a more intense FID program.

1-4. IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect it against

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Collectively, threats that rise to levels with the potential to topple

a HN government, economy, social structure, and subsequently the nation’s internal security are

subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. The United States defines

an internal threat as any person or organization that interferes with, disrupts, or damages the domestic,

lawfully constituted economic, military, informational, or political institutions of a nation through illegal

means or methods in an overt, covert, or clandestine manner. Examples include criminals, vigilantes,

terrorists, insurgents, or separatists. Nations formulate an IDAD strategy to not only combat and curtail

internal threats, but also to prepare for external threats and to ensure a comprehensive approach and

development plan that prevents the formation of disaffected domestic groups. IDAD focuses on building

viable institutions (political, economic, military, and social) that respond to the needs of the HN society.

IDAD is the HN program. The HN has responsibility and control of the program. It is the job of the

Country Team to help shape the HN IDAD program, but ultimately it is the responsibility of the HN. If the

internal threat to the HN is primarily political and nonviolent, FID operations may or may not be required

to support the HN IDAD program. Development programs that are carefully planned, implemented, and

properly publicized can serve the interests of population groups and deny exploitable issues to insurgents

or other internal threats. IDAD programs provide an atmosphere of security in which development and

building partner capacity can take place. FID planners and executors may encounter serious security issues

that the HN military must overcome, but they should remember at all times that IDAD is primarily a

political program.

1-5. The IDAD strategy is founded on the assumption that the HN is responsible for the development and

execution of its own programs to prevent or defeat subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and

other threats to its security. The fundamental thrust of the IDAD strategy is toward preventing the

escalation of internal conflict. Anticipating and defeating the threat posed by specific organizations and

working to correct conditions that prompt violence are effective means of prevention. If subversion,

lawlessness, insurgency, or terrorism occur, the emphasis is to hold down the level of violence. The

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Chapter 1

population must be mobilized to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is an overall strategy for the

prevention of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.

1-6. U.S. Army FID operations contribute to the overall IDAD strategy of the HN. These operations are

based on integrated military and civilian programs (Figure 1-1). FID operations can be conducted jointly

with or complementary to programs undertaken by the DOS and its agencies, such as the USAID. Because

IDAD often puts civilian programs in the lead over military programs, FID operations, such as medical

civilian assistance programs, can sometimes be viewed as cogs in the greater machinery that is the civilian-

led effort. As discussed in greater detail later in this manual, FID operations can be woven into the IDAD

strategy not only by enhancing the security of the HN, but also by complementing a myriad of civilian

programs throughout the diplomatic, information, military, and economic arenas.

Figure 1-1. Foreign internal defense development process

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH OF FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1-7. In times of need, nations often look to other nations for assistance. Nations seeking assistance often

struggle to quell unrest within their borders or look for ways to strengthen or promote professionalism

within their military. Internal problems could stem from economic issues, public dissatisfaction with the

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Introduction

government, social unrest, or terrorism. Unfortunately, these problems may also be exacerbated by

shortcomings in the military such as corruption, human rights abuses, and incompetence. The United States

has historically promoted democracy and freedom in other nations by assisting nations seeking solutions to

improve security and quell unrest within their borders. Numerous U.S. civilian and military organizations

support this effort.

1-8. FID planners must consider all instruments of national power and how those elements produce the

comprehensive approach of FID. Figure 1-2 uses the diplomatic, information, military, and economic

model to structure and illustrate the comprehensive approach of FID. FID fits into this framework as the

chief operation and effort under the military element of national power. The National Security Council

(NSC) is responsible for planning guidance for FID at the strategic level. The DOS is normally designated

as the lead agency for the execution of FID programs up to the point that the President authorizes major

combat operations. Military assistance is often required to provide a secure environment to accomplish HN

goals, and the DOD provides personnel and equipment to help achieve FID objectives.

Figure 1-2. Foreign internal defense comprehensive approach

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1-9. FID requirements include the identified needs of a HN along with a compilation of the national

military strategy, the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), joint plans, and the theater campaign

plans of the GCCs. These plans are based on U.S. policies developed with friends, allies, and partner

nations. These strategic commitments may lead to enhanced security, greater cooperation, and stronger

alliances with the nations involved. Commitments to other nations for providing more secure environments

may lead to various programs to help build or enhance the HN IDAD program or may provide assistance in

other areas. Military involvement in FID activities vary and range from training HN forces with a goal of

enabling them to internally secure strategic HN infrastructure facilities such as ports; to providing training

courses in specific activities such as counterterrorism; to enabling the HN to render environments

inhospitable to terrorist networks. FID could also be interrelated with other military operations or actual

combat operations. One Army unit could have a FID task to train a force, and, once completed, another

military unit may advise or assist the trained HN force to conduct actual combat operations. A conventional

military unit, such as an engineer company, might work permissively in a secure part of the HN by

building a road with a HN civilian agency.

HOLISTIC INTERACTION

1-10. The concept of the diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of national power

comes with the inherent implication that all elements share information to build partnerships. In some

instances, conditions may require the adaptation of one element of national power to be the principal force

wielded in IDAD support and participation in FID. This may seem contradictory, as FID is oriented toward

security; however, a Country Team can accomplish a successful security improvement in a HN. This can

be accomplished through diplomacy and the use of organic elements and perhaps United Nations police

training organizations. Nevertheless, most actions to support FID use all of the diplomatic, information,

military, and economic instruments of national power to some degree. To cite a single example, economic

support to FID might include an active program to reduce corruption and human rights abuses at all levels

in the HN. The method of holistic interaction ensures the differing instruments of national power are bound

in a collaborative environment to facilitate the comprehensive approach. By applying all instruments of

national power along with the fundamental principles of joint operations, the traditional military principle

of war (mass) is exponentially increased. The following four bullets illustrate some of the actions of each

element in this case:

The diplomatic element interfaces with the highest echelons of the HN government to bring

pressure at the national level for change.

The information element, through organic DOS elements and DOD MIS forces, assists the HN

with both indirect and direct support to influence target audiences capable of reducing or

reporting graft and corruption.

The military element (in addition to the information element) conducts active training with HN

military members on the dangers of graft and corruption.

The economic element, in conjunction with the other instruments of national power, brings

pressure by denying contracts or improvement projects to known companies or agencies

engaged in corrupt practices.

1-11. The holistic interaction does not imply that all instruments of national power are exercised to

conduct every FID operation, but rather conveys the required close coordination of all elements involved

regardless the lead in a given FID operation. The lead may be the Country Team or a joint force

commander; in either case a comprehensive and collaborative approach is required. In a country whose

IDAD plan is accomplished largely through a diplomatic presence, establishing or continuing some

military-to-military FID missions continues to keep the military element in synchronization with the other

elements diplomatic, information, military, and economic model. The holistic interaction may be

concentrated in any one or more of the instruments of national power. For instance, with incipient threats

or thoroughly exhausted and interdicted threats, the military element of U.S. national power may play only

a small role in the final interdiction of the internal threat. Conversely, the preponderance of effort against a

powerful internal threat will typically rely heavily on the military instrument of national power. The key to

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Introduction

successful use of the method of holistic interaction is adapting and achieving the right mix of USG support

to the HN.

RULE OF LAW

1-12. Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, defines rule of law as a principle under which all

persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that

are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with

international human rights principles. In FID, the USG conducts foreign assistance within the rule of law.

The FID end state is to enable foreign partners to conduct actions within an absolute legal basis. FID legal

issues are governed by U.S. Federal law, international law, and HN law. Appendix A of this publication

provides further guidance on law, authorities, and the legal aspects of FID operations. It is recommended to

consult the Judge Advocate General because activities conducted in rule of law involve the practice of law,

and therefore by statute, are performed by judge advocates or other attorneys under the statutory technical

supervision of the Judge Advocate General. FID operations are conducted in HNs to operate through the

rule of law and assist in applying modern codified law enforced by legitimate state actors and forces with

an independent judiciary and respect for human rights. Legal constraints on FID operations and (at a

minimum) the essential staff experts of the Country Team provide a framework of legal and diplomatic

protection for the FID practitioner. If a HN has deficiencies in what the United States (and typically the

global community) has identified in their concept of the just application of the rule of law, there will

typically be a program of legal reform in place. Such reform may be slow.

1-13. So long as the Westphalian sovereignty (a sovereign right to domestic authority and autonomous

control from external intervention) endures, it is likely that the concept of rule of law will vary. The true

rule of law varies even in current, economically powerful democracies. In democracies, the secular and the

sacred comingle under the rule of law. One nation retains harsh criminal penalties, while another nation

finds incarceration odious except in the worst of crimes. The FID practitioner, in both robust and small-

scale operations, must be cognizant of the aims (if any) of the USG in reforming the HN rule of law.

Soldiers conducting FID operations in remote areas must understand that they may witness far different

legal practices than would be seen in an industrialized democracy. Their role can range from simply

observing their counterparts during FID operations to actively instilling changes in the conduct of their

counterpart commensurate with DOS and DOD directives based on the HN legal reform. The exact legal

obligations of FID trainers and advisors are discussed in Appendix A of this manual.

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER OPERATIONS

1-14. Ultimately, FID efforts are successful if they preclude the need to deploy large numbers of U.S.

military personnel and equipment. (The absolute hallmark, of course, remains the use of nonmilitary

instruments of national power to support a HN threat eradication.) FID is among the operations within the

irregular warfare construct. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for

legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric

approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode the

power, influence, and will of the adversary. It is one of the most prevalent irregular warfare subset

operations; however, FID may simultaneously be conducted with operations outside this construct. FID

takes place in an arena that invariably includes nation assistance and may also include greater or lesser

degrees of operations, such as support to COIN, counterterrorism, peace operations, DOD support for

counterdrug operations, and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). These categories may include FID

operations as an integral component in supporting the fight against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency,

terrorism, and other threats to security. FID programs are distinct and vary from country to country to

support a country’s IDAD program.

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1-15. FID may be intertwined with security assistance and building partner capacity under the umbrella of

nation assistance as a joint action as acknowledged in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations. The

operational concept frames how Army forces, operating as part of a joint force, conduct operations, to

include FID operations. FID may be conducted by Army forces as applicable doctrine to defeat an enemy

or to establish conditions necessary to achieve the national strategic end state, under the range of military

operations from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence to major operations and

campaigns. Both FID and nation assistance are subsets of security cooperation with similarities at the

tactical level where advisory skills are applicable to both. At the strategic and operational levels, FID and

security assistance are joint actions that are applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and

deterrence objectives. Security force assistance includes DOD’s contribution to unified action to develop

foreign security forces capacity and capability from ministerial down to units of those forces. At

operational and strategic levels, both security force assistance and the military instrument of FID focus on

preparing foreign military and security forces. Building partner capacity includes USG interactions with

foreign partners to develop that nation’s partner capability to govern effectively and securely. One of

DOD’s key mission areas is to build the security capacity of partner states. The goals of security force

assistance, building partner capacity, and FID have much overlap in that they all intend to enable partner

nations to provide for their own security, with a collective goal of contributing effectively to broader

regional or global security challenges by maintaining professional, civilian-led militaries that respect

human rights. FID is established in U.S. law and involves application of the instruments of U.S. national

power in support of a foreign nation confronted by threats; and focuses on the U.S. efforts within unified

action to enhance the HN’s IDAD programs. FID is a core operation and the centerpiece of SOF’s regional

and global efforts to proactively promote security. Security force assistance may be an activity of SOF

during FID operations. Security force assistance encompasses joint force activities conducted within

unified action to organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, and advise and assist foreign security forces in

support of a HN’s efforts to plan and resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain local, HN, or

regional security forces and their supporting institutions. Security force assistance does not include direct

combat by U.S. forces, as direct combat does not build the capacity or capability of foreign security forces.

Security force assistance, however, could involve U.S. forces advising foreign security forces who engage

in direct combat. FID will be intertwined across the Army full spectrum and joint range of military

operations. Operations can precede or evolve from deteriorating conditions in a HN, such as noncombatant

evacuation operations. The likelihood remains that other operations, such as humanitarian demining

operations, may be part of future FID operations. In addition, the increased internal and regional stability

fostered by successful FID may reduce the likelihood of states either acquiring or proliferating weapons of

mass destruction or possible delivery systems.

ANCILLARY EXTERNAL BENEFITS

1-16. The strategic end state of FID is a HN capable of successfully integrating military force with other

instruments of national power to eradicate subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats

to security. Collaterally with this influence, the HN will also typically gain an ancillary benefit of achieving

a much stronger capability and heightened confidence to defend its borders against external threats. This

ancillary effect has been codified in FID doctrine since its inception and complements the focus of FID

operations, deterring hostilities and enhancing stability in the theater of operations. An internal threat may

have significant support and resources from neighboring nation-states, transnational actors, or globally

displaced communities. In addition, one of the benefits in FID programs that crosses over into the security

assistance realm is the general professionalizing of the HN military and law enforcement agencies. This

benefit is realized as the HN military transfers to new assignments. The HN benefits from strengthening

internally through the application of all instruments of national power and ultimately gains the ability to

project power externally, if required, as regional stability equating to sovereign security.

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Introduction

TRANSITIONS FROM FAILED AND OCCUPIED STATES OPERATIONS

Combined arms maneuver and wide area security provide the means for balancing the

application of the elements of combat power within tactical actions and tasks associated

with offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011

1-17. The likelihood of failed states requiring intervention by the world community may remain an issue

for some time. Stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations move such states into more

stable, functioning entities. FID is an integral subset of DOS stability, security, transition, and

reconstruction operations, as well as the U.S. Army full spectrum operations component—stability

operations. Amid the wide mix of strategic and operational challenges, Army units conduct full spectrum

operations that require continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability

support tasks. Mission command provides a methodology to create a more thorough understanding of the

operational environment and of the problems to be addressed. Within mission command, commanders

build teams and establish themes and messages to drive processes and procedures. Mission command

enables an operationally adaptive force that anticipates transitions; accepts risks to create opportunities;

informs friendly and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners; and influences

neutrals, adversaries, and enemies. The ultimate outcome results in successful full spectrum operations.

The exact point at which a stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operation evolves into a sole

FID operation under a viable HN IDAD program remains highly variable and dependent upon the

operational environment. Because this sort of transition will likely follow a major intervention by the

United States or coalition forces, the change in characterization must be made at very high levels. Such a

change in characterization is the province of the President or his designee. In the case of transitioning to an

exclusively FID operation, the designee is normally the U.S. Ambassador. Such a transition can only

happen when the U.S. Country Team is once again the lead agent in the country in question and the U.S.

military presence in the HN is at levels commensurate with a robust FID. Although highly fluid and

somewhat difficult to define, a robust FID might be characterized as being dominated by a limited number

of SOF and conventional forces assisting the military of the HN in subduing residual security threats,

coupled with a larger contingent of SOF and conventional trainers. This shift in balance from a majority of

operational forces to a majority of trainers is a reasonable indicator of transition between stability, security,

transition, and reconstruction (or FID).

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

1-18. Security force assistance is defined as the DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the

USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their

supporting institutions (JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense). Like FID, security force assistance is typically

conducted by a joint, interagency force with the Army component made up of Active Army, Army

National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and United States Army

Reserve (USAR) units. FID and security force assistance share similar TTP. FID has a narrative almost

five decades old, whereas the security force assistance narrative is still emerging. There are some emerging

maxims of note to FID and security force assistance planners, to include the following:

Neither FID nor security force assistance subsumes the other or negates the efficacy of the other.

Any strategic concept for HN security support could include either the simultaneous execution

of both FID and security force assistance or exclusively one or the other.

ARSOF units operating to support security force assistance use their established FID TTP.

Conventional units supporting FID operations may need additional training if not proficient in

security force assistance TTP.

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1-19. Security force assistance may be employed with a functional HN government and a U.S. Country

Team lead, with an extremely dysfunctional or embryonic HN government and be under DOD command,

or be conducted with regional or indigenous forces under a legitimate authority. Security force assistance

may—

Develop regional forces.

Precede a regime change.

Follow a forced regime change.

Have less legal considerations and constraints than FID.

Develop a capability and capacity to counter external threats.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TOOLS

1-20. The Army brings a host of conventional forces and SOF capabilities to support a HN IDAD through

FID. The Security Assistance Training Management Organization is another DOD tool available to provide

support to a foreign request for defense articles or services. The Security Assistance Training Management

Organization assists with price and availability data, letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs), technical

assistance, and training teams. When defense articles or services are required, the requesting country’s

representative provides a letter of request to his U.S. counterpart. Copies of the request are sent to the DOS

Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The DSCA is

the principal DOD organization through which the Secretary of Defense

(SecDef) carries out

responsibilities for security assistance. Within DOD, the Military Departments and other implementing

agencies manage individual country programs, including the development of the LOA and the delivery of

defense articles and services under the LOA contract. Financial management of accepted LOAs is a

responsibility of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. A security assistance organization (SAO),

under the direction of the chief of mission

(COM)—the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission or

Ambassador—conducts the in-country management of each recipient nation’s security assistance

programs. The SAO provides this oversight in conjunction with its HN counterparts, the Country Team

within the diplomatic mission, the Component Subordinate Command of the Geographic Combatant

Command, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DSCA, and the Military Departments. The Security

Assistance Training Management Organization coordinates with the security cooperation officer who

coordinates activities of the security assistance teams to ensure compatibility with other DOD elements in

or directly related to other ongoing in-country activities. The security cooperation officer ensures

compliance with directives and keeps the GCC informed of security assistance activities and progress.

DOD conducts activities under a variety of programs established under security assistance within the USC

that are regulated under the auspices of both DOD and civilian agencies. Appendix A provides additional

legal, regulatory, and policy considerations for FID operations. All of these programs can be characterized

as indirect support (indirect approach), direct support (direct approach), or combat operations; however,

U.S. forces may simultaneously conduct some degree of all three forms of support (approaches) at different

locations and times during FID operations. FID conveyed through the theme of irregular warfare may

either involve the economy of force and indirect approaches with SOF or the direct approach with the

integration of SOF and conventional forces. The instruments of power are the ways, the security assistance

resources are the means, and the regional strategic objectives are the ends that are achieved through FID.

Note: The DOS regulates and executes portions of some of the programs discussed in the

following paragraphs, which provide details on these programs from the standpoint of tools

available to the DOD.

INDIRECT SUPPORT

1-21. Indirect support (indirect approach) operations emphasize the principle of the self-sufficiency of the

HN. Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic, military, and

other capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. The U.S. military’s contribution to this type of support

1-10

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Introduction

is derived from security cooperation guidance and is provided primarily through security assistance.

Indirect support is supplemented by multinational exercises, exchange programs, and select joint exercises.

Army units may simultaneously conduct indirect and direct support of the HN military. For instance, a MIS

element might train and advise the HN MIS personnel on producing a specific product of their own, while

simultaneously producing MIS products of the same that directly support the MIS objective. An Army

engineer unit may be training counterparts in one area while supporting road construction in another.

1-22. Security cooperation is all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense

relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities

for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency

access to a HN. Security cooperation, security assistance, and FID are closely related. DOD Directive

5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, sets the policy and assigns

responsibilities under the GEF, 10 USC, 22 USC, Executive Orders, Guidance for the Development of the

Force, and policies relating to the administration of security cooperation, to include security assistance.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction 3141.01D, Management and Review of Campaign

and Contingency Plans, states that “The Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, (DJ-5), is

responsible for developing recommendations on strategy, strategic concepts, and political-military matters to

include security cooperation, security assistance, and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction

operations.”

1-23. The GEF consolidates and integrates DOD planning guidance into an overarching document that

supersedes security cooperation guidance. The GEF transitions DOD planning from a contingency-centric

approach to a strategy-centric approach with a broader theater emphasis on the regional ends as opposed to

the means. The GEF places emphasis on steady-state activities to achieve end states and objectives that

reflect the centrality of security cooperation activities listed in national strategy documents. The

centerpiece of the GEF is the requirement for combatant commanders to develop joint campaigns that

translate national and theater strategy into “joint” operational concepts to ensure steady-state activities and

operations are integrated and synchronized for achieving and attaining the regional or functional end states

specified in the GEF (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning). Joint operation planning includes all activities

that must be accomplished to develop courses of action

(COAs) for contingency or anticipated

operations—the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of

forces. Planners recommend and commanders define criteria for the termination of joint operations, and

they link these criteria to the transition to stabilization and achievement of the end state (JP 3-05, Special

Operations). The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process and the joint operation

planning process promote coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons, easing the

transition to crisis action planning. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other

instruments of national power

(diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and multinational

partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state. The military’s contribution to national

strategic planning consists of joint strategic planning and its three subsets—

Security cooperation planning.

Joint operation planning.

Force planning.

1-24. The GEF provides goals and activities for specific regions and provides the overarching framework

for many FID-related activities. Security cooperation tools and resources are as follows:

Multinational education.

Multinational exercises.

Multinational experimentation.

Multinational training.

Counternarcotics assistance.

Counter/nonproliferation.

Defense and military contracts.

Defense support to public diplomacy.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

1-11

Chapter 1

Facilities and infrastructure projects.

Humanitarian assistance.

Intelligence cooperation.

Information sharing.

International armaments cooperation.

Security assistance.

Other programs and activities.

1-25. Security assistance is a group of programs authorized by the FAA of 1961 (as amended), and the

Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 (as amended), or other related statutes by which the United

States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit,

or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Figure

1-3, page 1-12, depicts the

relationship of security cooperation, security assistance, and FID. Security assistance is an element of

security cooperation funded and authorized by DOS to be administered by DOD and DSCA.

1-26. Security assistance is a principal instrument in the U.S. FID effort. Like FID, security assistance is a

broad, encompassing topic and includes efforts of civilian agencies, as well as those of the military.

Security assistance provides defense materiel, military training, and other defense-related services by grant,

loan, credit, or cash sales. The express goal of the USG security assistance is the expansion of U.S.

national policies and objectives by enhancing the ability of lesser-developed nations to remain secure from

primarily external, but also internal threats. The post-Cold War paradigm in security assistance is for

nations supported by the program to have regional parity to maintain balances of power and internal

stability. Overall, only a portion (in terms of both numbers of programs and budgets) of the security

assistance effort encompasses FID, but that portion is a large part of the overall FID effort. The FAA of

1961 (as amended) and the AECA of 1976 (as amended) authorize the security assistance program. The

program is under the supervision and general direction of the DOS. Figure 1-3 shows security assistance as

a complete subset of security cooperation.

Figure 1-3. Relationship of security assistance and foreign internal defense

1-12

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Introduction

1-27. The military component of security assistance is implemented by DOD under the DSCA policy

guidance and in conjunction with the DOS. DOD Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management

Manual (SAMM), and Army Regulation (AR) 12-1, Security Assistance, Training, and Export Policy, describe

the programs in detail. The major types of DOD Army security assistance programs and activities are—

FMS.

Note: FMS are either funded by the customer or through a foreign-military financing

arrangement, credit, or guaranteed loan.

Foreign military construction services.

FMS credit.

Leases.

Military Assistance Program.

IMET.

Drawdown.

The major types of DOS security assistance programs are—

Economic support fund.

Peacekeeping operations.

International narcotics control and law enforcement.

Nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs.

Commercial export sales licensed under the AECA of 1976 (as amended).

1-28. The DOS provides financial support to international peacekeeping operations, a subset of peace

operations, through a peacekeeping operations fund. These components, combined with the economic

support fund and commercial sales licensed under the AECA, are security assistance tools that the United

States can use to further its national interests and support the overall FID effort.

