F16C/D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2002)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3100

The ground track of a flameout/SFO overhead

approach is approximately the same as that of a

normal overhead approach except the final approach

is approximately 3/4 nm long. Avoid rapid flight

control inputs which use excessive EPU fuel and may

exceed the emergency hydraulic pump capability.

If EPU fuel quantity is below 25 percent

at high key (20 percent with the JFS

running), a flameout landing should

not be attempted since adequate

hydraulic pressure may not be avail

able through the landing.

StraightIn Approach

Refer to figure 314. If one of the overhead approach

key positions cannot be reached, a straightin

approach may be flown. The clean glide at

maximum

range airspeed should be continued until the initial

aimpoint is 1117 degrees below the horizon; then the

LG should be lowered. Seventeen degrees is below the

forward field of view. A good visual reference for 15

degrees is when the initial aimpoint is at the bottom

of the HUD (just above the radome). Optimum LG

down airspeed is 10 knots less than maximum range

(LG up) airspeed. Minimum LG down airspeed is 20

knots less than maximum range (LG up) airspeed and

provides sufficient maneuverability to arrest the high

sink rate associated with a flameout approach.

NOTE

For a 10,000foot descent (LG down),

each 10 knots above optimum LG down

airspeed decreases glide range up to

1/2 nm.

IMC Penetration

Should IMC be encountered during a flameout

approach to the intended runway and no alternate

runway is available, an alternate descent/penetra

tion may be flown which should allow maneuvering

airspeed after penetrating the undercast.

IMC penetration should not be

attempted unless present position is

known and navigation can be per

formed throughout the descent, and

high terrain or other hazards are not a

factor.

The stores should be jettisoned and the aircraft glided

at maximum range airspeed until a 1:1 ratio between

altitude in thousands of feet and range to the runway

(e.g., 20,000 feet AGL at 20 nm, 15,000 feet AGL at 15

nm, etc.) is attained. The descent angle should then

be increased and airspeed allowed to increase to

maintain the 1:1 ratio. This equates to a 910 degree

descent angle. This 1:1 glide ratio must be

maintained until sufficient airspeed is attained to

maneuver after penetrating the undercast.

NOTE

A 90 degree level turn at 50 degrees

bank angle with the LG and

speedbrakes retracted will dissipate

6585 knots. A 180 degree turn will

dissipate 145250 knots. Airspeed

dissipation increases with increasing

GW and DI. A glide angle at a 1:1 ratio

begun from maximum range airspeed

will result in an airspeed of 260320

knots after a 10,000foot descent.

Higher airspeed at the start of the

glide, additional descent altitude,

heavier gross weight, or lower drag

index will result in higher airspeed at

the completion of the glide.

At 3000 feet AGL, the aircraft should be 3 nm from the

touchdown point. If the runway is not in sight by base

key altitude, the aircraft may be zoomed for a

controlled ejection. When VMC is attained and the

runway is in sight, the aircraft should be glided to an

attainable key position for an overhead approach or

to a straightin approach and the LG should be

lowered. Excess airspeed above optimum LG down

airspeed not required to maneuver to the flameout

landing approach should be dissipated by use of

speedbrakes or early LG extension.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

Change 13101

1 nm

3/4 nm

Point of intended

touchdown

Initial aimpoint should

be 1/3 runway length

Low key position

varies with wind

direction/velocity

A. HIGH KEY

B. LOW KEY

C. BASE KEY

Abeam point of rollout on final

Midpoint of turn from downwind to final

GR1F-16CJ-1-0123X37

Above a point approximately 1/3 of the way down the runway

NOTES:

Flameout Landing Pattern (Typical)

(OVERHEAD APPROACH)

1. Jettison stores (if required).

2. Maximum range (LG up) airspeed is 200,

190, 195 knots. Minimum LG down airspeed
is 180, 185 knots. Increase airspeeds by

5 knots per 1000 pounds of fuel/store weights

3. Maximum range (LG up) airspeed equates to approxi-

mately 7 degrees AOA (any GW or drag index) and

provides a glide ratio of approximately 7 nm per

5000 feet AGL. If stores are retained, glide ratio

decreases.

4. Altitudes:

5. Optimum bank angles are 50 degrees (LG up) and 55

degrees (LG down) for least altitude lost per degree

of turn.

High Key 7000-10,000 feet AGL

Low Key 3000-5000 feet AGL

Recommended altitude is 7000,

pounds of fuel/store weights and

Base Key 2000 feet AGL minimum

205 knots. Optimum airspeed (LG down) is

D
C

and an additional 5 knots if CFT's are

PX III

installed.

3250 feet AGL plus 250 feet per 1000

PX III

500 feet if CFT's are installed.

Recommended altitude is 3000,

pounds of fuel/store weights and

7500 feet AGL plus 500 feet per 1000

PX III

250 feet if CFT's are installed.

Figure 313.(Sheet 1)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3102Change 1

HIGH KEY

EPU fuel quantity should be at least 25

percent (20 percent with JFS running)

at high key to insure adequate hydraulic

pressure throughout landing.

Eject if it becomes obvious that a safe

landing cannot be made. Ejection can be

accomplished at any point in the pat-

tern; however, do not delay ejection

below 2000 feet AGL in an attempt

to salvage a questionable approach.

FLARE

Touch down 11-13 degrees

AOA optimum. Speedbrakes

as required.

BASE KEY

LG down. Increase airspeed

to move touchdown closer to

approach end of runway.

Do not delay lowering LG

below 2000 feet AGL.

LOW KEY

Do not extend LG unless

base key is assured.

and/or open the speedbrakes

GR1F-16CJ-1-0124A37

The JFS alone does not provide adequate

hydraulic pressure to land the aircraft.

Do not extend LG unless

base key is assured.

Flameout Landing Pattern (Typical)

(OVERHEAD APPROACH)

Do not allow airspeed to decrease below

minimum LG down airspeed.

