ATP 3-39.10 POLICE OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2021)

24 August 2021

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3-1

Chapter 3

The Police Station

The police station is the heart of all law enforcement activity. This is true whether the

law enforcement agency is civilian or military police. Police stations supporting bases,

base camps, or metropolitan areas can be large operations with significant capabilities

beyond basic law enforcement requirements, while small stations can be austere with

only the most basic equipment and facilities. This chapter discusses how deliberate law

enforcement activities require organizational structure and technical and tactical

capabilities and oversight specifically focused on law enforcement and policing

activities, provisions of due processes, and support to the rule of law. These activities

and capabilities are managed within the construct of police station operations.

SECTION I - POLICE STATION CAPABILITIES

3-1.

Law enforcement includes numerous distinct activities performed in an effort to maintain order, protect

personnel and equipment, enforce laws and regulations, apprehend offenders, and investigate crimes. Police

station operations comprise the activities and capabilities required to organize, plan, direct, and control law

enforcement and policing assets.

POLICE STATION

3-2.

The military police station provides the base for law enforcement communications, planning, patrol

operations, investigations, employment of special capabilities, temporary detention of subjects, and logistic

and administration support specific to law enforcement. Military police must be familiar with the basic

requirements of a functional police station to understand police station operations. These capabilities will be

found within military police and civilian HN structures. Military police and USACIDC should understand

that within HN police station structures, these capabilities may be organizationally aligned differently and

may contain variant command and control structures; however, the capability should be available for the

efficient conduct of law enforcement and policing.
3-3.

Military police stations providing law enforcement support to U.S. military bases and base camps will

typically have elements not required in stations supporting civilian populations. All military police stations

require an operations section to provide planning and direct oversight to the police station and associated

personnel and resources. The various sections and capabilities required for effective law enforcement and

policing activities are under the control of the operations section. The operations section and subordinate law

enforcement capabilities are typically provided by a military police law enforcement detachment and

associated teams. See chapter 2 for a description of the military police law enforcement detachments and

associated law enforcement capabilities.
3-4.

Military police Soldiers and leaders must be thoroughly familiar with basic police station operations

requirements. These requirements are relevant, whether performing police operations in support of bases and

base camps or building HN police capability and capacity in support of contingency operations. There are

several requirements and capabilities that are typically found in all police station operations. The relative size

of the individual capability elements depends on the size of the organization or AO to be supported, resource

constraints, and other environmental factors. The minimum elements required for any police station to

conduct effective law enforcement and policing must include—



A law enforcement operations section.



A police desk section.

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

A law enforcement patrol section.



A criminal investigations section.



A traffic management and enforcement section.



A police administration section.



A logistics section.



A police training section.



Absent without leave/deserter recovery.



An SRT.

Law Enforcement Operations Section

3-5.

The operations section provides oversight and control of the law enforcement mission and all elements

and resources of the organization engaged in law enforcement activities, including those shown above. The

operations section conducts near-term and long-range planning for the organization, assigns tasks and

produces operations orders for law enforcement elements, and coordinates with other military and civilian

agencies. In addition, the operations section provides oversight for—



Evidence custodian and evidence storage procedures.



Emergency response requirements.



Special-event planning and execution.



Coordination of police engagement activities.



Shift change and guard mount briefings.



Patrol debriefings.



Police intelligence activities.



Security detail for distinguished visitors.

3-6.

These functions will typically be performed by the military police brigade or battalion S-3 within

expeditionary environments during the early stages of deliberate policing missions associated with decisive

action. For missions supporting U.S. forces, this function will typically be assumed by a deployed military

police law enforcement detachment attached to a military police battalion or brigade. During missions in

support of HN civil control efforts, military police brigades and battalions will retain the mission as the

theater matures but will typically require augmentation by military police law enforcement detachments and

other modular law enforcement elements.

Police Desk Section

3-7.

The police desk section is responsible for managing the communications and daily task assignments

for available law enforcement assets. The police desk section works under the direct control and supervision

of the law enforcement operations officer within the operations section. The desk operations section includes,

at a minimum, a desk sergeant and a radio and telephone operator. For larger operations, multiple desk

sergeants and communications personnel may be required. These larger operations may also require the

addition of an administrative clerk to support production of the police blotter and a watch commander to

provide overall supervision when the span of control exceeds the capability of a single desk sergeant. The

police desk section receives all incoming calls for military police assistance and is typically the first point of

telephonic contact the public has with a police organization. The police desk section prioritizes the

employment of resources and assigns tasks appropriately, initiates notifications (when required), reviews the

initial case work of law enforcement patrols, and produces the police blotter. The desk section also—



Conducts alarm monitoring.



Controls detained personnel and associated detention cell requirements.



Maintains police journals to document police activities and contacts.



Provides information to law enforcement patrols and other support personnel.



Accesses law enforcement databases and reporting systems (the National Crime Information

Center, ALERTS).

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

Performs maintenance on breath analysis equipment required for cases involving driving under

the influence or other alcohol-related incidents.



Maintains station key control.



Performs station security.

NFORCEMENT

ATROL

ECTION

3-8.

The law enforcement patrol section within a police station provides the baseline patrol and initial

response capability within an assigned AO or jurisdiction. Typically, the patrol section within military police

operations is manned by military police Soldiers from supporting military police companies augmenting the

military police commander, the PM, or the military police law enforcement detachment responsible for the

law enforcement mission. In these cases, the military police operations section must coordinate support to

ensure that adequate manpower is available. This section can be supported with civilian DA police assets on

bases or base camps within the United States. Within a civilian agency, the law enforcement patrol capability

is an organic asset of the civilian law enforcement organization.

RIMINAL

NVESTIGATIONS

ECTION

3-9.

The investigations section conducts criminal investigations of identified criminal activities. These

investigators typically conduct follow-on investigations (when required based on the offense, the severity of

the crime, and the evidence available) following the report of a crime and the initial response by law

enforcement patrols. When warranted, criminal investigations can be initiated by criminal investigators

without an initial response by a law enforcement patrol. Law enforcement personnel assigned to the

investigations section require specialized and extensive training to conduct criminal investigations.
3-10.

Within many civilian police agencies, investigators are referred to as detectives or SAs. Within military

police organizations, minor criminal investigations are conducted by assigned military police investigators.

Military police investigators are typically assigned to the military police investigations team within a military

police law enforcement detachment, although limited capability exists within military police companies and

platoons. Serious crimes are investigated by USACIDC SAs. USACIDC SAs operate within the USACIDC

chain of command. See AR 190-30 for additional information responsibilities for criminal investigations.
3-11.

The investigations section, in support of criminal investigations and the law enforcement mission,

conducts—



Interviews and law enforcement interrogations.



Crime prevention activities and surveys.



Case reviews.



Law enforcement surveillance.



Legal coordination.



Evidence collection and preservation.



Drug suppression activities.

RAFFIC

ANAGEMENT AND

NFORCEMENT

ECTION

3-12.

The traffic management and enforcement section provides specialized patrols that conduct activities

focused on maintaining the safety of public roadways, enforcing traffic laws, investigating traffic collisions,

and working to mitigate traffic problems due to traffic congestion, accidents, and emergency situations. Law

enforcement personnel assigned to the traffic section require specialized training to conduct traffic

management, investigations, and enforcement. The traffic section also conducts—



Traffic studies.



Special-event planning and support.



Traffic control directional and warning signage (normally coordinated with the Directorate of

Public Works)



Checkpoints.

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OLICE

DMINISTRATION

ECTION

3-13.

The police administration section provides critical support capabilities required by law enforcement

agencies. This section typically manages automation systems and access requirements for the organization,

but also—



Manages and allocates case file numbers and monitors cases for administrative completeness and

accuracy.



Conducts processing and storage of police reports.



Submits law enforcement records to the United States Army Crime Records Center for long term

retention by means of assigning a United States Army Crime Records Center control number to

the report.



Distributes police reports (as appropriate) and ensures that the distribution is controlled and

conducted within legal and regulatory constraints.



Conducts liaison with the court system.



Produces police-related correspondence, as required.

OGISTICS

ECTION

3-14.

A logistics section is critical to any police operation. Within military police and USACIDC

organizations, this capability is provided by the organization logistics staff officer section. This section is

responsible for ensuring that law enforcement and support elements have the required equipment and supplies

to perform their missions. These requirements can range from vehicles and radios to paper and cleaning

supplies.
3-15.

Ongoing law enforcement requires extensive amounts of expendable administrative and routine

policing and investigations supplies. These supplies include—



Evidence collection materials.



Biometric collection equipment and materials.



Personal-protective equipment and other safety-related equipment, materials, or supplies.



Communications equipment.



Vehicles equipped for law enforcement activities. Law enforcement operations inherently require

large volumes of fuel and other petroleum supplies and extensive vehicle maintenance and repair

capabilities.



Special-response equipment.



Speed-measuring devices.



Emergency lighting.



Canine-related equipment, food, shelter, and protection items.

3-16.

A myriad of other materials may also be required. Planners should identify ongoing logistical

requirements early and develop and coordinate an appropriate military police support plan.

RAINING

ECTION

3-17.

