Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6)

MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE PROCEDURE

Engineering Services Department

4. Ensuring that any I/E systems changes integrity of recovery information is attained as per the

relevant housekeeping manuals and procedures.

5. Ensures that all modifications adhere to the relevant AlOC standards.

6. The TA must review the information as presented and avoid the temptation to indulge in opinion

engineering

Any comments or questions requiring answers / justification to be incorporated into “Part H”

Comments section.

The Instrument Electrical Technical Authority has the overall responsibility for the integrity of

the following documentation and records, but it is the responsibility of the RJO to ensure they are

updated.

 Register of Electrical Equipment

 Instrument data sheet documentation

 Software modification documentation

 Program backups

 I/E loop and line drawings

 Cause and Effects

Process Technical Authority

The Process Technical Authority (РТА) has the responsibility for:

1. Reviewing all Modification proposals for Process workscope implications.

2. Ensuring the modification does not jeopardize the technical integrity or the

3. Safety Case of the platform.

4. Ensure that potential process risks have been addressed.

5. Ensures that all modifications adhere to the relevant AIOC standards.

6. The TA must review the information as presented and avoid the temptation to indulge in opinion

engineering

Any comments or questions requiring answers / justification to be incorporated into “Part H”

Comments section.

The Process Technical Authority has the overall responsibility for the integrity of the following

documentation and records, but it is the responsibility of the RJO to ensure they are updated.

 P&lDs, PFDs

 Hazardous Area Classification drawings

 Chemical Inventories

 Register of Safety Related Devices

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Maintenance Authority

The Maintenance Authority (MA) has the responsibility for:

1. Reviewing all Modification proposals for Maintenance workscope implications.

2. Ensuring the modification does not jeopardize the technical integrity or the safety case of the

platform.

3. Ensures that all modifications adhere to the relevant AIOC standards.

4. Updating of the Maintenance Management system.

5. The TA must review the information as presented and avoid the temptation to indulge in opinion

engineering

The Maintenance Authority has the overall responsibility for the integrity of the following

documentation and records, but it is the responsibility of the RJO to ensure they are updated.

 Maintenance management system

 Equipment maintenance intervals

 Maintenance methodology

Facility Manager

The Facility Manager, has the responsibility for:

1. Reviewing all Modification proposals for Operational workscope implications within his area of

responsibilities.

2. Ensuring the modification does not jeopardize the technical integrity or the safety case of the

asset.

3. Ensures that the modification adheres to the relevant AIOC standards.

4. Reviews modification 'window' opportunity when necessary.

5. Reviews the working area requirements for proposed modifications.

Any comments or questions requiring answers / justification to be incorporated into “Part H”

Comments section.

The Facility Manager has the overall responsibility for the integrity of the following

documentation and records, but it is the responsibility of the RJO to ensure that they are updated.

 Safety Case book 1

 Operating procedures; temporary/startup /shutdown / normal running

 Training requirements

 Manning levels

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Engineering Services Department

HSE Technical Authority

HSE Technical Authority has the responsibility for:

1. Assurance of legislative, SMS & Environmental requirements are being complied with.

2. Reviewing all Modification proposals for HSE implications within his area of responsibilities.

3. HSE Technical Authority review is to provide assurance that sensitive areas have been identified and

confidence that the appropriate project, engineering and operational procedures, including those fo r

Occupational Health, Safety, Environmental control and Energy Efficiency have been or will be

developed to control the identified risks.

4. HSE Technical Authority review is not a guarantee that the installation will meet these objectives

5. HSE Technical Authority must review the information as presented and avoid the temptation to indulge in

opinion with engineering

Any comments or questions requiring answers / justification to be incorporated into “Part H”

Comments section.

The HSE technical Authority has the overall responsibility for the integrity of the following

documentation and records, but it is the responsibility of the RJO to ensure that they are updated.

 Safety Case

 Site specific Operating Procedures

DCC Administrator

The DCC Administrator issues MOC numbers from the Microsoft Access database, which will

be used for tracking and reporting of the system. Each time a MOC has to be moved to the next step or

from one person/department to the next he/she will log it on the system this will provide an auditable

trail around the departments. His minimum, responsibility is:

1. Using the Database to allocate numbers of MOC.

2. Produce MOC Circulation Sheet based on distribution list determined by STA.

3. Provide a weekly status report of MOC, Monitor any MOC, which appear to be 'stagnant'.

The DCC Administrator has the overall responsibility for the collation and update of the

following documentation and records.

 Modifications database

 Weekly reporting

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Engineering Services Department

Senior Operating Authority

Senior Operating Authority has the responsibility for:

1. Approval of initial concept of MOC so it can be raised and passed around parties

involved in finding solution, i.e. Engineering, Operating Site.

2. Approval of final go-ahead, i.e. the point when MOC package can go on site for physical

implementation and further progression

3. Authorities and Departments are involved when necessary

4. Central Asset Prioritisation

5. Securing resources

5.6.Sets targets for Engineering and Modification Contractors in line with BUs objectives

Formatted: Bullets and Numbering

6.7.Defines required performance point contact for the modification within BU

7.8.For the contractor measures performance of the job delivery

8.9.Decide on the allowable timescales for temporary modifications

9.10. Job „Champion‟ (vested interests in success)

The role of Senior Operating Authority is played by Area Team Leader.

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Management of Change Procedure

Any person with the relevant justification can initiate the procedure, the steps through the

process are;

Note. Any movement of the assembled workpack must be via the modification coordinator this

enables tracking and control of information.

Full Engineering Change Procedure

Initiation

1. Originator identifies the need for a modification

2. Discuss the proposal with the line manager

3. On authorization from Line Manager the proposal shall be approved by Senior Operating

Authority to go to Engineering Team

4. Originator together with Line Manager discuss the proposal with the Senior Technical

Authority to decide

 Responsible Job Officer nomination (if this is not obvious)

 Internal or external engineering

 Which departments should be included in circulation

 Full Engineering Modification, Configuration Change or Maintenance Modification

 Requirement for a full Safety Review

Full Engineering Change

1. The Initiator outlines the problem and the proposed solution on the MOC form part A along

with the justification in part B.

2. The Responsible Job Officer after discussion with the Initiator completes a full Statement of

Requirements, using part D of the MOC forms. If the modification is multi discipline then

the Responsible Job Officer enlists the help of the relevant discipline engineers to complete

the Statement of Requirements.

3. The completed Statement of Requirements is circulated for review and agreement around

those departments previously nominated for circulation.

4. Any comments are written into the MOC form part G and should have a written reply from

the relevant person or department.

5. The Responsible Job Officer reviews me comments and makes alterations to the Statement

of Requirements as required.

6. SOR sent to Internal or External engineering depending on which was previously specified,

for detailed completion with cost and time estimations. The Responsible Job Officer is the

point of contact.

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Engineering Services Department

7. The Responsible Job Officer receives the final detailed scope.

8. Final engineering plan and detailed information is then re-circulated around the original

circulation for approval, the STA being the last to approve and decide on the need for a

Safety Review.

9. Then MOC is submitted to Senior Operating Authority for final “go-ahead” approval

10. Only on receipt authorization from Senior Operating Authority the work can be started on

site as per design and plan.

11. The Responsible Job Officer ensures all relevant documentation has been updated.

12. The Senior Technical Authority reviews the modifications effectiveness after 3 months and

a) Signs off the change

b) Refers the mod to the Responsible Job Officer for further review.

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Configuration Change Procedure

Initiation

Originator identifies the need for a modification

Discuss the proposal with the line manager

On authorization from Line Manager the proposal shall be approved by Senior

Operating Authority to go to Engineering Team

Discuss with the Senior Technical Authority to decide

 Responsible Job Officer nomination (if tills is not obvious)

 Internal or external engineering

 Which departments should be included in circulation

 Full Engineering Modification, Configuration Change or Maintenance Modification

 Requirement for a full Safety Review

Configuration Change

1. The Initiator outlines the problem and the proposed solution on the MOC form part A along with

the justification in part B.

Note: the calculations or detailed design for the Configuration Change should be attached at

this stage.

2. These details are circulated around the previously nominated departments for APPROVAL.

Note: the agreement stage is bypassed because the proposal will generally have come from the

department from whom agreement is required

3. The Configuration Change request is sent to the previously nominated engineering department,

Internal or External who will then carry out the change under the guidance of the Responsible Job

Officer.

4. The Responsible Job Officer ensures all relevant documentation has been updated.

5. The Senior Technical Authority reviews the modifications effectiveness after 3 months and

a. Signs off the change.

b. Refers the mod to the Responsible Job Officer for further review.

