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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 43

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Through the four General Departments, the CMC exercises administrative control and

political leadership over the Military Regions, the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Second

Artillery, and several military academic institutions. (See Figure 3-1, on p. 62, for a

graphic representation.) Vertical lines of authority are structured around functional areas

of authority (described in Table 3-2, above), not around the different military services.²³⁰

The four General Departments are mirrored at each level of the PLA bureaucracy by an

administrative department: for instance, each Military Region has a Headquarters

Department (associated with the GSD), a Political Department, a Logistics Department,

and an Armaments Department. These departments exist at the army/corps, division, and

regiment levels, and are tasked by the unit commander to carry out any policies sent

down by the relevant General Department. Figure 3-2 shows how these vertical lines

work.

Figure 3-2: Vertical lines in the PLA

Central Military Commission

General

General

General

General

Staff

Political

Logistics

Armaments

Dept

Dept

Dept

Dept

Nanjing Military

Region (MR)

Headquarters

MR

MR

MR

MR

Headquarters

Political

Logistics

Armaments

Dept

Dept

Dept

Dept

Solid arrow = command or “leadership” relationship

Dotted arrow = “guidance” or “professional” relationship

²²⁹China’s National Defense in 2006, III: “China’s Leadership and Administration System for National

Defense.”

²³⁰ Nan Li, The Central Military Commission and Military Policy in China,” p. 76.

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Horizontal lines

Horizontal lines of authority

(literally,

“pieces” or kuai; 块 ) exist within a single

jurisdiction, such as a province or a Military Region. These lines coordinate issues across

that jurisdiction.

•

This means coordinating issues

COORDINATING ISSUES AT THE TOP:

across functional areas within a

LEADING SMALL GROUPS

single military unit: for instance,

procuring materials for training

At its very highest levels, the Chinese

tasks might require input from

government must coordinate issues across

the headquarters, logistics, and

Party, State, and army, and between policy-

armaments departments in a

setting bodies and policy-implementing

single unit.

bodies. It appears to do so through a series of

tightly knit, rather secretive bodies called

•

It also means coordinating not

“leading small groups” (lingdao xiaozu; 领导

just

within that

military

小组), or LSGs. The purpose of these bodies

jurisdiction, but also with the

is not to formally set policy, but to serve as a

local civilian administration.

locus of policy coordination, communication,

The joint civil-military tasks

and consultation.

discussed previously - such as

finding civilian

jobs for

Little information about these groups is

demobilized military personnel

available to foreigners or even to the Chinese

or coordinating the maintenance

citizenry, and their exact membership is

of military equipment and

unknown; however, it appears that high-level

supplies - are examples of tasks

PLA personnel sit on several LSGs, including

requiring

horizontal

the Foreign Affairs LSG and the National

coordination with

the local

Security Affairs LSG. In this way, the PLA,

government.

along with other concerned Party and State

organs, can weigh in on issues that stretch

Horizontal lines exist all the way up to

across their different bureaucracies.²³¹

the central government, where multiple

ministries are often required to

coordinate policy-making efforts. This

system is sometimes called

“decentralized

management.”²³²

²³¹ For more on LSGs, see e.g. Carol Lee Hamrin, “The Party Leadership System,” in Kenneth G.

Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 95-124; Cheng, Gunness, and Bellacqua, An

Exploration of the Evolving PLA Elite, pp. 163-69.

²³² There are some indications that the central government is moving to consolidate some of these

horizontal functions into single organizations, essentially “re-centralizing” some organizations into vertical

networks. Moves in this direction were announced at the Second Plenary Session of the 17^th Party Congress

in March 2008. See, e.g., “Responsible Official From Central Organization Committee General Office

Answers Questions From Renmin Ribao and Xinhua News Agency Reporters on Deepening Reforms of

the Administrative System and Organizational Structure,” 11 Mar 2008, OSC CPP20080311074003; and

Hua Jianmin, “Explanation on Reforming State Council Organizations,” 11 Mar 2008, OSC

CPP20080311074016. Horizontal networks also tend to give a degree of power to local governments.

Recent policy decisions suggest that the PRC central government is attempting to reassert some degree of

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• Logistics officers (houqin junguan; 后勤军官)

• Armaments officers²³⁵ (zhuangbei junguan; 装备军官)

• Specialized technical officers (zhuanye jishu junguan; 专业技术军官).

Four of these five categories correspond to the four General Departments. (Specialized

technical officers, who are responsible for equipment maintenance, repair, research,

development, and testing, may belong to any functional category, though they are most

frequently associated with the logistics or armaments tracks.²³⁷) Officers are tracked into

one of these systems when they are commissioned, are trained and educated throughout

their career in the same system, serve in units and headquarters within that system, and

do not routinely transfer from one system to another until they have reached quite a high

position (MR deputy leader or above) in

the military hierarchy.

(The one

SOLVING VERTICAL STOVEPIPING

exception is political officers, who - as

THROUGH HORIZONTAL COORDINATION

discussed earlier in this chapter - often

start their careers in a command or other

A 2004 newspaper article reported on a PLA

Navy officer who was promoted but did not

non-political billet.) As a result, PLA

officers are generally more narrowly

receive the pay raise he was expecting. Upon

specialized

than

their

American

investigation, the base’s command staff and

counterparts. Appendix 4 of this study

Party committee discovered that the various

depicts the notional career path of a

departments responsible for pay raises and

“cost of living fees” (including the finance,

typical “tracked” PLA officer.

cadre, military affairs, training, and health

Strong vertical lines encourage stove-

departments) had not coordinated on this

piping of information. Although

officer’s promotion or on many other cases.

vertical lines often lack command

The base Party committee was tasked with

authority, the PLA still tends to vertically

funnel information. This can lead to

coordinating these departments horizontally

inadequate

communication

among

across the unit. The Party committee ran

members of a military unit who belong to

educational activities for members of the

different vertical lines.

relevant departments, and devised base

regulations on the disbursement of cost of

This tendency is theoretically offset by

living fees, in accordance with regulations

the unit management structure: the

set forth by the four General Departments.²³⁶

commander and political commissar

should be well versed in all the issues

that the unit is dealing with, and the Party

committee provides a forum in which information should be shared across vertical

²³⁵ Sometimes translated as “equipment officers.”

²³⁶ Renmin Haijun, 30 Sept 2004, p. 1.

²³⁷ Elizabeth Hague, “PLA Career Progressions and Policies,” p. 264. See also Dennis J. Blasko, The

Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21^st Century (New York: Routledge, 2006), p.

55.

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Personnel grades

Table 3-3: Grade levels and their names

Every officer in the PLA also

has a grade level, sometimes

CMC Chairman (junwei zhuxi; 军委主席)

1

called a

“duty grade”

(zhiwu

Vice Chairman (junwei fuzhuxi; 军委副主席)

dengji; 职 务 等 级 ). It is an

officer’s grade that most clearly

CMC Member (junwei weiyuan; 军委委员)

2

signals his status in the PLA

hierarchy. The importance of the

MR Leader²³⁹ (daqu zhengzhi; 大区正职)

3

grade system is indicated in

several ways:

MR Deputy Leader (daqu fuzhi; 大区副职)

4

•

Grade level determines a

PLA officer’s authority

Army/Corps Leader (zhengjun; 正军)

5

vis-à-vis other officers.

For instance, it is because

Army/Corps Deputy Leader (fujun; 副军)

6

the commander and the

political officer in a given

Division Leader (zhengshi; 正师)

7

unit are always of the

same grade that they have

Division Deputy Leader (fushi; 副师)

8

equal authority in the unit.

Regiment Leader (zhengtuan; 正团)

9

•

Officers at the same

grade level are equal in

Regiment Deputy Leader (futuan; 副团)

10

status even if they have

different ranks.

Battalion Leader (zhengying; 正营)

11

•

An officer’s grade level

determines what billets he

Battalion Deputy Leader (fuying; 副营)

12

is eligible to fill.

Company Leader (zhenglian; 正连)

13

•

Officers’

pay

is

determined first by their

Company Deputy Leader (fulian; 副连)

14

grade level, and only after

that by their military rank

Platoon Leader (zhengpai; 正排)

15

and years of service.²⁴⁰

•

Promotion in

grade

indicates that one is moving up the career ladder. Moving from one grade level to

the next is a promotion; moving from one position to another in the same grade is

a lateral transfer. For example, moving from a position as chief of staff in an MR

headquarters to become deputy commander in the same MR headquarters is not a

promotion, because both have a grade level of MR Deputy Leader.

²³⁹ “Leader” = grade equivalent to the commander and political officer of a unit. “Deputy leader” = grade

equivalent to the deputy commander of the unit.

²⁴⁰ “Military Personnel Salary and Benefits,” Jiefangjun Bao, 14 Jan 2005, OSC CPP20080226436001.

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• Each grade level is associated with a mandatory retirement age. Upon reaching

that age, an officer must either be promoted or leave the military.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GRADES

Grade levels also permit military officers to compare their positions to civilians in the

government bureaucracy. Like PLA officers, civilian personnel are divided into 15 grades.

One option for PLA officers leaving active duty is to transfer to a civilian government

institution at the same grade as their last military billet. Officers choosing this option will

not receive retirement benefits from the PLA, but their time in the PLA will count toward

retirement from their new civilian positions.²⁴¹ In this way, PLA officers’ grades are

important not just to their status in the military but also to their career prospects after they

leave.