NOTES:

7. Frost or condensation on the canopy could restrict

visibility during flameout approach. Place AIR

SOURCE knob to RAM and place DEFOG lever

forward below 25,000 feet MSL.

8. Time constraints due to EPU fuel consumption must

be considered as well as distance to be covered.

9. Starting JFS reduces load on EPU, conserves EPU

fuel, and partially restores hydraulic system B.

To estimate required EPU fuel for a nonstandard

approach, use 15 percent per minute as a basis

for computation.

10. If alternate LG extension is used, the NLG may not

indicate down until airspeed is reduced below

190 knots.

ROLLOUT

Speedbrakes Open.

Hook DN (if required).

Drag Chute DEPLOY

(if required).

flightpath marker and to position scales for use

during flameout approach.

With FCC off, HUD continues to compute

Figure 313.(Sheet 2)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

Change 13103

8 nm (no wind)

7000 feet AGL

4 nm (no wind)

feet AGL

4-0 nm

(no wind)

POINT A

POINT B

AREA C

4000-8000

NOTES:

3. Maximum range (LG up) airspeed equates to approxi-

mately 7 degrees AOA (any GW or drag index) and

4. Minimum altitudes are based on an LG up glide at

maximum range airspeed to 2000 feet AGL followed

5. After lowering LG, glide range decreases by approxi-

mately 30 percent. Airspeed greater than optimum

LG down airspeed significantly increases energy

Flameout Landing Pattern (Typical)

(STRAIGHT-IN APPROACH)

GR1F-16CJ-1-0125A37

1. Jettison stores (if required).

7. Frost or condensation on the canopy could restrict

visibility during flameout approach. Place AIR

SOURCE knob to RAM and place DEFOG lever

forward below 25,000 feet MSL.

8. Time constraints due to EPU fuel consumption must

be considered as well as distance to be covered.

9. Starting JFS reduces load on EPU, conserves EPU

fuel, and partially restores hydraulic system B.

To estimate required EPU fuel for a nonstandard

approach, use 15 percent per minute as a basis

for computation.

10. If alternate LG extension is used, the NLG may not

indicate down until airspeed is reduced below

190 knots.

provides a glide ratio of approximately 7 nm for

each 5000 feet AGL. If stores are retained, glide ratio

decreases.

by an LG down glide at optimum LG down airspeed

to the runway for a drag index of 100.

loss rate and decreases glide range.

FLARE

Touch down 11-13 degrees

AOA optimum. Speedbrakes

as required.

ROLLOUT

Speedbrakes Open.

Hook DN (if required).

Drag Chute DEPLOY

(if required).

flightpath marker and to position scales for use

during flameout approach.

With FCC off, HUD continues to compute

2. Maximum range (LG up) airspeed is 200,

190, 195 knots. Minimum LG down airspeed
is 180, 185 knots. Increase airspeeds by

5 knots per 1000 pounds of fuel/store weights

205 knots. Optimum airspeed (LG down) is

D
C

and an additional 5 knots if CFT's are

PX III

installed.

Figure 314.(Sheet 1)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3104

GR1F-16CJ-1-0126X37

Angle between horizon and aimpoint

POINT A

8 nm (no wind), 7000 feet AGL,

horizon. Then lower LG and

establish optimum LG down

airspeed. As a guide, no wind

minimum EPU fuel is 45 percent

(40 percent with JFS running).

POINT B

fuel is:

6 nm 35 percent (30

percent with JFS running).

4 nm 25 percent (20

percent with JFS running).

AREA C

rizon (under nose of aircraft and not

visible). Normal straight-in approach

is not feasible.
Options are:

Delay LG lowering. Plan an over-

head approach from a high key

Delay LG lowering. Plan a modi-

fied flightpath to low key.

Lower LG, open speedbrakes,

and dive and maneuver aircraft

to intercept a point on the

normal straight-in glidepath.

7000

FEET

AGL

2000

FEET

AGL

OVERHEAD

APPROACH

POINT A

POINT B1

POINT B

POINT B2

POINT B1

POINT B2

AREA C

Do not allow airspeed to decrease below

minimum LG down airspeed.

If the aimpoint on the runway moves up in the

field of view while maintaining maximum range

Flameout Landing Pattern (Typical)

(STRAIGHT-IN APPROACH)

continue glide until initial aim-

point is 11-17 degrees below

4 nm (no wind), 4000-8000 feet

AGL, airspeed and LG as required.

As a guide, no wind minimum EPU

4 - 0 nm (no wind), initial aimpoint

is more than 17 degrees below ho-

Do not delay lowering LG

below 2000 feet AGL.

altitude but below the normal

recommended altitude.

(LG up) airspeed, the runway probably cannot

be reached. This path corresponds to a glide

angle of about 7 degrees between the horizon

and the aimpoint.

The JFS alone does not provide adequate

hydraulic pressure to land the aircraft.

EPU fuel quantity (points A, B , and B )

should be sufficient to insure adequate

hydraulic pressure through landing.

Eject if it becomes obvious that a safe landing

cannot be made. Ejection can be accomplished

at any point in the approach; however, do not

delay ejection below 2000 feet AGL in an

attempt to salvage a questionable approach.

Figure 314.(Sheet 2)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

Change 13105

Landing Phase

The LG should be lowered no later than 2000 feet

AGL to allow adequate time for alternate LG

extension. Establish a glidepath to achieve the initial

aimpoint while maintaining optimum LG down

airspeed. Once wings level on final approach, be

aware of the tendency to slow below minimum LG

down airspeed.

Do not attempt to stretch a glide by

allowing the airspeed to decrease

below minimum LG down airspeed. A

slower airspeed decreases the maneu

verability available to arrest the high

sink rate associated with the flameout

approach and may preclude a success

ful flameout landing.