A training capability is critical to any police organization. The training capability within military police

and USACIDC organizations is maintained within the company headquarters and military police brigade and

battalion S-3 sections. The training section must manage training records and certification documentation for

all law enforcement personnel. This includes annual and cyclical in-service training required to maintain

proficiency in critical or perishable skills. Some law enforcement capabilities require certification of any law

enforcement personnel before allowing them to conduct specific activities. These requirements mitigate the

chance of injury or death to law enforcement personnel or civilians and possible legal liability. Examples of

capabilities requiring periodic certification and training include—



Initial certification to perform law enforcement duties.



Emergency vehicle operations.

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

Weapons qualifications, including less lethal weapons (police batons, oleoresin capsicum [OC]

[pepper spray], electronic control device).



National Incident Management System certification.



Radar and laser speed detection device certification.



Drug and explosive dog detection certification.



Breath analyzer certification.

3-18.

In cases where military police must support the establishment of HN police organizations, training

capability must be established for planning, resourcing, and conducting initial-entry police academies and

advanced police training. While initial training for military police Soldiers and USACIDC SAs is the

responsibility of USAMPS, civilian police organizations often maintain their own organic training capability

or use a regional facility that meets local certification requirements. Military police and USACIDC personnel

must be prepared to assist HN police agencies in establishing and maintaining this capability.

DDITIONAL

OLICE

TATION

APABILITIES

3-19.

Some capabilities (due to the environment, organizational structure, or resource constraints) may not

be resident within police station organizations. Additionally, the nature of police operations in support of

military communities typically requires many capabilities resident within the military police station that may

not be required within their civilian counterparts. These capabilities will be present in most military police

stations supporting bases within the United States. The requirement for some capabilities outside the United

States or for operations in support of HN civil control efforts may not exist (for example, a conservation law

enforcement officer is not typically required outside the United States).

Civilian Police Liaison

3-20.

The civilian police liaison section is a military-specific capability required to support commanders by

maintaining communications and relationships with civilian law enforcement agencies in the area. This

section provides a dedicated capability to identify Soldiers who have been detained by civilian law

enforcement and coordinate for their return to military control. The civilian police liaison section provides

support to unit commanders to ensure that legal requirements emanating from a Soldier’s apprehension are

understood by the individual and their chain of command. The section also conducts coordination with

civilian law enforcement to return Soldiers to military control who are absent without leave and have been

apprehended by civilian authorities.

Conservation Law Enforcement Officer

3-21.

The Conservation Law Enforcement Program is responsible for actively enforcing local, state, and

federal environmental, natural, and cultural resource laws and regulations. The conservation law enforcement

officers are key components in the preservation of these resources that have been entrusted to the Army.

Conservation law enforcement officers—



Identify and respond to HAZMAT releases or dump sites.



Control access, movement, and egress of sportsmen or other personnel who are authorized to hunt,

fish, or conduct other activities on military bases and base camps. It is critical to know the location

of all personnel operating in and around training and operational areas to avoid conflicts with

military elements and to mitigate safety hazards.



Identify, cite, or apprehend illegal hunters, trespassers, area access violators, boating/watercraft

violations or illegal fisherman.



Respond to accidents (training, hunting, and vehicular) outside the populated areas of the AO.



Enforce and investigate violations of the Federal laws identified in DODI 5525.17.



Provide for the safety of recreationists and military users of the land.



Conduct inspections of hunters, anglers, and trappers to ensure that recreationists are in

compliance with state and local laws.



Perform emergent nuisance wildlife and predator control functions.

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

Provide education and training to the installation populace, workforce, and general public to

prevent inadvertent violation of natural and cultural resource laws



Enforce 10 USC, 16 USC, and 18 USC as they pertain to conservation law enforcement and

applicable Army or local regulations and state laws.

Physical Security and Access Control

3-22.

Dedicated physical security and access control elements are typically not found in civilian law

enforcement organizations. The unique requirements and the environment of the military community require

personnel in these elements to monitor physical security posture, provide physical security presence and

response, and educate the military community regarding physical security requirements and techniques. They

are also a critical element in community crime prevention efforts. Typically, the physical security section—



Conducts inspections and surveys.



Recommends and monitors mission-essential vulnerable areas.



Publishes and maintains a physical security plan.



Maintains physical security alarm systems.



Recommends access control procedures.

Biometrics

3-23.

Biometrics

is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological,

and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0). These characteristics are useful for tracking individuals, making

positive identifications, establishing security procedures, or using as tools to detect deception based on

measurable biological responses to stimulus. Biometric data can be used for protection and security efforts,

contributions to biometric-enabled intelligence activities, and evidence in investigations and criminal

prosecution. Matching biometric data from persons against forensically collected biometrics correlates a

person to a place or activity. Units must maintain operability of assigned biometrics equipment and

appropriate levels of user proficiency training to best facilitate biometric enrollment to enhance force

protection. The following are the major types of biometric data used by police and intelligence collectors:



Personal identification data.

Biometric collection and identification devices use biological

information (fingerprints, voiceprints, facial scans, retinal scans) to match an individual to a source

database. The identity of a specific individual can be identified from the target population during

screening.



Data that indicates source truthfulness.

Devices such as voice stress analyzers and polygraphs

are useful in determining a subject’s truthfulness. The USACIDC commanding general, in

coordination with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, exercises overall

Army staff responsibility for the DA Polygraph Program and policy guidance with respect to using

the polygraph in criminal investigations. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for intelligence

promulgates policy on the use of polygraph and credibility assessment for intelligence and

counterintelligence applications in AR 381-20.

Forensics

3-24.

Forensic is the application of multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts. The forensic

functions of recognize, preserve, collect, analyze, store, and share are used to establish facts and identify

connections between persons, objects, or data. Forensic is most commonly associated with evidence collected

at crime scenes or incident sites, but also includes methodologies for the analysis of computers and networks,

accounting, psychiatry, and other specialized fields. Forensics is typically employed to support legal

proceedings that lead to criminal prosecution. Additionally, forensic analysis is used to answer commander’s

critical information requirements, provide situational understanding, and support other mission requirements

in support of military operations.
3-25.

The primary mission of the Defense Forensic Science Center is forensics support to Army criminal

investigations and operations. The primary laboratory facility maintained by the Defense Forensic Science

Center is stationary due to the nature of the equipment required; however, within the Defense Forensic

Science Center, forward-deployed mobile forensics emerged as a solution to operational requirements to

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support deployed commanders. Operational developments in recent years have documented a growing

demand for forensics support to deployed commanders. The Defense Forensic Science Center deploys

forensics exploitations teams with trained examiners to support commanders in the field as far forward as

possible. These deployable capabilities enable the Defense Forensic Science Center to provide more timely

forensic analysis across the spectrum of capabilities, including latent fingerprints, toolmarks, firearms, DNA,

digital forensic analysis, and explosive and drug chemistry. The USACIDC digital forensic cells and the

Defense Cybercrime Center Cyber Forensic Laboratory also conducts digital forensics.
3-26.

The need for the proper handling of material from a crime scene or incident site is critical to the success

of forensic examination by forensic scientists and technicians. Military police are trained to properly handle

and preserve collected material, whether in the context of processing a crime scene or collecting and

protecting material in support of military operations. Recent operational developments have emerged

requiring Soldiers to train on the collection and preservation of forensic evidence on the battlefield. Soldiers

of many specialties beyond military police forces are now being required to understand basic evidence

collection procedures to protect crime scenes and incident sites.

Absentee Deserter Apprehension Program

3-27.

The criminal offenses of absent without leave and desertion are within the purview of the

PMO/Director of Emergency Services in accordance with AR 195–2. Investigation and documentation of the

criminal complaint is a law enforcement responsibility. Proactive efforts by military law enforcement to

physically apprehend the absentee will not generally be committed unless the PM determines such efforts are

warranted by specific circumstances. This does not preclude coordination with local, state or Federal law

enforcement agencies to affect apprehension if evidence exists or is developed to indicate the absentee’s

location. Military police efforts will generally extend only to the documentation, investigation and collection

of evidence regarding the offenses; any evidence the Soldier’s absence was a result of foul play or the criminal

actions of others; reporting information developed in the course of the investigation to the United States

Army Deserter Information Point to aid in the location and apprehension of the absentee; and providing a

completed report to the absentee’s commander for action. See AR 190-9 for additional information on

Absentee Deserter Apprehension Program.

DETENTION CELL OPERATIONS

3-28.

Most police operations centers that support bases and base camps are equipped with a detention cell to

temporarily hold military or civilian subjects, subsequent to apprehension for an offense. Detention cell

operations and construction requirements are governed by AR 190-45 and AR 190-47. The temporary

detention of personnel within the detention cell is conducted only when necessary to—



Ensure proper custody and control of detained personnel.



Ensure that the detained individual is safe.



Ensure that law enforcement and other personnel are safe.

3-29.

In situations where a detention cell is not available within the military police station, subjects may be

held in civilian facilities that meet the minimum Army requirements referenced above. Memorandums of

agreement are typically used to formalize the arrangements between military and civilian facilities.
3-30.

The detention cell should be constructed where constant supervision and monitoring can be conducted

by police desk or unit personnel to ensure that detained personnel are safe. This may be via direct observation

or through the use of video capability. The detention of military personnel typically will not exceed 24 hours;

however, detention up to 72 hours may be approved in extreme circumstances. Approval of detention over

24 hours and up to 72 hours is typically delegated by the supported base or base camp commander to the PM

or senior military police commander responsible for activities. The detention of civilian personnel should

only be done in extreme cases and only until the subject can be released to civilian authorities or any threat

the subject poses to themselves or others has been resolved or acceptably mitigated (such as a drunk driver

who is sufficiently sober or can be released to a third-party). A commissioned officer or PM typically must

approve the detention of a civilian subject.