The heads (military commanders and political officers) of units and organizations at each

level hold a grade level equal to that of the unit or organization itself. Their subordinates

hold lower grades, as do personnel serving in lower-level units and organizations.

What about ranks?

Each PLA officer holds one of 10 military

PLA RANKS: HIERARCHY

ranks. The ranks use ground force

Officers are divided into three levels with

terminology and mostly bear titles similar to

U.S. military ranks (as indicated in the shaded

10 ranks (sandeng shiji; 三等十级).

box). PLA Navy and Air Force officers

simply add “Navy” (haijun 海 军 ) or “Air

General officers (jiangguan; 将官):

Force”

(kongjun 空 军 ) before the ground

o general (shangjiang; 上将)

force rank, as in

“Navy general”

(haijun

o lieutenant general (zhongjiang; 中将)

shangjiang 海 军 上 将 ). However, English

o major general (shaojiang; 少将)

translations use American naval ranks, such

as “admiral” rather than “Navy general.”

Field grade officers (xiaoguan; 校官):

o senior colonel (daxiao; 大校).

Rank epaulets allow an observer to fix

o colonel (shangxiao; 上校)

approximately where an officer fits into the

o lieutenant colonel (zhongxiao; 中校)

PLA hierarchy. However, U.S. military

o major (shaoxiao; 少校)

officers of a particular rank should not

assume that PLA officers of equal rank are

Company grade officers (weiguan; 尉官):

their exact counterpart in terms of authority

or responsibilities.

o captain (shangwei; 上尉)

o first lieutenant (zhongwei; 中尉)

o second lieutenant (shaowei; 少尉)

²⁴¹ Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, “Demobilization and Resettlement: The Challenge of Downsizing the

People’s Liberation Army” in David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness, eds., Civil-Military Relations in

Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 263.

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Officers rise in both grade and rank as they are promoted; however, officers’ grades do

not dictate their exact rank, or vice versa.

• With the exception of CMC Chairmen and Vice Chairmen, who are always

generals, each grade level is associated with two ranks: for example, a deputy

Military Region leader could be a lieutenant general or a major general.

• Each rank is associated with as many as four grade levels. Hence, one might see

an officer deferring to another of the same rank, if the former is of a lower grade.

For a graphical representation of how PLA ranks and grades relate to one another, see

Appendix 6.

Determining an officer’s grade: looking for clues

PLA officers may not readily discuss their grade level with outsiders, so when meeting

PLA officers it can be difficult to gauge their place in the PLA hierarchy. However,

officers’ grades can be determined, either approximately or exactly, if one or more of the

following things are known:

Figure 3-3: Rank shoulder epaulets

• Their rank

General/Admiral

• Their job title

• Their uniform insignia.

Lt. General/Vice Admiral

Rank

Maj. General/Rear Admiral

Knowing officers’ ranks - identified by their

shoulder epaulets, as shown in Figure 3-3 -

Sr. Colonel/Sr. Captain

allows an observer to infer their approximate

grade. The reason is that a limited number of

grades can be attained by officers of a

Colonel/Captain

particular rank. For instance, a lieutenant

colonel may hold the grade level of regiment

Lt. Colonel/Commander

leader, regiment deputy leader, or battalion

leader. Appendix 6 illustrates how the ranks

Major/Lt. Commander

and grades correspond.

Job title

Captain/Lieutenant

Officers’ job titles indicate their current billet

(commander, political officer, department

1st Lieutenant/Lieutenant JG

director, etc.). Since each position within a

particular institution corresponds to a specific

2nd Lieutenant/Ensign

grade, an officer’s job title indicates the exact

grade level he has attained. For instance, if

Note: The colors shown here are for PLA

one learns that a PLA officer is the Director of

Navy officers. Colors differ by service,

but the configuration of stars on the

the Political Department for the Nanjing

epaulets is the same for all PLA officers.

Military Region (i.e., the head of a first-level

department of a Military-Region grade

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organization), it can be deduced that he is at the MR Deputy Leader grade level. Of

course, not all job titles make clear exactly what grade level that billet occupies.

Uniform insignia

In the summer of 2007, the PLA introduced a new style of uniforms for officers on which,

for the first time, an officer’s grade can be directly determined from the color and

number of stars on the center ribbon in the top row of ribbons worn on the left chest of

dress uniforms. (The other ribbons worn on the left chest signify years of service.) Table

3-4 shows dress uniform grade insignia.

Table 3-4: Uniform grade insignia

PLA Grades, Ranks, Insignia, and Ribbons

Grad

Ret.

P rimary Rank/

R ows of

Grade

Ins ignia

e #

Age

Secondary

R ibbons

Rank

1

N/A

CMC Vice Chairman

N/A or Gen

7

2

70

CMC Member

Gen

3

65

MR Leader

Gen/Lt Gen

6

4

63

MR Deputy Leader

Lt Gen/Maj Gen

5

Army Leader

Maj Gen/Lt Gen

55

5

6

Army Deputy Leader

Maj Gen/S r Col

7

Divis ion Leader

S r Col/Maj Gen

50

4

8

Divis ion Deputy Leader

Col/S r Col

9

Regiment Leader

Col/Lt Col

45

3

10

Regiment Deputy Leader

Lt Col/Maj

11

Battalion Leader

Maj/Lt Col

40

2

12

Battalion Deputy Leader

Capt/Maj

13

Company Leader

Capt/1^st Lt

35

14

Company Deputy Leader

1st Lt/Capt

1

15

30

P latoon Leader

2nd Lt/1^st Lt

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considered politically reliable will not rise to a leadership position, in the military

or the Party.

• The Party committee system (along with other elements of the political work

system) plays a key role in officer evaluations. Hence, regardless of professional

qualifications, an officer cannot have a successful career in the PLA without

receiving the imprimatur of the CCP via the Party committee system.²⁴³

• Unless one sits on the unit Party committee, one has little to no direct role in unit

decision-making. This excludes all non-Party members

(particularly enlisted

personnel, many of whom are not Party members), as well as unit personnel who

are Party members but who were not selected to be on the unit Party committee

by the next higher level Party committee.

The length of time an officer has been a Party member and her role in the Party

committee system are thus strong determinants of her status vis-à-vis her fellow

personnel. This may help explain some professional and social interaction among PLA

officers of various grades and ranks, which, from a Western military perspective, might

be considered instances of “undue familiarity” or disregard for rank and authority.²⁴⁵

SEPARATING PLA POSITION AND PARTY AUTHORITY

The PLA promotes the principle that personnel’s different positions in a unit should not

affect their authority within the Party committee, where all members are theoretically

equal (see Chapter 4). However, the PLA may be struggling to square this egalitarian

ideal with the realities of command relationships.

For example, a July 2002 PLA newspaper article reported that NCOs - who had only

recently been allowed to sit on the Party committees of tactical units - were beginning

to withdraw from these committees in significant numbers. The NCOs complained that

officers serving on the committees acted as if their superior positions also gave them

greater authority in Party organs, so they did not pay attention to NCOs’ opinions. The

article reported that one unit’s Party committee admonished officers to “separate the

relationship between their administrative and Party committee duties.”²⁴⁴

Informal networks

In the CCP and the PLA, certain individuals wield a level of influence disproportionate to

their formal positions. This can be traced largely to their membership in powerful

informal networks based on personal connections, or guanxi.

²⁴³ Gunness, Rosenfield, and Bellacqua, Not Just Party Propaganda, p. 71.

²⁴⁵ Gunness, Rosenfield, and Bellacqua, Not Just Party Propaganda, p. xii.

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GUANXI: THE ART OF RELATIONSHIPS

The concept of guanxi (关系) - literally, “connections” or “relationships” - is a well-

documented element of Chinese social, business, and political practices.²⁴⁶ In general,

guanxi relationships are long-term ties based on a sense of mutual obligation. These

relationships tend to be reinforced by such practices as giving gifts and hosting banquets,

and reflect a traditional emphasis on reciprocal relations as the basis of social order.²⁴⁷

Guanxi may rest on any of a variety of affiliations, including familial and geographical

ties. In modern China, guanxi may be formed among people who fought together in the

Civil War, were sent to work in the same rural units during the Cultural Revolution, or

went to school together.²⁴⁸ Guanxi may provide a way for people to attain positions of

status, by relying on the influence of senior members of their guanxi network.

Guanxi played a significant role in the rise of the CCP. The first generation of CCP

leaders fought together in a protracted civil war, an experience which cemented long-

term loyalties. Once the CCP came to power, one analyst notes, the subsequent

“volatility of Chinese politics” further encouraged leaders to

“rely on personal

relationships to get things done.”²⁴⁹ Some were able to use their guanxi networks to

avoid the purges that characterized Chinese factional politics during the 1950s and

1960s.²⁵⁰

Members of the PLA draw both on connections they formed before entering military

service and on a number of shared military experiences to establish guanxi networks.