Once landing is assured, the recommended procedure

is to shift the aimpoint from 1/3 of the way down the

runway to a position short of the intended touchdown

point. Speedbrakes may be used to help control

airspeed. The higher the airspeed, the shorter the

aimpoint should be to allow for additional float (from

flare to touchdown). The aircraft is easiest to control

in the flare if the flare is begun between optimum and

minimum LG down airspeeds. The point at which the

flare is begun depends upon airspeed, sink rate, and

glide angle. The flare should be started high enough

to allow a smooth gradual reduction in glide angle but

not so high as to run out of airspeed prior to

touchdown. Under a no wind condition, the aircraft

floats 30004000 feet after beginning the flare, if the

flare is begun at the optimum LG down airspeed.

Once the sink rate is arrested, attempt to slow to a

normal touchdown airspeed and AOA. If excess

airspeed exists after arresting the sink rate, the best

method to slow the aircraft is to stay airborne until

normal touchdown airspeed is reached.

After Touchdown

After touchdown from a flameout landing,

use a

normal or short field stopping technique as required

by the stopping distance available. If the JFS and

EPU are running, normal braking and NWS are

available (NWS is inoperative if the LG was lowered

with the alternate LG system). If the JFS is not

running, only the brake/JFS accumulators are

available to supply hydraulic pressure for braking.

Stop the aircraft by making one steady brake

application just short of antiskid cycling. If there is

any doubt about stopping on the remaining runway,

lower the hook.

When the aircraft is fully stopped,

have chocks installed or engage parking brake.

Leave the battery on line until chocks are installed.

If JFS START 2 was attempted but was unsuccess

ful, no braking is available for stopping or directional

control unless the brake/JFS accumulators are

recharged. Use flaperons and rudder as required to

maintain directional control. As the aircraft slows

below 70 knots, directional control is reduced and

the aircraft may drift right.

Flameout Landing Procedures

If the engine has flamed out or if flameout is

imminent, turn toward a suitable runway and

accomplish either an overhead approach or a

straightin approach, as appropriate.

Altitudes (overhead approach):

High key-700010,000 feet AGL.

Recommended altitude is

7000,

7500 feet

AGL plus 500 feet per 1000

pounds of fuel/store

weights

PX III

and plus 500 feet if CFT's are

installed.

Low key-30005000 feet AGL.

Recommended altitude is

3000,

3250 feet

AGL plus 250 feet per 1000

pounds of fuel/store

weights

PX III

and plus 250 feet if CFT's are

installed.

Base key-2000 feet AGL minimum.

Altitudes

(straightin approach):

8 nm-7000 feet AGL minimum.

The minimum altitude is based on an LG up

glide at maximum range airspeed to 2000 feet

AGL followed by an LG down glide at

optimum LG down airspeed to the runway for

a drag index of 100. A lower drag index

slightly reduces the minimum altitude

required. A higher drag index slightly

increases the minimum altitude required.

4 nm-40008000 feet AGL.

Delay lowering the LG until the initial

aimpoint is 1117 degrees below the horizon.

Eject if a safe landing cannot be made.

Ejection can be accomplished at any

point in the pattern but do not delay

ejection below 2000 feet AGL in an

attempt to salvage a questionable

approach.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3106Change 1

Stores-Jettison (if required).

Airspeed-

200,

205 knots.

Increase airspeed 5 knots per 1000 pounds of

fuel/store weights

PX III

and plus 5 knots if

CFT's are installed. This airspeed equates to

approximately 7 degrees AOA.

NOTE

During an airstart attempt, do not slow

below the minimum airstart airspeed.

EPU switch-ON.

NOTE

PX II

The VHF radio is not powered by

the EPU.

JFS switch-START 2 below 20,000 feet MSL

and below 400 knots.

EPU fuel quantity should be at least 25

percent (20 percent with JFS running)

at high key for an overhead approach

or 45 percent (40 percent with JFS

running) at 8 nm for a straightin

approach to insure adequate hydraulic

pressure through landing.

The JFS alone does not provide

adequate hydraulic pressure to land

the aircraft.

Do not start the JFS if engine seizure

has occurred or is anticipated or if

engine failure is a result of fuel

starvation. Starting the JFS may result

in no brake/JFS accumulator pressure

for the brakes.

NOTE

If engine is not operating, consider

placing the FUEL MASTER switch to

OFF if a fuel leak exists. This action

may conserve fuel for the JFS.

If the JFS is erroneously placed to

START 1, leave it there.

If the JFS RUN light does not

illuminate or goes off once illuminated,

place the JFS switch to OFF and

reattempt START 2 when the brake/

JFS accumulators are recharged. The

JFS switch does not relatch in either

start position while the JFS is spooling

down.

AIR SOURCE knob-RAM (below 25,000 feet

MSL).

DEFOG lever-Forward.

LG handle-DN. (Use DN LOCK REL button

if required.)

Do not delay lowering LG below 2000

feet AGL.

If LG handle does not lower, select

BRAKES CHAN 2 and position ALT

FLAPS switch to EXTEND.

PW 229

Nozzle remains closed, resulting in

higher than normal landing thrust.

ALT GEAR handle-Pull (if required) (190

knots maximum, if practical).

Alternate LG extension can be used up to 300

knots; however, the NLG may not fully extend

until 190 knots. Time above 190 knots should

be minimized in case there is a leak in the

pneumatic lines.

NWS is not available following alter

nate LG extension.

Do not depress the ALT GEAR reset

button while pulling the ALT GEAR

handle. This action may preclude

successful LG extension.

Airspeed-

190,

195 knots optimum in

pattern.

Increase airspeed 5 knots per 1000 pounds of

fuel/store weights

PX III

and plus 5 knots if

CFT's are installed.

Do not allow airspeed to decrease

below

180,

185 knots plus 5 knots

per 1000 pounds of fuel/store weights

PX III

and plus 5 knots if CFT's are

installed.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

Change 13107

After touchdown:

10. DRAG CHUTE switch-DEPLOY (if re

quired).

11. HOOK switch-DN (if required).

If brake/JFS accumulator braking is used:

12. Stop straight ahead and engage parking

brake.

