FM 3-09 FIELD ARTILLERY OPERATIONS AND FIRE SUPPORT (APRIL 2014) - page 1

 

  Главная      Manuals     FM 3-09 FIELD ARTILLERY OPERATIONS AND FIRE SUPPORT (APRIL 2014)

 

Search            copyright infringement  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Content      ..      1       2         ..

 

 

 

FM 3-09 FIELD ARTILLERY OPERATIONS AND FIRE SUPPORT (APRIL 2014) - page 1

 

 

*FM 3-09
Field Manual
Headquarters,
No. 3-09
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support
Contents
Page
PREFACE
v
INTRODUCTION
vii
Chapter 1
FIELD ARTILLERY OPERATIONS
1-1
Section I - The Mission and The Role Of Field Artillery
1-1
The Effects of Fires
1-2
Section II - Field Artillery Capabilities Supporting Offensive, Defensive, and
Stability Tasks
1-4
Field Artillery in Support of Offensive Tasks
1-4
Field Artillery in Support of Defensive Tasks
1-16
Field Artillery in Support of Tactical Enabling Tasks and Other Special
Considerations
1-24
Field Artillery in Support of Stability Tasks
1-28
Field Artillery in Defense Support of Civil Authorities
1-29
Section III - Organization for Combat and Command Or Support
Relationships
1-30
Organization for Combat
1-30
Field Artillery Inherent Responsibilities in Army Command Relationships
1-31
Section IV - Field Artillery Organization
1-35
Field Artillery Brigade
1-35
MLRS/HIMARS Battalion
1-36
Cannon Field Artillery Battalion
1-37
Section V - Key Considerations for Field Artillery Employment
1-40
Five Requirements for Accurate Fire
1-40
Fire Direction
1-44
Counterfire
1-46
Tactical Movement and Positioning
1-51
Survivability and Security
1-52
Sustainment
1-53
Chapter 2
FIRE SUPPORT
2-1
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-09, dated 3 November 2011.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
i
Contents
Section I - Fire Support in Unified Land Operations
2-1
General Considerations for Fire Support
2-1
Section II - Fire Support Coordination Organizations and Key Personnel . 2-3
Command Post Cells and Liaison
2-3
Integration of Fire Support and Airspace Control
2-8
Duties and Responsibilities of Fire Support Personnel
2-10
Air Force Fire Support Coordination Organizations
2-13
Navy and Marine Corps Fire Support Coordination Organizations
2-14
Section III - Information Collection and Target Acquisition for Fire
Support
2-16
Information Collection
2-16
Target Acquisition
2-16
Section IV - Fire Support Attack Resources
2-19
General Considerations
2-20
Army Munitions Attributes
2-20
Field Artillery
2-21
Multiple Launch Rocket System Munitions
2-22
Electronic Attack
2-25
Mortars
2-26
Naval Surface Fire Support
2-27
Air Support
2-28
Joint Air Attack Team
2-29
Army Aviation
2-29
Chapter 3
FIRE SUPPORT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
3-1
Section I - Fire Support Planning, Coordination, and Targeting
3-1
Fire Support Planning
3-1
Fire Support Coordination
3-4
Fire Support and Targeting
3-6
Section II- Fire Support Preparation
3-9
General Considerations
3-9
Rehearsals
3-9
Section III - Fire Support Execution
3-12
General Considerations
3-12
Clearance of Fires
3-12
Fire Support for Offensive Tasks
3-12
Fire Support for Defensive Tasks
3-13
Fire Support for Stability Tasks
3-15
Fire Support In Defense Support of Civil Authorities
3-16
Special Considerations For Fire Support
3-16
Section IV- Fire Support Assessment
3-18
Measures of Performance and Effectiveness
3-18
Fires Running Estimate
3-19
Chapter 4
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION AND OTHER CONTROL MEASURES
4-1
Section I - Fire Support Coordination Measures
4-1
ii
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Contents
Permissive Fire Support Coordination Measures
4-2
Restrictive Fire Support Coordination Measures
4-7
Target Control Measures
4-12
Section II - Boundary, Phase Line, and Other Key Considerations For Fire
Support
4-13
Boundaries
4-13
Phase Line and Trigger Line
4-13
Position Areas for Artillery
4-14
Section III - Target Acquisition Control and Airspace Coordinating
Measures
4-15
Radar Zones
4-15
Airspace Coordinating Measures
4-18
GLOSSARY
Glossary-1
REFERENCES
References-1
INDEX
Index-1
Figures
Figure P-1. FM 3-09 to ATP transition model
vi
Figure
1-1. Organization for combat - movement to contact example
1-8
Figure
1-2. Organization for combat - division attack example example
1-9
Figure
1-3. Organization for combat - FAB as counterfire headquarters example
1-18
Figure
1-4. Field artillery brigade organization example
1-35
Figure
1-5. MLRS/HIMARS battalion organization example
1-37
Figure
1-6. ABCT cannon battalion example
1-37
Figure
1-7. SBCT cannon battalion example
1-38
Figure
1-8. IBCT cannon battalion example
1-38
Figure
1-9. FAB self-propelled cannon battalion example
1-39
Figure
1-10. FAB towed cannon battalion example
1-39
Figure
4-1. Coordinated fire line example
4-2
Figure
4-2. Fire support coordination line example
4-4
Figure
4-3. Free-fire area example
4-5
Figure
4-4. Kill box example
4-7
Figure
4-5. No-fire area example
4-8
Figure
4-6. Restrictive fire area example
4-9
Figure
4-7. Restrictive fire line example
4-10
Figure
4-8. Fire support area and fire support station examples
4-10
Figure
4-9. Zone of fire example
4-11
Figure
4-10. Final protective fire example
4-12
Figure
4-11. Phase line and trigger line examples
4-13
Figure
4-12. Position area for artillery example
4-14
Figure
4-13. Critical friendly zone example
4-15
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
iii
Contents
Figure 4-14. Call for fire zone example
4-16
Figure 4-15. Artillery target intelligence zone example
4-17
Figure 4-16. Censor zone example
4-17
Figure 4-17. Common sensor boundary example
4-18
Figure 4-18. Formal airspace coordination area example
4-20
Figure 4-19. Restricted operations zone example
4-21
Tables
Table I-1. Change in proponent manual
viii
Table I-2. New or revised army terms
viii
Table I-3. Rescinded army terms
viii
Table 1-1. Field artillery inherent responsibilities in army command relationships
1-32
Table 1-2. Field artillery inherent responsibilities in army support relationships
1-34
Table 2-1. Capabilities of field artillery weapons locating radar
2-19
Table 2-2. Cannon field artillery capabilities
2-22
Table 2-3. MLRS/HIMARS munitions capabilities
2-24
Table 3-1. Synopsis of targeting
3-7
iv
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Preface
Field manual (FM) 3-09 provides tactics for field artillery operations and fire support in unified land operations.
The principal audience for FM 3-09 is all commanders and staffs. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters
serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational
doctrine concerning the range of military operations and relationships with joint or multinational forces.
Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States
(U.S.), international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their
Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and established rules of engagement. See FM 27-10.
FM 3-09 implements standardization agreements (STANAG) 2484 and 3680.
FM 3-09 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-09 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an
asterisk (*) in the glossary and are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is
italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
References to battalion and company organizations include units organized as squadrons and troops.
See Figure P-1 on page vi for an illustration of the FM 3-09 transition to Army training publications model.
FM 3-09 applies to the Regular Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States,
and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 3-09 is the United States Army Fires Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is the
Directorate of Training and Doctrine, United States Army Fires Center of Excellence. Send comments and
recommendations
on
a
Department
of
the
Army
(DA)
Form
2028
(http://www.apd.army.mil/pub/eforms/pureedge/a2028.xfdl ) (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) to Directorate of Training and Doctrine, 700 McNair Avenue, Suite 128, ATTN: ATSF-DD, Fort Sill,
OK 73503; by e-mail to: usarmy.sill.fcoe.mbx.dotd-doctrine-inbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form
2028.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
v
Preface
Figure P-1. FM 3-09 to ATP transition model
vi
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Introduction
Army forces are employed with other Services as part of a joint force. Consequently, this field manual (FM) is
grounded in joint doctrine as found in joint publications (JP) 3-0, JP 3-09, and JP 3-60. FM 3-09 builds on the
fires principles outlined in Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP) 3-09 and nests with Army Doctrine
Publications (ADPs)/ADRPs 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0 in support of the maneuver commander.
This FM 3-09 is unlike any FM 6-20 or FM 3-09 you have seen before.
It is revised to encompass the tactics for field artillery operations and fire support
planning supporting maneuver force commanders in accomplishing their objectives.
The tactics from several sources are described in the chapters of this FM. Field
artillery techniques, to include fire support planning and execution, are found in
current FMs until they are superseded by Army techniques publications (ATPs).
This publication is intended to provide guidance for brigade, division, and corps for the employment of field
artillery, and for the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of fire support. Higher echelon planners
may use it to assist in establishing fire support requirements. The manual begins by describing the capabilities
of the field artillery, how it is organized, and how field artillery supports the maneuver commander through the
integration of all forms of fires. Fires are the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal
effect on a target (JP 3-09). This publication also provides a comprehensive discussion of fire support. This
includes topics such as the role of fire support in Unified Land Operations, fire support coordination
organizations and key personnel, target acquisition for fire support, and fire support attack resources. This
publication also provides information on fire support in the operations process: fire support planning,
preparation, execution, and assessment. This manual is a must read for combined arms leaders especially
brigade and battalion commanders and staff, because it describes both field artillery and fire support as key
components of successful maneuver operations.
Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (Department of Defense
(DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 15 October 2013). Tactics are concerned with the
approach to combat, placement of troops, deployment and employment of weapons, and execution of
movements. For further discussion see ADRP 3-90 and FMs 3-90-1/2.
There have been four major changes in the organization and contents of this publication. First, this publication
is much broader in scope encompassing field artillery operations and fire support. Chapter 1, Field Artillery
Operations, is new. Second, fires function and its relationship to other warfighting functions and fire support to
the principles of joint operations, previously found in the context-setting Chapter 1 of this publication’s
predecessor, are now found in ADRP 3-09, Fires. Third, the content of Chapters 2 and 3 have been updated and
titled as Fire Support and Fire Support and the Operations Process, respectively. Fourth, this publication has
no appendices. The previous edition’s Appendix A, Maneuver Control and Fire Support Coordination
Measures has become Chapter 4. The discussion on command and support relationships, found in Appendix B
of the previous edition, is now a section in Chapter 1.
