|
|
|
*FM 3-22.40 (FM 90-40)
*MCWP 3-15.8
*NTTP 3-07.3.2
AFTTP(I) 3-2.45
*USCG PUB 3-07.31
FM 3-22.40 (FM 90-40)
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia
MCWP 3-15.8
U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia
NTTP 3-07.3.2
U.S. Navy Warfare Development Command
Newport, Rhode Island
AFTTP(I) 3-2.45
Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
USCG Pub 3-07.31
U.S. Coast Guard
Washington, D.C.
15 January 2003
NLW
Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE
..............................................................................................................I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
IX
PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
XI
CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW OF NONLETHAL WEAPONS
I-1
Background
I-1
Definition
I-1
Concept Description
I-1
Background on Development and Employment
I-2
Relationship of NLW to Deadly Force
I-3
Advantages of Employing NLW
I-4
Policy Per Office of the Secretary of Defense Instructions on
Employment of NLW
I-4
*This publication supersedes FM 90-40, MCRP 3-15.8, NWP 3-07.31, USCG Pub 3-07.31, dated 6 October 1998.
iv
CHAPTER II
PURPOSE, SYSTEM DESCRIPTION, AND ORGANIZATION
II-1
Purpose
II-1
System Description
II-1
Organization
II-2
CHAPTER III
NLW CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS
III-1
Applicability Across the Range of Military Operations
III-1
Core Capabilities
III-2
Limitations
III-3
CHAPTER IV
TRAINING
IV-1
Fundamental Concepts and Training Requirements
IV-1
Training of Instructors
IV-1
Nonlethal Training Topics for Deploying Units
IV-1
Leader Training
IV-2
Unit Training
IV-3
Training Disclaimer
IV-3
Additional Training
IV-3
Summary
IV-4
CHAPTER V
EMPLOYMENT
V-1
Background
V-1
Mission Planning Factors
V-1
NLW Tasks
V-2
Staff Planning/Responsibilities
V-16
Tactics
V-17
Employment Objectives
V-20
Rules of Engagement
V-21
CHAPTER VI
LESSONS LEARNED
VI-1
Background
VI-1
Lessons Learned
VI-1
Employment
VI-2
Publicity and Media
VI-3
Capabilities and Impact on Mission Accomplishment
VI-3
Knowing Your Adversary
VI-4
Summary
VI-5
APPENDIX A
DOD NONLETHAL WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT ITEM
DESCRIPTION
A-1
APPENDIX B
SUMMARY: SPECIALTY IMPACT MUNITIONS
B-1
APPENDIX C
INTERSERVICE NONLETHAL INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS
INSTRUCTOR COURSE
C-1
APPENDIX D
SAMPLE: UNIT TRAINING SCHEDULES/FIRING TABLES
D-1
APPENDIX E
NLW CAPABILITY SETS
E-1
REFERENCES
.........................................................................................References-1
GLOSSARY
.............................................................................................Glossary-1
INDEX
...................................................................................................Index-1
v
FIGURES
V-1. Nonlethal Weapons Ranges
V-21
V-2. Platoon in Depth
V-22
V-3. Platoon Recovery Team Deployment—Security
Element
V-23
V-4. Platoon Recovery Team Deployment—Recovery Team
V-24
V-5. Platoon Recovery Team Deployment—Recovery Team
Redeploy
V-25
V-6. Platoon Recovery Team Deployment—Security
Element Redeploy
V-26
V-7. Platoon On Line—Munitions Squad in Close Support to
Cover Flanks
V-26
V-8. Platoon Column
V-27
V-9. Platoon On Line
V-28
V-10. Platoon Lateral Support, Left (Right)
V-28
V-11. Two Platoons in Close Support
V-29
V-12. Recovery Team Deployment
V-29
V-13. Recovery Team Actions and Security Posture
V-30
V-14. Platoon in Column (USMC)
V-31
V-15. Platoon in General Support (USMC)
V-32
V-16. Platoon in Close Support (Start) (USMC)
V-33
V-17. Platoon in Close Support (Finish)
V-34
V-18. Deploying Soft Baseline
V-35
V-19. Deploying Escort Team (Start)
V-36
V-20. Deploying Escort Team (Finish)
V-37
V-21. Recovery of Downed Personnel or Stranded Vehicle
(Big Johnson)
V-38
A-1. Riot Face Shield
A-1
A-2. Riot Body Shield
A-1
A-3. Riot Shin Guard
A-2
A-4. Expandable Riot Baton (with holster)
A-2
A-5. Portable Bullhorn
A-2
A-6. Disposable Handcuff
A-3
A-7. Training Disposable Handcuff
A-3
A-8. MK-4 Pepper Spray Pouch
A-3
A-9. MK-4 Individual Live OC Pepper Spray
A-3
A-10. MK-9 Pepper Spray Pouch
A-3
A-11. MK-9 Squad Live OC Pepper Spray
A-4
A-12. MK-46 Platoon Live (Horizontal) OC Pepper Spray
A-4
A-13. MK-46 Sling
A-4
A-14. MK-46 Hardware Kit
A-4
A-15. MK-46 Refill Live OC Pepper Spray
A-5
A-16. MK-4 Individual Inert OC Pepper Spray
A-5
vi
A-17. MK-9 Squad Inert OC Pepper Spray
A-5
A-18. MK-46 Platoon Inert OC Pepper Spray
A-5
A-19. MK-46 Refill Inert OC Pepper Spray
A-6
A-20. FIST Training Suit
A-6
A-21. Riot Training Strike Bag
A-6
A-22. Caltrop
A-6
A-23. Road Side Spike Strip
A-7
A-24. High-Intensity Search Light
A-7
A-25. Individual Light Holster (6P)
A-7
A-26. 6P Individual Light
A-7
A-27. 6P Individual Light Accessory Kit
A-8
A-28. 3V Lithium Batteries
A-8
A-29. 12-Gauge Buttstock Cuff
A-8
A-30. 12-Gauge Utility Pouch
A-8
A-31. 40-mm Carrying Pouch
A-8
A-32. Diversionary/Rubber Ball Grenade Pouch
A-9
A-33. 12-Gauge Mossberg 500A2/590 Shotgun
A-9
A-34. 12-Gauge M870 (modified) Version 2 (USCG)
A-9
A-35. Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG) Reflex
Sight (USCG)
A-9
A-36. ACOG Reflex Sight (USCG)
A-10
A-37. Crowd Dispersal Cartridge
A-10
A-38. Soldier Employing CDC with M203
A-10
A-39. PVAB in Action (Far View)
A-11
A-40. PVAB in Action Near View
A-11
A-41. Modified Crowd Control Munition-Ground Emplaced
(MCCM-GE)
A-11
A-42. MCCM-GE Range Chart
A-12
A-43. 66-mm Vehicle Mounted Nonlethal Grenade Launcher
(VMNLGL)
A-13
A-44. VMNLGL Range Chart
A-13
A-45. Running Gear Entanglement System (RGES)
A-14
A-46. RGES Surface Delivery System
A-14
A-47. RGES Barrier Employment
A-15
A-48. RGES Aerial Delivery System (ADS)
A-15
A-49. RGES Aerial Delivery System (ADS)
A-16
A-50. Warp Cutter
A-17
B-1. 12-Gauge Launch Cartridge
B-1
B-2. 12-Gauge Bean Bag Cartridge
B-2
B-3. 12-Gauge Rubber Fin Stabilized Cartridge
B-3
B-4. 40-mm Foam Rubber Baton Cartridge
B-4
B-5. 40-mm Rubber Ball Cartridge
B-5
B-6. Rubber Ball Grenade
B-6
vii
B-7. Practice Grenade Body
B-7
B-8. Practice Grenade Fuze
B-8
B-9. Nonlethal Grenade Launch Cup
B-9
B-10. Diversionary Charge, MK 141, MOD 0
B-10
B-11. Cartridge, 12-Gauge Rubber Sting Ball™
B-11
B-12. Cartridge, 12-Gauge Sting Ball™ High Velocity
B-12
B-13. M1006, 40-mm Nonlethal Cartridge (Sponge Grenade)
B-13
B-14. M1012, 12-Gauge Shotgun: Nonlethal, Point Control
Cartridge
B-14
B-15. M1013, 12-Gauge Shotgun: Nonlethal, Crowd
Dispersal Cartridge
B-15
B-16. M1029, 40-mm Nonlethal Crowd Dispersal Grenade
B-16
B-17. L96A1, Grenade, Discharger: Antiriot, Irritant, CS
B-17
B-18. L97A1, Grenade, Discharger: Antiriot, Practice
B-18
B-19. Grenade, Launcher: Nonlethal, Distraction, M98
B-19
B-20. M99, Grenade, Launcher: Nonlethal, Blunt Trauma
B-20
Tables
V-1. Crowd Control
V-4
V-2. Incapacitate Personnel
V-6
V-3. Deny Area to Personnel
V-7
V-4. Deny Area to Vehicles
V-9
V-5. Deny/Neutralize Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels, and
Facilities
V-10
V-6. Seize Personnel
V-12
V-7. Clear Facilities of Personnel
V-13
C-1. Required Equipment For INIWIC
C-2
C-2. INIWIC Class V Requirements
C-4
C-3. INIWIC Curriculum
C-4
D-1. NLW Training Course 5-Day Training Schedule
D-12
D-2. NLW Training Course 10-Day Training Schedule
D-13
E-1 U.S. Army Nonlethal Capability Set (Version FY 2001)
E-1
E-2 U.S. Marine Corps FY02 Company-Size Nonlethal
Capability Set
E-2
E-3 USMC FY02 NLW Capability Set—Platoon Size
E-3
E-4. Notional USN NLW Capability Set
E-4
E-5. Notional USN Capability Set
E-5
E-6. USAF NLW Capability Set
E-6
E-5. Notional USCG NLW Capability Set
E-7
viii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Tactical Employment of
Nonlethal Weapons (NLW)
Today’s world events mandate a need to project nonlethal force across all levels of war
