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*FM 3-06
Field Manual
Headquarters
Department of the Army
No. 3-06
Washington, DC, 26 October 2006
Urban Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ix
Chapter 1
The Urban Outlook
1-1
The Prospect of Urban Operations
1-1
An Urban Perspective
1-2
Historical Significance of Urban Areas in Warfare
1-3
Modern Army Urban Operations
1-7
Chapter 2
Understanding the Urban Environment
2-1
A Complex Environment
2-1
Urban Terrain
2-2
Urban Society
2-13
Urban Infrastructure
2-18
Chapter 3
Understanding the Urban Threat
3-1
Asymmetrical And Adaptive
3-1
Weapons of Mass Destruction
3-2
Threat Objectives
3-2
Urban Threat Tactics
3-5
Negative Effects of Urbanization
3-11
Chapter 4
Understanding the Urban Environment’s Effects on Warfighting
Functions and Tactics
4-1
Warfighting Functions
4-1
Key Tactical Considerations
4-17
Chapter 5
Contemplating Urban Operations
5-1
Determining the Necessity of Urban Operations
5-1
Integration into Land Operations
5-6
Integration of Conventional and Special Operations Forces
5-24
Synchronization of Activities with Other Agencies
5-25
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-06, 1 June 2003.
i
Contents
Chapter 6
Foundations for Urban Operations
6-1
Urban Operational Framework
6-1
Fundamentals of Urban Operations
6-10
Chapter 7
Urban Offensive Operations
7-1
Purpose of Urban Offensive Operations
7-1
Offensive Characteristics Applied to Urban Operations
7-1
Urban Offensive Operations and Battlefield Organization
7-5
Forms and Types of Urban Offense
7-8
Urban Offensive Considerations
7-12
Chapter 8
Urban Defensive Operations
8-1
Purpose of Urban Defensive Operations
8-1
Defensive Characteristics Applied to Urban Operations
8-1
Urban Defensive Operations and Battlefield Organization
8-3
Types of Urban Defense
8-4
Urban Defensive Considerations
8-9
Chapter 9
Urban Stability and Civil Support Operations
9-1
Purpose of Urban Stability and Civil Support Operations
9-1
Characteristics of Urban Stability and Civil Support Operations
9-2
Urban Stability and Civil Support Operations and Battlefield Organization
9-3
Considerations for Urban Stability and Civil Support Operations
9-5
Chapter 10
Urban Sustainment
10-1
Urban Sustainment Characteristics
10-1
Logistics Preparation of the Theater
10-4
Achieving Force Agility
10-7
Sustainment Functions
10-7
Appendix A
Siege of Beirut: An Illustration of the Fundamentals of Urban
Operations
A-1
Overall Strategic Situation
A-1
PLO Military Position
A-2
Role of Civilians
A-2
Information Operations
A-2
Conduct of the Urban Operations
A-3
Lessons
A-4
Summary
A-7
Appendix B
An Urban Focus to the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
B-1
UNAFFECTED PROCESS
B-1
Significant Characteristics
B-4
Threat Considerations
B-10
Urban Intelligence Tools and Products
B-14
Appendix C
Operations in Somalia: Applying the Urban Operational Framework to
Stability Operations
C-1
General Situation
C-1
Somali Operations
C-1
Understand
C-4
Shape
C-5
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FM 3-06
26 October 2006
Contents
Engage
C-6
Consolidate and Transition
C-6
Summary
C-7
Appendix D Joint and Multinational Urban Operations
D-1
Purpose
D-1
Sister Service Urban Capabilities
D-1
Urban Functional Combatant Command Capabilities
D-5
Multinational Considerations
D-9
SOURCE NOTES
Source Notes-1
GLOSSARY
Glossary-1
Section I - Acronyms and Abbreviations
Glossary-1
Section II - Terms and Definitions
Glossary-4
REFERENCES
References-1
INDEX
Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Full spectrum urban operations
1-3
Figure 1-2. UO and DOTMLPF
1-12
Figure 2-1. Keys to understanding the urban environment
2-2
Figure 2-2. The multidimensional urban battlefield
2-4
Figure 2-3. Major urban patterns
2-6
Figure 2-4. Basic internal street patterns
2-7
Figure 2-5. Urban functional zones
2-9
Figure 2-6. Some toxic industrial chemicals and their industrial or commercial uses
2-10
Figure 2-7. Key aspects of the urban society
2-13
Figure 2-8. Urban areas by population size
2-14
Figure 2-9. Simplified analysis of urban society
2-15
Figure 2-10. UO society chain of effects
2-17
Figure 2-11. Urban infrastructure
2-19
Figure 3-1. Threat objectives
3-2
Figure 3-2. Urban threat tactics
3-6
Figure 3-3. Favored threat weapons
3-10
Figure 3-4. Negative effects of urbanization
3-11
Figure 3-5. Competing power structures
3-14
Figure 4-1. Urban maneuver challenges and means to overcome them
4-5
Figure 4-2. Urban effects on fire support systems
4-9
Figure 4-3. Methods to overcome urban communications challenges
4-16
Figure 4-4. Compressed tactical factors
4-17
Figure 4-5. Urban understanding and decision making
4-19
Figure 5-1. Risk management and the associated risks with urban operations
5-2
26 October 2006
FM 3-06
iii
Contents
Figure
5-2. Urban ISR considerations
5-12
Figure
5-3. IO elements and related activities
5-15
Figure
5-4. Public affairs principles
5-21
Figure
5-5. Civil affairs functional specialties
5-22
Figure
6-1. The urban operational framework and battle command
6-2
Figure
6-2. Urban isolation
6-4
Figure
6-3. Panama
6-8
Figure
6-4. Fundamentals of urban operations
6-11
Figure
7-1. Initial attack in Brittany
7-3
Figure
7-2. Subsequent disposition of forces in Brittany
7-4
Figure
7-3. Envelopment isolates an urban area
7-8
Figure
7-4. Turning movement
7-8
Figure
7-5. Infiltration
7-8
Figure
7-6. Penetration
7-9
Figure
7-7. Frontal attack
7-9
Figure
7-8. Metz envelopment
7-10
Figure
7-9. Metz final assault
7-11
Figure
7-10. Required urban reconnaissance capabilities
7-14
Figure
7-11. Shaping through isolation
7-15
Figure
7-12. Critical sensor-to-shooter links
7-17
Figure
7-13. Reactions to isolation
7-17
Figure
7-14. Initial attack to isolate Hue
7-18
Figure
7-15. Subsequent attack to isolate Hue
7-19
Figure
7-16. Final attack to isolate Hue
7-20
Figure
7-17. Coordination of SOF and conventional capabilities
7-21
Figure
7-18. Inchon-Seoul campaign, September 1950
7-27
Figure
8-1. An urban area incorporated into a larger mobile defense
8-4
Figure
8-2. German attacks to seize Stalingrad
8-5
Figure
8-3. German attacks to seize Stalingrad, September 1942
8-6
Figure
8-4. Soviet attacks trap German 6th Army
8-7
Figure
8-5. Retrograde through an urban area
8-8
Figure
8-6. Approximate defensive frontages and depths
8-10
Figure
9-1. Characteristics of stability and reconstruction and support operations
9-2
Figure
9-2. Example measures of effectiveness
9-7
Figure
9-3. Adaptability
9-11
Figure
10-1. Sustainment characteristics
10-1
Figure
10-2. Urban environment and essential elements of sustainment information
10-5
Figure
10-3. Sustainment functions
10-7
Figure
10-4. General principles of the law of war
10-25
Figure
10-5. General engineering support tasks
10-27
Figure A-1. The city of Beirut
A-1
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FM 3-06
26 October 2006
Contents
Figure A-2. Initial conduct of the urban operation
A-3
Figure A-3. Israeli probe of PLO defenses
A-3
Figure A-4. Initial Israeli attack
A-4
Figure A-5. Final Israeli attack
A-4
Figure B-1. The steps of IPB
B-1
Figure B-2. Relativity of key urban environment elements
B-3
Figure B-3. Significant urban terrain characteristics
B-5
Figure B-4. Significant urban societal characteristics
B-8
Figure B-5. Significant urban infrastructure characteristics
B-9
Figure B-6. A refined approach to civilian allegiance
B-12
Figure B-7. Urban intelligence tools and products
B-14
Figure C-1. Relative proportionality between types of operations
C-2
Figure C-2. Map of Somalia
C-3
Figure D-1. USAF E-8 JSTARS platform
D-2
Figure D-2. USN MK45 lightweight gun system
D-4
Figure D-3. USN MK V special
D-8
Historical Vignettes
Rome: A Microcosm of Urban Warfare
1-4
The Three Block War
1-6
Winning the Peace in Iraq: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations
1-8
Understanding the Effects of Unit and Soldier Actions in Iraq
2-18
Understanding the Urban Environment: Paris - 1944
2-25
Tempo
3-4
Identifying Threats from Noncombatants
3-7
Information and the Media
3-9
Cultural and Religious Instability
3-12
Food and Water Shortages
3-13
Insurgencies and the Urban Society
3-15
Crime and Criminal Organizations
3-16
Example of Simple Communications Innovation: Israel’s Six-Day War - 1967
4-17
Conventional and Special Forces Integration
5-24
Applying the Urban Operational Framework: Panama - 1989
6-7
Operational Context of Urban Operations: Brittany Ports - 1944
7-2
Forms of Attack in the Urban Offense: Metz - 1944
7-10
Isolating an Urban Area: Hue, Vietnam - 1968
7-17
Creative Task Organization: Using Artillery in the Direct Fire Role
7-22
Bold Operational Maneuver to Seize an Urban Area: Inchon and Seoul, Korea -
1950
7-26
Urban Defense in a Major Operation: Stalingrad - 1942 to 1943
8-5
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FM 3-06
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Contents
Defensive Combat Power: Suez - 1973
8-10
Assessment of Security and Force Protection: Belfast, Northern Ireland
9-8
Civil Support and Coordination with Civilian Authorities: Los Angeles - 1992
9-12
Restraint: An Najaf, Iraq - 2003
9-14
Base Security: Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam - 1968
10-2
Host Nation Repair Operations: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
10-13
Combat Stress: Chechnya - 1994 to 1996
10-18
Analysis of an Urban Area’s Underlying Terrain: Mitrovica, Kosovo - 1999
B-5
Shifting Civilian Interests and Intent
B-12
Operations in Somalia: Applying the Urban Operational Framework to Stability
Operations
C-1
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FM 3-06
26 October 2006
Preface
Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language, a purpose, and unity of
effort. Rather than establishing a set of hard and fast rules, the objective of doctrine is to foster initiative and
creative thinking. To this end, FM 3-06 discusses major Army operations in an urban environment. This
environment, consisting of complex terrain, a concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems, is an
operational environment in which Army forces will operate. In the future, it may be the predominant
operational environment. Each urban operation is unique and will differ because of the multitude of
combinations presented by the threat, the urban area itself, the major operation of which it may be part (or the
focus), and the fluidity of societal and geopolitical considerations. Therefore, there will always exist an innate
tension between Army doctrine, the actual context of the urban operation, and future realities. Commanders
must strike the proper balance between maintaining the capability to respond to current threats and preparing
for future challenges.
PURPOSE
This manual provides the analytical tools for evaluating an urban operation to determine if the operation is
necessary for overall mission success. It also provides the means to understanding and determining the impacts
of the urban environment on military operations and provides information on managing, taking advantage of,
and mitigating the effects of those impacts as appropriate. As such, this manual demonstrates how to apply the
doctrinal principles in FM 3-0 to this unique environment.
