|
|
|
Chapter 4
4-3. Commanders ensure Army forces have enough potential combat power to combine the elements of
full spectrum operations in ways appropriate to conditions. Every unit—regardless of type—either
generates or maintains combat power. All contribute to operations. Ultimately, Army forces combine
elements of combat power to defeat the enemy and master situations.
4-4. Commanders balance the ability to mass lethal and nonlethal actions with the need to deploy and
sustain the units that produce those actions. They balance accomplishing the mission quickly with being
able to project and sustain the force. Generating and maintaining combat power throughout an operation is
essential to success. Commanders tailor force packages to maximize the capability of the initial-entry force.
Follow-on units increase endurance and ability to operate in depth. Many factors contribute to generating
combat power:
z
Employing reserves.
z
Focusing joint support.
z
Rotating committed forces.
z
Staging sustainment assets to preserve momentum and synchronization.
4-5. Commanders achieve success by applying superior combat power. Combat power is not a numerical
value. Planners can estimate it but not quantify it. Combat power is always relative. It has meaning only in
relation to conditions and enemy capabilities. It is relevant solely at the point in time and space where
applied. In addition, how an enemy generates and applies combat power may fundamentally differ from
that of Army forces. Planners take an inordinate risk when they assume that enemy capabilities mirror those
of friendly capabilities. Before an operation, combat power is unrealized potential. Through leadership,
commanders transform this potential information to integrate and enhance action. Commanders also apply
information through the warfighting functions to shape the operational environment and complement
action. Combat power becomes decisive when applied by skilled commanders leading well-trained Soldiers
and units.
LEADERSHIP
4-6. Commanders apply leadership through the warfighting functions. Leadership is the multiplying and
unifying element of combat power. Confident, competent, and informed leadership intensifies the
effectiveness of all other elements of combat power by formulating sound operational ideas and assuring
discipline and motivation in the force. Good leaders inspire and elicit success. Effective leadership can
compensate for deficiencies in all the warfighting functions because it is the most dynamic element of
combat power. The opposite is also true; poor leadership can negate advantages in warfighting capabilities.
The Army defines leadership as the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and
motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (FM 6-22). An Army
leader, by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility, inspires and influences people to accomplish
organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions
for the greater good of the organization. They instill in Soldiers the will to win. Army doctrine describes
essential leadership attributes (character, presence, and intellect) and competencies (lead, develop, and
achieve). These attributes and competencies mature through lifelong learning. (FM 6-22 contains Army
leadership doctrine.)
4-7. Leaders influence not only Soldiers but other people as well. Commanders embrace their leadership
skills when dealing with civilians in any conflict or disaster. Face-to-face contact with people in the area of
operations encourages cooperation between civilians and Soldiers. Army leaders work with members of
other Services and civilian organizations. These leaders strive for the willing cooperation of multinational
military and civilian partners. The Army requires self-aware, adaptive leaders who can both defeat the
enemy in combat and master complexities of operations dominated by stability or civil support.
4-8. Leadership in today’s operational environment is often the difference between success and failure.
Leaders provide purpose, direction, and motivation in all operations. Through training and by example,
leaders develop cultural awareness in Soldiers. This characteristic improves Soldiers’ ability to cope with
the ambiguities of complex environments. Leadership ensures Soldiers understand the purpose of
operations and use their full capabilities. In every operation, Army leaders clarify purpose and mission,
4-2
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
Combat Power
direct operations, and set the example for courage and competence. They hold their Soldiers to the Army
Values and ensure their Soldiers comply with the law of war.
INFORMATION
4-9. Information is a powerful tool in the operational environment. Information has become as important
as lethal action in determining the outcome of operations. Every engagement, battle, and major operation
requires complementary inform and influence activities to inform a global audience, to influence audiences,
and to affect morale within the operational area. It also requires cyber/electromagnetic activities as a
weapon against enemy command and control information systems and other cyber capabilities.
Commanders use information to understand, visualize, describe, and direct the warfighting functions. They
also depend on data and information to increase the effectiveness of the warfighting functions.
4-10. Since information shapes the perceptions of the civilian population, it also shapes much of the
operational environment. All parties in a conflict—enemy forces, adversaries, and neutral and friendly
populations—use information to convey their message to various audiences. Information is critical in
stability operations where the population influences its success. The five stability tasks are essential for
success. Without complementary inform and influence activities that explain these actions to the
population, success may prove unattainable. Information must be proactive as well as reactive. An enemy
adeptly manipulates information and combines message and action effectively. Countering enemy
messages with factual and effective friendly messages can influence civilians as much as the physical
actions of Soldiers can. The effects of each warfighting function should complement information objectives
(the message) while information objectives stay consistent with Soldiers’ actions.
4-11. The joint force continues to modernize information systems. These improvements provide leaders
with the information necessary to enhance and focus the warfighting functions. Leadership based on
relevant information enables the commander, at all levels, to make informed decisions on how best to apply
combat power. Ultimately, this creates opportunities to achieve decisive results. The computer-displayed
common operational picture is one example. It provides commanders with improved situational awareness
by merging a lot of information into displays that Soldiers can understand at a glance. Information
disseminated by information systems allows leaders to make better decisions quickly. The common
operational picture lets Army forces use lethal and nonlethal actions more effectively than the enemy can.
For example, accurate intelligence disseminated quickly by information systems allows friendly forces to
maneuver around enemy engagement areas while massing the effects of combat power at the decisive place
and time. This reduces friendly casualties and may allow a small force to defeat a larger enemy force.
WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS
4-12. Commanders use the warfighting functions to help them exercise command and to help them and
their staffs exercise control. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems
(people,
organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to
accomplish missions and training objectives. Decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations combine all
the warfighting functions to generate combat power. Additionally, all warfighting functions possess
scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects. No warfighting function is exclusively decisive,
shaping, or sustaining. The Army’s warfighting functions are fundamentally linked to the joint functions.
*MISSION COMMAND
4-13. The mission command warfighting function develops and integrates those activities enabling a
commander to balance the art of command and the science of control. Formerly described as the
command and control warfighting function, this function adapts and captures what the Army has learned in
a decade of war. These lessons include—
z
The changing roles and responsibilities of leaders in distributed and increasingly decentralized
operations.
z
The requirement for leaders at every echelon to co-create the context for operations.
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
4-3
Chapter 4
z
The importance of teaming and collaborating with joint, international, interagency, and
multinational partners.
z
The need for leaders to anticipate and manage transitions during the course of a campaign.
(Chapter
5 defines mission command as an activity and discusses the commander’s role in mission
command.)
*Why Mission Command
4-14. The Army changed from command and control (C2) to mission command and eliminated the term
battle command. This philosophical shift emphasizes the commanders rather than the systems that they
employ. (See figure 4-2.) Army C2 and battle command did not adequately address the increasing need for
commanders to frame and reframe an environment of ill-structured problems. Framing these problems
enables commanders to gain the context of operations by continuously challenging assumptions both before
and during execution. Additionally, the old terms inadequately addressed the role of the commander in
building teams with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners.
*Figure 4-2. Why mission command?
4-15. Mission command magnifies leadership in land operations. It illuminates the leader’s responsibility
to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. It provides commanders and staff with a
philosophy for operating in an uncertain environment as opposed to trying to create certainty and imposing
order and control over a situation. Mission command recognizes that leaders command not only U.S. forces
but also diverse international, nongovernmental, and host-nation partners.
4-16. Mission command supports an adaptable Army in operations. An adaptable Army starts with leaders
able to adapt. Confronting hybrid threats—combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal
groups—in a complex operational environment requires such leaders. These Soldiers not only accept but
also seek and embrace operational adaptability as an imperative. Mission command enables an
operationally adaptive force that has both the authority and resources to operate effectively at all levels,
under clear mission orders. Mission command enables operational adaptability in the Army. It requires a
thorough understanding of the operational environment, seeks adaptive teams capable of anticipating and
managing transitions, and acknowledges that leaders must share risk across echelons to create
opportunities.
4-17. Mission command emphasizes the critical contributions of leaders at every echelon. It establishes a
mindset among leaders that the best understanding comes from the bottom up, not from the top down.
Mission command emphasizes the importance and common operating assessment of context. It highlights
4-4
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
Combat Power
how commanders—through disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent—transition among
offensive, defensive, and stability operations and between centralized and decentralized operations.
4-18. The Army has adopted mission command as the overarching term for both the warfighting function
and the philosophy of command. Mission command guides leaders how to think about what Soldiers do to
conduct successful operations on land. By emphasizing people as the driving force behind the development
of technology, mission command adapts technology to human needs, not humans to technological
restrictions. Understanding people, and influencing humans to achieve success in complex operations, is
fundamental to how the commander exercises the art of command.
*Mission Command Tasks
4-19. The commander is the central figure in mission command, essential to integrating the capabilities of
the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. Mission command invokes the greatest possible
freedom of action to subordinates. It enables subordinates to develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively
through disciplined initiative in dynamic conditions within the commander’s intent. Mission command
focuses on empowering subordinate leaders and sharing information to facilitate decentralized execution.
4-20. The art of command is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through decisionmaking and
leadership. Through the art of command, the commander has four tasks in mission command (see
figure 4-3). They are:
z
Drive the operations process.
z
Understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess.
z
Develop teams among modular formations and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational partners.
z
Lead inform and influence activities.
*Figure 4-3. Mission command
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
4-5
Chapter 4
4-21. The commander leads the staff’s tasks under the science of control. The science of control consists of
systems and procedures to improve the commander’s understanding and support accomplishing missions.
The three staff tasks are:
z
Conduct the operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess.
z
Conduct knowledge management and information management.
z
Conduct inform and influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities.
As much as the commander leads the staff’s tasks, the staff tasks fully support the commander in executing
the commander’s tasks.
4-22. Mission command networks and systems is the coordinated application of personnel, networks,
procedures, equipment and facilities, knowledge management, and information management systems
essential for the commander to conduct operations. These networks and systems enable the art of
command and science of control. Design provides a cognitive tool to help commanders anticipate change
and coordinate applications appropriately. It pervades all tasks and assists the commander to lead adaptive,
innovative efforts. Design provides the commander and staff with a methodology to better understand
complex, ill-structured problems.
4-23. Successful mission command, supported by design, fosters operational adaptability and a greater
understanding of the operational environment. Operational adaptability is the ability to shape conditions
and respond effectively to a changing operational environment with appropriate, flexible, and timely
actions. Operational adaptability reflects a quality that Army leaders and forces exhibit through critical
thinking, their comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, their willingness to accept prudent risk, and their
ability to rapidly adjust while continuously assessing the situation. Commanders enable operationally
adaptive forces through flexibility, collaborative planning, and decentralized execution. Operational
adaptability results in teams that—
z
Understand the operational environment.
z
Adapt and anticipate transitions.
z
Accept risks to create opportunities.
z
Influence friendly, neutrals, adversaries, enemies, and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational partners.
The ultimate outcome is successful full spectrum operations.
4-24. Understand the operational environment: Command is an individual and personal function. It blends
imaginative problem solving, motivational and communications skills, and a thorough understanding of the
dynamics of operations. Command during operations requires understanding the complex, dynamic
relationships among friendly forces, enemies, and the environment, including the populace. This
understanding helps commanders visualize and describe their commander’s intent and develop focused
planning guidance.
4-25. Adapt and anticipate transitions: Operational adaptability enables leaders to transition continuously
between fundamentally different operations. Major combat operations may evolve to irregular warfare or
peace operations. Units may transition from offensive to defensive operations or from defensive to stability
operations. Transitions often involve transferring responsibilities to other organizations or authorities, such
as from U.S. forces to partner forces, civil authorities, or international organizations. Commanders identify
potential transitions during planning and account for them throughout execution. Assessment ensures that
commanders measure progress toward such transitions and take appropriate actions to prepare for and
execute them.