1-29. FMS are authorized by the AECA and are conducted using formal contracts or agreements between

the USG and an authorized foreign purchaser. This program provides help to nations with weak economies

that would otherwise be unable to afford U.S. assistance. FMS enable foreign governments to purchase

defense materiel, services, and training from the USG. Eligible nations can use this program to help build

national security infrastructures. DOD Manual 5105.38-M provides details for FMS eligibility criteria with

charts depicting the region, country, and organization. A limitation of this program, especially in

relationship to FID, is that many nations that need the benefits of this program lack the resources to

purchase the materiel and training. The dilemma for those nations is that they need to take money from

civilian programs to execute FMS, which may exacerbate the problems motivating an internal threat. When

a foreign entity cannot finance a purchase by other means, credit financing can be extended if allowed by

U.S. law or if allocated by the DOS within the annual foreign-military financing ceiling imposed by U.S.

law. When authorized, the foreign-military financing program can provide funding for financing the

procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services through loans or

grants to eligible foreign countries and organizations. The foreign-military financing program can be an

extremely effective FID tool. Foreign governments and international organizations eligible for FMS are

eligible for foreign-military financing.

1-30. IMET contributes to the internal and external security of a country by providing training to selected

foreign militaries and related civilian personnel. The IMET program offers training to foreign countries

through DOD schools, which includes formal, informal, correspondence, and distance learning in the

United States or overseas. Eligible foreign governments or international organizations may purchase

training through the FMS program or foreign assistance appropriations, such as the IMET program,

foreign-military financing, or peacekeeping operations. The IMET program helps strengthen foreign

militaries through U.S. military education with exposure to democratic values that are necessary for the

functioning of a civilian controlled, apolitical, professional military. AR 12-15, Joint Security Cooperation

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

1-13

Chapter 1

Education and Training, prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for training foreign personnel.

Chapter 10, Section C10.7 of DOD Manual 5105.38-M provides a list of other training programs, such as

joint combined exchange training and many other programs. Training programs have long-term positive

effects on U.S. and HN multinational relations. The USG may provide IMET funds to foreign governments

to train and professionalize their militaries. IMET serves as an influential foreign policy tool where the

United States shapes doctrine, promotes self-sufficiency in maintaining and operating U.S.-acquired

defense equipment, encourages western values, and occasionally causes marked changes in the policies of

the recipient governments. Foreign students—many of whom occupy the middle and upper echelons of

their country’s military and political establishments—are taught U.S. defense doctrine and employment of

U.S. weapon systems. The results of IMET are greater cooperation and interoperability between the United

States and foreign partners.

1-31. The military component of security assistance funds U.S. peace operations, such as the multinational

force and observers in the Sinai, and the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus. The five

types of peace operations include—

Peacekeeping operations.

Peace enforcement operations.

Peacemaking.

Peace building.

Conflict prevention.

1-32. Peace operations are limited in scope and funding levels and, although related to FID operations,

they are generally considered separate activities with focused goals and objectives. FID may be conducted

in HNs in which peace operations are ongoing, but this typically involves only liaison efforts and

deconfliction by FID planners and executors.

1-33. Antiterrorism assistance, under the overall coordination of the Secretary of State, is designed to

enhance the ability of foreign law enforcement personnel to deter terrorist acts, such as bombing,

kidnapping, assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking. DOD training of law enforcement personnel is

significantly restricted by Section 660 of the FAA; however, awareness of and liaison with HN and USG

law enforcement agencies can only improve those FID programs that involve counterterrorism training,

exercises, or actions. HN forces designated for the antiterrorism or counterterrorism role may be military or

paramilitary forces.

1-34. Joint and multinational exercises strengthen U.S. and HN relations and interoperability of forces.

These exercises are joint and Service funded and complement security assistance and CMO by validating

HN needs and capabilities and by providing a vehicle for the conduct of HCA programs. Their effect can

be magnified through the lens of information operations (IO) (in particular MISO, public affairs, and

defense support to public diplomacy) conducted unilaterally or bilaterally with the HN. There are very strict

legal restrictions on the type of support that can be provided and on the monetary limits of such support.

Chapter 6 and Appendix A provide additional information on legal restrictions and monetary limitations.

1-35. Military exchange programs also support the overall FID program by fostering mutual understanding

between forces; familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other;

and enhancing cultural awareness. Exchange programs, coupled with the IMET program, are extremely

valuable in improving HN and U.S. relations. These programs may have long-term implications for

strengthening democratic ideals and respect for human rights among supported governments.

DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS)

1-36. Direct support (direct approach) operations involve the use of U.S. forces providing direct assistance

to the HN civilian populace or military. These operations differ from security assistance in that they are

joint or Service funded. In addition, these operations do not usually involve the transfer of arms and

equipment. When direct support includes training local military forces, it is distinguished from indirect

support in the immediacy with which the HN force uses their training operationally. In such cases, the HN

unit may transition from training to combat. In other words, the HN, under full spectrum operations, could

1-14

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Introduction

transition from stability training to defensive or offensive combat operations. Typically, such training

represents the validation of HN units that may already be in a high state of readiness. Direct support

operations normally are conducted when the HN is not yet self-sufficient and is faced with social,

economic, or military threats beyond its handling capability. Assistance usually focuses on CMO

(primarily the provision of services to the local populace), MISO, communications and intelligence

sharing, and logistic support. In some cases, training of the military and the provision of new equipment

may be warranted. In the case of direct support, the U.S. Ambassador and commanders use DOD personnel

in roles that typically assume more risks than indirect support.

1-37. CMO are a variety of activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military

forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian

populace. These operations are conducted in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate

military operations and to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. CMO not only support a

COIN program but also enhance all FID programs. CMO may be used in a preventive manner to address

root causes of instability in a reconstructive manner after conflict or in support of disaster relief,

consequence management, civil defense, counterdrug operations, and antiterrorism activities.

1-38. Civil affairs operations (CAO) are defined as those military operations planned, supported, executed,

or transitioned by CA forces through, with, or by the indigenous population and institutions,

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or other government

agencies (OGAs) to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to support

establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats to support CMO or other U.S.

objectives. CAO serve as a critical link between U.S. forces providing support in a HN with the

government, military force, and civilian population. CA facilitates the integration of U.S. military support

into the overall IDAD programs of the supported nation.

1-39. The purpose of FHA is to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other

endemic conditions such as disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that

can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by DOD forces is often limited in scope

and duration. Nevertheless, FHA programs are often an integral part of an overall FID program.

1-40. HCA activities are designed to support the HN populace in conjunction with U.S. military

operations. HCA activities are integrated into the overall FID program to enhance the stability of the

GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR), as well as to improve the readiness of U.S. forces deployed in the

theater of operations.

1-41. Military civic action (MCA) is the use of predominantly indigenous military forces on projects

useful to the local population at all levels, in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture,

transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social

development. These programs also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

Activities may involve U.S. supervision and advice, but normally the local military conducts the activities.

MCA is an essential part of military support to a FID program. MCA assists the local government with

developing capabilities to provide for the security and well-being of its own population. It may mitigate

and eventually, when coupled with other activities, eliminate the ill will and mistrust of the populace

toward the HN military.

1-42. The focus of MISO during FID operations is to support U.S. national objectives, to support the

GCC’s regional security strategy objectives, and to support the objectives of the Country Team. MISO are

used to promote the ability of the HN to defend itself against threats in several ways. Successful use of

MISO discredits and marginalizes threats while simultaneously fostering trust in HN institutions. MISO

also introduce, clarify the position of, and then articulate the exit strategy for the United States and

coalition forces. Much like other ARSOF, such as CA and SF, MIS elements often continue to have a

presence and relevance in scaled-back FID activities well after a larger contingent of SOF and

conventional forces have succeeded in achieving the main goals of FID.

1-43. U.S. military training support to FID should focus on assisting HNs in anticipating, precluding, and

countering threats or potential threats. When organizing, planning, and executing military training support

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

1-15

Chapter 1

to a FID program it is essential that the emphasis be on IDAD. This emphasis helps the HN address the

root causes of instability in a preventive manner rather than reacting to threats. Training programs for the

HN military and law enforcement may increase if a FID operation involves a transition from indirect to

direct support.

1-44. U.S. military involvement in FID historically has been focused on COIN. Increasingly, however,

U.S. FID programs may also aim at other threats to HN internal stability, such as civil disorder, corruption,

human rights abuses, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. Many of these threats are increasingly

intertwined. For instance, whereas the typical Communist insurgency disdained illicit drugs (at least

officially), modern threats feel little if any compunction to avoid this or any other criminal endeavor that

furthers its goals. Religious extremism increasingly blurs the line between terrorism and insurgency. It is

useful, however, to maintain a distinction between that part of FID that is counterterrorism and that part

which is COIN. For instance, it may be highly counterproductive to the MIS effort to characterize

insurgents who do not engage in terrorism or who are citizens of the HN as terrorists. U.S. military

training, therefore, should focus on the specific threats present.

1-45. In FID operations, COIN operations or relevant COIN TTP may represent a large or even a

preponderance of FID efforts. The likelihood that some sort of ideological-based insurgency will remain a

perennial FID focus in the future is high. In addition, insurgents and other threats may employ the same

tactics and techniques against the HN, to include classic insurgency methods. In terms of operational focus,

it is irrelevant if an internal threat is a true insurgent or is, for instance, a narcoterrorist group using

political rhetoric to foster recruitment and gain legitimacy. The focus of such FID operations may be a mix

of classic counterdrug operations and COIN techniques to separate the group from their base of support in

the populace. Increasingly, threats of all types attempt to employ religious or political rhetoric to further

their standing or fear in the HN, and sometimes even more importantly, in the United States and among

third parties. Typically, this has been done through the regional and global media. It is irrelevant if the

internal threat is actually ideologically based or disingenuously using religious or political rhetoric to

further their aims. They can, in effect, become legitimate if sufficient media exposure elicits a broad

perception of legitimacy or even the inevitability of their victory. Therefore, a fundamental ethos of COIN

remains a constant in FID—namely denying popular support to threats through a balance of lethal and

nonlethal interdiction as well as measures directed at winning the support of the populace for the HN.

1-46. The characterization of an operation as primarily FID with COIN elements is the province of the

overall military commander and/or the Country Team. In an operation with significant U.S. military

support committed for the interdiction of insurgents, major U.S. interests are typically at stake. As such, the

decision to characterize an operation as COIN usually rests at the highest levels of the USG, up to and

including Presidential visibility. Army commanders and Soldiers must be cognizant if an operation and an

internal threat is deemed best interdicted by not characterizing the threat as insurgents. This can be a

challenge, when at the tactical and operational levels that interdiction is accomplished through COIN TTP.

For Army commanders, the blend of COIN, counterterrorism, counterdrug, and other operations is

accomplished on a case-by-case basis. The emphasis on one or another subset of irregular warfare

techniques employed in FID is influenced by the conditions in the HN and the amount of resources

available to combat an internal threat. Conventional forces or ARSOF commanders prioritize FID

operations based on the threat, and that threat may evolve or devolve quickly. Comprehensive FID plans

anticipate this change and respond to it proactively by adjusting the balance of COIN, counterterrorism, or

other techniques.

1-47. During direct FID operations, U.S. military capabilities may be used to provide transportation or

maintenance support to the HN military for operations that do not routinely expose U.S. personnel to

hostile fire. Logistic support must be provided with consideration of the long-term effect on the capability

of the local forces to become self-sufficient. It may be necessary to provide logistic support for a surge

capacity if the HN is incapable of obtaining logistic support on their own. This must be articulated as

temporary and must be balanced with the ability of the HN to return to a stable situation afterward without

permanently overextending the capabilities of the HN.

1-16

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Introduction

1-48. During tactical operations, U.S. intelligence and communication range from strategic analysis to

current intelligence summaries and situation reporting. With the proliferation of unmanned aircraft

systems, as well as other organic collection assets, the ability for Soldiers to support HN forces with timely

intelligence and information continues to grow. As an adequate intelligence collection and dissemination

capability is often one of the weakest links in the HN military capability, the ability to provide this support

to the HN in FID can prove decisive. The release of classified information to the HN is governed by

national disclosure policy. Detailed guidance must be provided to the senior U.S. commander in the chain

of command and distributed to subordinate commands supporting FID, according to all statutory and regulatory

guidance. Limited delegation of authority, where appropriate, can supplement detailed written guidance.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

1-49. The introduction or transition of U.S. forces into FID combat operations requires a Presidential

decision. The use of U.S. forces in a combat role serves only as a temporary solution until the security

situation is stabilized and HN forces are able to provide security for their populace. In all cases, U.S.

combat operations support the HN IDAD program and remain strategically defensive in the realm of full-

spectrum operations. This stems from the fact that the HN is retaking its own sovereign soil and liberating

its own people. However, offensive operations can be conducted by U.S. forces in FID operations that

involve authorized combat. In addition, the HN forces should be encouraged and aided to gain the initiative

for conducting offensive operations. Despite the goal of achieving a stable strategic defense, once combat

operations are authorized, the HN is not restricted to its territories and may cross over into its neighboring

states to defeat transnational threats. Combat operations may entail operations in cooperative bordering

nations (for example, an active or passive coalition member) and may not include defensive action despite

this strategic characterization. Although joint and Service doctrine provide specific tactical procedures,

there are certain principles that should guide employment of U.S. forces in a tactical or operational role to

support FID combat operations. The presence of an uncooperative bordering nation unwilling or unable to

curtail internal threats operating on their soil may require the escalation of combat operations outside the

HN borders.

1-50. The primary role for U.S. military forces in tactical operations is to support, advise, and help HN

forces through logistics, intelligence, or other support. This allows the HN force to concentrate on taking

the offensive against hostile elements. If the level of lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency reaches a level

that HN forces cannot control, U.S. forces may be required to engage the hostile elements directly. If

possible, U.S. forces should avoid unilateral operations. In this case, the objective of U.S. operations is to

protect or stabilize the political, economic, and social institutions until the HN can assume these

responsibilities. In all cases, the strategic initiative and responsibility belong with the HN. To preserve its

legitimacy and to ensure a lasting solution to the problem, the host government must bear this

responsibility. Given the multinational and interagency impact of conducting combat operations supporting

FID, commanders can expect complex mission command relationships in a collaborative environment that

include joint forces, multinational forces, IGOs, and NGOs.

Note: Although the Army has replaced command and control with mission command, joint

operations will continue to use command and control.

1-51. The nature of U.S. tactical participation in HN internal conflicts requires judicious and prudent rules

of engagement (ROE) and guidelines for the application of force. Inappropriate destruction and violence

attributed to U.S. forces may easily reduce the legitimacy and sovereignty of the supported government. In

addition, these incidents may be used by adversaries to fuel anti-American sentiments and help the cause of

the opposition. Conversely, failure to use sufficient force to gain and maintain security may doom FID

operations and destroy the credibility of U.S. and HN forces to protect the populace. Civilians may endure

hardship and accept collateral damage if an internal threat is completely interdicted. Army FID planners

and executors must accept that a civil populace may expect nonlethal interdiction or that some populations

may be satisfied only with lethal interdiction. The latter may be from either cultural imperatives or the

simple desire (often stemming from fear) to be completely rid of a threat.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

1-17

Chapter 1

UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND POLICY

1-52. A basic premise of U.S. foreign policy is that the security of the United States and its fundamental

values and institutions are best preserved and enhanced as part of a community of free and independent

nations who adhere to the rule-of-law principle both within their borders and among the world community.

In this regard, the United States encourages other countries to do their part in the preservation of freedom

and independence for all nations. The objective is to support U.S. interests by means of a common effort.

This common effort makes use of all instruments of national power to support a HN. The diplomatic

instrument is often first used to show U.S. commitment. The political system within the HN is important in

providing stability and must be willing to improve stability within its own borders. The economic

instrument has influence across all aspects of FID.

1-53. In many cases, FID is incorporated into HN programs within nations that are less developed. These

nations require a means to fundamentally improve their economies. Economic stressors, including HN

government economic mismanagement, are often root causes of disaffection and unrest among HN

populations. U.S. support programs can range from favorable trade arrangements to military financing. The

informational instrument gets the message out to the public, and IO portray the positive efforts and

accomplishments of the HN. These operations also publicize U.S. support to the HN and U.S. efforts to

improve the HN. Although the focus of this publication is on the military instrument, the military

instrument of national power is primarily a supporting role to the overall IDAD program.

1-54. Those governments that lack the will to address their social, economic, or political problems are

unlikely to benefit from outside assistance. However, governments that mobilize their human and material

resources may find that outside help, to include U.S. security assistance, makes a critical difference. Where

significant U.S. national interests are involved, the United States may provide economic and military

assistance to supplement the efforts of such governments.

1-55. The creation of a relatively stable internal environment, one in which economic growth can occur

and the people are able to determine their own form of government, is a primary U.S. objective. Economic

assistance, supplied either by the United States through bilateral agreements or by several nations through

multilateral agreements, may help achieve this objective.

1-56. The threatened government is primarily responsible for creating a stable atmosphere through the

commitment and use of all its internal resources. Just as the United States is committed to a comprehensive

approach to supporting the HN, the HN should be equally committed to change. Under certain conditions,

U.S. policy supports supplementing local efforts to maintain order and stability. These conditions are as

follows:

The internal disorder is of such a nature as to pose a significant threat to U.S. national interests.

The threatened country is capable of effectively using U.S. assistance.

The threatened country requests U.S. assistance.

In addition, the magnitude of human suffering within a country may compel U.S. action in a country or

region where U.S. national interests are not at stake.

1-57. The USG spends billions of dollars a year in programs to improve allied and friendly nations. There

are numerous benefits to the U.S. military for conducting FID throughout the world. FID programs—

Bring diverse U.S. teams of Soldiers that embody the principles of freedom, fairness, and

humanity to countries troubled by ethnic, racial, and religious strife and intolerance.

Help build and foster favorable relationships that promote U.S. interests. In many cases, FID

programs lead to the establishment of personal and unit relationships.

Strengthen the capabilities of friendly nations, which ultimately strengthen U.S. security

concerns.

Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access in many of the foreign areas aided

by the United States.

1-18

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Introduction

Provide training exercises with foreign nations to increase the proficiency and skill of U.S.

forces.

Improve U.S. forces’ regional knowledge of specific areas (environmental, geographical, social,

political, economic, cultural, and spiritual), which can be disseminated throughout the force.

Improve the effectiveness of global operations against terrorist networks.

1-58. Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency are the result of specific conditions within a nation. These

conditions may stem from the population’s perception (often grounded to some degree in reality) that they

are suffering from poverty, unemployment, religious disparity, political issues, crime, or tribal unrest that

has been ignored or poorly dealt with by the HN government. These conditions have historically set the

stage for lawlessness and insurgency against an established government. This type of internal strife or

conflict within a nation’s borders may remain a local problem or it may expand, allowing an outside source

to influence or create opposition toward the legitimate government. In some cases, outside sources may

threaten the HN stability by exploiting the conditions within that nation to further their own cause. This

outside influence may even establish itself within the HN to promote and support civil unrest. These types

of conditions promote insurgencies and their violent methods, like terrorism.

1-59. Identification of the root cause of the problem, analysis of the environment, and identification of the

specific needs of the HN are crucial in tailoring military support to help a HN IDAD program. The

emphasis should be on helping the HN to address the root cause of instability in a preventative manner

rather than reacting to threats. Such reactionary strategies invariably fail. The United States supports

specific nations based on U.S. policy toward that nation or region and implements FID programs to support

that nation through GCCs’ security cooperation programs. FID programs of all types, such as humanitarian

assistance and counterterrorism programs, can prevent, reduce, or stop factors that contribute to the

beginning or spread of subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. FID activities

against an incipient, or even mature internal threat implemented through the GCC, may ultimately lead to

stability within that nation or region and effectively reduce threats to the United States. In addition, even

FID operations that escalate to combat operations reduce the number of U.S. casualties and the length of

time committed to overcoming a virulent internal threat.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

1-19

Chapter 2

Organization and Responsibilities

It is vital that we not only develop our military capabilities, but also strengthen the

capacity of other government agencies.

M.G. Mullen

Admiral, U.S. Navy

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 20 March 2009

To help a country with its IDAD efforts, FID planners must understand the political

climate, social attitudes, economic conditions, cultural considerations, the threat to

host government, and the local populace. In addition, within the globalized world,

FID planners rarely have the luxury of discounting other local, regional, and even

global influences. FID is primarily an instrument of the USG, with varying (and

sometimes highly limited) degrees of support from other nations as partners to help

the HN. When considering the IDAD effort and the role of FID in that effort, it is

essential to realize that the DOD is only one organization fulfilling many of the

responsibilities to support IDAD. Appendix B provides additional information on

IDAD strategy. International relationships are built along the continuum from peace

to war between entities from all of the instruments of national power. All the power

of the political entity in conflict must be brought to bear in a synchronized and

mutually supportive role. This is true for FID operations and is of utmost importance

for the HNs conducting an IDAD program. This chapter details the instruments of

national power and their responsibilities with emphasis on how these other

instruments synergize with the military arm of national power.

OVERVIEW

2-1. For FID to be successful in meeting HN needs, the United States must integrate the efforts of

multiple government agencies. Interagency coordination during joint operations ensures that all diplomatic,

information, military, and economic instruments complement each other. This coordination also allows all

available resources to be used in concert to build upon each other and avoid redundant and, therefore,

wasteful efforts. Effective integration is difficult and consists of more than mere coordination. Rarely does

a single instrument of national power accomplish an IDAD program component in the absence of other

elements. Ideally, the FID program incorporates all instruments in a coordinated and supported manner that

addresses HN requirements (military and, when possible, civilian). The military element must do this to

support all U.S. national policies and interests. Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical

between levels of commands and organizations and horizontal between USG agencies and HN military and

civilian agencies.

SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES

2-2. The United States routinely aids nations around the world in varying capacities to foster stability in

states that have few or low-level threats. However, U.S. support for IDAD that includes FID activities

signals an environment in which the USG recognizes a viable threat. The United States then institutes a

plan to support the HN IDAD strategy using the military element from the instruments of power. This may

occur after long-term engagement solely or primarily through the other instruments of U.S. and HN

national power if deemed as ineffective in providing comprehensive internal security for the HN. The USG

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may engage other instruments of national power under various criteria, but when FID is planned and

executed, it is a planned approach synchronized with regional end states and security cooperation

strategies.

2-3. The President or SecDef decides the level and type of military assistance to support a FID program.

Each FID program is distinct, even if regional similarities can provide potential best practices planning

suggestions. In addition, some FID programs can have coordinated activities when an internal threat

operates in two or more bordering countries. However, each FID program is country-specific based on the

IDAD strategy. The reality is that even in a regional effort, the level of FID support in countries that are in

close proximity or adjoining may differ greatly. Ordinarily, when FID limits support to minor levels of

security assistance or CMO, there is no requirement for a special management program. In these cases,

standard interagency coordination (typically under the COM or designee) should be adequate. Major FID

programs may demand levels of management and coordination beyond what is normally found at the

interagency, combatant command, and Country Team levels.

THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

2-4. As evident in Figure 2-1, page 2-3, the lines of organization and mission command in a FID situation

are complex. They follow the framework laid out in the national security Presidential directive (NSPD) 1,

Organization of the National Security Council System. NSPD 1 has had a lasting influence on the

development and execution of complex contingency operation planning and execution. This directive

mandates changes in procedures that continue to increase and improve interagency coordination and unity

of effort. Planning and execution centers on the institutionalization of the NSC practices to manage a crisis

and coordinate political-military plans.

2-5. In addition, NSPD

44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and

Stabilization, articulates the basic policy of U.S. efforts in stabilizing and reconstructing foreign states by

various operations, including FID, when it states: “The United States has a significant stake in enhancing

the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or

in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful

societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and

organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively

when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market

economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise

sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of

operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to

U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.”

DIPLOMATIC

2-6. The diplomatic instrument of national power makes extensive use of FID. A dysfunctional political

system in a nation results in internal instability. This is especially true when government is dysfunctional

down to the local level. Diplomacy is often the first instrument exercised by the United States in countries

dealing with an internal threat. Depending upon the decision of the President or his designee, the

diplomatic instrument of national power may be the only practical instrument of national power that can be

brought to bear. Indirect and direct military support provided through training, logistics, or other support

all make significant diplomatic statements by demonstrating U.S. commitment and resolve; therefore, the

diplomatic instrument is always a complementary component of any involvement of U.S. military forces.