SCOPE
Chapter 1 introduces theoretical and historical perspectives of urban operations that serve as the underlying
basis for the rest of the manual. While this manual has incorporated lessons learned from recent and ongoing
operations, it has deliberately taken a broad and varied historical perspective in order to remain relevant to
future threats and circumstance differing from those that the Army currently faces. Chapter 2 discusses the
characteristics of urban centers and populations as well as their impact on operations. It is unlikely that Army
forces will ever operate in a benign urban environment; therefore, Chapter 3 discusses the varied nature of
potential urban threats. Chapter 4 describes the effects of the urban environment on warfighting functions and
tactics. An understanding of the complexities of the urban environment, the nature of the enemy as an adaptive,
learning opponent, and the effects of the environment on warfighting capabilities and skills is essential to sound
decision making. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the potential costs of urban operations and risk reduction measures
that the commander and his staff must consider early in their planning. These chapters also outline an urban
operational framework and specific urban considerations that create the foundations necessary for successfully
applying operational doctrine to an urban environment.
The second part of the manual (Chapters 7 - 10) discusses how urban operations are conducted and resourced.
Urban operations include major offensive and defensive operations in urban environments as well as stability or
civil support operations ranging from peace operations and counterterrorism to disaster relief and humanitarian
assistance. For the different types of operations—offense, defense, and stability or civil support—the purpose,
characteristics, organization, and considerations are discussed. However, commanders consider that most urban
operations will normally involve the simultaneous execution of offense and defense with stability or civil
support (although proportional emphasis will shift over time) and plan accordingly.
APPLICABILITY
This manual is intended for Army commanders and their staffs at the brigade level and above. It addresses full
spectrum operations that Army units will execute in urban settings. However, users should also consult JP 3-06
for specific joint information. Additionally, users should be familiar with FM 3-06.1, FM 3-06.11, TC 90-1,
26 October 2006
FM 3-06
vii
Preface
and urban operations chapters, appendices, or sections found in other infantry, armor, combined arms, and
proponent field manuals for the tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) and appropriate proponent
information necessary to conduct tactical urban operations at the brigade level and below. This publication
applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States
(ARNGUS), and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
When this FM 3-06 was approved, doctrine was incomplete for incorporating stability operations and civil
support operations in place of stability operations and support operations. This manual incorporates stability
and reconstruction and civil support operations doctrine found in FM 1 and FMI 5-0.1; it will be revised to
reflect the future updates of FM 3-0 and FM 3-07 and, when published, FM 3-28. (Note: Stability and
reconstruction operations has been redesignated stability operations to comply with Department of Defense
Directive 3000.05.)
Chapter 2 defines “city” according to a population size. However, in historical vignettes and accounts, the term
“city” may be applied in its common usage without specific regard to size to maintain conformity with most
other historical reports.
In this manual, the term “threat” is applied broadly to include an enemy force (conventional or unconventional),
an armed belligerent in a peace operation, antagonistic or unfriendly elements of the civilian population, or
some other hazardous condition in the urban environment that negatively influences mission accomplishment.
The term military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) is replaced by urban operations (UO). MOUT is an
acronym from FM 90-10, which is superseded by this manual.
Otherwise, the glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-06 that have joint or Army definitions. Where Army and
joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Definitions for which FM 3-06 is the proponent manual
(the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent or amplifying manual for other terms is listed in
parentheses after the definition.
The manual attempts to incorporate a broad range of historical vignettes into each chapter where the account
supports the doctrinal line of reasoning. Two historical vignettes, however, were included as appendices (A and
C) because of their longer lengths.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
This publication contains copyrighted material.
The proponent for this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. Send written
comments and recommended changes on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) directly to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Combined Arms
Doctrine Directorate, ATTN: ATZL-CD, (FM 3-06), 201 Reynolds Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-
2337. Send comments and recommendations by e-mail to webb-cadd@leavenworth.army.mil. Follow the DA
Form 2028 format or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
viii
FM 3-06
26 October 2006
Acknowledgements
The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. Other
sources of quotations and material used in examples are listed in the source notes.
The quotation in Chapter 1 by Charles C. Krulak is quoted in Russell W. Glenn , Steven Hartman, and Scott
Gerwehr, Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2003). Copyright © 2003 by RAND and reproduced with permission.
The quotation in Chapter 2 by General Sir Rupert Smith is from General Sir Rupert Smith, “Wars in Our Time:
A Survey of Recent and Continuing Conflicts,” World Defence Systems, volume 3:2 (London: Royal United
Services Institute for Defence Studies, 2001). Copyright © 2001 by RUSI and reproduced with permission.
The quotation in Chapter 3 by Olga Oliker is from Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994- 2000: Lessons
from Urban Combat (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). Copyright © 2001 by RAND and reproduced with
permission.
The example in Chapter 3 on Insurgencies and the Urban Society is adapted from Trinquier, Roger, Modern
Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1964). Copyright © 1961 by
Editions de la Table Ronde. English translation © 1964 by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. Reproduced with
permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT.
The quotation in Chapter 7 by Russell W Glenn is from Russell W. Glenn, An Attack on Duffer’s Downtown,
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). Copyright © 2001 by RAND and reproduced with permission.
The quotation in Chapter 9 is from Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999). From Black Hawk Down, by Michael Bowden. Used by permission of Atlantic
Monthly Press.
The quotation introducing Chapter 10 is from Ralph Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” Parameters (spring
1996): 43- 50. Copyright © 1996 and reproduced with permission.
The quotation in Chapter 10 is from Russell W. Glenn , Steven Hartman, and Scott Gerwehr, Urban Combat
Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003). Copyright © 2003 by
RAND and reproduced with permission.
26 October 2006
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Chapter 1
The Urban Outlook
Today’s security environment demands more from Army leaders than ever before. Army
leaders must not only be able to lead Soldiers but also influence other people. They must
be able to work with members of other Services and governmental agencies. They must
win the willing cooperation of multinational partners, both military and civilian. But
ultimately, the Army demands self-aware and adaptive leaders who can compel enemies
to surrender in war and master the circumstances facing them in peace. Victory and
success depend on the effectiveness of these leaders’ organizations. Developing effective
organizations requires hard, realistic, and relevant training.
FM 1
Given the prevalence of large cities throughout the world, Army forces will likely be
required to conduct operations in, around, and over large urban areas. These
operations will normally be in support of a joint force commander (JFC) conducting
military operations pursuant to U.S. national security policy. This manual is designed
to facilitate the planning and conduct of the full range and spectrum of land
operations in a complex urban environment. Each urban environment and urban
operation is unique; prescribing a specific doctrinal “solution” for each situation is
impossible. Instead, this manual provides a framework to commanders and their
staffs for understanding the urban environment, for analyzing and deciding whether
or not to initiate urban operations (UO), and for applying operational doctrine to this
complex environment. It also provides a broad base of historical vignettes and
examples to help develop a refined analytical perspective and stimulate thought. The
manual also includes some planning points and tactics and techniques to assist in
preparing for and conducting UO. This information provides a foundation for
approaching major UO. Combined with other joint and Army doctrine, this
information also will help commanders and their staffs learn to adapt and succeed in
this challenging environment.
THE PROSPECT OF URBAN OPERATIONS
1-1. The world is undergoing massive urbanization. Although exceptions exist, an overall trend of
migration from rural to urban areas is occurring throughout the globe. (Australia, one of the world’s most
urbanized countries, is actually becoming less urbanized.) This trend is especially evident in developing
nations. Combined with the exponential growth of the global population in the last quarter century, this
migration has created massive urban areas that hold the centers of population, government, and economics
in their respective regions. In many cases, rapid urbanization has overburdened already weak
infrastructures, scarce resources, and a fragile economic base. As urbanization has changed the
demographic landscape, potential enemies recognize the inherent danger and complexity of this
environment to the attacker, and may view it as their best chance to negate the technological and firepower
advantages of modernized opponents. Given the global population trends and the likely strategies and
tactics of future threats, Army forces will likely conduct operations in, around, and over urban areas—not
as a matter of fate, but as a deliberate choice linked to national security objectives and strategy, and at a
time, place, and method of the commander’s choosing.
26 October 2006
FM 3-06
1-1
Chapter 1
Army Urban Operations
Army forces conduct UO either as one component of a larger operation or as a single
operation focused totally on a specific urban environment. Major Army UO are often
part of a joint and multinational effort requiring rigorous interagency and civil-military
coordination that typically includes the full spectrum of military operations.
Commanders of Army major operations must determine if UO are essential to
mission accomplishment. If so, commanders must carefully integrate the operations
into campaign planning to support the operational objectives of the JFC.
Army leaders conducting UO must—
• Understand the urban environment to determine decisive points.
• Shape the operation to set the conditions for success.
• Precisely mass the effects of combat power to thoroughly engage the decisive
points that lead to centers of gravity.
• Continually consolidate gains essential to the retention of the initiative.
• Transition the urban area to the control of another force or agency or, ultimately,
back to legitimate and functioning civilian control.
AN URBAN PERSPECTIVE
1-2. As a subset of all Army operations, UO are operations focused on an urban environment. UO include
full spectrum operations—offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support—that may be executed, either
sequentially or (more likely) simultaneously, during the conduct of a single urban operation (see figure 1
1). UO may be the sole mission of the commander or one of several tasks nested in a larger operation.
Regardless of the types of operations conducted or whether the urban area is the single focus of the
operation or only one component of a larger operation or campaign, the complex urban environment
significantly affects the overall conduct of the mission.
1-3. When conceptualizing urban operations, commanders must understand two important terms: urban
area and urban environment. The first is a subset of the second. An urban area is a topographical
complex where man-made construction or high population density is the dominant feature. Focusing
on urban areas means concentrating on the physical aspects of the area and their effects on weapons,
equipment, line-of-sight, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. The urban environment includes the
physical aspects of the urban area as well as the complex and dynamic interaction and relationships
between its key components—the terrain (natural and man-made), the society, and the supporting
infrastructure—as an overlapping and interdependent system of systems.
1-4. Importantly, commanders must also understand and consider that critical elements of the
infrastructure may lie far beyond the area’s physical confines. For example, the generating source
providing power to the urban energy system is part of that system but may be located well outside of the
urban area. Similarly, effects of the interaction between components of the infrastructure, located both
inside and outside the urban area, extend well into smaller, neighboring urban areas and surrounding rural
areas and often form their political, economic, and cultural focus. Understanding the total urban
environment is essential to planning and conducting full spectrum urban operations.
1-2
FM 3-06
26 October 2006
The Urban Outlook
Figure 1-1. Full spectrum urban operations
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF URBAN AREAS IN WARFARE
1-5. Urban areas always have been central to, or have significantly influenced, military operations. One
of the first urban-centered battles was the siege of Troy at the beginning of Greek history. Moreover, much
of the history of early Greece revolved around wars between its city-states or with Persia and centered on
the conquest, siege, or blockade of cities. Five hundred years later, the Roman Empire replaced Greece as
the dominant world power; although, urban areas remained central to the Roman method of warfare. Even
Rome’s history can be viewed as a microcosm of urban warfare over the past two thousand years. Though
military operations within the physical confines of many of these historic urban areas were not the norm,
the focus of these operations was their conquest or control.
1-6. Although Rome last saw combat in 1944, urban areas have been no less prominent in warfare since
that time. Seoul in Korea, Beirut in Lebanon, Panama City in Panama, Grozny in Chechnya, Sarajevo in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kabul in Afghanistan, and Baghdad in Iraq have been centers of conflict in the last
50 years. Urban areas, now more pervasive than ever before, will continue to be essential to successful
26 October 2006
FM 3-06
1-3
Chapter 1
operational and strategic warfighting. Today, armies cannot expect to execute major military operations
without the influence of the urban environments within their area of operations.