4-26. Accept risks to create opportunities: Operational adaptability assists commanders to create training
and organizational climates that promote calculated, disciplined risk-taking focused on winning rather than
preventing defeat. A key aspect of mission command includes identifying risks, deciding how much risk to
accept, and minimizing the effects of accepted risk by establishing control measures to mitigate those risks.
The staff helps the commander identify risks and offers recommendations to mitigate those risks. (See
FM 5-19 for doctrine on composite risk management.) Ultimately, the willingness to take prudent risks
rests with the commander. However, commanders must be careful not to decentralize all risks. Through
4-6
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
Combat Power
collaboration and dialog, commanders at all levels identify where risk exists and at what level of command
risk will be mitigated.
4-27. The commander considers how to establish conditions for success in full spectrum operations, protect
the force, and shape the operational environment. War gaming enables commanders and staffs to complete
a risk assessment for each course of action. They then propose appropriate control measures. They
continually assess the risk of adverse reactions from the population and media. Staff officers develop ways
to mitigate those risks. Commanders discuss these risks with subordinate leaders. Commanders and
subordinates determine what risks the higher commander will accept and what risk will remain with the
subordinate commander. Commanders then allocate resources as deemed appropriate to mitigate risks.
4-28. Influence friendly, neutrals, adversaries, enemies, and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational partners: Commanders personally use inform and influence activities to guide actors to make
decisions that support the commander’s objectives. Commanders directly shape the themes and messages
designed to inform domestic audiences and influence foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy
populations. Commanders ensure that themes and messages synchronize with actions to support operations
and achieve the desired end state. Commanders consider how their units’ actions will affect the
environment and influence perceptions among relevant groups. Commanders assume that their enemies and
adversaries can adeptly use the information environment. They expect the enemy to actively and
aggressively engage in the information environment to gain an operational advantage. The enemy attempts
to confuse the general population, distort facts to support their position, or use other means including
intimidation and propaganda.
4-29. Subsequent chapters provide greater detail on the taxonomy of mission command. Chapter 5
discusses the art of command and the role of the commander in mission command. Chapter 6 discusses the
science of control. It discusses the systems and procedures that support the commander to drive the
commander’s tasks and integrate the warfighting functions.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
4-30. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move
forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. Direct fire is inherent in maneuver, as
is close combat. This function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a positional
advantage over an enemy. One example is moving forces to execute a large-scale air or airborne assault.
Another is deploying forces to intermediate staging bases in preparation for an offensive operation.
Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires
to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission (JP 3-0).
Commanders use maneuver for massing the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and
momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination with fires. Movement is necessary to disperse
and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Both tactical and operational maneuver
require logistic support. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes the following tasks:
z
Deploy.
z
Move.
z
Maneuver.
z
Employ direct fires.
z
Occupy an area.
z
Conduct mobility and countermobility operations.
z
Employ battlefield obscuration.
The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include administrative movements of
personnel and materiel. These movements fall under the sustainment warfighting function. FM 3-90
discusses maneuver and tactical movement. FM 3-35 discusses force projection.
INTELLIGENCE
4-31. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate
understanding of the operational environment, enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. It includes
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
4-7
Chapter 4
tasks associated with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. The commander drives the
intelligence warfighting function. Intelligence is more than just collection. It is a continuous process that
involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation. The
intelligence warfighting function includes the following tasks:
z
Support to force generation.
z
Support to situational understanding.
z
Provide intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities.
z
Conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
*Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
4-32. Knowledge of the operational environment precludes all effective action, whether in the information
or physical domains. Knowledge about the operational environment requires aggressive and continuous
surveillance and reconnaissance to acquire information. Information collected from multiple sources and
analyzed becomes intelligence that provides answers to commanders’ information requirements concerning
the enemy and other adversaries, climate, weather, terrain, and population. Developing these requirements
is the function of intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR). Intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors,
assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and
future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. For Army forces, this
activity is a combined arms operation that focuses on priority intelligence requirements while
answering the commander’s critical information requirements. (JP 2-01 contains ISR doctrine.)
Through ISR, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ collection assets and forces.
These Soldiers collect, process, and disseminate timely and accurate information, combat information, and
intelligence to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and other intelligence
requirements. When necessary, ISR assets may focus on special requirements, such as information required
for personnel recovery operations. It supports full spectrum operations through four tasks:
z
ISR synchronization.
z
ISR integration.
z
Surveillance.
z
Reconnaissance.
4-33. ISR synchronization considers all assets—both internal and external to the organization. It identifies
information gaps and the most appropriate assets for collecting information to fill them. It also assigns the
most efficient means to process the information into intelligence and disseminate it. ISR integration tasks
assets to collect on requirements that intelligence reach or requests for information cannot answer or that
commanders consider critical. Commanders integrate assets into a single ISR plan that capitalizes on each
asset’s capabilities. Commanders also synchronize and coordinate surveillance and reconnaissance
missions and employ other units for ISR within the scheme of maneuver. Effectively synchronizing ISR
with the overall plan positions ISR assets to continue to collect information, reconstitute for branches or
sequels, or shift priorities throughout the operation.
*Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization
4-34. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization is the task that accomplishes the
following: analyzes information requirements and intelligence gaps; evaluates available assets
internal and external to the organization; determines gaps in the use of those assets; recommends
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets controlled by the organization to collect on the
commander’s critical information requirements; and submits requests for information for adjacent
and higher collection support. This task ensures that ISR, intelligence reach, and requests for information
result in successful reporting, production, and dissemination of information, combat information, and
intelligence to support decisionmaking.
4-35. The intelligence officer, with the operations officer and other staff elements, synchronizes the entire
collection effort. This effort includes recommending tasking for assets the commander controls and
submitting requests for information to adjacent and higher echelon units and organizations. When these
4-8
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
Combat Power
sources do not answer the CCIR and other requirements, ISR synchronization uses intelligence reach to
obtain the information.
4-36. ISR synchronization includes screening subordinate and adjacent unit requests for information
concerning the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. When intelligence reach and requests
for information do not satisfy a requirement, ISR synchronization develops specific information
requirements to facilitate ISR integration. (FM 2-0 discusses intelligence reach.)
4-37. Commanders use ISR synchronization to assess ISR asset reporting. ISR synchronization includes
continually identifying new and partially filled intelligence gaps. It also provides recommendations to the
operations officer for tasking ISR assets.
*Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Integration
4-38. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integration is the task of assigning and controlling
a unit’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (in terms of space, time, and purpose) to
collect and report information as a concerted and integrated portion of operation plans and orders.
This task ensures planners assign the best ISR assets through a deliberate and coordinated effort of the
entire staff across all warfighting functions by integrating ISR into the operation.
4-39. The operations officer, with input from the intelligence officer, develops tasks based on specific
information requirements (developed as part of ISR synchronization). Specific information requirements
facilitate tasking by matching requirements to assets. The operations officer assigns tasks based on the
latest time that information is of value and the capabilities and limitations of available ISR assets. Then the
operations officer identifies, prioritizes, and validates intelligence requirements. The staff develops and
synchronizes the ISR plan with the overall operation. During ISR integration, the entire staff participates as
responsibility for the ISR plan transitions from the intelligence officer to the operations officer. ISR
integration is vital in controlling limited ISR assets. During ISR integration, the staff recommends
redundancy and mix as appropriate. ISR synchronization and integration result in an effort focused on
answering the commander’s requirements through ISR tasks translated into orders.
*Surveillance
4-40. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons,
or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means
(JP
3-0). Surveillance involves
observing an area to collect information.
4-41. Wide-area and focused surveillance missions provide valuable information. National and joint
surveillance systems focus on information requirements for combatant commanders. They also provide
information to all Services for operations across the area of responsibility. The systematic observation of
geographic locations, persons, networks, or equipment is assigned to Army intelligence, reconnaissance,
and maneuver assets. Changes or anomalies detected during surveillance missions can develop
reconnaissance to confirm or deny the change.
*Reconnaissance
4-42. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,
information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0).
4-43. Units performing reconnaissance collect information to confirm or deny current intelligence or
predictions. This information may concern the terrain, weather, and population characteristics of a
particular area as well the enemy. Reconnaissance normally precedes execution of the overall operation and
extends throughout the area of operations. It begins as early as the situation, political direction, and rules of
engagement permit. Reconnaissance can locate mobile enemy command and control assets—such as
command posts, communications nodes, and satellite terminals—for neutralization, attack, or destruction.
Reconnaissance can detect patterns of behavior exhibited by people in the objective area. Commanders at
all echelons incorporate reconnaissance into their operations.
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
4-9
Chapter 4
*Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance
4-44. Surveillance is distinct from reconnaissance. Often surveillance is passive and may be continuous;
reconnaissance missions are typically shorter and use active means (such as maneuver). Additionally,
reconnaissance may involve fighting for information. Sometimes these operations are deliberate, as in a
reconnaissance in force; however, the purpose of reconnaissance is to collect information, not initiate
combat. Reconnaissance involves many tactics, techniques, and procedures throughout the course of a
mission. An extended period of surveillance may be one of these. Commanders complement surveillance
with frequent reconnaissance. Surveillance, in turn, increases the efficiency of reconnaissance by focusing
those missions while reducing the risk to Soldiers.
4-45. The Soldier is an indispensable source for much of what the intelligence commanders need. Every
Soldier is a sensor. Observations and experiences of Soldiers—who often work with the local populace—
provide depth and context to information gathered through surveillance and reconnaissance. Commanders
train all Soldiers to report their observations, even when not assigned a surveillance or reconnaissance
mission. Commanders and staffs emphasize integrating information gathered from Soldiers into
intelligence production.
FIRES
4-46. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and
coordinated use of Army indirect fires and joint fires through the targeting process. It includes tasks
associated with integrating and synchronizing the effects of these fires with the effects of other warfighting
functions. Commanders integrate these tasks into the concept of operations during planning and adjust them
based on the targeting guidance. Fires normally contribute to the overall effect of maneuver, but
commanders may use them separately for decisive and shaping operations. The fires warfighting function
includes the following tasks:
z
Decide surface targets.
z
Detect and locate surface targets.
z
Provide fire support.
z
Assess effectiveness.
z
Integrate and synchronize cyber/electromagnetic activities.
SUSTAINMENT
4-47. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and
services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The
endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth
and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment
provides the support for logistics, personnel services, and health service (excluding force health protection,
which is a component of the protection warfighting function) necessary to maintain operations until
mission accomplishment. Internment, resettlement, and detainee operations fall under the sustainment
warfighting function and include elements of all three major subfunctions. FM
4-0 describes the
sustainment warfighting function, and FM 4-02 discusses the Army Health System.
Logistics
4-48. Logistics is the planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects
of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement,
distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and
hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of
facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services (JP 4-0). Although joint doctrine defines it as science,
logistics involves both military art and science. Knowing when and how to accept risk, prioritizing myriad
requirements, and balancing limited resources all require military art. Logistics integrates strategic,
operational, and tactical support of deployed forces while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of
additional forces and materiel. Logistics includes—
4-10
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
Combat Power
z
Maintenance.
z
Transportation.
z
Supply.
z
Field services.
z
Distribution.
z
Contracting.
z
General engineering support.
Personnel Services
4-49. Personnel services are those sustainment functions related to Soldiers’ welfare, readiness, and quality
of life. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and
sustain personnel. Personnel services include—
z
Human resources support.
z
Financial management.
z
Legal support.
z
Religious support.
z
Band support.