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Engineering Services Department

Maintenance Modification Procedure

Initiation

Originator identifies the need for a modification

Discuss the proposal with the line manager

On authorization from Line Manager the proposal shall be approved by Senior Operating

Authority to go to Engineering Team

Discuss with the Senior Technical Authority to decide

Responsible Job Officer nomination (if this is not obvious)

Internal or external engineering

Which departments should be included in circulation

Full Engineering Modification, Configuration Change or Maintenance

Modification

Requirement for a full Safety Review

Maintenance Modification

The Initiator outlines the problem and the proposed solution on the MOC form part A along

with the justification in part B.

Note: the history and reason/or the Maintenance Modification should be attached at this stage.

These details are circulated around the previously nominated departments for APPROVAL.

Note: the agreement stage is bypassed because the proposal will generally have come from the

department from whom agreement is required.

The Maintenance Modification is sent to the Maintenance department who will then integrate

the change into the Maintenance Management system under the guidance of the Responsible

Job Officer.

The Responsible Job Officer ensures all relevant documentation has been updated.

The Senior Technical Authority reviews the modifications effectiveness after 3 months and:

a) Signs off the change.

b) Refers the mod to the Responsible Job Officer for further review.

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Engineering Services Department

Temporary Modifications

If the change is temporary then the Senior Technical Authority will have imposed duration on

this, the Responsible Job Officer is charged with confirming that the change has been reversed, and the

equipment reinstated to the original condition, this is recorded by signing off the FULLY RESTORED

portion in section E of the MOC form. Any changes to documentation or procedures will also be

reversed.

If the original timescale is to be exceeded then the Responsible Job Officer must seek

permission from the Senior Technical Authority and Senior Operating Authority,

Emergency Modifications

The acting Facility Manager has the authority to define a change for immediate implementation

only to maintain continuous and safe operation or shutdown. The offshore Risk Assessment procedure

must be adhered to prior to any change.

In such cases, the MOC must be followed as soon as reasonably practicable or the modification

must be reversed. If it is possible approval from Senior Operating Authority shall be received prior to

implementation of any work on site.

Inadvertent Modification

Unauthorized or inadvertent modifications are not permitted, therefore it is the duty of the

FACILITY MANAGER to review the daily logs for any inadvertent modifications, which fall within

the scope of this procedure. These must be identified and in such cases, the MOC must be followed as

soon as reasonably practicable or the modification must be reversed.

Modification Register and Update of Records

The Modifications Register is maintained by the DCC Administrator and is a central database

for all modifications.

The database must, as a minimum contain the following fields:

 Modification Number

 Modification Type

 Priority

 Modification Title

 Responsible Job Officer

 Area

 Origination Date

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Engineering Services Department

Attachment A - MOC Flowchart

Initiation

Initiator reviews the need for the modification

Initiator

and MOC

Rejected MOC is filed

Initiator to obtain approval from Line Manager

Line Manager and Operations Team

and Operations Team Leader (Senior

in appropriate filing

system on the site

Leader Approval

Operating Authority) for the proposed

modification

Yes

Initiator discusses with STA the proposed

modifiction

(PartA), RJO nomination,

STA

circulation, routing, solution and type of

modification are decided

RJO and initiator complete the preparation and

RJO

SOR using the relevant discipline engineers

(part B)

DCC Administrator

Full Engineering mod.,

Configuration Change?

Full Eng. mod.

Proposal and SOR circulated around the

Dicsipline Engineers

previously nominated personnel and

Review

& STA

departments for review comment and

agreement (Part C)

ConfigC

RJO

RJO receives comments and any

alterations are incorporated (Part H)

RJO forwards detailed SOR

Internal

to previously decided internal or External

Engineering Contractor

Engineering

RJO receives detailed Engineering plans and

RJO

costs. The comments (Part H) are addressed

by RJO.

These are then circulated around the previously

Dicsipline Engineers, Senior Technical

Authority, Senior Operating Authority

nominated personnel and departments for

Approval

approval.(Part E)

The requirement for Safety Review is

YES

RJO

identified by STA and RJO at initial review

Safety Review Required?

stage

RJO to take necessary actions to carry out

proper safety review.

At this stage approved MOC and Workpack

Site Installation

are issued to site for implementation through

DCC.

Impelmentation and

Commissioning

The relevant drawings/documentation is As-

Commissioning

built. The complete pack returned to RJO for

proceeding with Close-Out.

Documentation and

Close-Out Procedure

RJO to coordinate the close out according to

Control

Close-Out Procedure No. UNIF-ENG-PRC-

009

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Part D

Solution/SOR

P&IDs, Cause & Effects, GA s, Line drawings, Reference drawings, meeting

minutes, communications, e-mails, Modification description, procedure changes,

maintenance and operations knock on effects, Study reports, problem solution and

benefits, timescales.

SAFETY REVIEW REQUIRE

YES

Senior TA Signature

TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TIME LIMIT

Senior TA Signature

Part E

Approval

MECH

Date

HSE

Date

I/E

Date

Senior Technical Authority

Date

Process

Date

Senior Operating Authority

Date

Facility Manager

Date

Other Departments

Date

Maintenance

Date

RJO

Date

Supervisor

Senior

Operating

Date

Authority

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Engineering Services Department

Part G

Aide Memoir

Operations

Startup/Shutdown

Required Services

Operating Procedure Change

Routine Operation

Control panel Locale/Visibility

Unusual Operation

New Operating Procedure

Access for Operations

Noise Implications

Emergency Shutdown

Preparation for Maintenance

Lagging/Radiation/Protection

Personnel Protection

Manning

Training

ENGINEERING / MAINTENANCE

Past history of similar, equip.

Mechanical Isolation

Electrical Isolation

Instrument Isolation

Cavitation

Reliability / Availability

Lifting equipment

Cold Duty application

Standardisations of equipment

Erosion / Sand / Velocities

Sour Service

Maintenance access

Corrosion

Weight

Instrument test frequency

Spares

MMS

Corrosion Monitoring

IMPLEMENTATION AND COMMISSIONING

Shutdown Windows

System Shutdowns

Single V/V Isolations

Fire Pump availability

Hot Work restrictions

Long lead times

Tie In points

Any simultaneous operations

Scale

PROCESS HAZARDS CONSIDERED

Overfilling

Two Phasing

Erosion

Equipment Failure

Emptying

Chemical Reactions

Corrosion

Trip Failure

Backflow

Blockages

Deposition

Source of Ignition

Sampling

Leaks

Surge

Static

Overpressure

Spillage

Thermal Cycling

Power Loss

Vacuum Formation

Fouling

Vibration

Loss of Services

High Temperatures

Contamination

Fatigue

Cross Connections

Gas Blow by

Flammability

Passing Valves

Dust

Valve Line up

Explosion

Access

Radioactivity

Hazardous Liquids Inventory

PROCESS SAFEGUARDS

Relief Capacity

Earthling

Use of Filters

Procedures

Flaring

Bonding

Design Standards

Emergencies

Fire Protection

Locking

Instrumentation

Fire Fighting

Bellows

Purging

Trips

Access

Isolation

Lighting

Vents

Startup

Thermal Relief

Area Classification

Control Valve Failure

Shutdown

NRV s

Lagging

ROs

Frost Protection

Duplication

Training

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Document No: UNIF-ENG-PRC-013

Title: Hot Work (Naked Flame)

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-POL-101-C1

Formatted

Procedureolicy

Rev No: C102

Page 2 of 1116

Formatted

Dated: SeptemberJune, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Formatted

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Formatted

INTRODUCTION

Formatted

DEFINITIONS AND ABREVIATIONS

SCOPE

CROSS REFERENCES

RISK ASSESSMENT

PRECAUTIONS

STANDARD OF ISOLATION

WORKPLACE PRECAUTIONS

NON-PROCESS FLAMMABLE MATERIALS

109

Appendix A - A Summary Of Guidelines

Appendix B - Diagrammatic Arrangement Showing Risk Areas And

Required Plant Preparations

1211

Appendix C - Decision Process Flow Diagram

1312

Appendix D - Checklists

1413

The controlled version of this document can be found at: http://baku.bpweb.bp.com/dep/hse/safe/

Next Revision Date: 30/069/2005

Print Date: 24/07/201015/11/200407/06/2004

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING

Title: Hot Work (Naked Flame)

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-POL-101-C1

Formatted

Procedureolicy

Rev No: C102

Page 3 of 1116

Formatted

Dated: SeptemberJune, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Formatted

1. INTRODUCTIONntroduction

Formatted

Ppolicy

The Azerbaijan Business Unit

(AZBU) policy relating to hot work naked flame

activities in hazardous areas is that:

 It shall be avoided and only carried out when all other alternatives have been

totally exhausted.