Rome: A Microcosm of Urban Warfare
During two millennia, Rome has been the center of at least 12 battles. The Gauls lay
siege to Rome first in 387 BC. That first siege lasted six months and ended after the
barbarians burnt much of the city. The surviving patrician families paid a ransom for
the withdrawal of Brennus’ army. From 408 to 410 AD, the Goth leader, Alaric,
successfully besieged Rome no less than three times. The Byzantine General
Belisarius captured Rome twice from the Goths and withstood siege inside the city
once between 536 and 549. Five hundred years later in 1084, Norman adventurer
Robert Guiscard captured medieval Rome and sacked the city during a dispute
between the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire. Forces of the Holy Roman Empire
again stormed and captured the city to punish the Pope in 1527. During the Italian
Revolution in 1849, a French army supporting the Pope captured the city from the
Italian revolutionary army under Garibaldi. In 1944, the last military action took place
in and around Rome when the U.S. Fifth Army captured the city from the retreating
German army. Rome’s turbulent history—fought over ethnic and religious
differences, prestige, and military necessity—demonstrates the importance of urban
areas in warfare and the various causes and combatants within this complex
environment.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF URBAN AREAS
1-7. Several reasons have attracted (and continue to attract) armies to combat in urban areas:
A military force chooses to position itself in an urban area to capitalize on the perceived
defensive advantages offered by the environment. In contrast, an opposing force, by analyzing
the factors of the situation, determines that it must enter the urban area to attack and destroy its
enemy (or devote essential combat power to their isolation).
The urban environment’s people (their allegiance and support), infrastructure, capabilities, or
other resources have or can be of significant operational or strategic value.
The urban area has significant symbolic importance.
The urban area’s geographical location dominates a region or avenue of approach.
1-8. Russia’s
1994 experience in Chechnya illustrates an increasingly important motivation for
conducting urban operations. The Chechen rebels, after failing to engage Russian forces outside the city,
chose to turn Grozny into the main battlefield. Leaders of the defeated Chechen conventional forces
recognized that fighting in the urban area provided them their best chance for success. The complexities of
urban combat and the perceived advantages of defending an urban area mitigated their numerical and
technological inferiority. The urban area provided the Chechens protection from fires, resources, interior
lines, and covered and concealed positions and movement. Given such advantages offered by the
environment, smaller or less-sophisticated military forces have similarly chosen to fight in urban areas
either as a deliberate strategy or to escape certain destruction in open terrain.
1-9. Such advantages of operating in an urban environment also prompt forces to conduct an urban
operation to facilitate a larger campaign plan and decisive battle in another location. The urban operation
can focus the enemy on the urban area and allow other forces to conduct operations elsewhere. From a
defensive perspective, an urban defense may gain time and space to reorganize forces in new defensive
positions, to divert enemy forces from other critical tasks, or to prepare to conduct offensive operations. To
some extent, these reasons motivated Soviet forces defending Leningrad and Stalingrad from the Germans
in World War II. The stubborn defense permitted the Soviets to reorganize for later offensive operations.
From an offensive perspective, an attack on an urban area may be a shaping operation used to divert enemy
resources from the decisive operation that will follow.
1-4
FM 3-06
26 October 2006
The Urban Outlook
1-10. Armies also fight in an urban area to obtain some critical feature or resource in the area, such as a
port facility. The desire to control an important seaport and access to the Persian Gulf largely motivated the
Iranian and Iraqi struggle for Basra in the 1980s. Earlier, in 1944, British forces fought German units in
Arnhem for control of the Rhine River Bridge. Other key infrastructure of the urban environment may have
operational or strategic significance and can compel military forces to attack or defend the area. As urban
areas account for an increasing share of a country’s national income, often generating over 50 percent of
gross national product, the strategic implications for their control or influence become even greater.
1-11. Urban areas are often located on terrain that dominates a region or an avenue of approach. In these
cases, offensive armies capture these areas to proceed with security to another objective. Conversely,
defensive forces commonly defend the area to deny the area of operations. To illustrate, Cassino, Italy
during World War II stood astride the critical highway approach up the Liri valley to Rome. The allies had
to attack and capture the monastery to facilitate the allied offensive north. Cassino’s location made
bypassing virtually impossible. Likewise, in the early 1980’s, Israeli army urban operations in Beirut were
a result of its strategic location near the Israeli security zone; various Arab insurgent and terrorist groups
used Beirut as a base for attacks against Israel. Beirut evolved as the major base of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, a major opponent of Israel. Beirut’s location made it a security threat to Israel and thus
compelled several major Israeli operations in the urban area (see Appendix A).
1-12. Another reason for engaging in urban operations is the symbolic—historical, cultural, political, and
even economic—importance of many urban areas. Often, capital cities—such as Rome, Paris, Seoul,
Berlin, and Baghdad—are identified as the strategic centers of gravity of their respective nations.
Possessing or threatening these urban areas may impact directly on the outcome of a conflict. The objective
of Germany’s wars with France in 1870 and 1914 was ultimately Paris. Napoleon’s 1812 campaign had as
its objective Moscow, as did Hitler’s 1941 offensive into Russia. The objective of the Soviet 1945
offensive was Berlin, and the North Vietnamese 1975 offensive had as its objective the South’s capital of
Saigon. Still, history also reminds us that commanders must assess the sustainability and decisiveness of
operations directed toward these “prestige” objectives. For example, in 1812, Napoleon captured Moscow
but had to evacuate it within 30 days. He lacked supplies and shelter, failed to destroy the Russian Army,
and failed to defeat the political will of the Czar and the people. Similarly, the North Korean occupation of
Seoul during the Korean War was equally indecisive.
U.S. ARMY’S EXPERIENCE IN URBAN OPERATIONS
1-13. The U.S. Army has a varied history of conducting urban operations. The American Revolution saw
the Army conduct several urban operations. These operations included the unsuccessful defense of New
York, the successful attack on Trenton, and the decisive siege and attack on British forces at Yorktown. The
Mexican War also had a successful assault on the fortified city of Monterey and the decisive siege of
Mexico City. During the American Civil War, the armies, in the tradition of Napoleonic maneuver warfare,
avoided urban areas and fought in the open. However, the opposing armies frequently made urban areas
their objective because of their importance as railheads. Success in the siege of several key urban areas—
Vicksburg, Atlanta, and Petersburg—contributed to the Northern victory.
1-14. Following the Civil War, the U.S. Army faced no large-scale urban combat for several generations.
The Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and even World War I did not
require the Army to fight in large urban areas. Between the Civil War and World War II, the U.S. Army
fought in several urban areas worldwide supporting U.S. commitments. These limited urban combat
operations were small but essential parts of what are currently called urban stability operations. From 1900
to 1901, the Army provided public security for a sector of Peking, China of around 50,000 inhabitants. The
Army conducted UO and, in the course of the operation, the 9th U.S. Infantry suffered 20-percent
casualties while fighting in Tientsin. Punitive expeditions to places such as Siberia, Cuba, Philippines,
Central America, and Mexico put the Army in various urban situations that required using military power,
notably, the occupation and security of Vera Cruz, Mexico in 1914. In the context of these smaller-scale
contingencies, UO became a staple of U.S. Army employment.
1-15. World War II forced the Army to grapple with the issues of large-scale urban combat almost
immediately. In his 1941 defense of the Philippines, General MacArthur examined how to defend Manila.
26 October 2006
FM 3-06
1-5
Chapter 1
Manila represented a large, modern, friendly urban area, which was the capital city of a close U.S. ally.
Defending the urban area posed numerous challenges. Ultimately General MacArthur determined that he
could best conduct its defense outside the city by defeating the enemy forces in combat on the invasion
beaches or shortly after they landed. When Japanese forces defeated MacArthur’s Philippine Army in a
series of engagements, MacArthur had to decide how best to protect the friendly populace of Manila. He
had two choices: abandoning the city or waging a costly defense that would likely result in the city’s
destruction, thousands of noncombatant casualties, and no operational advantage. He had little choice but
to declare Manila an open city and move his forces to Bataan to wage an operational defense in the vain
hope that a counteroffensive could relieve his isolated force. On 2 January 1942, Japanese forces entered
Manila unopposed.
1-16. Had General MacArthur decided to defend Manila, his forces would have found scant doctrine in the
Army regarding how to fight in an urban area. Doctrine for urban operations did not appear until early
1944, when faced with the possibility of fighting through the larger urban areas of Western Europe. At this
time the U.S. Army published FM 31-50. This manual had the first formal discussion of how the Army
viewed urban combat. It was based on the Army’s limited experiences in the Mediterranean theater and the
study of German and Soviet experiences on the Eastern front.
1-17. FM 31-50 emphasized a deliberate pace, individual and small unit initiative, the liberal use of direct
and indirect firepower, and decentralized command and execution. It focused on the urban area (as opposed
to the environment); however, it did include policies towards the noncombatants. The manual was also
focused at the regimental combat team level. Complementing the doctrine of FM 31-50 was the 1944
operations manual, FM 100-5. This latter manual rightly emphasized the importance of combined arms
actions and the need for extensive reconnaissance of prepared and defended cities. The Army successfully
implemented this doctrine in several major instances of urban combat, most notably the capture of the first
German city, Aachen, and hundreds of small-scale urban assaults on cities, towns, and villages across
France, the Benelux, and Germany. Army forces also successfully employed this urban combat doctrine
during the liberation of Manila in 1945.
1-18. The legacy of this era of Army operations was an effective tactical solution to urban offensive
combat: isolate the urban area, seize a foothold, and expand the foothold block by block until occupying
the entire urban area and destroying the enemy. The doctrine’s emphasis on firepower kept friendly
casualties to a minimum. Unfortunately, when enemy forces stoutly defended the urban area, the emphasis
on firepower resulted in the area’s virtual destruction and high casualties among noncombatants.
1-19. The doctrinal approach honed in World War II remained the accepted Army approach to urban
combat to the century’s end. The last successful implementation occurred during the Korean War and the
final liberation of Seoul. The Vietnam conflict did not offer the Army opportunities or the requirement to
practice urban combat or test and refine doctrine on a large scale. The largest urban battle, Hue, was a
chaotic tactical battle that validated most of the historical lessons of urban combat without generating any
new doctrinal insights for large-scale urban warfare.
1-20. From the mid-1950s through the 1990s, the Army conducted UO in the U.S. in support of civil
authorities during civil unrest and anti-Vietnam protests. Some operations involved numerous active and
Reserve Component forces engaged in restoring public order. The Detroit riots of 1967 and the Los
Angeles riots of 1992 required the commitments of active and National Guard units. In 1968, the Army
deployed over 35,000 troops to Washington D.C., Chicago, and Baltimore following the death of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.
1-6
FM 3-06
26 October 2006
The Urban Outlook
The Three Block War
This is the landscape upon which the 21st Century battle will be fought. It will be an
asymmetrical battlefield. Much like the Germanic tribes, our enemies will not allow us
to fight the Son of Desert Storm, but will try to draw us into the stepchild of
Chechnya. In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing
displaced refugees—providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will
be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations—and,
finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all on the same
day…all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the “three block war.”
General Charles C. Krulak
Commandant, US Marine Corps
1-21. In the 1970s and 1980s, Army doctrine predominantly focused on urban areas and successfully
fighting a conventional ground war against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. FM 90-10
(1979) described how to conduct urban operations against Soviet forces in Germany. Its concepts were
never tested other than in simulation, and its approach to urban combat was not substantially different from
that practiced by the Army since World War II. Despite previous doctrine’s admonition to avoid cities, the
Army has had to fight in them in diverse circumstances.