Health Service Support
4-50. The Army Health System is a component of the Military Health System that oversees operational
management of the health service support and force health protection missions. The Army Health System
includes all mission support services by the Army Medical Department to support health service support
and force health protection mission requirements for the Army. Health service support is part of the
sustainment warfighting function while force health protection is a part of the protection warfighting
function. (Paragraph 4-53 also discusses force health protection.)
4-51. The health service support mission focuses on the mental and physical well-being of Soldiers and, as
directed, other personnel. This mission consists of three elements: casualty care, medical evacuation, and
medical logistics. Casualty care encompasses Army Medical Department functions to include—
z
Organic and area medical support.
z
Hospitalization (to include treatment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear patients).
z
Dental treatment.
z
Behavioral health and neuropsychiatric treatment.
z
Clinical laboratory services.
z
Medical evacuation (to include en route care and medical regulating).
z
Medical logistics (to include blood and blood products).
Health service support closely relates to force health protection. (See paragraph 4-53.)
PROTECTION
4-52. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so
the commander can apply maximum combat power. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel
(combatants and noncombatants), physical assets, and information of the United States and multinational
military and civilian partners. The protection warfighting function facilitates the commander’s ability to
maintain the force’s integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential
threats can disrupt operations and then counters or mitigates those threats. Emphasis on protection increases
during preparation and continues throughout execution. Protection is a continuing activity; it integrates all
protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces. The protection warfighting
function includes the following tasks:
z
Air and missile defense.
z
Personnel recovery.
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
4-11
Chapter 4
z
Information protection.
z
Fratricide avoidance.
z
Operational area security.
z
Antiterrorism.
z
Survivability.
z
Force health protection.
z
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.
z
Safety.
z
Operations security.
z
Explosive ordnance disposal.
4-53. The force health protection mission under the protection warfighting function includes all measures
to mitigate health threats and to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being of
Soldiers. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force
from health hazards. The measures include the prevention aspects of several Army Medical Department
functions, including the following:
z
Preventive medicine, including—
Medical surveillance.
Occupational and environmental health surveillance.
Health risk communication.
z
Veterinary services, including—
Food inspection.
Animal care.
Prevention of zoonotic diseases (those transmitted from animals to humans, such as plague
or rabies).
z
Combat and operational stress control (to include behavioral health, warrior resiliency training,
and combat operational stress reactions).
z
Dental services (preventive dentistry).
z
Laboratory services (area medical laboratory support).
COMBINED ARMS
4-54. Applying combat power depends on combined arms to achieve its full destructive, disruptive,
informational, and constructive potential. Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous
application of the elements of combat power to achieve an effect greater than if each element of
combat power was used separately or sequentially. Combined arms merges leadership, information, and
each of the warfighting functions and their supporting systems. Used destructively, combined arms
integrates different capabilities so that counteracting one makes the enemy vulnerable to another. Used
constructively, combined arms multiplies the effectiveness and the efficiency of Army capabilities used in
stability or civil support.
4-55. Combined arms uses the capabilities of each warfighting function and information in complementary
and reinforcing capabilities. Complementary capabilities protect the weaknesses of one system or
organization with the capabilities of a different warfighting function. For example, commanders use
artillery
(fires) to suppress an enemy bunker complex pinning down an infantry unit (movement and
maneuver). The infantry unit then closes with and destroys the enemy. In this example, the fires
warfighting function complements the maneuver warfighting function. Reinforcing capabilities combine
similar systems or capabilities within the same warfighting function to increase the function’s overall
capabilities. In urban operations, for example, infantry, aviation, and armor (movement and maneuver)
often operate close to each other. This combination reinforces the protection, maneuver, and direct fire
capabilities of each. The infantry protects tanks from enemy infantry and antitank systems; tanks provide
protection and firepower for the infantry. Attack helicopters maneuver freely above buildings to fire from
positions of advantage, while other aircraft help sustain the ground elements. Together, these capabilities
4-12
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
Combat Power
form a lethal team built on movement and maneuver. In another example, multiple artillery units routinely
mass fires to support a committed artillery battalion (reinforcement). Joint capabilities—such as close air
support and special operations forces—can complement or reinforce Army capabilities.
4-56. Army forces are familiar with combined arms operations. Unified actions—those integrating the
capabilities of joint forces with those of multinational military and civilian organizations—have become
typical as well. This integration requires careful preparation. Successful unified action requires training and
exchange of liaison at every level.
4-57. Combined arms multiplies Army forces’ effectiveness in all operations. Units operating without
support of other capabilities generate less combat power and may not accomplish their mission. Employing
combined arms requires highly trained Soldiers, skilled leadership, effective staff work, and integrated
information systems. Commanders synchronize combined arms to apply the effects of combat power to the
best advantage. The sequence and simultaneity of combined arms actions vary with both the operational or
tactical design and in execution. Typically, ISR activities begin soon after receipt of mission and continue
throughout preparation and execution. They do not cease after mission accomplishment but continue as
needed. Sustainment and protection are conducted constantly but may peak before and after execution.
Maneuver and fires complement each other continuously but sometimes precede each other. For example,
the commander conducts preparatory lethal fires combined with electronic warfare to isolate and destroy
enemy forces on an objective before maneuver forces make contact. Another example is the shifting of fires
beyond the immediate vicinity of maneuver units during a pursuit.
4-58. Units achieve combined arms through organizational design and temporary reorganization (tailored
and task-organized forces). For example, units organic to brigade combat teams perform all warfighting
functions. However, the capabilities organic to the brigade combat team do not include Army aviation, air
and missile defense, and Army special operations forces. When required, commanders add these
capabilities through force tailoring and task organization. Higher echelons achieve combined arms
capabilities by tailoring and task-organizing different brigades and battalions under corps or division
headquarters. For example, a division force commander may reinforce four or five brigade combat teams
with any number of the modular support brigades and functional brigades.
4-59. Hybrid threats require a combined arms approach emphasizing small-unit capabilities. Hybrid threats
also require a mix of forces different from conventional warfare to address the fundamental differences
between them. Requirements that characterize counterinsurgency in general, and civil security and civil
control in particular, vary significantly among tactical areas of operations. This situation requires releasing
intelligence, civil affairs, and information assets typically held at higher headquarters to brigade combat
teams and often to battalion task forces or lower. Liaison officers and adjacent unit coordination are
essential to integrating and synchronizing Army operations with those of other organizations. Higher
headquarters may need to reinforce the mission command capabilities of their subordinates to improve
coordination between them and the various organizations in their areas of operations.
FORCE TAILORING
4-60. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their
deployment in support of a joint force commander. It involves selecting the right force structure for a
joint operation from available units within a combatant command or from the Army force pool.
Commanders then sequence selected forces into the operational area as part of force projection. Joint force
commanders request and receive forces for each campaign phase, adjusting the quantity and Service
component of forces to match the weight of effort required. Army Service component commanders tailor
Army forces to meet land force requirements determined by joint force commanders. Army Service
component commanders also recommend forces and a deployment sequence to meet those requirements.
Force tailoring is continuous. As new forces rotate into the operational area, forces with excess capabilities
return to the supporting combatant and Army Service component commands.
TASK-ORGANIZING
4-61. Task-organizing is the act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistic package of
specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
4-13
Chapter 4
task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to: training, experience, equipage,
sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility. For Army forces, it includes
allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support
relationships. Task-organizing occurs within a tailored force package as commanders organize groups of
units for specific missions. It continues as commanders reorganize units for subsequent missions. The
ability of Army forces to task-organize gives them extraordinary agility. It lets operational and tactical
commanders configure their units to best use available resources. It also allows Army forces to match unit
capabilities rapidly to the priority assigned to offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support tasks.
MUTUAL SUPPORT
4-62. Commanders consider mutual support when task-organizing forces, assigning areas of operations,
and positioning units. Mutual support is that support which units render each other against an enemy,
because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent
capabilities
(JP 3-31). In Army doctrine, mutual support is a planning consideration related to force
disposition, not a command relationship. (See appendix B.) Mutual support has two aspects—supporting
range and supporting distance. (See figure 4-4.) Understanding mutual support and accepting risk during
operations are fundamental to the art of tactics.
Figure 4-4. Examples of supporting range and supporting distance
4-63. Supporting range is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit
yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit’s weapons systems. It depends on available
weapons systems and is normally the maximum range of the supporting unit’s indirect fire weapons. For
small units (such as squads, sections, and platoons), it is the distance between two units that their direct
fires can cover effectively. Visibility may limit supporting range. If one unit cannot effectively or safely
fire to support another, the first may not be in supporting range even though its weapons have the required
range.
4-64. Supporting distance is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to
come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil
situation. The following factors affect supporting distance:
z
Terrain and mobility.
z
Distance.
4-14
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
Combat Power
z
Enemy capabilities.
z
Friendly capabilities.
z
Reaction time.
When friendly forces are static, supporting range equals supporting distance.
4-65. The command and control capabilities of supported and supporting units affect supporting distance
and supporting range. Units may locate within supporting distance, but if the supported unit cannot
communicate with the supporting unit, the supporting unit may not be able to affect the operation’s
outcome. In such cases, the units are not within supporting distance, regardless of their proximity to each
other. If the units share a common operational picture, the situation may differ greatly. Relative proximity
may be less important than both units’ ability to coordinate their maneuver and fires. To exploit the
advantage of supporting distance, the units have to synchronize their maneuver and fires more effectively
than the enemy can. Otherwise, the enemy can defeat both units in detail.
4-66. Commanders also consider supporting distance in operations dominated by stability or civil support.
Units maintain mutual support when one unit can draw on another’s capabilities. An interdependent joint
force may make proximity less significant than available capability. For example, Air Force assets may be
able to move a preventive medicine detachment from an intermediate staging base to an operational area
threatened by an epidemic. An additional treatment capability might be moved to the operational area based
on the threat to Soldiers and the populace.
4-67. Improved access to joint capabilities gives commanders additional means to achieve mutual support.
Those capabilities can extend the operating distances between Army units. Army commanders can
substitute joint capabilities for mutual support between subordinate forces. Doing this multiplies supporting
distance many times over. Army forces can then extend operations over greater areas at a higher tempo.
Joint capabilities are especially useful when subordinate units operate in noncontiguous areas of operations
that place units beyond a supporting range or supporting distance. However, depending on them entails
accepting risk.
SUMMARY
4-68. The elements of combat power consist of six warfighting functions tied together by leadership and
enhanced by information. The commander is at the hub of mission command and essential to integrating
the capabilities of all warfighting functions to accomplish the mission through combined arms action.
Combined arms generates more combat power than employing arms individually. Army forces are
organized for combined arms using force tailoring and task organization. Mutual support used in
complementary and reinforcing combinations also multiples the effects of combat power.
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
4-15
Chapter 5
The Commander and Mission Command
This chapter discusses how commanders apply the art of command to synthesize and
apply this knowledge from all levels across the command. The commander uses
design to permeate all aspects of mission command. The commander drives four
primary tasks: drive the operations process; understand, visualize, describe, direct,
lead, and assess operations; develop teams; and lead inform and influence activities.
*ART OF COMMAND
5-1. Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates
by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using
available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and
controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for
health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel (JP 1). Leaders who command authority strive
to do so with firmness, care, and skill.
5-2. Command is considered more art than science because it depends on actions only humans can
perform. The art of command is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through decisionmaking and
leadership. Enabled by mission command networks and systems, commanders synthesize knowledge from
all levels—higher, lower, and lateral—and apply this knowledge across all levels of command. Those in
command have authority, decisionmaking skills, and leadership abilities.