In addition, the interaction of DOS and DOD personnel in the typical FID model, where DOS is the lead

agency, reinforces the concept of civilian rule.

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Figure 2-1. Foreign internal defense coordination

INFORMATION

2-7. Much like the diplomatic element of national power, the use of information may be the primary

practical force that can be leveraged to support the HN IDAD plan. Effective use of public diplomacy,

CMO, public affairs activities, and MISO are essential to a FID program. It is imperative that these

elements work in a mutually supportive effort. The establishment of FID programs offers an opportunity

for public misunderstanding and for exploitation by elements hostile to the United States and its allies. U.S.

foreign assistance that includes a military component may be met with skepticism (foreign and domestic).

In the past, USG military foreign assistance has been the target for adversary propaganda. Use of MISO in

the informational realm remains a contentious issue between those who have a clear understanding of the

role and function of MISO and those who erroneously equate all military IO with deception.

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2-8. FID offers a tremendous opportunity to portray U.S. support in a positive light, but not at the

expense of the supported nation that may be sensitive to accepting aid. Indeed, it may be counterproductive

to exploit U.S. aid efforts if doing so creates the perception that the HN government or military is weak or

incompetent. Those planning and conducting informational support to FID must be continually mindful

that information can travel to the majority of any population on the globe in minutes. Therefore, accurate

portrayal of U.S. FID efforts through positive information programs can influence HN or regional

perceptions of U.S. FID programs. Information programs can also highlight the HN desire to embrace the

changes necessary to combat subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. Every FID

effort must be viewed in informational terms as a potential global media target. This means that Soldiers

conducting FID must evaluate every action in terms of its informational (primarily psychological and

political) impact to avoid negative third-order effects. In addition, this means that Soldiers and junior

leaders must be empowered with the knowledge of how their tactical actions potentially affect operational

or even strategic goals.

MILITARY

2-9. The military component of FID can vary greatly. Countless examples of small teams of ARSOF

Soldiers conducting generations of FID operations created a proactive IDAD umbrella in many parts of the

world. Typically, concurrent with these operations, successive conventional force trainers or advisors have

also increased the competence and professionalism of the HN ground force. The civilian populace, internal

threats, and neighboring states often view the entire trained HN force as elite. In terms of these internal

threats and neighboring states, the capabilities of the HN force often far surpass the most competent cells

or units employed against them.

2-10. FID is conveyed as a joint action under nation assistance and as one of the activities of irregular

warfare. Historically, FID has not been the sole province of SOF. FID requires joint planning, preparation,

and execution to integrate and focus the efforts of all Service and functional components.

2-11. FID is a core operation of ARSOF. FID is an operation in which the inherent qualities and training

of ARSOF Soldiers place them in a natural position to conduct (in joint environments with conventional

forces) and command. FID by definition cannot take place without military support to the HN. It is,

however, necessary to remain cognizant of the place of the military element in terms of the IDAD strategy

as a whole. FID is a component of the military portion of national power used by the United States. It may

be the smallest element (numerically and financially) of support to the HN. In addition, whether the FID

operation is one with a small contingent of U.S. forces or a substantial force authorized to conduct combat

operations, it is a multinational and interagency effort, which requires integration and synchronization of all

instruments of national power. ARSOF, in support of FID, may operate in a joint task force (JTF), conduct

planning to provide support to partners, prepare the operational environment, synchronize Army FID tasks with

joint force partners, train and advise foreign security partners, assess FID effectiveness, and influence

populations.

ECONOMIC

2-12. Economic factors influence every aspect of FID support. Often, unfavorable economic conditions

give rise to the internal strife a supported nation may be facing. Internal threats may further exacerbate

economic hardships through violence and destruction, which results in a worsening spiral. The weakening

of national infrastructures and increase of instability create or heighten the perception that the HN

government is not able to meet the basic needs of the people. Internal threats may then begin to usurp the

HN authority by conducting a series of related activities to provide for the basic needs of the populace with

a goal of undermining the legitimacy and ability of the HN to provide for the populace. This tactic has

historically been combined with a continued, deliberate targeting of the infrastructure in other areas to

heighten the perception of worsening conditions in HN government-controlled areas. The U.S. economic

instrument of power is used in a variety of ways inside the HN, ranging from direct financial assistance and

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favorable trade arrangements to the provision of foreign-military financing under security assistance. When

an internal threat receives support from third-country or nonstate organizations, economic and financial

sanctions can be used to cut support to insurgent or other elements in the HN. Direct financial actions, such

as the freezing of assets, can also markedly hinder an internal threat’s capabilities.

NATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS

2-13. The United States uses multiple national-level organizations to address IDAD issues. The successful

interaction and synchronization of IDAD efforts among these many agencies is evolving and is described

in JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. JP 3-08 addresses the interagency,

IGO, and NGO relationships and provides fundamental principles and guidance to facilitate coordination

between the DOD and other USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and regional organizations. It also describes key

USG departments and agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and their core competencies, basic organizational structures,

and their relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States. This reference

points out the reality that joint operations bring together a myriad of USG agencies—all with different

doctrine, terminology, culture, and, most importantly, capabilities. The following paragraphs discuss some

of the national-level organizations involved in supporting FID. This discussion presupposes substantial

crossover portions of interagency coordination and activities conducted within the continental United

States, HN, and third countries. In addition, unless specifically stipulated, these activities are conducted by

various echelons (frequently to the lowest echelons during FID operations) of all the agencies mentioned.

NATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

2-14. Intelligence is critical to the execution of FID. Beyond that, it is critical to the planning and the

decision at national levels to execute or refrain from beginning FID operations. One of the advantages

available to FID planners and executors under global operations against terrorist networks is increased

connectivity to collaborative and accessible national-level intelligence dissemination programs. The

Director of National Intelligence is responsible to the President to oversee the intelligence assets of the

USG. The Central Intelligence Agency is an integral part of the Director of National Intelligence’s arsenal

of intelligence gatherers and analysts. This agency’s mission is to support the President, the NSC, and all

officials who make and execute U.S. national security policy. Through personnel in the continental United

States and in the HN, the Central Intelligence Agency provides invaluable (and in some cases otherwise

unobtainable) support to intelligence for FID. The National Security Agency was established by

Presidential directive in 1952 to provide signals intelligence and communications security activities for the

government. Since then, the National Security Agency has gained the responsibility for information

systems security and operations security training. Appendix C contains more information about intelligence

organizations under the Director of National Intelligence and the specific products, means, and methods

they provide to FID.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2-15. The National Security Act of 1947 (amended in 1949) created the NSC. The NSC’s formal members

are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and SecDef. The Director of National Intelligence, the

CJCS, the President’s national security advisor (the assistant to the President for national security affairs,

also director of the NSC), and the deputy advisor usually attend NSC meetings. The NSC also has a

civilian staff. The President appoints an executive secretary to head the staff. Determinations for FID

operations to commence, escalate, and terminate often require a decision by the NSC body. Invariably, the

progression of FID from direct support to combat operations involves the NSC advising the President (the

sole authority to authorize combat operations in FID).

ARMS TRANSFER MANAGEMENT GROUP

2-16. The Arms Transfer Management Group is an interagency board that advises the Secretary of State on

matters relating to security assistance program funding levels and arms transfer policies. The Under

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Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology chairs the Arms Transfer Management

Group. The group manages and coordinates weapons- and equipment-related security assistance matters. It

includes representatives from agencies throughout the executive branch who deal in security assistance

matters. Its members are frequently from but not limited to the—

NSC.

DOD.

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Central Intelligence Agency.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Office of Management and Budget.

Department of Treasury.

DOS.

USAID.

2-17. The group coordinates military assistance and military-related support assistance. This coordination

encourages mutually supporting programs and increases the efficiency of the security assistance program.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2-18. The DOS is the federal department in the United States that sets and maintains foreign policies. The

DOS is normally the lead agency for execution of FID programs with overall responsibility for the security

assistance programs. The Department of Defense provides the personnel and equipment to achieve FID

objectives. The DOS is involved with policy formulation and execution of FID programs from the national

level to the lowest levels within the HN. FID is best achieved by the DOS at levels that avoid deployment

of large numbers of U.S. military personnel. The DOS incorporates all instruments of national power as a

true whole-of-government or comprehensive approach, thus, FID is applied across the continuum of

operations including the spectrum of conflict ranging from stable peace to general war. FID operations are

applied as indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations—all

with the primary role to support and advise the HN’s IDAD program under the direction and lead of the

DOS COM.

BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

2-19. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, led by an assistant secretary, is the principal link between

the DOS and DOD. This bureau provides policy direction in the areas of international security, security

assistance, military operations, and defense trade. It is instrumental in the DOS’s efforts to accomplish the

Joint Strategic Goals of the DOS, which are anchored in the President’s National Security Strategy. The

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs advances the DOS to DOD relationship by bringing “smart power” to

U.S. foreign policy in six key ways—

Providing the Secretary with a global perspective on political-military issues.

Supporting the U.S. DOD by negotiating basing agreements, reviewing military exercises,

facilitating overseas operations, and providing embedded foreign policy advisors to Service

branch chiefs and combatant commands worldwide.

Promoting regional stability by building partnership capacity and strengthening friends and

allies through security assistance programs.

Reducing threats from conventional weapons through humanitarian demining and small-arms

destruction programs and setting the stage for post-conflict recovery in more than 50 nations

around the world.

Contributing to defense and political-military policy and planning.

Regulating arms transfers and U.S. defense trade.

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COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS

2-20. The coordinator for the Bureau of International Information Programs supports U.S. foreign policy

objectives by influencing public attitudes in other nations. The coordinator for the Bureau of International

Information Programs advises the President, his representatives abroad, and various departments and

agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs, and

official statements. DOD and DOS information programs efforts must be mutually supportive. Close

coordination among embassy public affairs officers (PAOs) and cultural attachés, military public affairs

offices, and MIS elements is essential. The Bureau of International Information Programs uses various

media and methods to—

Publicize U.S. policies.

Plan and conduct informative programs to support U.S. or host-government agencies.

Counter propaganda hostile to U.S. interests.

Coordinate and synchronize MISO with guidance from the DOS.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

2-21. The USAID is responsible for conducting nonmilitary U.S. foreign assistance programs and for

continuously supervising all assistance programs under the FAA of 1961. It is primarily concerned with

developmental, humanitarian, and civic assistance. The USAID also plans and implements overseas

programs that improve long-range economic and social development assistance efforts. The DOS and

USAID have a joint strategic plan with a strategic goal section that defines the primary aims of U.S.

foreign policy and development assistance as well as strategic priorities. The strategic goals represent the

core of the DOS and USAID transformational diplomacy efforts. The seven joint strategic goals and the

key strategic priorities within them are as follows:

Strategic Goal 1—Achieving Peace and Security:

Counterterrorism.

Combat weapons of mass destruction and destabilize conventional weapons.

Security cooperation and security sector reform.

Conflict prevention, mitigation, and response.

Transnational crime.

Counternarcotics.

Homeland security.

Strategic Goal 2—Governing Justly and Democratically:

Rule of law and human rights.

Good governance.

Political competition and consensus building.

Civil society.

Strategic Goal 3—Investing in People:

Health.

Education.

Social services and protection for especially vulnerable populations.

Strategic Goal 4—Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity:

Private markets and competitiveness.

Trade and investment.

Financial sector.

Infrastructure.

Energy sector.

Agriculture.

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Macroeconomic foundation for growth.

Economic opportunity.

Environment.

Strategic Goal 5—Providing Humanitarian Assistance:

Protection, assistance, and solutions.

Disaster prevention and mitigation.

Orderly humane means for migration management.

Strategic Goal 6—Promoting International Understanding:

Offer positive vision.

Marginalize extremism.

Nurture common interests and values.

Strategic Goal 7—Strengthening Consular and Management Capabilities:

Visa services.

Passport services.

American citizen services.

Human resources.

Information technology.

Security.

Facilities.

Planning and accountability.

Administrative services.

Rightsizing the USG’s overseas presence.

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS

2-22. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs advises the President, Secretary

of State, other bureaus in the DOS, and other departments and agencies within the USG on the

development of policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime. A secretary who is

under the direction of the Under Secretary of Political Affairs heads the Bureau of International Narcotics

and Law Enforcement Affairs. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs programs

support two of the DOS’s strategic goals:

Reducing the entry of illegal drugs into the United States.

Minimizing the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens.

2-23. Counternarcotics and anticrime programs also complement counterterrorism efforts, both directly

and indirectly, by promoting modernization of and supporting operations by foreign criminal justice

systems and law enforcement agencies charged with the counterterrorism mission.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

2-24. The U.S. Army in general has a long history of working with various agencies under the Department

of Justice in joint interagency operations. FID is certainly no exception. FID involves both the military and

civil goals of restoring justice and law enforcement services to ensure HN stabilization and reconstruction.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs can provide a bridge from military, to security,

to civil justice. Internal threats frequently cannot be given precise, one-dimensional definitions. A political

or religious-based insurgency may frequently have no problem acquiring funds through criminal activity,

such as piracy (intellectual and maritime), narcotics trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. Narcotraffickers

need only to slip Marxist rhetoric into a pseudo-ideology to cross the line into narcoterrorism. FID

counterdrug operations must involve the Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA), and other FID

operations may involve extensive coordination and intelligence sharing with Department of Justice

agencies. For instance, close cooperation between the DOD and Department of Justice on programs like

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Organization and Responsibilities

the various Rewards for Justice programs has yielded positive results in FID operations. In addition, as

more terrorist activity abroad has been directed at USG property, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has

increasingly worked with DOD elements to prosecute global operations against terrorist networks.

2-25. The Department of Justice has several standing programs executed abroad that support the goals of

FID where there is a criminal element, an untrained or corrupt judiciary and police, or both. The

International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program develops police and correctional

institutions, while the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training develops

prosecutorial and judicial institutions and legislative reform. The USAID funds and the Department of

Justice manages senior law enforcement advisors or prosecutors known as Resident Legal Advisors. These

advisors are stationed in a host country for at least 1 year. They provide full-time advice and technical

assistance in establishing fair and professionally managed justice sector institutions and practices. Senior

law enforcement advisors institutionalize best practices for justice and police capacity building and reform,

with a goal of establishing security at the community level for the HN populace. Senior law enforcement

advisors are also assigned for a minimum of 1 year, but many serve several years at one or more posts.

Senior law enforcement advisors create a single point of contact for all areas of law enforcement-related

training and technical assistance in a given country.

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

2-26. The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence was created within the Department of Treasury to

address broad illicit financing concerns. The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence combines the

department’s intelligence and enforcement functions with the twin aims of safeguarding the financial

system against illicit use and combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, money launderers, drug

traffickers, and other national and transnational security threats. The Office of Terrorism and Financial

Intelligence consists of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Terrorist Financing, Office of

Intelligence and Analysis, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

2-27. The United States Department of Agriculture has an important role in the interagency FID

framework. Historically, most insurgencies occur in countries where a majority of the population is

dependent upon agriculture and the unemployed or underemployed rural youth are considered prime

candidates for recruitment. Development of the agricultural sector and its institutions facilitate trade and

increase incomes, thereby reducing recruitment to, or support for, an insurgency or other internal threat.

The Foreign Agricultural Service has the primary responsibility for the Department of Agriculture’s

international activities, including market development, trade agreements and negotiations, and the

collection and analysis of statistics and market information. The Foreign Agricultural Service carries out a

broad array of international training, technical assistance, and other collaborative activities with developing

and transitioning countries to facilitate trade and promote food security.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

2-28. Within the DOD, the Office of the SecDef acts as a policy-making organization in most FID matters.

Numerous activities at the Office of the SecDef level affect FID programs. The following are directly

involved in the areas of security assistance and in the general areas of low-intensity conflict and FID-

related issues:

The Under SecDef for Policy exercises overall direction, authority, and control concerning

security assistance for Office of the SecDef through the various assistant secretaries. The Under

SecDef for Policy serves as the principal advisor and assistant to the SecDef for all matters

involving the integration of DOD plans and policies with overall national security objectives.

The Assistant SecDef

(special operations and low-intensity conflict and interdependent

capabilities) oversees DOD special operations and has far-reaching policy responsibilities that

can affect all areas of FID policy and programs.

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The Assistant SecDef (International Security Affairs) establishes policy and supervises security

assistance programs through the DSCA. Security cooperation activities are conducted with allies

and friendly nations to build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests, build allied and

friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provide U.S. forces

with peacetime and contingency access. Security assistance as a subset of security cooperation

encompasses a group of programs, authorized by law, through which the DOD or commercial

contractors provide defense articles and services in support of national policies and objectives.

Security assistance programs allow the transfer of defense articles and services to international

organizations and friendly foreign governments via sales, grants, leases, or loans to help friendly

nations and allies deter and defend against aggression, promote the sharing of common defense

burdens, and help foster regional stability. When the United States assists other nations in

meeting their defense requirements, it contributes to the security of the USG. The DSCA

partners with the U.S. State Department, the Military Departments, other USG organizations,

U.S. industry, and foreign government customers to provide—

FMS.

Foreign-military financing.

IMET.

Excess defense articles.

Humanitarian assistance.

HCA.

Mine action training (awareness and removal techniques).

The Assistant SecDef for Public Affairs supervises and establishes policy for public affairs

programs with the DOD. Public affairs is an integral part of military support to FID programs.

The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plays a key role in the security assistance effort through

the joint planning process. Essential Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plans are the Joint

Strategic Planning Document, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(JSCP), and the Joint

Intelligence Estimate for Planning. In addition, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff continually

reviews current and ongoing programs for specific countries and regions to ensure compatibility

with U.S. global security interests.

COMBATANT COMMAND ORGANIZATION

2-29. The GCCs are responsible for planning and executing military operations in their AOR to support

FID programs. The GCCs integrate all military security assistance plans and activities with regional U.S.

military plans. The role of the GCC is critical with a regional perspective at the operational and strategic

levels of conflict. The commander identifies and applies military and certain humanitarian or civic action

resources to achieve U.S. national strategic goals. With proper and timely employment, these resources

minimize the likelihood of U.S. combat involvement.

2-30. The GCCs integrate national and AOR strategy into strategic and operational objectives through the

development of the theater campaign plan (JP 5-0). GCCs use the security cooperation component of joint

operation planning to coordinate FID activities. Because threats often operate regionally, security

cooperation guidance may sometimes coordinate separate FID operations in multiple countries within the

GCC’s AOR. In addition, the FID operation in one country in the GCC’s AOR may need to be coordinated

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with the irregular warfare effort in an adjacent country. Organizing for military operations in FID may

vary, but there are fundamental principles that apply when planning or executing FID operations:

Plans must reflect national security priorities and guidance; therefore, FID must be considered

within the context of the priorities for the AOR as a whole.

Military activities that support FID are an integral part of the long-range strategic plans and

objectives for the command’s AOR. Many of these activities are habitual and are likely to span

the tenures of multiple GCCs.

Combatant commanders may coordinate to expand the military presence in the Country Team,

for instance the commitment of a MIS team or military liaison element.

In most instances, U.S. military resources that support the HN IDAD programs function through

the framework of the American Embassy staff.

A JTF or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) coordinates the efforts to expand U.S.

assistance to higher direct-support levels or to a combat role.

SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

2-31. Combatant commanders may form area and functional subordinate commands. An example of a

regional subordinate command is U.S. Forces Korea, which falls under the U.S. Pacific Command. The

responsibilities for FID support in these commands closely parallel those discussed for the combatant

commands. Specific authority for planning and conducting FID depends on the level of authority delegated by

the combatant commander. In addition, in some subordinate commands (such as U.S. Forces Korea); ongoing

programs to support the HN IDAD program are, for all practical purposes, a large, ongoing FID operation.

2-32. Functional subordinate commands such as United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

South, which is the theater special operations command (TSOC) for United States Southern Command,

control a specific functional capability. These functional commands contribute to FID planning and

execution through management of FID areas related to their functional areas of expertise. The TSOC

normally has operational control (OPCON) of all SOF in the theater and has primary responsibility to plan

and execute SOF operations that support FID. ARSOF units assigned to a theater fall under the command

authority of the GCC. The GCC normally exercises this authority through the commander of the TSOC.

Coordination among the TSOC and the other component commands of the GCC is essential for effective

management of military operations to support FID, including joint and multinational exercises, mobile

training teams (MTTs), SOF integration with conventional forces, and other operations.

JOINT TASK FORCES

2-33. Combatant commanders may form a JTF to execute complex FID operations. The formation of a JTF

signals a larger U.S. commitment and typically involves HNs of strategic importance to the United States

or nations in which FID is necessitated by a grievous natural or manmade disaster.

2-34. Much of the training, CAO, and MISO conducted by a JTF may warrant the creation of a

subordinate JSOTF, a joint CMO task force, or a joint MIS task force.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

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Chapter 2

Joint Task Force

Joint Task Force-Bravo is one of the three subordinate commands under the United

States Southern Command. Joint Task Force-Bravo was formed by the combatant

commander for the primary mission of coordinating and supporting U.S. military

training exercises in Honduras during a time when a U.S. forward presence in

Central America was deemed necessary. The large number of training exercises and

related HCA projects conducted were a primary factor in the decision to form the

JTF. Other JTFs may be organized to accomplish specific functional missions, such

as road construction and support for transportation and communications efforts. In

global operations against terrorist networks, Joint Task Force-510 in the Philippines

and Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa have provided proactive support of HN IDAD

programs.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC MISSION AND COUNTRY TEAM

2-35. U.S. organizations within the HN may be responsible for coordinating, planning, and resourcing

numerous activities, to include FID. These organizations include U.S. military and State Department

personnel. The primary organizations within a HN involved with FID are described below.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

2-36. The U.S. diplomatic mission to a HN includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies

physically present in the country. The COM, normally an Ambassador, ensures all in-country activities best

serve U.S. interests, as well as regional and international objectives. Depending upon the size or economic

import of a country, the U.S. may maintain only an embassy and no consular offices; however, the United

States may maintain one or more consular offices in some countries. Typically, Army elements conducting

FID deal with embassy officials, even in nations with a consular office. Relationships with consular offices

are determined on a case-by-case basis. The same basic entities and offices existing in the embassy are

present or liaised at the consular offices.

COUNTRY TEAM

2-37. The Country Team is the point of coordination within the host country for the diplomatic mission.

The members of the Country Team vary depending on the levels of coordination needed and the conditions

within that country. The Country Team is usually led by the COM and it is made up of the senior member

of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the COM. The Country Team informs

various organizations of operations, coordinates elements, and achieves unity of effort. Usually, the

primary military members are the defense attaché and the chief of the SAO. Army engagement with the

Country Team may primarily be with the SAO and this organization is discussed below. However, several

other attachés and offices may be integral to Army FID operations as well. Figure 2-2, page 2-13, shows

the Country Team concept.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION

2-38. The SAO is the in-country mechanism for ensuring that DOD security assistance management

responsibilities, prescribed by law and executive direction, are properly executed. It oversees all foreign-

based DOD elements with security assistance responsibilities. The SAO assists HN security forces by

planning and administering military aspects of the security assistance program. Security assistance offices

also help the U.S. Country Team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within

the USG.

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Organization and Responsibilities

Figure 2-2. Country Team concept

2-39. The SAO may differ in name and organization between countries by the number of personnel

assigned, the functions performed, or the HN results desired. Typical designations include Joint U.S.

Military Advisory Group, Joint U.S. Military Group, U.S. Military Training Mission, Defense Field Office,

or Office of Defense Cooperation. The GCCs are active in the security assistance process by advising the

ambassadors through the SAO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing security assistance efforts in

the AOR. Figure 2-3, page 2-14, shows the SAO departmental alignment, and Figure 2-4, page 2-14,

shows the SAO functional alignment.