Brakes should be applied in a single,

moderate, and steady application

without cycling the antiskid.

Brake pedal deflection of 1/16 inch

activates the brakes and bleeds the

brake/JFS accumulators. To avoid

brake activation and loss of accumula

tor fluid, do not rest feet on the brake

pedals.

Do not attempt to taxi clear of the

runway. Loss of brake/JFS accumula

tor pressure results in the inability to

stop or steer the aircraft.

13. Refer to ACTIVATED EPU/HYDRAZINE

LEAK, this section.

JETTISON

Selective Jettison

Selective jettison is used to release selected store(s)

(except airtoair missiles) or suspension equipment

in an unarmed or unguided condition.

GND JETT ENABLE switch-ENABLE (if LG

is down).

MASTER ARM switch-MASTER ARM.

ARMT CONSENT switch-On.

PX II

SMS switch-SMS.

PX III

ST STA switch-ST STA.

DOG FIGHT switch-Center.

MFD-SMS format.

Store and station selections can be made

from either cockpit.

SJ OSB (MFD)-Depress.

SJ PAGE (MFD)-Select stores desired for

jettison.

Jettison of an inboard shoulder

mounted store from a TER at station 4

or 6 with the MLG down may result in

LG and store(s) collision. To avoid this,

select RACK for jettison instead of

WPN.

Jettison of external wing fuel tanks

with stores/suspension equipment at

stations 3 and/or 7 with MLG down

may result in LG and external wing

fuel tank collision.

Failure to load the actual stores

configuration into SMS inventory could

cause damage to the aircraft by

inhibiting the selective jettison release

time delay used to insure safe

370/600gallon fuel tank separation

when a store is present at station 3 or 7.

Selective jettison airspeed/mach lim

its in T.O. GR1F16CJ12 are only

valid for:

Selective jettison of one store type at

a time.

Selective jettison from nonadjacent

stations.

If simultaneous selective jettison of

either more than one store type or from

adjacent stations is required, adhere

to emergency jettison airspeed/mach

limits.

NOTE

Weapon(s) and/or rack(s) to be jetti

soned is highlighted.

When 300gallon and 370/600gallon

fuel tanks are carried simultaneously,

the 300gallon fuel tank must be

separated prior to the 370/600gallon

fuel tanks.

10. WPN REL or

PX II

ALT REL but

ton-Depress.

NOTE

When jettisoning tanks from stations 4

and 6, hold release button depressed

for 1 second.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3108

Emergency Jettison

Emergency jettison is a onestep operation which

clears all expendable stores and racks except

airtoair missiles. All weapons are released in an

unarmed or unguided condition.

PX II

If the SMS is

off, depressing the EMER STORES JETTISON

button supplies electrical power to the SMS. In

addition, while the button is depressed, the SMS

enters the EJ mode. When the button is released,

the avionic system returns to the previous operating

mode. Emergency jettison is not available unless the

main, standby, or EPU generator is operating.

PX III

Emergency jettison may not be available if an MMC

FAIL PFL message is present. In this case,

emergency jettison can be restored by placing the

MMC switch to OFF.

PX III

If the MMC is off, depressing EMER STORES

JETTISON button supplies electrical power to the

MMC and RIU's. In addition, while the button is

depressed, the MMC enters the EJ mode.

GND JETT ENABLE switch-ENABLE (if

required).

Use EMER STORES JETTISON on the

ground only as a last resort.

EMER STORES JETTISON button-Depress

(1 second).

PX III

Emergency jettison is not

available if an MMC FAIL PFL

message is present. Emergency jetti

son can be restored by placing the

MMC switch to OFF.

NOTE

If the initial actuation of the EMER

STORES JETTISON button fails to

jettison all aircraft stores, subsequent

attempts may successfully release the

remaining stores.

FLCS FAILURES

Significant FLCS failures, except for reversion to

DBU, cause one or more PFL's to be displayed.

Warning level failures also trigger the FLCS

warning light; this light goes off only if the failure

resets. Caution level failures (except FLCS BUS

FAIL) also trigger the FLCS FAULT caution light;

this light goes off if the failure resets or when the

fault is acknowledged. Refer to PILOT FAULT

LIST-FLCS, this section, for PFL list.

The FLCS emergency procedures are based on the

following recommended sequence of pilot actions:

Note PFL(s) displayed.

Acknowledge fault.

Refer to PILOT FAULT LIST-FLCS, this section.

Refer to appropriate FLCS emergency procedure.

Perform FLCS reset, if so directed in the emergency

procedure.

Perform fault recall.

Certain MUX bus communication failures may result

in the inability to display FLCS PFL's on the PFLD.

If this occurs, PFL's may be observed on the FLCS

page of the MFD.

Manual selection of DBU to attempt correction of a

perceived FLCS failure is not recommended.

Do not select DBU if the FLCS warning

light is on since doing so allows failed

signals which were previously voted

out to be used.

Air Data Malfunctions

A single failure in the air data system (static/impact

pressure) is indicated by the FLCS FAULT caution

light and an FLCS ADC FAIL PFL. No degradation

of aircraft performance should be noticed.

Contamination of the pitot probe can cause blockage

of the passage which provides total pressure signals.

This causes erroneously low airspeed indications in

the HUD and on the airspeed/mach indicator with an

FLCS ADC FAIL PFL at approximately 300 knots.

An erroneously low airspeed value is used for FLCS

gain scheduling which may result in pitch

oscillations.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3109

If erroneously low airspeed indications are present

both in the HUD and on the airspeed/mach indicator

during takeoff, consider aborting. If takeoff is

continued, maintain airspeed below 210 knots (Cat

I) or 275 knots (Cat III) (use INS groundspeed or

wingman indications to determine airspeed) and

land as soon as practical. Pitch oscillations may be

experienced at higher speeds. If oscillations are

encountered, minimize stick commands and slow to

less than 210 knots (Cat I) 275 knots (Cat III).