5-3. Authority refers to the right and power to judge, act, or command. It includes responsibility,
accountability, and delegation. Commanders rely on their education, experience, knowledge, and judgment
in applying authority as they decide (plan how to achieve the end state) and lead (direct their forces during
preparation and execution). The authority of command provides the basis for control.
5-4. Decisionmaking refers to selecting a course of action as the one most favorable to accomplish the
mission. Commanders apply knowledge to the situation thus translating their visualization into action.
Decisionmaking includes knowing whether to decide or not, then when and what to decide, and finally,
understanding the consequences. Commanders use understanding, visualization, description, and direction
to determine and communicate their desired end state.
5-5. Leadership refers to influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while
operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. Commanders lead through a
combination of personal example, persuasion, and compulsion. (FM 6-22 discusses leadership.)
DESIGN
5-6. Through collaboration and dialog, commanders use design for visualizing and describing complex
operations, and then continually reassessing the situation. Design is a methodology for applying critical and
creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop
approaches to solve them (FM 5-0). Commanders who use design possess a greater understanding of the
operational environment. With this greater understanding, the commander can provide a clear commander’s
intent and concept of operations. Such clarity enables subordinate units and commanders to make the effort
to take initiative. Mission command requires commanders convey a clear commander’s intent and concept
of operations.
5-7. Design underpins the commander’s tasks in leading innovative, adaptive work and guiding planning,
preparation, execution, and assessment in operations. Design requires agile, versatile leaders. Throughout
operations, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and other partners collaborate and dialog
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
5-1
Chapter 5
actively, sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to better understand situations and
make decisions. Effective collaboration includes continuous dialog that leads to increased understanding of
the situation, including the current problems.
5-8. Three distinct elements collectively produce a design concept. Together, they constitute an
organizational learning methodology that corresponds to three questions that must be answered to produce
an actionable design concept to guide planning:
z
Framing the operational environment—what is the context in which design will be applied?
z
Framing the problem—what problem is the design intended to address?
z
Considering operational approaches—what broad, general approach may solve the problem?
5-9. Depending on the situation—to include the complexity of the problem—commanders conduct design
before, in parallel with, or after the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). When faced with an
ill-structured problem or when developing initial plans for extended operations, commanders often initiate
design before the MDMP. This sequence helps them better understand the operational environment, frame
the problem, and develop an operational approach to guide more detailed planning.
5-10. When commanders conduct design in parallel with the MDMP, members of the staff conduct mission
analysis as the commander and other staff members engage in design activities. Knowledge products—such
as results from intelligence preparation of the battlefield and running estimates—help inform the design
team about the operational environment. Commanders may direct some staff members to focus their
mission analysis on certain areas.
5-11. In time-constrained conditions requiring immediate action or if the problem is well structured,
commanders may conduct the MDMP and publish an operation order without conducting design. As time
becomes available during execution, commanders may then initiate design to help refine their commander’s
visualization and the initial plan developed using the MDMP. However, even if commanders do not
conduct design at the outset of planning, they continually assess during execution for changes in the
operational environment that may require them to reframe the problem. (See FM 5-0 for a detailed
discussion on design.)
THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER IN MISSION COMMAND
5-12. *Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission
orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive
leaders in the conduct of full spectrum operations. It is commander-led and blends the art of
command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission.
(See Chapter 4 for the definition of mission command as a warfighting function and all of its components.)
The role of the commander in mission command is to direct and lead from the beginning of planning
throughout execution, and to assess continually. Successful mission command requires the commander’s
presence and personal leadership. To ensure mission accomplishment in full spectrum operations, the
commander—
z
Drives the operations process.
z
Understands, visualizes, describes, directs, leads, and assesses operations.
z
Develops teams among modular formations and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational partners.
z
Leads inform and influence activities. (Chapter 6 has a more detailed discussion of inform and
influence activities.)
*DRIVE THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
5-13. Commanders drive the operations process (see figure 5-1). While staffs perform essential functions
that amplify the effectiveness of operations, commanders play the central role in the operations process.
Commanders blend the art of command and the science of control. Guided by their experience, knowledge,
education, intelligence, and intuition, commanders apply leadership to translate decisions into action.
(Chapter 6 discusses the operations process.)
5-2
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
The Commander and Mission Command
UNDERSTAND, VISUALIZE, DESCRIBE, DIRECT, LEAD, AND ASSESS OPERATIONS
5-14. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations. They understand the
problem. Commanders visualize the end state and the nature and design of the operation. They describe the
time, space, resources, purpose, and action. They direct the warfighting functions. Commanders also
continually lead and assess.
*Figure 5-1. Driving the operations process
5-15. *This process is the Army’s model for the exercise of mission command. Commanders apply the
methodology of design to gain and maintain a greater understanding of the operational environment and
support the operations process. They seek to visualize the end state and operational approach. They
describe the visualization to promote a shared understanding. Commanders direct action based on
situational understanding. They lead Soldiers and partners during execution. They continuously assess
progress of operations and adapt (reframe) as required.
5-16. Commanders conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) operations. They plan to understand a
situation, envision a desired future, and, with assistance of their staffs, lay out effective ways of bringing
that future about. Commanders guide preparation to help the force and Soldiers improve their ability to
execute an operation, and establish conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success.
Throughout execution, commanders create conditions for seizing the initiative. Finally, commanders
continuously assess the current situation and progress of an operation, and adjust or reframe as needed to
ensure objectives are accomplished and success is achieved. Commanders make timely and effective
decisions based on applying judgment to available information. It requires knowing both when and what to
decide. It also requires commanders to evaluate the quality of information and knowledge. Commanders
identify important information requirements and focus subordinates and staff on answering them. They face
a thinking, adaptive enemy. Commanders estimate, but cannot predict, the enemy’s actions and the course
of future events. Once executed, the effects of their decisions are frequently irreversible. Therefore, they
anticipate actions that follow their decisions.
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
5-3
Chapter 5
5-17. Commanders continuously combine analytic and intuitive approaches to decisionmaking. Analytic
decisionmaking approaches a problem systematically. The analytic approach aims to produce the optimal
solution to a problem from among the solutions identified. The Army’s analytic approach is the MDMP. In
contrast, intuitive decisionmaking is the act of reaching a conclusion that emphasizes pattern recognition
based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character.
This approach focuses on assessment of the situation vice comparison of multiple options (FM 6-0). It
relies on the experienced commander’s and staff member’s intuitive ability to recognize the key elements
and implications of a particular problem or situation, reject the impractical, and select an adequate solution.
(FM 5-0 discusses the MDMP. FM 6-0 discusses analytic and intuitive decisionmaking.)
5-18. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Commanders may make an intuitive decision based
on situational understanding gained during the MDMP. If time permits, the staff may use a specific MDMP
step, such as war gaming, to validate or refine the commander’s intuitive decision. In a time-constrained
environment, many techniques—such as selecting a single course of action—rely heavily on intuitive
decisions. Even in the most rigorous, analytic decisionmaking processes, intuition sets boundaries for analysis.
5-19. *Commanders conduct design to help them with the conceptual aspects of planning to include
understanding, visualizing, and describing. After receipt of or in anticipation of a mission, commanders
may begin design to understand the operational environment, frame the problem, and develop an
operational approach to solve the problem. Using the elements of operational art, commanders visualize the
desired end state and a broad concept of how to shape the current conditions into the end state.
Commanders describe their visualization through the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and concept
of operations, clarifying an uncertain situation.
5-20. Commanders continuously lead and assess. Guided by professional judgment gained from
experience, knowledge, education, intelligence, and intuition, commanders lead by force of example and
personal presence. Leadership inspires Soldiers (and sometimes civilians) to accomplish things that they
would otherwise avoid. This often requires risk. Commanders anticipate and accept prudent risk to create
opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Assessment helps
commanders better understand current conditions and broadly describe future conditions that define
success. They identify the difference between the two and visualize a sequence of actions to link them.
5-21. *Commanders encourage the leadership and initiative of subordinates through mission command.
Commanders accept setbacks that stem from the initiative of subordinates. They understand that land
warfare is chaotic and unpredictable and that action is preferable to passivity. They encourage subordinates
to accept prudent risks to create opportunities, while providing intent and control that allow for latitude and
discretion. They also express gaps in relevant information as commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIRs). Direction is implicit in command; commanders direct actions to achieve results and
lead forces to mission accomplishment.
Understand
5-22. Understanding is fundamental to the role of the commander. It is essential to the commander’s ability
to establish the situation’s context. Understanding involves analyzing and understanding the operational or
mission variables in a given operational environment. It is derived from applying judgment to the common
operational picture through the filter of the commander’s knowledge and experience. Understanding
includes physical factors (such as location of forces or population centers), human factors (such as religion
or morale), and the relationships among friendly and enemy forces, the local populace and other aspects of
the operational environment that potentially represent opportunities and threats to friendly forces.
5-23. To develop a truer understanding of the operational environment, commanders, subordinate
commanders, staffs, and other partners collaborate and dialog actively, sharing and questioning
information, perceptions, and ideas to better understand situations and make decisions. Competent
commanders circulate throughout their areas of operations as often as possible, talking to subordinate
commanders and Soldiers conducting operations, while observing for themselves. These individuals have a
more finely attuned sense of the local situation, and their intuition may detect trouble or opportunity long
before the staff might. Intuition deepens commanders’ understanding. It allows them to anticipate potential
opportunities and threats, information gaps, and capability shortfalls. Understanding becomes the basis of
the commander’s visualization.
5-4
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
The Commander and Mission Command
5-24. Numerous factors determine the commander’s depth of understanding. Surveillance and
reconnaissance prove indispensable as do actual observation and listening to subordinates. Formulating
CCIRs, keeping them current, determining where to place key personnel, and arranging for liaisons also
contribute to understanding. Maintaining understanding is a dynamic ability; a commander’s situational
understanding changes as an operation progresses. Additionally, commanders and their staffs must
continually assess the level of confidence they have in their understanding of the situation, and strive to
improve upon the degree of understanding. Relevant information fuels understanding and fosters initiative.
Knowledge management helps commanders make informed, timely decisions. It brings the relevant
information commanders require closer to that which they have. Information management helps
commanders develop situational understanding to better frame the problem and assess the situation. It
makes relevant information available to the right person at the right time. Greater understanding enables
commanders to make better decisions. It allows them to focus their intuition on visualizing the current and
future conditions of the environment and describing them to subordinates.
Visualize
5-25. Commander’s visualization is the mental process of developing situational understanding,
determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will
achieve that end state. During planning, commander’s visualization provides the basis for developing
plans and orders. During execution, it helps commanders determine if, when, and what to decide as they
adapt to changing conditions. Commanders and staffs continuously assess the progress of operations
toward the desired end state. They plan to adjust operations as required to accomplish the mission.
5-26. Assignment of a mission focuses the commander’s visualization. Because military operations are
fundamentally dynamic, this visualization must be continuous. Visualizing the desired end state requires
commanders to clearly understand the operational environment and analyze the situation. Commanders
consider the current situation and perform a mission analysis that assists in their initial visualization. They
continually validate their visualization throughout the operation. To develop their visualization,
commanders draw on several sources of knowledge and relevant information. These include—
z
Elements of operational art appropriate to their echelon.
z
Input from the staff and other commanders.
z
Principles of war. (See appendix A.)
z
Operational themes and related doctrine.
z
Running estimates.
z
The common operational picture.
z
Their experience and judgment.
z
Subject matter experts.
Visualization allows commanders to develop their intent and planning guidance for the entire operation, not
just the initial onset of action.