to enable our warfighters and leaders to effectively deal with a host of traditional as well as
nontraditional threats. Now more than ever, the minimal level of tolerance for collateral
damage and loss of human life, coupled with the tendency for the typical adversary to ex-
ploit the rules of engagement (ROE) to his benefit, necessitates an effective and flexible ap-
plication of force through nonlethal weapons. Much like a rheostat switch in which power
can be dialed up or down as desired, NLW provide tools to allow a commander to employ
sufficient force to accomplish an objective without requiring the destruction of an enemy or
the habitat. The intent of employing NLW is not to add another step in the progression of
escalation with an adversary, but to add another tool to use anywhere along that contin-
uum. This publication provides initial guidance for employing NLW in a tactical environ-
ment.
Overview of NLW
Chapter I describes the background, definition, and the concept description of NLW.
This chapter discusses the development and employment of NLW, and explains the rela-
tionship of NLW to deadly force capabilities. The final portion of the chapter reviews policy
per Office of Secretary of Defense instructions on employing NLW.
Purpose, System Description, and Organization
Chapter II describes the purpose of NLW and gives a general description of currently
available commercial or government off-the-shelf equipment and munitions. The chapter
also addresses organization structure, to include system location/distribution, personnel
requirements, and mission requirements/tactical structure.
New Capability Requirements
Chapter III describes the applicability of NLW across the range of military operations.
Additionally, this chapter discusses the core capabilities as stated in the Joint Mission Area
Analysis (JMAA) as described in the Department of Defense Joint Concept for NLW.
Training With the NLW Capability Set
Chapter IV describes training requirements, topics, methods, locations, and a program
of instruction from the Interservice Nonlethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course cur-
rently available for NLW options. This chapter also addresses additional training available
from civilian law enforcement agencies.
ix
Employment of NLW Capabilities
Chapter V establishes the fundamental understanding of the force continuum needed to
employ NLW. It outlines employment prerequisites, mission-planning factors, and person-
nel requirements needed to employ NLW options. It further delineates NLW tasks accord-
ing to the JMAA and provides considerations for preparation for unit tactical operations.
This chapter also discusses employment objectives for NLW and ROE development. This
chapter ends with multiple examples of service-specific crowd control formations used by
units equipped with NLW.
Lessons Learned
Chapter VI focuses on NLW lessons learned from recent military operations. The chap-
ter discusses how nonlethal technology has changed the way forces are looking at their ad-
versaries in using NLW. It also covers the use of NLW along the force continuum in con-
junction with ROE and the media.
x
PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
The following commands and agencies participated in developing this publication:
Joint
U.S. Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, VA
U.S. European Command, J3/J5, APO AE
U.S. Pacific Command, J3832, Camp H. M. Smith, HI
U.S. Central Command, J3, MacDill AFB, FL
U.S. Southern Command, SCJ5-PS, Miami, FL
U.S. Space Command, SPJ5X, Peterson AFB, CO
U.S. Special Operations Command, HQ USSOCOM, SOOP-PTE, MacDill AFB, FL
Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate, Quantico, VA
Interservice Nonlethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course, Fort Leonard Wood, MO
Army
Headquarters, Department of the Army, ODCSOPS (DAMO-FDT), Pentagon, Washington,
D.C.
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, DCSDCS (ATDO-A), Fort Monroe, VA
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, DCSDEV (ATCD-SN), Fort Monroe, VA
U.S. Army Infantry Center, DCD, Fort Benning, GA
U.S. Army Military Police School, ATTN: DOTD, MANSCEN (ATZT-DT-WM-M), Fort Leo-
nard Wood, MO
USAJFKSWCS, DOTD, Fort Bragg, NC
National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, VA
Marine Corps
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA
MARCORSYSCOM, Quantico, VA
USMC Warfighting Lab, Quantico, VA
MCSFT Company, MCSF Battalion, Chesapeake, VA
2d FAST MCSF Battalion, Yorktown, VA
1st MARDIV Military Police Company, HQ Battalion, Camp Pendleton, CA
Marine Corps Detachment Military Police and Chemical School, Fort Leonard Wood, MO
Special Operations Training Group, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA
Special Operations Training Group, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC
Navy
Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), Newport, RI
USN Surface Warfare Center, Crane, IN
USN Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
Air Force
AFDC/DJ, Langley AFB, VA
Headquarters, ACC/SFOT, Langley AFB, VA
Air Force Security Forces Center/SFOR, Lackland, AFB, TX
Headquarters, USAF/XOF, Washington, D.C.
Coast Guard
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, (G-OPL-2), Washington, D.C.
xi
Chapter I
Overview of Nonlethal Weapons
1. Background
a. In today’s operational environment, United States (U.S.) forces regularly perform
missions that were almost inconceivable a few decades ago. In this new environment,
lethal firepower or the threat of its use may no longer be the default solution to all crises or
problems. Senior leaders face a new level of public and media sensitivity and scrutiny
concerning the proper role of the military as an instrument of national power. Field
commanders must understand these sensitivities and attempt to achieve an appropriate
military force. Junior leaders must apply the resulting decisions wisely, often in changing
situations filled with uncertainty and danger.
b. Throughout history, changes in culture and technology have influenced the
character of military force and the manner in which it is employed. These changes are an
attempt to maximize military force in the force continuum. In the complex and changing
political and social domain of the modern world, nonlethal capabilities may offer the
opportunity to increase or maximize the military as an instrument of national power.
c. Nonlethal weapons (NLW) must now be considered an integral part of joint
operational capabilities. Joint forces anticipate that NLW technology will advance and
provide additional options for force commanders.
2. Definition
a. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.3, Policy for Nonlethal Weapons, 9
July 1996, defines NLW as “weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so
as to incapacitate personnel or materiel while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to
personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.” Furthermore, “unlike
conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets principally through blast,
penetration, and fragmentation, nonlethal weapons employ means other than gross
physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning. Nonlethal weapons are
intended to have relatively reversible effects on personnel and materiel.”
b. The term “nonlethal” does not mean zero mortality or nonpermanent damage; these
are goals and not guarantees of these weapons. NLW can add flexibility to combat
operations and enhance force protection by providing an environment in which friendly
troops can engage threatening targets with reduced risk of noncombatant casualties and
collateral damage.