A dual failure of static or impact pressure systems is

indicated by the FLCS warning light and a STBY

GAIN PFL. The FLCS ADC FAIL PFL is still present

since the first failure is still active. In standby gains,

the FLCS has transitioned to a fixed set of control

gains which are optimized for sea level and 600 knots

(LG handle in UP) and sea level and 230 knots (LG

handle in DN). The LEF's are at zero degrees with the

LG handle up and ALT FLAPS switch in NORM, and

are at 15 degrees down with the LG handle down or

the ALT FLAPS switch in EXTEND.

An FLCS reset can always be attempted for a first air

data failure. If the first air data failure does not reset,

and a second failure occurs (engaging standby gains),

the first failure is latched and will not reset. However,

the second failure is allowed to be reset and standby

gains can be exited if the reset is successful.

Flying qualities in standby gains are degraded.

Airspeed should be maintained subsonic and less

than 650 knots. AOA should be maintained less than

12 degrees. Since the gains are optimized for 600

knots at sea level, airspeed should be maintained

greater than 240 knots until the LG is lowered.

If FLCS ADC FAIL PFL occurs:

If BRK PWR DEGR PFL is also present, refer to

FLCS SINGLE ELECTRONIC FAILURE, this

section.

Establish 1g flight.

FLCS RESET switch-RESET.

If failure indications go off:

Continue normal operation.

If failure indications remain on:

Land as soon as practical.

If STBY GAIN PFL occurs:

Establish 1g flight with maximum of 12

degrees AOA.

Airspeed 240650 knots with LG up.

FLCS RESET switch-RESET.

Land as soon as practical.

Do not slow below 240 knots with LG up if

STBY GAIN PFL is still present.

AOA Malfunction

A single failure in the AOA system is indicated by

illumination of the FLCS FAULT caution light and an

FLCS AOA FAIL PFL. No degradation in aircraft

handling characteristics should be encountered. The

first AOA failure signal defaults to 11 degrees to

prevent hardover commands if two AOA inputs fail at

the upper AOA limit.

A dual AOA failure illuminates the FLCS warning

light and triggers an FLCS AOA WARN PFL. The

FLCS system code and FLCS AOA FAIL PFL are still

present since the first failure is still active. With a

dual AOA failure, the FLCC selects the mid AOA

value among the remaining good signal, 11 degrees,

and the failed signal. Aircraft handling characteris

tics may be degraded somewhat in the cruise

configuration, but should be adequate for landing

since the first AOA failure defaulted to 11 degrees.

FLCS RESET may be attempted for any AOA failure.

If the first failure does not reset and a second failure

occurs, the first failure is latched and cannot be reset.

If FLCS AOA FAIL PFL occurs:

If BRK PWR DEGR PFL is also present, refer to

FLCS SINGLE ELECTRONIC FAILURE, this

section.

Establish 1g flight.

FLCS RESET switch-RESET.

If failure indications go off:

Continue normal operation.

If failure indications remain on:

Land as soon as practical.

Do not exceed 11 degrees AOA during

approach, landing, or twopoint aerodynamic

braking.

If FLCS AOA WARN PFL occurs:

Establish 1g flight.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3110

FLCS RESET switch-RESET.

If FLCS warning light goes off:

Land as soon as practical.

Do not exceed 11 degrees AOA during

approach, landing, or twopoint aerodynamic

braking.

If FLCS warning light remains on:

Land as soon as possible.

Do not exceed 11 degrees AOA during

approach, landing, or twopoint aerodynamic

braking.

CADC Malfunction

A failure of any of the CADC electrical inputs (AOA,

total temperature, altimeter barometric reference,

etc.) or a detected failure internal to the CADC causes

illumination of the CADC caution light. If the CADC

caution light does not reset, systems dependent on

CADC information should be checked for proper

operation.

Retarding the throttle below MIL

while supersonic may induce inlet

buzz which produces severe cockpit

vibration and probable engine stalls.

NOTE

If a CADC malfunction occurs, the FLCC

AOS feedback function may deactivate.

If CADC caution light illuminates:

FLCS RESET switch-RESET.

If CADC caution light goes off:

Check for an ENG MACH FAIL PFL.

If ENG MACH FAIL PFL is still present:

Continue flight and observe throttle limita

tion, if supersonic. Refer to PILOT FAULT

LIST - ENGINE, this section.

If CADC caution light remains on:

AOA-Crosscheck with airspeed.

Use AOA indications with caution.

Land as soon as practical.

Final approach airspeeds:

PW 229

135,

129

136 knots

PW 229

137,

129

138 knots

Add 4 knots/1000 pounds of fuel/store

weights equates to 13 degrees AOA (add 8

knots for 11 degrees AOA).

Servo Malfunction

An initial servo malfunction results in illumination of

the FLCS FAULT caution light and an ISA

LHT/RHT/LF/RF/RUD FAIL PFL for the applicable

ISA. A failure of the second servo in the same ISA

results in a repeat of the PFL. Multiple servo

malfunctions involving more than one ISA cause an

ISA ALL FAIL PFL. Servo failures are reset by

placing the FLCS RESET switch to RESET. No

degradation in flying qualities is expected if the servo

does not reset.
Hydraulic failures or momentary drops in hydraulic

pressure (e.g., wake turbulence encounter, air in

hydraulic system) also illuminate the FLCS FAULT

caution light and cause an ISA ALL FAIL PFL.
1.

Airspeed-400 knots maximum (subsonic).

If hydraulic failure is confirmed:
2.

Go to SINGLE/DUAL HYDRAULIC FAILURE,

this section.

If hydraulic pressures are normal:
3.

FLCS RESET switch-RESET.

If failure indications go off:
4.

Continue normal operation.

If failure indications remain on:
4.

Land as soon as practical.

