F16C/D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2002)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3131

OBOGS MALFUNCTION

PX III

An OBOGS malfunction may be indicated by either

an OXY LOW warning light or difficulty in breathing

through the oxygen mask. An OXY LOW warning

light is activated by low partial pressure of oxygen

(PPO

), regulator pressure falling below 5 psi, or a

monitor failure. Difficulty in breathing through the

mask may indicate an OBOGS malfunction combined

with a failure in the warning light circuit. If difficulty

in breathing through the mask occurs, activate EOS

if above 10,000 feet cockpit altitude, descend, and

land as soon as practical.

If OXY LOW warning light illuminates:

OXYGEN regulator pressure and cockpit

altitude-Check.

If pressure is less than 5 psi and cockpit altitude is

above 10,000 feet, or if pressure is greater than 5 psi

and cockpit altitude is above 25,000 feet:

EOS - Activate.

Altitude - Descend to cockpit altitude below

10,000 feet.

Land as soon as practical.

If pressure is less than 5 psi and cockpit altitude is

below 10,000 feet:

Land as soon as practical.

Do not exceed cockpit altitude of 10,000 feet.

If pressure is greater than 5 psi and cockpit altitude

is below 25,000 feet:

Diluter lever - 100%.

If OXY LOW warning light goes off within 10 seconds:

Partial pressure of oxygen is sufficient for

operation in 100% but is not sufficient for operation

in NORM.

Continue mission with diluter lever in 100%.

If OXY LOW warning light remains on or diluter lever

was in 100% when light illuminated:

OBOGS BIT switch-BIT.

If OXY LOW warning light remains on steady:

Partial pressure of oxygen is not sufficient.

EOS-Activate if cockpit altitude is above

10,000 feet.

Altitude - Descend to cockpit altitude below

10,000 feet.

Land as soon as practical.

If OXY LOW warning light begins flashing when BIT

is selected:

OBOGS monitor has failed.

OBOGS BIT switch-BIT.

Returns OXY LOW warning light to steady.

Altitude - Descend to cockpit altitude below

10,000 feet.

Land as soon as practical.

PBG MALFUNCTION

A malfunction of the oxygen regulator while in PBG

may cause excessive pressure or failure of pressure to

decrease when g is reduced.

If excessive pressure is experienced or high pressure

continues after g is reduced:

OXYGEN mode lever-ON.

If pressure is not relieved:

Oxygen hose-Disconnect.

Cockpit pressure altitude-10,000 feet maxi

mum.

If unable to descend immediately:

Emergency oxygen-Activate.

Land as soon as practical.

SMOKE OR FUMES

All unidentified odors will be considered toxic. Do not

take off when unidentified odors are present. Do not

confuse ECS condensation for smoke.

If smoke or fumes are detected:

OXYGEN REGULATOR - Check ON, 100%,

and EMER.

NOTE

The emergency oxygen bottle is not

recommended for use in the smoke and

fumes environment unless aircraft

oxygen supply contamination is sus

pected. Activation of the emergency

oxygen bottle does not prevent cockpit

smoke or fumes from entering the

oxygen mask.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3132

Altitude - 25,000 feet maximum.

Airspeed - 500 knots maximum.

AIR SOURCE knob-RAM.

External fuel cannot be transferred in OFF or

RAM. Consider jettisoning tank(s) to

decrease drag if range is critical and the ECS

cannot be turned on for short periods of time

to transfer fuel.

PX III

If AIR SOURCE knob is placed to

OFF or RAM, OBOGS is inoperative.

Activate EOS if OXY LOW warning

light illuminates above 10,000 feet

cockpit altitude.

Nonessential electrical equipment-Off.

NOTE

If in VMC and the ADI and HSI are not

required for flight, the EGI/INS should

be considered nonessential.

Determine cause of smoke or fumes and

correct (if possible).

NOTE

Smoke in the cockpit may be indicative

of an engine oil system malfunction. If

possible, retard throttle to lowest

setting possible to sustain flight and

monitor the OIL pressure indicator.

Refer to OIL SYSTEM MALFUNC

TION, this section, if appropriate.

Any odor that smells of burning flesh

may be indicative of bird ingestion into

the engine. Monitor engine instru

ments for signs of abnormal operation.

Land as soon as possible.

If cockpit visibility precludes safe operation:

Airspeed-180 knots maximum.

Seat-Full down.

10. ALT FLAPS switch-EXTEND.

11. Canopy-Jettison.

LANDING EMERGENCIES

Generally, the type of pattern flown in an emergency

is either an SFO or straightin approach and depends

on several factors:

Nature of the emergency.

Weather conditions.

Day or night.

Proximity of a suitable landing runway.

Fuel status.

STRAIGHTIN LANDING

A straightin landing is recommended for emergen

cies which dictate minimum maneuvering inputs

such as hydraulic, flight control, or electrical

problems or situations which result in a relatively

high thrust level being maintained to touchdown

such as a stuck or closed nozzle or when the engine is

operating satisfactorily in SEC. A controllability

check should be accomplished prior to commencing

the approach if minimum flying airspeeds or control

difficulties are experienced or are anticipated.

NOTE

When landing in SEC, an increased

ground roll distance is required due to

higher idle thrust.