3. Concept Description
Nonlethal capabilities within the context of the service capability sets (see Appendix E)
may provide armed forces additional offensive and defensive tools to assist in the incapaci-
tation and destruction of an enemy, capture of important intelligence sources, crowd con-
trol, civil disturbances, enforcing mandates, and force protection in accordance with the
specified rules of engagement (ROE) for a specific operation. These operations include
small-scale contingencies (SSC), military operations other than war (MOOTW), stability
and support operations (SASO), and civil disturbances. The U.S. Army’s Task Force (TF)
FALCON in Kosovo and U.S. armed forces located at Camp X-RAY in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba are superb examples of the use of NLW to prevent escalation within an operation.
I-1
5. Relationship of NLW to Deadly Force
a. NLW provide “the lesser means” that could be considered prior to employing deadly
force. The services definition of deadly force is as follows:
(1) U.S. Army - “Force that a person uses causing, or that a person knows, or
should know, will create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.” (Army
Regulation (AR) 190-14, Military Police Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law
Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993).
(2) USMC - “That force which a person uses with the purpose of causing death or
serious bodily harm or which a reasonable and prudent person would consider likely to
create substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. It will be used as a last
resort when all lesser means have failed.” Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5500.6F, Arming of
Security and Law Enforcement Personnel and the Use of Force, 20 July 1995.
(3) USN - “Force that a person uses causing, or that a person knows or should
know would create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.” Secretary of
The Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5500.29B, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of
Firearms by Personnel of the Department of the Navy in Conjunction with Law
Enforcement, Security Duties and Personal Protection, 29 September 1992.
(4) USAF - “Force that causes, or that you know has a substantial risk of causing
death or serious bodily harm.” Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-207, Arming and Use of Force
by Air Force Personnel, 1 September 1999.
(5) USCG - “Deadly force is any force that is likely to cause death or other serious
physical injury.” (COMDTINST M16247.1B, Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, 9 August
2001.)
b. The commitment of military power to resolve crises has traditionally involved the
use of deadly force or the implicit or explicit threat of the use of deadly force. Military units
are trained, organized, and equipped for this purpose. A force armed only with traditional
military weapons normally has two options for enforcing compliance: threating deadly force
and applying deadly force. This limitation creates a critical vulnerability that belligerents
may quickly discern and use to their advantage.
c. Nonlethal capabilities provide a wider range of options that augment, but do not
replace traditional means of deadly force. The option to resort to deadly force must always
remain available when the commander believes it is appropriate to the mission. DODD
3000.3, states "the availability of NLW shall not limit a commander's inherent authority
and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in
self-defense.” The existence of nonlethal capabilities does not represent the potential for
“nonlethal war,” and unrealistic expectations to that effect must be vigorously avoided.
Noncombatant casualties, to include serious injuries and fatalities, are often an
unavoidable outcome when employing military power, regardless of NLW availability.
Augmenting deadly force with NLW should be fundamental to planning and executing any
operation where the commander is contemplating deadly force.
d. The commander must clearly articulate the roles of NLW within the ROE. NLW is
an additional means of employing force throughout the force continuum for the particular
purpose of reducing the probability of death or serious injury to noncombatants or
belligerents. Using deadly force must always remain an inherent right of individuals in
instances when they, their fellow servicemen, or personnel in their charge are threatened
with death or serious bodily harm. NLW add flexibility to combat operations and enhance
force protection by providing the field commander with options to engage threatening
targets with limited risk of noncombatant casualties and collateral damage.
I-3
e. Commanders and public affairs officers (PAO) must prepare personnel to address
media questions and concerns regarding the role of NLW. Operational experience indicates
that new capabilities give rise to significant media interest. Personnel participating in
interviews or briefings must be prepared to address the role of NLW. It must be clear that
the presence of NLW in no way indicates abandoning the option to employ deadly force in
appropriate circumstances.
6. Advantages of Employing NLW
NLW provide commanders the flexibility to influence the situation favorably with in-
creased safety to friendly forces and reduced risk of both noncombatant fatalities and col-
lateral damage. Some advantages follow:
a. NLW can be more humane and consistent with the political and social implications
implicit in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.
b. The force that properly employs nonlethal options can gain advantages over those
who rely on lethal options alone. Because the degree of provocation required to employ
NLW is substantially less than lethal options, the force can take a more proactive position
that may diminish the likelihood of having a situation escalate to a point where deadly
force is required to resolve a conflict.
c. NLW options can be less likely to provoke others. However, commanders should be
cautioned using NLW does not preclude an undesired result.
d. Demonstrated restraint can greatly diminish feelings of anger and remorse when
deadly force is required after nonlethal options fail.
e. Using NLW can facilitate post incident stabilization by reducing populace alienation
and collateral damage.
f. NLW can reduce the possibility of injury to friendly forces compared to forces
without NLW.
7. Policy Per Office of the Secretary of Defense Instructions on Employment of
NLW
a. DODD 3000.3 states, “nonlethal weapons, doctrine, and concepts of operation shall
be designed to reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options available to
commanders. Nonlethal weapons should enhance the capability of U.S. Forces to
accomplish the following objectives:
(1) Discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions.
(2) Limit escalation.
(3) Take military action in situations where use of lethal force is not the preferred
option.
(4) Better protect our forces.
(5) Temporarily disable equipment, facilities, and personnel.
(6) Nonlethal weapons should also be designed to help decrease the post-conflict
costs of reconstruction.”
b. DODD 3000.3 continues by stating, “The availability of nonlethal weapons shall not
limit a commander’s inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available
and to take all appropriate action in self-defense. Neither the presence nor the potential
effect of nonlethal weapons shall constitute an obligation for their employment or a higher
I-4
standard for employment of force than provided for by applicable law. In all cases, the
United States retains the option for immediate use of lethal weapons, when appropriate,
consistent with international law.”
c. DODD 3000.3 further states, “Nonlethal weapons shall not be required to have a
zero probability of producing fatalities or permanent injuries. However, while complete
avoidance of these effects is not guaranteed or expected, when properly employed, nonlethal
weapons should significantly reduce them as compared with physically destroying the same
target.” Nonlethal weapons may be used in conjunction with lethal weapon systems to
enhance the latter’s effectiveness and efficiency in military operations. This shall apply
across the range of military operations to include those situations where overwhelming
force is employed.”
d. According to paragraph 3.21 of the Interium Guidance issued by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, 30 October 2002, all developmental weapon systems must be
submitted for legal review and must receive favorable findings before they can be
incorporated into the force. This review includes examination for consistency with
applicable international and domestic laws, including the laws of war, various arms control
treaties, and protocols. U.S. forces can be assured that any NLW they are issued have
passed this critical test. Medical and policy reviews should also be considered prior to
fielding any new weapon systems. Commanders and operators should consult their specific
ROE for guidance.
e. Some capabilities, although designed to minimize fatalities and serious injuries, may
have effects that could actually discourage their use. Therefore, the basic decision to
employ military force in defense of national interests is usually a matter of intense public
concern. The manner in which that force is exercised is subjected to the same scrutiny.
f. The presence of NLW on the battlefield does not mean they must be used. It also
does not mean they must be used prior to the use of lethal force. In all cases, the U.S.
retains the option for immediate use of lethal weapons when the on-scene commander
deems it appropriate. Additionally, the immediate use of lethal weapons must be consistent
with U.S. and international law and the ROE.