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3-31.

The detention of civilian personnel should be conducted only—



In cases of serious felony offenses when the individual is considered a flight risk.



To ensure that the individual or the community (such as in drunk-driving cases) is safe.

Notes.

1. Male and female personnel should never be detained in the same cell simultaneously.
2. Juvenile offenders should never be detained in a military police detention cell and must be

separated by sight and sound from adults under apprehension.

3-32.

An apprehended person must be thoroughly searched before being placed in the detention cell to ensure

that the subject has no weapons, contraband, nor any other items that could be used for personal harm or to

harm others. All valuables, including money and personal property (other than clothing and wedding rings),

should be removed, inventoried, and safely secured. Some detained subjects may become distraught and

attempt to inflict harm on themselves; therefore, any clothing items that could be used to inflict personal

injury (belts, shoelaces, neckties, garters, suspenders) should be removed to ensure that the subject is safe.

These items should be inventoried and secured with the subject’s other property. All property, other than that

identified as having evidentiary value in a criminal proceeding, will be returned to the subject upon release

or transfer to civilian authorities. All property collected, retained, transferred, or released should be

documented according to AR 190-45 and AR 190-47.
3-33.

Military police detention cells may be used for holding subjects subsequent to apprehension for

criminal activity and housing military prisoners under the following circumstances:



Temporary confinement.

This confinement is conducted to house a military prisoner who is—



Awaiting transfer to a DOD corrections facility as a result of a court-martial sentence to

confinement.



Sent to a base or base camp from a DOD confinement facility to appear as a witness in a

court-martial proceeding or other legal proceeding.



Pretrial confinement.

In some cases, subjects awaiting court-martial may be held in pretrial

confinement within a military police detention cell (or a civilian facility meeting Army

requirements). Normally, military personnel awaiting trial remain under the control of their units.

Prisoners will only be placed in pretrial confinement and retained by military police when the legal

requirements of the Rules for Courts-Martial (contained in the

Manual for Courts-Martial

) are

met. Rule 305(k),

Manual for Courts-Martial

, requires probable cause belief that a court-martial

offense has been committed, that the prisoner committed it, and that a more severe form of restraint

is necessary to ensure that the prisoner will appear at pretrial and trial proceedings and not conduct

serious criminal misconduct. Military personnel are only subject to pretrial confinement when the

confinement is approved by the appropriate authority, as directed in AR 27-10. Within

expeditionary environments, apprehended U.S. military personnel or convicted military prisoners

may be held in a field detention facility. Military police use these facilities to detain U.S. military

prisoners placed in custody for short-term detention. Field detention facilities are used to hold

prisoners in custody only until they can be tried and sentenced to confinement or evacuated from

the immediate area for detention in a facility on a U.S. base or base camp. When possible, prisoners

awaiting trial remain in their units and not at a field detention facility. These facilities should

comply with regulatory construction standards to the greatest extent possible and within the

constraints of the operational environment. The lack of facilities and other infrastructure

constructed to standard does not reduce the requirements for providing for the safety and humane

treatment of any person held in detention. See FM 3-39 additional information on field detention

facilities.

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ARMY LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT

PROGRAM

3-34.

The Army Law Enforcement Compliance Program provides the Army a comprehensive tool for

objectively measuring Army installation PMO compliance and standardization in executing law enforcement

operations. The information obtained through the Army Law Enforcement Compliance Program is used to

develop performance improvement strategies tailored specifically to the needs of the PMO. Strategy

implementation supports attainment of the Army Law Enforcement Compliance Program’s primary goal—

to improve PMO readiness to respond to incidents spanning the all-hazards environment by fostering

continuous performance enhancement. The Army Law Enforcement Compliance Program objectively

measures policy compliance and performance in 15 LE functional areas. The functional a

reas are─



Access control.



Communications.



Credentials.



Criminal investigations.



Detention cell.



Evidence and property.



Equipment and uniforms.



Certification program.



Law enforcement operations.



Police administration.



Records and reporting.



Motor vehicle traffic program.



Training.



Use of force.



MWDs.

SECTION II - POLICE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

3-35.

Police information management is ongoing and integrated throughout law enforcement activities. The

military police, PM, or USACIDC operations officer is responsible for the management of police information,

including integrated police intelligence activities and products produced in support of police operations.

While the responsibility to provide oversight and management of police information typically resides with

the operations officer, Army law enforcement personnel (including police intelligence analysts and

associated staff) must understand the legal and regulatory requirements for handling and sharing law

enforcement information. Military police and USACIDC personnel—



Collect information from a wide variety of sources. The collected information must be reported as

soon as possible through the operational chain to the echelon operations section for processing by

police intelligence personnel.



Collaborate to develop effective police networks and databases.



Provide information, police intelligence, and mutual support to other agencies and organizations

to enable the targeting, collection, and interdiction of criminals and criminal activities.



Provide appropriate information to the general public to aid in crime prevention and other law

enforcement efforts.

3-36.

During contingency operations police information can greatly enhance situational understanding.

Police information informs the Army’s operations process through its associated integrating processes

(intelligence preparation of the battlefield, targeting, and risk management). Police information may be

restricted within the United States or in cases involving U.S. persons outside the United States.
3-37.

Information or police intelligence that must be retained within law enforcement channels to protect

information, sources, or ongoing investigations is characterized as law enforcement-sensitive. The term law

enforcement-sensitive is used to classify information or intelligence that is obtained for, processed through,

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or managed by law enforcement organizations. Data must be restricted to law enforcement channels, unless

otherwise directed by a competent authority that is managing police information. (See ATP 3-39.20.)

Distribution restrictions must be understood by the producers and the recipients of disseminated police

information or police intelligence. At times, products may contain data drawn from multiple unclassified

sources. These products may—



Remain unclassified.



Receive a distribution caveat of law enforcement-sensitive or sensitive but unclassified.



Receive a classified restriction when warranted.

3-38.

Documents or data classified as law enforcement-sensitive must be restricted. It may be possible to

prevent the creation of a classified product simply by protecting the manner in which the information was

collected or processed. In the event that a product requires classification, immediate action should be taken

to ensure that the classified data or document is properly stored to prevent unauthorized access or the

compromise of information or intelligence. Personnel should conduct coordination with the local offices

responsible for computer network defense and security issues to ensure that security requirements are

maintained.
3-39.

An increased emphasis on information sharing and networking among police agencies and advances

in database technology have resulted in the development and expansion of information networks accessible

by law enforcement organizations. Army law enforcement personnel continue to access the National Crime

Information Center database (managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation). There are also numerous

databases containing criminal threat information from the Department of Homeland Security; Federal Bureau

of Investigation; tasks forces; fusion centers; and federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations. See

AR 190-45 for information on personally identifiable information and how to prevent the unauthorized

release of information.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-40.

There are strict legal and regulatory constraints on storing information about U.S. persons. The

supporting SJA should be consulted to ensure that data storage is in compliance with applicable laws and

regulations. Specific regulations, statutes, and other directives relevant to collecting and managing police

information include—



5 USC 522a (commonly known as the Privacy Act of 1974).



AR 190-24.



AR 190-45.



AR 195-2.



AR 381-10.



AR 525-13.



DOD 5240.1-R.



DODD 3025.18.



DODD 5200.27.



DODD 5240.01.



DODI 2000.12.



DODI O-2000.16, Volumes 1 and 2.



DODI 3025.21.



EO 12333.

3-41.

Military police, USACIDC staff, and law enforcement personnel must understand applicable statutes,

regulations, directives, and orders pertinent to managing law enforcement information to ensure law

compliance. Military police and USACIDC personnel collect, analyze, store, and disseminate information

and police intelligence during the conduct of law enforcement activities.
3-42.

These activities are conducted within the guidelines and constraints established by national and

international laws, federal statutes, DA directives and regulations, and applicable status-of-forces

agreements. See ATP 3-39.20 for more information on managing police information and police intelligence.

The Police Station

24 August 2021

ATP 3-39.10

3-11

ARMY LAW ENFORCEMENT REPORTING AND TRACKING

SYSTEM

3-43.

The primary automation tool used by military police and USACIDC is DA Form 190-45-SG (Army

Law Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (ALERTS)). AR 190-45 mandates the use of ALERTS by

Army military police for law enforcement activities. This system provides a standardized database and

reporting system for military police reports. ALERTS is a secure systems for unclassified law enforcement-

sensitive information. Civilian agencies cannot access ALERTS.
3-44.

ALERTS enables the rapid dissemination of standardized law enforcement and investigative reporting,

as well as police intelligence products generated though the criminal and crime analysis processes. ALERTS

supports worldwide military police operations with real-time police information and police intelligence

sharing across the Army law enforcement community. The tools and reports inherent to ALERTS enables

police intelligence analysts and investigators to organize, analyzing, and disseminate police intelligence

products by presenting police information and police intelligence in easily understood and standardized

formats.
3-45.

ALERTS allows military police staffs and USACIDC personnel the ability to generate standardize

police reports for dissemination. There are several varieties of reports generated by ALERTS that facilitate

criminal and crime analysis, police management and planning, and other internal analysis or operational

functions.