SIMULATED FLAMEOUT (SFO) LANDING

Anytime engine failure is anticipated (abnormal

engine response, oil system failures, low fuel, etc.), an

SFO landing should be performed. At or just prior to

high key, turn the EPU on, and if engine seizure is not

anticipated, turn the JFS on

and verify their

operation (EPU run and JFS RUN lights on). If the

engine is still running at touchdown, the JFS shuts

down at WOW.

Fly the SFO pattern and landing in accordance with

the procedures for FLAMEOUT LANDING, this

section. If the engine fails, this action provides

sufficient energy to safely land the aircraft or to zoom

and eject if a safe landing cannot be made.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3133

An SFO landing is not recommended when landing

with the engine operating satisfactorily in SEC. The

higher level of idle thrust may result in a long and

fast landing and difficulty stopping the aircraft.

To simulate an engine out glide with the LG up, use

idle thrust and 30 degrees speedbrakes. From the

front cockpit, this equates to the intersection of the

top of the speedbrakes and a line drawn from the tip

of the horizontal tail to the top of the vertical tail root

fairing. To simulate an engine out glide with the LG

down, use idle thrust and 20 degrees speedbrakes.

From the front cockpit, this equates to the

intersection of the top of speedbrakes and a line

drawn from the tip of the horizontal tail to the base of

the vertical tail root fairing. The additional drag

produced during an engineout condition is equiva

lent to retaining stores with a drag index of 170 with

the LG up or 70 with the LG down. If stores are

retained, adjust speedbrake deflection accordingly. If

the engine fails, close speedbrakes and jettison

stores.

When flying an SFO approach with the engine

operating at a higher thrust level than normal idle,

control descent rate and airspeed with the speedbra

kes rather than adjust the ground track. If thrust is

excessively high or if landing on a runway where

stopping distance may be critical, the procedures for

ABNORMAL ENGINE RESPONSE, this section,

should be considered.

On runways with less than 8000 feet

and without arresting gear or drag

chute, there may be insufficient

distance to safely stop the aircraft.

After touchdown from an SFO landing, use a normal or

short field stopping technique as required by the

stopping distance available. Extend the hook if

required. If the engine rpm is greater than normal with

the throttle in IDLE or some other malfunction requires

excessive braking action to maintain a safe taxi speed,

the brakes may absorb a high amount of energy in a

short period of time. If required, refer to HOT BRAKES,

this section.

CONTROLLABILITY CHECK

When structural damage or any other failure that

may adversely affect aircraft handling characteris

tics is known or suspected, a controllability check

should be performed.

The following items should be accomplished:

Attain safe altitude.

NOTE

In the event that structural damage of

unknown extent is encountered or if

continued control of the aircraft is in

doubt, consider accomplishing applicable

steps of EJECTION (TIME PERMIT

TING), this section, prior to proceeding

with CONTROLLABILITY CHECK.

GW-Reduce (as required).

LE FLAPS switch-LOCK (if required).

If LEF damage is observed, consider locking

LEF's.

Determine optimum configuration available

for landing.

If a condition which might cause

asymmetric TEF extension exists, consid

er alternate LG extension with the LG

handle in UP to preclude TEF extension.

If the LG handle remains up:

Final approach airspeed is 20

knots higher than normal.

The TO/LDG CONFIG warning

light may illuminate.

PW 229

Nozzle remains closed,

resulting in higher than normal

landing thrust.

NWS is inoperative.

BRAKES CHAN 2 must be

selected.

FLCS remains in cruise gains.

Consider positioning AIR RE

FUEL switch to OPEN to obtain

takeoff and landing gains.

The LG handle warning light

remains on to indicate the position of

the gear handle is not in agreement

with the actual gear position.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3134

Stores-Selectively jettison (if required).

Refer to SELECTIVE JETTISON, this section.

Slow only to that AOA/airspeed which allows

acceptable handling qualities.

If the aircraft is not controllable down

to a reasonable landing speed (given

consideration to weather, runway

condition, facilities, pilot experience,

pilot arm fatigue, etc.), an ejection is

recommended.

CABLE ARRESTMENT

Refer to figure 55 for hook engagement limits. If

there is any doubt about stopping on the remaining

runway, lower the hook. Engage the cable as close to

center as possible, nosewheel on the runway with

brakes off and aircraft aligned with the runway.

Place the HOOK switch to DN at least 1500 feet

before reaching the desired arresting cable and

reduce speed as much as possible; however, if

brakes and NWS are inoperative, use flaperons and

rudder as required to maintain directional control.

As the aircraft slows to below 70 knots, directional

control is reduced and the aircraft drifts right.

For most approachend arrestments, touchdown

should be at least 500 feet in front of the cable to

allow sufficient time to lower the nosewheel to the

runway prior to engagement. For an approachend

arrestment with one MLG up or damaged as

described in LANDING WITH LG UNSAFE/UP,

this section, maintain landing attitude after

touchdown and prior to engagement. Immediately

after touchdown, retard throttle to IDLE.

After engagement, rollback should be controlled by

the throttle. For cable disengagement, place HOOK

switch to UP and use approximately 1015 percent

increase in rpm to allow a rollback disengagement.

Cable arrestment at speeds greater

than emergency arrestment speed,

with offcenter distances greater than

35 feet, or with the nosewheel in the air

could result in structural failure of the

NLG, hook, and/or hook backup

structure.

The hook may miss the cable if the

aircraft is not slow enough to compress

the MLG struts sufficiently to make

WOW or if forward stick pressure is held.