I-5
Chapter II
PURPOSE, SYSTEM DESCRIPTION, AND ORGANIZATION
1. Purpose
The purpose of NLW is to enhance the ability of military commanders to conduct opera-
tions across the spectrum of conflict. Over the past several years, military operations have
gravitated towards the lower end of this spectrum and have involved U.S. forces in various
missions. These missions include SSC, SASO, MOOTW, and civil disturbances where the
ROE are inherently restrictive. NLW are designed to address the special requirements of
low-intensity environments. They provide tools that enable the individual, team, or unit, to
anticipate and/or respond to provocation with more appropriate means than through the
use of deadly force. Essentially, NLW provide U.S. forces with a near-term capability for
effectively controlling the nontraditional battlefield, within the constraints levied by ROE,
by reducing the risk to friendly forces, mitigating casualties, and minimizing collateral
damage.
2. System Description
a. NLW Capability Set. The services have, and are continuing to procure, versatile
packages of NLW comprised of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and government off-the-
shelf (GOTS) equipment and munitions. The government is also exploring advanced
technologies for future procurements. In addition to addressing contingency requirements,
the services’ NLW capability sets provide limited sustainment training ammunition and
equipment.
b. NLW Capability Set—Component Categories. Each service determines the contents
of its own capability set. Examples of the services current configurations are shown in
Appendix E. The NLW capability set components can be divided into four distinct
categories: personnel protectors, personnel effectors, mission enhancers, and training
devices. The following examples are not all-inclusive.
(1) Personnel Protectors. Personnel protectors include items such as face shields,
riot shields, and shin guards that protect the individual from blunt trauma injuries
inflicted by thrown objects, clubs, etc.
(2) Personnel Effectors. Personnel effectors include items such as riot batons,
malodorants, stingball grenades, pepper sprays, and other kinetic rounds (e.g. sponge
grenades) designed to discourage, disorient, or incapacitate individuals or groups.
(3) Mission Enhancers. Mission enhancers include items such as bullhorns,
spotlights, caltrops, isotropic radiators (stun/flash), and barriers/entanglers. These items
are designed to facilitate target identification and crowd control, and to limit personnel and
vehicular movement.
(4) Training Devices. Training devices include items such as training suits,
training rounds, training batons, and inert pepper sprays. They are designed to facilitate
realistic hands-on scenario training in preparation for operations.
c. System Relationships and Inter/Intraoperability. The NLW capability set is
designed to provide an operating force (ranging from squad through battalion-sized units
[see Appendix E]) with tactically deployable nonlethal equipment. Fielding of this
capability set enhances the operation of systems and equipment already fielded and
planned within the joint community. The NLW capability set components are compatible
with military equipment that is already fielded or planned for future fielding. The
II-1
components of the NLW capability set are supported within current military logistic
capabilities.
d. Augmentation of Organic Equipment. The operational intent of the capability set is
to augment an operating force with the required nonlethal equipment to enhance its force
projection capability. The NLW capability set is additional equipment that must be
incorporated into lift and load planning.
3. Organization
Organization/organizational structure is not anticipated to change as a result of NLW
capability sets being added to the inventory.
a. System Location/Distribution. The United States Army (USA), United States
Marine Corps (USMC), and United States Navy (USN) have procured and fielded capability
sets to the operating forces, security forces, bases, and stations. All services have current
plans to field additional capability sets as required. At the time of this printing, the United
States Air Force (USAF) has identified its capability sets to field in the near future. The
United States Coast Guard (USCG) also intends to field NLW.
b. NLW Capability Set Composition. Appendix E describes the current and proposed
capability sets.
c. Personnel Requirements. To date, no change or increase in military specialty codes
have been determined in order to field, operate, and maintain the NLW capability set.
Each service determines its own training personnel requirements.
d. Mission Requirements/Tactical Structure.
(1) The mission requirements and tactical structure pertinent to the employment
of the NLW will vary depending on the type of contingency and subsequent task
organization of the employing unit. Mission requirements, derived from commander's
guidance, should be satisfied through the appropriate combination of lethal and nonlethal
capabilities.
(2) NLW provide commanders with a means of shaping their area of operations
(AO) short of employing deadly force. However, it is imperative that U.S. forces retain the
means and ability to employ lethal force in the event that nonlethal force fails to achieve
desired outcomes. For example, NLW employment may provoke a lethal response from the
adversary. Without the imminent threat of lethal force, nonlethal munitions will prove to
be less effective and possibly even counterproductive. More importantly, denying U.S.
forces a lethal capability would place them at unacceptable risk. If nonlethal force is
employed without the threat of lethal force, the belligerent may opt to exploit a perceived
vulnerability. In this case, the use of NLW becomes counterproductive, because it serves
only to aggravate the threat and causes the situation to deteriorate.
II-2
Chapter III
NLW CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS
1. Applicability Across the Range of Military Operations
a. U.S. forces conduct military operations across a large spectrum. This spectrum
spans from humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping to strategic nuclear exchange. Since
the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has been increasingly involved with operations at
the lower end of the spectrum. These operations focus on deterring war, resolving conflict,
supporting civil authorities and promoting peace. NLW may be useful across many
categories of these operations. The range of military operations includes various levels of
combat “intensity,” and NLW provide one more force option to deal with the varying
intensity. MOOTW may be found across the range of military operations and often include
situations where noncombatants are mingled with the adversaries or involved in acts of
violence, such as rioting or looting. In such circumstances, NLW provide commanders the
flexibility to influence the situation favorably with reduced risk of noncombatant fatalities
and collateral damage. NLW also provide a means by which to ascertain the intent of
individuals/belligerents. Some characteristics of operations that present the opportunity to
use NLW are—
(1) Close contact between friendly forces and noncombatant civilians.
(2) The presence of paramilitary or irregular forces.
(3) Armed civilian gangs, unlawful combatants, or militia.
b. These characteristics present a real but ill-defined threat. Under such
circumstances, the commander’s judgment or ROE may restrict using deadly force for other
than self-defense. NLW may provide U.S. forces flexibility to resolve situations where the
use of deadly force is restricted. These weapons provide flexibility by—
(1) Allowing U.S. forces to apply measured military force.
(2) Reducing risk of serious noncombatant causalities.
(3) Accomplishing the mission.
(4) Providing force protection.
(5) Retaining the initiative.
(6) Allowing U.S. forces to remain relevant and capable in increasingly complex
and chaotic environments.
c. The need to reduce the risks of serious injury to personnel is not limited to crowd
control scenarios. In MOUT, some of the local civilian populace may remain in an urban
area in the midst of battle. The traditional solution to such challenges has been restricting
ROE. Nonlethal capabilities may provide commanders the flexibility to adapt a fluid
approach to MOUT, which allows their subordinates the freedom of action to employ
appropriate levels of measured military force to accomplish their mission.
d. Another example of NLW applications in MOOTW is in peace enforcement. In these
operations, NLW are used in an area denial role to separate belligerents without resorting
to deadly force. They are also used to support humanitarian relief organizations in
protecting food and medical distribution sites. The presence of NLW will not limit a
commander’s inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to
take appropriate action in self-defense.
III-1
2. Core Capabilities
Core capabilities are those fundamental competencies that enable U.S. forces to achieve
desired operational objectives. NLW provide a flexible means to protect friendly forces,
high-value assets, and influence the actions of potential adversaries and/or noncombatants.
These goals can be achieved without resorting to lethal force and in a manner that may
minimize collateral damage. The core capabilities associated with nonlethal effects fall into
three major categories as stated within the Joint Mission Area Analysis (JMAA) for
Nonlethal Weapons (approved December 2000 by the Joint Requirements Oversight Coun-
cil): counterpersonnel, countermateriel, and countercapability.
a. Counterpersonnel Capabilities. The DOD Joint Concept for Nonlethal Weapons
concept paper, 5 January 1998, describes required nonlethal counterpersonnel capabilities
for U.S. forces as follows:
(1) “The application of military force to accomplish a mission with reduced risk of
fatalities or serious casualties among noncombatants—or even, in some instances, among
enemy forces.” There are several specific nonlethal counterpersonnel capabilities to be
considered. These include, but are not limited to, the means to influence the behavior and
activities of a potentially hostile crowd and the capability to bring a mob engaged in a riot
under control. While there are many similarities in these two capabilities, each involves
unique challenges, which may require radically different solutions.