 Engineering shall minimize the need for hot work and provide cost effective

alternatives by careful consideration during the design phase.

When such work is unavoidable it is necessary to ensure that the activity is planned

and activities recorded and approved demonstrating that ALARP requirements have

been met. In meeting ALARP the following shall be considered:

Record Management justification for considering naked flame work,

including consideration of alternatives.

Identify and classify the potential sources of release.

Determine the extent of the probable risk areas.

Carry out a formal risk assessment.

Only when these steps have been completed and with the approval of the Asset

Manager may the Area Authority consider the issue of a Hot Work (Naked Flame)

Permit.

The storage or handling of flammable fuels, such as diesel or aviation fuel is not

included, but general guidance is given in Section 10 of this procedure. Could not

find this !

If Naked Flame work is considered to be justifiable under these requirements, the

guidance in this document provides a logical and safe application methodology.

For clarity:

Permit for Hot Work could involve any of the following activities:

 Naked flames (welding, flame cutting)

The controlled version of this document can be found at: http://baku.bpweb.bp.com/dep/hse/safe/

Next Revision Date: 30/069/2005

Print Date: 24/07/201015/11/200407/06/2004

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING

Title: Hot Work (Naked Flame)

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-POL-101-C1

Formatted

Procedureolicy

Rev No: C102

Page 4 of 1116

Formatted

Dated: SeptemberJune, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Formatted

 Electrical welding

 Electrical induction pre-heating, stress relieving or use of high temperature

thermal calibrators (above 200°C), except in authorised workshops

 Use of portable grinders (air or electrically powered)

 Abrasive wheels

 Use of flare guns

 Use of heat shrink blowers in hazardous zones

 Use of equipment or work on pipe work or vessels contaminated or

potentially contaminated with pyrophoric scale

Note 1: A Hot Work (Naked Flame) Permit is not required for operations and/or

maintenance activities involving ignited gas flares or permanently mounted plant

using an enclosed flame (boilers, inert gas generators, etc).

2. DEFINITIONS AND ABREVIefinitions and AbbreviatioATIONSns

Hazardous Area

plant areas processing highly flammable

materials, e.g. gas and condensate

ALARP

As Low As is Reasonably Practical

Hot Work

covers the use of any device, tool or

equipment that produces flame, sparks, arcs,

heat or hot particles having enough energy to

ignite flammable or combustible materials

A combustible material

any material that will burn, while a flammable

material is a gas or liquid that is easily ignited

by most low-energy heat sources.

3. SCOPE

This procedure applies to any naked flame hot work in hazardous areas within the

BP AZBU.

4. CROSS REFERENCES

In carrying out any such Hot Work Naked Flame activity, compliance to AZBU SSOW

management system shall apply. As a minimum, reference shall be made to the

following:

SSOW

Document Number

Title of Procedure

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 103

Permit to Work

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 105

Work Site Risk Assessment

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 106

Energy Isolations-Electrical

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 107

Energy Isolations-Process

The controlled version of this document can be found at: http://baku.bpweb.bp.com/dep/hse/safe/

Next Revision Date: 30/069/2005

Print Date: 24/07/201015/11/200407/06/2004

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING

Title: Hot Work (Naked Flame)

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-POL-101-C1

Formatted

Procedureolicy

Rev No: C102

Page 5 of 1116

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Dated: SeptemberJune, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Formatted

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 108

Confined Space Entry

5. RISK ASSESSMENT

Formatted

Key Risk Issues

Formatted

The Key Risk Issues associated with hot work in hazardous areas are the ignition

potential to any local hydrocarbon residues or a leak, which could lead to a localised

fire impact on personnel and potential escalation. Hot work would also require that

local fire detection systems would need to be inhibited.

Formatted

Background

These requirements are loosely based on hazardous area classification for selection

of electrical equipment. They are not identical and care should be taken not to

confuse the results, which may differ significantly

(The electrical techniques

examines plant in normal operation while these guidelines are concerned with

abnormal operation)

The requirements are based on the:

 Identification of any item from which flammable material may be released

(the "source of release"), and then,

 The assessment of the extent of the area (the "risk area") likely to be affected

if flammable material is released.

Hot work sites must be prepared in such a manner that fires or explosions cannot

result from the work. To do this, it is essential to take all of the steps necessary to

keep flammable and combustible materials away from hot work ignition sources.

However, a non-flammable, combustible liquid that is confined at a temperature near

its flash point becomes highly flammable when it escapes from confinement.

The controlled version of this document can be found at: http://baku.bpweb.bp.com/dep/hse/safe/

Next Revision Date: 30/069/2005

Print Date: 24/07/201015/11/200407/06/2004

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING

Title: Hot Work (Naked Flame)

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-POL-101-C1

Formatted

Procedureolicy

Rev No: C102

Page 6 of 1116

Formatted

Dated: SeptemberJune, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Formatted

Preparing for safe hot work requires knowing sources of flammable and combustible

materials and operating conditions, which could adversely affect conditions at the

work site. The people who prepare the hot work sites also have an obligation to help

protect the people who do the work against other hazards. Such hazards include

hot, corrosive or toxic materials, hot atmospheres, harmful chemicals and unsafe

access.

Formatted

The Sequence of Events

The following activities have to be completed before hot work can commence (refer

to Appendix 3 of this policy):

Record management justification for considering naked flame work, including

consideration of alternatives.

Identify and classify the potential sources of release

Determine the extent of the probable risk areas

Carry out a formal risk assessment.

Only when these steps have been completed may the area authority consider, with

Asset Manager acceptance to proceed.

Classification of Sources of Release (and typical examples)

a) Low Risk

Items that are unlikely to be a source of release (and then only after a catastrophic

failure) is considered to be low risk; for example, continuous process pipework

without either flanges or drain/vent connections.

b) Medium Risk

Items where minor release is possible under normal operating circumstances (but

where such release is likely to be very restricted) are considered to be medium risk;

for example, flanges, valves, compression fittings.

c) High Risk

Items where release is likely under normal operating circumstances or where a

release is unlikely to be restricted are considered to be high risk; for example, open

or atmospheric vents, open vessels or pipework, open drains which are not isolated

or flushed.

Formatted

Extent of Risk Areas from Sources of Release

While the extent of the risk area from a particular source of release will depend on

the prevailing conditions, guidance is given below on some typical allowances for an

The controlled version of this document can be found at: http://baku.bpweb.bp.com/dep/hse/safe/

Next Revision Date: 30/069/2005

Print Date: 24/07/201015/11/200407/06/2004

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING

Title: Hot Work (Naked Flame)

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-POL-101-C1

Formatted

Procedureolicy

Rev No: C102

Page 7 of 1116

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Dated: SeptemberJune, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Formatted

initial appraisal of the risk area. The nature of the flammable material (e.g. heavier

than air) shall be included in the vertical assessment of the risk area.

a) Minimal Risk

Any work carried out further than 15.0 metres from process equipment. Such areas

are normally classified as safe areas.

b) Low Risk

The risk area is likely to extend 15.0 metres horizontally and vertically. This risk area

will apply around all process plant and pipework and will surround any medium or

high-risk areas.

c) Medium Risk and High Risk

The risk area is likely to extend 1.5 metres horizontally and vertically.

This initial appraisal shall be reviewed and adjusted if necessary by the formal risk

assessment.

6. PRECAUTIONS

Plant Preparation

Any naked flame hot work carried out in a risk area will require that the plant in the

risk area is prepared in accordance with the following general guidance. This

includes the minimum requirements and recommendations for further consideration.

Environmental impact shall be included when venting is considered.

The justification for the relaxation of the minimum requirements (for example due to

barriers - such as fire blankets or tarpaulins - or erection of a habitat or forced

ventilation) shall be formally recorded. More onerous conditions may be applied

following formal risk assessment (for example the risk area may be extended due to

a known leak or the prevailing wind conditions).

a) Minimal Risk

The process may continue in operation.

b) Low Risk

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Title: Hot Work (Naked Flame)

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Originating Dept: HSE

Formatted

The process in the risk area shall be shutdown. Consideration shall be given to

venting, draining, purging or flushing the plant.

c) Medium Risk

The process in the risk area shall be shutdown and vented/drained. Consideration

shall be given to purging or flushing the plant.

d) High Risk

The process in the risk area shall be shutdown, vented or drained and purged or

flushed.