FLCS Electronic Malfunctions

Only two single electronic failures are reported in

flight. These are a branch power supply failure (BRK

PWR DEGR PFL) and a coil current monitor (CCM)

detected failure (FLCS CCM FAIL PFL). All other

single electronic failures (rate gyro and accelerometer

failures, stick sensor failures, single axis failures, and

single branch failures) are reported 2 minutes after

WOW as an FLCS SNGL FAIL PFL. A momentary,

mild transient might be felt when a single electronic

failure occurs. Even though display of a single failure

is not always provided in flight, a single FLCS failure

can be reset.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

Change 13111

If a branch fails due to a branch power supply

problem, BRK PWR DEGR PFL is displayed. If power

fails in branch A, B, or C, then one AOA and one air

data input are also failed. This condition is displayed

by FLCS AOA FAIL and FLCS ADC FAIL PFL's in

addition to the BRK PWR DEGR PFL. A single

branch power supply failure may also cause FLCS

dual fail indications if the ADV MODE switch is not

in the depressed position. This dual failure can be

reset as long as the ADV MODE switch is in the

depressed position prior to reset. Anytime BRK PWR

DEGR occurs, FLCS power supply status should be

checked by placing the FLCS PWR TEST switch to

the TEST position. If any one of the four FLCS PWR

indicator lights does not illuminate, then that branch

is not powered and the indicated toe brake in the

indicated channel is inoperative.
If the CCM detects an erroneous output command from

one of the three servo amplifiers which drive the three

ISA servo valves, a backup servo amplifier is energized.

FLCS CCM FAIL PFL is then displayed. An FLCS reset

may bring the tripped amplifier back on line.
If a dual electronic failure occurs (i.e., two pitch rate

gyros, two roll stick sensors, or two power supplies),

the FLCS warning light illuminates and an FLCS

DUAL FAIL PFL occurs. A reset of a dual failure may

be attempted. However, reset is only possible back to

the single failure condition, since the single failure is

latched if it still existed at the time of the second

failure. Branch power status should again be checked

with the FLCS PWR TEST switch.
There is a remote possibility that a series of FLCS

failures during maneuvering on the CAT I/III AOA

limiter can result in centering of and lack of response

from one or both horizontal tails. The series of failures

starts with a FLCS CCM FAIL PFL and can quickly

progress to ISA FAIL PFL's and a FLCS dual failure.

Centering of and loss of horizontal tail response only

occurs in conjunction with FLCS dual electronic fail

indications. This should not be confused with a loss of

control associated with a departure from controlled

flight. If the aircraft suddenly becomes nonrespon

sive in pitch and FLCS DUAL FAIL indications are

present, perform a FLCS reset.
It is possible to receive FLCS dual fail indications

following a single failure of the ADV MODE switch

when attempting/during ATF operations. The dual

redundant switch has two outputs, each of which are

split for use by the fourchannel FLCS. If one side of

the switch fails, the FLCS warning light illuminates

and an FLCS DUAL FAIL PFL occurs. This dual

failure can be reset as long as the ADV MODE switch

is disengaged prior to reset.

LESS

b1q

Vibrations associated with gun firing may

cause either a single failure or a dual failure of a

FLCS accelerometer to be declared. These failure

declarations occur during gun firing because the four

outputs of the accelerometer do not always compare

within present software tolerances.

FLCS SINGLE ELECTRONIC FAILURE

If BRK PWR DEGR or FLCS CCM FAIL PFL occurs:
1.

Establish 1g flight and airspeed less than 400

knots (subsonic).

FLCS RESET switch-RESET.

If failure indications go off:
3.

Continue normal operation.

If failure indications remain on:
3.

FLCS PWR TEST switch-TEST.

Observe FLCS PWR lights and determine

brake and brake channel affected. If branch

A, B, or C FLCS PWR light fails to illuminate,

use a maximum of 11 degrees AOA for

approach, landing, and twopoint aero

dynamic braking.

BRAKES channel switch-Change channels

(if required).

Land as soon as practical.

FLCS DUAL ELECTRONIC FAILURE

If FLCS DUAL FAIL PFL occurs:
1.

Establish 1g flight and airspeed less than 400

knots (subsonic).

ADV MODE switch-Depress.

The ATF NOT ENGAGED caution light may

illuminate shortly after depressing the ADV

MODE switch.

FLCS RESET switch-RESET.

Reset may clear the FLCS warning light;

however, the single failure is still present.

If FLCS warning light goes off and no FLCS PFL's are

present:
4.

Continue normal operation, but do not use

ADV MODE switch.

If FLCS warning light goes off and an FLCS PFL is

still present:
4.

FLCS PWR TEST switch-TEST.

Observe FLCS PWR lights and determine

brake and brake channel affected. If branch

A, B, or C FLCS PWR light fails to illuminate,

use a maximum of 11 degrees AOA for

approach, landing, and twopoint aero

dynamic braking.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3112Change 1

BRAKES channel switch-Change channels

(if required).

Land as soon as practical.

If FLCS warning light remains on:

FLCS PWR TEST switch-TEST.

Observe FLCS PWR lights and determine

brake and brake channel affected. If branch

A, B, or C FLCS PWR light fails to illuminate,

use a maximum of 11 degrees AOA for

approach, landing, and twopoint aero

dynamic braking.

BRAKES channel switch-Change channels

(if required).

Land as soon as possible.

NOTE

No significant flying qualities degrada

tion should occur; however, with an

FLCS dual failure, the FLCS has no

redundancy.

Two minutes after WOW, the FLCS

FAULT caution light illuminates and

an FLCS SNGL FAIL PFL occurs.

FLCS Temperature Malfunction

If sensors in any two branches of the FLCC detect

temperatures in excess of 75

C, the FLCS FAULT

caution light illuminates and the FLCS HOT TEMP

PFL is displayed.

If an FLCS HOT TEMP PFL occurs:

Airspeed-400 knots maximum (subsonic).

Altitude-25,000 feet MSL maximum.

If possible, descend below 15,000 feet MSL.

AIR SOURCE knob-RAM.