PLA-specific networks include:

• Officers who attended the same institutions of professional military education²⁵¹

²⁴⁶ For an overview of the many ways that guanxi affects daily interactions in China, see Thomas Gold,

Doug Guthrie, and David Wank, eds., Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and the Changing

Nature of Guanxi (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

²⁴⁷ For a discussion of these practices in urban settings, see Mayfair Mei-Hui Yang, Gifts, Favors, and

Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); on rural

settings, see Andrew Kipness, Producing Guanxi: Sentiment, Self, and Subculture in a North China Village

(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997). One author notes that people attempting to cement a guanxi

relationship may offer favors now in order to create a sense of obligation for the future; see Xuezhi Guo,

“Dimensions of Guanxi in Chinese Elite Politics,” The China Journal, No. 46 (Jul 2001), p. 74.

²⁴⁸ Pre-existing networks among overseas Chinese are sometimes touted as the reason for their economic

success in many countries. For just one example of the many published works on this topic, see Yadong

Luo, Guanxi and Business (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2000).

²⁴⁹ Xuezhi Guo, “Dimensions of Guanxi in Chinese Elite Politics,” p. 70.

²⁵⁰ Lowell Dittmer, “Chinese Informal Politics,” The China Journal, 34 (Jul 1995), p. 13.

²⁵¹ Mulvenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps, pp. 59-61.

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• Officers whose early service was in particular corps or group armies²⁵²

• Officers who entered the PLA in the same province or region²⁵³

• Officers from particular “generations” or age cohorts²⁵⁴

• Commanders and their former subordinates²⁵⁵

• Officers from prominent military families.²⁵⁶

One analyst notes that the dual-leadership system further encourages the development of

“personal bonds mingled with personal emotions and moral obligations” between

commanders and political officers.²⁵⁷ Another source of long-term ties is the fact that

most PLA officers spend their entire military career in a single region and even in a

single unit: this means that they work with the same people for many years, and develop

relationships with local governments and Party committees.

INFLUENCE WITHOUT TITLES

The most influential leaders in the CCP and the PLA are those who have been able to

cultivate extensive ties and place “loyal friends” within multiple organizations at multiple

levels.²⁵⁸

Deng Xiaoping famously remained China’s “paramount leader” for years after resigning

his last formal leadership post in

1989. Under Deng, the PLA’s Central Military

Commission was dominated by an informal network of “elders” who had fought together

in China’s Revolutionary War. When these leaders retired, they maintained personal

influence through family members, protégés, and personal friends who remained in the

system.²⁵⁹

Under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the influence of this

“elder network” declined

considerably and power became more formalized. However, informal networks are said to

still play a crucial role within the highest levels of China’s defense establishment.

²⁵² Michael Swaine, The Military & Political Succession in China (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), pp.

23-25.

²⁵³ James C. Mulevenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications

(Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), p. 51; Li Cheng and Scott W. Harold, “China’s New Military Elite,” China

Security, Autumn 2007, p. 70-71. Mulvenon points out that more than half of the PLA officer corps from

1989-1994 was born in one of four coastal provinces (Shandong, Hebei, Jiangsu, and Liaoning), with 24

percent from Shandong alone. Ten years later, Cheng and Harold reported that officers from Shandong

continued to make up a disproportionate share of the “military elite.”

²⁵⁴ See William Whitson, “The Concept of Military Generation: The Chinese Communist Case,” Asian

Survey, Nov 1968, pp. 921-947; Cheng and Harold, “China’s New Military Elite,” pp. 71-72.

²⁵⁵ Xuezhi Guo, “Dimensions of Guanxi in Chinese Elite Politics,” p. 70.

²⁵⁶ Cheng and Harold, “China’s New Military Elite,” p. 77. According to the authors, in 2007 three

“princelings,” or sons of prominent military leaders, held posts on the Central Military Commission.

²⁵⁷ Xuezhi Guo, “Dimensions of Guanxi in Chinese Elite Politics,” p. 70.

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Recent publications indicate concern among the PLA leadership that guanxi networks at

lower levels have the potential to undermine discipline and cohesion. They express

particular concern about two types of networks: “soldiers with connections” (guanxi bing;

关系兵) and “hometown ties” (laoxiang; 老乡).

“Soldiers with connections” are enlisted soldiers with close ties to officers above their

immediate superiors. Recent PLA publications report that because of such ties, these

soldiers can be difficult to command. A 2004 newspaper article, for instance, reports that

the commander of a certain company was unable to punish a soldier for poor discipline

because this soldier “had strong connections to leaders above the company commander.”

²⁶¹ A manual for NCOs notes that

TAKING CARE OF OLD FRIENDS

those commanding

“soldiers with

A 2006 newspaper article reported on a

connections” may be subject to

regiment that had sent a group to conduct

entreaties from superiors to

“look

surprise safety and health inspections of its

after” these soldiers when decisions

grassroots units.²⁶⁰ The group found one

are to be made about accession to the

company in such perfect order that they

Party or NCO selection.²⁶²

concluded it must have been warned about the

inspection. The company commander admitted

The importance of “hometown ties”

that a headquarters staff officer had once been

in Chinese society has been well-

the deputy commander of the regiment. In order

documented for many centuries, and

to protect his “old unit,” this officer had leaked

PLA publications indicate that they

news of the upcoming inspection. The offending

remain an important source of

officer was reprimanded, and the regiment’s

informal affiliation among officers

Party committee launched a campaign to rectify

and enlisted personnel.²⁶³

similar disciplinary problems.

²⁵⁸ See David M. Lampton, “A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China,”

in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in

Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 56.

²⁵⁹ Jonathan D. Pollack, “Structure and Process in the Chinese Military System,” in Kenneth G. Lieberthal

and David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1992), pp. 160-161 and 163.

²⁶⁰ Huojianbing Bao,16 Feb 2006, p. 2.

²⁶¹ Renmin Haijun, 17 Jul 2004.

²⁶² Ou Guozheng, Liu Changjian, and Sha Gongping, (eds.), How to Be a Good NCO (zenyang dang

haoshibing; 怎样当好士官) (Beijing: Long March Press, 2000), p. 103; for an example, see Kongjun Bao,

9 Jul 2005.

²⁶³ For instance, home-town connections became the basis for the powerful political organizations that

provided social support and governed social and political relations among San Francisco’s Chinese

population in the late 19^th century; see, e.g., Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850-1943: A Trans-

Pacific Community (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), Chapter 3.

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Party committees make decisions “democratically,” in consultation with all

affected parties.

Although final decisions on major issues are made by unit Party committees, the PLA

professes a commitment to a form of “democracy within the military” (jundui nei de

minzhu; 军队内的民主) that gives all

members of a unit some input.²⁷⁰ The

In the CCP and the PLA, “democracy” means:

PLA’s “democracy” rests on ideals

•

“Consulting” with the masses to ensure

that diverge significantly from

that their needs are met by Party decisions

Western

democratic

traditions,

although both are aimed at

• Giving the masses the right to “criticize”

incorporating the knowledge and

and to

“supervise” their leaders, thus

opinions of the broader public into

ensuring the leaders’ adherence to laws

decision-making.

and Party regulations.²⁶⁹

In his 1948 essay “The Democratic Movement in the Army,” Mao Zedong described the

three forms of

“democracy” he deemed appropriate for the PLA.²⁷¹ These “Three

Democracies” are meant to provide a role for ordinary servicemen in decision-making,

and to employ a modified version of the Leninist principle of “democratic centralism,”

discussed in Chapter 1. Whereas Lenin’s “democratic centralism” was limited to intra-

Party discussions, Mao at times broadened this principle to include all affected persons.

Mao’s “Three Democracies” have undergone a number of refinements, but the PLA

leadership still considers them to be the cornerstone of enlisted personnel’s participation

in unit decision-making.²⁷² The “Three Democracies” are as follows:

²⁶⁹ On “democracy” within the military, see, e.g., Ou Guozheng, Liu Changjian, and Sha Gongping, eds.,

How to Be a Good NCO (zenyang dang hao shiguan; 怎样当好士官) (Beijing: Long March Press, 2000), p.

154; Zhou Guangde and Zhu Jinhai, Skills for Company Leaders Commanding Troops (lianzhang daibing

jineng; 连长带兵技能) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2005), pp. 96-97. On supervision as a central

element of “military democracy,” see Chen Zhou, Theory and Practice of the PLA Democratic System, pp.

96-97.

²⁷⁰ For a more in-depth discussion of the PLA’s principle of “military democracy” and the PLA’s

“democratic” institutions, see Peter W. Mackenzie, From the Masses, to the Masses: Servicemen’s

Committees and PLA ‘Democracy,’ CNA Information Memorandum D0019043.A1/Final (Alexandria, VA:

CNA, 2008), OSC CPP20081110325005.

²⁷¹ Mao Zedong, “The Democratic Movement in the Army” (1948), Selected Works of Mao Zedong

(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), Vol. IV, pp. 191-92,

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_27.htm. See also Chen

Zhou, Theory and Practice of the PLA Democratic System, pp. 36, 37.

²⁷² See e.g. Zhang Shusen and Cao Xueyi, eds., Guidebook to Military Life (junlü shenghuo zhinan; 军旅生

活指南), 2^nd Edition (Beijing: People’s Armed Police Publishing House, 2007), p. 265; Sai Zhongbao,

Interview with PLA Official, “Important Measures to Strengthen the Army’s Internal Democracy

Building,” Jiefangjun Bao, 7 Aug 2007, p. 3, OSC CPP20070807710003.