Formatted: Bullets and Numbering

7. STANDARD OF ISOLATION

a) tandard of IsolationLow Risk

For hot work in low risk areas, single valve isolation may be adequate but only

provided the integrity of the isolation has been proven and it can be demonstrated

there are no flanges or drain/vent connections.

b) Medium Risk

For hot work in medium risk areas, single valve isolation may be adequate provided

that the plant in the risk area is vented or drained to a safe location remote from the

risk area. If the plant is not vented or drained, the use of double block and bleed may

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Title: Hot Work (Naked Flame)

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Procedureolicy

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Originating Dept: HSE

Formatted

be considered only when the vent or drain valve is in a safe location remote from the

risk area and the integrity of the isolation has been proven. If neither isolation is

practicable, positive isolation (by blanking) is required.

c) High Risk

For hot work in high-risk areas, positive isolation is required.

d) General

It is recommended that where facilities exist, experienced process personnel should

monitor the pressure in the isolated section.

7.8. WORKPLACE PRECAUTIONS

Standard precautions are detailed in SSOW.

Additional measures may be taken to reduce risks where this is considered to be

reasonably practicable. Such measures may include the provision of barriers, (such

as fire-blankets or tarpaulins), a habitat around the workplace, or forced ventilation.

These precautions may reduce the extent of the risk area.

Formatted

8.1

Insulated Flanges

Where flanges are covered by insulation consideration shall be given to removing the

insulation to enable a satisfactory gas test.

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Title: Hot Work (Naked Flame)

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Procedureolicy

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Page 10 of 1116

Formatted

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Formatted

8.2

Open Drains

Formatted

Where it is possible for flammable materials to drain in to open drains, the drains

shall be considered to be high risk unless the drain lines are isolated and the drains

flushed though to remove flammable materials. After a satisfactory gas test such

flushed drains may then be considered to be low risk.

8.9. NON-PROCESS FLAMMABLE MATERIALS

In general, liquid fuels commonly used offshore are not considered to be volatile.

Provided that hot work is carried out so that such fuels are not heated, no further

plant preparation is likely to be required, except around the vents on aviation fuel

systems. Additional measures may be specified after the risk assessment.

Appendix 1A

- A Summary Of Guidelines

Formatted

A Summary Of Guidelines

Extent

Minimum

Additional

Classification

Typical

Required Plant

of Risk

Standard

Preparation to be

Examples

Preparation

Area

of Isolation

considered

Minimal Risk

Remote from

None

Shutdown, vented/

plant

drained and

purged/ flushed

Low Risk

Continuous

15.0 m

Shutdown

Single

Vented / drained

pipework

Valve

and purged /

flushed

Medium Risk

Flanges, valves

1.5 m

Shutdown,

Single valve

Purged/flushed

vented /drained

and vented

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Title: Hot Work (Naked Flame)

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Procedureolicy

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Originating Dept: HSE

Formatted

Appendix 2B - Diagrammatic Arrangement Showing Risk Areas And

Required Plant Preparations

Diagrammatic Arrangement Showing Risk Areas And Required Plant

Preparations

Low Risk: -

15.0 metres from process

equipment

Shutdown Process in Risk

Area. Consider venting,

draining purging or flushing

Medium Risk: -

1.5 metres round flange

Shutdown and vent/drain.

Consider purging or

flushing plant

High Risk

1.5 metres round PSV

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urge or flush

Title: Hot Work (Naked Flame)

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-POL-101-C1

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Formatted

Appendix C - Decision Process Flow Diagram

Appendix 3

Formatted

Decision Process Flow Diagram

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hot Work Justification

Area Authority

Yes

Can Hot Work

Safe Area or

be avoided in

Cold Work

Hazardous

area?

Can it be

Yes

Defer to a

Formatted

deferred?

shutdown period

Identify source(s) of

potential releases

Yes

High

Risk

Purge / Flush

Area?

Yes

Medium

Vent / Drain

Risk

Area?

Yes

Low Risk

Area?

Shutdown

Risk Assessment

ALARP

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Formatted

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Yes

------------

Management

Approval for Hot Work

Formatted

Appendix D - 4Checklists

Checklist

Formatted

Thiese checklists areis to assist the Aarea aAuthority of the precautions, which may be

required in completing a Hot Work permit for naked flame work in a hazardous area. A

completed copy of the appropriate checklist is to be attached to the top (performing authority)

copy of the permit and filed with the permit on completion. A new checklist is required for

each permit; it is not permitted to use the same checklist for continuation permits when the

work lasts more than one day.

In view of the importance of monitoring flammable materials when performing naked flame hot

works in hazardous areas the aArea aAuthority may require to specify the location of any

portable gas detectors. It may even be necessary to mark the required position of the

detectors on site to prevent inadvertent misplacement.

Title: Checklist prior To and During Hot Work

Formatted

Prior to work starting (by area authority)

When Noted on Permit

Required

Precaution

(Delete as necessary)

If not required

Consult HSE Advisor over Emergency

Yes

Response Plan

Habitat for Hot Work (complete

Yes

additional checklist)

Yes

Provide Forced Ventilation

Yes

Provide fire blankets

Mandatory

Barrier off area

Mandatory

Warning notices around worksite

Yes

Check calibration of fixed gas heads

Work squad familiarisation with fire

Yes

equipment

Yes

Test deluge prior to start

Yes

Inform CCR

Mandatory

PA prior to start of work

Formatted

During Work (by performing authority)

When Noted on Permit

Required

Precaution

(Delete as necessary)

If not required

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Formatted

Specified location for portable gas

Yes

monitors

Mandatory

Permanent Firewatcher

Yes

Radio contact with control room

Production operator to monitor plant

Yes

pressure

Yes

Ground monitor linked to fire hydrant

All fire doors to/from area to be kept

Yes

shut

Checklist prior To and During Hot Work

Formatted

Title: Checklist Prior To Habitat for Hot Work

FACILITY:

APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH THE WORKSCOPE

Formatted

Area Authorities Signature:

Date:

To be completed /signed/approved prior to the commencement of Naked Flame Work

Yes

Is the housing secure, safe, made of fire retardant material and sturdy enough to hold

men and equipment?

Are the entrance and exit satisfactory and are they identified?

Is the inside of habitat and any combustible fabric lined with fire blankets and is the fire

blanket secured to ensure that it stays in place within the habitat.

Will any welding debris etc. be contained within the habitat and neither come into

contact with the habitat structure nor fall out of the habitat into the external

environment?

Is the habitat of sufficient size for at least 2 men to carry out the job within minimum

restriction?

Is the inside of the habitat free from combustible material?

Is the pressurising air supplied from at least 2 meters within a safe area and is the

ducting properly secured?

Is the duct marked ‘FOR HABITAT USE - DO NOT REMOVE’?

Is the air supply to air movers marked ‘FOR HABITAT USE - DO NOT REMOVE’?

Is the exhaust ducting vented out of the module

Can the pressure within the habitat be maintained at a pressure above atmospheric

pressure? State test pressure achieved: _______________________

Is the exit from the habitat of sufficient size to allow easy escape in an emergency and

is there a suitable viewing port?

Is the area at the pressurising duct inlet, gas free?

Have all open ended pipes, not subject to workscope been blanked?

(Not applicable means yes)

NOTE:

Formatted

The answers to all the above questions must be ‘YES’ . Any conditions which do not meet the

procedure requirements must be rectified before the habitat can be put into service.

APPROVAL OF THE HABITAT

Formatted

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Formatted

Habitat Build Responsible Person

Signature:…………………………….…………………………… Date: …………………………………………….

Area Authority

Signature: ………………………………………………………… Date: ……………………………………………..

2^nd Auditor

Signature: …………………………………………………………. Date: ……………………………………………

APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH THE WORKSCOPE

Formatted

OIM Signature: ……………………………………………….

Date: …………………………………………..

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Title: Deviations Procedure

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-101-C2

Rev No: C2

Page 3 of 6

Dated: October, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Introduction

The Reasons for Change

Operations within BP Azerbaijan / Georgia are supported and controlled by:

 law and statutory regulations

 BP Group and subsidiary policy

 BP Azerbaijan / Georgia procedures

 Business Unit management system and other manuals, procedures, standing

instructions, local rules, etc.

However, occasions may occur where the best solution to an operational need involves

deviating from one or more of the above requirements due to specific circumstances at

the time.

Scope

This dispensation process should be used whenever it is deemed necessary to deviate

from current practice, standards, regulations and procedures on a specific work site.

This procedure defines:

 the process for authorising a deviation from a company practice, standard or

procedure or national regulation

 who needs to authorise deviations

 the conditions which must be met before authorisation is given

 the vehicle for documenting the process.

Note: Only the relevant national authorities can approve deviations from national

statutes, regulations and other national authority requirements. Before any

deviation from national legislation can be carried out, written approval from the

relevant national authority must be received and in the Site Manager’s

possession.