United States Defense Attaché Office

2-40. The United States Defense Attaché Office performs representational functions on behalf of the

SecDef, the Secretaries of the Military Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the U.S. Military

Services, and the GCC. The United States Defense Attaché heads the defense attaché office in-country and

is a member of the Country Team. The defense attaché serves as the military advisor to the COM, liaises

with the HN military, and manages the U.S. security assistance and military-to-military programs. The

defense attaché office assists the GCC and his staff with FID programs by exchanging information on the

military, social, and political conditions of the HN.

United States Defense Representative

2-41. The United States defense representative (USDR) is the SecDef’s and the appropriate subordinate

commander’s representative for coordination of administrative and security matters for all DOD noncombatant

command elements in the foreign country in which the representative is assigned. The USDR is normally the

senior military official assigned to permanent duty with the mission. The USDR is the in-country focal point

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

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Organization and Responsibilities

Other Department of State Officers and Agencies

2-42. The deputy COM serves as executive officer and chief of staff for the Ambassador and directs the

diplomatic mission in the Ambassador’s absence (then called the Chargé d’Affaires—French for “charged

with [in charge of] matters”). MIS units involved in FID may work closely with the deputy COM because

the Ambassador may delegate authority to approve or prereview MIS activities sent to the Ambassador.

The political counselor directs the political section and often fills the position of third in command of the

mission. The political section may also contain a political or military officer to support the coordination of

military activities supporting FID programs. The political counselor may have input on both MIS and CA

FID activities.

2-43. The cultural attaché/PAO is a DOS public diplomacy officer responsible for implementing the U.S.

information program throughout the HN. This individual often also serves as the PAO and as the chief of

Bureau of International Information programs in the HN. If an embassy has both a cultural attaché and a

PAO, the PAO is typically responsible for Bureau of International Information programs. All Army units

can benefit from the latest information the cultural attaché has to offer. MISO, in particular, frequently

work closely with the PAO and Bureau of International Information programs.

2-44. The director of USAID supervises the nonmilitary U.S. developmental efforts in the HN. CAO that

support FID should be closely coordinated with USAID efforts. In addition, every relief or improvement

project undertaken by USAID should, when possible, be coordinated and exploited for its MIS and public

affairs value. In addition, the USAID workforce can further the production of area assessments with

knowledge they have already gained.

2-45. In addition to the above DOS officers and agencies, FID operations may require coordination with

the following USG elements:

Commercial attaché.

Treasury attaché.

Agricultural attaché.

Labor attaché.

Air attaché.

Science attaché.

DEA representatives.

Director of the Peace Corps.

Legal attaché (representing the Department of Justice).

Central Intelligence Agency station chief.

Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives.

SUPPORTED HOST NATION

2-46. The HN IDAD program is always the centerpiece of any FID program. The entire FID effort is

tailored to the needs of the individual nation and designed to support the HN IDAD strategy. Appendix B

contains a more extensive explanation and details of a generic IDAD organizational structure. For Army

FID planners, it is important to realize that HN agencies may hold widely divergent outlooks on the IDAD

strategy and, particularly, any FID program. Significant internal opposition to the IDAD strategy and FID

operations is by no means a guarantee of mission failure; however, FID strategies that do not address

causes of poor governance or internal opposition frequently fail or degenerate into combat operations.

Conversely, Army FID planners should capitalize on positive and legitimate governance that supports the

populace within the HN for the IDAD program and FID operations.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES

2-47. Although IDAD organizations vary depending on the environment, resources available, and other

factors, certain basic principles guide a successful program. These principles may seem overly simplistic

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

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Chapter 2

and obvious; however, if they are not applied properly, the result may be a disjointed effort that damages

the legitimacy and stability of the HN government. These principles include—

Responsive governments.

Unity of effort.

Maximum use of intelligence, IO, and CA operations.

Minimum use of violence.

HOST NATION ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

2-48. Just as the United States organizes to support a FID program, so must a HN organize to facilitate the

extensive coordination required in a complex IDAD program. Planners must remember that the HN IDAD

program may be somewhat disjointed due to departmental rivalries and a myriad of other causes. In

addition it is the HN program. Neither the DOD IDAD concept nor the U.S. Ambassador’s Mission

Strategic Plan may translate into the same terms the United States uses. Ideally, the HN IDAD strategy

provides a detailed view of the organizations and methods that facilitate control and coordination of IDAD

programs, including FID. The concept typically requires an organization that is geographically divided into

national and regional levels. Each of these levels should typically have its own functional structure. This

concept facilitates management at both the macro and micro levels for those areas critical to accomplishing

balanced development with the accompanying security, neutralization, and mobilization functions.

2-49. Different HNs have varying capabilities for forming and implementing IDAD strategies. The first

challenge to implementing both IDAD cooperation and FID operations is assistance to the HN planners to

formulate strategy plans. It is also useful to remember that U.S. forces and agencies may have both a better

understanding of the HN IDAD plan and a greater sense of urgency in executing the plan.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE

2-50. Operations to support FID, both those that include combat and those that do not, are by definition

multinational and at a minimum bi-national. FID operations may frequently be multinational as the HN

receives IDAD support from several nations besides the United States. FID planners must be aware that

other participating nations may have divergent or competing strategies and aims that are at odds with U.S.

national policy and goals. Multinational coalitions in which the United States is an active participant are

typically conducted within the structure of an alliance that is the result of a formal agreement or an ad hoc

arrangement for common action. Such multinational operations require innovative mission command and

coordination procedures for FID planning and execution to facilitate unity of effort. Each multinational

operation that supports FID is different. Key planning and execution considerations may vary with the

international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members.

ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN FOREIGN INTERNAL

DEFENSE

2-51. The U.S. Army has been relied on heavily since the inception of internal defense support. As the

vignette below illustrates, conventional force participation in strengthening internal defense in the HN

precedes the coining of the formal FID term. The Truman-Marshall Doctrine of Containment, promulgated

soon after the close of the Second World War, mandated a commitment of significant conventional force

trainers and advisors. Weapons systems evolve, and tactics change either proactively or reactively through

the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities process.

Force structures also change and units may experience growth or downsizing—often at the turn of a

technological breakthrough leading to overmatch such as unmanned aircraft systems or a technological

obsolescence such as analog high frequency radios and high frequency managers. The Army Capabilities

Integration Center leads the development and integration of force capabilities across the doctrine,

organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities process for the Army.

Army conventional forces and ARSOF units complement each other by bringing core abilities together and

synthesizing those abilities into a collaborative environment. Conventional forces may enable operations

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1 September 2011

Organization and Responsibilities

logistically and SOF may provide personnel as trainers or the other way around. Historically, the

conventional force advisors and trainers in FID operations have seamlessly meshed with ARSOF, with

both interacting and supporting the other instruments of national power. In addition, conventional forces

have conducted FID without SOF and conversely, but through the full spectrum of security assistance, this

is atypical. In general, FID operations involve individuals, teams, and units designated from the entire

Army force generation strategy.

The Origins of Post World War II U.S. Army Training and Advising

of Host Nation Militaries

The history of Army trainers and advisors working in foreign nations stretches back to the

mid-nineteenth century. For example, War Department-sanctioned retired officers trained

the Royal Egyptian Army in the 1870s. The modern embodiment of a formal organization

for this purpose is the military assistance advisory group (MAAG.) The MAAG concept

has a narrative that stretches to some of the earliest days following World War II. MAAG

Korea (typically called KMAG) was sometimes a scapegoat for the first dark days of the

fight for South Korea’s freedom. Now, many military historians count KMAG as the

defining resource that made the holding of the Busan perimeter possible. Without the

KMAG trained cadre in Republic of Korea Army, the United States and other United

Nations forces would not have been able to hold the defensive positions around Busan. In

addition to KMAG, MAAG Greece is often cited, along with the Country Team’s well-

executed application of the Truman Doctrine, with maintaining Greece in the community

of free nations. Later, MAAG Vietnam provided the force to initiate the first dedicated

advisor course, the MATA course at the then Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina.

The MATA course was conceived as an intensive 4-week course specifically focused on a

common core curriculum of COIN, MISO, Vietnam country and area studies, and initial

Vietnamese language training. In addition, all ranks conducted refresher to advanced

training in demolitions and weapons. MOS individual training covered areas from artillery

employment to field radio repair. In 1962, the MATA Department (also known as the

MATA task force) was stood up with the benchmark of training over 600 officers and

enlisted men specifically designated for duty with the MAAG in South Vietnam. Classes

were composed of volunteers from a vast cross-section of Army conventional forces and

SOF. Immediately following a further session of language training at the Presidio of

Monterey for some graduates, the initial deployments were 2- to 5-man teams to train and

advise the South Vietnamese Army at the battalion level. These initial deployments of

MATA-trained advisors to MAAG Vietnam accompanied the deployment of MTTs from 5th

and 7th Special Forces Groups.

The MATA course met its mandate and more by graduating over 800 officers and enlisted

men in the first two classes. The course continued to mature in scope and expand in

length as feedback revealed an increased need for more language and other training.

Eventually, further production resulted in multiple in-depth handbooks in the areas taught

in the MATA course program of instruction. The coordination of training and advising

duties to diverse types of units in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam by U.S. Army

personnel was coordinated and supervised by MAAG Vietnam. The teams of MATA-

trained personnel were established in country. As MAAG Vietnam formed under the larger

command structures established after the introduction of U.S. combat forces, MATA-

trained personnel and ARSOF personnel continued to train and advise South Vietnamese

Army units.

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Chapter 2

2-52. Conventional forces conduct and support FID operations across the warfighting functions and

spectrum of conflict. This is true across the range of FID activities from indirect support to combat

authorization. Although no two FID programs are exactly alike, the focus of U.S. assistance under FID is

to assist a HN, if possible, in anticipating, precluding, and as a last resort, countering an internal threat.

Support in anticipating and precluding a threat is preventive in nature and is likely to require a mix of

indirect and direct approaches without involving combat operations. An existing threat is likely to require

responses that span all categories of FID support, to include U.S. combat operations. The level of training

needed by a foreign security force and the operational environment are vital considerations. The

assessment should be objectively used to examine individual and collective training strategies and mission-

essential tasks. Security force assistance tasks are actions that are taken by conventional forces or ARSOF

units to develop the capability or capacity of a foreign security force. The actions taken while conducting

FID include organizing, training, equipping, building/rebuilding infrastructure, and advising foreign

security forces. Units and individual Soldiers (regardless of MOS) help the HN security force in common

Soldier tasks, the professional warrior ethos, and often human rights. All forces, whether special operations

or conventional, contribute to building partner capacity through the sharing of their technical and tactical

proficiency specific to their MOS with their counterparts.

2-53. In addition to the security force assistance tasks that are specific to training and advising, security

force assistance-proficient units in the FID setting typically perform their standard unit functions to

maintain the logistics, protection, and other warfighting functions of the overall Army FID force. In

addition, when combat has been authorized, conventional force units, along with ARSOF counterparts,

often fire and maneuver to interdict subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. This

can be a unilateral U.S. effort; however, Army units should make every effort to make all operations

combined. In FID operations, additional tasks to larger scale security force assistance operations may

emerge. These include limited air assets, greater cognizance and employment of IO, logistical challenges

that may be insurmountable for the HN (as well as limitations on U.S. resources allocated), U.S. force caps,

and many others as further detailed in successive chapters. In short, the challenges of FID operations are

common to all Army units.

ROLE OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN FOREIGN

INTERNAL DEFENSE

2-54. U.S. military involvement in FID has frequently focused on support of the COIN efforts of HNs and

allies. COIN remains an important aspect of many FID operations; however, ARSOF involvement in FID

operations is not limited to conducting COIN. Army FID operations may involve several other areas,

including CAO, counterterrorism, and counterdrug operations. As subversion, lawlessness, insurgency,

terrorism, and other threats diversify and expand their range of indirect approaches to destabilizing HNs,

ARSOF Soldiers must be adaptable and adjust to counter such threats and exercise mission command

throughout the FID operation (planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment) to achieve

success in full spectrum operations.

SPECIAL FORCES

2-55. COIN remains a cornerstone of many SF FID operations; however, the primary SF mission in FID is

to organize, train, advise, assist, and improve the tactical and technical proficiency of the HN defense

forces. As a force multiplier, SF units maintain advanced skills and capabilities (such as language) that

enable them to conduct advisory operations with the HN for extended periods. Improved proficiency

enables HN forces to defeat threats, thereby limiting direct U.S. involvement. The emphasis is on training

HN cadres that will, in turn, train other HN forces. The capabilities that SF employ to perform FID tasks

are similar to those inherent to the unconventional warfare core task.

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1 September 2011

Organization and Responsibilities

2-56. All SF personnel must understand the political and legal implications of the operational environment.

Legal considerations in planning and implementing FID programs are complex and subject to changing

U.S. legislation. Commanders must keep their legal advisors involved in the planning process. Appendix A

summarizes key legal aspects of FID activities.

2-57. In the early stages of a nation’s need for assistance, the level of SF participation may be as small as

one Special Forces operational detachment A (SFODA). In the more advanced stages, an SF company or

battalion may establish an operations base (within or outside of country) and exercise OPCON of SF units.

Operational and support elements may be assigned to the base on a rotational or permanent basis. In the

case of small to moderate FID operations, these personnel may be organic. In the case of a robust FID

these personnel, or a portion thereof, are likely to consist of large numbers of conventional force Soldiers.

In the case of FID support for large security force assistance activities, the majority of those conducting

certain portions of operations may likely be ARSOF personnel. When the entire SF group or battalion

deploys to the country, it normally establishes a special operations task force (SOTF). The SOTF may then

elect to establish one or more SF advanced operations bases. SF units participate in a variety of operations

to accomplish the FID task. The HN needs and bilateral or multilateral agreements dictate the quantity and

level of support required for the IDAD program.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

Counterinsurgency is armed social work; an attempt to redress basic social and political

problems while being shot at. This makes civil affairs a central counterinsurgency

activity, not an afterthought. It is how you restructure the environment to displace the

enemy from it. In your company sector, civil affairs must focus on meeting basic needs

first, then progress up Maslow's hierarchy as each successive need is met. A series of

village or neighborhood surveys, regularly updated, are an invaluable tool to help

understand the populations’ needs, and track progress in meeting them over time. You

need intimate cooperation with inter-agency partners here—national, international and

local. You will not be able to control these partners—many NGOs, for example, do not

want to be too closely associated with you because they need to preserve their perceived

neutrality. Instead, you need to work on a shared diagnosis of the problem, building a

consensus that helps you self-synchronize. Your role is to provide protection, identify

needs, facilitate civil affairs and use improvements in social conditions as leverage to

build networks and mobilize the population. Thus, there is no such thing as impartial

humanitarian assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency. Every time you help

someone, you hurt someone else—not least the insurgents. So civil and humanitarian

assistance personnel will be targeted. Protecting them is a matter not only of close-in

defense, but also of creating a permissive operating environment by co-opting the

beneficiaries of aid—local communities and leaders - to help you help them.

David Kilcullen

Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level

Counterinsurgency, March 2006

2-58. Requests for CA forces may originate with the Ambassador, defense attaché, or SAO chief. Requests

are then passed through the appropriate GCC to the CJCS. The CJCS ensures proper interagency

coordination. If the forces are available within a theater of operations and there are no restrictions on their

employment, the GCC can approve and support the request. If insufficient CA forces are available in the

theater of operations, the GCC requests additional forces through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those forces are

sourced once USSOCOM validates the request for Active Army CA, the United States Joint Forces

Command validates the request for USAR CA, and the SecDef orders the deployment of those forces.

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Chapter 2

2-59. The proper use of CA assets in FID is essential during all phases of an insurgency to counter a

resistance movement, as well as to combat other threats. A resistance movement is an organized portion of

the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to

disrupt civil order and stability. CA commands provide expertise in six functional specialty areas:

Rule of law.

Economic stability.

Governance.

Public health and welfare.

Infrastructure.

Public education and information.

2-60. When used to its full potential, CMO can be crucial in preventing the escalation of an insurgency or

strengthening of another internal threat. A national development program can solidify the position of the

HN government and improve conditions for the people. CAO vary with the capabilities of the host

government and with the level of internal threat activity.

2-61. CA units conduct various CAO that support the internal development of a nation. CAO are those

military operations planned, supported, or executed by CA forces. These operations are coordinated

through, planned with, and supported by the indigenous population, IGOs, NGOs, or OGAs. The purpose

of CAO is to enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and mitigate or defeat

threats to civil society. CAO may involve application of CA functional specialty skills in areas of civil

administration, stabilization, reconstruction, and development that are normally the responsibility of the

HN civil government. These CMO activities establish, maintain, and influence relations between military

forces, governmental agencies, nongovernmental civilian organizations, authorities, and civilian populace

in the operational environment to facilitate U.S. objectives. CA personnel, other Army forces, or a

combination of the two conduct CMO that are fundamental to executing stability tasks. FM 3-05.40, Civil

Affairs Operations, provides further information. CA forces may support other military forces and

nonmilitary agencies through direct or indirect support of FID, but they must coordinate with the HN and

the GCC. These operations focus on the indigenous infrastructures and populations in the operational

areas. While maintaining coordination efforts through the central government supporting CMO objectives,

CA forces conducting CAO build partnerships at the necessary levels of governance by providing stability,

security, and services impacting the populace at village and district levels. CA forces support general

infrastructure reconstruction programs and provide municipal and other services to the populace. CA forces

assist long-term stability by providing bottom-up programs that support central government public service

goals that are top-down state building strategies. By partnering with legitimate local leaders, CA forces

assist in village stability operations and local police programs to benefit the civilian populace and military

by addressing economic, political, and social issues of the HN.

2-62. CA forces provide expertise in populace and resources control (PRC), FHA, nation assistance (MCA

is a subtask of nation assistance), support to civil administration, and civil information management. They

also provide support in limited medical and engineer advisory capabilities. CA personnel supporting FID

are normally assigned to the highest-level military elements supervising FID operations or to U.S. military

advisory elements that train and aid HN military units. CA elements supporting FID—

Review U.S. security assistance program goals and IDAD goals and plan CMO to support the

plan.

Plan CMO based on the characteristics of insurgency.

Train the HN military to plan, train for, and conduct MCA, PRC, and other CAO appropriate to

the IDAD of its country.

Train on developing indigenous individual, leader, and organizational skills to isolate internal

threats from the civil population and to protect the civil population.

Establish and maintain contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.

Identify specific CMO missions that the HN military can and should conduct.

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Organization and Responsibilities

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

2-63. MIS personnel provide support to FID by focusing on assisting HN personnel to anticipate, preclude,

and counter threat propaganda. U.S. FID programs may address other threats to the internal stability of a

HN, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, dominate in the

future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic

incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. Increasingly, subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism,

and other threats have learned to use, exploit, and produce media portraying their cause and actions in a

favorable light. Subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats are increasingly learning

the value of MIS actions (typically violent) conducted primarily for a psychological rather than military

value. Initial MISO to the HN may be to analyze and then to suggest means, methods, and progression that

may counter increasingly sophisticated use of propaganda by internal threats and their regional or global

supporters.

2-64. MISO support FID programs through both indirect and direct support to HN governments facing

instability. MISO may simultaneously conduct direct support of FID operations with a MIS team working

out of the embassy and indirect support through training opportunities provided by the joint combined

training exercise program. In a larger FID operation, a MIS element or task force typically conducts

significant unilateral operations in addition to working with HN units. In some instances, a HN may not

have previously organized MIS units. Building HN MIS capability must be balanced with the need to

counter internal threat propaganda and further U.S. and HN objectives through the application of the

informational instrument of national power. In the early stages of FID, the emphasis may need to be on

conducting MISO rather than building HN capacity.

2-65. MISO to FID combat operations is also a critical force multiplier. Should combat operations be

authorized, U.S. MIS forces are typically organized as a robust MIS element, MIS task force, or joint MIS

task force. In some instances of combat operations during FID, the situation may degenerate rapidly. If the

HN has an organized MIS force, it may be disorganized, reduced, or even destroyed. In addition,

infrastructure damage in the HN may limit the ability to produce or disseminate MISO series, and U.S.

MISO may be the only effective means of communicating with HN target audiences. Long-term

involvement of U.S. MISO is frequently necessary after the end of combat operations.

JSOTF-Philippines FID

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Philippines

(OEF-P) was successful because it

maintained a small SOF U.S. Military footprint in a politically sensitive environment to be

in agreement with the HN constitution. OEF-P applied interagency concepts because the

operation was completely synchronized between the JSOTF-P Headquarters, U.S.

Country Team, TSOC, and GCC. Additionally the JSOTF-P staff operated in close

coordination with the MAAG to interact with Philippine national-level headquarters to

facilitate nation assistance. This mutual effort enabled the JSOTF-P to assist our partner

nation along four lines of operations that were balanced and executed simultaneously.

First, JSOTF-P assisted Philippine Security Forces, which included military and law

enforcement, by increasing their capacity to provide security and conduct COIN

operations. This was conducted by SOF advisors working closely with Armed Forces of

the Philippines (AFP) units in the field. Second, JSOTF-P conducted CMO to remove the

conditions that allowed insurgent groups to exist and foment their radical ideology.

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Chapter 2

These efforts began with SOF detachments and their AFP counterparts that conducted

local assessments of the operational environment and worked closely with local

governmental units to identify development requirements, which ranged from medical

support or livelihood training, to building schools and roads. The key to program success

was through interagency coordination. There were numerous governmental, international,

and nongovernmental agencies that had enormous capability and that wanted to provide

assistance. ARSOF CA detachments, working side by side with USAID from the Country

Team, synchronized all of these agencies’ efforts and ensured that the right development

support went to the correct locations to assist the population, and more importantly to

remove conditions and core grievances that allowed for lawless activities. Third, JSOTF-P

provided intelligence support to the AFP to define the operational environment and assist

in the execution of FID operations.

Again, this was done through ARSOF detachments on the ground with their AFP

counterparts. Intelligence requirements were identified and the JSOTF provided

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. This support was also closely

coordinated with the Country Team to maximize the capabilities of interagency partners.

Fourth, JSOTF-P conducted MISO. JSOTF-P MIS teams worked closely with AFP public

affairs and the Country Team public affairs section to enhance the legitimacy of Philippine

government by informing the populace of services provided by the HN concerning good

governance, human rights, and security. All ARSOF personnel became part of this effort

through interagency coordination and HN interaction and by working closely with their

counterparts, they presented a disciplined, responsive military that supported the

government and the local population through the rule of law. The U.S. commander of

JSOTF-P was awarded the Gawad sa Kaunlaran Medal on 18 June 2010 from the AFP

for contributions to nation building and FID in Western Mindanao. The Gawad sa

Kaunlaran was an award given for acts that were geared toward development, which had

been the cornerstone of the relationship of the two military commands, and for bringing

about conditions conducive to nation building and peace, progress, and prosperity in the

western Mindanao provinces.

ARMY SUPPORT TO COALITIONS

2-66. Many FID operations involve only U.S. and HN forces; however, a robust FID operation may be

made up of a coalition of regional or major nations. When conducting FID in multinational coalitions,

Army Soldiers with long-term FID or security force assistance experience frequently bring with them

specific, deep-rooted training relationships with other military coalition members. For example, a

Southeast Asian nation may experience a crisis and request assistance. The nation might have never before

had FID operations conducted inside its borders. A regional coalition is formed that includes Army

Soldiers, members of the Royal Thai Army, the South Korean Army, and personnel from the AFP. Because

U.S. Army personnel have had routine training relationships with all members of this coalition, they bring

cultural expertise, sensitivity, and language skills to the FID operation. Whether FID-trained Soldiers

involved in a coalition have language skills corresponding to the other coalition partners, their inherent

cultural awareness and sensitivity foster relationships and rapport.

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Chapter 3

Planning

By better employing and integrating all elements of national power and international

cooperation, and should those fail, by possessing superior military capabilities and the

means and will to use them. To help prevent the conditions from arising that lead to

crises or conflicts, we strongly support the increased funding for diplomacy and

development provided for in the president’s international affairs budget request. And in a

world where arguably the most likely and lethal threats will emanate from failed or

fractured states, building the security capacity of partners has emerged as a key

capability for this department - one that reduces the need for direct U.S. military

intervention, with all of its attendant political, financial, and human costs. To provide

more resources, predictability, and agility to this important mission, the department will

seek an increase in the Global Train and Equip authority in the budget.