(2) “Capability to incapacitate personnel.” For the purposes of this document,
“incapacitation” is achieved when the weapon’s effects render personnel unable to
physically or mentally (real or perceived) act in a hostile or threatening manner. In
keeping with the guiding principles for NLW, this incapacitation should be reversible
through the passage of time. The focus will be on capabilities that affect both individuals
and groups of people.
(3) “Capability to deny personnel access to an area (land, sea, or air).” NLW can
provide new possibilities for barrier planning in any type of military operation, including
systems that produce physical or mental discomfort to those who enter the denied area.
(4) “Capability to clear facilities and structures of personnel.” The Joint Concept
for NLW states this capability “will facilitate MOUT by reducing the risks of noncombatant
casualties and collateral damage while simultaneously minimizing the advantages accruing
to an enemy defending a built up area.” This capability is applicable to all clearing
missions that may be conducted (e.g., Maritime Interception Operations [MIO]) and could
assist in providing enhanced force protection.
(5) “Capability to seize personnel, which could include some combination of
technologies inherent in other core capabilities, for example, incapacitation and entangling
devices (which may aid in seizing personnel).” This capability is intended to augment lethal
means used to capture specified individuals, such as enemy combatants or persons who are
inciting a mob or crowd to violence.
b. Countermateriel Capabilities. The Joint Concept for Nonlethal Weapons describes
countermateriel capabilities as follows:
(1) Rendering equipment and facilities unusable without complete destruction by
attacking only weapons of war and supporting infrastructure while minimizing risk to
noncombatants. This could enhance operations by defusing potentially volatile situations
where conventional military means might otherwise prove counterproductive.
(2) Disabling or denying the use of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft entry into
targeted areas or access within an AO. This capability may include physical barriers that
impede or stop movement. Alternative systems may alter combustion properties of fuels
III-2
and viscosity of lubricants, embrittle or decay materials, attack tires, gaskets, or hoses, or
act as adhesives to fuse metal parts. The requirement also includes the capability to
facilitate boarding and clearing operations.
c. Counter Capability Capabilities. For U.S. forces counter capability capabilities are
described within the JMAA for NLW as follows:
(1) “Disable or neutralize facilities and systems.” This includes a nonlethal
capability for disabling/neutralizing electrical generating facilities, command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
systems, Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), weapons systems, optical sensors,
electrical sensors, and navigation capabilities with such controlled effects as to allow for
selective, precise engagement. Other needs include deceiving reconnaissance with illusions
of barriers, obstacles, and/or forces, and concealing/covering friendly activities or
movements, particularly within complex urban terrain.
(2) “Deny the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).” Mission needs include
rendering a WMD inoperative; containing the potential release of deadly
agents/contaminants; and preventing or neutralizing the production, storage, deployment
(transport), employment, and delivery of WMD. Nonlethal capabilities in combating WMD
should be designed to permit engagement within a populated or sensitive terrain, prior to
the initiation of armed conflict.
3. Limitations
The limitations of NLW are effectiveness, perception, and legality.
a. The effectiveness of NLW is dependent on factors such as motivation, age,
environmental and human factors, range of engagement, and numerous others. NLW can
be lethal if improperly applied. Furthermore, countermeasures for thwarting virtually all
nonlethal options are usually apparent, quickly learned, and readily available. Because
they are not intended to kill, nonlethal options teach adversaries what to avoid in the
future. Small unit commanders must prepare to keep one step ahead of belligerents.
b. The perceptual limitation is that personnel may misunderstand the appropriate
applications of NLW across the range of military operations. The incorrect perception that
NLW will allow wars and MOOTW to be prosecuted without casualties may lead to
conflicting expectations between political and military leaders. These conflicts can result in
U.S. forces being vulnerable to misplaced or inconsistent ROE. All leaders, political and
military, involved in planning and executing military missions must understand there are
no “nonlethal operations.”
c. Some proposed NLW might be forbidden by law or policy. Accordingly, it is essential
that all NLW developments be evaluated by appropriate authorities to ensure they comply
with the law of war, U.S. law, and U.S. treaty obligations. Use of NLW containing chemical
agents, for instance, must be evaluated in the context of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Also, using RCA in an armed conflict requires Presidential approval.
III-3
Chapter IV
TRAINING
1. Fundamental Concepts and Training Requirements
The successful accomplishment of any operation in which nonlethal measures are em-
ployed requires extensive preparation, of which individual, unit, medical support, and unit
training are vital parts. Training should be designed to give individuals an understanding
of the entire subject area and enable them to function efficiently as members of a unit. This
training must be intensive and realistic. Training with the NLW capability set, and other
NLW, is critical to employ these weapons with confidence. The training flow should be—
train leaders, train instructors, train unit, exercise. Qualified instructors should conduct
initial unit training. Unit sustainment training should be conducted per individual service
and unit requirements.
2. Training of Instructors
a. Verbal communication skills, open-hand control techniques, RCA, effects of impact
weapons, and civil disturbance tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are areas trained
to standard at the Interservice Nonlethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course (INIWIC)
held at the Marine Corps Detachment, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. INIWIC is an
Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO) course, and quotas are available to any
service through normal training reservation channels. A course outline is provided in
Appendix C. This is the only formal DOD NLW instructor-training course. The training
requirements outlined in the INIWIC represent the minimum training standards to include
in developing NLW and tactics instructors. Additionally, the United States Army Military
Police School (USAMPS) has developed a training support package that includes Army-
specific TTP for small units (company level and below) in using NLW capabilities. The
reference for this is the U.S. Army’s website at: www.wood.army.mil.
b. The INIWIC is a “train-the-trainer” program to provide commanders NLW
instructors within their command. Furthermore, the military services are not precluded
from developing their own training based upon the INIWIC curriculum. The commander
can then tailor the NLW instruction to fit mission needs. Establishing the service-level
INIWIC serves as an assurance measure, giving the commander a quantifiable means of
certifying his nonlethal instructors.
3. Nonlethal Training Topics for Deploying Units
Each service and unit will have unique training requirements based on mission type,
unit size, deployment area, etc. As a minimum, the training instructor should cover the fol-
lowing topics in any training for units deploying with nonlethal capabilities. They are part
of the INIWIC curriculum.
NOTE: U.S. Army training standards are contained in Army Regulation (AR) 350-
38, Training Devices Policies and Management, 15 October 1993; USMC
training standards for NLW are contained in MCO 1510.112, Individual
Training Standards for Nonlethal Weapons, 27 May 1998.
a. Force Continuum. This is an introduction to the federal force continuum model as
outlined by MCO 5500.6F, Arming of Law Enforcement and Security Personnel and the Use
IV-1
of Deadly Force; AR 190-14; AFI 31-207, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel (1
September 1999) (or other service orders). Identifying the proper levels of force,
understanding levels of resistance, and how nonlethal technologies affect the force
continuum are the minimum topics the instructor should cover.
b. Crowd Dynamics/Crowd Control. This is an introduction to the differences between
crowds, mobs, and riots. This course teaches the student basic crowd control techniques
that will be easily applied to various situations. The student should be familiarized with
tactics and techniques found in field manual (FM) 19-15, MCWP 3-11.1, Rifle Company, TC
90-1, and Air Force manual (AFMAN) 31-201V6, Civil Disturbance (1 April 2002), but will
also consider nontraditional and small unit application.
c. Communication Skills. This is an introduction to the stages of conflict management,
verbal aggression, nonverbal communication, physical aggression, physiological diversions,
and proper mental conditioning. The first NLW skill an individual must have is the ability
to communicate. General A. M. Gray, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, once said,
“A warrior’s most formidable weapon is his mind.” The results of an individual’s mental
processes are evident through actions and words, and the words and communication skills
used in dealing with people are truly the first line of nonlethal options.
d. Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Aerosol and other RCA Training. This is an introduction
to the uses of OC/pepper spray and other RCA. The student should have an appreciation
for decontamination requirements, storage, and shelf life of OC/RCA. The instructor will
also teach legal and tactical considerations. INIWIC certified instructors should teach
existing training programs that include live agent training.
e. Open-Hand Control. This is an introduction to pressure point control techniques,
unarmed self-defense measures, weapon retention techniques, and other
submission/restraint/search techniques. The instructor should cover handcuffing/flex-
cuffing for contact team members.