This manual describes field artillery and fire support as key components of successful maneuver operations. It
begins by describing the capabilities of the Field Artillery, how it is organized, and how field artillery supports
the maneuver commander through the integration of all forms of fires. The discussion provides a comprehensive
discussion of fire support coordination; target acquisition; fire support attack resources, and fire support
planning, preparation, execution and assessment—fire support in the operations process.
FM 3-09 becomes the proponent manual for, or adds, modifies, or rescinds terms listed in introductory tables 1
through 3 on page viii.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
vii
Introduction
Table I-1. Change in proponent manual
Term
Remarks
call for fire
Change proponent manual from FM 6-30 to FM 3-09
fire support planning
Change proponent manual from FM 6-20-30 to FM 3-09
Table I-2. New or revised army terms
Term
Remarks
artillery target intelligence zone
Modified the definition and changed the proponent
manual from FM 3-09.12 to FM 3-09.
call for fire zone
Modified the definition and changed proponent manual
from FM 3-09.12 to FM 3-09.
censor zone
Modified the definition and changed proponent manual
from FM 3-09.12 to FM 3-09.
clearance of fires
Modified the definition.
common grid
Modified the definition and changed proponent manual
from FM 6-50 to FM 3-09.
common sensor boundary
Modified the definition and changed proponent manual
from FM 3-09.12 to FM 3-09.
counterpreparation fire
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
delay
New term and definition, formerly found in JP1-02
destruction
New term and definition.
field artillery brigade
New organization name, replaces fires brigade.
fire plan
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
fire support plan
New term and definition.
high-payoff target list
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
neutralization
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
neutralization fire
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
precision munition
New term and definition.
preparation fire
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
priority target
Modified the definition and changed the proponent
manual from FM 6-20-40 to FM 3-09.
scheme of fires
Modified the definition.
suppression
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
suppressive fire
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
target acquisition
Adopts the joint definition.
Table I-3. Rescinded army terms
Term
Remarks
desired effects
No longer formally defined as an Army unique term.
Adopts common English language dictionary definition.
fires brigade
Renamed to field artillery brigade.
viii
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Chapter 1
Field Artillery Operations
This chapter provides a brief overview of the field artillery and its role and employment
in Unified Land Operations. Field artillery operations are actually two distinct functions;
field artillery, and fire support (ADRP 3-09). Section I begins the chapter by describing
the mission and the role of the field artillery. Section II describes field artillery
capabilities supporting tactical mission tasks. Sections III and IV describe field artillery
organization for combat, command and support relationships, and field artillery
organization. Section V concludes the chapter with a discussion of key considerations for
field artillery employment.
SECTION I - THE MISSION AND THE ROLE OF FIELD ARTILLERY
The Mission of the Field Artillery
The mission of the Field Artillery is to destroy, defeat, or disrupt the enemy with
integrated fires to enable maneuver commanders to dominate in unified land operations
(ADRP 3-09).
1-1. Field artillery contributes to unified land operations by massing fires in space and time on single or
multiple targets with precision, near-precision, and area fire capabilities. Field artillery can rapidly shift fires
throughout the area of operations in support of the scheme of maneuver, and to counter unforeseen enemy
reaction to achieve the maneuver commander’s desired effects.
1-2. Field artillery consists of the equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of
indirect fire cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers (ADRP 3-09). Field artillery cannons are
classified according to caliber as:
z
Light — 120-mm and less.
z
Medium — 121 to 160-mm.
z
Heavy — 161 to 210-mm.
z
Very heavy — greater than 210-mm (JP 3-09).
1-3. Field artillery is the maneuver commander‘s principal means for providing continuous and responsive
indirect fires in support of operations. Indirect fire is 1. Fire delivered at a target not visible to the firing unit. 2.
Fire delivered to a target that is not itself used as a point of aim for the weapons or the director (FM 6-40).
1-4. Organic, assigned, attached, or placed under the operational control (OPCON) field artillery delivery
assets include cannon, rocket, and missile systems. Field artillery provides continuously available fires under all
weather conditions and in all types of terrain. Field artillery can shift and mass fires rapidly without having to
displace.
1-5. Field artillery limitations include a firing signature that makes firing units vulnerable to detection by
enemy target acquisition assets, limited self-defense capability against ground and air attacks, and limited
ability to engage moving targets.
1-6. Field artillerymen, from company FIST teams and battalion through corps level fires cells, integrate all
means of fire support ─ field artillery, mortars, electronic attack, and joint fires. Field artillery personnel
integrate and synchronize fire support within the commander’s scheme of maneuver. See chapter 2.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-1
Chapter 1
1-7. Field artillery supports ground and air operations by attacking the enemy force throughout the depth of its
formations and provides specific target engagement such as suppression of enemy air defenses. Field artillery
fires can provide simultaneous precision strikes of targets at long ranges that other means cannot attack without
significant risk. Strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability (JP 3-0). Field artillery’s
ability to quickly attack enemy forces on key terrain, flanks, and in dead space, enables the maneuver
commander to economize and concentrate to exploit advantages that arise.
1-8. Target acquisition is key to field artillery effectively providing timely and accurate fires. Target
acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective
employment of weapons (JP 3-60). Field artillery target acquisition is accomplished by forward observers and
weapons locating radars. In addition, maneuver commanders must integrate maneuver, unmanned aircraft
systems, and other collection assets into the information collection plan.
THE EFFECTS OF FIRES
1-9. Successful maneuver requires close coordination and effective employment of available fires. Maneuver
and field artillery fires functions are inseparable and complementary dynamics of unified land operations. These
functions can create conditions that enhance the effective application of the other throughout the supported
commander’s area of operations. Depending on the tactical situation as defined by the mission variables of
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations
(METT-TC), the maneuver commander can employ supporting field artillery fires to deceive, defeat, delay,
destroy, disrupt, divert, neutralize, and suppress enemy forces, combat functions and facilities. Fire support
personnel and engineers work together to combine the effects of indirect fires and engineer obstacles to disrupt,
turn, block or fix the enemy’s ability to counter friendly actions thereby setting the stage for successful
maneuver operations. Maneuver can also force enemy units into kill zones or concentrated formations where
fires can achieve maximum effectiveness. Combining maneuver with fire support makes destroying larger
enemy forces feasible and enhances the protection of friendly forces.
DECEIVE
1-10. Military deception is actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent
extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that
will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4). Field artillery supports military
deception by misleading the enemy decision makers’ understanding. This greatly improves the chances the
enemy will take risks that can expose him to the effects of friendly fires and maneuver. Field artillery fires
contribute to the overall deception plan. For example preparation fire of a false landing zone may contribute to
the belief a friendly attack is about to occur in one place when in fact it is about to occur in another.
DEFEAT
1-11. Defeat is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the
physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable to pursue that
individual’s adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander’s will and can no longer
interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the
threat of its use (FM 3-90-1). Defeat manifests itself in some sort of physical action, such as mass surrenders,
abandonment of positions, equipment and supplies, or retrograde operations. A commander can create different
effects against an enemy to defeat that force. For example a commander’s employment of field artillery fires to
attack an enemy force may result in the enemy no longer having sufficient personnel, weapons systems,
equipment, or supplies to carry out its mission. Likewise the delivery of massed, synchronized and intense fires
can cause enemy personnel to lose the will to continue to fight.
DELAY
1-12. To delay is to slow the time of arrival of enemy forces or capabilities or alter the ability of the
enemy or adversary to project forces or capabilities. When enemy forces are delayed, friendly forces gain
time. For delay to have a major impact the enemy must face urgent movement requirements or the delay must
1-2
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
enhance the effect(s) of friendly operations. When delayed enemy forces mass behind a damaged route segment
a more concentrated set of targets and a longer period of exposure to friendly fires results. Field artillery
delivered minefields to delay the movement of an enemy may be an effective use of field artillery fires.
DESTROY
1-13. Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is
reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any
function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-90-1). Destruction results
from the use of force to cause massive damage to equipment and material and significant personnel casualties.
Field artillery fires are a major destructive element of combat power, and play a significant role in a unit’s
ability to eliminate the enemy’s combat systems and affect his will to fight. Destruction 1. In the context of
the computed effects of field artillery fires, destruction renders a target out of action permanently, or
ineffective for a long period of time, producing at least 30-percent casualties or materiel damage. 2. A
type of adjustment for a given target.
Note: Field artillery systems use the computed effects of field artillery fires as their baseline for
tactical and technical fire direction computation purposes. Commanders may change the desired
computed level of effects for the computations. Any change will have a corresponding impact on the
number of rounds fired.
1-14. Destruction fire is 1. An element of the method of engagement portion of the call for fire requesting
destruction fire. 2. Fire delivered for the sole purpose of destroying materiel (FM 6-40).
1-15. The amount of damage needed to render a unit combat-ineffective depends on the type of unit, leadership,
training, discipline, and morale. Precision-guided munitions and, where appropriate, dual purpose improved
conventional munitions provide the ability to effectively destroy armored, dug-in, or point targets. A point
target is a target that is less than or equal to 200 meters in width and length. (ATP 3-09.30). The use of
precision-guided munitions also limits collateral damage and permits effective engagement of point targets. For
example, using precision munitions to destroy a high-payoff target during an attack on an urban objective (see
chapter 2). Collateral damage is the unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that
would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time (JP 3-60). Such damage is not
unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack.
DISRUPT
1-16. Disrupt is a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and
obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt the enemy’s timetable, or cause enemy forces to
commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion (FM 3-90-1) 2. An obstacle effect that focuses fire
planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy force to break up its formation and tempo, interrupt its
timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort. (FM 90-7). This affects the
enemy’s ability to effectively coordinate actions, sustain and exploit success, and increases vulnerability to
friendly maneuver and fires. For example, massed artillery fires on an enemy march formation disrupt his
ability to deploy to an attack formation.
DIVERT
1-17. A diversion is the act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal
operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention (JP 3-03). Diversion causes enemy forces to consume
resources or capabilities critical to enemy operations in a way that is advantageous to friendly operations.