Robert M. Gates

Secretary of Defense

Defense Budget/Quadrennial Defense Review Announcement, 1 February 2010

A major tenant of global operations against terrorist networks is the premise that

terrorism will be defeated in large measure through the establishment of viable

nations possessing the ability to preempt or defeat terrorist threats. FID is one of the

primary vehicles for accomplishing this end state. FID planners focus on an end state

in which a terrorist threat or other internal threat is at a level manageable by the HN.

Ideally, this state is at a point maintainable by HN law enforcement organizations

rather than military forces. All FID planning presupposes that the HN internal

defense capability must be raised. FID planners face a broad continuum of HN

capabilities. One HN may require training only at the upper echelons of relatively

well-trained military and paramilitary organizations, where another may require

training and assistance at the lowest levels of their military force. The former may

require short-duration FID operations; the latter may require long-term FID

operations that may take several years, perhaps generations, to accomplish. The art of

planning for FID is recognizing where the HN falls on this continuum and planning

FID operations with realistic milestones and timeframes.

OVERVIEW

3-1. FID operations are planned at the national, regional, and especially, the local level. The FID effort

should involve the integration of all instruments of national power down to the local level. Ideally, the HN

IDAD goals can be met by skillful use of these other instruments without conducting FID operations;

however, historically this is not the case. FID operations fall under two major categories—those under the

responsibility of the DOD and those under the responsibility of the DOS. Most DOD and DOS activities

are incorporated into the theater of operations planning process. Through the theater of operations planning

process, identified activities are intended to help shape the theater of operations in which the activities are

conducted. The how, where, and at what level the planning, coordinating, and resourcing takes place is

dependent on whether the mission has originated through the DOD or DOS. For example,

22 USC governs DOS programs and indicates that participants in these programs are noncombatants.

Programs under 10 USC authorities do not restrict participants from being combatants. Appendix A of this

publication provides further guidance on law, authorities, and the legal aspects of FID operations to include

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

3-1

Chapter 3

funding authorizations for mission types. There are numerous types of authorities, and the Judge Advocate

General should always be consulted to translate authorities—especially fiscal authorizations and

appropriations.

PLANNING IMPERATIVES

3-2. FID has certain aspects that make planning complex. Some basic imperatives when integrating FID

into strategies and plans are as follows:

Understand U.S. foreign policy. NSPDs and NSC directives, plans, or policies are the guiding

documents of this understanding. NSC directives also set forth U.S. FID policy. Joint Strategic

Planning System documents reflect the military’s responsibilities for carrying out this broad

guidance. The planners must be prepared to adjust FID plans as political conditions change in

both the HN and the United States.

Maintain and increase HN sovereignty and legitimacy. If U.S. military efforts that support FID

undermine the sovereignty or legitimacy of the HN government through any action, then they

have effectively sabotaged the IDAD program.

Understand long-term or strategic implications and sustainability of all U.S. assistance efforts

before implementing FID programs. HN development and defense self-sufficiency, both of

which may require large investments of time and materiel, are especially important in planning

for FID. Army FID planners assess the following:

End state of the IDAD strategy.

Sustainability of development programs and defense improvements.

Acceptability and the perceptions of fairness for development models across the range of

the HN society.

Impact of development programs on the distribution of resources within the HN, to include

potential shortages and bottlenecks.

Potential negative side effects of socioeconomic change.

Potential resistors to socioeconomic change.

Relationship between improved military forces and existing regional, ethnic, and religious

groups in both the military and society as a whole.

Impact of improved military forces on the regional balance of power.

Impact of military development and operations on civil-military relations in the HN.

Tailor military support of FID programs to the environment and specific HN needs. Consider

the threat, as well as local religious, social, economic, and political factors, when developing the

military plans to support FID. Failure to do so can result in equipment, training, and

infrastructures that are either unsuitable or unusable by the HN.

Ensure unity of effort. FID is a national-level effort that involves numerous USG agencies. In all

cases, the DOS plays a significant role in providing the content of FID plans. In most cases, the

DOS’s role in planning is significant, because the Ambassador is typically the final approval

authority for the FID plan in all situations not involving combat operations. Even when FID

planning involves combat operations, the Ambassador remains a significant partner in planning

FID operations. To reduce inefficiencies, contradictions, or redundancies in FID programs, other

services, USG agencies, and allies must be coordinated using an integrated theater of operations

effort that is joint, interagency, and

(sometimes) multinational. Appendix D describes an

interagency plan that provides a means for achieving unity of effort among USG agencies.

Assess HN forces and needs. To properly conduct the FID operation, Army units need to

identify—

The HN unit mission and its mission-essential task list and its capability to execute those

tasks.

The organizational tables for HN authorized personnel and equipment and for actual

personnel and equipment on hand.

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Planning

Any past or present foreign military presence or influence in doctrine, training, or combat

operations.

The HN unit’s ability to retain and support acquired skills or training from past MTTs or

foreign training missions.

The organization and leadership level responsible for training the individual Soldier. Does

the HN have institutional training established? Is it effective?

Any operational deficiencies during recent combat operations or participation in combined

or joint exercises with U.S. personnel.

The maintenance status to include maintenance training programs.

The language or languages in which instructions are conducted.

The religious, tribal, or other affiliations within the HN forces that need to be considered—

notably differences between HN forces and the local populace.

The potential security concerns with employing U.S. members (and allies) in the HN training

areas.

The local infrastructure and possible positive or negative impacts of training on the local

populace.

The attitudes of the local populace toward U.S. military and government personnel, as well

as ordinary U.S. citizens (to include presence and behavior of expatriate U.S. populations).

The prejudices or fears of the local populace.

Any key local leaders, communicators, and potential spoilers.

The presence, agendas, capabilities, influence, and attitudes of NGOs and IGOs.

The needs of the individual unit’s area (for example, local media for deploying MISO).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE GUIDANCE

3-3. Generally, the DOS is the lead agency for approving the execution for the majority of FID programs.

Under 22 USC, the DOS and DOD are responsible for security assistance to foreign countries. The DOS

provides general program guidance, determines participating countries, approves specific projects, and

integrates the military security assistance programs with other activities. Requirements for security

assistance are resourced primarily by the HN and U.S. grants provided to DOD by executive transfers.

DOD executes the security assistance program, identifies and prioritizes requirements, procures and

delivers military equipment, and provides services. Within DOD, the DSCA provides overall direction,

implementation, and supervision of approved security assistance and defense sales.

3-4. Theater of operations strategic planning incorporates policy and implementation of security

assistance programs, which includes planning specifically for military FID operations. However, because

of the different aspects of congressional oversight and funding of security assistance, the DOS determines

security assistance, and DOD implements. Security assistance policy flows from the President and

eventually converges at the SAO (Figure 3-1, page 3-4). Generally, requirements for security assistance

originate at the SAO in consultation with the HN and the GCC. The DOS issues policy to the embassies,

and the embassies control the DOD-executed portion of 22 USC activities. Throughout the policy flow,

agencies produce plans that support security assistance policy and issue additional guidance throughout the

process (for example, mission strategic plans, the security cooperation portion of the GCC’s theater

campaign plan, and training plans).

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

3-3

Chapter 3

Figure 3-1. Policy agents, routes, and products

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE

3-5. DOD guidance ensures the force is focused on supporting the President’s policy set forth in the

national security strategy as well as any other specific directives or policies. The goal of a portion of this

guidance is to accomplish security cooperation objectives without sacrificing combat readiness. Security

cooperation planning links activities of combatant commanders with security cooperation objectives

identified by the SecDef. Security cooperation activities include military contacts and exchange programs,

nation assistance, FID, security assistance, multinational training, multinational exercises, multinational

education, and arms control and treaty monitoring. Security cooperation is the DOD’s principal means of

engagement with foreign defense establishments. In response to direction in the DOD Security Cooperation

Guidance, combatant commanders, Service chiefs, and support agencies’ directors prepare security

cooperation strategies in accordance with Security Cooperation Guidance objectives for the CJCS review

and SecDef approval, with the GCCs as the supported entities. These strategies serve as the basis for

security cooperation planning. The DSCA accomplishes its assigned responsibilities by executing statutory

authorities in support of DOD GEF, Guidance for the Development of the Force, and GCC, combatant

commanders, or joint force commanders as appropriate, to conduct security cooperation programs and

activities. The joint operation planning process is an integral tool useful in planning security cooperation

activities. The DOD’s guidance for security cooperation may ultimately lead to military FID operations.

3-4

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Planning

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

3-6. The national military strategy is the master document containing the art and science of distributing

and applying military power to attain national objectives across the continuum of operations, including the

spectrum of conflict ranging from stable peace to general war. This document articulates how the United

States employs the military element of power to support the national security objectives found in the

President’s national security strategy. The national military strategy establishes three military objectives

that support the National Defense Strategy. The three national military strategy objectives are to—

Protect the United States against external attacks and aggression.

Prevent conflict and surprise attacks.

Prevail against adversaries.

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

3-7. Joint strategic planning provides strategic guidance and direction to friendly forces for security

cooperation planning, joint operations planning, and force planning. As the principal military advisor to the

President and the SecDef, the CJCS is responsible for a significant portion of developing the strategic

direction, strategic plans, and resource requirements for the national defense. The Joint Strategic Planning

System, supported by the joint warfighting capabilities assessment process, is the method used by the CJCS

to achieve these objectives. The Joint Strategic Planning System process assists the CJCS in preparing

strategic plans; preparing and reviewing contingency plans; advising the President and SecDef of

requirements, programs, and budgets; and providing net assessments on the capabilities of the Armed

Forces of the United States and its allies compared with those of their potential adversaries. The JSCP is

one of the products of the Joint Strategic Planning System.

JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN

3-8. The JSCP provides guidance to the combatant commanders and Service chiefs for accomplishing

military tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP is the primary vehicle through

which the CJCS exercises responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans. The JSCP

implements the strategic policy direction provided in the GEF. It also directs these agents to develop plans

to support the strategy contained in the national military strategy and counter threats using current military

capabilities. It allocates resources to GCCs according to military capabilities resulting from completed

program and budget actions and intelligence assessments. The capabilities of available forces, intelligence

information, and guidance issued by the SecDef determine the resources apportioned. The JSCP directs the

development of contingency plans to support national security objectives by assigning planning tasks and

apportioning major combat forces and strategic lift capability to the GCCs. As a capabilities planning

document, the JSCP represents the last phase of resource management. The JSCP dedicates the resources

provided by the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System to develop operation plans

(OPLANs). It provides guidance, missions, and resources to GCCs to develop concept plans and OPLANs

to support FID operations. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice

provided to the President and the SecDef.

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

3-9. The JOPES provides the foundation for conventional mission command by national and combatant

command-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct

of joint planning and operations. It includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting

structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. The JOPES

(complementary to the joint operational planning process) is used to monitor, plan, and execute

mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities associated with joint

operations. The JOPES is used in joint operational planning in either deliberate or crisis action procedures

to meet the tasks identified in the JSCP.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

3-5

Chapter 3

ARMY INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION POLICY

3-10. The Army International Security Cooperation Policy establishes Department of the Army policy and

prescribes responsibilities and procedures for the planning, integration, programming, budgeting, and

execution of Army security cooperation activities. AR 11-31, Army International Security Cooperation

Policy, provides further guidance. This regulation also authorizes the publication of an Army Security

Cooperation Plan, which, in conjunction with the annual assessment of Army security cooperation

activities, ensures that the Army’s security cooperation efforts are integrated and support guidance from

higher authorities. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army is responsible for planning, integrating, and

overseeing Army security cooperation activities. The Deputy Chief of Staff provides strategic guidance for

the development, integration, and evaluation of Army security cooperation activities in accordance with

guidance for the conduct of security cooperation activities, which is periodically issued by the SecDef

through decisions reached in Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and according to DOD contingency plans.

3-11. The Army Security Cooperation Plan is the Army’s plan to implement DOD security cooperation

guidance, which promulgates guidance by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army for

allocating security cooperation programs. The Deputy Chief of Staff oversees the development,

coordination, and implementation of the Army Security Cooperation Plan. The purpose of the Army

Security Cooperation Plan is to provide strategic guidance for all Army security cooperation activities and

to influence the integration of international considerations into institutional Army programs and functions,

such as acquisition programs or foreign area officer training.

THEATER OF OPERATIONS PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

3-12. GCCs focus joint strategic planning on their specific AORs as defined in the Unified Command

Plan. The JSCP links the Joint Strategic Planning System to joint operation planning, identifies broad

scenarios for plan development, specifies the type of joint OPLAN required, and provides additional

planning guidance as necessary. Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into executable

OPLANs and operation orders for contingency or crisis action response. The JSCP provides military

strategic and operational guidance and direction to combatant commanders and Service chiefs for

preparation of security cooperation plans based on current military capabilities. GCCs develop strategies

that support taskings from the JSCP. The planning instruments used by GCCs vary; however, military

activities that support FID requirements are integrated into concepts and plans from the strategic level

down to the tactical level.

3-13. Theater of operations strategy translates into long-term, regionally-focused priorities across the

continuum of operations including the spectrum of conflict ranging from stable peace to general war.

Peacetime goals normally focus on deterring hostilities, enhancing stability in-theater as a whole, and

dealing with regional or specific nation problems. FID is an integral part of this strategy. ARSOF and

conventional force units, notably USAR units, frequently have long-term relationships with various HN

militaries in a theater that span the tenure of several combatant commanders and their theater strategies.

Knowledge of past theater strategies and how those strategies have been translated into FID operations is

typically relevant to current planning.

3-14. There is no specific format for developing or documenting the theater strategy. Some frequent

common elements in the theater strategy include the—

Analysis of U.S. national policy and interests in the region.

Strategic assessment of the AOR.

Threat analysis.

GCC vision.

Theater missions and objectives.

3-6

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Planning

3-15. The political advisor supplies information regarding DOS policy goals and objectives that are

relevant to the combatant commander’s theater strategy and the subordinate joint force commander’s plans.

An OPLAN for a theater is the operational extension of a combatant commander’s theater strategy.

Planners from the TSOCs may have substantial input to theater planning in general and in FID planning in

particular. The contingency planning process is typically employed for FID planning, as most FID

programs should be planned as part of a larger strategy or theater campaign. In addition, ample lead time is

usually available when other operations such as stability, security, transition, reconstruction, and

simultaneous stability operations become FID operations.

SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING

3-16. The TSCP is primarily a strategic planning document intended to link GCC-planned regional

engagement activities with national strategic objectives. Direction for the GCC is provided through the

security cooperation guidance of the SecDef and the JSCP. This guidance provides regional focus and

security cooperation priorities. The TSCP implements the security cooperation guidance. The TSCP

provides region-specific guidance, country guidance, and direction to further U.S. interests in the AOR.

Service component commanders and the USSOCOM Commander develop supporting security cooperation

strategies to support the TSCP.

3-17. The combatant command plans and supports operations and activities to produce multiple benefits in

readiness, modernization, and security cooperation. Prioritizing peacetime military security cooperation

activities ensures efforts focus on those that are of greatest importance without sacrificing warfighting

capabilities. The TSCP identifies the synchronization of these activities on a regional basis and illustrates

the efficiencies gained from GCC security cooperation activities that support national strategic objectives.

3-18. A combatant command typically conducts some type of annual

(or more frequent) planning

conference, working group, or meeting. The purpose of this meeting is to identify what type of security

assistance, activities, and programs to implement for support of the security cooperation guidance.

Guidance from this meeting prioritizes activities and allocates the activities to specific countries.

Assessments can also be conducted on the previous year’s activities to ensure validity, support to current

guidance, and required updates. Annual planning conferences can provide continuity for long-term FID

efforts through the examination of assessments; therefore, a TSCP takes the strategic long-view. The result

is a living document updated due to occasional small tactical changes within a HN.

3-19. The TSCP specifies all activities that are conducted in conjunction with security assistance;

therefore, this plan includes not only FID, but also the application of all instruments of national power.

Fundamentally, a TSCP represents the holistic method of interaction within the spectrum of conflict and

operational themes embodied in the comprehensive approach to conflict resolution. It is inescapable that

security cooperation in general and FID in particular must promote certain fundamental American values.

A TSCP ensures, however, that this is done in a way culturally acceptable to the HN. Included within the

TSCP are operational activities, combined exercises, combined training, security assistance, and

humanitarian assistance. Planning, managing, and implementing a security cooperation plan within the

command are not identical. Each command may use various methods to develop a security cooperation

plan. TSCP planning is a continuous process.

3-20. The GCC’s strategic concept is normally updated biennially, and the activity annex is developed for

the year of execution and the following 7 years. The theater engagement planning process occurs in a four-

phase process (Figure 3-2, page 3-8) that results in the production of a TSCP. The phases are initiation or

continuation, strategic concept development, activity annex development, and plan review.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

3-7

Chapter 3

Figure 3-2. Theater security cooperation planning

PHASES

3-21. In Phase 1, initiation or continuation, the GCCs receive planning guidance and planning tasks from

the JSCP and the SecDef security cooperation guidance.

3-22. In Phase 2, strategic concept development, the GCC derives prioritized theater, regional, and country

objectives; and the strategic concept is developed. Resource requirements are identified to execute the

strategy. The strategic concept is reviewed and integrated and then collectively approved by the CJCS.

3-23. Phase 3 is activity annex development. This phase identifies security cooperation activities. This

phase describes the activities in detail, to include operations, security assistance, exercises, and

humanitarian assistance. During this phase, forces and resources are identified, requirements are analyzed,

and shortfalls are recognized. As required, the functional GCCs, Services, and other defense agencies

prepare and submit supporting and coordinating plans. The completed product is a TSCP.

3-24. In Phase 4, the joint staff, Services, supporting GCCs, and the Office of the Under SecDef (Policy)

review the TSCP. The TSCP is integrated into the strategic plans approved by the CJCS. Ultimately, all

security cooperation planning is then forwarded to the Under SecDef (Policy). In a circuitous process all

security cooperation planning translates into the GEF.

PLANNING PROCEDURES AND CONSIDERATIONS

3-25. Before individual Army units use military decision-making process in FM 5-0, The Operations

Process, to develop supporting plans, a FID plan must be completed at the joint level. As specified in JP 3-22,

JOPES provides the framework for planning functions. Unity of effort requires cooperation among all forces

3-8

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Planning

and agencies toward a commonly recognized objective regardless of the command or coordination structures

of the participants. Planning should consider joint, SOF, conventional force, and interagency planners. Plans

may be initiated in one of three ways:

From the top down through the Joint Strategic Planning System.

From the bottom up by the HN directly or, preferably, through the Country Team in the GCC’s

AOR. The GCC may then forward these requests to the President through the SecDef for USC,

Title 10, Armed Forces, authorization or, more commonly, to the SecDef for USC, Title 22,

Foreign Relations and Intercourse.

From the GCC. Military support to FID programs not directed under an existing, specified, or

implied mission may be identified and authorized by the SecDef.

JOINT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW

3-26. Before beginning FID planning, the GCC’s staff conducts a thorough mission analysis of the

operational environment and subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats in the AOR.

This mission analysis establishes the comprehensive approach for FID concept development and planning.

The following areas are considered during the concept development:

Threats to the HN internal defense.

HN social, economic, and political environment.

International aspects.

Mission analysis.

3-27. During the planning guidance phase, the commander outlines tentative COAs, additional

assumptions, and a planning directive to his staff and subordinate commanders. Several important FID

guidelines that may also significantly affect Army unit planning include—

Legal authorizations and restrictions to include the regulatory and policy considerations outlined

in Appendix A.

Third-country interests, which are outlined in detail below.

Restrictive use of force. This may turn the focus of some FID operations to CAO, MISO, and

training and advising programs.

Maximum intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) capabilities to include those outlined in

Appendix C.

ROE and economy-of-force measures. ROE may limit the mobility and TTP availability of some

Army units. Economy of force in FID operations has historically dictated that some FID

operations be conducted by small contingents of all ARSOF personnel. This trend is likely to

continue.

Sustainment. Army units may be engaged for years in some HNs.

Measures of effectiveness (MOEs). MOEs may be both long term and difficult to quantify in FID.

3-28. The staff analyzes and refines tentative COAs during the running estimate process of concept

development. Army planners and subject-matter experts frequently develop or provide vital input to the

three running estimates given to the commander as a tool for selecting final COAs. The following are three

estimates to facilitate an effective FID plan:

The intelligence estimate.

The CMO estimate.

The MISO estimate.

Note: Details of these estimates are covered in Appendix C.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

3-9

Chapter 3

JOINT PLAN DEVELOPMENT

3-29. Joint plan development begins after the GCC’s strategic concept is fully developed. Plan

development balances mission requirements against available resources and regional priorities. This action

is particularly important because a large portion of the force needed to conduct a particular FID operation

may be made up of USAR forces and, in most cases, are unavailable (short of use for Presidential Reserve

Callup Authority) for long-term operations. In major military operations that support FID, the commander

may face a shortage of Active Army CA and MIS capability when beginning to develop the plan. In this

case, use of Reserve component CA or MIS units may involve complex planning for rotation of several

individual units over the duration of FID. Furthermore, in a robust FID operation occurring in a priority

country, it cannot be assumed that sufficient regional and language expertise is necessarily available in the

Army Force Generation Active Component.

JOINT PLAN REVIEW CRITERIA

3-30. The joint plan review criteria, according to JP 5-0, are a comprehensive review of the plan for

adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with joint doctrine. Deconfliction of

Service and interagency doctrine and policy is accomplished at this stage as well. Although all joint

planning includes interagency integration, FID operations inherently include greater degrees of such

integration. Appendixes B and D address the complex environment of FID strategic and interagency

planning. The review for adequacy determines the sufficiency of scope and content of operations to

accomplish the assigned task, the validity of assumptions, and the degree of compliance with strategic

guidance. The review for feasibility measures the ability to accomplish the assigned mission using

available resources within the timeframes of the plan. It considers both the appropriateness and the planned

use of available resources. The review for acceptability ensures the plan is proportional and worth the

expected costs. The completeness section of the plan review criteria ensures the incorporation of all tasks

to be accomplished. It includes forces required, deployment concept, employment concept, sustainment

concept, time estimates for achieving objectives, mission success criteria, and military end state. The

compliance with joint doctrine review ensures approved joint doctrine provides a baseline that facilitates

both planning and execution.

3-31. Acceptable plans provide for accomplishment of the mission by maximizing all instruments of

national power and minimizing the loss of personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. Incorporation

of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing OPLANs facilitates crisis action planning and the execution

of operations. Commanders and their staffs should consider that many FID objectives involve a long-term

(sometimes generational) effort and that MOEs may be difficult to evaluate in the short term. For all Army

units conducting FID operations (notably MISO and CA), effectiveness—and in particular quantifiable

MOEs—as well as the direct cause and effect relationship above the tactical level will take time to gauge.

ARMY FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE SUPPORTING PLANS TO THE JOINT PLAN

3-32. FID operations are predominately planned within the TSCP. FID operations apply a comprehensive

approach to facilitate the interaction between interagency-supported endeavors directed through the DOS.

Army conventional force and ARSOF units conducting FID planning typically work through and with the

TSOCs. This is true of a FID operation with a preponderance of conventional force composition. TSOC

representatives support the GCC by developing strategies to support the TSCP. TSOC representatives plan,

coordinate, and recommend strategies that are then included in the TSCP activity annexes. Army planners

must adapt to the format of the GCC staff planning conventions. As stated previously, this may include

naming conventions other than TSCP.

Note: For purposes of brevity, this section uses the term JSOTF as the FID executing

headquarters. A JTF is equally applicable unless specifically noted.