1-22. In the 1990s and early 21st century, commanders and planners began to more carefully consider the
impact of urban environments on the overall conduct of campaigns and major operations. Maneuver
warfare characterized Operation Desert Storm in 1991; however, urban environments became prominent
during subsequent operations in Somalia, the Balkans, and again in Iraq. (During Operation Iraqi Freedom
in 2003, for example, Baghdad was considered as a strategic center of gravity for planning.) This was a
result of adversaries recognizing the asymmetric advantages to be gained by fighting superior U.S. forces
in an urban environment as well as a general worldwide trend of increasing urbanization. The evolving
nature of Army operations in the urban environment was recognized in the Army doctrine of full spectrum
operations. No longer could combat operations be considered exclusively as a separate phase of the major
operation. Instead, full spectrum operations—combat and stability or civil support—would be conducted
simultaneously. It also became clear to Army commanders that while one type of operation can often
dominate for a period, simultaneous, full-spectrum urban operations were now the norm and an in-depth
understanding of complex urban societies essential to overall success.
MODERN ARMY URBAN OPERATIONS
1-23. Modern urban operations will be full spectrum operations executed jointly and will often contain a
multinational and interagency component. They will span the entire range of possible applications of
military power. At higher echelons, these separations are often viewed as levels or scales of intensity. For
the tactical units conducting urban operations, these divisions appear indistinct, as the intensity is often
high despite where the operation falls within the range of military operations.
JOINT, INTERAGENCY, AND MULTINATIONAL
1-24. The urban environment is too multifaceted for a single-service, single-agency, or single-dimensional
solution. Generating desired effects and avoiding unintended negative consequences in this complex
environment requires careful integration of joint
(and often multinational) forces and interagency
capabilities throughout all phases of the operation. Effective interagency collaboration will help plan
effects, supporting actions, and measures of effectiveness to ensure that military actions complement
diplomatic, economic, and informational activities.
1-25. Joint urban operations (JUOs) in which Army forces are a major component will be primarily land
operations. These operations may take place within the context of a joint campaign conducted by a joint
force land component commander or a joint task force (JTF) commander. Or they may be an Army
operation under an ARFOR commander who himself operates for a JFC, depending on the organization of
the theater’s joint command structure. In the later case, the JFC will manage joint issues in the urban area.
26 October 2006
FM 3-06
1-7
Chapter 1
1-26. The JFC conducting JUOs will focus on effectively organizing his forces for UO and tasking them in
accordance with their service capabilities. His guide for the conduct of the JUO will be the joint
operational tasks described in JP 3-0. JP 3 06 will provide the JTF commander specific guidance regarding
the conduct of joint operational tasks in the urban environment. Army commanders will execute tasks
assigned by the JFC and advise him on using Army forces and capabilities. Army commanders will also
ensure that Army UO are nested within the JFC’s concept of operations. Also, the ARFOR commander will
request support through the JFC from other service and functional commanders who have urban
capabilities critical to the success of Army UO. See Appendix D for more information on joint capabilities
in an urban environment.
1-27. The military conflict will not be an end to itself. It is inevitably a means of transition from a
perceived unsatisfactory state of affairs to an improved end. Therefore, urban operations will require the
careful orchestration of military and civilian capabilities to achieve success. An early identification of
potential requirements will allow for the proper allocation of responsibilities between military and civilian
agencies and a clear understanding of what is possible for each to achieve. Such understanding will
preclude the establishment of false perceptions from all concerned, but particularly from the urban
population and the public at large.
1-28. Interagency cooperation will include the Army as part of the Department of Defense, elements of the
Department of State, and other various governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Urban
operations demand the expertise and abilities of various organizations and a synergistic unity of effort if
strategic goals aimed at bringing about a more satisfactory political, social, diplomatic, economic, and
military situation are to be achieved. However, there will often be a gap in time before bringing many
governmental capabilities to bear that the Army and other military forces—to include coalition partners—
will have to fill. Routine interagency training, planning, and coordination will help to decrease that gap in
time to its minimum. As it is likely that civilian organization leaders will be in charge during some phases
of the overall operation, they should lead planning at those times. A careful survey of urban requirements
and rapid communication to participating civilian organizations will also help speed civilian capabilities to
where they are needed most.
Winning the Peace in Iraq:
The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations
We found that if we concentrated solely on establishing a large security force and
targeted counterinsurgent combat operations—and only after that was accomplished,
worked toward establishing a sustainable infrastructure supported by a strong
government developing a free-market system—we would have waited too long. The
outcome of a sequential plan allowed insurgent leaders to gain a competitive
advantage through solidifying the psychological and structural support of the
populace.
Further, those who viewed the attainment of security solely as a function of military
action alone were mistaken. A gun on every street corner, although visually
appealing, provides only a short-term solution and does not equate to long-term
security grounded in democratic process. Our observation was born not from
idealism, but because it creates the essence of true security, protecting not only our
soldiers, but Iraq, the region, and, consequently, our homeland.
Major General Peter Chiarelli
Commander, 1st Cavalry Division
FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
1-29. Army forces will conduct full spectrum operations within urban areas. Army commanders conduct
full spectrum operations abroad by executing offensive, defensive, and stability urban operations as part of
an the joint, interagency, and multinational effort described above. Army forces within the United States
and its territories conduct full spectrum operations by combining offensive, defensive, and civil support
1-8
FM 3-06
26 October 2006
The Urban Outlook
operations to support homeland security. The situation will mandate that one type of operation—offense,
defense, stability, or civil support—dominates the urban operation. Depending on whether the operation is
overseas or within the United States, however, commanders will often find themselves executing offensive
and defensive operations and stability or civil support operations simultaneously. In fact, waiting until all
combat operations are concluded before beginning stability or civil support operations often results in lost,
sometimes irretrievable, opportunities. Unsurprisingly, the mission determines the dominant type of
operation, with the other types of Army operations conducted to shape the AO for mission success. The
dominant type of operation will vary between different urban areas even in the same campaign.
Offense
1-30. Against a large conventional enemy in a major urban area with a large civil population present,
offensive operations will likely require a greater commitment of Army resources than in other
environments. Urban offensive operations will also incur the greatest risks to Army forces and
noncombatants. Within defensive and stability or civil support operations, forces may conduct tactical
offensive UO, such as counterattacks to maintain the initiative or raids to eliminate elements disrupting the
stability or civil support operation.
Defense
1-31. Defensive UO are generally conducted as a shaping operation within a larger major operation. These
temporary operations often set conditions for successful offensive operations, stability operations, or civil
support operations. Commanders often conduct defensive UO within other types of operations to protect
essential facilities in the urban area, protect flanks against counterattack, prevent the breakout of isolated
enemies, or protect valuable supply bases or vulnerable convoy routes. Army forces conducting defensive
UO must creatively use the environment to enhance their combat power.
1-32. In UO, essential facilities will likely include urban ports and airfields required by sister services to
support ground operations. Therefore, Army commanders will need to carefully plan integrated air and
base defense operations with air and naval component commanders. Protection requirements increase
dramatically as air and naval assets are most vulnerable when aircraft are on the ground and ships are
docked at port. Without a carefully synchronized and integrated base defense plan, Army commanders risk
sporadic or total loss of support by air and naval forces—forces essential to successful UO.
Stability
1-33. Stability operations in an urban environment require offensive and defensive operations, combined
with other tasks unique to each stability operation. Army forces conduct urban stability operations for
various reasons, including noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, or support to
insurgencies (see Chapter 9). Urban stability operations will require an offensive capability to destroy any
military capability that overtly threatens its objectives before that military threat can adversely affect the
operation. Army forces employ defensive capabilities to safeguard themselves as well as secure critical
places, populations, or infrastructure in the urban area. Commanders may also employ defensive
capabilities to separate and protect one faction from another. Various stability operations will also require
the distribution of food or aid and the protection or assistance of agencies conducting economic or
humanitarian activities.
Civil Support
1-34. Army civil support operations in an urban environment aid other U.S. agencies and organizations in
mitigating the consequences of natural and man-made disasters. In response to the disaster, civil support
operations require the equipment, personnel, or organizational abilities of Army forces rather than the
Army’s combat capabilities. In a civil support mission, these capabilities often involve Army
transportation, medical, quartermaster, or engineer forces. Unless conducted in conjunction with homeland
defense, urban civil support operations will seldom require combat; however, commanders must determine
if force protection threats exist that could hamper Army civil support operations. During homeland security
operations, defensive and offensive capabilities will be required to defeat hostile armed forces.
26 October 2006
FM 3-06
1-9
Chapter 1
PREPARING FOR FUTURE URBAN OPERATIONS
1-35. To operate successfully in a complex urban environment requires a thorough understanding of the
urban environment and rigorous, realistic UO training. Training should be conducted by the complete
combined arms team and cover full spectrum operations to include appropriate tactics, techniques, and
procedures (see FM 3-06.11 and TC 90-1). It should also replicate—
The psychological impact of intense, close combat against a well-trained, relentless, and
adaptive enemy.
The effects of noncombatants—including governmental and nongovernmental organizations and
agencies—in close proximity to Army forces. This necessitates—
An in-depth understanding of culture and its effects on perceptions.
An understanding of civil administration and governance.
The ability to mediate and negotiate with civilians including the ability to effectively
communicate through an interpreter.
The development and use of flexible, effective, and understandable rules of engagement.
A complex intelligence environment requiring lower-echelon units to collect and forward
essential information to higher echelons for rapid synthesis into timely and useable intelligence
for all levels of command. Understanding the multifaceted urban environment necessitates a
bottom-fed approach to developing intelligence (instead of a top-fed approach more common
and efficient for open terrain and conventional threats). It also emphasizes the need for
intelligence reach and a truly collaborative approach to the development and sharing of
intelligence.
The communications challenges imposed by the environment as well as the need to transmit
large volumes of information and data.
The medical and logistic problems associated with operations in an urban area including
constant threat interdiction against lines of communications and sustainment bases.
Developing Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operability
1-36. UO training extends from the individual Soldier to the joint level including the integration of
conventional and special operations forces. Preparedness also includes enhancing interoperability in
regards to urban multinational and interagency operations. Training, as well as campaign and contingency
plan creation, should include significant and sustained participation by civilian agencies. Fruitful
multinational and interagency relationships must be cultivated before the onset of operations, that is, before
Soldiers and their coalition counterparts are making decisions—many with strategic implications and often
when they are under fire. Joint, interagency, and multinational collaboration will help design effects,
supporting actions, and measures of effectiveness necessary to ensure that military actions in urban
environments complement the diplomatic, informational, and economic activities necessary to achieve
strategic objectives.
Conducting Live, Virtual, and Constructive Training
1-37. Force preparedness mandates integrating the actual use of urban terrain, exercises at urban training
sites, simulations, or any combination into tactical- and operational-level intra- and interservice training.
This type of multi-faceted training will help commanders develop a better understanding of the complexity
of the urban environment and enable them to execute missions across full spectrum operations. Careful use
of these facilities will also allow Army forces to fully integrate urban operations within self-development,
institutional, and operational training.
Ensuring Every Soldier is an Urban Warrior
1-38. In a complex urban environment, every Soldier—regardless of branch or military occupational
specialty—must be committed and prepared to close with and kill or capture threat forces in an urban
environment. Every Soldier must also be prepared to effectively interact with the urban area’s
noncombatant population and assist in his unit’s intelligence collection efforts. Each urban operation will
1-10
FM 3-06
26 October 2006
The Urban Outlook
be unique and commanders—given an opportunity to surge and conduct mission-specific post-mobilization
and in-theater training—will need to conduct an analysis of the tasks requiring emphasis or modification to
fit the conditions of the operational environment. In UO, every soldier will likely be required to—
Perform advanced rifle marksmanship to include advanced firing positions, short-range
marksmanship, and night firing techniques (unassisted and with the use of optics).
