Airbus A330/A340. Flight Crew Training Manual (2007)

FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL

OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

AP / FD / ATHR

01.030

JAN 09/07

NORMAL OPERATIONS

The A/THR can only be active, when the thrust levers are between IDLE and the
CLB detent.

When the thrust levers are beyond the CLB detent, thrust is controlled manually
to the thrust lever position, and the A/THR is armed (A/THR appears in blue on
the FMA). This means that the A/THR is ready to be re-activated, when the flight
crew sets the thrust levers back to the CLB detent (or below).

A/THR OPERATING SECTORS _ ALL ENGINES OPERATING

TOGA

MCT

IDLE STOP

CLB

FOF 01030 00021 0001

ATHR

Sector

Arm

At Takeoff

The thrust levers are set either full forward to TOGA, or to the FLX detent.
Thrust is manually controlled to the TLA, and A/THR is armed.

The FMA

indicates this in blue.

After Takeoff

When the aircraft reaches THR RED ALT, the flight crew sets the thrust levers
back to the CLB detent.

This activates A/THR. MAX CLB will, therefore, be the

maximum normal thrust setting that will be commanded by the A/THR in CLB,
CRZ, DES, or APPR, as required.

Thrust Lever(s) below the CLB Detent

If one thrust lever is set to below the CLB detent, the FMA triggers a LVR
ASYM message, as a reminder to the flight crew (e.g. this configuration might be
required due to an engines high vibration level). However, if all thrust levers are
set to below the CLB detent, with the A/THR active, then the ECAM repeatedly
triggers the AUTO FLT AUTOTHRUST LIMITED caution. This is because there is
no operational reason to be in such a situation, and to permanently limit A/THR
authority on all engines.

In this case, all thrust levers should either be brought

back to the CLB detent, or the A/THR should be set to OFF.

Thrust Levers Beyond the CLB Detent

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AP / FD / ATHR

01.030

JAN 09/07

If all thrust levers are set to beyond the CLB detent, when A/THR is active, the
flight crew manually controls thrust to the Thrust Lever Position. The FMA
displays MAN THR in white, and the A/THR is armed. As a reminder, LVR CLB
flashes on the FMA. This technique is most efficient, when the aircraft speed
goes significantly below the target. When the aircraft speed or acceleration is
satisfactory, the thrust levers should be brought back to the CLB detent. This
re-activates the A/THR.

SPEED DROP IN APPROACH: RECOMMENDED RECOVERY TECHNIQUE

IAS Iower than

target speed

with ATHR SPEED mode

beyond CLB

Push levers

Bring levers

back into CLB detent

(if acceleration satisfactory)

MAN THR

with ATHR blue

Thrust Increases

FOF 01030 00024 0001

Note: When using this technique during approach (e.g. to regain VAPP), the

thrust levers should be moved past the CLB detent, but not beyond the
MCT.

In most cases, it is not necessary to go beyond MCT, and the PF

may inadvertently advance thrust levers all the way to the TOGA stop, and
thereby engage go-around mode.

OPERATIONS WITH ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE

The above-noted principles also apply to an one-engine inoperative situation,
except that A/THR can only be active, when the thrust levers are set between
IDLE and MCT.

A/THR OPERATING SECTORS - ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE

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OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

AP / FD / ATHR

01.030

JAN 09/07

IDLE

TOGA

MCT

Sect

FOF 01030 00025 0001

In case of engine failure, the thrust levers will be in MCT detent for remainder of
the flight.

This is because MCT is the maximum thrust that can usually be

commanded by the A/THR for climb or acceleration, in all flight phases (e.g.
CLB, CRZ, DES or APPR ).

TO SET AUTOTHRUST TO OFF

HOW TO SET A/THR OFF

FLX

SPD

HDG

LAT

HDG V/S

ALT

LVL/CH

V/S

METRIC

ALT

100

1000

SPD

MACH

HDG
TRK

V/S
FPA

AP1

AP2

A/THR

PUSH

LEVEL

OFF

APPR

LOC

ALT

A/THR

305

29000

NOT RECOMMENDED:

USE OF ATHR P/B ON FCU

RECOMMENDED METHOD:

USE OF THE INSTINCTIVE

DISCONNECT P/B

COMMONLY USED AT LANDING:

THRUST LEVERS

SET TO IDLE

T
H

FOF 01030 00026 0001

1) USE OF INSTINCTIVE DISCONNECT (I/D) PUSHBUTTON

If the I/D pushbutton is pressed when the thrust levers are in CLB detent, thrust
will increase to MAX CLB. This may cause a not desired thrust change. For
example, during approach, A/THR in SPEED mode, commands approximately N1
55 %.