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FM 3-05.2

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Planning

3-33. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as a JTF should also refer to applicable joint

doctrine. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force

Headquarters, provide detailed JSOTF and JTF procedures and operations. The Army Service component

headquarters for a JTF or a joint and multinational force is referred to as the ARFOR. The Army may

designate a task force with the last name of the task force commander, a code name, or number. During

larger FID operations involving a JTF or a JSOTF, ARSOF units may support a plan implemented by

conventional forces within the HN to accomplish the combined U.S. and HN goals. The JSOTF is typically

tasked to plan and conduct HN training. HN training can range from teaching advanced skills to focusing

on a general professionalization of the HN army as a whole. (See the vignette below.) The higher

headquarters may task the JTF or JSOTF to conduct specific training requirements or may set an end state

requirement that must be planned and resourced independently. Missions vary in size and scope based on

the combined U.S. and HN goals and the supporting role of Army units. Once JSOTF-level plans are

developed, ARSOF units may be required to establish a SOTF to develop training plans to support FID

within their assigned area of operations. The JSOTF commander may designate and organize a single

SOTF to provide operational direction of ARSOF. When the JSOTF commander has numerous and diverse

missions and large numbers of Army forces, he may designate multiple SOTFs and exercise direct OPCON

of each SOTF. Each SOTF is organized around the nucleus of an ARSOF unit and can include a mix of

ARSOF units and their support elements. The SF Group (Airborne) is an extremely flexible organization

designed to have self-contained mission and support elements for long-duration missions. Because of this

flexibility, the SF Group (Airborne) has the capability to form the nucleus of a SOTF, and they are also

normally identified as the Army service force component of a JSOTF.

3-34. FID operations involving a JSOTF may include SF support of a plan, which is implemented by

conventional forces within a country, to accomplish the combined goals of the United States and the HN.

SF units may be tasked to conduct various missions in support of the FID program. The JSOTF is tasked to

plan and conduct HN training, which can range from teaching advanced skills, to training a force, to

conducting personal security or protection missions. The higher echelon tasks the JSOTF to conduct

specific training requirements or an end state requirement that the JSOTF must plan and resource

independently. Missions vary in size and scope based on the combined U.S. and HN goals and the

supporting role of SF units. Once JSOTF plans are developed, the SOTF develops training plans to support

the FID program within its assigned area of operations.

Note: Graphic Training Aid 31-01-003, Detachment Mission Planning Guide, includes more

information on planning.

FID in El Salvador

In what is now often called the Salvadoran Civil War, low-key involvement by U.S.

trainers and advisors began in the early 1980s with MTTs from 7th Special Forces

Group (Airborne). Initial training focused on training a COIN reaction force capable of

countering the early tactical successes of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation

Front (FMLN).

Training of five immediate-reaction infantry battalions (BIRI-Atlacatl, Belloso, Atonal,

Bracamonte, and Arce) in-country, as well as at Fort Benning and Fort Bragg, helped

stand up an initial COIN capability. Under the Reagan administration a more

formalized training and advisory structure was created through the Security

Assistance and Training Management Organization with the assignment of Army,

Navy, Marine, and Air Force advisors under the Operational Planning and Assistance

Training Team and Extended Training Service Specialist programs to U.S. Military

Group El Salvador.

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Chapter 3

Advisors served at each brigade and most military detachment headquarters, as well

as at the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) National Headquarters (Estado Mayor).

Although Army Special Forces constituted the majority of advisors, there were also

advisors from intelligence, ground, naval and air operations, logistics, CA, and MIS

backgrounds. Concern over expansion of the U.S. role in the COIN effort led to a 55

man cap on advisors in El Salvador, which was closely monitored by Congress.

This small cadre helped not only in training and advising the ESAF but also played a

significant role in the professionalization of the armed forces in the face of

accusations of human rights abuses throughout the 1980s—some factual and some

blatant FMLN propaganda efforts. From training and advising on basic Soldier skills

at the Centro de Entrenamiento Militar de la Fuerza Amada (the armed forces military

training center near La Unión) to working with Salvadoran leadership at military

detachment, brigade, and national levels, U.S. military personnel were instrumental

in setting examples of professional military conduct and reinforcing the importance of

respect for human rights. Through a concerted effort that included an emphasis on

respect for private property during military operations, human rights cards for all new

military trainees, and later officer professionalism seminars at each military

headquarters, the ESAF overcame a reputation of unprofessional and abusive

conduct in the 1980s. This ultimately turned public opinion against the FMLN and

brought about a ceasefire and peace settlement in February 1992. The successful

resolution of over 10 years of insurgency in El Salvador was brought about by a

number of factors, but it can certainly be argued that the role of the U.S. advisor

played a major part in the military success and peaceful transition of the ESAF to a

peacetime army.

3-35. When an Army unit is tasked to conduct a FID mission, the unit plans that mission based on the

military decision-making process. When planning and conducting a FID mission, units need to determine

or identify—

The HN unit mission and mission-essential task list and its capability to execute them.

The HN organizational tables for authorized personnel and equipment and for personnel and

equipment actually on hand.

Any past or present foreign influence on training and combat operations using MTTs, advisors,

or available military equipment.

The ability of the unit to retain and support acquired skills or training from past MTTs or foreign

training missions.

The organization and leadership level responsible for training the individual Soldier. Does the

HN have institutional training established and is it effective?

Operational deficiencies during recent combat operations or participation in combined or joint

exercises with U.S. personnel.

Maintenance status, to include maintenance training programs.

The language or languages in which instructions will be conducted.

The religious, tribal, or other affiliations within the HN forces that need to be considered.

The potential security concerns with employing U.S. members in the HN training areas.

The relationship between the HN unit and the local population.

The ability of the HN unit to satisfy its administrative and logistics requirements without a

negative impact on the civilian populace.

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Planning

3-36. During FID operations, other ARSOF units may either set up as or fall under other task forces or

supporting agencies within the JTF structure. MIS units in a robust FID operation may set up as a joint

MIS task force, while CA forces may plan out of a joint CMO task force. Although not a CA organization,

the joint CMO task force may likely have CA units at its core or as subordinate elements and may be

commanded by a CA commander.

REGIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS

3-37. With the advent of instant or nearly instant communications and media access in even the most

remote regions, U.S. FID efforts in any HN may be scrutinized much closer within the region, surrounding

regions, or even globally. In addition, FID operations may affect countries throughout the region or even

cause international debate and opposition. Traditional rivalries and hostility toward the United States are

factors in some theaters. For example, U.S. assistance to a nation with long-standing adversaries in the area

may be perceived by those adversaries as upsetting the regional balance of power. Although it is

increasingly an untenable position, some nations within a region or elsewhere internationally may consider

the HN to be within its sphere of influence. The ethnic rivalries in the Balkans and the quasi-religious

dogmas of the jihadists promulgating world-wide terrorism show that history, even a millennium old, can

still foster fanatic resistance to U.S. FID efforts. These last examples also highlight the propensity of some

internal threats to use revisionist history in their propaganda.

3-38. Regional, transnational, and even distant nations may see U.S. intervention in the area (or any area)

as U.S. domination or outright imperialism. Some nations and nonstate actors may perceive this (and seek

to portray it) as U.S. political, cultural, and economic imperialism. Regionally, a neighbor to the HN may

fear increased economic competition from that nation should FID operations succeed. Globally, given the

world of the digital age, opposition to a U.S. FID operation can come from virtually any corner of the

world and any interest. Opposition, however, does not dictate U.S. policy but requires careful evaluation

and consideration, as well as possible alternate planning.

3-39. Proactive public affairs programs can accurately depict U.S. efforts. Effective or believable

adversary propaganda warrants a concerted and timely U.S. MISO program to defeat it quickly. The United

States can pursue a proactive information effort in the HN and neighboring regional countries to prepare

key target audiences for U.S. FID operations. In addition, MISO can exploit early successes in the HN.

U.S. commanders must consider friendly, neutral, and hostile nations in the supported HN region and must

envision how they perceive U.S. support. MISO and public affairs can be coordinated to address regional,

transnational, and, if applicable, global audiences that may have (or perceive they have) a stake in any U.S.

FID operations.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE ASSESSMENT

3-40. Primarily, planners within the theater responsible for conducting FID programs assess what

programs to conduct. DOS representatives work with foreign governments and DOD representatives work

with foreign military personnel to develop programs that are consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives

and that are useful to the country concerned. The representatives developing FID programs use the TSCP

process to assess currently implemented programs and exercises. The representatives developing FID

programs assess the previous programs (with the exception of the rare instances of countries first opening

up to U.S. military assistance) for relevancy and success to the overall goals within the region.

Assessments identify the effectiveness and strategic impact of the programs. To meet the goals of the U.S.

security concerns and HN goals, the representatives review security assistance, exercises, training

programs, and operational activities. These programs are assessed based on key trends, shortfalls, future

opportunities, and challenges.

3-41. In instances of long-term success, a waning internal threat or initial insurgencies may be best

countered in either their endgame or birth pang stages by nonmilitary instruments of national power with

limited or no military FID involvement. In this instance, the FID assessment may conclude that HN

training may be substituted with limited direct or indirect support by select Army units. Rarely will FID

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Chapter 3

operations begin with FID combat authorized. Even if this is the case, however, long-term success must

also include an immediate focus on assessing the environment and deciding which HN units to train while

conducting FID combat operations using Army personnel.

ENVIRONMENT AND TRAINING ASSESSMENT

3-42. When FID programs are assessed as warranted, specific personnel or forces are allocated to

programs approved for implementation within a region. Exercises can be planned through the CJCS and

GCC or Service-sponsored training programs. The DSCA supports the implementation of approved U.S.

security assistance programs.

3-43. Assessments to conduct a given mission or program can be completed at all levels of planning. At

the tactical level, Army units conduct a training assessment before conducting a training mission. The unit

assesses the training requirements, personnel manning shortages, individual training needs, and equipment

shortfalls of the HN conventional force or SOF counterpart to be trained. Appendix A of this publication

assists with guidance on authorities, to include funding authorizations for the type of mission. There are

numerous types of authorities—10 USC, 22 USC, or Title XII of the National Defense Authorization Act. The

Judge Advocate General should always be consulted to translate authorities—especially fiscal authorizations

and appropriations.

3-44. The DOS assesses the HN forces and personnel before conducting security assistance. Army units

must implement procedures to help the DOS and Country Team in scrutinizing HN forces before they can

receive training. Any personnel who are not vetted must be removed from training. The primary purpose of

vetting is to ensure the identification of personnel with a history of human rights violations. The U.S.

policy is to prevent U.S. cooperation with the government of any country that engages in a consistent

pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Ideally, a site survey team gathers

this information.

HANDOFF CONSIDERATIONS

3-45. Handoff considerations assist FID planners with a direct handoff between units or when there has

been lag time between FID operations. The considerations listed below are intended primarily for a direct

handoff between ARSOF or FID-trained conventional force units. Leaders must take these factors into

consideration when handoff is made to a non-FID or security force assistance trained conventional force

unit or OGA. In addition, the considerations should be taken into account in a mature FID operation where

there may be lag time between deployments. In this latter case, preparing an analysis of the considerations

is an aid for the incoming commander on the next iteration. The incoming and outgoing commanders or

OGA lead representative must take into consideration the following:

Mission.

Operational environment.

Adversary composition.

United States/multinational forces.

HN forces.

Civilian populace.

Terrain and weather.

Time.

OGAs.

Continued Army forces involvement.

MISSION

3-46. The incoming Army commander must make a detailed study of his unit’s mission statement and

understand the present mission tasks and the implied mission tasks. The mission may also require a unit

with additional skill sets, such as advanced special operations, near-real-time connectivity, CA functional

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Planning

specialists, or complex media production capability. Knowing the mission, commander’s concept of the

mission, commander’s critical information requirements, priority intelligence requirements, and

information requirements help the incoming commander understand the mission. After a complete in-depth

study of the operational area, the incoming commander should complete the handoff in a manner that

allows for continued, uninterrupted mission accomplishment. The changeover must not allow the adversary

to gain any operational advantages.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-47. The in-country Army unit provides continuous information updates to the incoming commander.

Priority intelligence requirements and information requirements are established for the original mission

along with operational, strategic, and tactical information. The incoming unit must become familiar with

the ongoing and upcoming priority intelligence and information requirements along with their linkages to

planned programs.

ADVERSARY COMPOSITION

3-48. The incoming commander must have the latest available intelligence on all subversion, lawlessness,

insurgency, terrorism, and other threats that affect the mission. This intelligence includes comprehensive

data on terrorists and terrorist-related incidents over the previous several months. In addition to the normal

intelligence provided to the incoming unit commander on a regular basis, the situation may call for a

liaison from the outgoing unit. Operations security is critical to prevent the enemy from discovering the

impending relief and then exploiting the fluidity of the change and the concentration of U.S. forces.

Know your turf. Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and

culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader and ancient

grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district. If you don't know

precisely where you will be operating, study the general area. Read the map like a book:

study it every night before sleep, and re-draw it from memory every morning, until you

understand its patterns intuitively. Develop a mental model of your area - a framework in

which to fit every new piece of knowledge you acquire. Study handover notes from

predecessors; better still, get in touch with the unit in theater and pick their brains. In an

ideal world, intelligence officers and area experts would brief you. This rarely happens:

and even if it does, there is no substitute for personal mastery. Understand the broader

“area of influence” - this can be a wide area, particularly when insurgents draw on

“global” grievances. Share out aspects of the operational area among platoon leaders

and non-commissioned officers: have each individual develop a personal specialization

and brief the others. Neglect this knowledge, and it will kill you.

David Kilcullen

Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency, March 2006

UNITED STATES/MULTINATIONAL FORCES

3-49. To the incoming unit, learning about the friendly forces is as important as knowing the enemy

situation. The unit must be familiar with the mission command structure it will deal with on a daily basis.

The incoming unit must know all friendly units in adjacent operational environments and be aware of any

non-FID specific or permanent party conventional force units and the capabilities of their mission support

base. The incoming unit must also be aware of other operations, units, and their capabilities. If U.S. logistic

units are to be relieved, the relief should occur after the relief of the FID operational units they support.

HOST NATION FORCES

3-50. The incoming Army unit plans and prepares for a quick and frictionless transition in counterpart

relations; however, potential or anticipated friction between the HN unit and the incoming unit may cause

the relief to take place more slowly than desired. Therefore, the incoming and outgoing units need a period

of overlap to allow for in-country, face-to-face contact with their counterparts before the mission handoff.

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FM 3-05.2

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Chapter 3

If possible, the incoming unit members should receive biographical data on their counterparts, to include

photographs. This information allows unit members to become familiar with their counterparts before

deployment and to determine which advisor techniques may need more emphasis. Execution of the mission

must continue within the capabilities of the incoming unit, the HN unit, and the available supporting assets.

CIVILIAN POPULACE

3-51. All incoming Army units must do an in-depth area study, giving close attention to local problems.

General demographic data may be available from ARSOF units, notably CA and MIS, which can be

expanded upon for unit-specific needs. Popular support for U.S. activities taking place within the

operational environment may directly influence changes in the mission statement. The outgoing unit must

provide this critical information and describe in detail all completed civic action projects and those that are

in progress. The incoming unit must understand the functioning of the HN government and the status of

any international civilian or government agencies involved in or influencing the situation in its operational

environment.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER

3-52. Terrain and weather affects all units conducting FID. Issues can range from minor to critical. An

example of a minor to moderate concern is acclimation to extremes in temperature, altitude, or even urban

pollution. At the other end of the spectrum, some handoff operations may require select ARSOF units, such

as SFODAs or conventional force infantry with assault climbers, to move by foot or by animal mounts into

and out of the operational environment. In such instances, the outgoing unit plans and reconnoiters the

routes used for infiltrating the incoming unit and those used for its exfiltration. These routes must provide

the best possible cover and concealment. If possible, the units make this exchange during darkness or

inclement weather. Units must consider significant terrain features or weather that may impede movement.

In addition, weather conditions and significant elevations can greatly affect rotary-wing operations. These

factors can critically affect resupply and health service support

(HSS) (notably medical evacuation

procedures).

TIME

3-53. The depth and dispersion of units and the number of operations conducted determines the time

required to rotate FID units. Ideally, there is an overlap period to allow the incoming unit to become

familiar with the operational environment and to establish rapport between the incoming unit personnel and

their HN counterparts. However, the handoff operation must take place as quickly as possible. The longer

the operation takes, the more personnel in the operational environment become vulnerable and lucrative

targets for adversarial forces. A quickly executed relief reduces the time available to the enemy to strike

before the incoming unit has time to consolidate its position. The incoming unit should not sacrifice

continued and uninterrupted execution of ongoing operations for speed. The incoming unit needs to have

enough time to observe training techniques and procedures and to conduct debriefings on lessons learned.

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

3-54. For the unit or team being relieved of a function by another government agency handoff, procedures

involve longer handoff times and more complex coordination. However, the other areas of consideration

still apply and in fact may be a greater issue for another government agency. Outgoing Army units that

have past, present, or future projects planned with OGAs must provide for the transfer of these projects to

new responsible agents in the incoming unit. Outgoing unit personnel need sufficient time to put incoming

unit personnel in contact with OGA counterparts. In addition, the outgoing unit should brief the incoming

unit on any OGA programs effecting FID operations.

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Planning

CONTINUED ARMY FORCES INVOLVEMENT

3-55. The constant and unbroken presence of Army units in FID operations is not a foregone conclusion.

In FID operations, gaps in deployments of units may be unavoidable. In addition, limited or single ARSOF

disciplines or specific conventional force units (for example, engineers) may be present on an ongoing

basis. In these instances, the Army units with a constant presence must maintain continuity and brief

incoming force units on aspects of the operational environment relevant to their skill sets and mission. A

JTF, JSOTF, or SOTF providing structure for continuity at the staff level during gaps or when forces are

not available can ease transitions.

TRAINING PLAN

Commanders understand the operational environment and how it affects training. They

replicate operational conditions, including anticipated variability, in training. For

example, the conditions and collective and individual tasks required to accomplish a

mission differ depending on where the operation falls on the spectrum of conflict. Tasks

required to accomplish a mission in a combined arms maneuver role can be different

from the tasks required in a wide area security role. Army forces need to be proficient in

both and often execute them simultaneously. Commanders use the operational variables

(PMESII-PT: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical

environment, and time) and the mission variables (METT-TC: mission, enemy, terrain

and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations) to

analyze the operational environment and mission as they plan, prepare, execute, and

assess training. The essence of the principle is to replicate conditions of the operational

environment as part of training to standard.

FM 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations,

23 February 2011

3-56. A key component of developing the training plan is an agreement (frequently referred to as a

memorandum of agreement or letter of agreement) between the HN and the Army unit conducting the

training. These are, in effect, signed contracts detailing the specifics of what is being provided by each

party. Training plans at the operational level vary based on HN needs and unit training capabilities. An

assessment for the training to be conducted should begin with some sort of premission site survey by all the

practicable types of units that are deploying to the HN. For instance, SF units routinely do so during a

predeployment site survey. In another case, a MIS unit may deploy a MIS assessment team for a larger FID

operation. In other cases, conventional force units may deploy a minimum of survey personnel.

3-57. After completing the training assessment, each unit analyzes the assessment and site survey and

prepares a training plan. The unit develops FID tasks, conditions, and standards to train the HN forces.

Units tasked to train HN forces use the appropriate U.S. doctrine as a template to attain the training goals.

For example, they may use battle drills and Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) training events,

when applicable, to support HN training. Planners should examine HN doctrine for contradictions with

U.S. doctrine; therefore, they must develop useable, attainable training that the HN can adopt and codify

into new doctrine. The training plan may have to address issues, such as constraints in resources, societal

or military culture, or other concerns.

3-58. HN training strategies must include multiechelon training whenever it is feasible. Multiechelon

techniques save time and achieve synchronized execution of mission-essential tasks throughout the HN

force. However, constraints on both U.S. force commitment and the needs of the HN may dictate a

concentration on one or two echelons. As an example, operational realities and constraints during FID

operations might dictate that a SFODA exclusively train a COIN field force at the company level, while a

MIS element might concentrate limited assets at the highest-strategic levels of HN government and

military. Teams or units from the conventional force may be training simultaneously on critical areas such

as logistics or basic fire direction control. When planning training programs and field exercises, Soldier

planners assess (among others) the factors listed below:

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Chapter 3

HN current level of training to determine if the training plan requires changes because of its

level of proficiency or needs.

HN ability (or inability) to field systems or equipment.

Potential training facilities and areas based on projected training (for example, ranges and

military operations in urban terrain sites).

Individual and unit proficiency in tactical operations and other skills required in IDAD

operations involving intelligence, CMO, and PRC. Because of varied missions and limited

resources, individuals and units require cross training.

An adaptive program of instruction and tasks adapted to specifically meet the needs of the HN.

Avoid using template mission-essential task lists or programs of instruction from U.S. organic

unit training.

Equipment availability (for example, radios, weapons, and vehicles).

Mission command systems and logistics procedures, to include medical treatment and

evacuation that stress decentralized operations over large areas.

Cooperation level with U.S. and HN intelligence agencies during operations and training exercises.

CAO surveying and planning need. A realistic assessment of unit resources is necessary to

ensure that the unit’s primary mission and HN sustainability are kept in mind.

Constraints on U.S. MISO in relation to past HN MISO miscues and history.

Orientation on the terrain, climate, and unusual health requirements.

PLANNING FOR PROTECTION

3-59. In terms of risk to personnel, FID operations span a complete continuum of environments. Adequate

personal security is always a critical mission factor. Commanders must address protection of Soldiers

during all phases of FID operations—from planning through deployment, employment, and redeployment.

Deploying Soldiers must receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel-protection

requirements before arrival in the operational area. Any updates to the situation in the HN must be briefed

on arrival.

3-60. For the foreseeable future, the threat of terrorism is a constant factor in any nation, even those with

advanced domestic security infrastructures. FID operations, whether conducted in nations with high states

of domestic security or those with little emphasis on security because of a lack of an internal threat, require

proactive full spectrum protection measures. Additional threats include but are not limited to—

Street or organized crime.

Foreign intelligence services, possibly including the HN intelligence collection community.

Local populace animosity or demonstrations (domestic or U.S. directed).

HN regional transportation systems.

HN military equipment, training, and procedural deficiencies.

Weapons of mass destruction (to include regional nations and nonstate actors).

Weather, terrain, and environment.

Contaminants and pollution.

Health threats.

Mines and unexploded ordinance.

Political groups, parties, or individuals.

Regional cross-border threats.

Hostile media seeking to discredit individual Soldiers or collective units.

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Chapter 4

Training

Real security lies in the prevention of war—and today that hope can come only through

adequate preparedness.

General Omar N. Bradley

Former CJCS, 1951

During FID operations, conventional force and ARSOF units routinely operate in

austere environments and atypical cultural surroundings. FID programs may be

conducted in areas where there has been little or even no previous direct contact with

Americans or outsiders in any form. This requires skill sets that may not routinely

exist as organic skills and knowledge in conventional units; however, many FID

operations require competency mainly in a Soldier’s MOS. In addition, with the

proliferation of conventional units trained in security force assistance, further training

in the nuances of FID declines. However, SOF (in general) and ARSOF units (in

particular) remain uniquely trained and accustomed to filling roles that might

otherwise be left vacant in some FID environments.

OVERVIEW

4-1. During FID operations, Army units may be the primary or sole trainers of HN military or

paramilitary personnel, and a large number of forces and units may be involved in direct support (not

involving combat operations). Training of HN military may continue while U.S. forces provide direct

support and, to some degree, even during combat operations. In both instances, commanders are faced with

a dual dynamic force. A commander must balance the need to use U.S. forces in direct assistance to the HN

civilian populace or military against the need to enable self-sufficiency of the HN. Regardless of the level

of support the FID program gives the HN, the Soldiers’ role as a trainer remains constant.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TRAINING

4-2. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for formulating policies for joint training,

including FID operations. Some training for supporting FID programs consist of Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff-directed exercises. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves the priorities for

training formulated by the GCCs, and the GCCs exercise direction over all aspects of joint training of

assigned forces. The Services, in turn, are responsible for providing trained forces that may be used to

support FID programs.