Operate their unit’s crew-served weapons.
Conduct urban reconnaissance and combat patrolling.
Enter and clear buildings and rooms as part of an urban attack or cordon and search operation.
Defend an urban area.
Act as a member of a combat convoy (including specific drivers training).
Control civil disturbances.
Navigate in an urban area.
1-39. While not all-inclusive and necessarily urban-specific, other critical individual and collective UO
tasks (often modified for the urban environment) might include—
Conduct troop-leading procedures.
React to contact, ambush, snipers, indirect fire, and improvised explosive devices.
Establish an observation point, personnel or vehicle checkpoint, or roadblock.
Secure a disabled vehicle or downed aircraft.
Call for indirect fire and close air support.
Create and employ explosive charges.
Handle detainees and enemy prisoners of war.
Treat and evacuate casualties.
Accurately report information.
Understand the society and culture specific to the area of operations.
Use basic commands and phrases in the region’s dominant language.
Conduct tactical questioning.
Interact with the media.
Conduct thorough after-action reviews.
1-40. Commanders must understand that all Soldiers will require urban-specific equipment to conduct
many urban-specific tasks. Critically, commanders cannot expect supporting forces to fight alongside and
support ground maneuver units in an urban environment without the appropriate equipment and training.
26 October 2006
FM 3-06
1-11
Chapter 1
Figure 1-2. UO and DOTMLPF
Continual Adaptation and Innovation
1-41. Realistic UO training (as well as the conduct of real world operations) has the added benefit of
identifying operational requirements and resultant changes necessary in our doctrine, organizations,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) (see figure 1-2 and FM
100-11). While technology
(materiel) and organizational changes are important, confident Soldiers
(personnel) remain the decisive means for success. Technology and organizational changes will be a critical
enabler to attain better understanding of the urban environment, enhance command and control on the
noncontiguous battlefield, and achieve the agile, simultaneous, and precise effects required in UO. In the
future, technology may lead to a radically new operational concept and approach to UO. Still, competent
leaders and well-trained, disciplined, and adaptive Soldiers will remain the decisive means for the Army to
succeed in this complex and multidimensional urban environment.
1-12
FM 3-06
26 October 2006
Chapter 2
Understanding the Urban Environment
From a planning perspective, commanders view cities not just as a topographic feature
but as dynamic entities that include hostile forces, local population, and infrastructure.
Planning for urban operations requires careful IPB, with particular emphasis on the
three-dimensional nature of the topography and the intricate social structure of the
population.
FM 3-0
Of all the environments in which to conduct operations, the urban environment
confronts Army commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found
elsewhere. Its distinct characteristics result from an intricate topography and high
population density. The topography’s complexity stems from the man-made features
and supporting infrastructure superimposed on the natural terrain. Hundreds,
thousands, or millions of civilians may be near or intermingled with soldiers—
friendly and enemy. This second factor, and the human dimension it represents, is
potentially the most important and perplexing for commanders and their staffs to
understand and evaluate. To this end, this chapter provides information essential to
understanding the urban environment and conducting an effective intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (see FM 2-01.3, FMI 2-91.4, and Appendix B).
Although urban areas possess general similarities, each environment is distinct and
will react to and affect the presence and operations of Army forces differently. A
tactical technique effective in one area may not be effective in another area due to
physical differences, such as street patterns or the type of building construction. An
Army policy popular with one urban group may cause resentment and hostility in
another due to diverse cultural differences. All difficulties potentially exist, and they
increase the complexity for Army forces operating in urban areas. These difficulties
range from conventional military forces to disease and starvation (see Chapter 3) to a
pervasive media—often acutely present in intricate combinations. Thus, commanders
at all levels must make extraordinary efforts to assess and understand their particular
urban environment to plan, prepare for, and execute effective urban operations (UO).
A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT
2-1. Urban areas vary depending on their history, the cultures of their inhabitants, their economic
development, the local climate, available building materials, and many other factors. This variety exists not
only among urban areas but also within any particular area. The ever-changing mix of natural and man-
made features in urban areas present commanders with some of the most difficult terrain in which to
conduct military operations.
2-2. Although urban areas possess similar characteristics, no two are identical. The sprawl of Los
Angeles, for example, bears little physical resemblance to New Delhi. Societal characteristics most signifi
cantly affect each area’s uniqueness and complexity. While complex, information about the terrain, its
potential effects on operations, and how it changes over time may be determined with some degree of cer
tainty. However, the human dimension is much more difficult to understand and assess, particularly its
26 October 2006
FM 3-06
2-1
Chapter 2
effects on military operations. Like any environment, the side that can best understand and exploit the
positive and mitigate the negative effects of the urban environment has the best chance of success.
2-3. Whether a large metropolis or a small village, each urban environment has identifiable components
that constantly change and interact. This “system of systems” consists of the terrain, the society, and the
infrastructure that links the two (see figure 2-1).
2-4. These systems are not separate and distinct categories, but rather overlapping and interdependent
systems, acting dynamically with each other. Thoroughly analyzing these elements, along with the other
factors of mission, enemy, weather, troops and support available, and time—
Contributes to the accuracy of the commanders’ situational understanding.
Potentially lessens the number and cost of close combat engagements.
Allows commanders to develop courses of action that apply appropriate resources against
decisive points.
2-5. In stability operations and civil support operations, this understanding allows commanders to engage
and dominate the decisive points critical to maintaining peace or restoring normalcy to the urban
environment. Although each system is categorized into subordinate components or subsystems, com
manders must often “step back” and visualize each system, the complex urban environment, and their area
of operations (AO) as a unified whole. This “systems thinking” aids commanders in uncovering key
relationships and intersections that can help reveal centers of gravity (COGs) and decisive points.
2-6. To comprehend the urban environment and its components to the fullest extent possible,
commanders must carefully integrate and employ tactical reconnaissance forces, special operations forces
(SOF)—to include psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs units—and a myriad of other human
intelligence (HUMINT) assets and regional, language, and
cultural experts. The societal aspects and integrating
infrastructure will challenge commanders’ assessment and
understanding. These aspects will also require greater
dependence on nonmilitary and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and host-nation agencies for their
information, knowledge, and expertise. This last
consideration requires commanders to develop effective
techniques and procedures for coordinating, interacting,
and, to the greatest extent possible, synchronizing
activities with these agencies.
Figure 2-1. Keys to understanding the
urban environment
URBAN TERRAIN
2-7. Although complex and difficult to penetrate with many intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) assets, the terrain is the most recognizable aspect of an urban area. Truly understanding it, however,
requires comprehending its multidimensional nature. The terrain consists of natural and man-made
features, with man-made features dominating; an analysis considers both. Buildings, streets, and other
infrastructure have varied patterns, forms, and sizes. The infinite ways in which these factors can inter
twine make it difficult to describe a “typical” urban area. However, these various factors provide a
framework for understanding the complex terrain in an urban area. Furthermore, man-made features
significantly affect military systems and Soldiers, and thus tactics and operations. General effects on urban
operations are discussed in this chapter. Specific effects on warfighting functions (see Chapters 4 and 10)
and the spectrum of operations (see Chapters 7, 8, and 9) are interwoven throughout the manual.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL BATTLEFIELD
2-8. Urban areas present an extraordinary blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean
forms superimposed on the natural relief, drainage, and vegetation. An urban area may appear dwarfed on
2-2
FM 3-06
26 October 2006
Understanding the Urban Environment
a map by the surrounding countryside. In fact, the size and extent of the urban area of operations is many
times that of a similarly sized portion of undeveloped natural terrain. A multi-storied building may take up
the same surface area as a small field, but each story or floor contains approximately an equal area as the
ground upon which it sits. In effect, a ten-story building can have eleven times more defensible area than
“bare” ground—ten floors and the roof. It is the sheer volume and density created by this urban geometry
that makes UO resource intensive in time, manpower, and materiel.
2-9. Like natural disasters, UO can
radically
alter
the
physical
characteristics of the urban terrain in
ways not experienced in other environ
ments. They may cause
(either
intentionally or not) uncontrollable fires
or the loss of electricity. A power
outage can cause flooding (especially in
subsurface areas) by shutting down
pumping stations. Entire buildings may
be destroyed, eliminating reference
points, leaving large piles of rubble,
altering fields of fire, and making
movement and transportation extremely
difficult. Additionally, buildings and
other urban structures, damaged but not
destroyed, can become
(or remain)
effective obstacles and possible booby
traps. Even without enemy exploitation,
their weakened construction and unstable structure increase the risk of injury to Soldiers and civilians
moving within them. (Engineer expertise will often be needed to determine whether the buildings can
support occupation by Army forces or civilians.) Yet, even the total collapse of a building may not
eliminate its defenders. Of additional concern, the likely presence of toxic industrial material (TIM) can
create additional obstacles and health hazards.
2-10. Commanders in other environments normally address the depth, breadth, and height of their AO in
terms of two areas: airspace and surface. In an urban environment, they broaden their scope to include
supersurface and subsurface areas (see figure 2-2) that voluminously extend the commanders area of
operations. Although spatially separated, each area may be used as an avenue of approach or mobility
corridor, line of communications (LOC), or engagement area.
2-11. Supersurface and subsurface areas magnify the complexity of the urban physical environment.
Commanders must consider activities that occur outside buildings and subterranean areas (the external
space) as well as the activities happening unseen in buildings and subterranean systems (the internal
space). This internal volume further challenges command, control, and intelligence collection activities and
increases the combat power required to conduct UO. Commanders must develop methods and techniques
to help themselves, their staffs, and their subordinate commanders and staffs to represent, visualize, and
reference these multiple dimensions. Increasing the difficulty, such dimensions can change rapidly simply
due to continued urban growth or, as described earlier, the effects of nature and UO themselves.
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Figure 2-2. The multidimensional urban battlefield
Airspace
2-12. As in all other environments, aircraft and aerial munitions use the airspace as rapid avenues of ap
proach in urbanized areas. Forces can use aviation assets for observation and reconnaissance, aerial attack,
or high-speed insertion and extraction of Soldiers, supplies, and equipment. Some surface obstacles in an
urban area, such as rubble, do not affect flight (though they may prevent the take-off and landing of
aircraft). Buildings of varying height and the increased density of towers, signs, power lines, and other
urban constructions, however, create obstacles to flight and the trajectory of many munitions (masking).
Similarly, these obstacles can restrict a pilot’s line of sight as well as physically limit low-altitude
maneuverability in the urban airspace. Excellent cover and concealment afforded enemy gunners in an
urban area increases aviation vulnerability to small arms and man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADS), particularly when supporting ground forces. The potential for a high volume of air traffic
(military and civilian) over and within urban airspace (including fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned
aircraft systems) may become another significant hazard and necessitate increased airspace command and
control measures.
Surface
2-13. Surface areas apply to exterior ground-level areas, such as parking lots, airfields, highways, streets,
sidewalks, fields, and parks. They often provide primary avenues of approach and the means for rapid
advance. However, buildings and other structures often canalize forces moving along them. As such,
obstacles on urban surface areas usually have more effect than those in open terrain since bypass often
requires entering and transiting buildings or radical changes to selected routes. Where urban areas border
the ocean or sea, large lakes, and major rivers, the surface of these bodies of water may provide key
friendly and threat avenues of approach or essential LOCs—a significant consideration for Army
commanders. As such, amphibious, river-crossing, and river operations may be integral parts of the overall
urban operation (see FM 3-05.212 and FM 3-90.12).