If the PF presses the I/D pushbutton, the A/THR is set to off, and thrust

goes to MAX CLB.

This will perturbate the approach.

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FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL

OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

AP / FD / ATHR

01.030

JAN 09/07

Therefore, the recommended technique for setting A/THR to off is:

-- Return the thrust levers to approximately the current thrust setting, by

observing the TLA symbol on the thrust gauge

-- Press the I/D pushbutton

This technique minimizes thrust discontinuity, when setting A/THR to off.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUE TO SET A/THR OFF

55.0

Press I/D

Bring thrust

55.0

A/THR ON

A/THR OFF

levers to actual

thrust

N1 55

FOF 01030 00027 0001

2) THRUST LEVERS SET TO IDLE

If thrust levers are set to IDLE, A/THR is set to off.

This technique is usually

used in descent, when the A/THR is in THR IDLE, or at landing. During flare,
with the A/THR active, the thrust levers are set to the CLB detent. Then, when
thrust reduction is required for landing, the thrust levers should be moved
smoothly and set to the IDLE stop. This will retard thrust, and set A/THR to off.
As a reminder, the "RETARD" aural alert will sound.

In flare, this aural alert will

occur at 20 feet, except in the case of autoland, where it occurs at 10 feet.

It should be noted that, when the thrust levers are set back to IDLE and A/THR
set to off: The A/THR can be reactivated by pressing the pushbutton on the
FCU, and returning the thrust levers to the applicable detent.

The thrust levers

should be immediately returned to the applicable detent, in order to avoid an
ECAM "AUTOTHRUST LIMITED" message

3) USE OF THE FCU PUSHBUTTON

Use of the FCU pushbutton is considered to be an involuntary A/THR off
command (e.g. in the case of a failure).

When pressed, thrust is frozen and

remains locked at the value it had when the flight crew pressed the A/THR
pushbutton, as long as the thrust levers remain in the CLB or MCT detent.

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OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

AP / FD / ATHR

01.030

JAN 09/07

If thrust levers are out of detent, thrust is manually controlled and, therefore,
unlocked.

An ECAM caution and an FMA message trigger during thrust lock:

⇒

THR LK appears in amber on the FMA

⇒

The ECAM caution is:

AUTOFLT

: ATHR OFF

ENG.........THR LOCKED

thrust levers.....move

In this case, when the flight crew moves the thrust levers out of detent, full
manual control is recovered, and the THR LK message disappears from the FMA.

This feature should not be used, unless the instinctive disconnect pushbuttons
are inoperative.

ALPHA FLOOR

When the aircraft’s angle-of-attack goes beyond the ALPHA FLOOR threshold,
this means that the aircraft has decelerated significantly (below ALPHA PROT
speed):

A/THR activates automatically and orders TOGA thrust, regardless of

the thrust lever position.

The example below illustrates that:

The aircraft is in descent with the thrust levers manually set to IDLE.

The aircraft decelerates, during manual flight with the FD off, as indicated on

the FMA.

SPEED SCALE AND FMA INDICATIONS IN A TYPICAL A FLOOR CASE

When A Floor triggered

TOGA thrust

(although levers Idle)

When out of A FLOOR

TOGA LK

A FLOOR

TOGA LK

A/THR

FOF 01030 00030 0001

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OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

AP / FD / ATHR

01.030

JAN 09/07

When the speed decreases, so that the angle-of-attack reaches the ALPHA
FLOOR threshold, A/THR activates and orders TOGA thrust, despite the fact that
the thrust levers are at IDLE.

When the aircraft accelerates again, the angle-of-attack drops below the ALPHA
FLOOR threshold. TOGA thrust is maintained or locked. This enables the flight
crew to reduce thrust, as necessary.

TOGA LK appears on the FMA to indicate

that TOGA thrust is locked. The desired thrust can only be recovered by setting
A/THR to off, with the instinctive disconnect pushbutton.

ALPHA floor is available, when the flight controls are in NORMAL LAW, from lift
off to 100 ft R/A at landing. It is inhibited in some cases of engine failure.