4-3. The USSOCOM Commander is charged by USC with training assigned forces to meet FID taskings

and to ensure their interoperability with conventional forces as well as other SOF. USSOCOM determines

relevant unit sourcing to particular FID taskings with the support of the TSOCs. Taskings for Army units

to conduct FID operations and training are forwarded through either U.S. Army Forces Command (via

Joint Forces Command) or United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and are typically

assigned to an appropriate conventional force unit or a regionally-oriented ARSOF unit. In peacetime and

in the circumstances of global operations against terrorist networks, the general cultural awareness of

ARSOF is greater than the conventional force. ARSOF personnel are specifically trained in regional,

cultural, and language skills, and in working with translators and conducting FID operations as a core task.

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Chapter 4

4-4. The ultimate responsibility for training a HN military or paramilitary force rests with the Army

elements and Soldiers conducting FID operations. Preparing to train HN forces entails determining the

extent of those responsibilities and assessing the HN military force capabilities. In the case of habitual FID

relationships, this may translate into a detailed knowledge of the capability of the HN units following

previous FID operations and perhaps through continual contact with those units through planning

conferences or other means. At the other end of the spectrum of determining training responsibilities is the

first-time or long-interim lag time of FID operations. Army trainers in this case must maximize their

scrutiny of predeployment site surveys, organic and higher echelon intelligence assessments, and the

American Embassy SAO. Military liaison elements, even in a neighboring country, may shed light on the

HN military forces level of training. In all instances, Army units with a responsibility to conduct training of

HN forces must seek the best picture of the current baseline training level of the relevant HN forces before

beginning to develop training strategies and products.

TRAINING AND SKILLS NEEDED FOR SUCCESS

4-5. With the complex and intertwined environment of training and the skills necessary for the successful

training of HN military forces for FID operations, it is quite possible to lose sight of the ultimate gauge of a

successful FID program. That gauge is in fact when the military portion of the HN IDAD strategy is

concluded and any remaining internal threats are well within the abilities of civilian agencies to combat.

Note: For ease of reading the following section uses the term predeployment training

exclusively. However, the areas of focus are relevant to all training and education products

concerning FID.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

4-6. Ultimately, the commander’s intent drives the specific training units receive before conducting FID

operations. In addition, the baseline, common training conducted for all FID operations is driven by the

commander’s intent to emphasize or de-emphasize certain aspects of FID training. In predeployment training,

the commander assesses the factors and skills necessary for a specific FID operation and the state of training

and readiness of the deploying element. Based on this assessment, the commander formulates an intent that

emphasizes blends of all the FID training and deployment factors listed in the paragraphs below. Planners and

trainers base predeployment training on how best to train the unit in the areas this intent encompasses.

OVERALL UNITED STATES AND THEATER GOALS FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

4-7. The USG may have highly varying goals from one FID operation to another. One theater may have a

general set of internal threats at variance with the common threat in another theater. In addition, the world

is increasingly a global system and the conditions in one nation of a GCC can affect a counterpart a

hemisphere away. Personnel engaged in military activities that support FID programs must understand the

overall goals and objectives of the supported GCC and the potential impacts on other theaters, global

operations against terrorist networks, or other U.S. national objectives and policies. An understanding of

these goals provides a framework for Army units and personnel to determine if their actions and programs

support overall theater objectives without compromising other national objectives. For the Soldier, whose

any one action can potentially have strategic consequences, national and theater goals often take on a

heightened importance compared to other operations.

COGNIZANCE OF POLITICAL REALITIES

4-8. Similar to understanding the goals within the theater and the relevant national goals and objectives,

Soldiers require a detailed knowledge of potential political pitfalls in any FID operation. An agenda of HN

military and civilian personnel may be to unwittingly draw support for political or diplomatic plans that are

not supported by the United States by orchestrating visits, photo opportunities, or statements from Army

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Training

commanders and Soldiers. In addition, Soldiers should be trained on domestic political agendas within the

HN that may be counterproductive to FID operations or U.S. national interests. This may be heightened in

areas outside the full control of the HN government where HN authorities may be more likely to commit

human rights violations or simple practices that alienate the local populace.

JOINT, INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

4-9. The joint, multinational, intergovernmental, and NGOs in a collaborative environment are never

going to be the same even during different iterations of a long-running FID operation. Each deployment

typically presents different mixes of agencies and forces constituting the collaborative environment. The

collaborative environment may include building partner capacity and coordination with the following

organizations:

U.S. military forces.

Foreign military forces (multinational forces, HN forces, and allies).

DOD agencies.

OGAs.

State and local government agencies (primarily in civil support operations).

IGOs (those created by a formal agreement between two or more governments, for example, the

United Nations).

International organizations (entities recognized by governments but not created by an agreement

executed by governments, for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross).

NGOs (private, self-governing, not-for-profit).

Foreign government agencies.

4-10. Predeployment FID training needs to address building partner capacity. In addition, briefings or

classes are given on the agencies or forces involved and how to operate through, with, or around those

agencies or forces. Other agencies are going to have language and cultural differences; therefore, cross-

cultural engagement skill training is recommended for building partner capacity. Typically, those

differences are magnified when dealing with nonmilitary agencies.

4-11. In most cases, the partner capacity equation has a collective agenda and shared goals with units

conducting FID. Nevertheless, training in moderate to even highly varied language (in particular acronyms

or lack thereof) and culture may be required. Interagencies may have similar goals but highly different

ways of attaining them. For instance, civilian agencies may hold (for valid reason) reservations about

working around an armed force. Despite these differences, the typical challenges of the joint and

interagency portion are a matter of training on coordination and deconfliction strategies.

4-12. Much like training for potential political pitfalls with the HN, Soldiers must train on recognizing and

adapting to competing or contradictory agendas as well. Although more prevalent in some portions of

building partner capacity (notably intergovernmental), other agencies may intentionally or unintentionally

pursue policies and programs that oppose FID goals and objectives. Training on operating around these

agencies may involve negotiation, conflict resolution, or even avoidance strategies. Training on

recognizing political and media ploys may be necessary as well.

CULTURE, CUSTOMS, AND CONDUCT

4-13. A FID operation can be critically disabled within the first few moments of contact with HN military,

civilian officials, or even ordinary citizens, if vital cultural mores are violated by U.S. personnel. The

United States is a highly diverse and open culture with relatively few baseline customs other than tolerance

and an inherent belief in the rights of individuals and subcultures to practice any behavior or dress that

does not infringe on the rights of others. Nations in which FID operations are conducted may be just the

opposite with varying degrees of tolerance of a faux pas committed by outsiders. In addition, many nations

still harbor legal, economic, or cultural disparities in their culture. These may in fact contribute to the need

for a FID program.

1 September 2011

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Chapter 4

4-14. FID-trained Soldiers are typically aware of the cultural conventions and customs of the HN.

Refresher and new personnel training may well be necessary. In addition, when possible, providing cultural

awareness training to conventional forces accompanying SOF on FID operations should be strongly

suggested or (if applicable) mandated. All Soldiers deploying on FID operations must be forewarned and

prepared for HN practices that may be unfamiliar. In addition, they must be prepared for treatment by HN

personnel toward them and toward HN citizens that is harsh and offensive. Predeployment training is,

therefore, sometimes necessary to discern between HN personnel behaviors that are simply cultural norms

and those that degenerate into human rights abuses.

4-15. ARSOF Soldiers are either trained by virtue of their MOS or, if coming from the conventional force

to an ARSOF unit, infused by the community to understand the importance of the image they project to the

HN military and population. Projection of this impression has a significant impact on the ability of the

United States to gain both short- and long-term support for the overall FID program. Infusing this into

attachments and newly arrived Soldiers should be part of the predeployment train-up. Ideally, ARSOF and

conventional force units conduct predeployment training together for at least some of the available train-up

time. Specific potential issues that may arise in the HN should be covered for all personnel at this time as

well, and training for potential conflict is sometimes necessary. During FID, interaction with HN militaries,

governments, and citizens who may operate in a culture of corruption, elitism, bigotry, or other

unacceptable practices may often be unavoidable. Training on how best to approach these conflicts can

provide Soldiers the tools to mitigate these situations.

LANGUAGE TRAINING AND INTERPRETER/TRANSLATOR USE

4-16. Knowledge of the HN culture and language are an essential part of the FID operation. An

understanding of the culture and language permit U.S. forces to adequately train, assist, and advise foreign

partners confronting an insurgency. The ideal in FID is for all personnel conducting operations to be able

to communicate with HN personnel in the native language of the HN. In reality, interpreters and translators

may be required to effectively communicate political, military, cultural and language nuances in localized

tribal languages. While proficiency using an interpreter can be substituted for language ability, interpreter

usage always diminishes the capability to communicate effectively and confidently. The specifics on how

to exercise, lead, and direct an interpreter are covered in FM 3-07.10, Advising: Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces. Translators and interpreters are seldom native

speakers of both languages (normally, they are native speakers of one language with training in the other);

therefore, it is best to have sufficient understanding of the language to ensure that the interpreter or

translator is not straying from the desired message. In general, an interpreter facilitates the oral

communication from one language to another and goes beyond the word-for-word transference in an

attempt to convey the speaker’s nuances. The interpreter also uses technical or colloquial language, as

appropriate. If the target language has no exact word or phrase for a technical term, an experienced

interpreter will give a brief explanation of the concept meaning. There are two methods of interpretation

used as techniques according to FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations:

Alternate.

Simultaneous.

4-17. Whereas translation, performed by a translator generally refers to written language, a skilled

translator attempts to match the tone set by the original document and has excellent writing skills. There is

a strong tendency to translate messages literally (word-for-word) from the speaker’s language to the target

language. This technique may work well, but it can lead to embarrassing situations. According to

FM 2-22.3, there are three types of translations applied to document recovery, translation, and exploitation:

Full.

Extract.

Summary.

4-4

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Training

4-18. Some Army MOSs mandate minimum language proficiency for award of the MOS, and language

proficiency building is part of the regular training for most units. Army enlisted linguists are managed

through the following four groups:

Personnel in language-dependent MOSs.

Personnel in language-capable MOSs.

Personnel in nonlanguage-dependent MOSs.

Personnel possessing a foreign language capability not related to their MOS.

Note: Interpreter/Translator is an Army language-dependent MOS (09L). AR 11-6, Army

Foreign Language Program, contains detailed information on the Army Foreign Language

Program, to include contract linguists.

4-19. The reality of the complexities of regional languages and changes in languages equates to frequent

deficiencies in the capabilities of qualified personnel in certain HN languages. In addition, conventional

and ARSOF units may conduct FID operations beyond the regions in which the primary language of the

HN is spoken. Familiarity with and an attempt to use some basic phrases trained during predeployment,

coupled with cultural sensitivity, can greatly enhance relations with HN personnel.

4-20. Language capabilities can significantly aid trainers and others who have daily contact with HN

military personnel and the local population. Personnel can function more effectively if they conduct

language training in the target language before deployment. Trainers from across the Army can focus on

mastering or refreshing select words, phrases, and sentences for some instruction, such as battle drills.

However, all ARSOF and highly technical conventional force disciplines invariably must teach at least

some complex classes, and in some cases an entire curriculum, containing technical terms and advanced

theory. In these instances, only conventional or ARSOF Soldiers possessing a native speaker language

capability are sufficient. Cleared and vetted contract interpreters may be a necessary alternative.

4-21. Although language ability is important, it is equally important for personnel (even those proficient in

one or more additional languages) to conduct training on the art of using interpreters while teaching and

training. Refresher or initial training in the associated vetting and employment of translators and

interpreters is also warranted. Personnel serving for the first time as managers of an interpreter pool should

receive training as well.

AREA AND ENVIRONMENT

4-22. Detailed knowledge of the operational environment is required to maximize the effectiveness of

military operations that support FID programs. Regionally-oriented ARSOF units typically have detailed

country and area data for the region they support; however, the possibility of conventional force or ARSOF

Soldiers having boots on the ground for the first time in either one or more specific country or region

remains a possibility. Training briefs based on the specifics of these areas should be developed from the

predeployment site survey. Other specific aspects of area and population studies are addressed in detail in

Chapter 5 under the CMO and MIS estimates of the situation.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

4-23. Because of their proximity and access to the local populace, personnel conducting military activities

that support FID programs are passive information collectors and have valuable information to provide to

the intelligence system. Army units and teams collect detailed information on the social, economic, and

political situation that may collaterally be processed into essential intelligence by organic or higher echelon

intelligence units and agencies. Appendix C provides a detailed discussion of this process. To foster

relationships with the HN and to maintain credibility, it often behooves all ARSOF and conventional force

units (invariably in the case of CA and public affairs elements) to not be associated in the minds of the

populace or their HN counterparts as intelligence collectors. This perception may be unavoidable;

however, if Army units return with information determined to be of value after being vetted through

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FM 3-05.2

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Chapter 4

intelligence cycles, the perception is irrelevant. Personnel involved in FID operations must know and

understand their responsibilities in these areas.

SPECIFIC OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY ISSUES

4-24. FID programs are likely to interact at multiple levels with OGAs from predeployment through

postdeployment. ARSOF and select conventional force units have regular working relationships with

multiple global operations against terrorist networks. Specific training or procedures may be required,

since this type of coordination may be new to some personnel supporting a FID program. In other cases,

predeployment training may be specific and detailed to include information on the specific global

operations against terrorist network personnel and status of programs that Army units will interface,

integrate, or work with. Home station global operations against terrorist network liaison officers can

conduct some predeployment training.

LAW AND POLICY

4-25. Between rotations of a long-term FID operation, the legal, regulatory, and policy of either the United

States or the HN may change. A single incident, even one occurring outside the HN, may change the

conditions in the HN. Training on new restrictions or new latitude may be necessary. Refresher or initial

training on the legal and regulatory concerns in the HN is warranted even if conditions remain unchanged.

Central to this training are provisions of applicable status-of-forces agreements as well as restrictions on

the transfer of equipment and on other types of assistance that may be provided. A review of the ROE and

rules of interaction to support FID must be included as well. Whether stand-alone or made part of the ROE,

changes in the rules of interaction can have a critical effect on some Army units, notably CA, public

affairs, and MIS units. Instituting or eliminating highly-restrictive rules for interacting with the HN

populace calls for extensive predeployment training. This training is especially important for operations

involving recently opened or closed groups or areas.

FORCE PROTECTION TRAINING

4-26. FID operations often require small elements to deploy to isolated areas or complex urban

geographies with highly varying threats and constraints. Army units face a myriad of different security

measures within the range of FID operations. Predeployment training with the full range of weapons and

concealment (if authorized) should be part of the protection train-up. Other areas covered in training

should include—

Personal-protection lethal force employment parameters.

HN-provided security.

Transportation.

CI threat brief.

Housing and local security.

Nonlethal options (if available or authorized).

Media procedures.

Disclosure and classification issues.

Private military contractors.

Medical threats and countermeasures.

4-6

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Training

TRAINING STRATEGY

4-27. Conventional forces that support FID are typically proficient in the directed mission-essential tasks

of FID. FM 7-0 emphasizes that the unit’s mission-essential task list must reflect full spectrum operations.

The CATS development and management process supplements FID for corps, division, and brigade

headquarters, and it consists of a descriptive collective task-based training strategy that is maintained in the

Army’s Digital Training Management System, which is accessible to conventional forces. The strategy for

training is expressed for each echelon within an organization in terms of training events.

4-28. USSOCOM is the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated FID task; however, this

does not preclude conventional units from conducting FID missions. Historically, conventional force

trainers have often been in the majority in some FID operations. The legislative mandate outlines the two

types of FID training: institutional and unit. SOF prepare for FID operations through institutional and unit

training, whereas most conventional forces prepare for supporting FID operations through unit training.

(This should not be construed to say that some conventional force MOSs do not come to FID operations

with relevant training they received at the institutional level.) Training to support FID covers a broad range

of areas. In some instances, ARSOF units may conduct all HN training in a small-scale FID operation;

however, even a small-scale FID operation may contain a majority of conventional units. This probability

is increasingly likely when the internal threat is not an insurgent or terrorist group. Therefore, training must

often be designed to support a mix of personnel ranging from SOF that are language trained and culturally

focused to forces that are untrained and unfamiliar with either the HN or the specific area in which the FID

program is located.

INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING

4-29. ARSOF Soldiers, primarily SF, MIS, and CA, receive extensive institutional training in language,

culture, regional studies, interpersonal skills, and instructional techniques as qualifications in their basic

specialty. Although ARSOF Soldiers are not the only Army personnel to receive this sort of training at the

institutional level, the core tasks that ARSOF units are assigned, including FID, mandate a broader and more

in-depth level of training than conventional units currently receive. Some critical areas covered in ARSOF

institutional training (that conventional force units typically require cross training in) relating to FID include—

Overarching strategic and operational FID and IDAD principles.

Tactical FID TTP.

COIN techniques.

Guerrilla warfare (underground and resistance operations when applicable).

Security assistance and authorities.

IMET.

FMS.

Foreign military funding.

Foreign military construction services.

Foreign military exchange programs.

Counterpropaganda procedures.

Negotiation techniques.

Area, training, and morale assessments.

Partner capacity to integrate joint forces, multinational forces, IGOs, and NGOs in a collaborative

environment.

UNIT TRAINING

4-30. Both conventional and SOF units conduct unit training for each new FID deployment. The unit can

conduct much of the training necessary to prepare conventional unit personnel to support a FID program. A

more extensive train-up for units may be necessary when they operate outside their normal region. Unit

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Chapter 4

training may also be necessary when Army units are in a HN for the first time or after a long absence from

the area. This training focuses on the individual or, in the case of unit-size participation, involves large-

scale collective training. Training should conform to the tasks recorded on the memorandum of agreement

signed by the ARSOF and HN personnel. In addition, the training should be adapted toward tasks that were

identified during the predeployment site survey. The postmission debriefing of previous FID operations, if

available, provides additional information to customize unit training.

4-31. Predeployment training with conventional units participating in FID operations should be pursued

when possible. The presence of a country or area ARSOF specialist to help in briefing and training cultural

awareness and culturally sensitive techniques can be invaluable. When feasible, units should conduct

operational rehearsals of the FID operation. These rehearsals allow participants to become familiar with the

operation and to visualize the plan. Such rehearsals should replicate, as much as possible, the potential

situations that a unit may encounter during a FID operation. The use of role players can be invaluable,

especially for personnel unfamiliar with dealing with emotionally charged situations involving indigenous

populations and institutions.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

4-32. The role of language and cultural awareness is of high importance in global operations against

terrorist networks. The operational environments of the future place an emphasis on language and cultural

awareness that crosses boundaries between institutional and unit training. Clearly, the purpose of

institutional training is to acquire in-depth language ability and cultural knowledge. ARSOF units working

with conventional units or attachments can facilitate foreign language and cultural training. Except in those

few cultures that disdain rudimentary attempts to communicate in their language, knowing a few polite and

authoritative phrases is beneficial to Soldiers dealing with HN personnel. In addition, it is hard to conceive of

an instance in which knowing the fundamentals of cultural norms would not be beneficial to Soldiers. Army

personnel should endeavor to impart as much of their expertise in these areas as is practicable when training

unfamiliar Soldiers.

4-33. It may be useful to evaluate and attempt to evenly distribute personnel with language and cultural

expertise during development of a final predeployment training strategy. This can be accomplished by

using the established guidelines of the CJCS Instruction 3126.01, Language and Regional Expertise

Planning (current as of 27 November 2010). These guidelines differ slightly from the Defense Language

Proficiency Test ratings; however, the guidelines are useful with nonlanguage-trained or nonmilitary-

trained language speakers. The speaking skill level guidelines are—

0-Use this code when the skill is not required.

1-Can ask and answer questions, participate in short conversations. Everyday survival topics

and courtesy requirements. Intelligible to a native speaker accustomed to dealing with

foreigners.

2-Able to fully participate in casual conversations, can express facts, give instructions, describe,

report on, and provide narration about current, past, and future activities. Concrete topics such

as own background, family, and interests; work, travel, and current events. Understandable to a

native speaker not used to dealing with foreigners; sometimes miscommunicates.

3-Can converse in formal and informal situations, resolve problem situations, deal with

unfamiliar topics, provide explanations, describe in detail, offer supported opinions, and

hypothesize. Practical, social, professional, and abstract topics; particular interests; and special

fields of competence. Errors never interfere with understanding and rarely disturb the native

speaker. Only sporadic errors in basic structures.

4-Able to tailor language to fit audience, counsel, persuade, negotiate, represent a point of view,

and interpret for dignitaries. All topics normally pertinent to professional needs. Nearly

equivalent to an educated native speaker. Speech is extensive, precise, and appropriate to every

occasion with only occasional errors.

5-Functions equivalent to an educated native speaker. All subjects. Performance equivalent to

an educated native speaker.

4-8

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Training

TRAINING AND ADVISORY ASSISTANCE TO THE HOST NATION

4-34. There is no distinct boundary between training assistance and advisory assistance. In broad-brush

terms, training assistance is typically nonoperational in areas and under conditions where Army personnel

are not likely to be forced to engage any armed internal threat. In equally broad-brush terms, advisory

assistance may entail some operational advice and assistance beyond training in less secure areas. FID

participants generally provide security assistance to relatively low-risk situations; however, the current

global situation proves that any Soldier is, to some degree, in harm’s way. Advisory assistance (and to a

lesser degree training assistance) may involve situations that require Soldiers to defend themselves;

therefore, the commander and the American Embassy accept greater risk. The difficulty in putting exact

and unqualified definitions on either type of security assistance is that both may take place through the

entire range from indirect support to direct support not involving combat operations during the same FID

operation. As long as risk is clearly defined, planned for, mitigated where possible, and, most importantly,

deemed worth the potential cost, this lack of definition causes no inherent problems. Mitigation, however,

may translate into exclusion of trainers or advisors from certain areas.

Note: The above description does not abolish statutory concerns of U.S. military’s direct

involvement with HN forces. The statutory concerns outlined earlier in this text and those in

Appendix A still apply. The purpose of the above broad descriptions is merely to suggest

possible areas of training emphasis.

4-35. Army elements typically develop, establish, and operate centralized training programs for the

supported HN force. Soldiers can also conduct individual, leader, and collective training programs for

specific HN units. Training subjects run the gamut of tasks, and training ranges from individual instruction

through leader development to specialized collective training. Army personnel can provide both training

and advisory assistance in two ways:

Small teams may provide training or give operational advice and assistance to HN civilian,

military, or paramilitary organizations.

Individual Soldiers may be assigned or attached to the SAO to perform training and advisory

assistance duties on a temporary or permanent basis. (Soldiers are typically assigned as advisors

rather than trainers, as in the case of SF advisors working with HN operational forces.)

4-36. In either case, assistance may be provided under the OPCON of the SAO chief in his role as the in-

country U.S. defense representative, other designated embassy official, or the TSOC, depending on the

mission command arrangement.

TRAINING ASSISTANCE

4-37. The agreement negotiated between U.S. and HN officials provides the framework for the who, what,

when, where, how, and why of military training assistance. Often, U.S. doctrine, as prescribed in

applicable publications, must be modified to fit the specific requirements of the HN forces being trained.

Procedures may vary, but the fundamental techniques and thought processes still apply. Training assistance

should focus on the materiel, fiscal, and logistical realities of the HN.

4-38. In general, those skills, concepts, and procedures for FID taught to U.S. forces are also applicable to

HN forces for IDAD. For some units (notably MIS and CA), the reality of other HN agencies benefiting

more in their portion of the IDAD program than the HN military is a frequent by-product of the FID

activities they conduct. Training emphasis varies according to the HN requirements, force composition,

and U.S. and HN agreements. The training to be conducted depends on the situation and varies

considerably. Existing military personnel, new military personnel, or paramilitary forces may receive

training assistance.