To prevent hook bounce and possible

missed engagement, avoid runway

centerline lighting.

NOTE

Under certain conditions, arrestment

may produce a bouncing motion which

is readily apparent.

Offcenter engagement results in air

craft yaw motions during cable runout.

Up to 5 seconds (after activation) are

required to fully raise the BAK14

cable.

GW-Reduce (as required).

HOOK switch-DN.

Approachend arrestment:Touch down at

least 500 feet in front of the cable.

Departureend arrestment:HOOK switch to

DN at least 1500 feet before reaching the

cable.

SHOULDER HARNESS knob-LOCKED.

Consider options available if a missed

engagement occurs.

Prior to cable engagement:

Throttle-IDLE.

NWS-Engage (if required).

Engage cable as close to center as possible;

nosewheel on the runway (if required) and

brakes off.

Using forward stick pressure to keep

an abnormally fast aircraft on the

runway for cable engagement will

probably result in a missed engage

ment or failure of the nose tire/NLG.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3135

Do not use brakes while the cable is

stretched or while being pulled back

ward. This action can result in aircraft

tipping backward. Control rollback

with the throttle.

NET ARRESTMENT

Refer to NET ARRESTMENT LIMITATIONS,

section 5. Engaging a net barrier requires minimal

pilot action as there is no hook to lower and little roll

back after the aircraft's forward motion stops.

SHOULDER HARNESS knob - LOCKED.

Brakes - Release prior to engagement.

Throttle - Off prior to engagement.

Engage net perpendicular, preferably in the

center portion of the runway.

The canopy should be retained

throughout the engagement to provide

pilot protection. Barrier netting will

not prevent subsequent canopy open

ing/jettison.

Engage net perpendicular to preclude

aircraft rotating sideways during the

arrestment. Avoid steering back to

ward the center of the runway just

prior to engagement as this could

result in a nonperpendicular engage

ment. Nosewheel steering is not

required; however, if engaged, it may

be left engaged. The throttle should be

retarded to off prior to engagement to

reduce the possibility of foreign object

damage.

LANDING WITH A BLOWN TIRE

When landing with a blown MLG tire, the landing

gear may collapse during landing roll if portions of

the tire remain and cause a wheel imbalance

condition. To avoid possible directional control

problems associated with landing gear collapse, an

approachend arrestment is preferred over a normal

approach and landing. To reduce the possibility of

damage, the lowest practical landing GW and

airspeed should be attained. Jettison stores if

possible. Retain empty external fuel tanks. Stores/

suspension equipment at stations 3 and/or 7 may

cause external fuel tanks at stations 4 and 6 to move

inboard when jettisoned. If an approachend

arrestment is not available and a normal approach

and landing is flown, leave the antiskid system on

to minimize the possibility of skidding on the good

tire. If the wheel with the blown tire does not turn

after landing, the antiskid system switches to the

b2t

alternate braking mode,

LESS

b2t

pulsating antiskid

mode. Use roll control to relieve pressure on the blown

tire and NWS to maintain directional control.

With a blown tire, avoid centerline

lights as they may cause wheel damage

and subsequent loss of directional

control.

Stop straight ahead and shut down the engine as soon

as firefighting equipment is available. Do not attempt

to taxi unless an emergency situation exists.

If the blown tire is on the NLG, directional control

may be a problem due to a reverse castering effect. An

approachend arrestment with the nosewheel off the

runway is recommended. Depending on GW and

speed at the time of engagement, type of cable

engaged, and height of nosewheel above the runway,

it is possible for NLG strut failure and/or inlet

structural damage to occur. To reduce the possibility

of such damage, the lowest practical landing GW and

airspeed should be attained. Jettison stores if

possible. Retain empty external fuel tanks. Stores/

suspension equipment at stations 3 and/or 7 may

cause external fuel tanks at stations 4 and 6 to move

inboard when jettisoned. Landing should be made

with the remaining internal fuel in the aft system.

After touchdown from a 13 degree AOA approach,

pitch attitude should be reduced to approximately 5

degrees prior to cable engagement. The HUD gun

borecross can be used to determine pitch attitude.

During the arrestment, the aircraft is likely to turn

slightly right before stopping.

If an approachend arrestment is not available, refer

to procedures for aborting with a blown nose tire in

BLOWN TIRE ON TAKEOFF, this section, or

consider an all LG up landing (refer to LANDING

WITH LG UNSAFE/UP, this section).

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3136

Landing With A Blown Main Gear Tire

Prior to landing:

Stores - Jettison. Refer to JETTISON, this

section.

Retain empty external fuel tanks.

GW-Reduce (if practical).

TANK INERTING switch-TANK INERT

ING even if Halon is not available.

AIR REFUEL switch-OPEN, if external fuel

tank(s) is installed.

Failure to depressurize external fuel

tank(s) significantly increases the prob

ability of tank explosion and fire if the

aircraft departs the runway.

NOTE

Delay placing the AIR REFUEL switch

to OPEN until all external tanks are

empty.

ANTISKID switch-ANTISKID.

Use of antiskid minimizes skidding on good

tire during braking.

HOOK switch-DN.

An approachend arrestment is recom

mended. Refer to CABLE ARRESTMENT,

this section.

Final approach AOA-13 degrees.