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Political democracy. Officers and enlisted personnel are politically equal. All have

the right to criticize leaders, offer suggestions, and report abuses of power and

violations of discipline. Leaders solicit the ideas and opinions of the “masses” of

enlisted personnel before making decisions.

Economic democracy. Enlisted personnel have the right to supervise and take part in

their unit’s economic management, including such issues as mess expenses and

provisioning.

MILITARY DEMOCRACY IN ACTION

Military democracy. Enlisted

personnel have the opportunity to

“Before our assault on Shijiazhuang

[in

provide ideas and suggestions

November

1947], we called for giving

before military operations are

precedence to studying how to attack the city,

conducted. Training is to be

with senior and junior cadres holding a

conducted on the basis of “mutual

meeting together. When we were fighting we

learning” between officers and

also held meetings, and also when we were

enlisted personnel.

unable to advance. On the firing line, three to

five people would still hold meetings,

As discussed in Chapter 1, the two

especially branch personnel, to bring up

components of Maoist

“democratic

leadership functions

The result was that

centralism” dictate, first, that all

soldiers worked as a team, with each man

affected individuals engage in debate

doing his part, to obtain victory.”²⁷³

before a decision is made, and, second,

— Zhu De, “Letter to the CCP Central Committee and

that once a decision is made by the

Comrade Mao Zedong” (Dec 1947)

Party leadership, everyone must

conscientiously implement the decision even if they do not agree with it.²⁷⁴

Accordingly, PLA decision-makers are supposed to conduct broad consultations with

members of both the Party committee and the unit as a whole, and to allow energetic

debates to take place before a decision is made.²⁷⁵ The processes by which these

consultations are conducted are discussed later in this chapter.

Decisions are made collectively.

Party leaders in PLA units are supposed to abide by the principle of

“collective

leadership” (jiti lingdao; 集体领导). This principle holds that no single individual has the

²⁷³ Selected Works of Zhu De (Zhu De xuanji; 朱德选集) (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1983), pp.

225-26.

²⁷⁴ Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: W.W. Norton,

2004), p. 193.

²⁷⁵ Chen Zhou, Theory and Practice of the PLA Democratic System, p. 71.

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PLA decision-making practices

Consensus-based decision-making within PLA units tends to follow certain steps.

1. Discussion and debate

PLA publications suggest that

INSUFFICIENT DISCUSSION?

vigorous debate and discussion is

indispensable to developing new

Recent PLA newspaper articles suggest a

policies, especially at higher levels. In

concern that there may be too little debate in

practice, this ideal has received

PLA Party committees. These articles suggest

varying degrees of adherence over the

that PLA leaders are particularly troubled that

years. Chairman Mao, for instance,

NCOs, who have recently been allowed to sit on

often consulted with a group of high-

company-level Party committees, do not

level civilian and military leaders

participate enough in committee discussions.

about policy decisions; in most cases,

One article points out, for instance, that

however, the

“consensus” that

although PLA Navy companies have set aside

resulted from these meetings reflected

company-level Party branch posts for NCOs,

Mao’s personal preferences.²⁸¹ At

these NCOs “are reticent to speak up during

times, most infamously in the

Committee meetings and worry that their

“Hundred

Flowers”

movement

suggestions will not be viewed favorably.”

(baihua yundong; 百花运动) of 1956

Thus, they are “usually very quiet during times

and 1957, Mao encouraged a broad

of discussion and decision making.”²⁸⁰

public debate on policy issues, only to

use this debate to identify and punish critics.²⁸²

In recent years, the Party has again encouraged open discussions on policy issues within

decision-making bodies, especially with regard to doctrinal issues.

²⁸⁰ Renmin Haijun, 29 May 2003 and 24 Apr 2004.

²⁸¹ Michael Swaine, “Chinese Crisis Management: Framework for Analysis, Tentative Observations, and

Questions for the Future,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., Chinese National Security

Decisionmaking Under Stress (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), p.

25.

²⁸² See Jonathan D. Spence, The Search For Modern China, 2^nd Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990),

pp. 539-43.

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DEBATING DOCTRINE

The PLA encourages open discussion on issues relating to military doctrine within its

professional newspapers and journals. Much can be gleaned about recent doctrinal debates

from these publications. For readers of PLA periodicals, a series of articles expressing a

variety of views on a similar topic usually indicates several things:

• The PLA is considering a doctrinal adjustment in this area.

• PLA institutions are probably engaged in formal research efforts on this topic.

• The course of adjustment has not yet been decided. These articles indicate the range

of views being explored.²⁸³

However, once a doctrinal concept has been settled upon and codified by the CMC, public

debate appears to cease completely. Just as they are used to announce the beginning of a

doctrinal debate, PLA newspapers and journals also signal that debate has ended, consensus

has been reached, and a decision has been made. This type of message is normally sent by

way of articles announcing the issuance of new regulations.²⁸⁴ From that point forward, the

expression of contending views stops and all voices rally around the new guidance.²⁸⁵

2. Bargaining

After allowing sufficient time for debate, Party committees build consensus through a

process of bargaining. CCP and PLA leaders at all levels must wait to act until the

complex trade-offs involved in this process have been concluded and a consensus has

emerged.²⁸⁶

One recent analysis of CCP decision-making notes that this process occurs largely behind

the scenes; the particulars of discussions and the various bargaining positions are not

discussed outside the Party committee “until decisions have been reached and the unified

line is ready for public viewing.”²⁸⁷

²⁸³ Maryanne Kivlehan, Doctrinal Change in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Institutions, Processes,

and Influences, CNA Research Memorandum D0008391.A2/Final (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2003), p. 65.

²⁸⁴ Kivlehan, Doctrinal Change in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, p. 103.

²⁸⁵ Kivlehan, Doctrinal Change in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, p. 81.

²⁸⁶ David M. Lampton, “A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China,” in

Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-

Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 35.

²⁸⁷ Susan Puska, “SARS 2002-2003: A Case Study in Crisis Management,” in Scobell and Wortzel,

Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress, p. 94.

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PLA newspapers from the past several years indicate that although holding meetings is

still considered an appropriate way to gather “democratic” input, PLA leaders are seeking

to moderate what they view as an excessive proliferation of meetings. The articles

suggest that the meetings often take attention away from important operational tasks.

THE TROUBLE WITH MEETINGS

Recent PLA media articles have cited the burden of frequent meetings. For example:

On 15 January 2004, Renmin Haijun reported that the PLA Navy Political Department

had set forward guidance for naval headquarters on the “three do nots (san bu; 三不),”

the first of which was “do not hold useless meetings.” The article noted that because of

the overabundance of meetings, “grassroots level work units were overwhelmed.”

On 25 May 2004, a Kongjun Bao article quoted an Air Force company commanding

officer who reported having to attend five to six meetings per day: “There are too many

meetings, so many in fact that he cannot get his work done.”

In January 2006, Renmin Haijun reported that a field navigation station had not had

running water for over a month. Faulty pipes had not been fixed because “the period at

the end of a year and beginning of the new one is filled with meetings…command staff

is often taken away from taking care of important problems like this one.”

The bureaucratic process is slow.

The PLA’s emphasis on consensus-building can make decision-making an extremely

slow process, and can limit flexibility during times of crisis. Western analysts of the CCP

and the PLA have made the following observations:

The need to solicit and balance a wide range of views, and then build consensus

among a number of different actors, can slow down the process of policy

formulation.²⁹⁹ Though this process gives decision-makers access to useful

information, opinions, and ideas, it also requires a significant amount of time to

process and discuss all this information. Since CCP decision-making is largely closed,

this delay can convey to outsiders the impression that decision-makers are afflicted by

“policy paralysis.”³⁰⁰

Too many people have a veto in the bargaining process, which can be a recipe

for infighting and inertia.³⁰¹ If a significant minority holds out for greater

concessions, it can hamstring the process.³⁰²

²⁹⁹ See David Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is It Changing,

and Does It Matter?” in David Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 13.

³⁰⁰ Frank Miller and Andrew Scobell, “‘Decisionmaking under Stress’ or ‘Crisis Management’?: In Lieu of

a Conclusion” in Scobell and Wortzel, Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress, p. 235.

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Chapter 5: Challenges to PLA Culture

Recent PLA writings depict a military whose traditional culture is under bombardment by

internal and external forces. PLA leaders are concerned that changes in society and in the

PLA itself are making it harder to sustain a critical balance between its twin goals,

discussed in Chapter 2, of “winning wars” and “not degenerating.” They worry that if the

PLA does not rise to meet the challenges currently facing it, it will be unable to

accomplish either goal.

Changing world, changing China

PLA publications discuss several trends that are altering the environment in which the

PLA recruits, trains, and operates.