Diversions draw the attention of enemy forces away from critical friendly operations and prevent enemy forces
and their support resources from being employed for their intended purpose. Diversions can also cause more
circuitous routing along lines of communication, resulting in delays for enemy forces. An option for field
artillery employment in support of a commander’s diversion is to use high explosive fires to encourage an
enemy to adopt a different route.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-3
Chapter 1
NEUTRALIZE
1-18. Neutralize is a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of
interfering with a particular operation (FM 3-90-1). Neutralization in the context of the computed effects of
field artillery fires renders a target ineffective for a short period of time, producing at least 10-percent
casualties or materiel damage. The commander specifies the enemy force or materiel to neutralize and the
duration, which is time or event driven. The neutralized target may become effective again when casualties are
replaced, damage is repaired or the effect resulting in the neutralization is lifted. The assets required to
neutralize a target vary according to the type and size of the target, and the weapon and munitions combination
used. Neutralization fire is fire delivered to render the target ineffective or unusable. For example, firing a
battery 1 on an enemy platoon in the open may result in 10-percent casualties.
SUPPRESS
1-19. Suppress is a tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the performance of a force or
weapons system below the level needed to accomplish the mission (FM 3-90-1). Suppression occurs when a
commander employs direct or indirect fires, such as artillery, electronic attack, or smoke on enemy personnel,
weapons, and equipment to prevent or degrade enemy fires, sensors, and visual observation of friendly forces.
Suppressive fire is fires on or about a weapons system to degrade its performance below the level needed
to fulfill its mission objectives during the conduct of the fires. Unlike the neutralization task the original
target regains its effectiveness without needing to reconstitute once the effects of the systems involved in the
suppression effort lift or shift to another target. Suppression usually lasts only as long as the fires or their effects
continue. Suppression, in the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, renders a target
ineffective for a short period of time producing at least 3-percent casualties or material damage.
SECTION II - FIELD ARTILLERY CAPABILITIES SUPPORTING OFFENSIVE,
DEFENSIVE, AND STABILITY TASKS
FIELD ARTILLERY IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE TASKS
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1-20. An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and
population centers (ADRP 3-0). During the offensive, the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), chief of fires,
fire support officer, and fires cell integrate close-supporting field artillery, mortar fires, counterfire, strike,
electronic attack; naval surface fire support; and the fires of close air support and air interdiction aircraft into
the operations of the supported command. Such fires may be time or event-driven. The planning also involves
the use of surface-to-surface fires necessary to suppress enemy air defenses to facilitate joint air attack team and
counterair operations within the supported command’s area of operations —
z
Suppression of enemy air defenses is activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades
surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means (JP 3-01).
z
A joint air attack team is typically supported by field artillery and other fire support assets. See
chapter 2 for more information on joint air attack teams.
z
Offensive counterair is offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles,
launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, and as
close to their source as possible (JP 3-01).
1-21. The field artillery commander emphasizes the development of clear, concise, and rapidly integrated fire
support plans (see chapter 3). Planning ensures responsive fires are available when needed. A fire plan is a
tactical plan for using the weapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated. A fire plan
typically includes the plan for direct fires and the fire support plan.
1-22. The field artillery commander positions field artillery assets forward within the attacking formation to
facilitate continuous and effective fire support. In order to be within supporting range of maneuver forces, the
field artillery commander must fully understand the supported commander’s concept of the operation.
1-4
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
Successful massing of Army indirect and joint fires requires that the fire support planners (FSCOORD, chief of
fires, fire support officer, and fires cell) be proficient in the tracking of friendly indirect fire asset positions and
movements. Additionally the field artillery commander must be aware of the enemy situation and likely
reactions to friendly actions.
1-23. The fire support planners plan fires on known and likely enemy positions. A high-payoff target is a target
whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60).
High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success
of the friendly commander’s mission. A high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires for the
successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60). The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously
degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest. A high-payoff target
list is a prioritized list of high-payoff targets by phase of the operation.
1-24. As the attacking force moves forward, preparation fire and counterfire destroy, neutralize, or suppress
enemy positions and weapons systems. Preparation fire is normally a high volume of fires delivered over a
short period of time to maximize surprise and shock effect. Preparation fire can include electronic attack
and should be synchronized with other electronic warfare activities. Electronic attack is a division of
electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to
attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat
capability and is considered a form of fires (JP 3-13.1).
1-25. In planning fires the maneuver commander and fire support planners must weigh the probable effects of
preparation fire against the achievement of surprise and the creation of obstacles capable of impeding friendly
forces movements. Preparation fire can continue while ground maneuver elements are moving. If the
commander chooses to make the initial assault without preparation fire to achieve tactical surprise, fires are
planned to support each subordinate unit’s maneuver throughout the operation.
1-26. Disrupting one or more parts of the enemy’s team weakens the entire enemy force. For example,
disrupting the enemy’s fire support system allows friendly forces to maneuver and mass against the enemy with
a reduction in the effects of the enemy’s indirect-fire weapons on friendly forces. Field artillery disrupts an
enemy indirect fire target set’s capability through the attack of enemy forward observers, fire direction centers,
command posts, cannon and rocket artillery firing positions and ammunition stocks. The successful attack of
each target set requires a different mix of resources to locate and engage individual targets within the set. For
example, as the friendly force moves through the enemy‘s security area and closes into the enemy’s main
defensive positions, fires can be concentrated on neutralizing enemy command and fire control nodes, target
acquisition, and intelligence-gathering systems. By doing so, the maneuver commander may prevent the enemy
from determining the location and objective of the main attack.
OFFENSIVE TASK CONSIDERATIONS FOR FIELD ARTILLERY UNITS
1-27. Field artillery fires during offensive tasks facilitate maneuver by achieving desired effects on the enemy
forces and positions. Considerations for field artillery units during the offense include—
z
Continuously adjusting field artillery plans and responsibilities to meet the maneuver commander’s
intent.
z
Establishing and maintaining effective communications with the supported unit.
z
Identifying and planning the engagement of high-payoff targets with the appropriate mix of lethal
and nonlethal effects.
z
With the supported command’s assistant chief of staff, operations
(G-3)/battalion or brigade
operations staff officer (S-3) and assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2)/battalion or brigade
intelligence staff officer
(S-2) identifying and coordinating the attack of high-payoff targets;
integrating information collection sources to identify potential targets and integrating such targets
into fire plans.
z
Identifying and tasking primary and alternate observers and sensors to support the attack of
targets; designating target/observer sensor-to-shooter communication links, and integrating radar
placement and zones into fire planning.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-5
Chapter 1
z
Coordinating target acquisition assets to locate targets, potentially in a 6400-mil/360-degree area of
operations.
z
Developing an observation plan.
z
Ensuring accurate target locations by using the most accurate target acquisition asset available.
z
Using permissive fire support coordination measures to facilitate the attack of targets.
z
Integrating electronic attack into the attack guidance matrix.
z
Positioning of firing units well forward to better exploit weapons ranges and preclude untimely
displacement.
z
Weighting the decisive operation with a preponderance of fires.
z
Massing fires to gain maximum efficiency and effectiveness.
z
Providing fires in support of close combat and fires in depth to support maneuver operations and to
destroy and disrupt the enemy.
z
Allocating responsive fire support for leading elements.
z
Ensuring forward observers accompany leading elements of the assault force.
z
Coordinating with available aviation assets for target identification and attack.
z
Conducting counterfire.
z
Interdicting and disrupting enemy sustainment efforts and troop movements.
z
Planning fires to obscure enemy observation or screen friendly movements.
z
Providing field artillery illumination to assist friendly force night operations, to mark locations or
targets, to provide friendly direction orientation, or to degrade enemy night vision equipment.
z
Planning targets to protect assaulting troops by destroying, neutralizing, or suppressing enemy direct
fire weapons.
z
Providing preparation fire, when required, to weaken the enemy's resistance; shifting fires just as the
maneuver force moves toward the objective.
z
Developing signals for lifting and shifting fires on the objective, primarily by networked
communications and by visual signals as a backup means.
z
Recommending fire support coordination measures, accounting for danger close and the echelonment
of fires, to enable maneuver forces to get as close as possible to the objective before lifting fires.
z
Planning fires against enemy reinforcements during the attack and to support friendly consolidations
once the objective has been seized.
z
Disrupting enemy counterattacks.
z
Providing rapid delivery of field artillery scatterable mines minefields to support maneuver
operations.
z
Coordinating for meteorological and survey data.
z
Providing precision, near-precision, and area fires.
z
Coordinating air support to destroy targets on the objective and then shifting to reinforcing enemy
units, artillery assets, and command nodes.
z
Proactively suppressing enemy air defenses.
z
Positioning prepackaged ammunition stocks capable of rapid delivery.
z
Allocating fire support for the neutralization of bypassed enemy combat forces.
FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE TASKS
General Considerations
1-28. Field artillery brigade (FAB) fires in support of offensive tasks are responsive, timely and assist the
supported commander to achieve and sustain the initiative. Supporting fires must always be able to range the
targets of advancing maneuver formations. General considerations for the FAB during the offensive include
z
Serving as the force field artillery headquarters, if designated by the maneuver commander.
1-6
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
z
Providing fires in support of shaping operations.
z
Establishing command or support relationships to provide responsive fires.
z
Supporting brigade combat teams (BCTs) during the attack by providing close supporting fires.
z
Providing radar support to BCT organic field artillery battalions unable to maintain radar coverage.
z
Shifting fires to targets away from objectives when necessary to interdict enemy reinforcements.
z
Structuring communications networks that ensure continuous responsive fire support to maneuvering
forces.
z
Providing continuous survey and meteorological coverage to the subordinate battalions and BCTs if
required.
Movement to Contact
1-29. Movement to contact is an offensive task that is designed to develop the situation or regain contact
(ADRP 3-90). It is conducted when the information related to enemy positions, situation and deployment is not
clear. In a movement to contact the maneuver commander has lost contact with the enemy main body and
attempts to reestablish it, using all available sources of intelligence to develop the situation. He may know the
location of enemy reserve and follow-on forces. Since a movement to contact involves an unclear or uncertain
situation, the FAB maintains centralized control over organic and assigned assets, enabling a coordinated
response to a rapidly developing situation. See Figure 1-1 on page 1-8 for an example organization for combat
for a movement to contact.