If a missed approachend cable arrestment occurs or

no approachend cable is available:

NOTE

If no approachend cable is available,

land on the side of runway away from

the blown tire.

NWS-Engage (if required).

The NWS light does not illuminate when

NWS is engaged if the AIR REFUEL switch

is in OPEN.

Brake-As desired on good tire.

Landing With A Blown Nose Gear Tire

Prior to landing:

Stores-Jettison. Refer to JETTISON, this

section.

Retain empty external fuel tanks.

GW-Reduce (if practical).

Plan to land with approximately 1500 pounds

of fuel on board.

Fuel distribution-All fuel in aft tank system

(if practical).

At 3000 pounds fuel remaining, place ENG

FEED knob to FWD. When forward reservoir

is empty, place ENG FEED knob to NORM.

(Emptying forward tank system takes

approximately

15 minutes,

9 minutes if

fuel flow is 4000 pph. When forward tank

system empties, the fuel in aft tank system is

approximately

2000 pounds,

2400

pounds.)

TANK INERTING switch - TANK INERTING

even if Halon is not available.

AIR REFUEL switch-OPEN, if external fuel

tank(s) is installed.

Failure to depressurize external fuel

tank(s) significantly increases the

probability of tank explosion and fire if

the nose gear collapses during the

arrestment.

HOOK switch - DN.

An approachend cable arrestment with the

nosewheel off the runway is recommended.

Refer to CABLE ARRESTMENT, this sec

tion.

Final approach AOA - 13 degrees.

After touchdown:

Stick - Lower nose to approximately 5 degrees

pitch attitude for arrestment.

After cable engagement:

Stick - Apply aft stick after nose starts down

to reduce load on the NLG.

If a missed cable engagement occurs:

10. Maintain pitch attitude and go around.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3137

With a blown NLG tire and loss of

NWS, it may not be possible to prevent

departure from the runway. A reverse

castering effect may occur in which the

nosewheel moves opposite to the

rudder or differential braking input.

NOTE

The maximum allowable fuel flow with

one reservoir empty is 25,000 pph.

LG EXTENSION MALFUNCTIONS

Malfunctions in extending the LG are normally

indicated by failure of the LG handle to lower or by

failure of one or more LG's to extend accompanied by

lack of the corresponding WHEELS down lights and

continuous illumination of the LG handle warning

light. Refer to LG FAILS TO EXTEND, this section.

Mechanical failures can have varying causes. Failure

of an LG component usually affects only one LG and

cannot be corrected in flight. Abnormally high

moisture content in the hydraulic fluid can cause

more than one LG to fail to extend after prolonged

operation at low ambient temperatures. This

situation can usually be corrected after several cycles

of the LG handle at low altitude.

Abnormal indications after the LG handle is lowered

can also be caused by electrically related malfunc

tions (i.e., electrical shorts, electrical component

failures, or cannon plug problems). The malfunction

may result in an indication problem or an actual

failure of one or more LG to extend. A visual

confirmation of the LG position should be obtained if

possible before any action is taken.

A common failure mode is electrical shorting within

a downlock switch caused by moisture intrusion. This

shorting typically occurs after the LG handle is

lowered and results in opening of the LG uplock/

downlock circuit breaker. Opening of this circuit

breaker causes all WHEELS down lights to remain

off. The light in the handle may go off normally or it

may remain on if the shorting has also adversely

affected the warning light circuit. Another result of

this circuit breaker opening is that the LG will go into

hydraulic isolation immediately after the LG handle

is raised and the LG won't retract. Other effects

associated with an open LG uplock/downlock circuit

breaker are as follows:

No AOA bracket in the HUD.

Speedbrakes are not limited to 43 degrees.

Landing/taxi light is inoperative.

NWS is inoperative.

An indication failure may be distinguished from an

actual extension malfunction by the WHEELS down

lights and the LG handle warning light. The

WHEELS down lights and the LG handle warning

light have separate power sources and circuitry.

Thus, if either circuit operates correctly, the LG

should be down and locked even though the other

circuit may indicate a problem. If possible, cycle the

LG to reattempt extension while watching the

WHEELS down lights and the LG handle warning

light.

Because of the number of possible malfunctions,

specific procedures for every situation are not

feasible. If time and conditions permit, ground

supervisory and technical assistance should be

requested. Evaluate available options prior to using

the ALT GEAR handle. Other options may include an

LG up landing, diverting to a more suitable landing

field, landing where the hazards of departing the

prepared surface are minimal, or using a cable

arrestment.

LG Handle Will Not Lower

If the LG handle cannot be moved to the DN position

after depressing the LG handle down permission

button, the electrical circuitry or solenoid has

probably failed.

The DN LOCK REL button

mechanically permits the LG handle to be moved to

the DN position. If the LG handle cannot be moved to

the DN position due to a mechanical failure, CHAN 1

brakes are inoperative and TEF's must be extended

using the ALT FLAPS switch

PW 229

and the nozzle

remains closed. With the nozzle closed, idle thrust is

approximately 400 pounds greater than normal.

If LG handle cannot be lowered normally:

DN LOCK REL button-Depress and lower

LG handle.

If LG handle still cannot be lowered:

ALT FLAPS switch-EXTEND.

BRAKES channel switch-CHAN 2.

Go to ALTERNATE LG EXTENSION, this

section.