With the ECS shut down or the AIR

SOURCE knob in OFF or RAM, the

gsuit does not inflate and PBG is

disabled.

PX III

If AIR SOURCE knob is placed to

OFF or RAM, OBOGS is inoperative.

Activate EOS if OXY LOW warning

light illuminates above 10,000 feet

cockpit altitude.

NOTE

External fuel cannot be transferred in

OFF or RAM. Consider jettisoning

tanks to decrease drag if range is

critical and ECS cannot be turned on

for short periods of time to transfer

fuel.

If failure indications go off:

It may take up to 15 minutes for ramair cooling to

extinguish the light.

Land as soon as practical.

If failure indications remain on:

Land as soon as possible.

Autopilot Malfunctions

If the autopilot fails to receive needed data or AOA

exceeds 15 degrees, the FLCS FAULT caution light

illuminates, the FLCS A/P FAIL PFL is displayed,

and the autopilot automatically disengages. If

engagement is attempted with a failure or degrada

tion, or AOA above 15 degrees the autopilot does not

engage and FLCS A/P FAIL PFL occurs. If ATF is

engaged or if engagement is attempted, this failure

also causes the ATF NOT ENGAGED caution light to

illuminate.

If FLCS A/P FAIL PFL occurs:

Establish 1g flight.

Below 15 degrees AOA.

FLCS RESET switch-RESET.

If PFL clears:

Continue normal operation.

If PFL remains, autopilot cannot be engaged.

The FLCS FAULT caution light and the FLCS A/P

DEGR PFL are displayed during nonTF operations

if the autopilot is engaged but is not providing the

selected function.

The PFL occurs under the following conditions:

Attitude hold modes-After 12 seconds of operation

outside of attitude limits with no stick input.

Roll attitude hold mode-After 12 seconds of

operation with the autopilot roll command at its

maximum authority.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

Change 13113

Pitch attitude and altitude hold modes-After 5

seconds of operation with the autopilot pitch

command at its maximum authority, no stick

inputs, and aircraft not correcting back to

referenced altitude/attitude.

If FLCS A/P DEGR PFL occurs:

Maneuver aircraft into autopilot envelope.

FLCS RESET switch - RESET.

If PFL clears:

Continue normal operation.

If PFL remains:

3. Disengage autopilot.

DBU ON Warning Light

DBU is entered automatically by detection of a primary

software fault. Such a fault is assumed to exist if power

is lost in three branches, if three processors fail, or if a

threebranch combination of power and processor

failures occur. If automatic DBU engagement occurs,

toe brake operation may be affected.

Due to the simplicity of the DBU, fault tolerance is

reduced and detailed FLCS failure information is

not provided. DBU is intended as a backup mode that

provides a transition to cruise flight and a return to

base capability in the event that a software fault has

been encountered within the FLCC.

To transfer back to primary mode after an automatic

transfer to DBU, the DIGITAL BACKUP switch must

be cycled to BACKUP and then back to OFF. Pitch

transients are possible due to horizontal tail position

changes when the DIGITAL BACKUP switch is

cycled back to OFF. These transients can be

minimized by stabilizing at 1g prior to reselecting

OFF. If ATF was engaged prior to automatic DBU

engagement, a 3g incremental nonrolltowings level

flyup is present. Depressing the paddle switch

interrupts the flyup command. Placing the DIGITAL

BACKUP switch to BACKUP cancels the flyup

command.

If DBU ON warning light illuminates:

Establish 1g flight.

Do not use abrupt control inputs or make

rudder inputs during rolls.

Airspeed-500 knots/0.9 mach maximum.

If possible, slow to 300 knots.

DIGITAL BACKUP switch-Cycle to BACK

UP, then back to OFF.

If DBU ON warning light goes off:

Verify that DBU is no longer present on the FLCS

page of the MFD.

FLCS RESET switch-RESET (if required).

Land as soon as practical.

Do not exceed 500 knots/0.9 mach.

If DBU ON warning light remains on:

DIGITAL BACKUP switch-BACKUP.

Airspeed-500 knots/0.9 mach maximum.

If possible, slow to 300 knots. Avoid abrupt

control inputs. Restrict bank angle changes

to less than 90 degrees.

Controllability-Check.

Lower LG at safe altitude and check handling

qualities at 1113 degrees AOA. A mild

noseup transient of approximately 2 degrees

occurs if LG is lowered below 200 knots.

FLCS PWR TEST switch-TEST.

Observe FLCS PWR lights and determine

status of toe brakes. If branch A, B, or C FLCS

PWR light fails to illuminate, use a maximum

of 11 degrees AOA for approach, landing, and

twopoint aerodynamic braking.

BRAKES channel switch-Change channels (if

required).

Land as soon as possible.

Plan a straightin approach.

TF FAIL Warning Light

The TF FAIL warning light illuminates when a TF

malfunction is detected by the NVP or when SWIM

failures are detected by the FLCS.

If TF FAIL warning light illuminates:

Altitude-As required.

Climb to minimum enroute altitude (MEA) or

depart low altitude environment, if required.

Paddle switch-Depress (if required).

This action interrupts the flyup in ATF or

manual TF (if enabled).

PFLD-Check.

If a SWIM PFL is displayed, the TF

malfunction was detected by one or more

SWIM monitors.

CARA, EGI/INS, and

PX II

FCC,

PX III

MMC-Check for proper operation.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3114

If SWIM ATF FAIL, SWIM NVP FAIL, SWIM RALT

FAIL, or SWIM SCP FAIL PFL is displayed:

Paddle switch-Release.

NOTE

If the malfunction was detected by

SWIM and this malfunction is no

longer present, releasing the paddle

switch resets the SWIM monitors,

cancels the flyup, and extinguishes

the TF FAIL warning light.

If SWIM ATF FAIL, SWIM NVP FAIL, SWIM RALT

FAIL, or SWIM SCP FAIL PFL does not clear or

recurs:

Discontinue TF operations.