The changing nature of warfare

PLA leaders have long been aware that the PLA lags behind the militaries of other

powerful countries in terms of advanced weaponry, technology, and doctrine. PLA

propaganda has consistently promoted the belief that the PLA’s superior human qualities

allow it to overcome these shortcomings. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, Chinese

armies historically drew upon the country’s large peasant class for the majority of their

personnel. Beyond the simple

availability of large numbers

“Our army’s modernization in recent years has resulted

of able young peasant men,

in significant developments. Nonetheless, China still

Chinese

peasants

were

lags behind neighboring countries, not to mention its

believed to be “possessed of

gap with developed countries. Our army’s

many military virtues, such

modernization level is no match for winning

as

simplicity,

sincerity,

informatized wars. Its military capacity does not fit in

bravery, obedience, tenacity,

well with the army’s historical mission in the new stage

and the ability to stoically

of the new century.”³⁰⁵

endure great hardship.”³⁰⁶

— Two PLA major generals, in an interview with a Chinese journal

However, in recent decades - and especially since observing the U.S. forces’ use of high-

tech weapons and joint operations in the First Persian Gulf War - many PLA strategists

have become convinced that the nature of modern warfare has changed so fundamentally

that Chinese soldiers’ excellent human qualities alone can no longer guarantee victory.

PLA texts warn that unless the PLA upgrades its capabilities to become competitive with

the world’s most advanced militaries, China will not play its rightful role in the world and

will again be vulnerable to the whims of foreign powers.

³⁰⁵ Liu Demou, Yun Shan, and Wu Liang, “The New Mission of the People’s Army” (interview with Major

Generals Yao Youzhi and Fu Liqun at the Academy of Military Science), Liaowang, 8 Jan 2007, pp. 26-28,

OSC CPP20070111710012.

³⁰⁶ Chang Jui-te, “The National Army from Whampoa to 1949,” in David A. Graff and Robin Higham, A

Military History of China (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), p. 203.

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officer corps that had limited technological skills and a narrow knowledge base, and an

enlisted force composed largely of unskilled, poorly educated rural conscripts.³¹⁵

LOOKING FOR A FEW GOOD MEN

Due to the changing demands of 21^st-century warfare, the PLA now seeks:

• Conscripts from urban, educated backg2rounds

• Officers who are better educated and more technically capable

• Personnel who are capable of incorporating new technologies

• Personnel who are innovative and willing to take risks.

However, despite reforms to the personnel system, PLA leaders remain concerned that the

PLA has too many:

• Conscripts who are rural, uneducated, and poor

• Officers who stay too long in their positions and are too slow to adapt to new

techniques and technologies

• Personnel (particularly officers) who are conservative and risk averse.³¹⁶

The PLA now wants to fill its ranks with technically proficient personnel who have

sophisticated critical thinking skills and broad educational backg2rounds. However, it

faces two difficulties in meeting this goal:

The rural, uneducated youths from whom the PLA traditionally drew its

personnel still make up the bulk of the PLA’s enlisted force. Traditionally

peasants were thought to be honest and hardworking, but they do not have the broad

education or the technological know-how to meet the PLA’s current needs.

The urban, educated youth whom the PLA now seeks to recruit increasingly do

not want to join the PLA. In the past, the career opportunities and compensation

level provided by the PLA were comparable to - or better than - those of the

agricultural and state sectors that employed the vast majority of young Chinese.

However, today’s rapidly growing private sector generally offers better pay and more

flexibility to the urban, well-off, educated youths whom the PLA most needs. ³¹⁷

³¹⁵ See, e.g., Shang Chunming, “A Review of New-Era Military Academy Training and a Preview of

Coming Reform and Development,” Junshi Kexue, 1999-4; Cheng Sijin, “The Challenge of Conscription in

an Era of Social Change,” in David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness, eds., Civil-Military Relations in

Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 237-39.

³¹⁶ Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of

Defense, 2008), p. 46; Kenneth Allen and James Bellacqua, Overview of the Chinese People’s Liberation

Army’s Enlisted Forces, CNA Research Memorandum D0014253.A1/Final (Alexandria, VA: The CNA

Corporation, 2006), pp. 6-7.

³¹⁷ See, e.g., Renmin Haijun, 21 Jun 2005, p. 1, which notes that “the disparity between military and

civilian incomes is a constant challenge for political education,” and that “the challenges of recruiting and

retaining these young talented individuals” are difficult.

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useful forums for exchanging opinions and pinpointing problems within the

unit.³³⁶

• Informal debates and discussions, usually convened by a unit’s Party committee,

for the purpose of settling disputes by “airing out the opinion of the two sides”³³⁷

or of exploring all sides of an operational or ideological issue.³³⁸

Challenge: Younger personnel are seen as weak, immature, and morally deficient.

PLA publications indicate serious concern among the PLA leadership about the rise of

the “little emperors” (xiao huangdi; 小皇帝), those born in the years since the one child

policy was implemented. Within the PLA, this generation is viewed as spoiled and soft.

Two factors contribute to this

perception:

THE PLA’S DEPICTION OF ONLY CHILDREN

• As only children, or “single-

“In

2006,

65% of the

[Second Artillery]

child soldiers”

(dusheng

conscripts were only children and

60% were

zibing; 独生子兵), they have

from cities and towns. During new conscript

received the total attention -

training, these conscripts frequently stayed in

and collective aspirations

-

bed, goofed around, or cried. During meals, they

of their parents, and often of

wasted food that they did not find appetizing.

their grandparents as well.

The new conscript company held arduous

education sessions to try and correct their

• Having grown up entirely in

behavior, but met with little success.”³³⁹

the reform period, they have

— Huojianbing Bao, 2006

little experience with the

political chaos and economic

hardship that characterized and “toughened” the generation of citizens who came

of age in the 1950s and 1960s and are now in positions of senior PLA leadership.

On one hand, the little emperors are believed to exhibit “talent” and “innovation.”

PLA publications suggest that these young people, having grown up with greater personal

freedoms and opportunities than their parents, add

“new vigor and vitality to the

undertaking of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”³⁴⁰ A 2007 Jiefangjun Bao survey

of only-child soldiers concluded that most of them “possess a special literary aptitude,

[and] stress the … use of personal competences; their thinking is open and lively, their

³³⁶ Zou Weirong, Yang Jiqing, and Guo Jianyao, “PRC Article Compares Quality of Two ‘Democratic

Life’ Meetings Held by Military,” Jiefangjun Bao, 22 Oct 2003, p. 6, OSCCPP20031022000066.

³³⁷ Huojianbing Bao, 27 May 2006, p. 2

³³⁸ See, e.g., Huojianbing Bao, 20 Jun 2006, p. 2; Kongjun Bao, 16 Dec 2004, p. 2.

³³⁹ Huojianbing Bao, 21 Feb 2006.

³⁴⁰ Jing Zhiyuan and Peng Xiaofeng, “To Unremittingly Cultivate a New Generation with the Innovative

Theory of the Party—Reflections on Learning From and Publicizing the Outstanding University Student

Soldier Gao Ming,” Beijing Qiushi, 16 Oct 2007.

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democratic and competitive consciousness is relatively strong, they are good at

independent thought, and they are relatively self-sufficient.”³⁴¹

A SAMPLING OF PERSPECTIVES ON “ONLY-CHILD

On the other hand, they are

SOLDIERS” IN PLA PUBLICATIONS

perceived as having weak

moral and psychological

•

They are

“delicate and fragile,” and

“cannot

fiber. The ways in which the

handle setbacks.”³⁴²

PLA describes its new

•

They are “soft and materialistic (gonglixing; 功利

generation

of

enlisted

性).”³⁴³

soldiers could apply to young

recruits in any military: they

•

They are “lacking in willpower.”

are viewed as immature,

•

They “easily get into clashes with their comrades-

undisciplined, and overly

in-arms.”

concerned with their peers’

opinions.³⁴⁶

However, the

•

They have

“unsociable

and

eccentric

PLA attributes these traits

personalities.”

less to recruits’ youth than to

•

They “lack a sense of collective identity and a

their status as only children

sense of honor.” ³⁴⁴

or as members of a post-

reform generation.

•

Their “demands and expectations are excessively

high, and when they cannot do as they wish, their

PLA service newspapers run

feelings of disappointment are strong.”

frequent

stories

about

•

They “rely excessively on their affection for their

“single-child soldiers.” One

families and hometowns.”

cites unit-level surveys that

indicate that these soldiers

•

Their “moods fluctuate greatly, and they easily get

are “relatively selfish and are

excited in reaction to events.” ³⁴⁵

unaccustomed to obeying

orders or caring for others” and are “accustomed to getting whatever they want.”³⁴⁷

Training errors and discipline problems are often blamed on soldiers’ only-child status.

³⁴¹ Zhou Weimin, “One Child Families’ Influence on the Thinking of Officers and Enlisted Personnel and

Countermeasures,” Jiefangjun Bao, 7 Nov 2007.

³⁴² Maureen Fan, “China Scouts Colleges to Fill Ranks of Modern Army,” The Washington Post, 17 Dec

2007, p. A01; Zhou Weimin, “One Child Families’ Influence on the Thinking of Officers and Enlisted

Personnel.”

³⁴³ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Hu’s New Goal: Inspiring the PLA for Victory,” China Brief 7:5 (5 Apr 2007).

³⁴⁴ Zhou Weimin, “One Child Families’ Influence on the Thinking of Officers and Enlisted Personnel.”

³⁴⁵ Zhang Wei and Chen Jianzhou, “Harmony and the ‘Soft Power’ of Leaders” (hexie, lingdaozhe de ‘ruan

shili’; 和谐，领导者的“软实力”), Jiefangjun Bao, 14 Sept 2007, p. 6.