2-14. Larger open areas—such as stadiums, sports fields, school playgrounds, and parking lots—are often
critical areas during urban operations. They can provide locations for displaced civilians, interrogation
centers, and prisoner of war holding facilities. These areas also can afford suitable aircraft landing and
pickup zones and artillery firing locations. They can provide logistic support areas and aerial resupply
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Understanding the Urban Environment
possibilities because they are often centrally located. Finally, large open areas (and immense or unusually
shaped structures) within urban areas are often easier to see—especially from the air—and can serve as
excellent target reference points from which to shift or control fires.
Supersurface
2-15. These areas include the internal floors or levels (intrasurface areas) and external roofs or tops of
buildings, stadiums, towers, or other vertical structures. They can provide cover and concealment; limit or
enhance observation and fields of fire; and restrict, canalize, or block movement. However, forces can
move within and between supersurface areas creating additional, though normally secondary, avenues of
approach. Rooftops may offer ideal locations for landing helicopters for small-scale air assaults and aerial
resupply. First, however, engineers must analyze buildings for their structural integrity and obstacles. Such
obstacles include electrical wires, antennas, and enemy-emplaced mines (although personnel may be
inserted by jumping, rappelling, or fast roping from a hovering helicopter and extracted by hoist
mechanisms). Some rooftops are designed as helipads. Roofs and other supersurface areas may also pro
vide excellent locations for snipers; lightweight, handheld antitank weapons; MANPADS; and
communications retransmission sites. They enable top-down attacks against the weakest points of armored
vehicles and unsuspecting aircraft. Overall, elevated firing positions reduce the value of any cover in
surrounding open areas and permit engagement at close range with less risk of immediate close assault.
This area (and the subsurface area) requires commanders to think, plan, and execute ground operations
vertically as well as horizontally. In this latter regard, UO share strong similarities with mountain
operations (see FM 3-97.6).
Subsurface
2-16. Subsurface areas are below the surface level. They may serve as secondary and, in fewer instances,
primary avenues of approach at lower tactical levels. When thoroughly reconnoitered and controlled, they
offer excellent covered and concealed LOCs for moving supplies and evacuating casualties. They may also
provide sites for caching and stockpiling supplies. Subsurface areas include subterranean areas such as
subways, mines, tunnels, sewers, drainage systems, cellars, civil defense shelters, and other various
underground utility systems. In older cities, they may include ancient hand-dug tunnels and catacombs.
Both attacker and defender can use subsurface areas to gain surprise and maneuver against the rear and
flanks of a threat and to conduct ambushes. However, these areas are often the most restrictive and easiest
to defend or block. Their effectiveness depends on superior knowledge of their existence and overall
design. Army commanders may also need to consider potential avenues of approach afforded by the
subsurface areas of rivers and major bodies of water that border urban areas. This particularly applies when
operating as part of a joint task force (JTF) task organized with SOF or when opposing a threat with similar
capabilities.
MAJOR URBAN PATTERNS
2-17. Four major urban patterns (satellite, network, linear, and segment) can influence UO (see figure 2-3).
Central to two of the patterns (satellite and network) is the hub or dominant urban area or pattern around
which outlying urban areas or patterns radiate. (A segmented urban area, because it tends to be a larger
urban area, can often be a hub.) In offensive and defensive operations, the hub serves as a pivot or strong
point; as such, it can become a major obstacle to an attacker. If the attacker chooses to bypass the urban
area (hub) located along his axis of advance without first isolating the area, he may expose his flank or
LOC to attack from the hub as well as dependent urban areas or subordinate satellite patterns. Because the
focus of stability and civil support operations is normally on people, commanders should understand the
value and influence of the hub to the economic, political, or cultural well being of the surrounding area.
Generally the larger the hub, the greater influence it has on satellite urban areas and surrounding rural
areas. Commanders must remember that urban areas are not islands; all are connected to the surrounding
rural (and other urban) areas through fluid and permeable boundaries and LOCs.
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Figure 2-3. Major urban patterns
Satellite Pattern
2-18. This common pattern consists of a central hub surrounded by smaller, dependent urban areas. LOCs
tend to converge on the hub. Outlying areas often support the principal urban area at the hub with means of
reinforcement, resupply, and evacuation. In some instances, they may serve as mutually supporting battle
positions. Commanders should consider the effects of the outlying urban areas on operations within the
hub, and, conversely, the effects of operations within the hub on outlying urban areas. Information
operations (IO), for example, targeted primarily at key leaders and other civilians located within the hub of
a satellite pattern may subsequently influence civilians in outlying urban areas and achieve necessary
effects without having to commit specific resources to these outlying areas.
Network Pattern
2-19. The network pattern represents the interlocking of the primary hubs of subordinate satellite patterns.
Its elements are more self-sufficient and less supportive of each other, although a dominant hub may exist.
Major LOCs in a network extend more than in a satellite pattern and take more of a rectangular rather than
a convergent form. Its natural terrain may vary more than in a single satellite array. Operations in one area
may or may not easily influence, or be influenced by, other urban areas in the pattern.
Linear Pattern
2-20. Potentially a subelement of the previous two patterns, the linear pattern may form one ray of the
satellite pattern or be found along connecting links between the hubs of a network. Most frequently, this
pattern results from the stringing of minor urban areas along a confined natural terrain corridor, such as an
elongated valley, a body of water, or a man-made communications route. In offensive and defensive
operations, this latter form of the linear pattern facilitates developing a series of strong defensive positions
in depth, effectively blocking or delaying an attacking force moving along the canalized terrain.
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Understanding the Urban Environment
Segment Pattern
2-21. When dominant natural terrain, such as a river or man-made features (canals, major highways, or
railways), divides an urban area, it creates a segmented pattern. This pattern often makes it easier for
commanders to assign areas of operations to subordinate commanders. However, this pattern may fragment
operations and increase risk to an operation requiring mutual support between subordinate units. Still, the
segmented urban areas may allow commanders to isolate threats more easily in these areas and focus
operations within segments that contain their decisive points. Although an integral part of the whole (the
urban area), each segment may develop distinct social, economic, cultural, and political characteristics.
This social segmenting may benefit commanders faced with limited assets to influence or control the urban
populace. After thoroughly analyzing the society, they may be able to focus IO and populace and resources
control measures against only specific segments that affect decisive operations. Commanders may need
only to isolate other segments or may need to just monitor for any significant changes in the attitudes,
beliefs, or actions of the civilians located there.
LESSER STREET PATTERNS
2-22. Lesser patterns in the urban area result from the layout of the streets, roads, highways, and other
thoroughfares. They evolve from influences of natural terrain, the original designer’s personal prejudices,
and the changing needs of the inhabitants. Street patterns (and widths) influence all warfighting functions;
however, they greatly affect movement and maneuver, command and control, and sustainment. (In some
portions of older Middle Eastern urban areas, the labyrinths of streets were designed only to allow two
loaded donkeys to pass each other; tanks are too wide.) Urban areas can display any of three basic patterns
and their combinations: radial, grid, and irregular (see figure 2-4).
Figure 2-4. Basic internal street patterns
Radial
2-23. Societies of highly concentrated religious or secular power often construct urban areas with a radial
design: all primary thoroughfares radiating out from the center of power. Urban areas with this design may
signal an important historical aspect in the overall analysis of the urban society. Terrain permitting, these
streets may extend outward in a complete circle or may form a semicircle or arc when a focal point abuts a
natural barrier, such as a coastline or mountain. To increase mobility and traffic flow, societies often add
concentric loops or rings to larger radial patterns. Unless commanders carefully plan boundaries, routes,
and axes of advance, their subordinate units’ movement or maneuver may be inadvertently funneled toward
the center of urban areas with this pattern resulting in congestion, loss of momentum, and an increased
potential for ambush or fratricide.
Grid
2-24. The most adaptable and universal form for urban areas is the grid or rectangular pattern: lines of
streets at right angles to one another forming blocks similar to the pattern of a chessboard. A grid pattern
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can fill in and eventually take over an original radial pattern. Grid patterns often appear to ease the assign
ment of boundaries for subordinates units. However, commanders also consider how the natural terrain
influences operations and the establishment of graphic control measures. They also consider the influence
of the buildings and other structures lining these streets, such as their height and construction, before
assigning boundaries and developing other control measures. Commanders should also consider the
following when developing urban graphic control measures:
Describing boundaries, phase lines, checkpoints, and other graphic control measures by easily
recognizable features is as important in urban areas as elsewhere. While easily identifiable urban
structures such as unusually tall or oddly-shaped buildings, cemeteries, stadiums, or prominent
rail or highway interchanges can be useful references, available natural features are a better
descriptor than man-made features that may be altered or unrecognizable. As an aid to air-to
ground coordination, commanders should select features that can be identified by both ground
and air forces. Those that help in controlling ground forces may not be easily visible from the air
and vice versa.
Commanders should also consider whether a boundary along an easily-recognizable terrain
feature, such as a river, will also be easy to identify by the threat who may seek to “find the
seam” and exploit the likely control and coordination difficulties associated with boundaries,
especially between higher-level units. This often requires commanders to carefully position a
control measure away from the key feature to provide a designated subordinate force with the
terrain and space necessary to control the feature. On the other hand, commanders working
closely with local authorities during stability and civil support operations may not need to
thoroughly understand the physical effect of street patterns on the assignment of boundaries as
they might for combat UO. Instead, commanders may choose to assign boundaries overlaid on
existing geopolitical boundaries used by local agencies to increase interoperability and aid in
unity of effort.
IRREGULAR
2-25. In most urban areas, regardless of the original intent, plan, or vision, existing street patterns emerge
from successive plans overlaid one on another. Some are well planned to fit with previous plans while
others a haphazard response to explosive urban growth. The result may mix patterns. Urban engineers and
planners may specifically design irregular patterns for aesthetic reasons (as in many suburban housing
developments) or to conform to marked terrain relief. Irregular street patterns may alert commanders and
analysts that the underlying natural terrain may exert greater influence over operations than in other
portions of the urban area. Finally, irregular street patterns make the movement and maneuver of forces
less predictable. However, a labyrinth of irregular or “twisting” street patterns may increase the possibility
of fratricide particularly for units that are trained or accustomed only to grid patterns.
AN URBAN MODEL
2-26. Throughout the world, urban areas have similar form and function. In form, urban areas contain like
characteristics, readily divisible into distinct sections or areas. Functionally, they tend to be the centers of
population, finance, politics, transportation, industry, and culture. While urban areas may be modeled by
several different means, figure 2-5 illustrates the general forms and internal functions. Some forms and
functions may overlap. For example, high-rise buildings are located in core areas as well as in outlying
areas and may be used for residential purposes. With the rapid urbanization associated with developing
nations, the areas displayed in this urban model often manifest themselves less clearly there than in
developed nations.
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Understanding the Urban Environment
Figure 2-5. Urban functional zones
2-27. This analysis helps to determine, in general terms, potential advantages and disadvantages each
portion of the urban area may have toward accomplishing the urban operation. However, construction
materials and methods can vary drastically. Commanders and their staff will often need to identify specific
building types and construction and understand weapons effects on them. If a commander desires precise
effects, the chosen munitions or weapons system must be sufficiently accurate, capable of penetrating the
target structure (without exiting the other side), and achieve effects within. Often noncombatants, critical
infrastructure, or protected targets are in the vicinity. Commanders may need to determine if the
surrounding walls or structures will sufficiently absorb or negate the blast or thermal effects of the weapon.
Regardless, understanding the structure and composition of buildings and other structures in the urban AO
may be necessary to allow commanders to determine the best means to accomplish the mission.