Prolonged or Frequent Deviations

If it proves necessary to deviate from a practice, standard, regulation or procedure for a

prolonged period of time, or if the same deviation is requested on a frequent basis, the

person handling the request is responsible for implementing measures to either:

 change the practice, standard, or procedure in order to bring it into line with

what needs to be done

or...

 change the method of work to bring it into line with the practice, standard,

regulation or procedure.

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Title: Deviations Procedure

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-101-C2

Rev No: C2

Page 4 of 6

Dated: October, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Roles and Responsibilities

Site Manager

The Site Manager has responsibility for authorising a deviation from:

 BP Standards

 practices and procedures

 national regulation (provided that written approval for the deviation has been

received from the relevant national authorities).

Area Authority

The Area Authority is responsible for:

 informing the Site Manager at the earliest opportunity of the need to apply for

deviation from standards, practices and procedures or a national regulation

 identifying and specifying the standards, practices and procedures or

national regulation(s) from which deviation is sought, along with the reason

 seeking specialist technical advice where required to carry out the

associated risk assessment

 carrying out the risk assessment and identifying mitigating measures

 obtaining endorsement from the appropriate technical authority

 distributing the original, and copies of, the completed request with approvals.

 ensuring that all mitigating measures are in place.

Deviation Approval Process

Application for Deviation Approval

Applications for site specific dispensation are submitted to the Site Manager at the

place of operation using pro forma illustrated in Figure 1.

For such applications, the attached form should be used to document the:

 regulation, procedure, practice recommendation, etc., from which a deviation

is required

 required duration of the dispensation

 requested deviation

 justification for the deviation

 risk assessments carried out

 mitigating measures to be implemented

 signatures of those in charge of processing the request.

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Title: Deviations Procedure

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-101-C2

Rev No: C2

Page 5 of 6

Dated: October, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

1. Procedure, Standard, Regulation:

2.Duration

From:

To:

Date/time

3. Site/Department:

4.Requested deviation:

5. Justification:

6. Risk assessment

6. Mitigation actions:

7. Comments by Technical Authority

Tech Auth.

Sign./date:

Deviation

proposed

approved

by,

by Site

Manager,

Sign./Date:

Figure 1 Authorisation for Local Deviation (Pro-forma)

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Title: Deviations Procedure

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-101-C2

Rev No: C2

Page 6 of 6

Dated: October, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Requirements for Approval

The Site Manager at the place of operation has the authority to approve deviations from

BP standards, practices and procedures.

In order to authorise dispensation for a deviation, the Site Manager is responsible for

ensuring that:

 a risk assessment has been properly carried out in accordance with

UNIF-HSE-PRO-105 Task Risk Assessment

 appropriate technical endorsement has been obtained

 mitigating measures have been identified and appropriate actions

implemented

 interim procedures have been produced and distributed to all relevant

personnel

 written dispensation has been received from the relevant national authorities

(if the deviation involves a national regulation).

Work Control (Permit to Work Requirements)

All work requiring an authorised deviation from BP standards, practices and procedures

or a national regulation shall be carried out under a permit to work. This provides the

vehicle for the Site Manager to ensure that all agreed precautions are in place before

the work proceeds.

Note: The form illustrated in Figure

1 is to be used for recording the deviation

authorisation. This form must be attached to the permit and must be brought to

the attention of the Performing Authority before he signs the permit.

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UNIF-HSE-PRO-102

Incident Investigation and Reporting

Revision

Date

Originator

Revision

Checked

Approved

Signature

Descriptiont

ails

xx.xx.xx23.02

E.Shikhkerimov,

Revision

M.SinquefieldJ.

G.Vidrine,

.2002

Safety Adviser

01Updated

Carpenter,

HSE Director

Procedure

Safety Manager

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE

1.2 SCOPE

1.3 CONTRACTOR INVESTIGATIONS

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 ALL PERSONNEL

2.2 PERFORMANCE UNIT LEADER

2.3 SITE MANAGER

2.4 OWNER

2.5 INVESTIGATOR / INVESTIGATION TEAM

2.6 APPROVER

2.7 INCIDENT REPORT ORIGINATOR

2.8 RESPONSIBLE PARTY

2.9 DIRECTOR HSE

3 CORPORATE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

3.1 NOTIFICATION REQUIRED

Business Unit Leader

Exco

3.2 INFORMATION REQUIRED

4 THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS

108

4.1 DETERMINING INCIDENT SEVERITY

108

Major Incident (Definition)

119

Tr@ction

119

4.2 ESTABLISH INVESTIGATION TEAM

119

Terms of Reference

119

Team Selection

1210

Team Mobilisation

1210

4.3 CONDUCT INVESTIGATION

1210

Scope and Objectives

1210

Fact Finding

1310

Establish the Sequence of Events

1311

Establish Findings

1311

4.4 ANALYSE FINDINGS

1311

Identify Critical Factors and Causes and Make Recommendations

1311

System Cause Analysis

1412

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UNIF-HSE-PRO-102

Incident Investigation and Reporting

System Cause Analysis - Example

1412

4.5 COMPILE REPORT

1513

Records

1513

Report Outline

1513

Non-Contributory Factors

1714

4.6 REVIEW WITH MANAGEMENT

1714

BP Management

1714

Contractors

1715

4.7 AGREE WITH OWNER

1715

4.8 ACTIONS

1715

Owner

1715

Responsible Party

1715

Close Out of Actions

1815

Incident Report Originator

1816

5 REPORT DISTRIBUTION

1917

6 STORAGE OF RECORDS

1917

6.1 MAJOR INCIDENTS

1917

6.2 MINOR INCIDENTS

1917

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE

1.2 SCOPE

1.3 CONTRACTOR INVESTIGATIONS

1.4 DEFINITIONS

Accident

Incident

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 ALL PERSONNEL

2.2 PERFORMANCE UNIT LEADER

2.3 SITE MANAGER

2.4 OWNER

2.5 INVESTIGATOR / INVESTIGATION TEAM

2.6 APPROVER

2.7 INCIDENT REPORT ORIGINATOR

2.8 RESPONSIBLE PARTY

2.9 DIRECTOR HSE

3 CORPORATE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

3.1 NOTIFICATION REQUIRED

Business Unit Leader

Exco

3.2 INFORMATION REQUIRED

4 THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS

4.1 DETERMINING INCIDENT SEVERITY

Major Incident (Definition)

Tr@ction

4.2 ESTABLISH INVESTIGATION TEAM

Terms of Reference

Team Selection

Team Mobilisation

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FebruaryApril 20023

Incident Investigation and Reporting 3

UNIF-HSE-PRO-102

Incident Investigation and Reporting

4.3 CONDUCT INVESTIGATION

Scope and Objectives

Fact Finding

Establish the Sequence of Events

Establish Findings

4.4 ANALYSE FINDINGS

Identify Critical Factors and Causes and Make Recommendations

System Cause Analysis

System Cause Analysis - Example

4.5 COMPILE REPORT

Records

Report Outline

Non-Contributory Factors

4.6 REVIEW WITH MANAGEMENT

BP Management

Contractors

4.7 AGREE WITH OWNER

4.8 ACTIONS

Owner

Responsible Party

Close Out of Actions

Incident Report Originator

5 REPORT DISTRIBUTION

6 STORAGE OF RECORDS

6.1 MAJOR INCIDENTS

6.2 MINOR INCIDENTS

APPENDICES:

APPENDIX A - MAJOR INCIDENT NOTIFICATION PRO-FORMA

APPENDIX B - /HIGH POTENTIAL NOTIFICATION PRO-FORMA

APPENDIX BC - TR@CTION SEVERITY MATRIXINCIDENT REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION FORM

APPENDIX DC - MODEL TERMS OF REFERENCE TEMPLATE

APPENDIX E D - SYSTEM CAUSE ANALYSIS CHARTCLC CHART

APPENDIX E - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

APPENDIX FF - - GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING AND RECORDING OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND

ILLNESSES

APPENDIX G - INJURY AND ILLNESS REPORTING DECISION TREE

APPENDIX H - HSE ACCOUNTABILITY BOUNDARIES

FIGURES

FIGURE 1 MAJOR / HIGH POTENTIAL INCIDENT NOTIFICATION CHART

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Incident Investigation and Reporting 4

UNIF-HSE-PRO-102

Incident Investigation and Reporting

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE

This document describes the procedures employed for investigating incidents related

to BP activities in the Azerbaijan Business Unit (AzBU) and in the preparation of

associated reports.

Note: The prime objectives of such an investigation are to analyze the causes and

make recommendations to prevent recurrence of a similar incident. It is not to

attribute blame.