A/THR USE - SUMMARY

Use of A/THR is recommended during the entire flight. It may be used in most
failures cases, including:

Engine failure, even during autoland

Abnormal configurations

However, use of manual thrust is recommended when the autotrim function is
lost. The aim of this recommendation is to avoid large thrust changes.

A/THR USE IN FLIGHT

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FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL

OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

AP / FD / ATHR

01.030

JAN 09/07

At THR RED ALT (until landing)

GO AROUND

Thrust levers: TOGA

A/THR armed (blue on FMA)

At TAKE OFF

Thrust levers: TOGA or FLEX

A/THR armed (blue on FMA)

In APPROACH

Thrust levers: CLB (or MCT in case of engine failure)

A/THR active in speed mode

Hold the thrust levers and push them forward (not

above MCT) temporarily if required for additional thrust

FLARE and LANDING

Thrust levers: IDLE when required

A/THR off

Note: no automatic RETARD except
in autoland. This explains
why the RETARD call out comes
at 20 ft in all cases, except
AUTOLAND where it comes at
10 ft.

Thrust levers: CLB (or MCT in case of engine failure)

A/THR active (white on FMA) in speed or thrust mode

FOF 01030 00029 0001

A/THR should be monitored via the:

FMA

SPEED / SPEED TREND on the PFD

N1/N1 command (EPR) on the ECAM E/WD.

AP, FD, A/THR MODE CHANGES AND REVERSIONS

MSN 0002-0860

INTRODUCTION

The flight crew manually engages the modes. However, they may change
automatically, depending on the:

AP, FD, and A/THR system integration

Logical sequence of modes

So-called "mode reversions".

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FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL

OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

AP / FD / ATHR

01.030

JAN 09/07

AP, FD, ATHR SYSTEM INTEGRATION

There is a direct relationship between aircraft pitch control, and engine thrust
control.

This relationship is designed to manage the aircraft’s energy.

If the AP/FD pitch mode controls a vertical trajectory (e.g. ALT, V/S, FPA, G/S):

A/THR controls speed

If the AP/FD pitch mode controls a speed (e.g. OP CLB, OP DES):

A/THR controls thrust (THR CLB, THR IDLE)

If no AP/FD pitch mode is engaged (i.e. AP is off and FD is off):

A/THR controls speed

Therefore, any change in the AP/FD pitch mode is associated with a change in
the A/THR mode.

Note: For this reason, the FMA displays the A/THR mode and the AP/FD vertical

mode columns next to each other.

THE LOGICAL SEQUENCE OF MODES

In climb, when the flight crew selects a climb mode, they usually define an
altitude target, and expect the aircraft to capture and track this altitude.
Therefore, when the flight crew selects a climb mode, the next logical mode is
automatically armed.

For example:

AP/FD MODE CAPTURE AND TRACKING (1)

ALT

Capture

Conditions

V/S + 2000

ALT

OP CLB

Capture

Conditions

ALT*

Tracking

FOF 01030 03717 0001

The flight crew may also manually arm a mode in advance, so that the AP/FD

intercepts a defined trajectory.

Typically, the flight crew may arm NAV, LOC-G/S, and APPNAV-FINAL.

When

the capture or tracking conditions occur, the mode will change sequentially.

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FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL

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AP / FD / ATHR

01.030

JAN 09/07

AP/FD MODE CAPTURE AND TRACKING (2)

HDG

NAV

HDG

ALT

G/S

LOC

ALT

G/S

LOC*

NAV

ALT

G/S

LOC

FOF 01030 03719 0001

These logical mode changes occur, when the modes are armed.

They appear

in blue on the FMA.

MODE REVERSIONS

GENERAL

Mode reversions are automatic mode changes that unexpectedly occur, but are

designed to ensure coherent AP, FD, and A/THR operations, in conjunction with
flight crew input (or when entering a F-PLN discontinuity).

For example, a reversion will occur, when the flight crew:

Changes the FCU ALT target in specific conditions

Engages a mode on one axis, that will automatically disengage the associated

mode on the other axis

Manually flies the aircraft with the FD on, but does not follow the FD orders,

which leads to the aircraft to the limits of the flight envelope.

Due to the unexpected nature of their occurrence, the FMA should be
closely-monitored for mode reversions.