Core
2-28. The core is the heart of the urban area, the downtown or central business district. Relatively small
and compact, it contains a large percentage of the urban area’s shops, offices, and public institutions.
Often, it houses the headquarters for commercial and financial activities and contains important cultural,
historical, and governmental buildings. These activities prefer the core because of its accessibility. As the
focal point of the transportation network, residents find the core the easiest part of the urban area to reach.
It normally has the densest concentration of multistory buildings and subterranean features (underground
parking garages, underground shopping centers, and basements).
2-29. High-rise buildings, varying greatly in height (possibly 50 stories above ground and four stories
below ground), make up the cores of many of today’s urban areas. Buildings routinely abut one another,
with little or no setback from the sidewalks. Building height and density (except in outlying high-rise
areas) often decreases from the core to the edge of the residential areas, while the amount of open areas fre
quently increases. Modern urban planning allows for more open spaces between buildings than found in
the cores of older urban areas. Most core areas have undergone constant redevelopment resulting in various
types of construction. Commonly, brick buildings abound in the oldest part of the core; framed, heavy-clad
structures in the next oldest part; and a concentration of framed, light-clad buildings in the newest part. The
outer edge of the core, the core periphery, has ordinarily undergone less change than the core resulting in
buildings of uniform height (commonly two to three stories in towns and five to ten stories in larger urban
areas).
2-30. Generally, offensive operations focused in core areas (even when effectively isolated) will require
greater resources—particularly manpower, time, and information—than in many other parts of the urban
area. Mounted maneuver often proves more difficult in core areas because of fewer open areas, buildings
closer to the streets, and an increased density of civilian vehicles. Razed buildings in central core areas
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(especially high-rise buildings) become greater obstacles to mobility as they can collapse on and easily
block thoroughfares. Rubble piles provide excellent covered and concealed positions for dismounted threat
forces. Consequently, commanders often use more dismounted forces as part of their combined arms
operations. Conversely, the core may be critical to urban defensive operations, particularly older areas of
heavier construction that afford greater protection. Despite potential difficulties, the core area may be key
to accomplishing many stability or civil support missions since it houses much of the human activity that
occurs in the urban area.
Industrial Area
2-31. Industrial areas often develop on the outskirts of the urban areas where commercial transportation is
easiest (along airfields and major sea, river, rail, and highway routes). The road networks in and around
industrial areas are generally more developed and suitable for transportation assets. These areas will likely
displace farther from the core and residential areas as urban planners recognize the potential threat of TIM.
The dispersed pattern of the buildings provides sufficient space for large cargoes, trucks, and materiel
handling equipment. These areas may provide ideal sites for sustainment bases and maintenance sites.
While older heavier-clad structures may be found, new construction generally consists of low, large, flat-
roofed factory and warehouse buildings with large parking areas and work yards. These structures
generally have steel frame and lightweight exterior walls. Multistory structures usually have reinforced
concrete floors and ceilings.
Figure 2-6. Some toxic industrial chemicals and their industrial or commercial uses
2-32. Toxic industrial chemicals and other TIM may be transported through an urban area (by rail, barge,
truck, or pipeline) or found stored throughout. However, larger concentrations will exist in industrial areas,
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Understanding the Urban Environment
and their presence should concern Army forces operating near them. Some TIM are heavier than air and
tend to settle in low-lying and subsurface areas.
2-33. Each year, over 70,000 different chemicals are produced, processed, or consumed globally. An
estimated 25,000 commercial facilities around the world produce, process, or store chemicals that have a
legitimate industrial use yet are also classified as chemical warfare agents. Many other chemicals (not
classified as weapons) may still be sufficiently hazardous to pose a considerable threat to Army forces and
civilians in urban areas as choking agents or asphyxiates, flammables or incendiaries, water contaminants,
low-grade blister or nerve agents, or debilitating irritants. These chemicals can be released either
accidentally or deliberately. For example, on 2 December 1984, nearly 40 tons of methylisocyanate used to
produce pesticides leaked from a storage tank at Bhopal, India, killing thousands and injuring hundreds of
thousands. Figure 2-6 contains a small sampling of other toxic industrial chemicals along with their
industrial or commercial usage that commanders may encounter in an urban area. The most common
chemicals that may pose an immediate risk to Army forces are highly toxic irritant gases such as ammonia,
chlorine, hydrogen chloride, and sulfur dioxide.
2-34. Standard chemical defense equipment may not protect against (and chemical detection devices may
fail to detect) many toxic industrial chemicals. Therefore, the risk to Soldiers operating near the chemicals
may increase. Commanders must vigilantly identify these potential hazards, carefully consider them as part
of their overall vulnerability analysis, factor the analysis into their risk assessment, and execute necessary
contamination avoidance measures. (Local urban fire fighters may be a critical source of information for
determining the likely locations of TIM.) Any assessment includes the chance that toxic industrial
chemicals may be deliberately released by a threat to gain advantage or accidentally released by friendly
actions (see FM 3-11.9, FM 3-11.14, FM 3-11.21, and the U.S. Department of Transportation’s current
version of the Emergency Response Guidebook).
Outlying High-Rise Area
2-35. High-rise areas consist of multistoried apartments, commercial offices, and businesses separated by
large open areas, such as parking lots, parks, and individual one-story buildings. High-rise buildings are
generally of framed, light-clad construction with thin walls of brick, lightweight concrete, or glass. The
automobile, mass transit systems, and improved road networks encourage these areas to grow and function
further from the urban core.
2-36. Similar to the urban core, units given the mission to clear these areas, or even portions therein, will
need more resources—most notably personnel and time—to accomplish their mission. Commanders should
consider courses of action that isolate these entire areas, multiple sections within these areas, or even
individual buildings before assigning tasks. Without careful consideration and analysis, some tasks in these
areas could unintentionally—but rapidly—drain a unit’s resources or unhinge other portions of the major
operation. When defending, commanders who can integrate these areas in the defense will present the
attacker with similar resource problems and may be appropriate in a defense to delay. However, defending
commanders must ensure that the defense is arranged so that this portion cannot be easily isolated and
bypassed. Defensive positions in structures may require extensive reinforcement due to light-clad construc
tion.
Residential Area
2-37. Residential areas can be found dispersed throughout the urban area; however, large suburban areas
(or sprawl) normally form on the outskirts. Residential areas often consist of row houses or single-family
dwellings set in a grid or ringed pattern in a planned development project. Yards, gardens, trees, and fences
may separate the buildings in a residential area. In some areas of the world, residential areas may be
located in high walled compounds with houses built right up to the edge of the street. Modern residential
construction is more often of light-clad, framed wood construction, or brick, however; residential homes
formed by poured or pre-cast concrete can be found throughout many parts of the world. The combined
population of surrounding suburban areas often far outnumbers that of the urban area proper. Specific
suburbs tend toward homogeneity based on ethnicity, religion, economics, or some other social aspect.
Commanders must locate and analyze these areas to determine their impact on operations—often the most
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critical importance is the people located there (see the subsequent discussion in this chapter on the urban
society).
2-38. In offensive and defensive operations, commanders should determine whether operations pose an
unacceptable physical risk to civilians. If so, they may have to relocate civilians to a safer area, perhaps
another residential area. If not, commanders may implement a “stay-put” policy for that area and attempt to
isolate the effects of the operation from them. During civil support and stability operations, residential
locations may be the initial focal point for operations since most of the permanent population is located
there.
2-39. This area also contains an urban phenomenon known as shantytowns. These areas are commonly on
unoccupied, low-value land in and around many urban areas in underdeveloped countries. Shantytowns
may contain over 50-percent of the total urban population. They usually lack streets and public utilities.
The lean-to structures tend to be irregularly laid out, connected by walking paths, and made of any scrap
material available: lumber, brick, sheet metal, cardboard, cloth, or vegetation. The random arrangement of
structures, the absence of formal street naming and numbering, and often the lack of easily identifiable
buildings and terrain create challenges. These challenges include navigation, coordination, and the trans
mission of accurate information and intelligence. Depending on the operation, the temporary nature of the
structures can also mean that mobility can be either more or less restricted than other sections of the urban
area. A military force may easily knock down and traverse structures without affecting mobility at all.
However, their destruction may cause unacceptable civilian casualties, in which case mobility becomes
more restrictive as the narrow paths often do not accommodate vehicular traffic. Similarly, the makeshift
materials inhibit weapons effects less than many other parts of the urban area built more solidly. A tank
round, for example, may go much farther and injure many more noncombatants than in an area where the
primary building material is stone. Regardless, commanders should consider the effects of their operations
in this area, to include vehicles and weapons, as the weak structures increase the risk of fratricide, civilian
casualties, and large, rapidly spreading fires.
Commercial Ribbon Area
2-40. Commercial ribbon areas are rows of stores, shops, and restaurants built along both sides of major
streets that run through and between urban areas. These same types of areas often develop along the roads
that connect one urban area to another (strip areas). The buildings uniformly stand two to three stories tall
(about one story taller than the dwellings on the streets behind them).
Military Area
2-41. Fortifications and military installations may be found in or near urban areas throughout the world.
Historically, they may have been the “seed” responsible for initiating the growth of the present-day urban
area. Many countries possess long coastlines and borders with potentially hostile neighbors. To meet their
defensive needs, they developed coastal and border defense works that include extensive subsurface
facilities, many contiguous to urban areas. North Korea, for example, has built numerous hardened
artillery, missile, and command and control facilities along both its coasts and the demilitarized zone which
separates them from South Korea. While some fortifications may be inactive
(particularly ancient
fortifications), they can be rapidly activated and modified by threats (or Army forces) to accomplish their
original role. Even if not activated, they may still serve as choke points and major obstacles to movement
and maneuver.
2-42. Permanent-type fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick, concrete, steel-reinforced
concrete, or any combination of the above. Some contemporary constructions have been built subsurface
and employ heavy armor, major caliber weapons, internal communications, service facilities, and chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear overpressure systems. Because they have been built specifically for
military purposes, commanders and planners should carefully consider the effects of these military
constructions on the conduct of UO.
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Understanding the Urban Environment
URBAN SOCIETY
2-43. Although intricate, understanding the urban terrain is relatively straightforward in comparison to
comprehending the multifaceted nature of urban society. UO often require Army forces to operate in close
proximity to a high density of civilians. Even evacuated areas can have a stay-behind population in the tens
of thousands. This population’s presence, attitudes, actions, communications with the media, and needs
may affect the conduct of operations. Homogeneity decreases drastically as the size of the urban area
increases. Commanders must take into account the characteristics of a population whose beliefs and
interests vary based on factors (see figure 2-7). Analysis and understanding of these societal factors is
critical to a successful IO campaign and, thus, the entire operation.
2-44. Civilian populations continually influence, to varying degrees, operations conducted in an urban
area. Thoroughly understanding these societal aspects and avoiding “mirror-imaging”—overlaying one’s
own values and thought processes on top of the person or group one is trying to understand—will help to
accurately anticipate civilian actions and response. For example, while bribery and nepotism are not
accepted norms in U.S. society, they may be customary practices in the foreign urban environment in
which Army forces are operating. If
commanders attempt to understand
incidences of bribery and nepotism
using their own societal norms and
values as a basis, they are likely to
misinterpret the significance of the
events and implement an inappropriate
course of action. Critically, however,
the development of an in-depth
understanding of the urban society
does not mean that commanders and
their Soldiers should adopt the culture
of the foreign urban society. While
understanding and respect of the urban
area’s culture is crucial to successful
UO, Soldiers function best in dealing
with the urban society when they act in
accordance with American culture and
values.