5-27. Subordinate, supporting, adjacent, and higher commanders communicate with one another to
compare perspectives and visualize their environments. Commanders increase the breadth and depth of
their visualizations by collaborating with other commanders. Staff input, as running estimates, focuses
analysis and detects potential effects on operations. Commanders direct staffs to provide the information
necessary to shape their visualization. Commanders (and staff, if available) translate the commander’s
visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected
results.
5-28. Commanders consider the elements of operational art as they frame the problem and describe their
visualization. (See chapter 7.) However, the utility and application of some elements are often limited at the
tactical level. Commanders use the elements that apply to their echelon and situation.
Describe
5-29. After commanders visualize an operation, they communicate their vision to their staffs and
subordinates. They describe their shared understanding of the mission and commander’s intent. Through
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
5-5
Chapter 5
collaboration and dialog, commanders ensure subordinates understand the visualization well enough to
begin planning. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it as
circumstances require. Commanders express their initial visualization in terms of—
z
Initial commander’s intent.
z
Planning guidance, including an initial concept of operations.
z
Information required for further planning (CCIRs).
z
Essential elements of friendly information to protect.
Initial Commander’s Intent
5-30. Commanders summarize their visualization in their initial intent statement. The initial commander’s
intent aims to facilitate planning while focusing the overall operations process. Commanders develop this
statement. It succinctly describes the commander’s visualization of the entire operation listing what the
commander wants to accomplish. The initial commander’s intent links the operation’s purpose with the
conditions that define the desired end state. Usually the intent statement evolves as planning progresses and
more information becomes available.
5-31. The initial commander’s intent statement focuses the staff during the operations process. The staff
uses this statement to develop and refine courses of action. These courses of action help establish
conditions that define the end state. Planning involves developing lines of effort that link the execution of
tactical tasks to end state conditions. A clear initial commander’s intent drives this effort.
Planning Guidance
5-32. Commanders provide planning guidance with their initial intent statement. Planning guidance
conveys the essence of the commander’s visualization. Effective planning guidance is essentially an initial
concept of operations that prioritizes each warfighting function. It reflects how the commander sees the
operation unfolding. It broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to employ combat
power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent. Broad and general guidance gives
the staff and subordinate leaders’ maximum latitude; it lets proficient staffs develop flexible and effective
options.
5-33. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning guidance.
They ensure staffs understand the broad outline of their visualization while allowing them the latitude
necessary to explore different options. This guidance provides the basis for a detailed concept of operations
without dictating the specifics of the final plan. As with their intent, commanders may modify planning
guidance based on staff and subordinate input and changing conditions.
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
5-34. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the
commander as being critical to facilitating timely decisionmaking. The two key elements are friendly force
information requirements and priority intelligence requirements (JP 3-0). A CCIR directly influences
decisionmaking and facilitates the successful execution of military operations. Commanders decide
whether to designate an information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions and their
visualization of the course of the operation. A CCIR may support one or more decisions. During planning,
staffs recommend information requirements for commanders to designate as CCIRs. During preparation
and execution, they recommend changes to CCIRs based on assessment. A CCIR is—
z
Specified by a commander for a specific operation.
z
Applicable only to the commander who specifies it.
z
Situation dependent—directly linked to a current or future mission.
z
Focused on predictable events or activities.
z
Time-sensitive—planners report the answer to a CCIR to the commander immediately by any
means available.
5-35. Always promulgated by a plan or order, commanders limit the number of CCIRs to focus the efforts
of limited collection assets. Typically, commanders identify ten or fewer CCIRs. The fewer the CCIRs, the
5-6
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
The Commander and Mission Command
easier staffs can remember, recognize, and act on each one. This helps staffs and subordinates identify
information the commander needs immediately. While most staffs provide relevant information, a good
staff expertly distills that information. It identifies answers to CCIRs and gets them to the commander
immediately. It also identifies vital information that does not answer a CCIR but that the commander
nonetheless needs to know. A good staff develops this acumen through training and experience.
Designating too many CCIRs limits the staff’s ability to immediately recognize and react to them.
Excessive critical items reduce the focus of collection efforts.
5-36. The list of CCIRs constantly changes. Commanders add and delete individual requirements
throughout an operation as they need information for specific decisions. Commanders determine their own
CCIRs but may select some from staff nominations. Staff sections recommend the most important
intelligence and information requirements for the commander to consider as CCIRs. Once approved, a
CCIR falls into one of two categories: priority intelligence requirements
(PIRs) and friendly force
information requirements (FFIRs).
5-37. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence
support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment
(JP 2-0). PIRs identify the information about the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that
the commander considers most important. Lessons from recent operations show that intelligence about civil
considerations may be as critical as intelligence about the enemy. Thus, all staff sections may recommend
information about civil considerations as PIRs. The intelligence officer manages PIRs for the commander.
5-38. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand
the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). FFIRs identify the information about the
mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers
most important. In coordination with the staff, the operations officer manages FFIRs for the commander.
Essential Elements of Friendly Information
5-39. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if
known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the
operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection. Although EEFIs are not CCIRs,
they have the same priority. An EEFI establishes an element of information to protect rather than one to
collect. EEFIs identify those elements of friendly force information that, if compromised, would jeopardize
mission success. EEFIs help commanders protect vital friendly information. Their identification is the first
step in the operations security process and central to the protection of information. (FM 3-13 addresses the
operations security process.) EEFIs are also key factors in formulating military deception operations.
Direct
5-40. Commanders direct all aspects of operations. This direction takes different forms during planning,
preparation, and execution. Commanders make decisions and direct actions based on their situational
understanding, which they maintain by continuous assessment. They use control measures to focus the
operation on the desired end state. Commanders direct operations by—
z
Preparing and approving plans and orders.
z
Assigning and adjusting missions, tasks, task organization, and control measures based on
changing conditions.
z
Positioning units to maximize combat power, anticipate actions, or create or preserve maneuver
options.
z
Positioning key leaders to ensure observation and supervision at critical times and places.
z
Adjusting support priorities and allocating resources based on opportunities and threats.
z
Accepting risk to create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
z
Establishing themes (and sometimes messages) for inform and influence activities.
z
Committing reserves.
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
5-7
Chapter 5
Plans and Orders
5-41. Plans and orders are key tools used by commanders in directing operations. Under mission
command, commanders direct with mission orders. Mission orders is a technique for developing orders
that emphasizes to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them. It
provides maximum freedom of action in determining how to best accomplish assigned missions.
Mission orders synchronize subordinates’ actions only as required for mission success. Constraints are
appropriate when mission success requires closely synchronized action by multiple units. Even then,
commanders establish constraints in a manner that least limits individual initiative. Commanders ensure
that orders prepared by the staff follow the precepts of mission orders to facilitate decentralized execution
and maximum flexibility of subordinates.
5-42. Generally, subordinate commanders exercise full freedom of action within the concept of operations
and commander’s intent. Higher commanders may impose additional control over subordinates during a
particular phase or mission. As soon as conditions allow, subordinates regain their freedom of action.
Effective mission orders communicate to subordinates the situation, their commander’s intent and mission,
and the important tasks of each unit. The commander’s intent and concept of operations set guidelines that
ensure unity of effort while allowing subordinate commanders to exercise initiative.
5-43. Mission orders stress not only the tasks required of subordinates but also understanding their context
and purpose. While clear direction is essential to accomplishing the mission, commanders strike a balance
between necessary but minimum direction and overly detailed direction. Subordinates who act first (within
the commander’s intent) and report later often achieve far more than those who delay action to wait for the
commander’s confirmation.
Commander’s Intent
5-44. The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the
conditions the force must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that
represent the desired end state. The commander’s intent succinctly describes what constitutes success in
an operation. It includes the operation’s purpose and only the most important conditions that define the end
state. It links the mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units. A clear commander’s intent
facilitates a shared understanding and focus on the overall conditions that represent mission
accomplishment. During execution, the commander’s intent spurs individual initiative.
5-45. Soldiers two echelons down must easily remember and clearly understand the commander’s intent.
The shorter the commander’s intent, the better it serves these purposes. Typically, the commander’s intent
consists of three to five sentences. Commanders formulate and communicate their commander’s intent to
describe the boundaries within which subordinates may exercise initiative while maintaining unity of effort.
To avoid limiting subordinates’ freedom of action, commanders place only minimum constraints for
coordination on them.
5-46. Commanders develop their intent statement. The commander’s intent, coupled with mission, directs
subordinates toward mission accomplishment, especially when current orders no longer fit the situation and
subordinates must decide how to deviate from them. Subordinate leaders, empowered with authority and a
clear understanding of the commander’s intent and concept, develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively
under fluid, dynamic conditions.
Concept of Operations
5-47. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units
cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to
achieve the end state. It is normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining
operations. The concept of operations expands on the commander’s intent by describing how the
commander wants the force to accomplish the mission. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible
subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement one another. The concept of operations
promotes general understanding by stating the task (such as attack) that directly accomplishes the mission
(the decisive operation) and the units that will execute it. The concept of operations clearly describes the
other units’ tasks in terms of shaping and sustaining operations. It may include, for example, the type of
5-8
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
The Commander and Mission Command
support or specific location for providing support. Normally, the concept of operations projects the status of
the force at the end of the operation. If the mission dictates a significant change in tasks during the
operation, the commander may phase the operation. Small-unit commanders and leaders usually do not
describe their concept of operations in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations; they simply
assign tasks to subordinates using main effort as required. (FM 5-0 discusses the concept of operations in
detail.)
5-48. The decisive operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission. It determines the
outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. The decisive operation is the focal point around
which commanders design the entire operation. Multiple units may be engaged in the same decisive
operation. For example, one task force may follow another on an axis of advance, prepared to assume the
attack. Units operating in noncontiguous areas of operations may execute the tasks composing the higher
headquarters’ decisive operation simultaneously in different locations. Commanders visualize the decisive
operation and then design shaping and sustaining operations around it.
5-49. Changing the mission normally changes the decisive operation. This can occur because of a change
of phase but is more typical in the conduct of branches and sequels. When Army forces transition to a new
operation, through either mission accomplishment or a significant change in the situation requiring
reframing, the commander identifies a new decisive operation. Any element of full spectrum operations can
be the decisive operation, as can a specific task, such as movement to contact or civil security. The
commander determines the decisive operation. In a protracted stability operation, for example, the
commander may identify a stability task in a particular area as the decisive operation: “The decisive
operation is to provide civil security in Tal Afar. Task Force Roper provides civil security in Tal Afar
commencing D+2.”
5-50. A shaping operation is an operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for the
success of the decisive operation. Shaping operations establish conditions for the decisive operation
through effects on the enemy, population (including local leaders), and terrain. Inform and influence
activities, for example, may integrate Soldier and leader engagement tasks into the operation to reduce
tensions between Army units and different ethnic groups through direct contact between Army leaders and
local leaders. Shaping operations may occur throughout the operational area and involve any combination
of forces and capabilities.
5-51. Shaping operations may occur before, during, or after the decisive operation begins. Some shaping
operations, especially those executed simultaneously with the decisive operation, may be economy of force
actions. However, if the force available does not permit simultaneous decisive and shaping operations, the
commander sequences shaping operations around the decisive operation. The concept of operations
describes how shaping operations contribute to the decisive operation’s success, often in terms of the
purpose. For example, “Task Force Hammer conducts search and attack operations in area of operations
Anvil to neutralize insurgents that threaten Tal Afar. Task Force Rapier secures area of operations Sparrow
as a support area for brigade operations.”