NOTE: USMC plans to replace the current open-hand defensive tactics training
with the USMC Martial Arts Program.
f. Impact Weapons. This is an introduction to using the rigid straight baton,
collapsible straight batons, side handle batons, and/or riot control batons.
g. ROE/Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). This is an introduction to the ROE/LOAC and
their relationship. (Refer to DODD 5100.77, AR 27-1, and NWP 1-14M).
h. Nonlethal Munitions—Employment and Tactics. This subcourse is an introduction
to the capabilities and employment of available NLW. NLW provide additional unit force
protection capabilities. Introduction to tactics is outlined in Chapter 5. Appendix D is a
sample unit training schedule covering the topics listed above. U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has developed training support packages that will include
company level and below TTP.
4. Leader Training
a. An understanding of the topics covered in the INIWIC curriculum is essential.
However, commanders/leaders should also possess an in-depth understanding of the ROE,
their implementation, as well as the politics, culture, and demographics of the area to
which they are deploying.
b. Commanders should involve their medical personnel, public affairs (PA)
representatives, civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), staff judge advocate
IV-2
(SJA), engineers, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and military police (MP) in training
exercises when possible. Involvement by these special staff sections will greatly enhance
the quality and realism of the training. Medical personnel will better understand OC
decontamination and the possible injuries they may encounter as a result of NLW
employment. Because of the international attention that NLW receive, all personnel will
benefit from media training by PA personnel. CA and PSYOP personnel can provide area-
specific cultural, ethnic, and political briefs to enhance awareness of the challenges within
the AO. SJA personnel can clarify complex ROE questions and assist in training on ROE-
related issues. Additionally, supply and logistic staff members also require training in
NLW maintenance and environmental issues unique to the equipment and munitions.
5. Unit Training
The INIWIC is primarily designed to produce instructors who will train individuals in
using and employing NLW. Collective unit tactical training is the unit’s responsibility;
however, a NLW sample schedule based on INIWIC training is provided in Appendix D.
Units should conduct collective training before deploying with NLW. Unit standard operat-
ing procedures (SOP) and tactics may require adjustment to enable the employment of
NLW and new equipment for the success of specific missions. All collective training should
include nonlethal options and decision making. Whenever NLW are employed during train-
ing, the instructor must also conduct lethal capability training. Troops must understand
the integration of nonlethal and lethal capabilities and always be prepared to protect them-
selves, as required, with lethal force. It is impossible to accurately predict the response of
an individual or crowd.
6. Training Disclaimer
Initial unit training should not be conducted without qualified instructors. Non-type
classified and COTS nonlethal munitions cannot be fired without Army Materiel Command
(AMC), Army Training Support Center (ATSC), Crane Naval Weapons Center, or Air Force
Munitions Center type classifying the ammunition. The instructor should conduct unit sus-
tainment training in accordance with (IAW) service guidelines.
7. Additional Training
a. Additional training is left to the discretion of the unit but should be encouraged in
order to add credibility to the training package. Some recommended training certifications
for instructors include, but are not limited to—
(1) Management of Aggressive Behavior (MOAB)
R.E.B. Training International, Inc.
PO Box 845, Stoddard, NH 03464
(2) Oleoresin Capsicum Aerosol Training (OCAT)
R.E.B. Training International, Inc.
PO Box 845, Stoddard, NH 03464
(3) Monadnock Defensive Tactics System (MDTS)
Training calendar available at the Monadnock website:
b. These courses add viable credentials to the instructors as perceived by civilian and
military alike. In addition, the instructor can issue certification cards for the area which an
individual has been certified. Certifications in various areas offers additional protection in
IV-3
the event of a lawsuit or claim against the government by ensuring the individuals that
have been trained within your unit are completely capable.
8. Summary
NLW and tactics training are not meant to be stand-alone training—units must antici-
pate the requirement for NLW in their missions and train accordingly. NLW provide com-
manders with a graduated response in the force continuum.
IV-4
Chapter V
EMPLOYMENT
1. Background
a. A military unit deployed to an area will normally conduct operations IAW current
doctrine. The environment may contain both noncombatants and combatants. Nonlethal
capabilities provide the military force with tools to engage adversaries and minimize
collateral damage. Fundamental to employing NLW is a thorough understanding of the
force continuum. As stated before, nonlethal capabilities provide a wider range of options
that augment traditional means of deadly force but do not replace them. Nonlethal
capabilities allow a commander the flexibility to increase and decrease the amount of force
applied to accomplish a mission. The force continuum is generally continuous and
seamless, yet a careful examination reveals five broad categories:
(1) Threats. The force continuum begins with threats. These can be either implied
or expressed. An implied threat may be manifested through presence by forming into riot-
control formations, fixing bayonets, or donning protective masks. An expressed threat
occurs when a commander makes known the consequences of defiance.
(2) Denial options. The equipment used in denial options are usually placed in
highly visible areas and often marked with placards. Examples include concertina,
caltrops, barbed wire, or other obstacles.
(3) Munitions that cause physical discomfort/incapacitate. Munitions that cause
physical discomfort, but fall short of inflicting trauma, include flash bangs, RCA—tear gas
(O-Chlorobenzyl-Malononitrile [CS]), and OC. Although the discomfort or injury may be
substantially less than impact munitions, employing these munitions requires an
appropriate use of force assessment. Factors such as training, discipline, prejudices,
emotions, and judgment all play a part in their application.
(4) Munitions that inflict blunt trauma. Munitions that inflict blunt trauma will
inflict painful or debilitating injuries. These munitions constitute the upper end of
nonlethal options within the force continuum. Examples include foam batons, stingball
grenades, beanbags, sponge projectiles, and rubber ball rounds.
(5) Lethal munitions. Lethal weapons are at the highest level of force continuum.
Lethal options should always be regarded as part of the force continuum and not as a
separate option altogether. ROE, along with judgment and experience, helps on-scene
commanders decide when using lethal force is authorized and appropriate.
b. Nonlethal capabilities include using existing systems that were not designed
specifically as NLW. Nonlethal capabilities can minimize fatalities, permanent injury to
personnel, and undesired damage to property, facilities, and the environment. Examples
include PSYOP, CA, military working dogs, and PA. However, this chapter limits
discussion primarily to using weapons and components explicitly designed as part of a NLW
capability set. This focus is not intended to limit the commander’s option to use whatever
means are available to accomplish the mission without unnecessary lethality.
2. Mission Planning Factors
Incorporating NLW into a plan does not change the fundamental principles of mission
planning. Commanders should use NLW as an operational enhancement. The first concern
of a commander is successfully completing the mission. ROE are a critical consideration in
the commander’s planning and guide him in determining the appropriate use of nonlethal
V-1
and lethal force. The availability of NLW does not relieve a force from its obligation to de-
fend itself. Therefore, it must be equipped and trained with both lethal and nonlethal
means.
3. NLW Tasks
a. NLW tasks were derived from the combatant commanders and service mission needs
statements and are codified in the JMAA for Nonlethal Weapons. These tasks are grouped
under three core capabilities: counterpersonnel, countermateriel, and countercapability.
(1) Counterpersonnel:
(a) Control crowds.
(b) Incapacitate personnel.
(c) Deny an area to personnel.
(d) Clear facilities/structures of personnel.
(2) Countermateriel:
(a) Deny an area to vehicles, vessels, and aircraft.
(b) Disable/neutralize vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment.
(3) Countercapability:
(a) Disable or neutralize facilities and systems.