1-30. Centralized control also gives the FAB the flexibility to provide effective support to BCTs—allowing the
organic field artillery battalions to continue movement with their BCTs in anticipation of contact with the
enemy. Positioning of FAB units must facilitate responsive execution of fire support tasks. Additionally the
FAB may provide the necessary meteorological, survey, and radar coverage required to support the operation;
consequently the FAB may position units in the BCTs’ areas of operations. The positioning and movement of
FAB assets must be coordinated with the maneuver BCT S-3s. Given the uncertain enemy situation the assets
should move as far forward as practical to allow maximum flexibility once the enemy contact is made. Specific
FAB considerations include—
z
Providing responsive cannon, rocket, and missile fires to the BCTs to enable their organic field
artillery battalions to continue to move during the movement to contact.
z
Integrating FAB radar, meteorological, and counterfire coverage in support of the BCTs to allow
BCT organic field artillery battalions to continue to maneuver with the BCT; coordinating handover
of support to BCTs once the situation is developed.
z
Integrating FAB radar coverage in support of the BCTs to allow the radars in the BCT organic field
artillery battalions to continue to maneuver with the BCT.
z
Integrating field artillery, joint fires, and radar target acquisition to assist in securing the unprotected
flanks of vulnerable division, corps, or other FAB supported command assets during advances.
z
Transitioning FAB cannon field artillery battalions from general support (GS) or general support-
reinforcing (GSR) to reinforcing (R) once the situation is developed and the BCTs begin to conduct
follow-on offensive or defensive tasks.
z
Coordinating positioning of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS)/high mobility artillery rocket
system (HIMARS) battalions well forward to maximize range.
z
Positioning field artillery to best support air and ground operations - deconflicting with airspace
coordinating measures.
z
Positioning the FAB command post forward.
z
Planning for 6400-mil/360-degree fires and support to units in the division and/or corps support area.
z
Attacking bridges and other mobility corridors with FAB strike and joint fires to limit enemy
mobility options and facilitate shaping the meeting engagement for the BCTs.
z
Executing strikes for the FAB-supported command’s shaping operations against high-payoff targets.
z
Using unmanned aircraft systems to conduct reconnaissance of routes and target areas of interest.
z
Requesting joint fires to be employed rapidly against identified fires assets.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-7
Chapter 1
Figure 1-1. Organization for combat - movement to contact example
Attack
1-31. Attack is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both
(ADRP 3-90). Attacks are violent engagements incorporating movement supported by fires against an enemy
position with a force whose disposition is known and reasonably understood. However based on mission
variable analysis the commander may decide to conduct an attack using only fires. Attacks may be either a
decisive or shaping operation and, depending on the time available for planning, are characterized as either
hasty or deliberate. An attack differs from a movement to contact because, in an attack, the commander knows
part of the enemy’s disposition. This knowledge enables the commander to better synchronize the attack and
employ combat power more effectively in an attack than in a movement to contact (FM 3-90-1). During the
attack, less centralized control of fires is used because the FAB-supported maneuver force will have the
initiative. Allocation of field artillery fires for the FAB-supported command’s main effort helps control the
tempo of offensive tasks. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in
time is most critical to overall mission success (ADRP 3-0). The main effort must be weighted by providing
adequate field artillery fires. See Figure 1-2 on page 1-9 for an example organization for combat for a division
attack.
1-8
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
Figure 1-2. Organization for combat - division attack example
1-32. Timely displacements of field artillery units are essential for successful offensive tasks. Field artillery
units move well forward prior to an attack, displacing by echelon to provide continuous fires to the supported
force. If the FAB must maneuver in the area of operations of a BCT, the brigade S-3s must coordinate
positioning. Units positioned by the FAB may be in danger of being left behind unless repositioning is frequent
and synchronized to support the forward progress of BCTs. Displacements should maximize continuous
delivery of fires and be completed as rapidly as possible. Specific FAB considerations to support an attack
include—
z
Attacking, in coordination with joint fires, enemy operational reserves and second echelon forces
outside the BCT area of operations to isolate first echelon forces.
z
Supporting combat aviation brigade attack operations by suppressing enemy air defense systems.
z
Conducting FAB strikes to slow and disorganize repositioning and withdrawing enemy forces.
z
Destroying enemy command and control facilities.
z
Providing counterfire.
z
Providing target acquisition.
z
Providing fires for deception operations.
z
Executing FAB strikes and supporting joint strikes in support of division, corps, joint task force, or
other supported command shaping operations.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-9
Chapter 1
z
Positioning field artillery units to best support ground and air operations - deconflicting airspace
coordinating measures.
z
Planning for 6400-mil/360-degree operations and to provide fires to division or corps sustainment
areas.
z
Considering positioning individual MLRS/HIMARS batteries to support battlefield surveillance
brigade targeting for shaping operations.
z
Providing radar/meteorological coverage for the BCTs to allow the uninterrupted movement of their
assets forward during the attack.
z
Providing preparation fires to shape the close fight.
z
Providing massed fires to the BCTs to support the penetration of enemy positions.
z
Responding to BCT requests for support against uncommitted and repositioning enemy forces in the
BCT’s area of operations.
z
Recommending support relationships for a BCT’s field artillery battalion when the BCT is held in
reserve.
z
Considering the requirements to support follow-on offensive tasks (pursuit/exploitation); ensuring
routes have sufficient mobility to move rapidly to support the division, corps, joint task force, or
other FAB supported command.
z
Positioning FAB weapon locating radars to fill gaps in the BCTs’ radar coverage.
z
Integrating air support into counterfire operations.
z
Establishing communications channels between surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition
assets and FAB field artillery battalions for immediate execution of counterfire missions.
Exploitation and Pursuit
1-33. Exploitation is an offensive task that usually follows the conduct of a successful attack and is designed to
disorganize the enemy in depth (ADRP 3-90). Exploitation is the primary means of translating tactical success
into operational advantage. It exacerbates enemy force disorganization, confusion and disruption of the
command and control system caused by tactical defeat. Exploitation takes advantage of tactical opportunities to
degrade enemy forces to the point where they have no alternative but surrender, be destroyed, or take flight.
Typically, the maneuver commander does not assign a subordinate unit the mission of exploitation before
starting a movement to contact or attack, but reorganizes internally to reflect the existing mission variables of
METT-TC when the opportunity to exploit success occurs. Exploitation demands a force with sufficient
mobility to maintain pressure on the fleeing enemy force.
1-34. Field artillery units reposition to where they can support a renewed attack. Aviation assets can provide
support while artillery systems reposition. The commander uses air reconnaissance to augment ground
reconnaissance and can employ aerial sensors in advance of ground maneuver reconnaissance. This allows
aerial observation of named and targeted areas of interest that facilitate the unit’s movement and cue the attack
of targets. A commander may need to request additional resources to include reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition assets to help identify targets for attack. Once targets are identified, the commander can
request long-range rocket and missile fires, precision-guided munitions, attack helicopters, and fixed wing
aircraft.
1-35. Pursuit is an offensive task designed to catch or cut of a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim
of destroying it (ADRP 3-90). A pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. Unlike an exploitation,
which may focus on seizing key or decisive terrain instead of the enemy force, the pursuit always focuses on
completing the destruction of fleeing enemy forces by destroying their ability and will to resist. The commander
in a pursuit tries to combine direct pressure against the retreating forces with an enveloping or encircling
maneuver that fixes the enemy in positions where the enemy force can be defeated in detail. Fires can restrict
movement of the enemy force and delay and disrupt its ability to quickly execute the maneuvers vital to
protecting itself as a whole.
1-36. An aggressively executed pursuit keeps the moving enemy unprepared, and unable to defend, ultimately
faced with the options of surrendering or complete destruction. Pursuits require swift maneuver and attacks by
1-10
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
forces to strike the enemy’s most vulnerable areas. There are two options in conducting a pursuit; each involves
assigning a subordinate the mission of maintaining direct-pressure on the rearward moving enemy force. The
first is a frontal pursuit that employs only direct-pressure. The second is a combination that uses a subordinate
element to maintain direct-pressure and one or more other subordinate forces to encircle the enemy. In the
pursuit, the most decisive effects result from combining a direct pressure force and an encircling force (FM 3-
90-1).
1-37. There is generally little time to establish and affect new task organizations or support relationships
between an attack and exploitation and/or pursuit. These operations transition very quickly from one to another.
1-38. During exploitation and pursuit it is important to have decentralized execution authority and support
relationships. For example a FAB MLRS/HIMARS battalion providing long-range rocket and missile fires to
the direct pressure force may have a GSR support relationship, and FAB cannon field artillery battalions may
have a reinforcing (R) support relationship to BCT field artillery battalions.
1-39. Specific FAB considerations for supporting a maneuver force during exploitation and pursuit include—
z
Positioning forward to support the division, corps, joint task force, or other FAB supported
command.
z
Massing fires to support the exploitation and pursuit.
z
Executing radar target acquisition, conducting counterfire, and strike operations in support of
division, corps, joint task force.
z
Conducting FAB strikes on repositioning and withdrawing enemy forces.
z
Supporting combat aviation brigade attack operations by suppressing enemy air defense systems.
z
Destruction of enemy command and control facilities
z
Using available aviation assets and joint fires to facilitate continuous fires on fleeing enemy forces
while FAB MLRS/HIMARS units are repositioning or moving with the exploiting/pursuing force.
z
Positioning the majority (two-thirds or more) of the FAB assets with the direct pressure force.
z
Placing field artillery assets with the pursuing/exploiting force.
z
Planning 6400-mil/360-degree fires to support the flanks and rear of pursuing/exploiting forces.
z
Providing massed FAB fires to the BCT to destroy enemy hasty defenses and allow the BCT to
continue the pursuit of the enemy main body.
z
Providing counterfire for the BCT to allow their organic and reinforcing field artillery battalions to
mass fires on fleeing maneuver forces.
z
Positioning FAB radars as far forward as possible to maximize range and provide maximum
flexibility as the division, corps, joint task force, or other FAB supported command rapidly moves to
destroy enemy formations.