PW 229

Nozzle remains closed, resulting in

higher than normal landing thrust.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3138

NOTE

After a successful alternate gear

extension with the landing gear handle

still up, the LG handle warning light

remains on to indicate the position of

the gear handle is not in agreement

with the actual gear position.

LG Fails To Extend

NOTE

If alternate LG extension was per

formed and one or more LG indicate

unsafe, refer to ALTERNATE LG

EXTENSION, this section.

If one or more LG fail to extend, the LG handle may

be cycled multiple times to attempt to extend the LG

if no structural/battle damage exists and if normal

hydraulic pressure exists. Multiple cycle attempts

may release the locking pawls and result in normal

gear extension if the failure to extend was caused by

failure of the uplocks to release.

If the LG previously failed to retract,

do not cycle the LG handle. Damage to

the LG or LG doors may preclude

successful extension.

If cycling of the LG handle fails to correct the

situation, use of the alternate extension system must

be considered.

If possible, get a visual confirmation of LG position.

If the NLG WHEELS down light is off, confirmation

of the NLG position can be made by checking

landing/taxi light operation. Illumination of either

light confirms that the NLG is down. With the NLG

WHEELS down light off, NWS may be inoperative

(without a NWS FAIL caution light).

If one or more LG indicate unsafe:

If at anytime, an LG intermittently

indicates unsafe (i.e. WHEELS down

light off and LG handle warning light

on), the overcenter lock on the LG drag

brace assembly may not be functioning

properly. The LG may appear down, but

the LG may collapse during landing.

Plan on using the LG unsafe/up

procedures even if the LG eventually

indicates normal. Refer to LANDING

WITH LG UNSAFE/UP, this section.

If the LG previously failed to retract,

do not cycle the LG handle. Damage to

the LG or LG doors may preclude

successful extension.

NOTE

If the NLG WHEELS down light is off,

confirmation of the NLG position can be

made by checking landing/taxi light

operation. Illumination of either light

confirms that the NLG is down. With the

NLG WHEELS down light off, NWS

may be inoperative (without a NWS

FAIL caution light).

LG handle-Cycle and monitor LG handle

warning light and WHEELS down lights.

If LG handle warning light came on when the LG

handle was lowered, then went off, and tests good or

if WHEELS down lights operated normally:

Speedbrakes - Verify opening is less than 43

degrees.

From the front cockpit, the top of the

speedbrakes should be slightly above a line

drawn from the tip of the horizontal tail to the

top of the vertical tail root fairing.

If RMLG WHEELS down light is off,

speedbrakes may not be limited to 43

degrees.

Land normally.

If LG handle warning light did not illuminate or

remained illuminated after LG handle was lowered and

if one or more WHEELS down lights did not illuminate:

Go to ALTERNATE LG EXTENSION, this

section.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3139

Alternate LG Extension

Alternate LG extension should be accomplished at

the lowest practical airspeed below 190 knots. The

NLG may not indicate down until airspeed is reduced

below 190 knots. NWS is inoperative after alternate

LG extension even if system B hydraulic pressure is

available.

LG handle-DN. (Use DN LOCK REL, if

required.)

Do not delay lowering LG below 2000

feet AGL.

If LG handle does not lower, select

BRAKES CHAN 2 and position ALT

FLAPS switch to EXTEND.

PW 229

Nozzle remains closed, resulting in

higher than normal landing thrust.

ALT GEAR handle-Pull (if required). (190

knots maximum, if practical).

Alternate LG extension can be used up to 300

knots; however, the NLG may not fully extend

until 190 knots. Time above 190 knots should

be minimized in case there is a leak in the

pneumatic lines.

If an unsafe MLG indication exists and both

MLG are out of the wheel wells, pulling the

ALT GEAR handle is not recommended.

NWS is not available following alter

nate LG extension.

Do not depress the ALT GEAR reset

button while pulling the ALT GEAR

handle. This action may preclude

successful LG extension.

Pulling the ALT GEAR handle with

normal system B hydraulic pressure,

e.g., NLG fails to extend, may result in

hydraulic system B failure within 15

minutes.

If LG indicates safe:

Land normally.

If possible, get visual confirmation of LG

position. If all WHEELS down lights were

initially off with the LG handle down and

use of the hook may be required after

touchdown, verify before landing that the

hook extends.

Stop straight ahead on the runway.

NWS is not available following alter

nate LG extension.

If the LG was alternately extended due

to failure of system B, only brake/JFS

accumulator braking is available and

after stopping, the parking brake

should be engaged until chocks are

installed.

If LG indicates unsafe:

Stick-Apply alternating g forces (-1.0 to +3.0

g) to free LG.

Up to 300 knots may be required to provide

sufficient g force.

If LG indicates safe:

Land normally.

If possible, get visual confirmation of LG

position.

Stop straight ahead on the runway.

If the LG was alternately extended due

to failure of system B, only brake/JFS

accumulator braking is available and

after stopping the parking brake

should be engaged until chocks are

installed.

If LG still indicates unsafe:

Speedbrakes - Verify opening is less than 43

degrees.

From the front cockpit, the top of the

speedbrakes should be slightly above a line

drawn from the tip of the horizontal tail to the

top of the vertical tail root fairing.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3140

If RMLG WHEELS down light is off,

speedbrakes may not be limited to 43

degrees.

Go to LANDING WITH LG UNSAFE/UP, this

section.