3-46.

ALERTS is accredited for unclassified law enforcement-sensitive operations and uses private,

network-based software applications. Military police and USACIDC personnel have local office and global

access to most data in ALERTS. ALERTS helps analysts and investigators by providing a common reporting

and storage database for police information. This allows stored police information to be retrieved, collated,

and used for criminal and crime analysis across law enforcement and investigative organizations. (See chapter

4 for discussion of ALERTs support to analysis). ALERTS also allows for the rapid query of police

information to meet immediate information requirements, inform key decision makers, or share with relevant

and authorized stakeholders. (See chapter 5 for discussion of ALERTS support to dissemination).
3-47.

A central feature of ALERTS is the common repository of police information that allows law

enforcement personnel across the Army to access common information, reports, and standards to support

local analysis processes. Given the common access to this database by law enforcement officers across the

Army, the seams that previously existed between military police and USACIDC data storage systems have

largely been eliminated.
3-48.

Besides being a database and repository for police information, ALERTS also provides analytical tools

and capabilities that enable police intelligence analysts to perform criminal and crime analysis. Many of the

analysis techniques explained in this manual can be performed using the tools inherent to ALERTS or using

the data stored in ALERTS. ALERTS supports analysis and production with several tools, reports, and

product outputs that can be generated using the system. These include law enforcement reports, crime

prevention surveys, be on the lookouts (BOLOs), and criminal intelligence reports, raw data files, and reports

that enable analysis and manipulation using common spreadsheet programs to determine patterns or develop

charts to depict police information and police intelligence.
3-49.

ALERTS replaced the Army Criminal Investigation/Intelligence system and the Centralized

Operator’s Police Suite, becoming the primary case management system for all Army law enforcement

professionals. This system provides the Army with an integrated case management system for law

enforcement, supporting both military police and USACIDC personnel. ALERTS streamlines the referral

process and data flow from military police reports to reports of investigation to prevent duplicate reporting

of the same criminal incidents. Additionally, external data reporting and sharing features, such as the Defense

Data Exchange and the Defense Incident Base Reporting System, improve the ability of military police and

USACIDC to share information with relevant stakeholders. For additional information on ALERTS, see

AR 190-45 and DA Pam 190-45.

Chapter 3

3-12

ATP 3-39.10

24 August 2021

NON-ARMY LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS

3-50.

When conducting police operations in support of HN police agencies or maneuver unit operations

targeting populations other than U.S. personnel, information and police intelligence collected by military

police and USACIDC personnel may be shared within the U.S. military or with HN police, security

personnel, or others that require the information. These information systems may be Army systems or other

information systems. Access to local, theater, DOD, non-DOD, and commercial databases can provide

valuable information sharing capabilities. A validated Defense Intelligence Agency customer number

(acquired by the appropriate level intelligence staff section), in combination with Secret Internet Protocol

Router Network and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System connectivity, is required to

establish access to most online databases.

ISTRIBUTED

OMMON

ROUND

YSTEM

–A

RMY

3-51.

The Distributed Common Ground System–Army provides a net-centric, enterprise information

collection, weather, and geospatial engineering capability to organizations of all types at all echelons from

battalion to joint task force levels. The Distributed Common Ground System–Army provides the capabilities

necessary for commanders to access information from data sources and to synchronize sensors. Distributed

Common Ground System–Army provides continuous acquisition and synthesis of data and information from

joint and interagency capabilities and multinational partners. These capabilities allow forces to maintain an

updated and accurate awareness of the operational environment.
3-52.

Criminal information related to U.S. persons will typically be stored within secure law enforcement-

only systems. Law enforcement- related information obtained by military police or USACIDC elements

regarding non-U.S. persons is not typically required to be retained within secure law enforcement-only

systems, allowing it to be populated into tactical databases (such as the Distributed Common Ground System–

Army). This information can be a significant enabler for U.S. military staff and commanders to enhance

situational understanding, targeting, and information collection priorities. Distributed Common Ground

System–Army facilitates the rapid conduct of operations and the synchronization of warfighting functions.

This capability enables commanders to operate within the threat decision cycle and shape the environment

for successful follow-on operations.

UTOMATED

ATABASE AND

NALYTICAL

PPLICATIONS

3-53.

Numerous database applications are available to Army law enforcement but are not exclusive to the

law enforcement community. These applications include automated databases with powerful analytical

capabilities that can be used to aid Army law enforcement in identifying trends, patterns, and associations

relevant to individual crimes, criminals, and criminal organizations. These software applications can be used

to populate large amounts of data for analysis, prepare reports, and produce law enforcement products (to

include police intelligence). See ATP 3-39.20 for additional information on automated database and

analytical software capabilities.

EOGRAPHIC

NFORMATION

YSTEM

3-54.

The GIS can be extremely helpful to Army law enforcement. The GIS software may be used by Army

law enforcement, typically the police intelligence analyst within the operations section, to conduct a

geographic distribution analysis through layered graphics, blended geographic data, and descriptive

information to map places, events, and criminal incidents to identify patterns and associations.
3-55.

There are numerous commercial and DOD GISs to assist Army law enforcement in organizing,

analyzing, and producing geographic data and products. These tools are useful and have the capability of

providing layered, three-dimensional images of specific areas of interest. Data can be imported from an

existing database or manually input into the GIS. Data for ongoing operations must be continuously updated

to ensure that current and accurate data is used. GIS tools enable layering of informational data on top of

The Police Station

24 August 2021

ATP 3-39.10

3-13

terrain to provide a more accurate picture of the AO or a specific target. These capabilities are especially

useful in support of operations in dense urban areas. A GIS can be used to—



Portray the effects of terrain on operations. For example, a GIS can produce a three-dimensional

image of a target building for rapid analysis and decision making where a law enforcement raid

or SRT mission is planned.



Map and analyze criminal activity and associated structures and locations, aiding the identification

of trends, patterns, and associations.



Identifying high-risk areas (areas at high risk for ambush, kidnapping, assassination, and

improvised explosive device threats).



Identifying hot spots for focusing law enforcement patrol and crime prevention efforts.



Depicting criminal activity and emerging patterns facilitating geographic profiling to predict

potential criminal or disruptive activity.



Displaying locations of connected crimes or activities, enabling the determination of probable

areas of bases of operation, offender residences, or other key locations.



Plan for emergency response to mission-essential vulnerable areas or high-risk targets.



Plan for traffic control measures (traffic control points, communications nodes, supply and refuel

points, road conditions).



Plan for traffic control activities during disaster operations or special events.

OST

-N

ATION

NFORCEMENT

ATABASES

3-56.

When U.S. forces partner with HN forces, especially as their capability increases and operations are

transitioning to HN control, information sharing is required. Military police and USACIDC personnel

conducting HN police development and transition activities may provide law enforcement information

collected on HN personnel to HN police and security elements for inclusion in their databases. The

information provided must be synchronized with U.S. military and other friendly elements operating in the

AO, but the information must not compromise U.S. and other friendly operations.

SECTION III - POLICE STATION CONSTRUCTION CONSIDERATIONS

3-57.

Oversite of law enforcement activities require organizational structure and technical and tactical

capabilities specifically focused on law enforcement and policing activities, in support of the rule of law.

This structure and the required capabilities are managed within the police station. Regardless of size, military

police stations have basic requirements common to all functional military police operations. An

understanding of the basic requirements can help military police in establishing military police stations in

support of operations and when assisting HN police agencies in building their police station capability and

capacity.

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

3-58.

The public must have access to military police station activities to conduct legitimate business. These

areas must be easily accessible and clearly marked. However, controls must be established to prevent visitors

and unauthorized personnel from wandering through the station. Such controls must not interfere with

personnel who are conducting business with the various PM sections. Electronically operated visitor control

doors can be used to gain access to the information desk. Military police station criteria for permanent stations

in support of bases and base camps are outlined within the UFC 1-201-01. UFC 1-201-01 provides

standardized planning guidelines for small and large military police stations. Minimum standards for

detention cells are prescribed in AR 190-45 and AR 190-47.
3-59.

Mission requirements determine the need for specific station features. To support the basic military

police mission, space is required for—



The PM, the deputy PM, and administrative support personnel (office space).



A station desk.



Law enforcement sections.

Chapter 3

3-14

ATP 3-39.10

24 August 2021



Operations.



Traffic.



Investigations.



Physical security and access control.



Police administration (records and reports).



Conservation law enforcement officer (if required).



An offender-processing area.



Conference and interrogation or interview rooms.



Patrol work areas, with automations support.



Arms, evidence, and property storage.



Briefing and debriefing patrol and reserve areas.



Detention facilities.



Public waiting rooms.



Latrine facilities.



Parking for employees, visitors, and military police vehicles.



Impounded-vehicle parking.



Communications and automations equipment (including a National Crime Information Center

terminal).



Storage for riot control and other special equipment.



Shower facilities.

3-60.

Specific station features should include—



Outside lighting 360° around the station, with a 50-foot standoff area free of private vehicle

parking.



Controlled or monitored access to the station on all doors.



Special entrances provided for military police personnel.



Interior and exterior doors with shatterproof windows for maximum observation, with the

exception of the door leading from the public waiting area to the detention area, which must not

permit observation. This door is electrically operated.



A minimum of exterior windows. Where required, shatterproof windows may be substituted for

plate glass.



Emergency lighting and power.