1.2 SCOPE

This process is to be used for all types of incidents, including:

 fatalities

 workplace injuries and illness

 security breaches

 spills and leaks

 vehicle accidents,

 significant near misses, etc.

Formatted: Bullets and Numbering

All events resulting in harm to people, industrial illness, damage to assets, and

environmental harm (together with near miss events in these categories) areis to be

reported immediately to the supervisor and / or the BP representative.

1.3 CONTRACTOR INVESTIGATIONS

For serious incidents involving contractor employees, contractor management may

wish to conduct a separate internal incident investigation. BP policy is to respect the

wishes of contractors, but to encourage completion of a joint investigation in a

cooperative manner with representatives of both BP and affected contractors.

The contractors‟ own incident investigation procedure may be used if it is at least as

comprehensive as this procedure.

1.4 DEFINITIONS

Guidance and detailed explanations of definitions are provided in the

Appendix F, Guidelines for Reporting and Recording Occupational Injuries and

Illnesses.

Accident

Accident - is an undesired event that results in harm to people, damage to

property/assets, environmental harm and breach of security.

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UNIF-HSE-PRO-102

Incident Investigation and Reporting

Incident

The term used to describe the undesired transfer of energy that may either

result in an accident or has the potential to do so.

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 ALL PERSONNEL

Any person involved in or observing an accident or near miss must immediately

report it to his / her supervisor or BP Representative.

2.2 PERFORMANCE UNIT LEADER

Performance Unit Leaders (PUL) areis responsible and accountable for:

 ensuring that this procedure is implemented in their performance units

 reporting Major Incidents and High Potential Incidents to the Corporation.

2.3 SITE MANAGER

Site Managers are responsible for:

 making an initial assessment of the severity of an incident

 instigating the appropriate investigation process

 assuming ownership of minor incidents on his site

 accepting the Incident Report and allocating the resultant actions.

2.4 OWNER

The Owner is the individual who requested the Incident Investigation to be

performed. This will be the Site Manager or PUL.

The Owner shall:

 appoint the Investigation Team

 draw up the terms of reference for the investigation

 provide a business overview on actions prior to entry into the tracking

system and shall review each action item for confidentiality

 review the selection of the Responsible Party for handling the action items

 ensure that all new or reassigned action items are entered in to the

Accident and Incident database under the appropriate category

 review progress reports to ensure that all outstanding action items are

being completed within specified deadlines

 shall take appropriate action with the Responsible Party if action items are

not being completed within the desired deadline.

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Incident Investigation and Reporting 6

UNIF-HSE-PRO-102

Incident Investigation and Reporting

2.5 INVESTIGATOR / INVESTIGATION TEAM

The Investigator / Investigation Team are responsible for:

 investigating the circumstances leading to the event

 making recommendations to prevent recurrence

 ensuring that the written report is completed.

2.6 APPROVER

The Approver is responsible for assuring the quality of the investigation report and

the data entered into the Accident and Incident Reporting database.

Note: This role will normally be undertaken by the most senior HSE person in the

Owner‟s organisation:

the most senior HSE person in the Owner‟s

organisation will normally undertake this role.

The Approver shall:

 review the Incident Report to ensure an accurate document with proper

root cause analysis

 ensure that:

 appropriate hazards have been identified

 action items will effectively mitigate the hazards

 action items are clear and provide the Responsible Party with

adequate details to implement the action item

 review the selection of the Responsible Party for handling the action item

in order to ensure that the action item has been assigned to an individual

or job position with sufficient authority and expertise to complete the action

 approve the report in the Accident and Incident database.

2.7 INCIDENT REPORT ORIGINATOR

The Incident Report Originator is responsible for entering the Incident Report into the

Accident and Incident database.

Note: This will normally be the Investigator, a member of the Investigating Team or

a nominated Accident and Incident data base operator.

2.8 RESPONSIBLE PARTY

The Responsible Party is the individual who has been assigned an action item arising

from an Owner‟s Incident Investigation. The Responsible Party must have sufficient

authority and expertise to carry out the action.

The Responsible Party shall:

 review validity of assignments of an action item with the Owner, if and

when they consider the assignment inappropriate

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 take accountability for ensuring that all of his/her action items are

completed by the target date

 take appropriate action with the owner if the action items are not being

completed within the desired deadline

 ensure that all comments against their action items, updates of the status

of their action items and closure of their action items when completed are

entered into the Accident and Incident data base.

2.9 DIRECTOR HSE

Director HSE is responsible for:

 maintaining this procedure (including annual revalidation)

 providing support to the respective Manager in setting up the Investigation

Team.

3 CORPORATE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Note: See Appendix F for the definition of a major or high potential incident. The

Formatted

following paragraphs describe the notification required for major / high potential

Formatted

incidents. See also Figure 1 Major / High Potential Incident Notification

Formatted

FlowchartFigure 1 Major / High Potential Incident Notification FlowchartFigure 1

Major / High Potential Incident Notification FlowchartFigure 1 Major / High Potential

Incident Notification FlowchartFigure 1 Major / High Potential Incident Notification

FlowchartFigure 1 Major / High Potential Incident Notification FlowchartFigure 1

Major / High Potential Incident Notification FlowchartFigure 1 Major / High Potential

Incident Notification FlowchartFigure 1 Major / High Potential Incident Notification

FlowchartFigure 1 Major / High Potential Incident Notification FlowchartFigure 1

Major / High Potential Incident Notification Flowchart.

3.1 NOTIFICATION REQUIRED

Business Unit Leader

The PUL should notify the Business Unit Leader of major / high potential incidents

through personal conversation at the earliest opportunity, but within 24 hours.

ExcCo

The Business Unit Leader will notify Regional President (ExCo Tag) at the earliest

opportunity but within 24 hours (only for major incidents). The initial report may be

verbal and confirmed with the pro-forma reports in Appendix A for MIA and Appendix

Formatted

B for HiPo.

3.2 INFORMATION REQUIRED

The notifications should provide the following information:

 type of occurrence (fire, explosion, injury, spill, etc)

 site / location

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Accountable PUL or

Notify Business Unit Leader

Incident Commander

and Director HSE of Incident

Accountable PUL or

Evaluate against Major/High

Consult Director HSE or

Incident Commander

Potential Incident in GHSER

Safety Manager if

assistance is required

Accountable PUL or

Prepare statement on pro

Consult Director HSE or

Incident Commander

forma

Safety Manager if

assistance is required

Business Unit Leader

Review and Approve

Business Unit Leader or

Forward to London

his deputy

Figure 1 Major / High Potential Incident Notification Flowchart

4 THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS

4.1 DETERMINING INCIDENT SEVERITY

The processes used to investigate an incident always follow the same principles.

However, the make up of the Investigation Team, and the investigation process

followed, is determined by the potential severity of the incident.

The first stage of the process is therefore to make an estimate of the worstmost

serious probable outcome of the incident in order to determine the process to be

followed. This will be done by the Site Manager.

Note: Potential Incident severity is based upon the wormost serious probable

outcome. For example:

If a man cuts his finger with a knife, the most likely outcome of the incident is

a cut finger and the potential severity of the incident should be judged on that

basis

but...

If a man cuts his finger on a power saw, the wormost serious possirobable

outcome could easily have been an amputation and the potential severity of

the incident is therefore judged to be much greater.

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Major Incident (Definition)

A Major Incident is an incident, including a security incident, involving any one of the

following:

 a fatality associated with BP operations

 multiple serious injures

 significant adverse reaction from authorities, media, NGO‟s or the general

public

 cost of accidental damage exceeding US$ 500,000

 oil spill of more than 100 barrels, or less if it at a sensitive location

(1 barrel=159 litres=42 US gallons)

 release of more than ten tonnes of a classified chemical.

Note: An incident must always be treated as a Major Incident for investigation

purposes if personal injury resulting in a day away from work case or an oil or

chemical release beyond company premises has occurred.

Tr@ction

Tr@ction is a software tool designed to provide a single data entry system for all

Health, Safety, Environmental, Property Damage, Reputation and Business

Interruption/Unit OutageHSE, Security and Quality incidents. Tr@ction also offers an

actual and potential severity matrix that allows the user to assess the incident

severity on a consistent basis. A sample of Incident Reporting and Investigation form

and severity this matrix isare provided in Appendix BC.

4.2 ESTABLISH INVESTIGATION TEAM

The responsibility to establish the Investigation Team is with the initiating PUL,

Director HSE, and Business Unit Leader. An Owner for the investigation will be

designated.

The Business Unit Leader and Department Manager shall initiate the investigation by

issuing “Terms of Reference” to the Investigation Team Leader.

Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference detail the requirements of the investigation and give official

status to the investigation. In particular they will:

 identify references

 define the scope of work

 list the team members

 provide objectives/guidance

 indicate any requirements for intermediate reporting.