MLRS/HIMARS BATTALION IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE TASKS
General Considerations
1-40. Armed with a combination of long-range delivery systems, precision munitions, and a control system, the
MLRS/HIMARS battalion provides the commander with the capability to interdict selected high-payoff targets
or entire target sets at depths previously accessible only to aviation assets or special operations forces. Long-
range MLRS/HIMARS battalion rocket and missile fires are employed to enable the supported commander to
shape operations by taking advantage of the reach afforded by these systems to engage the enemy well before
he is in contact with the main force. This long-range capability coupled with a synchronized array of fires assets
including mortars, electronic attack, unmanned aircraft, and rotary- and fixed-wing manned aircraft, enable the
ground force commander to set the condition for decisive operations. An MLRS/HIMARS unit functions to
provide commanders conducting offensive operations the ability to greatly expand the depth of battle.
Movement to Contact
1-41. The MLRS/HIMARS can provide support during both movement to contact and attack operations. With
its long range and tactical mobility, MLRS/HIMARS is suited to augment other artillery fires to protect the
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-11
Chapter 1
force, ensure freedom of maneuver, and prevent enemy reinforcement. Considerations for an MLRS/HIMARS
battalion supporting a maneuver unit during movement to contact include—
z
Planning artillery movement to maintain force momentum and provide adequate immediately
responsive support.
z
Using unmanned aircraft systems searching forward of advancing MLRS and HIMARS batteries as
an aid to reconnoiter routes and position areas—particularly to identify by-passed enemy forces.
z
Destroying enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
z
Anticipating/planning for hasty attack contingencies where enemy activity could significantly impact
operations of the supported unit.
z
Planning on-order fire support coordination measures throughout the supported unit area of
operations.
z
Planning and executing preparation fires.
Attack
1-42. Considerations for an MLRS/HIMARS battalion supporting a maneuver unit conducting an attack
include—
z
Planning for and providing preparation fires to facilitate attacks by the supported unit.
z
Massing effects of fires against high-payoff targets to meet criteria established by the force
commander to set conditions for crossing the line of departure.
z
Providing fires to disorganize and disrupt enemy reinforcing or reserve formations.
z
Massing fires against counterattacks.
z
Reinforcing field artillery battalions of attacking BCTs.
z
Providing fires to support raids and spoiling attacks.
z
Planning and providing counterfire.
Exploitation and Pursuit
1-43. Exploitation and pursuit involves rapid movement forward. The extended range provided by guided
MLRS and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) munitions efficiently supports both offensive tasks.
Ensure proper clearance of MLRS/HIMARS fires.
1-44. Considerations for an MLRS/HIMARS battalion supporting a maneuver unit during exploitation and
pursuit include—
z
Positioning MLRS/HIMARS unit close to the line of departure or forward line of own troops.
z
Ensuring that MLRS/HIMARS units maintain supporting fires while advancing.
z
Planning resupply operations.
z
Continually requesting, monitoring, and updating fire support coordination measures throughout the
supported unit area of operations.
z
Synchronizing MLRS/HIMARS fires with the employment of obstacles in chokepoints to continue
destruction of retreating enemy forces.
z
Conducting counterfire.
z
Providing MLRS/HIMARS fires to suppress enemy air defense systems.
CANNON FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE TASKS
General Considerations
1-45. For cannon field artillery battalions, offensive tasks frequently involve forward, rearward, and lateral
movement to better provide supporting fires to the attacking force. During periods of rapid advance, large areas
of terrain may be available and position areas for artillery may be relatively easy to find. When advances stall,
1-12
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
or attacking forces are counterattacked, terrain may be restricted. General considerations for the cannon field
artillery battalion during offensive tasks include—
z
Positioning firing units to effectively support the maneuver commander’s fire support requirements.
z
Planning for rapid movement along multiple routes using all available resources.
z
Positioning firing units to range beyond maneuver objectives.
z
Identifying requirements for extended range munitions.
z
Coordinating for external radar support.
z
Designating and positioning combat configured loads of artillery ammunition.
z
Ensuring ammunition plans address security, movement, and recovery of unused ammunition.
z
Planning for unit defense in a 6400-mil/360-degree environment.
z
Planning and executing radar zones.
Movement to Contact
1-46. Considerations for a cannon field artillery battalion supporting a maneuver force movement to contact
include—
z
Providing responsive fires for each phase of the operation.
z
Planning and providing counterfire.
z
Ensuring coordination requirements necessary to maintain synchronization of successive priority
targets.
z
Positioning fire support assets well forward to facilitate communications, allow for massing of fires,
preclude untimely displacements, and exploit weapons ranges.
z
Planning fires on key known, suspected, or potential enemy positions.
z
Planning for obscuration or screening smoke.
z
Planning fires to support blocking and fires to support future operations.
z
Planning fires on critical points along the axis of advance, to include the flanks.
z
Planning for suppression of enemy air defenses.
z
Planning fires to support reconnaissance assets.
z
Assigning priority of fires as designated by the BCT or supported commander.
z
Refining all targeting data based on the reconnaissance effort and operational changes as the situation
develops.
z
Synchronizing the positioning and movement of cannon field artillery batteries and platoons with the
tempo of the BCT or other supported unit and its fire support requirements.
z
Ensuring that firing batteries are positioned to support the BCT at points of vulnerability such as
obstacles, canalizing terrain, bridges, or gap crossings.
z
Positioning a cannon field artillery battery or platoon to follow close behind the advance guard to
provide responsive fires to lead elements.
z
Considering fires to support deception efforts.
z
Planning fires to support a possible transition to a hasty defense.
Attack
1-47. Considerations for a cannon field artillery battalion supporting an attacking maneuver force include—
z
Positioning to engage high-payoff targets.
z
Providing counterfire.
z
Planning for obscuration or screening smoke.
z
Positioning units to mass fires at decisive points.
z
Planning for the use of scatterable mines.
z
Planning for engaging enemy by-passed units.
z
Planning for field artillery movement through the breach site.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-13
Chapter 1
z
Positioning and sustaining field artillery assets to ensure continuous fire support.
Exploitaton and Pursuit
1-48. Considerations for a cannon field artillery battalion supporting a maneuver unit during exploitation and
pursuit include—
z
Planning for continual displacement field artillery.
z
Positioning firing units well forward in the supported unit formation.
z
Suppressing bypassed enemy pockets of resistance.
z
Planning for the delivery of scatterable mines.
z
Planning for greater use of available radio retransmission capabilities.
z
Planning for increased use of Class III and Class V supplies; air transportation of supplies may be
required.
TARGET ACQUISITION IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE TASKS
General Considerations
1-49. The effective assignment of target acquisition assets enables responsive fires during offensive tasks.
Quick-fire nets allow the observers to communicate with specific field artillery or mortar fire units. These kinds
of communication arrangements enhance responsiveness. Communication planning should also include
communications nets for the clearing of targets for air assets.
1-50. During offensive tasks, target acquisition radars support the protection of friendly forces by locating
enemy indirect fire systems. In offensive tasks, particular attention must be given to planning target acquisition
that enables future operations. The target acquisition planners provide focus on the identification of enemy
indirect fire assets. Detailed planning should provide for continuous coverage of the supported command’s area
of operations. The fire support planners must identify and coordinate the use of the terrain for the radar. Fire
support planners also recommend radar zones to the commander.
1-51. Control and cueing for radars should be decentralized during offensive tasks. The field artillery
controlling headquarters should designate cueing agents that can directly contact the radar through the radar
deployment order. The radar deployment order identifies the cueing agents and their priorities to the radar
section.
1-52. Requirements for radar positioning and movement are identified early in the operations process (see
chapter 3) and tied to specific events. This allows continuous coverage by facilitating mutually supporting
coverage between radars. The field artillery battalion commander monitors this process closely to ensure that
the use of terrain, movements, and radar zones are properly coordinated. General considerations for target
acquisition during all types of offensive tasks include—
z
Executing target acquisition in support of the supported command’s operations.
z
Positioning observers and radars to support the observation and collection plans.
z
Planning for frequent repositioning of target acquisition assets.
z
Using call for fire zones to provide target acquisition coverage on suspected enemy firing positions.
z
Coordinating radar employment across the supported command’s area of operations to ensure there
are no gaps in coverage.
z
Positioning radars to maximize range and provide maximum flexibility.
z
Positioning radars to cover critical point targets that are vulnerable to indirect fire.
z
Planning for 6400-mil/360-degree coverage and flank security.
Movement to Contact
1-53. Target acquisition assets focus on locating enemy indirect fire systems throughout the movement to
contact. Not only must the FAB support the BCTs with radar coverage to allow the BCTs’ organic radars to
1-14
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
continue to maneuver with the BCT, but also coverage must be provided to protect vulnerable assets. As the
situation develops surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition assets will transition to support shaping
and counterfire missions. Considerations for target acquisition during movement to contact include
z
Positioning observers, including manned and unmanned aircraft forward and along the supported
unit’s flanks to detect enemy forces.
z
Positioning radars as far forward as possible to maximize range and provide maximum flexibility.
z
Positioning radars to cover critical friendly assets that are vulnerable to enemy indirect fire from
bypassed regular or irregular forces.
z
Ensuring coordination requirements necessary to maintain synchronization of successive priority
targets.
Attack
1-54. During the attack, target acquisition assets focus on identifying enemy systems that can interdict the
supported maneuver unit as it moves toward the objective. Radars and observers linked to fire support systems
enable the supported unit’s attack. Specific considerations for target acquisition during the attack include
z
Integrating primary and alternate observers to engage targets.
z
Using unmanned aircraft systems to conduct reconnaissance of target areas of interest.
z
Ensuring radars are in position in time to support the assault on the objective and subsequent
consolidation.
z
Coordinating radar employment across the supported command’s area of operations to ensure there
are no gaps in coverage.
z
Planning call for fire zones on suspected and known enemy indirect fire systems.
z
Planning for critical friendly zones over breaching sites and gap crossings.
z
Positioning target acquisition to support higher echelon operations.
z
Insuring adequate sensor-to-shooter linkage.
z
Coordinating FAB radar coverage across the supported command’s area of operations to ensure there
are no gaps in coverage.
z
Using echeloned movement to provide continuous radar coverage to the supported force.
z
Providing FAB radar coverage for the BCTs or other supported units to allow movement of these
subordinate unit assets forward during the attack.
z
Coordinating surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition requirements with the battlefield
surveillance brigade and division, corps, joint task force, or other supported command G-2/S-2.
z
Positioning radars as far forward as possible to maximize range and provide maximum flexibility.
z
Positioning radars to cover critical friendly assets.