4-39. The training assistance portion of security assistance can make a very significant impact on the HN

IDAD program. The GCC is actively involved in coordinating, planning, and approving training support

with the Security Cooperation Organization and HN. Training assistance supports U.S. foreign policy and

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FM 3-05.2

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Chapter 4

national security objectives. Training assistance promotes U.S. military rapport with the armed and security

forces of foreign countries to operate in multinational environments. The completion of the security assistance

training contributes to the U.S. security interests and building partnership capacity objectives. HN counterpart

personnel accompany U.S. security assistance trainers. The goal is for these counterparts to eventually conduct

all instruction and training without guidance from U.S. personnel. Initially, U.S. personnel may present all or

most of the instruction with as much HN assistance as is feasible. U.S. trainers use the train-the-trainer

concept to foster the foreign country’s development of its own professional and technical training

capability. The general objectives of training programs under security assistance consist of the following

elements:

Professional Military Education. This training expands the goal of regional stability through

effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate in increased

understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and the HN.

Operation and Maintenance Skills. This training objective creates skills needed for effective

operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the United States.

Effective Management. Effective management assists the foreign country in developing

expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment.

Development of Training Self-Sufficiency. This program fosters development by the HN of its

own training capability.

Rapport and Understanding. Rapport and understanding are necessary for promoting military

to-military understanding, which leads to increased standardization and interoperability.

Increased Awareness. Increased awareness provides an opportunity to demonstrate the U.S.

commitment to the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights.

4-40. Training assistance consists of all formal training conducted by Army units. ARSOF careerists as

Army professionals conducting FID are trained to be adept in defense, diplomacy, and development. SF

operators are trained in advisory functions, diplomatically astute, and undergo extensive interpersonal

training. All Army forces conducting FID must be aware of the complexity of enhancing the military

capabilities of allies and partner nations. The training usually follows or is connected to the equipping of a

foreign military force, for the specific reason to build the security capacity of partner states. All Soldiers

engaged in training assistance must be cognizant that they are typically under the sharp, and sometimes

magnified, scrutiny of HN government personnel, military, media, and ordinary citizens. Part of preparing

Soldiers for providing training assistance is making them aware of the less tangible elements of training

assistance that have a deep impact or third-order effect within the HN. Soldiers should know that, in many

HNs, their mere presence alongside their counterparts often bolsters that counterpart’s prestige within their

organization and among the populace. Those providing training assistance should be aware that many HNs

have a domestic MISO program and that exploiting the presence of highly skilled U.S. trainers may be part

of their agenda. Generally, none of the less tangible offshoots of providing training assistance are

detrimental toward the FID mission or U.S. national policy as long as trainers are prepared and focus on

the objective to build partner capacity.

ADVISORY ASSISTANCE

4-41. Within the DOD, the principal element charged with providing advisory assistance is the SAO.

Army personnel may provide assistance in two ways:

As a unit providing advice and assistance to a HN military or paramilitary organization.

As an individual Soldier assigned or attached to the SAO.

4-42. Army units may be under OPCON of the SAO chief in his role as the in-country U.S. defense

representative or under OPCON of a TSOC. The SAO includes all DOD elements, regardless of actual

title, assigned in foreign countries to manage security assistance programs administered by DOD. The U.S.

advisor may often work and coordinate with civilians of other Country Team agencies. When he does, he

must know their functions, responsibilities, and capabilities, because many activities cross jurisdictional

borders. Together, the advisor and his counterpart must resolve problems by means appropriate to the HN

4-10

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Training

without violating U.S. laws and policies in the process. Advisors operate under very specific ROE to

ensure that they remain advisors unless under threat of loss of life or limb.

4-43. The FID advisor must understand the scope of SAO activities. He also must know the functions,

responsibilities, and capabilities of other U.S. agencies in the HN. Because many FID activities cross the

jurisdictional boundaries or responsibilities of other Country Team members, the advisor seeks the

members to coordinate his portion of the overall FID effort.

4-44. In some situations, the HN may refuse U.S. advisors. HN military leaders may instead request and

receive other types of assistance such as joint air operations, movement and maneuver, or fires. To

coordinate this assistance and to ensure its proper use, U.S. liaison teams accompany HN ground maneuver

units receiving U.S. FID direct support involving combat operations. Language-qualified and area-oriented

SF teams are especially suited for this mission. The HN government may refuse lethal support but eagerly

accept support from MIS, CA, and various intelligence capabilities.

4-45. The role of the advisor is critical in the execution of FID. The advisor is the primary interface on the

ground between the U.S. military forces and the HN forces. Due to language and cultural skills, ARSOF

Soldiers have traditionally been a part of training, advising, and, if necessary, accompanying HN personnel

to support FID efforts. A comprehensive guide to advisor training is provided in Training Circular (TC) 31-73,

Special Forces Advisor Guide; however, there is no absolute guide to advisory assistance. Each situation

requires adaptability in working with embassy staff and HN personnel. The FID advisors, whether SOF or

conventional forces, project skills to develop capabilities in HN personnel supporting the end state of a self-

sufficient HN force.

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FM 3-05.2

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Chapter 5

Employment Considerations

We will undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security

forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote

regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

President Barack Obama

National Security Strategy, May 2010

FID involves all instruments of national power. FID is primarily a series of programs

that support friendly nations operating against or threatened by hostile elements. FID

promotes regional stability by helping a HN respond to the needs of its population

while maintaining security. FID is a significant mission, which requires joint

planning, preparation, and execution to integrate and focus the efforts of all Service

and functional components. Units conducting FID cannot dominate their environment

unless they first gain a clear understanding of the theater of operations, including

civilian influence, and adversarial and friendly capabilities. The employment

considerations for conducting FID operations apply to SOF and conventional forces.

Just as no two nations in the world are identical, the employment considerations in

one nation may have little or no bearing on those in a bordering nation. Therefore,

FID planners must take a detailed look at each FID operation on a case-by-case basis

when deciding to employ forces in support of FID.

OVERVIEW

5-1. The overall U.S. theater strategy typically incorporates FID programs with other major peacetime

training and maintenance functions as part of the comprehensive approach to promote the HN IDAD

strategy. FID programs are frequently joint and are, by definition, multinational in nature. Even small

tactical operations are usually multinational in terms of efforts with the supported HN. Planning and

coordination, up to and including combat operations, are multinational endeavors with the HN. Although a

single Service component may execute some operations, such as road building, these smaller efforts fit into

the overall theater strategies and plans. Full coordination and visibility at the joint and multinational levels

facilitate best-case employment of sometimes highly limited FID-proficient personnel.

EMPLOYMENT FACTORS

5-2. Several areas deserve special attention when discussing employment of forces in FID operations.

The joint force employment factors consist of—

SOF.

Conventional forces.

Psychological impact.

Public information programs.

IO impact.

Global operations against terrorist networks.

Counterdrug operations.

Intelligence support.

Logistic support.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

5-1

Chapter 5

Operations security.

Lessons learned.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

5-3. USSOCOM is the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated FID core operation. In

fulfilling this core task, USSOCOM provides SOF to support GCCs. In addition to dedicated theater

forces, ARSOF units typically contribute to the FID effort under OPCON of the TSOC, which has the

primary responsibility to plan and supervise the execution of SOF operations to support FID. However,

FID operations other than combat may have a direct mission command relationship with the COM or his

designee at the American Embassy. In smaller FID operations, ARSOF units may compose the majority of

the force or may entirely make up the force. The opposite may be true as well. In a large FID operation,

caps on total troop numbers may result in a disproportionally smaller number of ARSOF personnel than

conventional forces; however, ARSOF units may still have a prominent supporting role, but their focus

may shift to training HN SOF.

5-4. ARSOF units possess specialized capabilities for FID, including support for COIN and, when

applicable, for unconventional warfare missions contingent to FID. Other support includes coordination

and CAO conducted by CA elements, as well as MISO conducted through tactical MIS teams. Special

Operations Aviation Regiment

(SOAR), Sustainment Brigade

(Special Operations)

(Airborne)

(SB[SO][A]), and Rangers may conduct training in specific areas as well, typically with HN SOF.

Specialized training teams may train HN units for specific SOF tasks. In addition, ARSOF units may

support combat operations by conducting highly specialized missions. However, the typical ARSOF role in

FID is to train, advise, and support HN military and paramilitary forces. ARSOF operations that support

FID operations are frequently unilateral; however, they may support other ongoing U.S. military assistance

efforts. When planning for the use of ARSOF units, mission command requirements among the combatant

command, the Country Team, and the ARSOF unit must be assessed. Additionally, communications

requirements for mission command, administration, logistics, and emergencies must be coordinated and

resourced.

5-5. CA forces may support other military forces and nonmilitary agencies through direct or indirect

support of FID, but they must coordinate with the HN and the GCC. These operations focus on the indigenous

infrastructures and population in the operational areas. CA forces supporting FID are normally assigned to the

highest-level military elements supervising FID operations or to U.S. military advisory elements (usually

ARSOF) that train and aid HN military units. Chapter 6 provides more information on CMO.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

5-6. Conventional force units whose directed essential task list is or has been security force assistance can

conduct FID with some additional country-specific training if operating for the first time in that country.

Conventional forces can play a limited role, provide a moderate presence, or, conversely, make up the

majority of the FID effort. Planners and employers of forces conducting FID operations must be aware that

operations may change rapidly in character and that their force structures may need to adapt as well.

During global operations against terrorist networks, it has been shown that the integration of ARSOF units

with the conventional force (and vice versa) is increasingly the norm. In FID, this may involve ARSOF

personnel briefing and assisting in train-up for relieving units from the conventional force. For the

conventional force, this may include nontraditional employment and ARSOF collective task execution.

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT

5-7. Every employment of an element of U.S. national power has a psychological impact on elements of

the HN population and, sometimes, even the entire HN population. Regardless of whether the operation is

supported by or is conducted to support MISO, all efforts supporting a FID program must be executed with

the identified information engagement plan in mind. Failure to do so may derive short-term tactical benefits

that have long-term negative strategic consequences. Psychological effects may be the collateral or

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Employment Considerations

unintended result of operations. However, most effects can be anticipated and should be the intended

effects of general operations, specific MISO series, or the result of a psychological action (typically

violent) specifically executed for its psychological effect. All Army forces are cognizant that their actions

(operationally and incidentally) may have great psychological impact. MIS and other Army units are

trained to manage, magnify, or mitigate this impact. When employed in a collaborative environment, it is

typically incumbent upon MIS personnel as subject-matter experts to identify second- and third-order

effects of HN joint forces, multinational forces, conventional forces, and ARSOF actions.

PUBLIC AND COMMAND INFORMATION PROGRAMS

5-8. Public information and command information is important during all phases of FID operations. The

chief origin of public information, as a subset of public diplomacy, is the American Embassy in most FID

operations. MISO, public affairs, and the entire FID force are either dynamic or passive practitioners of

Army support to the designated embassy office(s) and personnel. Although it is important to correctly

portray the FID effort to HN personnel through MISO, it is also important to employ an effective public

affairs program to inform the HN, United States, and third-party audiences of current and, when operations

security allows, planned FID actions, goals, and objectives. History has shown that without the support of

these publics, it may be impossible to develop an effective FID program. At the U.S. national level, public

diplomacy programs (typically through strategic communications often from the highest U.S. officials)

accurately depict U.S. efforts.

5-9. U.S. international information programs are important to FID operations and are supported through

the combatant commanders. Information programs require a sustained commitment over time and

coordination with other elements of national power. Information programs disclose the maximum amount

of information deemed best in the parameters of a synchronized IO strategy within the applicable security

restrictions and guidelines. Coordination is essential between the public affairs staff and the media, the

Country Team, MIS elements, and other information agencies within the HN and region.

IMPACT OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

5-10. IO involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while protecting

one’s own information and information systems. IO apply across all phases of an operation and throughout

the continuum of operations including the spectrum of conflict ranging from stable peace to general war.

During FID operations, IO disciplines employed must be closely integrated into all aspects of planning and

execution. In small- or moderate-sized FID operations, Army forces may represent the only trained core,

supporting, or related IO capability. In these instances, it is incumbent upon Army personnel to determine

the full spectrum of IO impact. The core and related IO capabilities of MISO and CMO play a significant

role in all FID operations. The potential exists for MISO and CMO to be the sole capability employed in

FID programs. In this instance, ARSOF and conventional force units may need to operationally mitigate

the absence of other IO capabilities. This may, for instance, include work-arounds for activities such as

computer network operations and other complex technical core tasks of IO.

GLOBAL OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORIST NETWORKS

5-11. Any internal threat can contribute to the spread and growth of terrorists and terrorism. An ignored

internal threat, such as an organized criminal element, may evolve into a terrorist organization or begin

using terror tactics. FID programs complement global operations against terrorist networks by reducing the

impact of internal threats and curtailing incipient insurgencies before they become capable of projecting

terror outside the HN boundaries. Forces can conduct specific antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts as

part of the FID program for a HN. ARSOF units conduct counterterrorism operations when authorized and,

along with conventional forces, they frequently support the antiterrorism and counterterrorism effort

through training of counterterrorism HN forces along with MIS training.

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FM 3-05.2

5-3

Chapter 5

5-12. The DOS is primarily responsible for strengthening the commitment of other states to fight terrorism.

Army units can conduct and support efforts that can improve public perceptions in the HN of both their

government and the USG. Success of an ARSOF counterterrorism force, combined with proactive MISO

series, CAO, and increased capacities of HN forces, can encourage larger, more extensive HN efforts to

combat terrorism. Direct military-to-military contacts encourage HN officials to advocate initial and

increased operations against terrorist capabilities. FID trainers and advisors stress how such measures also

strengthen its overall IDAD program. These measures can include the following:

Decrease, interrupt, or break funding for internal threats.

Develop or enhance HN counterterrorism force equipment and training.

Increase border, airport, seaport, and other static entry-point security.

Enhance HN security and intelligence agencies to include regional and international networks.

Develop effective judicial and law enforcement systems by minimizing corruption, favoritism,

and political influence.

Deter potential recruits through balanced and targeted development programs.

Combat ideological motivators by promoting moderate views and personalities.

COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

5-13. Narcotics production or trafficking may be introduced or worsened in the HN by subversion,

lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. This may be deliberate or incidental as internal

threats break down HN infrastructure and institutions. Motivators for doing so can range from simple greed

to a means of funding that an internal threat would not otherwise use. In addition, internal threats may

tolerate or even encourage narcotics use in members or target groups to control or degrade unwanted

opposition. In all instances, FID operations complement counterdrug efforts by reducing and reversing

narcotics problems in target nations. Integrating and resourcing counterdrug-focused programs into theater

strategies as a coordinated effort supports the HN IDAD program and worldwide interdiction of narcotics.

5-14. Within legal parameters, DOD resources may be used in connection with counterdrug activities in

nations receiving military assistance to support a FID program. This military assistance often centers on

production operations; however, it can involve in-transit counterdrug operations. In addition, the DOD, as

the lead USG agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into

the United States, may conduct nonconfrontational intercepts. This is further augmented by the U.S. Coast

Guard’s power to arrest traffickers at sea. The DOD may also gather and process tactical intelligence from

a variety of sources for intelligence or communication purposes. Army units may provide limited support

for such missions and should be aware of the intelligence derived from such efforts. Direct support is

typically limited to surveillance and intelligence, as well as MISO and CAO. HN and U.S. MISO programs

may seek to reduce narcotics users, producers, smugglers, or dealers. CAO may seek to improve living

conditions in areas of production and attempt to reduce financial and social motivators.

5-15. In a counterdrug support role (subject to national policy and legislative guidance), the DOD may

offer certain direct support to HN counterdrug personnel and certain enhanced support to U.S. civilian law

enforcement agencies that may be operating in the HN and the DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics

Matters. When direction from the SecDef is absent, Soldiers engaged in counterdrug activities are

prohibited from engaging in direct law enforcement activity. Soldiers may not directly participate in an

arrest, search, seizure, or other similar activity. DOD personnel are not authorized to accompany HN forces

on actual counterdrug field operations or to participate in any activities where hostilities are likely to occur.

5-16. As directed by the SecDef through the CJCS, GCCs are given the authority to plan and execute HN

programs using a combination of security assistance, training and advisory assistance (not funded by

security assistance), intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support, and FHA. These efforts are

designed to bolster the HN capability to operate against the infrastructure of drug production. In FID

operations, lines between purely criminal elements, narcoterrorists, and internal threats using narcotics as a

5-4

FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Employment Considerations

financial means to an end may be blurred. A comprehensive approach to support the FID program may

target all these elements. Units may coordinate closely with the Country Team, DEA, and representatives

of the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics Matters.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

5-17. Army forces conducting FID operations require in-depth intelligence on both general and specific

elements of the HN populace and infrastructure. In some instances, ARSOF intelligence requirements are

specific to individual units. For example, MIS elements may be the only portion of the U.S. force that

needs details of radio station frequencies and program formats in a given province or other provincial area.

In another case, an SFODA may need detailed knowledge of the customs, taboos, and mores of an isolated

tribe or group.

5-18. A thorough intelligence analysis for FID operations must focus on the political, social, scientific,

technical, medical, and economic (among other) aspects of the area, as well as on an analysis of hostile

elements. A continuous intelligence effort determines the effects of U.S. efforts on the infrastructure, as

well as evaluates the strengths, weaknesses, and disposition of opposition groups in the area. An

intelligence analysis effort also supports determining the baseline views and reactions of HN population

elements to FID programs. Organic, in-country U.S. forces, theater, national, and HN intelligence assets

must all be resourced to provide intelligence. Appendix C provides intelligence considerations and a

format for intelligence preparation of the FID operational area.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

5-19. Logistic operations during FID programs support U.S. forces and primary operational missions with

medical, construction, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities. Conventional forces typically

operate in small force packages (for instance company) in austere environments or in typical brigade

combat teams in robust FID operations. In the latter, conventional forces typically have large logistical

assets (notably, the capability to move logistical items for the U.S. and partner forces). In the former,

conventional units are typically under the same austere sustainment paradigms as ARSOF units. ARSOF

logistical TTP provide an enduring method of overcoming the challenges of such environments.

Conversely, ARSOF units may have the benefit during robust FID operations of conventional force units

and their logistical support capability. ARSOF units must liaise with those conventional units in

predeployment and fully integrate the full capability of logistical support into planning.

5-20. Some general guidelines for logistic issues that support small force packages conducting FID

operations include the following:

Maximize the use of HN support capabilities. Minimize logistic support requirements when

reliance on the HN is not feasible.

Balance the advantages of using HN support with the danger of establishing dependence on

potentially unreliable sources.

Task organize logistic operations according to mission parameters:

Joint FID operations Service logistic support elements are integrated into the overall joint

force.

Logistic support for the deployed forces remains a Service responsibility.

Realize HN limitations. HNs often require support beyond their own capabilities, therefore—

Multinational logistic support agreements must be reached.

FID support positions must be identified to fill in the planning phase with organic positions

or equivalent.

Needs must be met before participation in the operation.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

5-5

Chapter 5

Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements negotiated with multinational partners may be

beneficial to the FID effort.

Authority to negotiate and execute these agreements is typically delegated to the GCC by

the SecDef.

Recognize logistical needs that are not available through HN support and, in some instances,

through theater logistical assets for ARSOF-specific equipment or operations.

Recognize logistical needs in select areas, though available in limited quantity through HN

support, may be insufficient for Army units.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

5-21. FID programs may be degraded or even preempted if critical information about friendly intentions,

capabilities, and activities reach subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats.

Frequently, before and during FID operations, a select number of HN officials and the populace have prior

knowledge of some Army activities. In some instances, far more knowledge of activities may exist than in

other operations. Internal threats, particularly an active insurgency, attempt to place (and in some cases

succeed in placing) members in positions in which they can obtain information about FID operations and

spread misinformation and disinformation. In addition, they may have sympathizers within HN institutions

that could be informants. Some corrupt HN officials may attempt to capitalize on one or more opportunities

to sell information. This can be particularly difficult to detect officials who engage in such activities

selectively or on a one-time basis. All personnel employed during FID operations must remain vigilant to

maintain operations security and report possible violations or suggest procedural changes that better

safeguard the IDAD effort.

LESSONS LEARNED

5-22. As FID programs are implemented, it is critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander

to modify the FID program to fit special circumstances and environments. Comprehensive after action

reviews and after action reports focusing on the specifics of FID operations should be conducted to gather

lessons learned information as soon as possible after mission execution. Lessons learned databases are

available to all FID planners and operators. The United States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, maintains a Center for Army Lessons Learned

(CALL) Web site

(http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp ). Through this Web site, users can either access a database of

lessons learned or submit a request for information. The CALL maintains a liaison at USASOC, Fort

Bragg, North Carolina, to facilitate the dissemination of SOF lessons learned. The CALL Web site also

maintains links to other lessons learned databases and centers, to include the Joint Lessons Learned

Information System, which is accessible to all Services.

5-23. Special Operations Debrief and Retrieval System [or more commonly known as SODARS] is a

database system accessible to SOF that includes intelligence information derived from previous FID and

other SOF core activities. This system is accessible via a SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network [or

SIPRNET] on the USSOCOM portal. In addition, open source intelligence can provide useful after action

lessons following a FID operation. Networking with counterparts and communicating with them after a

FID operation may provide not only continuous feedback, but also an opportunity to continue mentoring

them. It should be noted that open source intelligence is vetted and processed. Open source information, as

with counterpart information, should not be considered anything other than anecdotal before it is

processed. The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance has the mission to capture, analyze,

and document security force assistance observations, insights, and lessons from contemporary operations,

and to serve as an additional resource for observations and recommendations.

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FM 3-05.2

1 September 2011

Employment Considerations

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

5-24. The purpose of a CMO estimate is to provide information and recommend COAs on the civil

considerations of the current operational environment in the HN. This estimate may be used in a range of

circumstances from indirect FID support to combat operations. The content must be tailored to the country,

region(s) of operations, and mission. JP 3-22 provides a guide to elements that should be included in the

estimate. Relevant infrastructure facts in the HN and the degree of anticipated CMO and the supporting

CAO dictate the level of detail and length of the CMO estimate. The combatant command’s J-9, in close

collaboration with the other staff sections and subordinate commanders or CA site survey team, usually

prepares the estimate. If time allows, the preparer can make a detailed written estimate, or the format may

be used as a mental checklist to ensure that all elements of the civil situation are considered. A major

mission for CAO in the FID environment is to support and facilitate other CMO; therefore, any analysis of

CAO must include an analysis of the CMO missions. In many paragraphs of the CMO estimate, both CAO

and CMO missions are examined together.

5-25. Ultimately, the supported commander dictates the format of the CMO estimate (Figure 5-1, pages

5-8 and 5-9). The CMO estimate is derived from other CA planning and evaluation documents in addition

to outside sources. Key among these is the CMO estimate of the situation as presented in FM 3-05.40, and

all relevant annexes and appendixes. Supporting documents and resources include—

Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events, and civil considerations analyses.

MOE spreadsheets.

Trend analysis spreadsheets.

Trend analysis charts.

Impact analysis charts.

All relevant intelligence products.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

5-26. The purpose of a MISO estimate is to provide information on all psychological and some

informational aspects of military operations to aid the commander in accomplishing the mission. This

estimate is important to any plan but is particularly critical to successfully integrating FID operations. The

estimate is usually prepared at the joint level by the MIS staff element in close coordination with the other

coordinating staff sections and subordinate commanders, to include the supporting MIS unit commander.

The site survey team prepares the estimate. Any MISO estimate should use the documentation of the site

survey in conjunction with any other references. Once completed, the MISO estimate becomes an annex to

the operations officer’s estimate of the situation.

5-27. A detailed written estimate may be made if time allows, or the format may serve as a mental checklist

to ensure that all elements of the MISO situation are considered. The detail varies with the level and type of

command. The format for a joint MISO estimate is provided in Figure 5-2, pages 5-10 and 5-11.

1 September 2011

FM 3-05.2

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