Separate latrine facilities for public and station personnel.



A field safe for storing property and evidence during nonduty hours when the evidence custodian

is not readily available.



Interview rooms with one-way mirrors (where possible) for identification purposes.



A private work area for the duty officer. This area can also serve as an interview room.



A break area, out of public sight, for military police personnel. Break areas may contain vending

machines.



A communications room with intrusion detection alarms for the post exchange, the finance office,

and the bank.



Furniture (in public areas) inconspicuously secured to the floor to prevent its use in a scuffle.



Access to detention facilities that are free of items that can cause prisoner injury.



Offices that require frequent coordination (such as operations and administration) located close to

one another.

3-61.

Efficient design can enhance the security of the station, reduce personnel requirements, and ensure that

station facilities are used effectively. The general planning guidance in each sample design is based on

programming factors (staff composition, organizational structure, physical development requirements

consistent with a hypothetical set of functional and operational objectives). Space organization principles are

based on established organizational and functional needs and on requirements for the design and construction

The Police Station

24 August 2021

ATP 3-39.10

3-17

RECONSTITITION OF HOST-NATION POLICE STATIONS

3-62.

During the conduct of stability tasks, the U.S. military may be required to reconstitute HN police

organizations and infrastructure. Military police (in conjunction with Civil Affairs, other multinational

forces, governmental agencies, and HN forces) must assess the existing police structures to coordinate for

construction support. They must coordinate reconstruction and funding efforts with contracting personnel to

ensure compliance with procedures for expending funds in direct support of HN organizations. Military

police must be prepared to write a statement of work and properly staff it through higher headquarters. Any

project statement of work for an HN police station should address construction, protection, and other

requirements identified in an assessment (as necessary) for the functionality of the police station. Project

plans should be staffed with interagency and HN partners.
3-63.

Police personnel and facilities are often targeted by criminals, terrorists, and insurgents; therefore,

police personnel, equipment, and facilities require robust security and protection. Regardless of the physical

structure or layout of the various police stations, basic protection measures need to be in place before police

operations begin. Many of these measures may take weeks or months to construct. Protection measures

include—



Protection in-depth (includes the integ

ration of supporting technology─

lighting, surveillance

cameras, automations and communications systems, alarms and alarm monitoring).



Standoff distance.



Access control.



Barriers and blast mitigation.

AYERED

EFENSE

-D

EPTH

3-64.

There is no single security system, method, or design that protects against all threats. The central

mechanism in the Army to protect against threats is through the layering of security, better known as layered

defense in-depth. Commanders must apply layered defense in-depth to any protected facility to render an

attack ineffective. Figure 3-3 illustrates the general, layered defense approach to the implementation of a

physical security system. The protected facility is located within an innermost ring of security. Additional

layers of security are provided at increasing distances from the asset to be protected. The number of layers,

the components that comprise the layers, and their resistance to penetration depend on the threat and the

importance of the asset to be protected. However, protection measures should not deter citizens’ access to

the police station to report crimes and other problems/concerns.

Figure 3-3. Example of layered protection

Chapter 3

3-18

ATP 3-39.10

24 August 2021

3-65.

The objective of providing in-depth defense is to manage risks with redundant security or multiple

protective measures between the threat and the target. Subsequently, these measures help a commander

achieve a more complete security posture. Each measure must present unique obstacles to the threat, while

also affording detection and protection capabilities. This action will increase the risk of detection to the

adversary and reduce their chances of a successful intrusion or attack. Theoretically, if one layer of security

proves inadequate protection, another layer will prevent the threat from conducting a full breach.

TANDOFF

ISTANCE

3-66.

The best protection from the effects of blasts is standoff distance. The standoff distance is the distance

maintained between where a threat may be and the target. The initial goal should be to make that distance as

far from the target as practical. In most countries, police stations are built from conventional construction

(common unhardened construction). These buildings will not withstand common blast effects. To mitigate

blast threats to police stations, standoff distances and exclusion areas must be established and enforced. See

ATP 3-39.32 for data on minimum standoff distances to mitigate blast effects.

CCESS

ONTROL

3-67.

Local citizens should have access to police stations to report crimes, seek assistance, or receive public

safety information. However, access must be controlled and monitored to prevent adversaries from causing

injury, death, or destruction to the police station and personnel. Personnel trained specifically in access

control may be required in high-threat environments.
3-68.

Initially, HN personnel may require military police Soldiers or other U.S. and multinational elements

as partners to provide security or access control. This can be especially critical when HN loyalties or the

infiltration of HN elements is a concern. HN security personnel must be monitored and supervised.

Combining security forces enhances capabilities and provides different styles and levels of control. Using

different methods to apply control measures confuses would-be adversaries. Access control procedures are

described in TC 19-210.
3-69.

Planning facility access control includes developing procedures for inspecting all incoming personnel,

hand-carried items, and vehicles. Specific areas to be considered during access control operations include—



Identification methods to be used (photograph identification, badges, biometric screening, finger

print systems, and other supporting technologies).



Authority for access and identification confirmation.



Criteria for access to the police facility for—



Assigned personnel.



Visitors.



Media.



Maintenance personnel.



Contractors.



Delivery personnel.



Other emergency personnel.



Material control procedures (consider inspecting all hand-carried items and deliveries).



MWD team employment.



Vehicle control (vehicle inspections, parking, emergency vehicle procedures, and other vehicle-

related activities).



Security overwatch and fighting position locations.



Additional security measure locations.



Protective barriers.



Lighting (to include emergency backup lighting).



Communications.

The Police Station

24 August 2021

ATP 3-39.10

3-19



Response force operations (military police employ response force operations as described in

ATP 3-39.30 and TC 19-210).



Contingency planning (responding to fire alarms, bomb threats, hostage situations, natural

disasters, and other emergencies).

ARRIERS AND

LAST

ITIGATION

3-70.

The most important protection measures used to protect personnel and facilities are barriers and blast

mitigation. The detonation of vehicle bombs generates four primary hazards to personnel in fixed structures

and shelters and in the open. These hazards include—



Primary fragments.



Secondary fragments from barriers and structures.



Secondary debris in fixed structures.



Blasts.

3-71.

Barriers capable of stopping moving vehicles include chain link fences reinforced with cable,

reinforced concrete barriers, ditches, and berms. Barrier materials may not be available in large quantities.

Concrete barriers will need to be constructed locally and delivered to the site using large trucks and

equipment. Engineers should be employed to ensure that the concrete is reinforced and that it meets minimum

standards to prevent spalling, fracturing, and other forms of degradation caused by substandard production.

Other types of barriers used to protect against blast threats include—



Earth-filled barriers.



Portable, water- or sand-filled barriers.

3-72.

Reinforced concrete barriers used for countermobility should not be used to mitigate blast damage.

Concrete barriers at the detonation point can help (when properly constructed and placed) to mitigate

fragments, but do little to mitigate the blast. Reinforced concrete barriers should be linked with cabling to

ensure that the integrity of the barrier is maintained. Earth-filled barriers work well for fragment protection,

but do little to reduce structural damage. Water-filled barriers are ideal for quick deployment. Water-filled

barriers are lightweight when they are empty, but they can weigh several thousand pounds when full.

Therefore, water-filled barriers should be chained together for effectiveness.
3-73.

Maximum protection can be achieved when different types of barriers are integrated into a system of

protection. Personnel should consider using a combination of concrete and earth-filled barriers for

countermobility protection and to reduce the effects of a blast. TC 19-210 describes each barrier and its

protection capabilities. See ATP 3-39.32 for the planning and implementation of barriers, blast mitigation,

and the other aspects of hardening measures related to protection.

24 August 2021

ATP 3-39.10

4-1

Chapter 4

Policing Measures and Strategies

Military police incorporate various policing measures and strategies depending on the

community, the agency, the problem, and other operational and environmental

considerations. Often, different approaches overlap because different groups develop

similar solutions to the same types of problems. This chapter discusses how military

police synchronize, integrate, and organize complementary and reinforcing policing

measures and strategies to safeguard the force, protect populations, and enable the

existence of law and order.

SECTION I – POLICING MEASURES

4-1.

Military police conduct police operations to support a commander’s efforts to maintain order and

discipline, control and protect populations and resources and to facilitate the existence of a lawful and orderly

environment, thus protecting combat power and enabling freedom of action. Police operations and associated

activities are critical to the commander’s antiterrorism program (see AR 525-13). Military police also conduct

police operations to support civil security and enable the establishment of civil control and a functioning

criminal justice system supporting HN populations. It is the responsibility of the PM or senior military police

commander tasked with the law enforcement mission to develop measures to enforce these requirements.

The same measures can be applied when conducting police operations to establish and maintain civil control

within the HN population during stability tasks.
4-2.

The PM or senior military police commander establishes police operations measures to—



Enforce compliance with policies, directives, and applicable laws by the U.S. military community

or HN populace.



Prevent or mitigate illegal or disruptive activity.



Respond to emergencies.



Protect and educate the populace.

4-3.