Exploitation and Pursuit
1-55. Considerations for target acquisition during exploitation and pursuit include—
z
Using unmanned aircraft to help provide timely and accurate information about enemy locations and
activities.
z
Focusing target acquisition assets on acquiring enemy indirect fire systems.
z
Positioning radars to cover critical friendly assets that are vulnerable to indirect fire from bypassed
regular or irregular forces.
z
Monitoring radar acquisitions for indications of scatterable mine emplacement by the enemy.
z
Integrating reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting acquisition with FAB strikes.
z
Positioning radars as far forward as possible to maximize range and provide maximum flexibility.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-15
Chapter 1
FIELD ARTILLERY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSIVE TASKS
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1-56. A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an attacking enemy force, retain key terrain, gain time,
economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. (ADRP 3-0) During
defensive tasks, FSCOORD, the chief of fires, fire support officer, fires cell integrate fires into the supported
unit‘s scheme of maneuver by planning fires previously described for offensive tasks (depending on mission
variables of METT-TC) as well as those specific to defensive tasks. These fires may also be time or event-
driven.
1-57. As the commander develops defensive plans, he must visualize how to synchronize, coordinate, and
distribute the effects of indirect and direct fire at the decisive time and place. Counterpreparation fire is
intensive prearranged fire delivered when the imminence of the enemy attack is discovered.
Counterpreparation fire is designed to break up enemy formations; delay movement of reinforcements or
reserves; disorganize the enemy’s system of command, communications, and observation; decrease the
effectiveness of artillery preparation; and impair the enemy’s offensive spirit. The fire support planners
continuously review and adjust primary and alternate task responsibilities. The FAB/artillery battalion S-3 must
maintain close coordination with the supported maneuver commander’s G-3/S-3 and fire support planners to
monitor changes in tasks and trigger responsibilities. The supported maneuver command’s brigade support
battalion
(BSB), sustainment officer and forward support company commander may need to deliver or
redistribute ammunition, to include emergency expeditionary support packages.
1-58. Indirect fires have the greatest impact when they are planned in depth, and synchronized with direct fires,
the use of obstacles, and strong defensive positions. As the enemy attack stalls, fires are a key element during
the execution of counterattacks. The maneuver commander integrates the indirect fire to enhance the
effectiveness of obstacles and to counter enemy attempts to breach or bypass these obstacles.
1-59. Typically a commander (depending upon METT-TC) will begin engaging advancing enemy forces at the
maximum range of field artillery fires. The focus being to destroy high-payoff targets as they appear, identify
the enemy’s main attack, cause early deployment of the attacking force, and channel the enemy into the
engagement area. Once an enemy attack begins, mortar and artillery fires break up the enemy formations to
suppress and neutralize supporting weapons and to destroy as much of their force as possible. Targets in relation
to friendly defensive positions are planned —
z
In front of the position on all confirmed and suspected enemy locations, on likely avenues of
approach, and on prominent terrain features that can be used by enemy overwatch elements.
z
In front of friendly barriers and obstacles, these fires are often critical to the defense. Any obstacle
not covered by both direct and indirect fires can be obscured and breached.
z
On the position, so that if an enemy penetrates friendly defenses, effective fire can be delivered on
them immediately.
z
Behind friendly positions to provide flexibility to the defense if an enemy surprises the defender by
attacking from an unexpected direction. This also aids the defender in blunting enemy penetration,
making the counterattack decisive.
z
On enemy avenues of approach into the flanks of a units position.
1-60. Commanders coordinate the attack of enemy high-payoff targets with field artillery fires as the enemy
concentrates at obstacles and near other movement-restricting points. Proper distribution of fires ensures
effective maneuver/fires coordination and the massing of overwhelming combat power at critical times and
places. The defending force employs its available combat power to defeat the enemy and regain the initiative.
The maneuver commander uses economy of force measures in areas where he does not anticipate decisive
operations. In all cases the maneuver commander’s most responsive resource, one able to add mass to units in
position, are the fires that are available to him.
1-61. In defensive tasks, the supported commander normally directs more centralized control of all artillery
assets, to ensure they are immediately responsive to the supported headquarters.
1-16
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
1-62. The commander employs fires to support the security force, using precision and other munitions to
destroy enemy reconnaissance and identified high-payoff targets. This also helps to deceive the enemy about the
location of the main battle area. The FSCOORD supports the security force by planning the delivery of fires at
appropriate times and places throughout the area of operations to slow and canalize the enemy force as it
approaches the security area. This allows the security force to engage the enemy on more favorable terms
without becoming decisively engaged. To prevent fratricide, the commander designates no-fire areas over
security force elements. Finally, the commander uses fires to support the withdrawal of the security force once
the shaping mission is complete and the defending unit is prepared to conduct main battle area operations.
1-63. In addition to long range cannon, rocket and missile fires, commanders use air interdiction to disrupt an
enemy advance. The commander also incorporates artillery fires with electronic attack and joint systems to
suppress enemy air defenses while close air support attacks a target. Air interdiction can delay, destroy, or
neutralize enemy attackers and follow-on forces before they can be brought to bear effectively against friendly
forces, thereby providing the commander with additional time to defeat the enemy in detail and prepare
defensive positions for subsequent attacks.
1-64. Field artillery assets target enemy combat units to force them to deploy, inflict casualties, disrupt the
cohesion of the enemy’s attack, and impede the enemy’s ability to mass combat power or reinforce successes.
Field artillery assets continue to extend the battle to attack enemy follow-on forces before they can be
committed to the main battle area. Field artillery systems attack command facilities and logistics sites in depth
to disrupt and deplete the attacking enemy.
1-65. Field artillery systems are deployed to cover obstacles, barriers, and lightly defended areas. The
defending commander takes advantage of the range and flexibility of field artillery weapons to quickly shift and
mass fires to engage targets at critical times and points in the battle. The defending commander assigns tasks to
field artillery systems that include closing obstacle gaps, or reseeding mines in previously breached obstacles.
1-66. In response to shallow enemy penetrations of the defense, artillery commanders normally reposition their
systems laterally, away from the point(s) of enemy penetration. This allows the defender‘s artillery systems to
provide fire support throughout the area of penetration.
1-67. Final protective fire is an immediately available prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy
movement across defensive lines or areas (JP 1-02). Final protective fires are the highest type of priority targets
and take precedence over all other fire requests. Final protective fires differ from standard priority targets in that
they are fired at the maximum rate of fire until ordered to stop or until all ammunition is expended. They are
designed to create a final barrier of steel. The risk estimate distance for a given delivery system is a factor in
how close the final protective fires can be placed in front of friendly front lines. Closer final protective fires are
easier to integrate into direct fire final protective lines. Danger close in close air support, artillery, mortar, and
naval gunfire support fires, is the term included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fire which
indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of the target. The close proximity distance is
determined by the weapon and munition fired (JP 3-09.3).
1-68. Artillery final protective fires are allocated to companies in the most critical defensive positions. Mortar
final protective fires may be allocated to cover less critical avenues of approach. Once allocated to a company,
that commander designates the precise final protective fire location where they can best augment the direct fire
weapons.
DEFENSIVE TASK CONSIDERATIONS FOR ALL FIELD ARTILLERY UNITS
1-69. Field artillery fires during defense tasks support maneuver by achieving desired effects on the attacking
enemy forces. Defensive task considerations for all field artillery units include—
z
Providing counterfire, counterpreparation fire and suppression of enemy air defenses.
z
Providing fires in support of the unit‘s security operations.
z
Providing field artillery fires in support of close combat and in depth to support maneuver operations.
z
Neutralizing enemy forces that have penetrated the defensive area.
z
Relocating field artillery units after identifying the enemy‘s main effort.
z
Providing rapid delivery of scatterable mines to support maneuver operations.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-17
Chapter 1
z
Planning for obscuration or screening smoke.
z
Coordinating for meteorological and survey data.
z
Providing precision munitions.
z
Designating firing units for final protective fires.
z
Delivering field artillery fires at maximum range.
FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSIVE TASKS
General Considerations
1-70. As during offensive tasks, FAB fires during defensive tasks are fundamental to the success of the
supported unit. Fires throughout the enemy’s depth destroy enemy artillery, separate enemy echelons, and
defeat enemy maneuver elements as they move forward. Fires can be critical to offsetting a lack of maneuver
assets for defense of large areas. See Figure 1-3 for an example organization for combat for a FAB designated
as the counterfire HQ with control of all field artillery radars.
Figure 1-3. Organization for combat - FAB as counterfire headquarters example
1-71. In the defense, the FAB generally retains more centralized control of field artillery assets. This allows the
FAB commander maximum flexibility in supporting all BCTs. FAB movement during defensive tasks is
normally limited to: withdrawal from the covering force area; lateral repositioning for survivability; and
maneuver to support the striking force in a mobile defense. The FAB could be positioned in a BCT area of
operations during the defense. Close coordination between the FAB and the BCT S-3 is vital to ensure the FAB
1-18
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
is positioned to execute its missions but will not interfere with BCT movement or repositioning. The FAB may
be given its own assignment for positioning and some security assets to respond to localized threats.
1-72. The general tasks of the FAB in the defense are—
z
Coordinating joint fires against the enemy to separate echelons.
z
Executing fires at maximum range.
z
Providing long-range missile fires on enemy high-payoff targets.
z
Providing adequate support to the division covering force. A large portion of the FAB may occupy
the covering force operational area and it is possible that the FAB will serve as the force field
artillery headquarters for the BCT executing the covering force mission.
z
Coordinating joint air assets against enemy indirect fire systems.
z
Supporting joint air and combat aviation brigade attacks by suppressing enemy air defenses.
z
Providing massed fires to assist BCTs in breaking the momentum of attacking enemy maneuver
forces.
z
Executing counterfire to destroy enemy artillery systems.
z
Providing meteorological support to subordinate units.
z
Positioning radars to augment the BCT assets in the covering force.