5-52. A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or
shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power. Sustaining operations differ from
decisive and shaping operations in that they are focused internally
(on friendly forces) rather than
externally (on the enemy or environment). They typically address important sustainment and protection
actions essential to the success of decisive and shaping operations. However, sustaining operations cannot
be decisive themselves. Note that logistic and medical support provided to the civilian population relate to
stability and civil support operations (provide essential services); they are not sustaining operations. At the
operational level, sustaining operations focus on preparing the force for the operation’s next phase. They
determine the limit of operational reach. At the tactical level, sustaining operations determine the tempo of
the overall operation; they ensure the force can seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
5-53. Sustaining operations are continuous; commanders do not reiterate routine sustainment requirements
in the concept of operations. Rather, the concept of operations emphasizes important changes in
sustainment required by the operation. For example, “Brigade support battalion moves to area of operations
Sparrow as soon as it is secure and establishes the brigade support area. On order, brigade special troops
battalion assumes control of area of operations Sparrow.” If there are no significant changes to sustainment,
the sustainment paragraph or annexes discuss it.
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
5-9
Chapter 5
5-54. The concept of operations identifies a main effort unit if required; otherwise, the priorities of support
go to the unit conducting the decisive operation. The main effort is the designated subordinate unit
whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted
with the preponderance of combat power. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource
allocation. When commanders designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and
resources. Commanders shift resources and priorities to the main effort as circumstances and the
commander’s intent require. Commanders may shift the main effort several times during an operation.
Commanders may designate a unit conducting a shaping operation as the main effort until the decisive
operation commences. However, the unit with primary responsibility for the decisive operation becomes
the main effort upon execution of the decisive operation. For example, “Task Force Hammer is the main
effort until D+2.”
Lead
5-55. After commanders make decisions, they lead their forces throughout execution. During execution,
commanders provide the strength of character, moral courage, and will to follow through with their
decisions. When changing decisions, they must know when and what to decide, and when to make other
decisions that address changes in the situation. (FM 6-22 discusses leadership actions during execution.
Chapter 4 discusses leadership and combat power.)
5-56. Effective leaders have physical presence. Commanders carefully consider where they need to be,
balancing the need to inspire Soldiers with that of maintaining an overall perspective of the entire
operation. The commander’s forward presence demonstrates a willingness to share danger. It also allows
them to appraise for themselves the subordinate unit’s condition, including leader and Soldier morale.
Forward presence allows commanders to sense the human dimension of conflict, particularly when fear and
fatigue reduce effectiveness. Then commanders need to lead by example, side-by-side with Soldiers.
Commanders cannot let the perceived advantages of improved information technology compromise their
obligation to lead by example.
5-57. The commander’s will is the one constant that propels the force through the shock and friction of
battle. Friction is inherent in all operations. Inevitably, things can and will go wrong. The ability of leaders
and Soldiers to concentrate erodes as they reach the limit of their endurance. Against a skilled and resolute
enemy, Soldiers may approach that point when fear, uncertainty, and physical exhaustion dominate their
thinking. At this point, the commander’s strength of will and personal presence provides the moral impetus
for actions that lead to victory.
*Assess
5-58. Assessment helps commanders to better understand current conditions and determine how the
operation is progressing. The commander maintains overall perspective, comparing the current situation to
the one originally envisioned. This requires critical thinking, inspired when possible, by the commander’s
participation in design. The information that commanders receive from subordinates often shapes how
commanders identify, frame, and seek to solve a problem. Commanders use this information to develop
indicators to determine progress toward a successful outcome. These indicators may take the form of
intermediate objectives that units must accomplish to achieve a desired end state.
5-59. The commander assesses the overall progress against the conditions extant, always asking whether
the mission and commander’s intent still apply. When assessment reveals a significant variance from the
commander’s original visualization, commanders reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan as
required. The staff assessment guides how to exercise control and regulate subordinate activities. Mission
command requires that staff officers balance their judgment with the subordinate commanders’ perspective;
assessing progress against their commander’s intent first, and then existing control measures.
*DEVELOP TEAMS AMONG MODULAR FORMATIONS AND JOINT, INTERAGENCY,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL PARTNERS
5-60. Developing teams within organizations begins early in the operations process. This key activity
begins in preparation and continues throughout execution. As part of unified action, the Army conducts
5-10
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
The Commander and Mission Command
operations with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners, as well as
nongovernmental organizations. Commanders integrate all their capabilities. Developing teams enables
commanders to shape operations before, during, and after operations. Army and joint, interagency,
intergovernmental and multinational leaders study and understand the capabilities and limits of each team
member. This effort ensures unity of effort. Leaders develop this understanding by training and
continuously planning with joint, intergovernmental, interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental
partners. Sustained engagement with host-nation governments and security forces enhances the developed
understanding. Integrating capabilities during full spectrum operations requires interaction and preparation
before commanders commit forces. Integration occurs through training exercises, exchange programs, and
training events. Greater collaboration in developing systems and equipment results for all the forces
involved.
5-61. The Army transformed from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force with brigades
organized by function. The brigade building blocks of the division make it a modular force task organized
to the needs of the mission while creating options to use forces less than full divisions. However, this
modular construct creates a challenge for commanders trying to build trust and confidence within
subordinate organizations. These organizations are task-organized to meet specific mission requirements
and often not habitually associated with a higher headquarters. Often they have not trained with the higher
headquarters that employs them. Collaboration and dialog with subordinate organizations can mitigate
these potential obstacles to team building. Through collaboration and dialog, commanders gain insight into
the needs of subordinate leaders while also sharing their own clear vision and commander’s intent.
5-62. By circulating among subordinate units, commanders can assess subordinates’ preparation and
execution, get to know new units in the task organization, and personally motivate Soldiers. By personally
briefing subordinates, commanders gain firsthand appreciation for the situation as well as ensuring
subordinate leaders and Soldiers understand the commander’s intent. Commanders lead, coach, and mentor
subordinate leaders. This assists in establishing close relationships that foster trust and mutual confidence.
A subordinate’s understanding of the commander’s intent, provided through clear and succinct mission
orders, drives successful mission command.
5-63. Commanders also visit with other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and the local populace in their areas of operations. With their presence,
commanders build personal relationships with civilian leaders. Knowledge gained during these visits
enables commanders to maintain situational understanding and continuously update their commander’s
visualization prior to and during execution. Civilian organizations, including those of the host nation,
frequently arrive before and remain after forces depart. Commanders and staffs identify and make contact
with those various organizations.
5-64. A challenge in building teams among civilian and military efforts stems from differing capabilities
and cultures in the civilian and host-nation organizations compared to those of the headquarters. To help
build partnerships, commanders strive to have partners—
z
Represented, integrated, and actively involved in planning and coordinating activities.
z
Share an understanding of the situation and problems to solve.
z
Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goals.
z
Work for unity of effort toward achieving common goals.
5-65. As Army forces conduct operations with various joint and other U.S. government agencies, leaders
integrate Army and interagency capabilities to accomplish specific operational objectives. Interagency
cooperation seeks to balance and combine the capabilities that the Army and those agencies bring to the
operation. To effectively integrate complementary interagency capabilities, commanders follow policy
guidance and the higher commander’s concept of operations. Army leaders apply their understanding of
different cultures and agencies involved to place military efforts in context and to serve on civil-military
teams.
5-66. Partnering, especially with multinational partners, helps direct efforts toward mission
accomplishment. It exceeds an opportunity for exchanging ideas and information. Partnering, and the need
to partner, enables successful military operations. Even when no command authority exists, collaboration
between commanders and partners affords commanders opportunities to revise their understanding or
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
5-11
Chapter 5
operational approach so together they can achieve the desired end state. Commanders seek unity of effort
through coordination and cooperation even if participants come from different commands or organizations.
Achieving unity of effort depends on leaders working with partners. They develop a mutual understanding
of the environment and a common commitment to solutions. They address causes of conflict and sources of
enemy strength. Achieving unity of effort requires Army leaders to have a high degree of cultural
understanding and social skills. Without such understanding and skills, leaders will fail to mediate and
collaborate with diverse partners.
5-67. Commanders continuously engage and emphasize strengthening existing relationships with modular
formations and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. Such action remains
essential to developing mutual trust and common understanding. To build and strengthen bonds of trust and
understanding, commanders sustain efforts to conduct combined training, education, and cultural
exchanges. Successful joint and multinational operations often depend on close coordination, constant
communication, and addressing issues concerning strategy and operations openly and directly.
*LEAD INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES
5-68. Effective full spectrum operations require commanders to establish, synchronize, and integrate
actions with information themes and messages to achieve a desired end state. The integration of actions,
themes, and messages aids the commander to provide consistent messages to diverse audiences. In an
information-saturated environment, actions, themes, and messages are inextricably linked requiring careful
coordination and integration. Information, as an element of combat power, is a critical and sometimes
decisive factor in full spectrum operations. Effectively employed, information can shape the operational
environment and multiply the effects of friendly successes while countering adversary or enemy
information efforts. Commanders establish themes and messages. They personally engage key players,
ensuring that the themes and messages are transmitted and received as the commander intends.
5-69. Information theme means a unifying or dominant idea or image that expresses the purposes for an
action. A message is a verbal, written, or electronic communication that supports an information theme
focused on an audience. It supports a specific action or objective. Accurate, timely, and synchronized
themes and messages—delivered to the right audiences and integrated with effective actions—increase the
pressure on the enemy. When dealing with friendly and neutral audiences, synchronized and integrated
actions, information themes, and messages create significant opportunities to gain support for operations.
Influencing behavior among varied and diverse groups enables commanders to deny the enemy safe havens
and support bases necessary to mobilize resources and prepare for operations. Influence is as much a
product of public perception as a measure of operational success. It reflects the ability of friendly forces to
operate within the cultural and societal norms of the local populace while accomplishing the mission.
Influence requires legitimacy. Developing legitimacy requires time, patience, and coordinated, cooperative
efforts across the operational area. (Chapter 6 has a detailed discussion of inform and influence activities.)
SUMMARY
5-70. Commanders execute mission command to achieve success in full spectrum operations. The role of
the commander in mission command is to direct and lead from the beginning of planning throughout
execution, and continually assess. The commander is the central figure in mission command. Design
permeates all aspects of mission command. Commanders drive the operations process. They understand,
visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations in complex, dynamic environments. Commanders
lead the development of teams with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners as
well as nongovernmental organizations. Commanders establish and synchronize information themes and
messages to inform and influences specific audiences. Throughout operations, commanders, subordinate
commanders, staffs, and other partners collaborate and dialog actively, sharing and questioning
information, perceptions, and ideas to better understand situations and make decisions. Commanders
encourage individual initiative through mission orders and a climate of mutual trust and understanding.
Guided by their experience, knowledge, education, intelligence, and intuition, commanders apply
leadership to translate decisions into action. Commanders synchronize forces and capabilities in time,
space, and purpose to accomplish missions.
5-12
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
Chapter 6
The Science of Control
This chapter describes how commanders and staffs apply the science of control to
support the commander’s tasks. It discusses the staff tasks. This chapter details how
staffs conduct the operations process, conduct knowledge management and
information management, and conduct inform and influence and cyber/
electromagnetic activities.
*SECTION I - CONTROL
6-1. While command is a personal function, control involves the entire force. In the context of mission
command, control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in
accordance with the commander’s intent. Commanders require control to direct operations. Aided by
staffs, commanders exercise control over all forces in their area of operations. Staffs coordinate,
synchronize, and integrate actions, inform the commander, and exercise control for the commander.
6-2. The control aspect of mission command applies more science than art because it relies on objectivity,
facts, empirical methods, and analysis. The science of control includes the detailed systems and procedures
to improve the commander’s understanding and support execution of missions. Commanders and staffs use
the science of control to overcome the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate.