Landing With LG Unsafe/Up

Prior to landing with any of the LG unsafe or up,

consider the following:

Airfield facilities.

Hook engagement limits.

Crosswind component.

Runway and overrun conditions.

If conditions are not favorable:

Refer to EJECTION (TIME PERMITTING),

this section.

To accomplish the landing:

Retain empty fuel tanks and racks.

If time permits, delay landing until

external fuel tanks are empty. If an

immediate landing is required, jetti

son all external fuel tanks.

Armament-Jettison.

GW-Reduce.

TANK INERTING switch-TANK INERT

ING even if Halon is not available.

AIR REFUEL switch-OPEN.

Failure to depressurize external fuel

tanks significantly increases the prob

ability of tank explosion and fire.

NOTE

Delay placing the AIR REFUEL switch

to OPEN until all external fuel tanks

are empty.

FCR-OFF.

PX II

SMS

PX III

ST STA/HDPT/ECM power -

Off.

SHOULDER HARNESS knob-LOCKED.

Refer to figure 316.

NOTE

If either MLG is not extended, EPU

operation cannot be terminated with

the EPU switch after engine shut

down.

ANTISKID MALFUNCTION (LANDING)

Illumination of the ANTI SKID caution light when

the LG handle is lowered indicates one of the

following:

b2t

Loss of power to one of the two brake channels

or from the ANTISKID switch.

b2t

Built in Test (BIT) detected malfunction of one

of the two brake channels.

LESS

b2t

Failure in the antiskid system (pulsating

brake pressure mode activated).

LESS

b2t

Loss of electrical power to the CHAN 1

brake and antiskid control circuits.

b2t

Cycling the ANTISKID switch to OFF and back

to ANTISKID will not extinguish the ANTI SKID

caution light. Touchdown skid control protection

may not be available, so do not apply brakes before

touchdown.

b2t

If the ANTI SKID light extinguishes on wheel

spin up, antiskid protection is available and one of

the two brake control channels is fully functional.

Normal braking may be used. If the light does not

extinguish on wheel spinup, or first illuminates on

wheel spinup, braking may be in the alternate

braking mode, detectable by a pulsing sensation

when differential braking is applied. In the alternate

braking mode, symmetric braking will give the best

stopping performance.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3141

LESS

b2t

Changing to CHAN 2 brakes may

extinguish the ANTI SKID caution light and provide

normal antiskid and braking functions. If the failure

was in the antiskid system, cycling the ANTISKID

switch may correct the problem. If the ANTI SKID

caution light remains on, antiskid protection is not

available and degraded (i.e. pulsating) or inopera

tive braking should be expected.

If the ANTI SKID caution light illuminates (with the

ANTISKID switch in ANTISKID) when the LG

handle is lowered:

BRAKES channel switch-CHAN 2.

b2t

If the ANTI SKID caution light remains on:

Refer to ANTISKID MALFUNCTION

(GROUND), this section.

LESS

b2t

If the ANTI SKID caution light remains on:

ANTISKID switch-OFF, then back to ANTI

SKID.

If the ANTI SKID caution light remains on, expect

pulsating or inoperative braking and no antiskid

protection during landing:

Refer to ANTISKID MALFUNCTION

(GROUND), this section.

ASYMMETRIC STORES (LANDING)

Refer to figure 317 for computation of asymmetric

moment. A modified approach is required if the net

asymmetry exceeds 10,000 footpounds. Successful

landings have been demonstrated with asymme

tries as large as 25,020 footpounds. If the net

asymmetry exceeds 25,020 footpounds, stores

should be selectively jettisoned from the heavy wing

to reduce the asymmetry. The decision to land with

large asymmetries should consider such factors as

weather conditions, runway length/width, surface

conditions (RCR), arresting gear availability,

crosswind component/gusts, and pilot experience.

Avoid abrupt control inputs. Limit maximum bank

angle changes to 90 degrees and do not exceed 10

degrees AOA until the net asymmetry can be

determined. A controllability check should be

performed with the LG down to determine handling

qualities and the feasibility of landing. During the

controllability check, determine maximum maneu

vering AOA by slowly increasing AOA until roll

authority is insufficient to maintain wings level. Do

not exceed 12 degrees AOA during this check. If loss

of roll authority is experienced, the maximum

maneuvering AOA is 2 degrees below that at which

roll authority was lost or 10 degrees AOA,

whichever is less. If landing is feasible, plan to fly

a shallow, poweron, straightin approach. Use roll

trim and lateral stick as required. Full roll trim may

not be enough to compensate for large asymmetries.

Trim rudder into the heavy wing up to a maximum

of two dots. This decreases bank angle and permits

a low bank angle, low sideslip approach, minimiz

ing pilot induced lateral oscillations. This action

increases the roll trim necessary to hold up the

heavy wing.

Fly a shallow, poweron, straightin approach and

reduce bank angle to wings level on short final. Do

not exceed the maximum maneuvering AOA, as

determined during the controllability check, on

final approach or during the flare/touchdown.

Twopoint aerodynamic braking should be per

formed at 1011 degrees AOA until approximately

120 knots. The nose should then be lowered to the

runway and maximum effort antiskid braking

should be used. At no time should 11 degrees AOA

be exceeded while on the runway. When the ARI

switches out with wheel spinup, large rudder

changes can occur which cause yaw into the heavy

wing. When landing with no crosswind, this yaw

helps align the aircraft with the runway. With

crosswind components greater than 10 knots (5

knots if the net asymmetry exceeds 20,000

footpounds), land with the heavy wing into the

crosswind even if this results in landing downwind.