³⁴⁶ See, e.g., Sun Shiquan and Liu Zhihong, Dispelling Doubt on Soldier’s Psychological Problems (junren xinli

wenti shiyi; 军人心理问题释疑) (Jinan: Yellow River Press, 2006), p. 161.

³⁴⁷ Huojianbing Bao, 23 Feb 2006, p. 3.

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According to PLA publications, the major faults of only children include:

Fearfulness. A number of PLA newspaper articles recount training problems where

young enlisted soldiers were terrified by live ammunition training, night-time flying,

and other exercises.³⁴⁸ PLA publications contrast the fearfulness of this generation

with the bravery of their predecessors.³⁴⁹

Poor self-control. PLA publications report that the little emperors lack the self-

discipline to curb such behaviors as excessive internet use, drunkenness, fighting,

gambling, and financial irresponsibility.³⁵¹ The latter behavior is of particular concern

both because it undermines the PLA’s public image as a frugal, self-sacrificing

institution, and because it may drive young soldiers into debt from which they have a

hard time recovering. Tendencies

toward conspicuous consumption can

“What [today’s enlisted personnel] are not

also encourage a culture of gift-giving

eager to do themselves, they pay others to

and bribery, which the PLA is eager to

do; they spend a good deal of money when

avoid.

they go on holiday or leave, and are not

willing to take public buses; when they

Lack of discipline. The PLA attributes

wear civilian clothes they pay attention to

many disciplinary problems to the

famous brands, and the “class” of their

“psychological” weaknesses of young

cigarettes gets higher and higher;…The

recruits and to the temptations of the

squads and platoons of some companies

outside world. Examples include

now frequently hold dinner parties.…Some

soldiers going AWOL or taking

soldiers, when they have any sort of good

excessive leave; urban soldiers or

news or happy occasion, everyone yells

college graduates showing disdain for

out ‘treat us,’ so they buy some dishes, go

working in “grassroots units” in rural

out to restaurants, and order some good

areas; and enlisted soldiers refusing to

food and wine to eat and drink

obey commanders whom they find

together.”³⁵⁰

“overly repetitive” or

“untrust-

— Platoon Leaders’ Handbook

worthy.”³⁵²

Aversion to hardship. Today’s young recruits are believed to be either unprepared or

unwilling to “suffer hardship” (chiku; 吃苦), either because as only children they

³⁴⁸ See, e.g., Renmin Haijun, 1 Apr 2004, p. 1, and 31 Aug 2004, p. 1.

³⁴⁹ Kongjun Bao, 4 Sept 2003, p. 4.

³⁵⁰ Liu Shihao, Techniques and Methods for Platoon Leaders Commanding Troops, p. 395.

³⁵¹ See, e.g., Kongjun Bao, 14 Sept 2004, p. 3.

³⁵² Kongjun Bao, 14 Oct 2004, p. 3; Sun Shiquan and Liu Zhihong, Dispelling Doubt on Soldier’s

Psychological Problems, p. 161.

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have been spoiled by their parents, or because as urbanites they have simply never

experienced true hardship. ³⁵³

PLA leaders worry that as younger generations become accustomed to mental

stimulation, information, and entertainment from the outside world, the relatively

sparse barracks lifestyle will become ever more difficult for young troops to endure.

PLA publications on managing enlisted personnel recount dozens of problems,

including the troops’ “growing sense of anxiety” about being cut off from the internet,

their complaints about life on base being boring, resentment among remotely

stationed troops that they did not get urban postings, and so on. ³⁵⁴

In recent years, the PLA has attempted to address some of these complaints by

providing soldiers with more amenities, including better recreational facilities and

higher-quality food, as described earlier in this chapter. However, some PLA officials

are concerned that soldiers’ more comfortable surroundings may soften their resolve,

such that “the affluent living conditions of the peace era may become the root of

misfortune for the corrosion of fighting spirit.”³⁵⁵

Weak devotion to the people. PLA publications suggest that the individualistic

nature of a market economy

undermines the Party’s and the PLA’s

“The negative influences of the market

goal of

“serving the people.” A

economy have increased the difficulty of

Jiefangjun Bao commentary on the

ideological and political construction.… The

2001

“Servicemen’s

Moral

corrosion of the unit by the diversification

Standards” complained that some

of social life and the ideologies of money

personnel

“consider it incompatible

worship,

hedonism,

and

excessive

with the basic principle and inherent

individualism is becoming more and more

law of market economic operations to

widespread…. Officers’ and enlisted men’s

emphasize serving the people .…

ideals and convictions, ideologies, outlooks

They regard serving the people as

on life, and outlooks on morals are facing an

‘mere formality,’ and

.… regard

unprecedented assault.”³⁵⁶

satisfying personal needs as the most

— PLA General, writing about the current state of

tangible benefit.”³⁵⁷

the PLA

Other reports indicate that former

PLA servicemen often expect to receive some “preferential treatment” in looking for

³⁵³ Renmin Haijun, 23 Aug 2005, p. 1; Huojianbing Bao, 23 Feb 2006, p. 1.

³⁵⁴ Lu Jiamo and Heng Xiaochen, eds., 100 Cases in Psychological Counseling for Officers and Enlisted

Soldiers (guanbing xinli shudao yibai li; 官兵心理疏导一百例) (Beijing: PLA Press, 2003), pp. 29, 276.

³⁵⁵ Liu Shihao, Techniques and Methods for Platoon Leaders Commanding Troops, p. 395.

³⁵⁶ Qiu Nengyang, “Strengthening ‘Five Types of Consciousness’ to Ensure the Party’s Absolute

Leadership of the Military,” in Cai Dongchen, ed., Generals Discuss the Military (jiangjun lun bing; 将军

论兵) (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2006), p. 543.

³⁵⁷ Qiao Jinping and Zhou Shanying, “Ethics for Chinese Servicemen,” Jiefangjun Bao, 22 Nov 2001.

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resolved.”³⁶⁷ Such talks are employed in a wide range of situations, from correcting

soldiers’ training errors to dealing with personnel who have gone AWOL.³⁶⁸

Officers are instructed to hold these talks as soon as problems become evident, to

maintain a warm rather than reprimanding tone, and to focus on guiding soldiers to

willingly improve their performance rather than on pressuring or threatening them. Since

lower-level figures of authority, such as squad leaders, traditionally assume the role of a

sympathetic “elder brother” to enlisted soldiers, it is thought by many in the PLA that

soldiers will be most receptive to their persuasion and guidance. “Heart-to-heart talks”

also allow unit leaders to criticize their troops without exposing them to a public loss of

face.

Challenge: Three decades of peace have weakened personnel’s sense of urgency

about the PLA’s missions.

Because the PLA has not engaged in significant conflict since its

1979 war and

subsequent skirmishes with Vietnam nearly thirty years ago, the vast majority of PLA

soldiers have never seen actual combat.³⁷⁰

“Although great wars are not being

PLA publications express concern that China’s

fought right now, that does not mean

long peace has led many personnel to develop

that they will not be fought; we

the

“muddled idea” that they are “peacetime

should see that behind ‘peace’ there is

soldiers.” This phenomenon is described in a

still the scent of gunpowder; we

leadership manual for squad leaders:

should not have the mindset of being

When a line forms, they are the last to come

‘peacetime’ soldiers.”³⁶⁹

out of the dormitory; when the troops

— Guidebook to Military Life

assemble on the drilling ground, they are the

last to take their place in the ranks; during exercises, they always have a few small

problems

When you look for reasons, they say, “It’s peacetime now, we’ll never

fight a war,” “These are exercises, not war-fighting or being on duty,” or “These

are not real guns and bullets, so there’s no need to be so serious.”³⁷¹

The “peacetime soldier” phenomenon has potentially harmful effects on PLA values and

on its operational capabilities, including the following:

³⁶⁷ Ou Guozheng, Liu Changjian, and Sha Gongping, eds., How To Be a Good NCO (zenyang dang hao

shiguan; 怎样当好士官) (Beijing: Long March Press, 2000), p. 233.

³⁶⁸ Huang Shaowen, Squad Leaders’ Techniques for Commanding Troops (banzhang daibing jiqiao; 班长

带兵技巧) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2001), p. 130.

³⁶⁹ Zhang and Cao, Guidebook to Military Life, p. 32.

³⁷⁰ Cheng Li and Scott W. Harold, “China’s New Military Elite,” China Security 3:4 (Autumn 2007), p. 72.

³⁷¹ Huang Shaowen, Squad Leaders’ Techniques for Commanding Troops, p. 115.

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Diminished “fighting spirit.” PLA publications note that young soldiers often do not

enter the military with the appropriate sense of devotion and urgency to create a

unified, strong-willed fighting force. Young conscripts are more likely to join the

PLA out of personal motivations - to gain income and technical skills - than out of a

sense of patriotism and self-sacrifice.³⁷²

PLA newspapers also report that some units underestimate the importance of mental

training and overemphasize technical skills, because they believe that

“modern

warfare involves little bodily contact, and that knowing how to use modern

equipment is the most important knowledge set.”³⁷³ This kind of training downplays

the “fighting spirit” and other “human qualities” that the PLA has long considered its

greatest asset.