Control demands commanders and staffs understand those aspects of operations that they can analyze and
measure. These include the physical capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy organizations and
systems. Control also requires a realistic appreciation for time-distance factors and the time required to
initiate certain actions. The science of control supports the art of command.
6-3. When dealing with complex problems, commanders use design to assist them in understanding the
operational environment, framing the problem, and developing a broad general approach to its solution.
Design pervades all systems and procedures, enabling commanders to better understand complex problems.
The commander’s visualization and description of what to do to achieve desired conditions must flow
logically from what commanders understand and how they have framed complex problems.
SECTION II - THE STAFF TASKS
6-4.
*Three key staff tasks apply to the science of control:
z
Conduct the operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess.
z
Conduct knowledge management and information management.
z
Conduct inform and influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities.
These three tasks support the commander’s tasks and, although discussed in this chapter on control,
complement the commander’s tasks.
CONDUCT THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
6-5. The operations process consists of the major mission command activities performed during
operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. The
commander drives the operations process through leadership. Commanders may perform the activities
of the operations process sequentially or simultaneously. These activities are usually not discrete; they
overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Commanders use the operations process to help them decide
when and where to make decisions, control operations, and provide command presence. (See FM 5-0 for a
detailed discussion on the operations process.)
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
6-1
Chapter 6
6-6.
*Planning, to include design, is synchronized. Throughout the operations process, commanders
synchronize forces and warfighting functions to accomplish missions. Synchronization enables units to
achieve synergic effects. For example, units must synchronize delivery of fires with target acquisition to
produce the desired effects. However, synchronization is not an end in itself. It is useful only as it
contributes to the greater effectiveness of the force. Unnecessary synchronization or synchronization for
limited gains degrades tempo, impedes initiative, and allows the enemy to act within the friendly force
decision process. Excessive synchronization undermines mission command.
6-7. Both design and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) assist commanders and staffs with the
conceptual aspects of planning. Commanders and staffs use design with the MDMP and troop leading
procedures to integrate activities during planning. They also develop additional procedures and processes
for executing control. Paragraphs 6-32 through 6-73 discuss this support in detail.
PLAN
6-8.
*Planning is the process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the
commander’s visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on
the expected results. Planning begins with analysis and assessment of the conditions in the operational
environment, with particular emphasis on the enemy, to determine the relationships among the mission
variables. It involves understanding and framing the problem and envisioning the set of conditions that
represent the desired end state. Design and the MDMP assist commanders and staffs with the conceptual
aspects of planning. Based on the commander’s guidance, planning includes formulating one or more
supportable courses of action to accomplish the mission. Good plans foster initiative, account for
uncertainty and friction, and mitigate risks.
6-9. Commanders and staffs consider the consequences and implications of each course of action. Once
the commander selects a course of action, the staff formulates specified tasks to subordinates, required staff
actions, and an assessment framework. Planning develops the detailed information required during
execution. Examples include setting initial conditions, assigning command relationships, and establishing
priorities. Planning does not cease with production of a plan or order. It continues throughout an operation
as the order is refined based on changes in the situation. In addition, staffs refine plans for branches and
sequels during an operation.
6-10. Whenever possible, commanders employ red teams to examine plans from an opponent’s
perspective. Red teams provide insight into possible flaws in the plan as well as potential reactions by the
enemy and other people in the area of operations. This insight helps the staff improve the plan and develop
more effective branches and sequels.
6-11. The scope, complexity, and length of planning horizons differ at the operational and tactical levels.
At the operational level, campaign planning coordinates major actions across significant periods. Planners
integrate Service capabilities with those of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
organizations. (JP 5-0 contains doctrine for joint operation planning.) Tactical planning has the same clarity
of purpose but typically reflects a shorter planning horizon. Comprehensive, continuous, and adaptive
planning characterizes successful operations at both levels.
6-12. The Army uses three doctrinal planning procedures to integrate activities during planning: design, the
MDMP, and troop leading procedures. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders may begin design to
understand the operational environment, frame the problem, and develop an operational approach to solve
the problem. The design concept serves as the foundation for more detailed planning, including the
production of plans and orders using the MDMP. In units with a formally organized staff, the MDMP
provides structure to help commanders and staffs develop running estimates, plans, and orders. It provides
a logical sequence for decisionmaking and interaction between the commander and staff, and it provides a
common framework for parallel planning. At the lowest tactical echelons, commanders and leaders follow
troop leading procedures. Design, the MDMP, and troop leading procedures hinge on the commander’s
ability to visualize and describe the operation. They are means to an end; their inherent value lies in the
results achieved, not the process. (FM 5-0 discusses design, the MDMP, and troop leading procedures.)
6-2
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
The Science of Control
6-13. Planning continues as necessary during preparation and execution. When circumstances are not
suited for the MDMP or troop leading procedures, commanders rely on design, intuitive decisionmaking,
and direct contact with subordinate commanders to integrate activities.
PREPARE
6-14. Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an
operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement. Preparation establishes
conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It facilitates and sustains transitions,
including those to branches and sequels.
6-15. Preparation requires staff, unit, and Soldier actions. Mission success depends on preparation as much
as on planning. Rehearsals help staffs, units, and Soldiers to better understand their roles in upcoming
operations, practice complicated tasks, and ensure equipment and weapons function properly. Activities
specific to preparation include—
z
Revision and refinement of the plan.
z
Rehearsals.
z
Force tailoring and task-organizing.
z
Surveillance and reconnaissance.
z
Training.
z
Troop movements.
z
Precombat checks and inspections.
z
Sustainment preparations.
z
Integration of new Soldiers and units.
z
Subordinate confirmation briefs and backbriefs.
6-16. Several preparation activities begin during planning and continue throughout execution. For
example, uncommitted forces prepare for contingencies identified in branches and subsequent events
detailed in sequels. Committed units revert to preparation when they accomplish their objectives, occupy
defensive positions, or pass into reserve.
EXECUTE
6-17. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission
and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions.
It focuses on concerted action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Army forces seize the initiative
immediately and dictate tempo throughout all operations.
6-18. Commanders use mission command to achieve maximum flexibility and foster individual initiative.
Subordinates exercising their initiative can significantly increase the tempo of operations; however, this
may desynchronize the overall operation. Desynchronization may reduce commanders’ abilities to mass the
effects of combat power. Executing even relatively minor, planned actions produces second- and third-
order effects throughout the force; these affect the operation’s overall synchronization. Nonetheless, under
mission command, commanders accept some risk of desynchronization as the price of seizing, retaining,
and exploiting the initiative.
6-19. The commander’s intent and mission orders focus every echelon on executing the concept of
operations. Mission command enables and prompts collaborative synchronization among subordinates.
When subordinates exploit opportunities, individual initiative resynchronizes the overall operation
continuously. Subordinates’ success may offer opportunities anticipated in the concept of operations or
develop advantages that make a new concept practical. In either case, the commander’s intent keeps the
force focused and synchronized. Subordinates need not wait for top-down synchronization. The climate
fostered by mission command encourages subordinates to act on information about the enemy, adversaries,
events, and trends without detailed direction.
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
6-3
Chapter 6
6-20. As commanders assess the operation, they determine when to make decisions. Orders usually
identify some decision points; however, unanticipated enemy actions or conditions often present situations
that require unanticipated decisions. Commanders act when decisions are required. They do not wait for a
set time in the battle rhythm.
6-21. During execution, commanders draw on experience, intellect, creativity, intuition, and education to
make rapid decisions. They learn deliberately as the situation develops and make changes based on that
learning. Staffs synchronize or resynchronize forces and warfighting functions more quickly during
execution than during planning and preparation. They must do this while forces are moving and processes
are ongoing.
6-22. During execution, commanders incorporate considerations for the operation’s next phase or sequel.
They begin to visualize how to transition from the current operation to the next one. Based on their
visualization, commanders direct actions to posture the force for the transition. As they visualize the
implications of events and their solutions, commanders describe their conclusions to staff and subordinates
through updated commander’s critical information requirements and planning guidance. The guidance may
be to develop a branch or change the main effort to exploit success. Commanders direct adjustments when
necessary, primarily through fragmentary orders.
ASSESS
6-23. Assessment refers to the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation,
particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation. Assessment precedes and guides every operations
process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. It involves a comparison of
forecasted outcomes to actual events. Assessment entails three tasks:
z
Continuously assess the enemy’s reactions and vulnerabilities.
z
Continuously monitor the situation and progress of the operation towards the commander’s
desired end state.
z
Evaluate the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.
6-24. Staffs monitor the current situation for unanticipated successes, failures, or enemy actions. As
commanders and staffs assess the operation, they look for opportunities, threats, and acceptable progress.
They accept risks, seize opportunities, and mitigate threats. Throughout the operation, commanders
visualize, describe, and direct changes to the operation.
6-25. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task
accomplishment (JP 3-0). Measures of performance answer the question, “Was the task or action performed
as the commander intended?” A measure of performance confirms or denies that a unit has performed a
task properly.
6-26. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or
operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an
objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). Measures of effectiveness focus on the results or consequences
of actions taken. They answer the question, “Is the force doing the right things, or are additional or
alternative actions required?” A measure of effectiveness provides a benchmark against which the
commander assesses progress toward accomplishing the mission.
6-27. Staffs analyze the current situation using mission variables and prepare their running estimates. A
running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current
operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are
supportable
(FM 5-0). Staffs continuously assess how new information might impact conducting
operations. They update running estimates and determine if adjustments to the operation are required.
Commanders empower their staffs to make adjustments within their areas of expertise. This requires staffs
to understand the aspects of operations that require the commander’s attention as opposed to those
delegated to their control.
6-28. Commanders integrate their own assessments and those of subordinate commanders into all aspects
of the operations process. Assessment helps commanders refine their situational understanding. It allows
them to make informed, rational decisions throughout the entire operation. During planning, assessment
6-4
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
The Science of Control
focuses on understanding the current conditions in the operational environment and developing relevant
courses of action. During preparation and execution, it emphasizes evaluating progress toward the desired
end state, determining variances from expectations, and determining the significance (threat or opportunity)
of those variances.
6-29. Planners primarily use the common operational picture, observations of commanders, and running
estimates for assessing the operation against the concept of operations, mission, and commander’s intent.
The commander’s visualization forms the basis of the commander’s personal decisionmaking methodology
throughout the operation. Running estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendations from
the perspective of each staff section. They help to refine the common operational picture and supplement it
with information not readily displayed.
6-30. During assessment, commanders may decide to reframe after realizing the desired conditions have
changed, are not achievable, or cannot be attained through the current operational approach. Reframing
provides the freedom to operate beyond the limits of any single perspective. Conditions change during
execution. Commanders and staff expect such change because forces interact within the operational
environment. Recognizing and anticipating these changes is fundamental to design and essential to an
organization’s ability to learn.
6-31. Commanders avoid excessive analysis when assessing operations. Committing valuable time and
energy to developing elaborate and time-consuming assessments squanders resources better devoted to
other operations process activities. Effective commanders avoid burdening subordinates and staffs with
overly detailed assessment and collection tasks. Generally, the echelon at which a specific operation, task,
or action is conducted should be the echelon at which it is assessed. This provides a focus for assessment at
each echelon. It enhances the efficiency of the overall operations process.
SUPPORT TO THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
6-32. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staff develop additional procedures and
processes for executing control. They may execute these simultaneously. Commanders and staff also
produce products that provide enough control to ensure subordinates execute within the commander’s
intent.