These measures are integral to the police operations discipline and can be generally aligned within

three categories (law enforcement, physical security, and crime prevention). While these categories serve as

general descriptors, it must be understood that activities within the separate categories are mutually

supporting and are rarely conducted as a singular effort. They are most effective when conducted in a

synchronized and integrated manner, producing a layered approach to security and law enforcement

supporting U.S. or supported HN assets. The intent of law enforcement, physical security, and crime

prevention measures are to prevent, detect, and respond to crime and criminal activity. Law enforcement

measures are focused on the enforcement of laws through preventive patrolling, response to criminal activity,

and law enforcement investigations (see appendix C for additional information on special response

considerations). Physical security includes measures designed to safeguard personnel; prevent unauthorized

access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and safeguard against espionage, sabotage,

damage, and theft. (See ATP 3-39.32.)

Crime prevention

is a crime control method that applies to efforts

to reduce criminal opportunity, protect potential human victims, and prevent property loss by

anticipating, recognizing, and appraising crime risk and initiating actions to remove or reduce it.

Crime

prevention measures seek to—



Educate the populace to encourage appropriate attitudes and actions conducive to preventing or

mitigating criminal activity.



Anticipate crime-conducive conditions and eliminate or reduce opportunities and incentives for

criminal acts to occur.

Chapter 4

4-2

ATP 3-39.10

24 August 2021

4-4.

There are numerous law enforcement, physical security, and crime prevention measures that can be

implemented. Police operations in support of home station locations are typically very thorough and well

established within Army law enforcement organizations and the military community in general. The law

enforcement, physical security, and crime prevention measures in other operational environments may be

more limited or restricted, depending on the maturity of the AO, the specific security considerations for the

AO, and whether the location will be enduring. Army law enforcement personnel must consider mission and

operational variables, local and international laws, status-of-forces agreements, and cultural norms of the

operational environment.

LAW ENFORCEMENT MEASURES

4-5.

The law enforcement measures include all activities employed in an effort to enforce laws and

regulations within an AO. They support command efforts to maintain good order and discipline within their

formations, protect personnel and resources, and maintain and generate combat power. Law enforcement

activities are conducted by military police Soldiers, Department of the Army Civilian Police, USACIDC

SAs, and supporting law enforcement personnel. These personnel require technical training and certification

to perform law enforcement duties. Although law enforcement activities focus primarily on enforcement

measures, criminal investigations, and supporting tasks, many activities serve multiple purposes. For

example, law enforcement patrolling is a key enforcement activity that also serves as a major crime

prevention role. Law enforcement-specific activities include—



Police station operations (see chapter 3).



Law enforcement patrolling (see chapter 5).



Traffic management and enforcement (see chapter 8).



Law enforcement investigations (criminal and traffic related)

NFORCEMENT

NVESTIGATIONS

4-6.

Investigation of criminal activity and traffic-related matters may be required in any environment in

which military operations occur, from home station to austere operational environments. Regardless of the

operational environment, criminal activity committed against U.S. forces and property degrades military

discipline, morale, and operational capabilities. Army law enforcement works in coordination with federal,

state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies to investigate crimes and incidents in support of the

commander’s effort to protect personnel, resources, and critical assets.
4-7.

Army law enforcement activities, including law enforcement investigations, are typically conducted

within the framework of the military police operations discipline. Law enforcement investigations are

primarily conducted as a supporting law enforcement task within the police operations discipline. Law

enforcement investigations typically fall into two primary categories—criminal investigations and collision

(traffic accident) investigations.
4-8.

Criminal investigations supporting Army operations are conducted primarily by USACIDC SAs and

military police investigators (see AR 195-2 for information on investigative purview). TMCIs are a

specialized investigative asset focused on investigation of traffic collisions and other traffic-related concerns.

All military police Soldiers must be knowledgeable in basic investigative techniques and are required to

identify and secure crime scenes, document initial observations and identify and preserve evidence, conduct

preliminary investigations, and assist dedicated investigative assets as directed by their supervisor or the lead

investigator.

RIMINAL

NVESTIGATIONS

4-9.

A criminal investigation is the process of identification, collection, preservation, documentation,

analysis, preparation, and presentation of both physical and testimonial evidence to prove the truth or falsity

of a criminal allegation. Criminal investigations are typically conducted by trained criminal investigators

(USACIDC SAs and military police investigators) supported by military police patrol elements. They cover

a broad spectrum from nonviolent incidents of larceny or fraud to physical attacks such as homicide or rape.

The sheer magnitude and range of possible crimes that may be investigated requires a large body of

Policing Measures and Strategies

24 August 2021

ATP 3-39.10

4-3

knowledge and skills for criminal investigators to master, as well as a significant pool of technical experts

supporting the investigator within their areas of expertise.
4-10.

Criminal investigation is both an art and a science. In science, the absolute truth is often achieved.

Experience has shown that in criminal investigations a less decisive hypothesis may sometimes be all that is

possible to achieve. Objectives of criminal investigations include—



Determining if a crime was committed.



Collecting information and evidence legally to identify the perpetrator or responsible party,

victims, and witnesses.



Apprehending the person(s) responsible or reporting the individual (or group) to the appropriate

civilian police agency.



Recovering stolen property.



Presenting the best possible case to the prosecutor.



Providing clear, concise testimony.

4-11.

While criminal investigators conduct deliberate criminal investigations, all military police must be

knowledgeable in basic investigative techniques. Military police patrols are typically the first on the scene

and must always secure the scene, observe, and document their initial observations (including personal

behavior of witnesses and potential subjects). They are also in the best position to identify and preserve

potential evidence and conduct initial interviews of witnesses and potential subjects. See ATP 3-39.12 for

additional information on criminal investigations.

COLLISION

INVESTIGATIONS

4-12.

A collision investigation is the process of observation, collection and documentation of evidence

(including physical measurements of objects, markings, and vehicles), analysis, preparation, and presentation

of both physical and testimonial evidence to determine the cause or causes of a collision or mishap involving

a vehicle. Collision investigations are typically conducted by a trained TMCI; however, any military police

patrol may be required to conduct investigations of minor traffic incidents or assist TMCIs in major incidents

or complex collision investigations.
4-13.

Military police investigators or USACIDC SAs may assume investigative responsibility over criminal

offenses discovered as a result of the collision. If evidence of criminal activity is identified by responding

military police patrols or TMCIs, military police investigators, or USACIDC SAs should be notified as soon

as possible. Military police will notify the supporting USACIDC element whenever a traffic accident involves

a fatality or an offense within USACIDC investigative responsibility as described in AR 195-2. In all cases,

TMCIs or military police patrols will complete the investigation of the actual collision and provide a copy of

the report to the USACIDC element or military police investigator as appropriate. See ATP 3-39.12 for

additional information on collision investigations.

PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES

4-14.

Comprehensive and consistent physical security practices are vital to protect Army personnel and

resources by mitigating or eliminating crime-conducive conditions. The protection of physical resources

ensures a commander’s ability to maintain combat power.

Physical security

is that part of security concerned

with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment,

installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft

(JP 3-0). The Provost Marshal General is the proponent for the Army Physical Security Program, and the

military police play a key role. While military police are heavily involved in physical security measures on a

continuous basis, the physical security of Army property is the responsibility of every commander, Soldier,

and Army civilian entrusted with the care and stewardship of that property. Physical security standards are

established to assist Army personnel in providing adequate security for Army resources. Minimum physical

security standards and guidelines are found in—



AR 190-11.



AR 190-13.



AR 190-51.

Chapter 4

4-4

ATP 3-39.10

24 August 2021



AR 190-54.



AR 190-58.

4-15.

Today, commanders have a full array of sophisticated electronic security systems; sensitive CBRN

sensors; explosive detection devices; and forward-looking infrared radar systems to employ. These systems

provide multilayered, 360°, real-time capability to detect, assess, alert, and act against air and ground threats

at fixed sites. The goal of the security system for an installation, area, facility, or asset is to employ security

in depth to preclude or reduce the potential for sabotage, theft, trespass, terrorism, espionage, or other

criminal activity.
4-16.

In contingency environments, commanders of expeditionary forces protect combat power by

establishing a system of complementary, overlapping security measures to control access to critical resources

and personnel. Electronic security systems and other physical security measures (physical barriers, clear

zones, lighting, access and key control, security badges, and defensive positions) should work together to

greatly enhance the unit protective posture and to prevent crime. Recent improvements in analytical tools

(such as the United States Army Security Management System [Countermeasures]) have enhanced physical

security surveys and inspection processes. This system enables commanders to quickly detect vulnerabilities

that may be exploited by terrorists and criminals and to develop options that eliminate or mitigate those

vulnerabilities.
4-17.

Physical security includes a wide variety of measures, employed together to create a full-dimensional,

integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring defense against criminal or other threats. ATP 3-39.32 includes

detailed information on the implementation of physical security measures, to include—



Site design to enhance security.



Access control.



Protective barriers.



Physical security lighting.



Electronic security systems.



Security locking systems and key control.



Security force planning.



In-transit security procedures.



Physical security inspections, surveys, and assessments.

4-18.

Specially trained and credentialed military police Soldiers and Army civilians conduct physical

security inspections and assessments to determine vulnerabilities, criticalities, and appropriate safeguards to

protect the command, personnel, materiel, and other assets (such as critical infrastructures). These inspections

and assessments are typically conducted in support of bases and base camps within expeditionary

environments. At bases and base camps, a physical security office within the organization of the PMO

provides general support to units, activities, and facilities within the AO. As the AO matures within

expeditionary environments, physical security teams deploy with military police law enforcement elements

to provide this necessary support.
4-19.