If SWIM ATTD FAIL or SWIM VEL FAIL PFL is

displayed:

Paddle switch-Release.

Discontinue TF operations.

Further TF operations should not be

attempted after the occurrence of a

SWIM ATTD FAIL or SWIM VEL FAIL

PFL.

If no SWIM PFL was present (NVP malfunction):

Paddle switch-Release.

Perform TFR BIT.

If NVP malfunction still exists:

Discontinue TF operations.

LEF Malfunction (Symmetric)

A symmetric LEF malfunction may be indicated by

an FLCS warning light and an FLCS LEF LOCK

PFL. These indicate that one or both of the LEF

branches have malfunctioned, that the asymmetry

brakes have been activated, or that the LEF have

been manually locked.

LEF's will stop and remain fixed in position when an

FLCS LEF LOCK PFL occurs. LEF should remain

symmetrical (within 10 degrees).

Certain LEF malfunctions do not activate the FLCS

LEF LOCK PFL. The presence of higher than normal

buffet levels during maneuvering flight and reduced

directional stability in the high AOA region are

indications that the LEF have failed to schedule

properly.

If an FLCS LEF LOCK PFL occurs or a malfunction

is suspected (without an FLCS LEF LOCK PFL):

AOA - 12 degrees maximum.

Exceeding 12 degrees AOA reduces

departure resistance. Limit rolling

maneuvers to a maximum bank angle

change of 90 degrees and avoid rapid

roll rates.

FLCS RESET switch - RESET.

If FLCS warning light resets:

Continue flight.

If the FLCS warning light does not reset or a

malfunction is suspected (without an FLCS LEF

LOCK PFL):

Airspeed - Decelerate to subsonic flight if

supersonic.

LE FLAPS switch - LOCK (after LG is down).

Lock LEF's in landing configuration at final

approach airspeed at a safe altitude. This

makes final approach and landing as normal

as possible and protects against

uncommanded LEF excursions close to the

ground.

Land as soon as practical.

With the LEF at or near full up, there are no

unique control inputs required. A small

increase in airspeed may be noted compared

to a normal landing approach at 11 degrees

AOA. With the LEF at or near full down, the

aircraft may tend to float in ground effect

and a slight forward stick force may be

required.

During engine shutdown:

MAIN PWR switch - Do not place to OFF until

engine rpm has reached zero.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

3115

Placing MAIN PWR switch to OFF

before hydraulic pressure is lost may

cause damage to two LEF shafts.

LEF Malfunction (Asymmetric)

The most likely cause of asymmetric LEF's is a

mechanical disconnect in one of the LEF drive trains

accompanied by a failure of the asymmetry brake.

This failure may not activate the FLCS LEF LOCK

PFL or illuminate the FLCS warning light. The first

indication of an asymmetry is an uncommanded roll.

The failed LEF may be as much as 90 degrees up or

down. Adequate roll control is available below 10

degrees AOA at subsonic speeds. Use lateral stick for

roll control. Use roll trim to reduce lateral stick force

as required. Do not attempt to achieve coordinated

flight. Avoid using rudder except to reduce sideslip

when stores are jettisoned or to aid in maintaining

desired ground track during the final part of landing

approach. Do not use rudder trim. If the yaw is away

from the failed LEF (i.e., nose left yaw with right LEF

failed up), rudder inputs to reduce resulting sideslip

actually aggravate the situation by increasing roll

control requirements. Accepting some sideslip

reduces roll control requirements. To prevent

excessive sideslip, maintain AOA as low as practical.

Banked flight reduces the amount of heading change

due to sideslipinduced heading drift. Lock the good

LEF as close to symmetrical as possible to aid in roll

control and to prevent transients caused by

automatic scheduling. Monitor fuel consumption

since significantly higher thrust is required to

compensate for the increased drag.

Selectively jettison stores to reduce asymmetry and

sideslip and reduce fuel weight as necessary to

reduce approach speed. Perform a controllability

check. The aircraft tends to roll into the wing with

the least lift (i.e., the heavy wing). If the LEF is failed

up, lift on that wing is less. If the LEF is failed down,

lift on that wing is more or less depending on the

failed LEF position and the position at which the

other LEF is locked. If there is a significant

crosswind, diminish crosswind effects, if possible, by

landing with the heavy wing upwind.

Fly a shallow, straightin approach at approximately

8 degrees AOA (fly no lower than 6 degrees AOA) with

minimum roundout for touchdown. Immediately

prior to touchdown, use rudder as required to align

the aircraft with the runway. Reduce the rate of

descent somewhat prior to touchdown, as required,

but do not flare or raise the nose above 10 degrees

AOA because available roll control is reduced and

heading drift will increase as AOA increases. Lower

the nose immediately after touchdown. Directional

control should not be a problem.

If LEF asymmetry occurs:

AOA - 610 degrees.

Exceeding 10 degrees AOA may result

in insufficient roll authority. Limit

rolling maneuvers to gentle roll in with

a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees.

Flying a fast approach (lower than 6

degrees AOA) presents additional

control difficulties caused by a change

in the path of the disturbed airflow

coming off the failed LEF.

Lateral stick/roll trim - As required.

Minimize rudder inputs. Use rudder as

required to reduce sideslip when jettison

ing stores or to aid in maintaining desired

ground track during the final part of

landing approach. Do not use rudder trim.

LE FLAPS switch - LOCK.

Lock operating LEF as near symmetrical as

possible.

Stores - Jettison (if required).

Consider selective jettison of stores from the

heavy wing as a means to reduce roll control

requirements. Refer to SELECTIVE JETTI

SON, this section.

Fuel weight - Reduce (if feasible/required).

Reduce fuel weight if fatigue is not a

factor. Fuel flow is significantly higher

with an LEF failed full up or down and

must be considered during recovery.

Controllability - Check.

Lower LG at a safe altitude and check

handling qualities at 68 degrees AOA.

Land as soon as practical.

F16C/D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2002) - page 25

F16C/D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2002) - page 25