Integrating Processes
6-33. Certain integrating processes occur during all operations process activities (see figure 6-1, page 6-6).
Commanders synchronize these processes with each other and integrate them into the overall operation:
z
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. (For joint and functional component commanders, this
is intelligence preparation of the operational environment. See JP 2-0.)
z
Targeting. (See FM 3-60.)
z
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization.
z
Composite risk management. (See FM 5-19.)
z
Knowledge management.
Continuing Activities
6-34. The following activities continue during all operations process activities. Commanders synchronize
these activities with one another and integrate them into the overall operation:
z
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
z
Security operations.
z
Protection.
z
Liaison and coordination.
z
Terrain management.
z
Information management.
z
Airspace command and control.
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
6-5
Chapter 6
Figure 6-1. Operations process expanded
*Mission Command Networks and Systems
6-35. Commanders cannot exercise mission command alone except in the smallest organizations. Thus,
commanders perform these functions through mission command networks and systems. (Chapter 4 defines
mission command networks and systems.) An effective mission command system enables commanders to
conduct operations that accomplish the mission decisively.
6-36. A commander’s mission command system begins with people. No amount of technology can reduce
the importance of the human dimension.
(FM 6-22 discusses the human dimension.) Therefore,
commanders base their mission command systems on human characteristics more than on equipment and
procedures. Effective mission command systems required trained personnel; the best technology cannot
support mission command without them.
6-37. Networks are key enablers to successful operations. Commanders capitalize on networks to extend
the connectivity of higher levels to staff and subordinates. This connectivity supports operational
adaptability without sacrificing coordination or unity of effort. Commanders ensure that all units have
access to, understand, and communicate information across friendly networks. Electronic long-distance
sensor, collector, and transmitter networks provide actionable information across the battlefield. To enable
mission command, leaders and Soldiers access networks to create, process, and integrate information.
Network systems provide synthesized information so leaders can make informed decisions without being
overburdened. Commanders use these systems to communicate with joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
and multinational partners on multiple networks.
6-38. Procedures govern actions within a mission command system to make it more effective and efficient.
Procedures are standard, detailed steps that describe how to perform specific tasks. Adhering to procedures
minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitation as commanders make frequent, rapid decisions to
meet operational requirements.
6-39. Equipment and facilities provide sustainment and a work environment for the other elements of a
mission command system. Facilities vary in size and complexity. At the lowest echelon, commanders may
use their command post or vehicle as the facility. At the highest echelons, facilities consist of large and
complex buildings. Units equip facilities with current and emerging technologies that provide timely,
accurate, and reliable information to commanders.
6-40. To respond to a rapidly changing operational environment and develop creativity, innovation, and
adaptation, information must become knowledge. Knowledge must permeate the Army. This requires both
6-6
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
The Science of Control
art and science. Knowledge management generates knowledge products and services among commanders
and staffs. It supports collaboration and the conduct of operations while improving organizational
performance. Information management combines information systems and information processes to
distribute, store, display, and protect knowledge products and services.
(Paragraph
6-81 discusses
information management.)
6-41. Agile and adaptive Soldiers are the single most important element of any mission command system.
Their actions and responses—everything from fire and maneuver techniques to the disciplined observation
of rules of engagement—control operations. Soldiers also assist commanders and exercise control on their
behalf. Staffs perform many functions that help commanders exercise mission command:
z
Provide relevant information and analysis.
z
Maintain running estimates and make recommendations.
z
Prepare plans and orders.
z
Monitor operations.
z
Control operations.
z
Assess the progress of operations.
FORMS OF CONTROL
6-42. Control allows commanders to adjust operations to conform to their commander’s intent as
conditions change. Staffs provide their greatest support in assisting the commander with control.
Commanders use two forms of control—procedural and positive. Commanders balance the two forms
based on the situation.
6-43. Army procedural control is a technique of regulating forces that relies on a combination of
orders, regulations, policies, and doctrine (including tactics, techniques, and procedures). Army
procedural control requires no intervention by the higher headquarters once it is established.
6-44. Army positive control is a technique of regulating forces that involves commanders and leaders
actively assessing, deciding, and directing them. It may restrict Soldiers since commanders directly
monitor operations and intervene, directing specific actions to better synchronize subordinates’ operations.
Excessive use of Army positive control can rapidly become detailed command.
6-45. The definitions of individual control measures provide Army procedural control without requiring
detailed explanations. For example, boundaries, the most important control measure, designate the area of
operations assigned to or by a commander. Commanders know they have full freedom of action within their
area of operations.
6-46. Army positive control may best apply when units require detailed directions to sequence actions or
coordinate the activities with nearby forces. A river crossing illustrates this situation. In exercising Army
positive control, commanders may use digital information systems to assess without requesting information
explicitly or continuously from subordinates. Positive control supplements mission command when
necessary.
CONTROL MEASURES
6-47. Commanders exercise Army procedural and Army positive controls through control measures. A
control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. Control measures are
established under a commander’s authority; however, commanders may authorize staff officers and
subordinate leaders to establish them. Commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, require
synchronization between forces, impose restrictions, or establish guidelines to regulate freedom of action.
Commanders use control measures to coordinate subordinates’ actions. The control measures can be
permissive or restrictive. Permissive control measures allow specific actions to occur; restrictive control
measures limit the conduct of certain actions.
6-48. Control measures help commanders direct by establishing responsibilities and limits that prevent
subordinate units’ actions from impeding one another. They foster coordination and cooperation between
forces without unnecessarily restricting freedom of action, decisionmaking, and individual initiative.
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
6-7
Chapter 6
6-49. Control measures may be detailed (such as a division operation order) or simple
(such as a
checkpoint). Control measures include, but are not limited to—
z
Laws and regulations.
z
Planning guidance.
z
Delegation of authority.
z
Specific instructions to plans and orders and their elements, including—
Commander’s intent.
Unit missions and tasks.
Commander’s critical information requirements.
Essential elements of friendly information.
Task organization.
Concept of operations.
Target lists.
Rules of engagement.
Service support plans.
Graphic control measures.
Unit standing operating procedures that control actions as reporting and battle rhythm.
z
Information requirements.
6-50. Certain control measures belong to the commander alone—the commander’s intent, unit mission
statement, planning guidance, commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIRs), and essential
elements of friendly information (EEFIs). Commanders cannot delegate these control measures. Unit
standard operating procedures specify many control measures. An operation plan or order modifies and
adds additional measures for a specific operation. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, modify control
measures to account for the dynamic conditions of operations.
6-51. Some control measures are graphic. A graphic control measure is a symbol used on maps and
displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions. Graphic control measures are always prescriptive.
They include symbols for boundaries, fire support coordination measures, some airspace control measures,
air defense areas, and minefields. Commanders establish them to regulate maneuver, movement, airspace
use, fires, and other aspects of operations. In general, all graphic control measures relate to easily
identifiable natural or manmade terrain features. (FM 1-02 portrays and defines graphic control measures
and discusses rules for selecting and applying them.)
MISSION VARIABLES: THE FACTORS OF METT-TC
6-52. METT-TC is a memory aid that identifies the mission variables: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and
weather, Troops and support available, Time available, and Civil considerations. It is used in information
management (the major categories of relevant information) and in tactics (the major variables considered
during mission analysis). Mission analysis describes characteristics of the area of operations in terms of
METT-TC, focusing on how they might affect the mission. (FM 6-0 discusses METT-TC in more detail.)
6-53. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the
reason therefore (JP 3-0). Commanders analyze a mission in terms of specified tasks, implied tasks, and the
commander’s intent two echelons up. They also consider the missions of adjacent units to understand their
relative contributions to the decisive operation. Results of that analysis yield the essential tasks that—with
the purpose of the operation—clearly specify the actions required. This analysis also produces the unit’s
mission statement—a short description of the task and purpose that clearly indicates the action to be taken
and the reason for doing so. It contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why. Mission
command requires that commanders clearly communicate—and subordinates understand—the purpose for
conducting an operation or a task.
6-54. When assigning missions, commanders ensure each subordinate’s mission supports the decisive
operation and the higher commander’s intent. They identify the purpose for each task assigned, nesting unit
missions with one another and with the decisive operation. (FM 5-0 discusses the nested concept.) Under
6-8
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
The Science of Control
mission command, commanders articulate each subordinate’s mission in words that foster individual
initiative.
6-55. The second variable to consider is the enemy. Relevant information regarding the enemy may include
the following:
z
Dispositions (including organization, strength, location, and mobility).
z
Doctrine (or known execution patterns).
z
Personal habits and idiosyncrasies.
z
Equipment, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
z
Probable courses of action.
Analysis of the enemy includes not only the known enemy but also other threats to mission success. Such
threats might include multiple adversaries posing with a wide array of political, economic, religious, and
personal motivations.
6-56. To understand threat capabilities and vulnerabilities, commanders and staffs require detailed, timely,
and accurate intelligence. Of all relevant information, intelligence is the most uncertain. Commanders use
surveillance and reconnaissance to collect the most important threat-related information and process it into
intelligence.
6-57. Terrain and weather are natural conditions that profoundly influence operations. Terrain and weather
are neutral; they favor neither side unless one is more familiar with—or better prepared to operate in—the
physical environment. Terrain includes natural features (such as rivers and mountains) and manmade
features (such as cities, airfields, and bridges). Terrain directly affects how commanders select objectives
and locate, move, and control forces. It also influences protective measures and the effectiveness of
weapons and other systems. Effective use of terrain reduces the effects of enemy fires, increases the effects
of friendly fires, and facilitates surprise. Terrain appreciation—the ability to predict its impact on
operations—is an important skill for every leader. For tactical operations, commanders analyze terrain
using the five military aspects of terrain, expressed in the memory aid, OAKOC: Observation and fields of
fire, Avenues of approach, Key and decisive terrain, Obstacles, Cover and concealment.
6-58. Climate and weather affect all operations. Climate means the prevailing pattern of temperature, wind
velocity, and precipitation in a specific area measured over a period of years. Climate is a more predictable
phenomenon than weather and better suited to operational-level analysis. Planners typically focus analysis
on how climate affects large-scale operations over a geographically diverse area. In contrast, weather
describes the conditions of temperature, wind velocity, precipitation, and visibility at a specific place and
time. It applies better to tactical analysis, where its effect on operations is limited in scale and duration.
Climate and weather affect conditions and capabilities of Soldiers and weapons systems, including
mobility, obstacle emplacement times, and munitions performance. Effective commanders use climate and
weather to their advantage.
6-59. The fourth mission variable is troops and support available. This refers to the number, type,
capabilities, and condition of available friendly troops and support from joint, interagency, multinational,
host-nation, commercial (via contracting), and private organizations. It also includes support provided by
civilians. Commanders and staffs maintain information on friendly forces two echelons down. They track
subordinate readiness—including training, maintenance, logistics, and morale. Commanders provide
subordinates with the mix of troops and support needed to accomplish their missions. When assigning or
allocating troops to subordinates, commanders and staffs consider differences in mobility, protection,
firepower, equipment, morale, experience, leadership, and training.
6-60. Commanders and staffs consider available troops and support when determining the resources
required to accomplish a mission—a troop-to-task analysis. If commanders determine they lack sufficient
resources, they request additional support. When they lack the resources needed to execute simultaneous
operations, commanders execute sequential operations.
6-61. The next mission variable is time available. Controlling and exploiting time drives initiative, tempo,
and momentum. By exploiting time, commanders can exert constant pressure, control the relative speed of
decisions and actions, and exhaust enemy forces. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders assess the time
available for planning, preparing, and executing it. This includes the time required to assemble, deploy, and
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
6-9
|
|