In operational environments where credentialed physical security personnel are not available, military

police elements provide basic physical security support in the AO. While not all military police Soldiers are

trained as physical security inspectors, all military police units typically have some capability to assist

commanders and provide advice on physical security-related issues. They can also use military police

technical channels to obtain assistance when needed.
4-20.

Physical security measures are applied to Army property and personal property of Army personnel.

Increased security measures are applied to sensitive items (arms, ammunition, and explosives; controlled

substances within medical treatment facilities; motor pools, logistical warehouse facilities, or other facilities

where there is a high concentration of equipment, supplies, or other pilferable items). Many of these areas

will be provided with alarms; military police are typically responsible for alarm monitoring and response to

these areas. Military police respond to these areas when a crime is committed or when alarms indicate a crime

may be in progress; however, the day-to-day physical security responsibility falls on the Army personnel

responsible for the property being secured. Military police also support logistics security to support the

prevention, identification, and investigation of criminal acts committed by terrorists, criminal elements, or

Policing Measures and Strategies

24 August 2021

ATP 3-39.10

4-5

insider threats ranging from the United States Army logistics provider to the military force on the ground.

For additional information on logistic security see ATP 3-39.30.
4-21.

Military police are typically responsible for access control to bases, base camps, and other critical

facilities (when directed). They are also heavily involved in random antiterrorism measures conducted as part

of a holistic security plan for these types of locations.

CCESS

ONTROL

4-22.

A critical aspect of the security posture of any base or base camp is access control. The purpose of

access control is to prevent unauthorized access by personnel and vehicles, including criminals or other

threats. Access control is an integral part of the overall security plan of any base or base camp. On bases and

base camps, access control is typically the responsibility of the PM conducting law enforcement in support

of the base. In many instances, access control is performed by specially trained security guards, whose sole

focus is access control. These personnel will typically fall under the command and control of the PM or senior

military police commander to ensure coordination and synchronization of access control and law enforcement

activities. Vigilant access control, combined with aggressive law enforcement patrolling, deters attempted

attacks against an installation.
4-23.

Access control activities are conducted while maintaining optimum vehicular flow and pedestrian

traffic. Access control is the first visible line of defense to identify and prevent threats from entering a

controlled AO and mitigating associated vulnerabilities to those threats. Access control can also be enabled

through police intelligence, forensics, and biometrics capabilities. These activities enhance the overall

protection posture while minimizing the impact on normal operations. Access control measures are tightened

or relaxed based on threat levels and associated force protection condition levels. Force protection condition

levels are established in a graduated scale based on available intelligence and the relative risk of attack. In

mature bases within the United States, access control procedures are addressed in the installation access

control plan. See ATP 3-39.32 and TC 19-210 for detailed information on access control activities and other

physical security tactic techniques and procedures.
4-24.

In expeditionary environments on bases that have matured to a level requiring dedicated military police

law enforcement support, the senior military police commander can assume responsibility for the access

control function; however, the responsibility for access control may be retained under the control of the base

commander. Regardless of the command, access control must be synchronized with law enforcement

elements supporting the base to ensure a seamless security posture. Law enforcement elements and security

elements conducting access control must be in constant communication to enable a synchronized response to

threats and to avoid possible fratricide.

ANDOM

NTITERRORISM

EASURES

4-25.

Random antiterrorism measure program activities are implemented according to AR 525-13 and

DODI O-2000.16, Volume I. This program involves implementing multiple security measures in a random

fashion to change the appearance and activities of security personnel and resources employed to secure a

base, facility, or activity. Units are required by regulation to employ year-round random antiterrorism

measures as part of an antiterrorism program.
4-26.

Commanders responsible for a military base or activity implement random antiterrorism measures

based on staff recommendations and current threat assessments. Random antiterrorism measures are typically

recommended by the base antiterrorism officer with input from the PM or military police commander

providing base law enforcement support. Most random antiterrorism measures at this level are implemented

by police and security personnel and are documented and maintained on file for review. Random

antiterrorism measures should be visible to allow the threat to see the change in security profile. A typical

random antiterrorism measures may include—



Placing or moving barriers.



Establishing or changing exclusion areas for standoff.

Chapter 4

4-6

ATP 3-39.10

24 August 2021



Changing access requirements.



Implementing multiple picture identification requirements.



Increasing escort or sponsorship requirements.



Implementing bag and vehicle inspections.



Employing biometrics or identification scanning equipment.



Increasing security or law enforcement patrols.



Deploying unmanned aerial systems.



Setting up or moving static checkpoints.



Modifying gate, building, or other access points.



Establishing single points of entry into key facilities.



Closing specified gates or converting to one-way ingress or egress points.



Employing mobile cameras.

CRIME PREVENTION MEASURES

4-27.

Crime prevention is a critical element in an overall policing strategy. It includes law enforcement,

physical security, and crime prevention measures. These measures are mutually supporting. Military police

support the commander’s crime prevention and protection efforts through a wide range of activities. Crime

prevention measures, like physical security measures, are conducted by all Army personnel. Even though

military police play a large role and participate heavily in many crime prevention programs, crime prevention

should be recognized as a commander’s program rather than a military police program. Crime prevention

efforts can also be established within HN communities to develop community involvement and a sense of

ownership by the HN community and leaders.
4-28.

Crime prevention programs and strategies can have major impacts on reducing crime rates at bases and

base camps with a relatively minor cost in dollars and manpower. It takes less effort to discourage a criminal

from perpetrating a crime or to teach a Soldier to avoid becoming a victim than it does to investigate a crime

and identify, prosecute, and punish an offender.
4-29.

Community crime prevention councils or boards with representation from groups and organizations

across a community (at a military base or in an HN community) can also be very effective for disseminating

crime prevention-related information and establishing awareness across the community or AO. Commanders

and PM use community-based forums to promote crime prevention efforts—



Provides representatives from major segments of the population with a forum where they can

provide feedback regarding crime prevention initiatives and identify criminal problems that are of

the greatest threat and concern to them.



Allows representatives of major organizations or groups to review the available options to counter

a crime and select the level of resource commitment that is compatible with capabilities and

internal priorities.



Increases the probability of participation, thus ensuring that the resources of the entire community

are mobilized to attack the problem.

RIME

REVENTION

ROGRAMS

4-30.

While military police use crime prevention measures as an integral part of their policing activities,

crime prevention must always be recognized as a commander’s program rather than as a military police

program. Military police personnel have the expertise to analyze data, identify major problems, and develop

lists of possible countermeasures. They perform these functions in support of a crime prevention council or

working group, typically appointed by the base, base camp, or mission commander and composed of

representatives of all major organizations and activities. Military police can also provide support to individual

unit commanders when requested.
4-31.

Many crime prevention programs (Drug Abuse Resistance Education®, Gang Resistance Education

and Training, McGruff the Crime Dog®) are tightly controlled and require specific training for military police

Policing Measures and Strategies

24 August 2021

ATP 3-39.10

4-7

personnel conducting the programs. Others require less formal training, but can still produce positive results

when appropriate emphasis is applied. Crime prevention measures can include—



Preventive patrolling (saturation patrols, directed patrols, foot patrols) in crime hotspots.



Community-based activities (neighborhood watch programs, iWATCH program, other

organizations focused on community improvement and responsibility).



Public initiatives that promote—



Engraving or indelibly marking property for ease of identification.



Locking or otherwise securing personal property.



Situational crime prevention.



Order maintenance (graffiti removal, abandoned car removal, broken/improved street light

repairs).



Juvenile programs.



Drug Abuse Resistance Education.



Gang Resistance Education and Training.



McGruff the Crime Dog.



Police explorer programs.



After-school activity programs.



Police engagement with the community.



Crime prevention education programs.



Workplace crime prevention.



Military unit crime prevention.



School faculty crime prevention.



Crime tip lines.



Environmental design for new construction or renovation projects.



Crime prevention and residential security surveys.



Technology focused deterrence.



Field interviews.



Surveillance.

RIME

REVENTION

FFICERS

4-32.

The PM or military police commander responsible for police operations typically appoints a senior

noncommissioned officer or officer who has a extensive background in military police investigations or

physical security to serve as the crime prevention officer. This person supports the crime prevention council

by serving as the military police representative responsible for providing crime and criminal data analysis to

identify problem areas, recommending programs for council consideration, and coordinating the efforts of

unit crime prevention officers to support the implementation of the crime prevention program.
4-33.

As a member of the PM staff, the crime prevention officer develops the law enforcement section of the

crime prevention program, develops and maintains the written crime prevention plan, and coordinates crime

prevention programs with civilian police agencies and community groups.
4-34.

Crime prevention officers are also appointed in each organization, down to the company level. At the

company level, written crime prevention plans are not required; however, SOPs are established. A crime

prevention officer serves as the organization focal point for coordinating crime prevention plans and

supervises the implementation of the crime prevention program within the organization.

ROGRAM

EVELOPMENT

4-35.

Crimes that are the most susceptible to crime prevention measures are those that exhibit a high

probability of recurrence. Crimes such as murder are typically not repetitive and are poor candidates for

inclusion in the crime prevention program. Information collected through police intelligence operations is

the starting point for developing a crime prevention program. Analysis of crime and criminal activity can

Chapter 4

4-8

ATP 3-39.10

24 August 2021

help develop tailored crime prevention efforts. (See ATP 3-39.20.) This analysis identifies significant crime

and criminal trends and patterns that are susceptible to crime prevention efforts.
4-36.