Lax combat training. PLA leaders also

AIMING FOR PERFECTION OVER

worry that these “peacetime soldiers” have

REALISM

been subject to a training culture that

focuses on the perfection of rote tasks, and

In

2005, one PLA Marine Corps

thus have been inadequately trained to

brigade suddenly gave up an award it

respond to the contingencies of combat.

had won after live-fire training and

demanded that the brigade political

In recent years, there has been a great deal

commissar cancel its first-place

of discussion in PLA newspapers about

ranking. During a private conversation

the shortcomings of the PLA’s combat

with some of his soldiers, a squad

training practices. These newspapers

leader within the brigade had

report that in many of these exercises,

inadvertently revealed that the night

units are provided with meticulous

before the contest he had secretly

training plans that detail every step and

sneaked onto the tank combat assault

leave little to chance, leaving soldiers

field and measured the distance from

unable to respond to the inevitable

the point his tank would stop to the

contingencies and uncertainties of

target. The following day when he took

warfare.³⁷⁵

the field he fired four rounds and struck

four targets. Unfortunately for this

Additionally, since many units are

squad leader, news of his trickery

rewarded according to the

“success” of

reached the platoon leader who then

their training exercises, there is little sense

made a report to the company leader.³⁷⁴

that training can be used to uncover and

— Renmin Haijun

rectify

weaknesses. This provides

incentives for even tighter scripting and, in some units, outright cheating.

³⁷² Chen Anren, On the Cultivation of Military Talent’s Moral Character, p. 277; see also Kongjun Bao, 13

Jul 2004, p. 3.

³⁷³ Kongjun Bao, 11 May 2004, p. 3.

³⁷⁴ Renmin Haijun, 23 Apr 2005.

³⁷⁵Renmin Haijun, 16 Mar 2004, p. 1.

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Military-to-military relations with China are captive to the larger bilateral

relationship.

Since U.S.-PRC bilateral relations were normalized in 1979, their least stable element

has been the military dimension.³⁹² When the political relationship has soured, mil-mil

relations have usually been the first to be cut

off and the last to be reestablished. They are

“U.S. military ties with China often have

also the only element in the relationship that

served as the proverbial canary in the

has undergone periods of complete

coalmine, acutely vulnerable to harmful

suspension. These suspensions follow a

changes in their environment.”³⁹¹

familiar cycle: they begin with an instigating

— Two American analysts of the PLA

event, and are followed by a period in which

the two sides “court” one another to resume or deepen relations. See Table 6-1, on the

following page, for an overview of major swings in the relationship since the 1980s.

When the CCP deems mil-mil exchanges to be necessary, the PLA must execute

this directive whether or not its leaders want to.

The decision to enhance mil-mil interaction with the United States rests with the Party,

not the PLA. How dialogue with the U.S. military is executed, however, is largely left to

the PLA. ³⁹³ As a result, when PLA leaders find specific tasks unpalatable, the PLA can

drag its feet and make execution difficult. Even when the Party is clearly willing to

improve the military relationship, agreements in principle do not necessarily translate—

or they may translate only very slowly—into action on the ground. ³⁹⁴

³⁹¹ Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, “The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation: Lessons from

1995-1999,” The Washington Quarterly 29:1 (Winter 2005-06), p. 180.

³⁹² For a history and analysis of the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship since 1980, see Kevin

Pollpeter, U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship (Arlington,

VA: RAND Corporation, 2004), Chapter 2; Shirley A. Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for

Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), pp. 1-4; Kurt Campbell and Richard

Weitz, “The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation,” pp. 169-186; David Finkelstein and John Unangst,

Engaging DoD; and Kristen Gunness, “China’s Military Diplomacy in an Era of Change,” paper presented

at the National Defense University symposium on China’s Global Activism: Implications for U.S. Security

Interests, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 20 Jun 2006.

³⁹³ Finkelstein and Unangst, Engaging DoD, p. vii.

³⁹⁴ Finkelstein and Unangst, Engaging DoD, p. 32.

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Table 6-1: Swings in the U.S.-China mil-mil relationship between 1980 and 2008 - selected incidents³⁹⁵

DATES

INSTIGATING INCIDENT

RESULT

HOW WAS THE ISSUE RESOLVED?

1981-1983

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan

China halts technology transfers and

Two countries sign the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique in August 1982, in which

arms purchases from the U.S.

U.S. promises to “gradually … reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan.” In 1983, the

two sides agree in principle to resume military ties. U.S. agrees to four arms sale

programs between 1985 and 1987.

1987-1988

Chinese arms sales to Iran and

U.S. suspends additional

Suspension lifted March 1988, but many in U.S. government remain skeptical of

Saudi Arabia

liberalization of high-tech transfers to

whether such transfers are in U.S. interest.

China.

June 1989 -

Tiananmen Square massacre

U.S. side suspends mil-mil contacts

Some restrictions on equipment sales lifted in December 1992; President Clinton

fall 1994

and arms sales to China. Both sides

and Secretary of Defense William Perry reestablish bilateral military contacts in

cancel completion of previously-

1994 as part of overall “comprehensive engagement” with China. Reflecting

agreed arms sale programs.

lingering suspicion of Chinese intentions, U.S. Congress passes a law in 1995

barring U.S. assistance in Chinese defense conversion.

1996

PLA launches missiles across

U.S. briefly cancels high-level mil-

Some in U.S. advocate increased military ties with China to improve

the Taiwan Strait for the

mil visits.

communication. The two countries hold first Defense Consultative Talks (DCT)

second time in six months.

in December 1997.

May 1999

US errantly bombs Chinese

China suspends military contacts in

U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, Kurt Campbell, meets

embassy in Belgrade during

1999.

with Chinese officials in November 1999 to discuss restarting the mil-mil

the war in Kosovo.

relationship. High-level contacts resume by 2000. Reflecting years of concern on

the part of U.S. lawmakers, in 2000 the U.S. Congress passes the National

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and DeLay Amendment limiting mil-mil

contacts to a few areas.

April 2001

American surveillance plane

U.S. briefly suspends all mil-mil

U.S. reestablishes limited mil-mil contacts in May 2001, subject to case-by-case

and Chinese fighter plane

contacts.

review. DCT resume in late 2002. Cabinet-level mil-mil contacts held 2005-2006.

collide near China, killing the

Chinese pilot.

Oct 2008

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

China suspends mil-mil contacts.

Not resolved as of January 2009.

³⁹⁵ For more on the impact of these incidents on U.S.-China relations, see e.g. Pollpeter, U.S.-China Security Management, Chapter 1; Kan, U.S.-China Military

Contacts, pp. 1-4; Finkelstein and Unangst, Engaging DoD, Chapter 1.

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PLA COMPETITIVENESS

In 2006, an unusual military competition took place in Zhanjiang, China, between a

U.S. Marine Corps detachment and a unit of Chinese Marines. Organized at the PRC’s

suggestion, this was the first such competition held between the two militaries. It

consisted of a tug-of-war, a basketball game, an obstacle course, and a target-shooting

competition.

American Marines who participated in the event reported being surprised by the

degree of competitiveness that their Chinese counterparts displayed on several levels.

•

First, the PLA participants in this

“casual” competition had clearly been

handpicked for their extraordinary physical strength and skill. As one U.S.

participant later said, “These guys obviously played basketball all day - this was

their job.… The tug-of-war guys were big guys, with thick legs, and they all had

these specialized shoes.” The U.S. Marines were outmatched in every event

except the rifle competition.

•

Second, although the Chinese agreed to the Americans’ suggestion that U.S. and

Chinese Marines form two mixed teams, each with members from both

militaries, “the Chinese changed it up once we got started - they ran every race

as one of them vs. one of us.” A Chinese television report of the event highlights

individual U.S. Marines losing badly on the course, and makes no mention of the

combined teams.

•

Third, PLA officers and Chinese media repeatedly touted the superiority of the

Chinese Marines over the Americans. U.S. participants said that the PLA

Marines were gracious, but that their commanding officers were determined to

make clear to the media and other bystanders that the Chinese military had

proved its superiority. For instance, the Chinese and U.S. participants got into a

mild disagreement over who had won a target-shooting competition: the U.S.

Marines had a higher average score, but a Chinese Marine had the highest single

score. U.S. participants report that the Chinese media and officers were adamant

that the Chinese had “won” this competition. As one U.S. participant said,

“There was definitely a purpose to all this - to show that they [the Chinese] were

superior.”⁴⁰⁰

PLA leaders see mil-mil interaction as a chance to correct what they consider

unfairly negative U.S. perceptions of China’s strategic intentions.

PLA leaders believe that the United States wrongly sees China as a threat. When U.S.

government or military leaders express concern about the purpose of China’s current

military buildup, they are pilloried in the Chinese press as having a “Cold War mentality”

⁴⁰⁰ Interviews #4, 11, and 12; a video of the event is at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bFoWCbQjwXw.

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Goal #3: Learn about the U.S. military

All PLA interactions with developed foreign militaries are seen as opportunities to assess

the state of modern warfare. The PLA leadership uses military exchanges to learn about

aspects of U.S. military technology, doctrine, and organization that may be worth

emulating. As one interviewee said, “For the PLA, the U.S. is the gold standard.” ⁴⁰⁷

U.S. analysts suggest that members of the PLA show “great interest in U.S. defense

doctrines and manuals,” and in learning from U.S. military practices.⁴⁰⁸ Interviewees

noted that during mil-mil exchanges the PLA tends to show fairly high levels of interest

in:

• U.S. military technology

• How the U.S. military manages its personnel.