Area Defense
1-73. The area defense is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated
terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADRP 3-90). The focus of the area defense
is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting prepared
positions. During an area defense, FAB fires assist in shaping operations that constrain the enemy into a specific
course of action or fix him in a given location. These actions limit the enemy’s options. Fires may be used to
attrit enemy follow-on and reserve forces to keep them from entering the main battle area. The commander
covers obstacles with fires that turn, block, or disrupt to limit the options available to the enemy. The decisive
operation focuses fires into engagement areas, possibly supplemented by a counterattack. Additional
considerations for the FAB in supporting an area defense include—
z
Executing fires at maximum range.
z
Engaging enemy long-range indirect fire systems prior to the enemy executing preparation fires.
z
Coordinating joint air assets against enemy indirect fires systems.
z
Coordinating joint fires against the enemy high-payoff targets.
z
Massing fires to break the momentum of an enemy attack.
z
Providing counterfire support to BCTs as the enemy enters the engagement areas allowing the BCT’s
organic field artillery battalions to execute close support fires for maneuver.
z
Providing fires to disrupt follow-on echelons.
z
Executing target acquisition and strike in support of shaping operations.
z
Planning for 6400-mil/360-degree fires and support to sustainment area operations and units.
Mobile Defense
1-74. The mobile defense is a defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through
a decisive attack by a striking force (ADRP 3-90). During a mobile defense the defender withholds a large
portion of available forces for use as a striking force in a counterattack. Effective mobile defense requires
retaining the ability to maneuver freely and quickly to strike and defeat the enemy. Defending forces combine
offensive, defensive, and delaying actions to lure the attacking enemy into positions where they are vulnerable
to counterattack. In a mobile defense, commanders take advantage of terrain in depth, military deception,
obstacles and mines while employing fires and maneuver to seize initiative from the attacking enemy force.
Planning of all fires and identifying and defeating targets to delay, disrupt and disorganize the enemy attack is a
critical enabling factor of the mobile defense. The defending force positions itself to conduct decisive
engagements that destroy the enemy maneuver forces. The operations require continuous and concentrated fire
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-19
Chapter 1
support. The commander weights the striking force, through the allocation of field artillery and other fire
support resources available.
1-75. The defending force’s planned maneuver must incorporate the movement of fire support assets to
locations where they can provide continuous support. Fire support assets, especially when employing precision-
guided munitions, can enhance the combat capability of committed maneuver forces and enable the quick defeat
of the enemy force.
1-76. The defending commander takes precautions to prevent fratricide by establishing restrictive fire lines and
other fire support coordination measures. He positions fire support assets to support screen and guard forces and
allocates additional artillery to support a covering force. If the security force is assigned a large operational
area, the commander may have to position fire support assets to provide effective coverage of only the most
likely enemy avenues of approach. This is particularly important for a screen because often the screen force
relies on indirect fire to delay or disrupt the enemy. Providing adequate indirect fire support to the security force
may require the main body to position its artillery well forward in its formation.
1-77. Additional considerations for FAB fires in support of a mobile defense include—
z
Positioning two-thirds of the FAB firing units with the fixing force during a mobile defense and one-
third with the striking force.
z
Moving one-third of the FAB firing units with the striking force during a mobile defense.
z
Supporting combat aviation brigade attack operations.
z
Suppressing enemy air defenses.
z
Positioning FAB radars as far forward as possible to maximize range and acquire enemy indirect fire
systems.
Retrograde
1-78. The retrograde is a defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy (ADRP 3-
90). This includes delays, withdrawals and retirements. Retrograde operations are conducted to gain time,
preserve forces, place the enemy in unfavorable positions or avoid combat under undesirable conditions.
Movement of FAB units during retrograde operations is closely tied to the movement of the ground maneuver
forces. The FAB must balance the requirement to execute strike missions with the need to maneuver with the
force away from the enemy. Close coordination between the FAB and the terrain managers is necessary to
ensure the FAB positioning and movement is synchronized with the retrograde of the BCTs.
1-79. The considerations for establishing command and support relationships for retrograde operations are
similar to those for the mobile and area defenses. The ground forces in contact with the enemy need responsive
fires to support breaking contact with the enemy. For a withdrawal not under pressure, there is no enemy
contact, however the supported force and the FAB move tactically and retain the readiness to respond should
the enemy attack. The FAB continues to centrally control fires to support the force as a whole. Additionally, the
FAB must retain the flexibility to mass fires in support of individual BCTs to facilitate disengagement and
repositioning.
1-80. Additional considerations for the FAB in support of a retrograde include—
z
Providing FAB strike to delay, disrupt, and attrit attacking enemy forces.
z
Echeloning FAB units to keep two-thirds of FAB assets in position.
z
Task-organizing FAB field artillery battalions.
z
Providing support to the supported command rear guard.
z
Designation as the force field artillery headquarters for the BCT executing the covering force
mission.
z
Positioning sufficient assets forward to support a covering force if one is employed.
z
Establishing liaison with the covering force headquarters.
z
Providing fires to disrupt out of contact enemy echelons within the BCT area of operations.
z
Positioning units to facilitate follow-on operations such as establishment of a hasty defense.
z
Positioning FAB radars to provide coverage while BCT radars are displacing.
1-20
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
z
Providing mass fires to the BCT to permit disengagement by the BCTs.
z
Providing counterfire support to the BCTs.
z
Providing recommendations to the supported commander concerning the placement, coordination,
and movement of target acquisition assets.
z
Planning for the possibility that civilian evacuation during operations may interfere with tactical
movement.
z
Planning for the suppression of enemy air defenses.
MLRS/HIMARS BATTALION SUPPORT OF DEFENSIVE TASKS
General Considerations
1-81. General consideration for the MLRS/HIMARS battalion supporting defensive tasks include—
z
Providing long-range fires with precision-guided and area munitions.
z
Providing rocket and missile fires on enemy targets arrayed in depth and high-payoff targets.
z
Providing long-range rocket and missile fires to suppress enemy air defenses in support of air
operations.
Area Defense
1-82. Specific considerations for the MLRS/HIMARS battalion supporting an area defense include—
z
Positioning sufficient MLRS/HIMARS firing units forward to support a covering force.
z
Providing long-range rocket and missile fires to delay, disrupt, and attrit attacking enemy forces.
z
Providing rocket and missile fires to break the momentum of an enemy attack.
z
Providing rocket and missile fires to destroy enemy indirect fire and target acquisition systems.
z
Providing rocket and missile fires to disrupt the arrival of enemy follow-on echelons.
Mobile Defense
1-83. Specific considerations for the MLRS/HIMARS battalion supporting a mobile defense include—
z
Planning positions that allow two-thirds of the MLRS/HIMARS firing units to be ready to fire at any
one time.
z
Positioning MLRS/HIMARS firing units with both the fixing and striking forces.
z
Moving MLRS/HIMARS firing units with the striking force.
Retrograde
1-84. Specific considerations for the MLRS/HIMARS battalion supporting a retrograde include—
z
Conducting strikes to delay, disrupt, and attrit attacking enemy forces.
z
Echeloning MLRS/HIMARS units to keep two-thirds of firing units in position ready to fire to
enable the supported command retrograde.
z
Positioning MLRS/HIMARS firing units with the covering force.
z
Moving to positions that facilitate follow-on operations.
CANNON FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSIVE TASKS
General Considerations
1-85. Repositioning to alternate or supplemental positions may often be reactive during early stages of the
defense. The cannon field artillery battalion may experience increased lateral and rearward movement until the
friendly maneuver force can regain the initiative, slow the advance and/or better anticipate enemy actions.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-21
Chapter 1
1-86. During defensive tasks, the cannon field artillery battalion should coordinate for engineer support and
Class IV materials to harden positions and reduce the effectiveness of enemy fires. Plan for the use of direct fire
in support of battery/platoon defenses. Critical friendly zones may be used to increase protection of key friendly
units. Anticipate the need for survivability moves after firing units have provided extended and/or intense fires
(planned or unplanned). Review emergency destruction procedures.
1-87. Additional considerations for cannon battalions during defensive tasks include—
z
Planning alternate and supplementary positions for each location.
z
Unmanned aircraft systems can be used to recon routes and field artillery position areas.
z
Conducting ground reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of alternate and supplementary
positions.
z
Requesting engineer assets to prepare field artillery position areas.
z
Engaging approaching enemy formations at maximum range with field artillery fires.
z
Providing counterfire.
z
Coordinating with the supported command’s fires cell to ensure that the obstacle plan integrates
cannon fires to reinforce obstacles.
z
Planning for the use of scatterable mines.
z
Developing the fire support plan to include priorities of fires, targets on point obstacles, obstacle
belts and groups.
z
Coordinating with the supported command’s fires cell for close air support and Army aviation close
combat attacks.
z
Coordinating with the supported command’s fire support officer and fires cell to plan for and mass
all available fires to support disengagements.
z
Providing field artillery illumination to assist friendly force night operations, to mark locations or
targets, to provide friendly direction orientation, or to degrade enemy night vision equipment.
Area Defense
1-88. Specific considerations for the cannon field artillery battalion supporting an area defense include—
z
Ensuring adequate cannon field artillery fires are available for the battle handover and withdrawal of
the security forces.
z
Planning to forward position cannon field artillery firing units in support of security area operations.
z
Coordinating the movement of field artillery batteries to support fire support tasks; ensuring
movements are coordinated with the scheme of maneuver to avoid confusion and possible
interference with planned maneuver actions.
Mobile Defense
1-89. Specific considerations for a cannon field artillery battalion supporting a mobile defense include—
z
Providing timely cannon field artillery fires to suppress enemy air defenses.
z
Planning for the use of obscuration or screening smoke to support both the fixing and striking force.
z
Synchronizing the positioning and movement of the cannon field artillery battalion subordinate firing
units and radars with the scheme of maneuver.
z
Providing counterfire.
z
Positioning ammunition stocks for each phase of the operation.
Retrograde
1-90. Considerations for a cannon field artillery battalion supporting a retrograde are the same as those for a
mobile defense.
1-22
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
TARGET ACQUISITION IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSIVE TASKS
General Considerations
1-91. The primary role of target acquisition radar in the defense is to provide target intelligence and
information to allow for counterfire mission processing. Target acquisition planners must also consider
transitions to offensive tasks such as counterattacks. Positioning, task organization, and on-order missions
should facilitate transitions. General consideration for target acquisition during defensive tasks include—
z
Employing target acquisition assets to provide coverage of named areas of interest, target areas of
interest, and critical assets.
z
Integrating radar placement and acquisition data into fire planning.
z
Coordinating target acquisition assets to locate targets in a 6400-mil/360-degree area of operations.
z
Assisting the supported command’s fires cell in the development of an observation plan that:
„ Ensures obstacles are under continuous observation.