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Note: The investigation shall remain strictly within the Terms of Reference and

deviate from them only after discussion with the Owner. A model Terms of

Reference template is provided in Appendix CD.

Copies of the Terms of Reference shall be provided to the Investigation Team and

the Site Manager.

The Team Leader of the Investigating Team shall discuss the Terms of Reference

with the Owner to ensure that he is fully briefed.

Team Selection

Incident investigation teams are determined according to the type of incident.

Generally, the team will consist of the following:

 a member designated as the Investigation Team Leader

 at least one person knowledgeable in the process involved

 a contract employee, contractor management representative, and / or HSE

representative if the incident involved the work of a contractor

 a person knowledgeable in incident investigation techniques and system

cause analysis

 other persons, as needed, with appropriate knowledge and experience to

thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident, i.e., may include persons

from other assets or within the industry as a third party representative in

major investigations.

Note: For Major Incidents, the Investigation Team Leader and at least one other

member shall be from a different Business Unit (GHSER requirement).

Team Mobilisation

All teams shall be mobilized within 48 hours of the incident.

4.3 CONDUCT INVESTIGATION

The Team Leader is responsible for completing the investigation.

Scope and Objectives

The investigation shall:

 establish the facts surrounding the incident

 review the application of management systems and management

practices and their impact

 identify system causes and make recommendations to prevent

recurrence.

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Fact Finding

Information on the incident can be obtained by collecting information from people,

positions, parts and papers.

Interviews with witnesses shall be carried out as soon as possible after the incident;

while the incident is fresh in their minds and before too much discussion has taken

place with their colleagues.

Witnesses should be interviewed individually, so that they are not interrupted or

questioned by others involved. One member of the team shall interview the witness

and a second record the interview. Interview transcripts must be signed by the

intervieweeThe interviewee must sign interview transcripts.

Checklists are useful in the early stages to keep the full range of inquiry in mind, but

they cannot cover all possible aspects of an investigation, nor can they follow all

individual leads back to system causal factors. To ensure that all facts are

uncovered, ask the broad “who, what, where, when, why and how” open-ended

questions.

Establish the Sequence of Events

As the investigation progresses, the investigators should begin to identify the

sequence of events and concentrate efforts on increasing their knowledge in areas of

uncertainty.

As the extent of physical factors involved in an incident becomes clear, the

investigators should shift the emphasis of their investigation and questioning to the

system causes and the reasons for people‟s actions.

Establish a chronology of events by date, time and place. The construction of a

diagram showing the connections between the various events and conditions leading

up to the incident, called Sequence of Events, is a useful technique in the

investigation process, especially for more complex incidents.

Establish Findings

The findings of the investigation should establish the system causes of the incident

so that corrective measures can be taken to prevent future incidents.

4.4 ANALYSE FINDINGS

Identify Critical Factors and Causes and Make Recommendations

The investigation process shall identify actions to prevent recurrence. This is

achieved by addressing the substandard acts and conditions and by identifying and

correcting the latent failures.

Not all causes can be completely eliminated and some may be eliminated only at

prohibitive cost. Some recommendations will, therefore, be focused on reducing the

risk to a tolerable level, while others will be focused on improving protective systems

(the defenses) to limit the consequences.

At least one recommendation should be made for each finding.

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Actions shall be ranked for order or priority as follows.

1. Requires immediate action before activity at the site resumes.

2. Must be completed to an agreed plan.

3. Should be considered but not a priority.

System Cause Analysis

All incident findings should be reviewed to determine the critical factors, immediate

causes and system causes of the incident.

Identification of system causes of an incident may often reveal underlying

management system failures that resulted in the incident occurring.

System causes should be correlated with Getting HSE Right, and other controlled

documents to determine recommendations to prevent recurrence.

System Cause Analysis is a:

 process for analyzing incidents.

 means to provide consistent and repeatable results.

 means of providing objective and not punitive results.

 means of providing final results from which system causes can be

identified. Once identified, actions can be taken to correct the cause and

prevent a similar type incident.

After examining all the critical factors involved in an incident and arriving at the

system causes, a good check to use is to ask, “If these system causes were

corrected, would this prevent the incident from happening again?” If the answer is no,

further evaluation is needed.

System Cause Analysis - Example

It is very easy to mistake an immediate cause for a system cause of an incident. As

stated above, the system causes of an incident will often be a management system

failure. The following example illustrates this point:

A spill occurred when an employee overflowed a fuel truck while loading it at

the bulk fuel loading facility.

The initial investigation revealed that the operator of the truck overestimated

the amount of fuel required to fill the truck. By the time he realized he was

running out of tank capacity, he couldn’t reach the shutoff switch before the

truck overflowed.

The initial finding was that the operator of the fuel truck was inattentive.

However further questioning of the driver and a survey of the scene revealed

that the truck was being loaded from the top and the emergency shutoff

switch for top loading was not functioning properly. This required the operator

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to climb down off of the truck and to enter the pump room to shut off the flow

of fuel. The malfunctioning switch had been reported several weeks prior to

the incident but had not yet been repaired.

Note: One system cause of the incident was subsequently found to be a

management system that allowed a critical component of an emergency

shutdown system to remain in service while not functioning properly.

After arriving at one of the most obvious causes of the incident, it is important to ask,

“Why?” In the case above, asking why the employee overflowed the tank resulted in

the identification of the malfunctioning switch, and the need for a system to prioritize

work requests so critical safety components are repaired as soon as possible.

The BP System Cause AnalysisComprehensive List of Causes Chart see Appendix

DE shall be used to determine system causes for all incident investigations.

4.5 COMPILE REPORT

Note: Minor Incidents need only be reported on the Incident Investigation Report

form (Appendix C) (see Appendix E). Major and High Potential Incident

Reports must follow the layout described.

Records

A copy of all BP Major Investigation Reports shall be kept in the Business Unit files

and in Corporate HSE files. The incident shall also be entered into the Accident and

Incident Data Base. The original of the report will be kept in the files of the site or

area in which the incident occurred for the life of the facility.

Report Outline

The report contents should adhere to the following outline:

Title Page: Includes title, location and date of the incident and date of the report.

Executive Summary: “High-level” summarized description of the incident,

highlighting significant findings/ conclusions and referencing the investigating team‟s

recommendations. Should be restricted to one page.

Table of Contents: A listing of the report contents and page numbers.

Terms of Reference: An example is attached in the Appendix CD.

Core report: Critical factors identified during investigation should be addressed

clearly and specifically. Critical factors are those events which if eliminated would

prevent the incident from occurring or significantly reduce the severity of the incident.

Incident Description: Describe the situation before the incident, what happened

during the incident and actions taken after the incident. The questions who, what,

where and when must be answered.

Discussion of the Evidence & Losses: This section should take the Leader

through the logical discussion of the evidence whichevidence that leads to the

conclusion of immediate causes.

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Immediate Causes: These are “symptoms” of the system causes and may be

identified by utilizing the Incident Investigation Report (Appendix E) form (Appendix

C) and the System Cause AnalysisCLC Chart (Appendix DE).

System Causes: Categorized as “Basic CausesSystem Causes” on the Incident

Investigation Report form (Appendix C) (Appendix E) and “System Causes” on the

System Cause AnalysisComprehensive List of Causes Chart (Appendix DE), they

are the “whys” of the immediate causes.

Recommendations to Prevent Recurrence: Review each of the immediate and

system causes to develop recommended actions to address all identified risks. If

causes and recommendations are related to other Controlled Documents and/or

regulations, i.e., Traffic Regulations of Azerbaijan / Georgia, those documents should

be referenced.

Signatories: After the report has been reviewed and agreed by the Owner, the

Investigation Team Leader will sign the report as representative of the Investigation

Team and the Owner will sign the report to signify acceptance of the findings and

recommended actions on behalf of the Business Unit.

Appendices: Appendix A - Incident Investigation Report - This initial report will be

completed by the Incident Investigation Team. It is the primary

information required to document the incident on Accident and

Incident Reporting database.

Appendix B - Diagrams and Photographs - To correlated and

illustrate locations and/or progressive locations of people, equipment,

etc. that were influential in incident cause and/or prevention.

Appendix C - Documentation - This information is generally the most

difficult to find, but the most objective. It is the primary reason why at

least one team member must be knowledgeable of the process

(operations / maintenance).

Supporting documentation of relevance to the overall report should be

contained in this section. This should include statements from

witnesses, photographs or drawings, copies of Work Permits, or other

documents of importance. If equipment was damaged the details

could be recorded in this section.