INTEREST IN U.S. NCOS

American visitors to China note that their PLA counterparts are clearly interested in

how the U.S. military organizes and manages people. Several remarked that the

PLA seems particularly interested in the authority and autonomy given to

noncommissioned officers.⁴⁰⁹ One interviewee reported, “The Chinese were really

intrigued by the fact that the U.S. NCOs were making things happen. This was

something their leadership had a lot of questions about - how do your NCOs do

that, how do they make their decisions?”⁴¹⁰ The PLA’s interest in foreign

militaries’ use of NCOs, and in military management more generally, is echoed in

many of its publications.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁷ Interview #3.

⁴⁰⁸ Campbell and Weitz, “The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation,” p. 173.

⁴⁰⁹ Interviews # 9, 10, 12, 14, and 15.

⁴¹⁰ Interview #12.

⁴¹¹ See, e.g., Deng Zhongdang, A Comparison of Chinese and Foreign NCO Education (zhongwai shiguan

jiaoyu bijiao; 中外使馆教育比较) (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2005).

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What distinctive viewpoints does the PLA bring to its interactions with

the U.S. military?

Chinese and American military leaders have significantly different understandings of the

demands that militaries may reasonably make on one another. Specifically, they display

divergent views on:

• How to build “mutual trust”

• How to cultivate relationships among members of the two militaries

• How to define “transparency.”

Mutual trust

The PLA assesses the outlook for bilateral military relations

“Mutual trust is the

in terms of the level of “mutual trust” (huxin; 互信) that has

basis of all bilateral

already been established between the two sides.⁴¹³ They argue

relations.”⁴¹²

that only when deep “mutual trust” exists can two nations

— PLA military academic

conduct a successful military-to-military relationship.

For the PLA, “mutual trust” means an absence of significant suspicion about the

intentions of the other party.

A perusal of Chinese sources suggests that when the PLA leadership says that a high

degree of “mutual trust” exists between two nations, it means that neither country harbors

significant concerns about the intentions or actions of the other. PLA writers complain

that the U.S. government and military display a lack of

“trust” when they make

statements indicating that China is not transparent enough and may pose a military threat

to the United States. In the view of the PLA leadership, these “groundless suspicions,”

and the continued U.S. attempts to “pressure” China into changing some of its military

practices, pose major obstacles to the two countries’ ability to build the “mutual trust”

that is necessary for cooperative military relations.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹² PLA Colonel Teng Jianqun (ret.), Director, Research Department, China Arms Control and

Disarmament Association, quoted in Ding Ying, “Ring Up the Generals,” Beijing Review, 17 Apr 2008,

OSC CPP20080428715036.

⁴¹³ Interview # 2.

⁴¹⁴ Ding Ying, “Ring Up the Generals”; see also Liu Jun, “China-Russian Military Hotline is Set Up as a

Natural Result of the Ripe Conditions,” Guoji Xianqu Daobao, 18 Mar 2008, p. 4, OSC

CPP20080408624002.

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“Mutual trust” is built on “mutual understanding,” which is achieved through

dialogue.

Long-time observers of China’s military note that in PLA parlance, achieving “mutual

trust” requires that nations first reach a

“mutual understanding” of one another’s

viewpoints. This “mutual understanding”

is attained through dialogue and personnel

“Security is mutual, and security dialogues

exchanges, particularly at higher levels -

and cooperation should be aimed at

for instance, the U.S.-China bilateral

promoting

trust,

not

at

creating

Defense Consultative Talks, or exchanges

confrontations.” ⁴¹⁵

between the two countries’ National

— Information Office of the PRC State Council

Defense Universities.⁴¹⁶

Theoretically such dialogue should allow the two sides to frankly confront strategic

differences and take one another’s concerns seriously. However, observers report that in

practice “dialogue” usually means persuading the United States of the correctness of

China’s position.⁴¹⁷

Once “mutual understanding” has been attained through dialogue - or once the United

States has been brought around to the Chinese point of view - the two countries can then

prove their commitment to establishing “mutual trust” by displaying, through public

statements, that they harbor no concerns about each other’s intentions.⁴¹⁸

Mil-mil interaction is a symbol of “mutual trust” that already exists, not a path

toward building trust.

PLA writings argue that nations cannot engage in combined military activities unless a

high degree of political and military “mutual trust” has been established. One recent

Jiefangjun Bao commentary states that “If a joint exercise is held between the countries

that have serious conflicts… [it] can only be a symbolic military exercise with no

concrete content.”⁴¹⁹ PLA-U.S. military joint activities or contacts are usually tied to

Chinese assessments of an increase in “mutual trust” and positive movement in the

bilateral strategic agenda.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁵ China’s National Defense (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of

China, Jul 1998), I: “The International Security Situation”; emphasis added.

⁴¹⁶ Finkelstein and Unangst, Engaging DoD, p. 18.

⁴¹⁷ E.g., interview #6; also Finkelstein and Unangst, Engaging DoD. p. v.

⁴¹⁸ Finkelstein and Unangst, Engaging DoD, p. 17.

⁴¹⁹ Wang Xinjun, “What To Look For in Joint Exercises,” Jiefangjun Bao, 7 Aug 2007, p. 5, OSC

CPP20070807710002.

⁴²⁰ Finkelstein and Unangst, Engaging DoD, p. 19.

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The difference between the U.S. and Chinese perspectives on mil-mil interaction may be

characterized as a

“trickle-up” approach versus a

“trickle-down” approach. In the

American view, specific joint initiatives build mutual understanding and trust, which

eventually lead to strategic agreement. For the PLA, conversely, agreement on strategic

issues results in mutual understanding and trust, which allows for specific initiatives to

take place.⁴²¹ These approaches are shown below, in Figure 6-1.

Figure 6-1: Different approaches to building mutual trust

China: “Trickle-Down”

U.S.: “Trickle-Up”

1. Agreement on

3. Leads to eventual

strategic issues

strategic agreement

2. Results in mutual

2. Build mutual

understanding &

understanding &

mutual trust

mutual trust

3. Allows specific

1. Specific initiatives

mil-mil initiatives

Relationship building

PLA members view personal relationships as carrying a degree of obligation.

As was discussed in Chapter 1, traditional Chinese thought holds that all relationships

carry clear mutual obligations, including that between “friends.” Observers note that

Chinese officials seek to form strong friendships with key individuals on the U.S. side

who are viewed as sympathetic to China. They hope that when necessary they will be

⁴²¹ Yuan Peng, “Strategic Mutual Trust and Strategic Stability: Principal Tasks Facing Sino-US Relations,”

Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, 20 Jan 2008, OSC CPP20080403587001; Finkelstein and Unangst, Engaging DoD,

p. 45.

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able to call upon these “old friends” to advocate for conciliatory policies and negotiation

stances toward China.⁴²² In doing so, they may seek to manipulate their American

friends’ “feelings of good will, obligation, guilt, or dependence.” ⁴²³

PLA officials do not consider individuals to be interchangeable, and are

frustrated by the many “new faces” in U.S. delegations.

One implication of the PLA’s preference for building long-term relationships is that new

arrivals to the conversation cannot expect to pick up a discussion where their predecessor

left off. As a U.S. military attaché said, “You can’t just plug in a new person.”⁴²⁴

Members of the PLA endeavor to build relationships with their American counterparts

over many years and multiple visits. Because “mutual understanding” is achieved through

a long process of dialogue between members of both militaries, replacing members of

that conversation sets this process back.

“[A recent visit] confirmed one of Beijing’s

Because PLA personnel tend to stay in a

greatest frustrations with Sino-U.S. senior

single unit

- and hence a single

military dialogue … [namely that] many of its

geographic location - for a long time,

visiting U.S. interlocutors are soon-to-retire

they expect their interpersonal networks

officers on their final,

“swan song” visit,

to remain fairly stable. This does not

which undermines the goal of developing

mesh well with the U.S. standard of

long-term ties between professionals.” ⁴²⁵

moving officers from one position to

— American analyst of the PLA

another after just two or three years.

Senior PLA members have been known to complain that each American delegation

seems to consist of an entirely new set of faces, making it difficult to establish the solid

relationships that are conducive to “mutual trust.” ⁴²⁶

Friendliness and cordiality are not indicators of a strong relationship.

American personnel sometimes misread the cordial tone of interactions with the PLA.

PLA officers - and the Chinese more generally - are known as extremely gracious hosts,

but this does not reflect an underlying sense of obligation or trust.⁴²⁷ One interviewee

commented that U.S. visitors often wrongly assume that “after having a meeting, sharing

a meal, and engaging in some sidebar conversations, they will get a sense of their

⁴²² Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington, DC: National Defense

University Press, 1994), p. 58; Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests

Through “Old Friends” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), p. 61.

⁴²³ Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behavior, p. 4.

⁴²⁴ Interview #4.

⁴²⁵ Mulvenon, “Make Talk Not War,” p. 4.

⁴²⁶ Interviews #3 and 6.

⁴²⁷ Interviews #4, 6, and 7.

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