Failure to do so may result in inadequate roll

control.

Compare weights on mirror stations (4 and 6,

3 and 7, etc.). Include wingtip AIM120's;

exclude wingtip AIM9's since their weight is

offset by the lift they generate.

Determine asymmetric moment for each set of

stations. Enter with weight difference at

bottom of chart, proceed vertically to the

appropriate line, and proceed horizontally left

to read the asymmetric moment.

Add or subtract each asymmetric moment to

determine net asymmetry.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3142

LG Unsafe/Up Landing

APPROACHEND ARRESTMENT

CONFIGURATION

AVAILABLE

UNAVAILABLE

ALL LG INDICATE UNSAFE

BUT APPEAR NORMAL

10. HOOK-DOWN.

11. APPROACHEND CABLE-ENGAGE.

10. LAND NORMALLY.

ALL LG UP

ARRESTMENT NOT RECOMMENDED.

USE APPROACHEND ARRESTMENT

UNAVAILABLE PROCEDURE.

10. EPU-ON.

11. ALT FLAPS-EXTEND.

12. LOW ANGLE APPROACH AT 13

AOA.

13. THROTTLE-OFF IMMEDIATELY

PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN.

BOTH MLG UP OR UNSAFE

10. ALT GEAR HANDLE-IN.

11. WAIT 5 SECONDS.

12. LG HANDLE-UP.

13. ALT GEAR RESET BUTTON-DEPRESS

(2 SECONDS).

14. USE ALL LG UP PROCEDURE.

15. IF NLG DOES NOT RETRACT:

a. HOOK-DOWN.

b. LOW ANGLE APPROACH AT 11

AOA.

c. ATTEMPT A FLYIN ENGAGEMENT.

d. THROTTLE-OFF AFTER EN

GAGEMENT.

IF THE ENGAGEMENT IS

MISSED, MAINTAIN WINGS LE

VEL AND GO AROUND. IF A

GOAROUND IS NOT AC

COMPLISHED, THE AIRCRAFT

MAY GROUND LOOP.

10. ALT GEAR HANDLE-IN.

11. WAIT 5 SECONDS.

12. LG HANDLE-UP.

13. ALT GEAR RESET BUTTON-DEPRESS

(2 SECONDS).

14. USE ALL LG UP PROCEDURE.

15. IF NLG DOES NOT RETRACT:

a. CONSIDER LANDING FROM A

LOW ANGLE APPROACH AT 13

AOA IF WING FUEL TANKS ARE

CARRIED.

b. RECOMMEND EJECTION IF WING

FUEL TANKS ARE NOT CARRIED

OR IF CONDITIONS ARE NOT

CONSIDERED FAVORABLE FOR

AN ATTEMPTED LANDING WITH

WING FUEL TANKS.

NLG UP OR UNSAFE

ARRESTMENT NOT RECOMMENDED.

USE APPROACHEND ARRESTMENT

UNAVAILABLE PROCEDURE.

10. EPU-ON.

11. LOW ANGLE APPROACH AT 13

AOA.

12. THROTTLE-OFF AFTER TOUCH

DOWN.

13. LOWER NOSE TO RUNWAY BEFORE

CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS BEGINS

TO DECAY.

14. EPU-OFF AFTER STOP.

Figure 316.(Sheet 1)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3143

LG Unsafe/Up Landing

APPROACHEND ARRESTMENT

CONFIGURATION

AVAILABLE

UNAVAILABLE

ONE MLG AND NLG UP OR UNSAFE

ARRESTMENT NOT RECOMMENDED.

USE APPROACHEND ARRESTMENT

UNAVAILABLE PROCEDURE.

10. ALT GEAR HANDLE-IN.

11. WAIT 5 SECONDS.

12. LG HANDLE-UP.

13. ALT GEAR RESET BUTTON-DEPRESS

(2 SECONDS).

14. USE ALL LG UP PROCEDURE.

15. IF LG DOES NOT RETRACT:

a. CONSIDER LANDING FROM A

ONE MLG INDICATES UNSAFE

BUT APPEARS NORMAL

10. HOOK-DOWN.

11. LOW ANGLE APPROACH AT 11

AOA.

12. AFTER TOUCHDOWN, USE ROLL

CONTROL, IF NECESSARY, TO HOLD

WING UP. IF ROLL CONTROL IS NEED

ED TO HOLD WING UP, MAINTAIN

LANDING ATTITUDE FOR ENGAGE

MENT. IF ROLL CONTROL IS NOT

NEEDED TO HOLD WING UP, LOWER

NOSE FOR ARRESTMENT.

13. THROTTLE-OFF AFTER ENGAGE

MENT.

IF THE ENGAGEMENT IS MISSED

AND ROLL CONTROL WAS NEC

ESSARY TO HOLD WING UP,

MAINTAIN WINGS LEVEL AND

GO AROUND. IF A GOAROUND

IS NOT ACCOMPLISHED, THE

AIRCRAFT MAY GROUND LOOP.

a. CONSIDER LANDING FROM A

LOW ANGLE APPROACH AT 13

AOA IF EXTERNAL FUEL TANK(S) IS

CARRIED.