„ Ensures that responsibility for related fire support tasks are identified and coordinated.
„ Includes priority intelligence requirements.
„ Addresses both military and civilian activity.
„ Is objective oriented.
„ And focuses on monitoring critical areas.
z
Rehearsing the observation plan to ensure that all targets are adequately observed, that triggers are
effectively coordinated, and that backup plans are adequate.
z
Employing radar in support of higher echelon shaping operations.
z
Linking unmanned aircraft systems with MLRS/HIMARS units to rapidly respond to acquired enemy
indirect fires units.
z
Positioning observers to see both targets and trigger lines.
z
Ensuring adequate sensor-to-shooter linkage.
z
Using echeloned movement to provide continuous radar coverage to the supported force.
z
Coordinating surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition requirements with the supported
command G-2/S-2.
z
Integrating air assets into counterfire operations.
z
Coordinating radar employment across the supported command’s area of operations to ensure there
are no gaps in coverage.
Area Defense
1-92. During area defense the commander directs reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition assets to
determine the locations, strengths and probable intentions of the attacking enemy force before and throughout
the defense; placing a high priority on early identification of the enemy’s main effort. Target acquisition assets
are focused on locating enemy identified high-payoff targets that may include enemy fire support systems.
Specific considerations for target acquisition systems area defense include
z
Integrating primary and alternate observers to engage high-priority targets.
z
Positioning radars to maximize range and acquire enemy indirect fire systems.
z
Positioning radars to cover infantry defiles and strong points.
z
Employing allocated unmanned aircraft systems to conduct reconnaissance, detect enemy indirect
fire systems, and other enemy forces.
z
Planning for radar critical friendly zones.
Mobile Defense
1-93. Specific considerations for target acquisition supporting a mobile defense include—
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-23
Chapter 1
z
Planning for frequent repositioning of target acquisition assets based on movement of the forward
line of own troops.
z
Positioning observers forward and along the flanks of both the fixing and striking force to observe
and execute priority targets.
z
Positioning radars as far forward as possible in the fixing force to maximize range and provide
maximum flexibility as the striking force maneuvers to destroy enemy formations.
z
Positioning radars to cover critical point targets.
z
Employing unmanned aircraft systems forward of advancing maneuver units to detect enemy forces.
z
Using unmanned aircraft systems to conduct reconnaissance of target areas of interest that include
enemy indirect fires assets.
z
Continually reviewing timelines and coordination requirements necessary to maintain
synchronization of observers/triggers, shooters, and decision makers for successive priority targets
during for both fixing and striking forces.
z
Monitoring radar acquisitions for indications of scatterable mine emplacement by the enemy.
z
Integrating reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting acquisition with the fixing force to slow and
disorganize repositioning and withdrawing enemy forces.
Retrograde
1-94. During a retrograde, target acquisition-specific considerations may include
z
Positioning long-range radars rearward to provide extended coverage for the supported command
during the retrograde.
z
Planning call for fire zones on probable enemy field artillery locations.
FIELD ARTILLERY IN SUPPORT OF TACTICAL ENABLING TASKS
AND OTHER SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
SECURITY OPERATIONS
1-95. Security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate
warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which
to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force
(ADRP 3-90). The ultimate goal of security operations is to protect the force from surprise, clarify the enemy’s
tactical intent, and reduce the situational unknowns. A commander may conduct security operations to the front,
flanks, or rear of the friendly force.
1-96. All maneuver forces are capable of conducting security operations (ADRP 3-90). A reinforcing FAB
cannon field artillery battalion or BCT organic field artillery battalion may be part of a larger covering force
operation where a FAB functions as the force field artillery headquarters. The BCT field artillery battalion will
provide fire support to its parent BCT, but may also be assigned an R, GSR, or GS relationship by the division
commander or the force field artillery headquarters. A BCT organic field artillery battalion may also serve as
force field artillery headquarters of the covering force.
ARTILLERY RAID
1-97. An artillery raid is a type of attack that uses field artillery as its primary attack mechanism. An artillery
raid is frequently conducted by a platoon or battery sized field artillery unit. Artillery raid missions are
conducted to achieve tactical or operational objectives and involve the rapid movement of artillery assets by air
or ground into a position to attack a high-payoff target with artillery fires. They entail sending firing elements
forward—generally beyond the security area—to engage enemy targets beyond the maximum range of
positioned field artillery weapons. Normally the raid is extremely short and should not involve sustained
operations. Detailed planning, surprise, and speed in execution are the key factors in the successful conduct of
an artillery raid. Because the target is likely to be perishable, the raid is planned and executed in a compressed
1-24
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Field Artillery Operations
timeline. For more information on raids in which specific types of field artillery units participate, see the Army
techniques publication (ATP) specific to that type of unit.
ENCIRCLEMENT OPERATIONS
1-98. Encirclement operations are operations where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an
opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communications and reinforcement (ADRP
3-90). Encirclement operations occur because combat operations involving modernized forces are likely to be
chaotic, intense, and highly destructive, extending across large areas containing relatively few units as each side
maneuvers against the other to obtain positional advantage (ADRP 3-90).
1-99. If there is an encircled enemy force, and the friendly commander decides to destroy it, that enemy force is
reduced as rapidly as possible to free resources for use elsewhere. The reduction of an encircled enemy force
continues without interruption, using the maximum concentration of forces and fires, until the encircled enemy
force is destroyed or surrenders. A commander may destroy encircled enemy forces by fires alone or by a
combination of fire and movement.
BREAKOUT OPERATIONS
1-100. A breakout is an operation conducted by an encircled force to regain freedom of movement or contact
with friendly units. It differs from other attacks only in that a simultaneous defense in other areas of the
perimeter must be maintained (ADRP 3-90). The field artillery may support the breakout of friendly encircled
forces as part of the encircled force or from outside the encirclement. Considerations for field artillery as part of
the encircled force may include
z
Reorganizing and consolidating, as necessary, field artillery units within the encirclement.
z
Ensuring centralized control where possible and establishing a force field artillery headquarters, as
required.
z
Ensuring 6400-mil/360-degree coverage.
z
Retaining the capability to mass fires, as required.
z
Planning for aerial resupply of ammunition and critical items.
z
Reallocating ammunition to support the firing unit(s) supporting the breakout.
z
Coordinating with field artillery units outside the encirclement that can provide supporting fires.
z
Prioritizing communications to prevent network overload.
z
Implementing appropriate fire support coordination measures.
z
Planning for firing restrictions based on ammunition shortages.
1-101. The field artillery battalion should be neither the first nor the last unit out of the perimeter during
breakout from an enemy encirclement. If more than one firing element is within the perimeter, withdrawal
should be phased to maximize the time field artillery fires are available. Consider external field artillery support
if available. Maintain unit integrity at platoon or battery level if at all possible. The field artillery battalion
commander must keep in contact with both the lead element commander and the forces remaining in the
perimeter. Moving units must anticipate emergency occupations.
PASSAGE OF LINES
1-102. A passage of lines is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s
combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (JP 3-18). A commander
conducts a passage of lines to continue an attack or conduct a counterattack, retrograde security or main battle
forces, and any time one unit cannot bypass another unit’s position (ADRP 3-90).
Forward Passage of Lines
1-103. A forward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving
toward the enemy. During a forward passage of lines, responsibility for field artillery fires passes from the
stationary force to the passing force at the same time control is passed to the maneuver units. The stationary
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-25
Chapter 1
field artillery force may be attached to the passing field artillery force or it may be ordered to reinforce the
passing field artillery force from its present positions, until the passing force has moved out of range. During a
forward passage of lines, the field artillery commander considers
z
Establishing liaison and communications with the stationary force field artillery headquarters.
z
Obtaining and reviewing the passage plans of the supported force.
z
Determining security requirements.
z
Obtaining available target lists and fire plans from the stationary force.
z
Planning and reviewing position areas and routes.
z
Reviewing possible enemy observation capabilities in the area.
z
Reviewing fire support coordination measures.
z
Considering future resupply operations.
z
Exchanging survey data with the stationary force field artillery headquarters.
z
Exchanging data for radar zones; particularly call for fire zones and artillery target intelligence zones.
z
Reviewing the observation plan, and coordinating forward positions.
z
Planning for follow-on tasks.
Rearward Passage of Lines
1-104. Withdrawal actions in the defense often involve a rearward passage of lines. A rearward passage of
lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving away from the enemy (ADRP 3-
90). This often occurs when a security force withdraws behind the forward edge of the battle area. Field artillery
units with each force exchange liaison and critical information as early as possible. They coordinate fire plans to
synchronize and maximize their combined firepower. This includes the transfer of field artillery support
responsibilities within the maneuver unit’s sector. This transfer usually coincides with the passing of maneuver
control. During the rearward passage the withdrawing field artillery commander considers—
z
Exchanging field artillery fire plans and target lists.
z
Establishing communications requirements.
z
Coordinating clearance of position areas and routes, as required.
z
Coordinating resupply, if appropriate.
z
Exchanging survey data with the stationary force field artillery headquarters.
z
Confirming recognition signals with the stationary force.
RELIEF IN PLACE
1-105. A commander conducts a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat
effectiveness of committed units. A relief in place is an operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all
or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for
the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3). The incoming
unit continues the operation as ordered.
1-106. The higher headquarters directs when and where to conduct the relief and establishes the appropriate
control measures. Normally, during the conduct of major combat operations, the unit relieved is defending.
However, a relief may set the stage for resuming offensive operations (ADRP 3-90). During a relief in place,
the field artillery battalion commander should consider
z
Establishing liaison and communications between field artillery units.
z
Providing existing fire plans to the incoming field artillery unit and exchange liaison officers.
z
Establishing procedures for the relief.
z
Provide existing survey data to incoming unit
1-107. Normally, field artillery units will not be relieved at the same time as the maneuver forces. The
exchange of field artillery responsibilities is a condition that must be met and acknowledged by the supported
commander. The outgoing force passes fire plans to the incoming force as a key component of those conditions.
1-26
FM 3-09
4 April 2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Content      ..      1       2         ..

 

 

///////////////////////////////////////