Police intelligence products (crime statistics, predictive analysis) can be critical enablers to many

crime prevention efforts. These products can help identify specific areas of concern and focus efforts. Military

police personnel have the expertise to analyze data, identify major problems, and develop lists of possible

countermeasures.
4-37.

Since it is seldom practical to attack all criminal problems simultaneously, crimes should be prioritized

based on their impact on the command’s ability to perform the mission and the impact on personnel. Next,

the whole range of countermeasures that can be used to combat each problem must be identified. Once

developed and prioritized, the list of criminal problems and possible countermeasures is presented to the

installation crime prevention council for action. The council should decide which crimes will be addressed

and which countermeasures will be used for each crime. A sample crime countermeasure matrix is shown in

table 4-1. The council may then identify specific objectives for its crime prevention campaigns.

Table 4-1. Sample crime countermeasure matrix

Crime

Command/Law Enforcement Countermeasures

Community Programs

Cri

p L

eas

l C

irect

illa

Public

ity

esi

den

tial

ity

ven

ile

Pro

gra

Pro

gra

Emp

t C

Ars

gra

vei

llan

Ide

ific

ion

Pro

gra

ks o

r E

ort

obile

t L

Public

ess a

tio

Arson

X X

Auto theft

X X

X X X

Burglary or

housebreaking

X X X X X X

X X X X

Employee theft

X X

Fraud

Larceny

Rape

X X X X X X

X X

Robbery

X X X X X

X X

Juvenile

delinquency

X X

Vandalism

X X

RIME AND

RIMINAL

NALYSIS

4-38.

Crime and criminal analysis is a system for identifying trends, patterns, and associations that may exist.

This analysis is an integral component of integrated police intelligence activities, applicable across the

operational continuum. It is an ongoing function for the PM and military police brigade and battalion staffs.

Crime and criminal analysis is the foundation upon which a bases and base camps physical security and

antiterrorism program are based. ATP 3-39.20 provides detailed discussion of crime and criminal analysis

Policing Measures and Strategies

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ATP 3-39.10

4-9

and other police intelligence activities. An effective crime and criminal analysis seeks to identify the

following:



Crimes having a significant impact on a bases and base camps.



Segments of the population being victimized.



Criminal or perpetrator identifications.



Locations, times, and causes for enduring/chronic crime problems.



Offense information (weapon types, victim actions that may be enabling criminal activity).



Information critical to bases and base camps or mission commander threat and vulnerability

assessments.



Information essential to formulating successful patrol distribution plans.



Identifying successful crime prevention strategies and programs.

RIME

REVENTION

URVEYS

4-39.

An important factor in understanding the crime prevention survey is that it must be considered as an

ongoing process. While a particular survey will result in specific recommendations, each survey will provide

a foundation for future actions. In combination, these surveys form an information database that can be used

in support of a community crime analysis and action guide to support the resolution or reduction of problems

on a community-wide basis.
4-40.

Six steps are used to conduct surveys and assess the impact of implemented recommendations. These

steps include—



Analyzing the overall environment for threats, current protection and enforcement gaps and

measures, and crime-conducive conditions.



Assessing the general vulnerability of the premises.



Defining the specific points of vulnerability.



Recommending specific security and enforcement procedures.



Including specific remedial hardware recommendations.



Conducting a follow-up study to assess the implementation and success of recommendations,

including continuous crime and criminal analysis.

4-41.

Based on crime and criminal analysis and crime prevention surveys, personnel can identify needed

objectives. Crime prevention objectives should clearly identify the—



Crime that should be reduced.



Target population that will be addressed.



Specific changes and behaviors on the part of the victims or perpetrators that will be encouraged.



Actions that the command must take to reduce the opportunities for the crimes to occur.

4-42.

With the information from crime and criminal analysis and crime prevention surveys, milestones and

specific countermeasures can be developed to mitigate crime-conducive conditions, reduce the opportunity

for a crime to occur, or remove the incentives for perpetrators. Without an effective crime and criminal

analysis, the overall security effort is unfocused. Moreover, a base or base camp patrol distribution plan may

be ineffective.
4-43.

Crime prevention countermeasures can include—



Physical security measures (lighting, barriers, alarms). See ATP 3-39.32 for an in-depth discussion

of physical security measures and applications.



Police engagements.



Command and public information and education campaigns.



Targeted law enforcement patrols (walking, bicycle, mobile).



Command emphasis and enforcement on existing physical security and crime prevention

countermeasures.



Proactive environmental designs to enhance crime prevention and physical security.

Chapter 4

4-10

ATP 3-39.10

24 August 2021



Juvenile crime prevention and awareness programs.



Neighborhood watch and other community programs.

RIME

REVENTION

ROGRAM

VALUATIONS

4-44.

Crime prevention programs must be continuously evaluated and assessed for effectiveness. This

analysis requires the PM, commander, and staff to—



Develop program objectives.



Determine if the program was implemented and resourced as designed.



Identify measures of effectiveness.



Identify data requirements.



Develop baseline data for comparisons and collect new data.



Identify changes.



Determine if desired or intended effects and outcomes were achieved.



Describe results and make recommendations for change. See figure 4-1.

Figure 4-1. Crime prevention program evaluation

4-45.

Several inherent difficulties in data collection on crime prevention programs make it difficult for

personnel to determine, with 100 percent accuracy, that a particular reduction in a crime rate is the result of

a particular crime prevention measure. These difficulties include the control of variables, the displacement

effect, and unreported crimes.

Control of Variables

4-46.

In its simplest form, the type of evaluation most commonly used in academic or scientific settings will

determine the relationship between two variables. By varying the independent variable, the effect on the

dependent variable is determined while all other variables are held constant. For example, police designate

two like areas (demographics, crime problems) to test crime prevention methods. One neighborhood is

business as usual, no change in police operations, tactics, or resources (control group). Second neighborhood

is the one that police and community partners saturate with new tactics, capabilities, and resources

(experimental group). After 3-6 months, they assess the measures of performance and the measures of

effectiveness in each neighborhood. If crime is down in the experimental group, then it is highly likely that

it is a result of the newly imposed crime prevention methods.

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24 August 2021

ATP 3-39.10

4-11

4-47.

These considerations also apply in the evaluation of crime prevention programs. However, since crime

prevention programs deal with human subjects in environments that cannot be readily controlled, certain

complications arise. The degree of success may have nothing to do with the effectiveness of the program, but

only with the way it was introduced or with the personal predispositions of the groups involved. There is no

standard population; human beings are not standardized as mice are for laboratory purposes. A program found

successful at one base or base camp may be a failure at another.
4-48.

This evaluation is further complicated by the behavior of the offenders. The offenders cannot be treated

directly or separated into experimental and control groups; they will not stand up and be counted. The

effectiveness of these programs is normally determined by looking at statistics of reported crimes and arrests,

which are more indirect indicators.
4-49.

In a crime control program, it may be impossible to classify variables as dependent and independent;

they may all affect and be affected by each other. Furthermore, because of the difficulty in determining why

people behave the way they do, a number of variables may go unnoticed. Police programs designed to reduce

crime may have their most direct effect on the behavior of the general public toward the police, which in turn

affects the crime rate.
4-50.

Evaluations are not necessarily restricted to the analysis of objective crime data; they can also include

subjective considerations and perceptions. These subjective evaluations can be of significant benefit in

augmenting the statistical analysis of the program results. They are especially helpful in assessing why and

how a program worked and whether a statistical outcome is actually evidence that the program was

successful. Interviews of participating agency personnel and residents of the program area are usually used

to supply this information. They can give the evaluator new insight into the actual program operation.

Displacement Effect

4-51.

In many cases, where crime reductions have been measured and attributed to programs, it is unclear

whether there has been an actual reduction in crime or whether the crime has been displaced. The amount of

displacement depends, to an extent, on the offender’s characteristics. An opportunistic offender can be

pictured as having a relatively elastic demand—if the risk level is too high, he will forgo the crime. A drug

addict is typically described as having a relatively inelastic demand for the product because of the inelastic

demand (need) for drugs (despite the risks, they need the product). The displacement effect manifests itself

in multiple ways, including displacement to other—



Crimes.



Tactics and targets.



Areas.

Note.

While displacement has been noted to occur in some instances, there is research that suggests

and proves a diffusion of crime may be more likely. Many studies show a

spreading of benefits to

areas near or next to the targeted area,

not only does the crime hotspot see a reduction in crime,

but the surrounding also has a reduction in criminal activity.

Unreported Crimes

4-52.

Crime statistics are based on crimes reported to the police; however, many crimes go unreported.

Victimization studies can estimate the extent of unreported crime, its change from year to year, and by areas

of the country. They can also help determine reasons that victims fail to report crimes. These victimization

studies are best suited to determine long-term effects. They are not suited for most crime prevention

evaluations in which short-term changes must be assessed.
4-53.

However, crime statistics do not always paint an accurate picture of criminal activity in an AO. Not all

crimes are reported to the police. There are estimates based on comparisons between known crimes reported

to the police and crimes detected as unreported by victim surveys. It works out to an average one out of every

three crimes committed being reported. The most common reason why a crime goes unreported is the victim

chooses to deal with it in another way

which is normally in a personal or private manner. Normally a crime

ATP 3-39.10 POLICE OPERATIONS (AUGUST 2021) - page 3