FLIGHT CREW CHANGE OF FCU ALT TARGET

ACTIVE VERTICAL MODE

NOT POSSIBLE

FCU CHANGE RESULTING REVERSION TO VS MODE

FCU ALT Target

Change

DOWN, while in

OP CLB (CLB)

While ALT *

UP, while in OP DES (DES)

V/S (FPA)

FOF 01030 03721 0001

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OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

AP / FD / ATHR

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JAN 09/07

This reversion to the V/S (FPA) mode on the current V/S target does not modify
the pitch behaviour of the aircraft.

It is the flight crews responsibility to change it as required.

FLIGHT CREW HDG OR TRK MODE ENGAGEMENT

DISENGAGEMENT OF

ASSOCIATED MODE ON THE VERTICAL AXIS

This reversion is due to the integration of the AP, FD, and A/THR with the FMS.

When the flight crew defines a F-PLN, the FMS considers this F-PLN as a whole
(lateral + vertical). Therefore, the AP will guide the aircraft along the entire F-PLN:

Along the LAT F-PLN (NAV

APP NAV modes)

Along the VERT F-PLN (CLB

DES

FINAL modes).

Vertical managed modes can only be used, if the lateral managed NAV mode is

used. If the flight crew decides to divert from the lateral F-PLN, the autopilot will
no longer guide the aircraft along the vertical F-PLN.

Therefore, in climb:

LATERAL MODE CHANGE AND VERTICAL MODE REVERSION

CLB NAV

If HDG or TRK mode is

engaged,

CLB reverts to OP CLB

OP CLB HDG

FOF 01030 03726 0001

In descent:

LATERAL MODE CHANGE AND VERTICAL MODE REVERSION

FINAL APP

G/S LOC

DES NAV

If HDG or TRK mode is

engaged,

to V/S

The vertical mode reverts

V/S HDG

FOF 01030 03727 0001

FPA TRK

This reversion to V/S (FPA) mode on the current V/S target does not modify the
pitch behavior of the aircraft. It is the flight crews responsibility to adapt pitch, if
necessary.

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AP / FD / ATHR

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THE AIRCRAFT ENTERS A F-PLN DISCONTINUITY

NAV mode is lost, when entering a F-PLN discontinuity. On the lateral axis, the

aircraft reverts to HDG (or TRK) mode. On the vertical axis, the same reversion
(as the one indicated above) occurs.

THE PF MANUALLY FLIES THE AIRCRAFT WITH THE FD ON, AND DOES
NOT FOLLOW THE FD PITCH ORDERS

If the flight crew does not follow the FD pitch orders, an A/THR mode reversion
occurs.

This reversion is effective, when the A/THR is in THRUST MODE (THR

IDLE, THR CLB), and the aircraft reaches the limits of the speed envelope (VLS,
VMAX):

REVERSION TO SPEED MODE

THR IDLE DES

SPEED

THR CLB CLB

If the flight crew

pitches

the aircraft up,

and the speed

decreases

to VLS

A/THR REVERTS TO SPEED MODE

and the speed

increases

to VMAX

A/THR REVERTS TO SPEED MODE

THR IDLE OP DES

THR CLB OP CLB

FOF 01030 03728 0001

If the flight crew

pitches

the aircraft down,

A/THR in SPEED mode automatically readjusts thrust to regain the target speed.
The FD bars will disappear, because they are not being followed by the PF.

TRIPLE CLICK

MSN 0002-0860

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AP / FD / ATHR

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The "triple click" is an aural alert.

It is an attention-getter, designed to draw the

flight crew’s attention to the FMA.

The PFD FMA highlights a mode change or reversion with a white box around
the new mode, and the pulsing of its associated FD bar.

The reversions, described in the previous paragraph, are also emphasized via
the triple click aural alert.

Note: The triple click also appears in the following, less usual, cases:

SRS

CLB (OPCLB) reversion:

If, the flight crew selects a speed on

the FCU

The V/S selection is "refused" during ALT *: The flight crew pulls the

V/S knob, while in ALT*

The V/S target is not followed, because the selected target is too high,

and leads to VLS/VMAX.

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FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL

OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

ECAM

01.040

JAN 09/07

PURPOSE OF THE ECAM

MSN 0002-0860

The Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system is a main
component of Airbus two-crewmember cockpit, which also takes the "dark
cockpit" and "forward-facing crew" philosophies into account.