NOTE

LAND ON THE SIDE OF THE

RUNWAY AWAY FROM THE UN

SAFE MLG.
b. RECOMMEND EJECTION IF

EXTERNAL FUEL TANK(S) IS NOT

CARRIED OR IF CONDITIONS ARE

NOT CONSIDERED FAVORABLE

FOR AN ATTEMPTED LANDING

WITH EXTERNAL FUEL TANK(S).

ONE MLG UP

10. ALT GEAR HANDLE-IN.

11. WAIT 5 SECONDS.

12. LG HANDLE-UP.

13. ALT GEAR RESET BUTTON-DEPRESS

(2 SECONDS).

14. USE ALL LG UP PROCEDURE.

15. IF LG DOES NOT RETRACT:

a. HOOK-DOWN.

b. LOW ANGLE APPROACH AT 11

AOA.

c. AFTER TOUCHDOWN, USE ROLL

CONTROL TO HOLD WING UP

AND MAINTAIN LANDING ATTI

TUDE FOR ENGAGEMENT.

d. THROTTLE-OFF AFTER EN

GAGEMENT.

IF THE ENGAGEMENT IS MISSED,

MAINTAIN WINGS LEVEL AND

GO AROUND. IF A GOAROUND

IS NOT ACCOMPLISHED, THE

AIRCRAFT MAY GROUND LOOP.

Figure 316.(Sheet 2)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3144

WEIGHT 1000 POUNDS

ASYMMETRIC MOMENT 1000 FOOT-POUNDS

GR1F-16CJ-1-0128X37

Asymmetric Moment

Figure 317.

SAMPLE PROBLEM 1:

Full 370gallon fuel tank on station 4; empty

fuel tank on station 6.

Three MK 82 (SNAKEYE) bombs on station 3,

station 7 empty.

Station 4/6 weight

difference

= 2405 pounds

Asymmetric moment

= 14,000

footpounds

Station 3/7 weight

difference

= 1650 pounds

Asymmetric moment

= 16,500 foot

pounds

Net asymmetry (B+D) = 30,500 foot

pounds

SAMPLE PROBLEM 2:

Full 370gallon fuel tank on station 6; empty

fuel tank on station 4.

Three MK 82 (SNAKEYE) bombs on station 3;

station 7 empty.

Follow same procedures (A through D) as above;

however, since the asymmetric moments are on the

opposite wing, the moments are subtracted rather

than added.

Net asymmetry (B-D) = 2500 footpounds

AOA-10 degrees maximum.

Large asymmetric loads severely limit

lateral control when rolling away from

the heavy wing. Until determining net

asymmetry, limit maximum bank

angle change to 90 degrees, avoid

abrupt control inputs, and do not

exceed 10 degrees AOA.

Determine net asymmetry.

Refer to figure 317.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3145/(3146 blank)

If asymmetry is greater than 25,020 footpounds:

Stores-Jettison (as required).

Selectively jettison stores from the heavy

wing to obtain a net asymmetry less than

25,020 footpounds. Refer to SELECTIVE

JETTISON, this section.

If asymmetry is greater than 10,000 footpounds:

Controllability-Check.

Lower LG at a safe altitude and check

handling qualities until roll authority is

insufficient or up to 12 degrees AOA

maximum.

Maximum maneuvering AOA for approach

and landing is 10 degrees AOA or 2 degrees

less than the AOA at which roll authority is

insufficient to maintain wings level, which

ever is less.

If landing is feasible:

The decision to land with a large

asymmetry should consider such fac

tors as weather conditions, runway

length/width and surface conditions

(RCR), arresting gear availability,

crosswind component/gusts, and pilot

experience.

Fly a shallow, poweron, straightin approach.

With crosswind component greater

than 10 knots (5 knots if the net

asymmetry exceeds 20,000 foot

pounds), land with heavy wing into the

crosswind even if this results in

landing downwind. Failure to do so

may result in inadequate roll control.

Do not exceed the maximum AOA, as

determined during the controllability

check, during final approach, flare,

touchdown, or twopoint aerodynamic

braking.

Roll trim and lateral stick-As required.

Rudder trim-Trim into the heavy wing (if

required).

If landing is not feasible:

Go to EJECTION (TIME PERMITTING), this

section.

If asymmetry is less than 10,000 footpounds:

Land normally.

NLG WOW SWITCH FAILURE

If the NLG WOW switch fails to the ground position,

the A/R DISC function on the stick is inoperative, the

speedbrakes are not limited to 43 degrees with the

right MLG down, NWS can be engaged in flight, and

AOA indications are approximately 0 degrees.

NWS-Engage.

If AR/NWS light comes on:

NWS-Disengage.

AR/NWS light-Off.

NOTE

Insure that AR/NWS light is off prior to

landing so that the NWS does not

follow rudder commands when the

nosewheel is lowered to the runway.

Speedbrakes-Close to less than 43 degrees.

From the front cockpit, the top of the

speedbrakes should be slightly above a line

drawn from the tip of the horizontal tail to the

top of the vertical tail root fairing.

Visually confirm speedbrake opening

is limited to 43 degrees to prevent the

lower surfaces from striking the

runway during landing.

DRAG CHUTE FAILURE

If decision is made to goaround:

Drag chute-Release.

Throttle-MAX AB.

F16C/D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2002) - page 27

F16C/D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2002) - page 27