(b) Deny use of WMD.
b. Although not all encompassing, the following list of employment considerations is
designed to assist commanders and staffs in formulating plans for use of NLW:
(1) General considerations:
(a) Understand and define ROE.
(b) Commander develops identification of friend or foe (IFF) procedures.
(c) Distribute NLW munitions to troops in advance.
(d) NLW options require lethal overwatch fire.
(e) Ensure area is well lighted to include perimeter.
(f) Employ night vision devices outside the perimeter to identify personnel.
(g) Utilize appropriate media to inform civilians to stay away from denied
areas.
(h) Enforce positive access control into perimeter (personnel/vehicles).
(i) Ensure posted signs are easily understood (symbols/pictures). If
interpreter support available, post warning signs in native language.
(j) Use entanglements such as caltrops, tanglefoot, barbed wire, and
concertina/razor tape as these disrupt/slow intrusion attempts.
(k) Employ sensors, if available.
(l) Employ aerial or naval pickets.
V-2
(2) Counterpersonnel considerations:
(a) Employing kinetic rounds at less than 15 feet/5 meters may result in
fatal outcomes.
(b) Target area at 15 to 40 feet should be center mass for blunt munitions.
(c) Head shots may be lethal.
(d) Kinetic rounds will not be skip fired.
(e) Kinetic rounds are effective against selected individual targets and can
be used to disperse individuals.
(f) Considering differing rates of fires; the M203 and shotgun are
complementary in a nonlethal role, depending upon the munitions used and their effective
ranges.
(g) Employ riot batons only after proper training.
(h) Use RCA to disrupt/disperse crowds.
(i) Use RCA markers (RCA with a nontoxic, water-soluble marking dye) to
mark agitators for future identification and apprehension.
(j) RCA greatly reduce visibility of control force.
(k) Closely control the employment of RCA.
(l) Disperse RCA to face and eyes for full effect.
(m) Employ optics with designated marksmen to identify mob leaders.
(n) Searchlights dazzle/disorient individuals (night only).
(o) Use bullhorn for communicating with crowd and to control formations.
(p) Employ recovery/apprehension/snatch teams to apprehend agitators.
(q) Use flex cuffs for agitators.
(r) Prepare disposition plan for cleared personnel.
(s) Isolate area to prevent reinforcements.
(t) Consider future friendly use of cleared facility.
(u) Prepare security plan for cleared facility.
(v) Channel passive traffic away from formations.
(w) Maintain rapid reaction force/quick reaction force (RRF/QRF).
(3) Countermateriel/countercapability considerations:
(a) Use marking agents to mark a vessel for later interception.
(b) Consider materiel handling equipment required to evacuate
vessel/airframe.
c. Selected NLW tasks are further addressed in Tables V-1 through V-7. The tables
are not intended to be all-inclusive but merely a stimulus to planning. The equipment
listed is taken from the currently available systems designed for nonlethal purposes. The
user should not limit his nonlethal options to this specific equipment and should be aware
that there are many existing and emerging systems and potential uses of current
technology and common objects to achieve the desired mission end state.
V-3
Table V-1. Crowd Control
NLW
Employment
Tasks
Planning Factors
Equipment
Considerations
Notes
Crowd
Administration/
Support Equipment
•
Distribute to troops
•
Strictly define
control
Personnel
• Riot face shield
in advance
ROE
• SJA / claims
• Full length riot
•
Employ riot baton
•
NLW options
planning
shield
only after proper
require lethal
• Chaplain affairs
• Expandable riot
training
cover fire
• Casualty
baton
•
Employ optics with
notification
• Optics
designated
marksman (DM) to
• Detainee
• Portable bullhorn
identify (ID) mob
disposition plan
• Vest
leaders
• PAO/media
•
Use bullhorn for
planning
communicating
• Information
with crowd and to
dissemination
control formations
Crowd
Intelligence
Kinetic Rounds
•
Do not employ
control
• Intelligence
•
12-gauge (ga)
kinetic rounds at
preparation of the
bean bag round
less than 15 feet
battlespace (IPB)
due to possible
•
12-gauge rubber
fatal outcome
• Background on
bullet
country and
•
12-gauge
•
Target area at 15
culture
to 40 feet should
launching
• Route/map recon
cartridge
be center mass
• Sensor
•
40-mm rubber
•
Head shots are
not acceptable
emplacement for
baton
advance
•
Kinetic rounds will
•
40-mm wooden
notification
not be skip fired
baton
• Information on
NOTE: USMC no
•
Kinetic rounds
Mob leaders
longer uses wooden
effective against
• Patrols and
baton.
selected targets
listening post
•
40-mm stinger
and to disperse
individuals
(LP)/observation
grenade
post (OP)
•
M203 and shotgun
• Stun grenade
• Determine reason
are nonlethal
• Flash bang
complementary;
for the crowd
M203 has low rate
of fire; area target.
Shotgun has high
rate of fire; point
target
V-4
Table V-1. Crowd Control
NLW
Employment
Tasks
Planning Factors
Equipment
Considerations
Notes
Crowd
Operations
RCA
•
Disrupt/disperse
control
• Tactical
• OC Dispenser
crowds
Integration of NLW
• Team OC
•
Disperse RCA to
and lethal fires
dispenser
face and eyes for
• Fire Support
full effect
• High volume
Element (FSE)
dispenser
•
Employ snatch
plans to include
teams to
RCA
apprehend
• Allocation of NLW
agitators
munitions
• Integration of NLW
fires and
maneuver
• Engineer barrier
planning
• Understand
mission (deny
access/disperse/
monitor)
Crowd
Logistics
Riot Control
•
Searchlights
control
• Distribution of
• Xenon Searchlight
dazzle/disorient
NLW supplies
individuals (night
• Flex cuffs
only)
• Security of rear
• RCA markers
area facilities
•
Flex cuffs used for
agitators
• Resupply of NLW
munitions
•
RCA markers are
used to mark
• Procurement of
agitators for future
medical supplies
ID
• Hospital planning
• Medic planning for
tactical units
V-5
Table V-2. Incapacitate Personnel
NLW
Task
Planning Factors
Equipment
Employment
Notes
Incapacitate
Administration/Perso
Support Equipment
•
Distribute to
•
Commander
personnel
nnel
• Riot face shield
troops in advance
needs to define
• SJA/claims
• Full length riot
•
Do not employ riot
incapacitation
planning
mission
shield
baton to the head
• Media plan
•
Take a balanced
• Expandable riot
•
Employ optic with
baton
DM to ID mob
approach to public
leaders and cover
dissemination of
• Rifleman’s
with lethal fire
NLW so counter
combat optic
measures cannot
• Vest
be rapidly
developed
•
Cover NLW
options by lethal
force
Incapacitate
Intelligence
Kinetic Rounds
•
Do not employ
personnel
•
ID types of
•
12-gauge bean
kinetic rounds at
insurgents and
bag round
less than 15 feet
demonstrators
due to possible
•
12-gauge rubber
fatal outcome
•
ID causes and
bullet
factions
•
12-gauge
•
Target area at 15-
40 feet should be
•
ID mob
launching
ringleaders
cartridge
center mass
•
40-mm rubber
•
Head shots are
not acceptable
baton
•
Kinetic rounds will
•
40-mm wooden
not be skip fired
baton
NOTE: USMC no
•
Kinetic rounds
longer uses wooden
effective against
baton.
selected targets
and to disperse
•
40-mm stinger
individuals
grenade
•
M203 and
• Stun grenade
shotguns are
• Flash bang
nonlethal
• M203 and
complementary.
shotguns are
M203 has a low
nonlethal
rate of fire, area
complementary.