The purpose of the ECAM is to:

Display aircraft system information

Monitor aircraft systems

Indicate required flight crew actions, in most normal, abnormal and emergency

situations.

As the ECAM is available in most failure situations, it is a significant step in the
direction towards a paperless cockpit and the removal of memory items.

MSN 0002-0860

MAIN PRINCIPLES

INFORMATION PROVIDED WHEN NEEDED

One of the main advantages of the ECAM is that it displays applicable
information to the flight crew, on an "as needed" basis.

The following outlines

the ECAMs operating modes:

Normal Mode

Automatically displays systems and memos, in accordance with the flight phase.

Failure Mode

Automatically displays the appropriate emergency/abnormal procedures, in
addition to their associated system synoptic.

Advisory Mode

Automatically displays the appropriate system synoptic, associated with a
drifting parameter.

Manual Mode

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OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

ECAM

01.040

JAN 09/07

Enables the flight crew to manually select any system synoptic via the ECAM
Control Panel (ECP).

Most warnings and cautions are inhibited during critical phases of flight (T/O
INHIBIT

LDG INHIBIT), because most system failures will not affect the aircrafts

ability to continue a takeoff or landing.

FAILURE LEVELS

The ECAM has three levels of warnings and cautions. Each level is based on
the associated operational consequence(s) of the failure.

Failures will appear in

a specific color, according to defined color-coding system, that advises the flight
crew of the urgency of a situation in an instinctive, unambiguous manner.

addition, Level 2 and 3 failures are accompanied by a specific aural warning:

Continuous Repetitive Chime (CRC) indicates a Level 3 failure, and a Single
Chime (SC) indicates a Level 2 failure.

Failure Level

Priority

Color

Coding

Aural

Warning

Recommended Crew

Action

Level 3

Safety

Red

CRC

Immediate

Level 2

Abnormal

Amber

Awareness, then

action

Level 1

Degradation

Amber

None

Awareness, then

Monitoring

When there are several failures, the FWC displays them on the Engine Warning
Display (E/WD) in an order of priority, determined by the severity of the
operational consequences.

This ensures that the flight crew sees the most

important failures first.

FEEDBACK

The ECAM provides the flight crew with feedback, after action is taken on
affected controls:

The System Synoptic

Displays the status change of affected components.

The Memo

Displays the status of a number of systems selected by the flight crew (e.g.
anti ice).

The Procedures

When the flight crew performs a required action on the cockpit panel, the
ECAM usually clears the applicable line of the checklist (except for some
systems or actions, for which feedback is not available).

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ECAM

01.040

JAN 09/07

The ECAM reacts to both failures and pilot action.

ECAM HANDLING

MSN 0002-0860

Task sharing is essential to effective ECAM operation, particularly in the case of
abnormal operations.

NORMAL OPERATIONS

On ground, the ECAM MEMO is reviewed for feedback on temporarily-selected
items (e.g. SEAT BELTS/IGNITION/ENG A/I), and to check whether IRs are
aligned. If alignment is not complete, the time remaining will be displayed. It is,
therefore, not necessary to refer to the OVHD panel.

In cruise, the main systems should periodically be reviewed during flight (ENG,
BLEED, ELEC AC/DC, HYD, FUEL, F/CTL), to ensure that they are operating
normally, and to detect any potential problem in advance.

The ECAM MEMO must be included in the instrument review. In cruise, in most
of the cases, it should be blank.

It helps to make the flight crew aware of any

system that a flight crewmember temporarily selected, but forgot to deselect.

A STS label, displayed at the bottom of the E/WD, indicates that there is a
STATUS to be reviewed. Therefore, when a C/L calls for STATUS review, press
STS, only if the label appears.

If there is a STS at engine shutdown, it will pulse at the bottom of the E/WD. If
this is the case, the STATUS page should be reviewed for help in completing the
technical log.

IN CASE OF ADVISORY

The flight crewmember that first notices an advisory announces: "ADVISORY on
XYZ system". Then, the PF requests the PNF to review the drifting parameter. If
time permits, the PNF may refer to the QRH Part 2, containing recommended
actions in various advisory situations.

R (1) (2)

ABNORMAL OPERATIONS

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Airbus A330/A340. Flight Crew Training Manual (2007) - page 3