Figure 2-7. Key aspects of the urban society
POTENTIAL CENTER OF GRAVITY
2-45. A COG during an urban operation, particularly in stability and civil support operations, may be the
civilian inhabitants themselves—specifically their behavior. However, supportive behavior is generally an
advantage in any type of operation. Correspondingly, neutral behavior toward friendly forces is an
advantage over hostile behavior.
(However, a neutral population normally will not readily provide
information to Army forces—often critical to understanding the urban environment and threat. In this light,
neutrality can be seen as a disadvantage.) To influence or control their behavior, commanders must first
understand the society’s complex nature and character. Second, they must understand and accept that every
military action (or inaction) may influence the relationship between the urban population and Army forces,
and, by extension, mission success or failure. Lastly, they must understand that Army forces may play only
a supporting (but essential) role as part of an integrated and synchronized multiagency effort focusing all
aspects of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. With this awareness,
commanders can take one or more actions:
Coordinate and plan operations.
Implement effective civil-military programs.
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Take the immediate action necessary to maintain support of a friendly populace, neutralize or
gain the support of hostile or neutral factions, or do any combination of these activities to
achieve precise effects and accomplish the mission.
Without this understanding, commanders increase the risk that their actions, particularly concerning the
urban population, may not have the intended and necessary effects.
2-46. Although the factor of civil considerations takes on added significance in UO, it is just one that
commanders evaluate. Sometimes, as in most urban counterinsurgency operations, it may be the most
important factor to consider as a COG. At other times it may be the least important as to be almost
negligible. Its importance is not constant; it changes over time (like all factors). At the beginning of the
operation, civil considerations may not be essential to mission accomplishment, but as the operation
progresses this factor’s importance to success may increase. In other circumstances, the opposite may be
true. Overall, commanders should consider three objectives regarding the civilians of the urban area:
Minimize their interference with urban operations. In offensive and defensive operations this
means moving them away from combat operations or establishing measures to shield them from
its effects. In all operations, it often requires centralizing them in one or more locations—which
may mean keeping them where they are.
Maximize their support of Army, joint, and multinational forces and government agencies.
Observe the necessary legal, moral, and humanitarian obligations.
GENERAL POPULATION SIZE
2-47. Urban areas are commonly classified according to the general size of their population instead of
landmass. Figure 2-8 lists one method of defining and categorizing urban areas by various population sizes.
2-48. These categories are useful to establish commonality and standardize terms that shape ideas, discus
sion, and concepts. Smaller populations usually suggest homogeneity among the inhabitants. Homogeneity
can make consensus or compromise easier to achieve because fewer opposing viewpoints exist. Given this
homogeneity, effects of change are more certain and
often easier to determine. However, homogenous
does not mean identical. If major social divisions do
exist
(either physical or ideological), commanders
can more easily determine those divisions and their
fundamental causes with smaller populations.
Treating an urban population as a completely
homogenous entity can lead to false assumptions,
cultural misunderstandings, and poor situational
understanding.
Figure 2-8. Urban areas by population size
2-49. As urban areas expand, the urban patterns begin to blur and the social complexity increases. For
example, as satellite patterns continue to grow, the LOCs between a central hub and outlying urban areas
may develop and begin to assume a linear urban pattern. Simultaneously, a hub and outlying urban areas
may continue to expand until they merge into a single, large metropolis. On a larger scale, a network
pattern can grow and unite as a single megalopolis. This growth physically unites smaller urban areas but
cannot force conformity of needs and beliefs. It also increases the physical and social complexity of an
urban area.
GROUP SIZE, LOCATION, AND COMPOSITION
2-50. Understanding how specific elements of the urban society affect operations (and vice versa), begins
with analyzing their size, location, and composition (see figure 2-9). Because commanders must minimize
civilian casualties, size and location (without regard to composition) are important initial demographic con
siderations. After determining the presence and numbers of civilians relative to decisive points,
commanders can then decide whether civilian proximity and density represent a significant risk to their
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Understanding the Urban Environment
mission—refugees clogging LOCs, for example. If civilians are the primary focus of the operation, as in
many stability and civil support operations, this same analysis may help to determine decisive points. In
this analysis, commanders should consider that urban areas, on many levels, are in constant motion. The
densities of circulating people and other traffic often vary according to cultural events or the time of day,
such as religious holidays or sporting events and rush hours or market times. Therefore in planning urban
operations, commanders must consider the timing, rhythms, or patterns of the population and their vehicu
lar movements in the urban area. Identifying and understanding trends and patterns of activity (and dis
ruptions to them) may provide critical information to commanders.
Figure 2-9. Simplified analysis of urban society
2-51. Commanders normally determine the composition of, or the identifiable groups or organizations
within, the civilian urban population. Groups may be categorized by race, religion, national origin, tribe,
clan, economic or social class, party affiliation, education level, union memberships, age, gender, occupa
tion, or any other significant social demographic. Physical and ideological overlaps (and divisions) often
exist between groups. Overlaps may provide early focus for analysis and suggest ways to affect more than
one group simultaneously. In some cases, groups may have radically different ideologies but are (or can
be) united by a single characteristic. Commanders must understand the intricacies of “who does what to
whom.” Such understanding furthers identifying the urban society’s sources of power, influence (both
formal and informal), and decisive points that hold the keys to controlling or protecting this potential COG.
(See also the discussion of competing power structures in Chapter 3.) Commanders should have expert,
detailed, and current knowledge and information to avoid developing simple formulas of social interaction
that may actively mislead and add to a flawed course of action.
LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION
2-52. Commanders must also understand how authority and responsibility is held or shared within and
between each of the identified groups; they must understand leadership and the social hierarchy. For
groups to exert meaningful influence, leadership provides vision, direction, and organized coherence. This
leadership can be a function of personality as well as organization. Some groups depend on a charismatic
leader to provide cohesion; although in some cultures, the spokesman is not the leader. Others de-
emphasize individual leadership and provide redundancy and replacement in decision making. Others
combine elements of both these types of leadership and organization. Based solely on personality, a leader
may centralize power or, while still being in ultimate control, decentralize decision making and execution
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Chapter 2
to subordinates. In contrast, a single person may head a group while a ruling council actually makes and
executes policy. Groups centered on one leader (which may or may not be the officially designated leader)
can often produce decisions and initiate actions rapidly but are vulnerable to disruptions if key
personalities are removed or co-opted. Groups with shared or redundant leadership take longer to make
decisions yet are more resistant to change and outside influence.
2-53. In UO, particularly stability operations, Army commanders and leaders at all levels will devote
considerable effort to identifying and cultivating relationships with civilian leaders in their AO. This
civilian leadership will include political, religious, tribal or clan, ethnic, and economic leaders.
Commanders should consider that their attention toward and discussion with identified leaders may
increase
(or, some instance, decrease) the targeted leaders’ prestige and power. While this may be
intentional, commanders must often ensure that the leaders that they chose to deal with are the legitimate
and accepted in the eyes of the urban population. Otherwise, they may further imbalance an already weak
power structure and exacerbate the situation. In unique circumstances, commanders may need to identify
and interact with the leadership of criminal organizations. These civilian leaders will be the means to affect
change and allow the urban populace to understand and accept the purpose behind Army operations. As
importantly, they will be the conduit for understanding the urban society’s sentiments, perceptions, and
reactions to Army operations. As such, reliable and trustworthy linguists that can not only interpret the
language but can serve as cultural advisors to Army forces will be in great demand. Keeping the local
population objectively informed not only of current Army operations but also of the intent and desired end
state will often be a key task for commanders. A poor communications effort and a lack of understanding
of intent may alienate a commander and cause significant problems in future negotiations. It is imperative
that communications be clear and effective and that all Army leaders are aware of its implications. See FM
4-05.401 and FM 3-07 for the effective use of interpreters and the conduct of productive meetings and
negotiations.
INTERESTS AND ACTIONS
Me and Somalia against the world, me and my clan against Somalia, me and my family
against the clan, me and my brother against my family, me against my brother.
Somali Proverb
2-54. Identifying and analyzing groups also helps commanders focus on specific segments of the urban
society to determine their beliefs, needs, and agendas. It also helps commanders determine how those
interests motivate groups to future action (or inaction)—previous patterns of activity are critical in this
regard. This analysis seeks to determine why groups (and their leaders) act as they do. Commanders should
consider political, economic, cultural, and religious factors in this analysis. These factors affect all groups
to some extent and often provide the basis for their beliefs, needs (actual or perceived), and subsequent
behavior. Size and location considerations also apply to each group to help determine to what extent its
beliefs or ideologies, needs, and actions may impact the urban operation. However, size and proximity may
not accurately indicate actual or potential capabilities. Individuals, small groups, and groups located some
distance from the actual conduct of the urban operation may be able to influence large portions of the
population. These individuals or groups may have a capability disproportionate to their size and
proximity—especially against objectives that are not terrain oriented (as in the case of many stability
operations).
INTERACTION, INFLUENCE, OR CONTROL
2-55. Commanders must cultivate an understanding of a group’s—
Size, location
(and proximity to operations), and composition
(to include leadership and
organization).
Interests.
Capabilities.
Potential actions (intent) and their effects—if any—on operations.
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Understanding the Urban Environment
2-56. Then they can develop or modify courses of action as appropriate. Certain courses of action may be
needed to improve the interaction between Army forces and civilians (and between other agencies) to
accomplish common goals. Others may be needed to influence favorable support, stabilize neutral groups,
or neutralize hostile groups. Still others may require more forceful means to control and protect—never to
punish—civilians. Courses of action may include—
Establishing buffer zones and restricted areas.
Setting up checkpoints and roadblocks with other travel restrictions on people and goods.
Screening civilians.
Conducting negotiations (directly or as a mediator).
Providing or protecting rations, water, and other critical resources.
Restoring or improving specific, key infrastructure.
Enforcing curfews.
Inspecting facilities.
Directing amnesty programs.
Conducting internment and resettlement operations.
Maintaining a “stay-put” policy.
2-57. Commanders must remember that many measures will require significant resources that may initially
be beyond the capabilities of the Army force to impose and enforce. (Where possible, commanders should
attempt to use host-nation security forces and local urban law enforcement to control activities.) Other
elements of the environment, terrain and infrastructure, may fragment efforts and make it difficult to
impose controls throughout the area. A careful assessment and understanding of the urban society’s
interests (beliefs, needs, and agendas) is essential before implementing any populace and resources control
measures. Otherwise inappropriate controls, particularly if they are improperly perceived as punishment,
may only aggravate the situation. Finally, an appropriate course of action may require no specific action
towards the urban society. In most cases, training and discipline, grounded in cultural understanding and
sensitivity, will help mitigate many potential adverse effects resulting from military-civilian interaction.
(Commanders should review FM 3-19.15 and FM 3-19.40 for additional civilian control measures and
considerations.)
Figure 2-10. UO society chain of effects
A CHAIN OF EFFECTS
2-58. Since urban society is so dynamic and the relationship between various elements so complex,
commanders must continually assess how their operations will affect the society and vice versa (see figure
2-10). Specifically, they assess how effectively their measures improve interaction with, influence of, and
control over civilians. There is always a difference between intended and actual effects of a specific course
of action. Nowhere is this more prominent than dealing with the urban society. This chain of effects frus
trates understanding during UO. Therefore, commanders must continuously monitor these effects to make
decisions and modifications while planning, preparing, executing, sustaining, and transitioning UO. (Com
manders may conduct informal and formal polling activities to assess and understand changing civilian
perceptions.) Initially certain aspects of the society, such as religion, may not affect the operation.
However, if the threat successfully shapes the perceptions of the urban populace that Army forces are
biased against their religion or religious beliefs (or at least critical segments are affected by propaganda),
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