target. Shotgun
M203 has a low
has a high rate of
rate of fire, area
fire, point target
target. Shotgun
has a high rate of
fire, point target
V-6
Table V-2. Incapacitate Personnel
NLW
Task
Planning Factors
Equipment
Employment
Notes
Incapacitate
Operations
RCA
•
Disrupt/disperse
personnel
• Prepare and
• OC dispenser
crowds
confirm ROE for
• Team OC
•
Disperse RCA to
NLW
dispenser
face and eyes for
• Integration of
full effect
• High-volume
NLW and deadly
• OC dispenser
force
• Allocate NLW and
designate unit use
• Integrate NLW
fires and
maneuver
Incapacitate
Logistics
Riot Control
•
Searchlights
personnel
• Distribute NLW
• Xenon
dazzle/disorient
munitions
individuals (night
• searchlight
• ID special storage
only)
• Flex cuffs
requirements
•
Use flex cuffs for
• Chemical markers
agitators
• Resupply NLW
munitions
•
Use RCA markers
to mark agitators
for incapacitation
Incapacitate
Civil Affairs
personnel
• Collect civilian
intelligence
• Care for injured
personnel
• Detain civilian
personnel
Table V-3. Deny Area to Personnel
NLW
Task
Planning Factors
Equipment
Employment
Notes
Deny area to
Administration/
Support Equipment
• Ensure area is
• Utilize appropriate
personnel
Personnel
• Area lights
well lighted to
media to warn
• SJA/claims
include perimeter
civilians away
• Area sensors
planning
• Employ night
from denied area
• Night vision
• Media plan
vision devices
• Access control
outside the
• Warning signs
perimeter
written in host
• Positively ID
nation language
accessed
personnel
• Employ warning
signs in native
language
V-7
Table V-3. Deny Area to Personnel
NLW
Task
Planning Factors
Equipment
Employment
Notes
Deny area to
Intelligence
personnel
• Terrain and map
study
• Threat ID
• Sensor
emplacement
around area
• IPB
Deny area to
Operations
personnel
• Prepare and
confirm ROE
• Integrate NLW
and deadly force
• Allocate NLW and
designate unit use
• Determine scope
of mission
• Determine access
procedures
• Use of area
(friendly or total
denial)
Deny area to
Logistics
personnel
• Distribute NLW
munitions
• ID special storage
requirements
• Resupply NLW
munitions
• Security of rear
area facilities.
Deny area to
Civil Affairs
Entanglements
•
Disrupt/slow
personnel
• Collect civilian
• Caltrops
intrusion attempts
intelligence
• Tanglefoot
•
Maintain suitable
reaction force
• Barbed wire
•
Channel passive
• Foams
traffic away
• Concertina/ razor
•
Use foam to cover
tape
caltrops
• Stinger spike
system
V-8
Table V-4. Deny Area to Vehicles
NLW
Task
Planning Factors
Equipment
Employment
Notes
Deny area to
Administration/
Support Equipment
•
Ensure area is
•
Commander
vehicles
Personnel
•
Area lights
well lighted to
needs to define
• SJA/claims
•
Area sensors
include perimeter
denial mission
planning
•
Employ night
•
Utilize appropriate
•
Night vision
• Media plan
vision devices
media to warn
•
Access control
outside the
civilians away
•
Warning signs
perimeter
from denied area
written in host
•
Positively ID
nation language
accessed vehicles
Deny area to
Intelligence
vehicles
• Terrain and map
study
• Threat ID
• Sensor
emplacement
around area
• IPB
• Traffic analysis
Deny area to
Operations
•
Commanders
vehicles
• Prepare and
must consider
confirm ROE
flying operations
when employing
• Allocate NLW and
designate unit use
RCA. Area(s)
should be
• Determine scope
reusable in short
of mission
order.
• Determine access
procedures
• Determine MP/
security forces
requirements
• Use of area
(friendly or total
denial)
Deny area to
Logistics
vehicles
• Distribute NLW
supplies
• Be prepared to
evacuate stalled
vehicles
Deny area to
Civil Affairs
Entanglements
•
Disrupt/slow
•
Commanders
vehicles
• Collection of
• Caltrops
intrusion attempts
must consider
civilian
• Tanglefoot
•
Maintain suitable
flying operations
intelligence
reaction force
when employing
• Barriers
NLW. NLW
•
Channel passive
• Organic
should not hinder
equipment
traffic away
flying operations.
•
Use foam to cover
• Barbed wire
caltrops
• Foams
V-9
Table V-5. Deny/Neutralize Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels, and Facilities
Task
NLW Planning
Equipment
Employment
Notes
Factors
Deny/
Administration/Perso
Support Equipment
•
Employ ground
•
Commander
neutralize
nnel
• Sensors to track
and water
needs to define
vehicles,
• SJA/claims
approaching
sensors, if
neutralization
aircraft,
planning
vehicles, aircraft,
required
mission
vessels,
• Media plan
and vessels
•
Employ aerial or
•
Element of
facilities
• Night vision
naval pickets
surprise remains
equipment
•
Use materiel
a critical factor in
• Materiel handling
handling
mission
equipment
equipment to
accomplishment
• Portable bullhorn
evacuate vessel
•
Commander
needs to develop
IFF procedures
Deny/
Intelligence
neutralize
• Sensor
vehicles,
emplacement if
aircraft,
required
vessels,
• Threat ID
facilities
• IPB
• Analyze target
area
Deny/neutrali
Operations
RCA
•
Use marking
ze vehicles,
• Prepare and
• Marking agent
agents to mark a
aircraft,
confirm ROE
vessel for later
vessels,
interception
• Integrate NLW
facilities
and deadly force
• Allocate NLW and
designate unit use
• Determine scope
of mission
• Determine access
procedures
• Determine
boarding
procedures
(vessels and
aircraft)
• Determine
apprehension
procedures
• Determine
decontamination
(DECON)
procedures
V-10
Table V-5. Deny/Neutralize Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels, and Facilities
Task
NLW Planning
Equipment
Employment
Notes
Factors
Deny /
Logistics
Riot Control
•
Use RCA to
•
Commanders
neutralize
• Distribute NLW
• Xenon searchlight
incapacitate crew
must consider
vehicles,
munitions
members
flying operations
aircraft,
• ID special storage
•
Searchlights can
when employing
vessels,
RCA
requirements
disorient
facilities
personnel or
•
Area(s) should be
• Resupply NLW
illuminate target
reusable in short
munitions
order.
• Determine
vessel/aircraft
disposition
Deny /
Civil Affairs
Entanglements
•
Use caltrops to
neutralize
• Collect civilian
• Caltrops
disable vehicle
vehicles,
intelligence
• Foams
•
Use combination
aircraft,
• Handle displaced
of foam and
• Speed bumps
vessels,
civilian personnel
caltrops to
• Nets
facilities
preserve the
• PVAB
element of
surprise
•
Channel passive
traffic away
•
Use nets to foul
props
Deny/neutrali
Medical
ze vehicles,
• Treating injured
aircraft,
civilian personnel
vessels,
facilities
V-11
Table V-6. Seize Personnel
NLW
Task
Planning Factors
Equipment
Employment
Notes
Seize
Administration/
Support Equipment
•
Employ optics with
•
Commander
personnel
Personnel
• Optics
DM to ID
needs to define
• SJA/claims
personnel to be
seizure mission
planning
seized
and strictly
• PAO media plan
•
Cover personnel
enforce ROE
employing
•
Element of
nonlethal force
surprise is critical
for mission
accomplishment
•
Speed is critical
•
Seizing personnel
can be surgical
with special
operations
personnel or
conducted within a
crowd to seize an
agitator
Seize
Operations
RCA
•
Use RCA to
personnel
• Prepare and
• OC dispenser
incapacitate
confirm ROE
personnel
• CS
• Integrate NLW
•
Spray into eyes
and deadly force
and face for full
effect
• Allocate NLW and
designate unit use
• Integrate NLW
fires and
maneuver
• Breaching and
assault planning
• Determine holding
area/processing
center
Seize
Logistics
Riot Control
•
Searchlights
personnel
• Distribute NLW
• Xenon searchlight
dazzle/disorient
munitions
individuals
• Flex cuffs
• ID special storage
• RCA markers
•
Use flex cuffs for
requirements
apprehension
• Resupply NLW
•
Use RCA markers
munitions
to mark agitators
for seizure
• Plan
transportation
V-12
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