Appendix D - Interviews - Most information during investigation is

obtained from people. They must be interviewed separately and as

quickly as practical. The longer the interval between incident and

interview, the more distorted the information becomes.

Interview statements should not be a verbatim record of each

interview, but should summarize the information gained at each

interview. The detailed interview notes may be appended to the report

or archived as considered appropriate.

Note: At least one team member must be trained and competent in

interviewing.

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Non-Contributory Factors

The Team may find deficiencies when investigating an incident, which have no

bearing on the incident or outcome. If recorded these must be clearly stated as such

in the report.

4.6 REVIEW WITH MANAGEMENT

BP Management

The report will be reviewed with management to confirm that the technical aspects

are correct and the Terms of Reference have been met. The recommendations

should be reviewed and action items assigned to a responsible party with target

completion dates and priorities before the report is submitted to the Owner.

Contractors

For investigations involving contractor owned / operated worksites or equipment,

located on BP operated areas, efforts will be made to obtain agreement on the report

context by BP and contractor management.

4.7 AGREE WITH OWNER

Each action in the recommendations must have been assigned to a person

accountable for the action, a target date for completion and a risk rating

(low / medium/ high).

The Owner is responsible for making the actions, required completion date, and risk

rating, known to the person accountable for the action and assuring timely

completion).

4.8 ACTIONS

For all Incident Reports, the basic causes and actions must be agreed with the

Owner before the final „approved‟ or signed off report is produced. Recommended

actions must state explicitly what is to be done, when and by whom.

Owner

The Owner (Site Manager for Minor Incidents or PUL or Manager for Major Incidents)

shall allocate actions to a Responsible Party. The Owner and Responsible Party shall

reach an understanding on the scope of the action and the time by which it is to be

completed.

Responsible Party

The Responsible Party shall ensure that the action is closed out in the Action and

Incident Data Base. An action will not be considered finalised until the database has

been updated.

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Close Out of Actions

Each Performance Unit shall establish a process for tracking the close out of actions.

This shall be done on a monthly basis by the Managers directly accountable to the

Performance Unit LeaderThe Managers directly accountable to the Performance Unit

Leader shall do this on a monthly basis. The Performance Unit Leader shall be

notified of the number of overdue actions each month. Actions resulting from Major

Incidents, High Potential Incidents, Day Away From Work Cases and significant

audits will be tracked to resolution at the BU level in Tr@ction. Actions resulting from

Field Code Changed

minor incidents will be tracked by means of action tracking system operated at PU

level.

Incident Report Originator

Each Performance Unit shall formally appoint Incident Report Originators who will be

responsible for entering Incident Reports into the database and closing actions in the

database when advised to do so by Responsible Parties.

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5 REPORT DISTRIBUTION

All incidents reports shall be copied to:

 the Owner

 the Site Manager (if he is not the Owner)

 Responsible Parties (i.e. those allocated remedial actions)

 the senior HSE person of the BU or service unit

 HSE Director (Major Incident and HiPo Reports as defined above only).

When the Incident Report is entered directly into the Accident and Incident Data

Base, the report may be distributed by use of an e-mail referring the recipient to the

report reference number and title in the database. Paper copies must be circulated to

/ from sites which do not have access to the database.

6 STORAGE OF RECORDS

6.1 MAJOR INCIDENTS

The master copy of the report must be retained on file by the business

unitPerformance Unit and the copy sent to the HSE Director must be retained in the

Corporate BU HSE Department files.

6.2 MINOR INCIDENTS

When a site has access to the Accident and Incident Data Base Tr@ction, the report

Field Code Changed

in the database is sufficient record of the incident. (The approval process built into

the data base means no signed copy needs to be retained).

When a site does not have access to the Tr@ction Accident and Incident Data Base

Field Code Changed

a copy of the report signed by the Originator and Owner must be retained on the site

and forwarded to the BU HSE Department.

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Appendix A - Major Incident /High Potential Notification Pro-Forma

BP Major Incident Announcement

URGENT

Send by E-mail to the relefant distribution list. Add other addressees as necessary to meet BU or

Regional requirements e.g. local Management Team, Joint Venture partner

Business Unit:

Issued by:

Country:

Location of incident:

Date of incident:

Time of incident:

Brief account of incident (Report as fact only what you are clear is fact. Specify the status of anything

else which you report, e.g., a belief or an estimate):

People:

No. of injuries

No. of fatalities

Description / details

Employee

Contractor

Third party

Business impact/damage/loss:

External agencies involved:

News media coverage seen:

What assistance has been requested:

BP person in charge

Business Unit Leader

of response/

investigation

Office telephone:

Mobile telephone:

Home telephone:

Incident Report Form

Formatted

REPORT TITLE

[Performance Unit]

INCIDENT REPORT

GENERAL INFORMATION

INCIDENT TYPE

(Mark x)

Near Miss

dd/mm/yy

Time

Injury / Illness

Facility/Site

Material Release

Area/Module/Delivery Unit

Property Damage/Fire

Companies involved

Business Interruption

Drilling & Wells

/ Construction

/ Production & Maintenance /

Incident Function

Security

Other / Fabrication Yards & Construction

Not work related

Responsible contact

[Name, Job Title]

Reputation

WORK PROCESS

Catering

Diving

Lifting/Loading

Storage

Commissioning

Drilling

Pipe laying

Testing

Construction

Inspection

Production/Injection

Transporting (Specify)

Demolition

Maintenance

Survey

Wire line / well service

Discharging Products

Normal Operation

Shutting down

Other (Specify)

INCIDENT DESCRIPTION, LESSONS LEARNED, COMMENTS

[Report as fact only what you are clear is fact. Specify status of anything else you report, e.g. estimate/belief]

[Lessons learned]

[Weather/Ground Comments]

OUTPUTS (use extra pages for multiple injuries)

PERSONAL INJURY (underline necessary item)

Nature of

Type of contact

First Aid Treatments

Work

injury/illness:

dy part

1. Non-prescription medication at non-

Caught Between;

injured:

prescriptive strength

Abrasion; Amputation;

Chemical Substances; Cold

2. Tetanus immunizations

Avulsion; Bite; Blister; Blood Borne

Substances; Diving Related;

3. Cleaning, flushing or soaking wounds on the

YES

Pathogen; Burn-Chemical; Burn-

Electricity; Eye flash; Fall from

surface of the skin

Thermal; Carpal Tunnel Syndrome;

Height; Fall from Ladder/Steps;

Disp

4. Using wound coverings such as bandages,

Chemical Exposure; Concussion;

Fire or Explosion; Foreign Body

Band-AidsTM, guaze pads, est., or using

Classific

in Eye; Fumes or Gas; Handling

Contusion/Bruise; Death; Dislocation;

Formatted

butterfly bandages or Steri-StripsTM

Dust Disease - lung; Electric Shock;

Goods or Materials;

5. Hot or cold therapy

ation:

Fracture; Hernia; Impalement; Incision;

Lifting/Handling Equipment

Formatted

6. Any non-rigid means of support

Failed; Loss of Containment;

Fatality

Irritation; Laceration; Loss of

7. Temporary immobilization devices

Consciousness (asphyxiation); No

Machinery; Radiation; Slip or

8. Drilling of a fingernail or toenail to relieve

DAFWC

apparent Injury; Occupational Skin

Fall at same level; Struck

pressure, or draining fluid from a blister

Restricte

Disease; Physical Agent Disorder

Against; Struck by; Structural

9. Using eye patches

d work Medical

(e.g., heat, cold); Poisoning; Puncture

Failure; Transport; Use of Hand

10. Removing foreign bodies from the eye

Treatment

W ound; Respiratory Condition - Toxic

Tools; Other (Specify)

using only irrigation of a cotton swab

First aid

Agent; Sprain or Strain; Standard

11. Removing splinters or foreign material from

Threshold Shifts (STS); Trauma

areas other that the eye by irrigation, tweezers,

treatment

Disorder (e.g., noise, vibrations); Other

cotton swabs or other simple means

(Specify)

12. Using finger guards

13. Using massages

Overtime

Age

Male/Female

Occupation

Experienc

Person Affected

14. Drinking fluids for relief of heat stress

Yes No

BP / Contractor / 3^rd Party

MATERIAL RELEASE

Material

Tot

Not

Release Type

Released to

Released

al Volume

recovered

Atmospheric /Leak /Spill / Waste

Water /Air /Ground /Containment

Disposal

Area

TRANSPORTATION

Type (Car, Truck, Aircraft,

Driver

Road / Accident type / Load / Other comments

Maritime, etc.)

Bp /Contractor

[Be specific]

/3^rd Party

PROPERTY/EQUIPMENT DAMAGE/ FIRE

Description

Loss in $

Comments

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6) - page 4