MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010)

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

Table 1.2.1.a Minimum intermodule Q-Ds (in meters) for ammunition of HD1.1 stored in ISO containers or

equivalent.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.1

500

1 ton

NEQ

tons

ton

NEQ

Unbarricaded

D= 4.8 Q1/3

105

120

135

145

Barricaded

D= 0.8 Q1/3

Table 12.1.b Minimum intermodule Q-Ds (in meters) for ammunition of HD1.2(.1 and .2) stored in ISO containers

or equivalent.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.2

500 kg

1 ton

5 ton

10 ton

15 ton

20 ton

25 ton

NEQ

Unbarricaded

Barricaded

No QD

Barricaded and protective

No QD

roof

Table 1.2.1.c Minimum intermodule Q-Ds (in meters) for ammunition of HD1.3C stored in ISO containers or

equivalent.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.3C

500 kg

1 ton

5 ton

10 ton

15 ton

20 ton

25 ton

NEQ

Unbarricaded

D= 0.44 Q1/2

Barricaded

D= 0.22 Q1/2

Barricaded

No QD

No QD No QD

No QD

and protective

roof

Table 1.2.1.d Minimum intermodule Q-Ds (in meters) for ammunition of HD1.3G stored in ISO containers or

equivalent.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.3G

500 kg

1 ton

5 ton

10 ton

15 ton

20 ton

25 ton

NEQ

Unbarricaded

Barricaded

No QD

Barricaded and protective

No QD

roof

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Exterior Quantity-Distances

Specific types of exposed sites as they appear in the theatre of operations are redefined and classified into their

vulnerability to explosion effects. They are subdivided into military and civil ones (see table 1.2.2.a).

Table 1.2.2.a Definitions of exposed sites in the exterior military and civil zone.

Exposed site

Examples

Unprotected

Personnel in:

personnel

the open, standard vehicles, tents,

light structures, field hospitals, etc.

Semi-protected

Personnel in strengthened structures

personnel

Protected

Personnel in:

personnel

protective shelter, armoured vehicles

(like YPR-765), etc.

Unprotected

POL-installation

Protected POL-

POL-installation with protective

installation

measures, e.g. Hesco Bastions and

protective roof construction

Unprotected

People in:

civilians

the open, houses, cars, etc.

Chemical

industry

“Semi-protected personnel” refers to personnel in strengthened structures. Examples are:

1. accommodations in which the normal glazing is replaced by air blast- and bullet resistant glazing;

2. accommodations which are equipped with bullet (SAA) resistant panels;

3. strengthened roof constructions (e.g. earth covered 20 ft flatracks).

“Protected personnel” refer to personnel in bunkers and armoured vehicles. This type of structures must be able to

resist explosion effects like ammunition fragments and air blast with a peak incident overpressure of 21 kPa

(corresponding with a protection level of 8.0 Q1/3).

An example of a field protective shelter is shown in figure 1.2.2.a. Protection is given by walls of Hesco Bastion

Concertainers and a protective roof which is made of small Hesco Bastion Concertainers filled with sand with on

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(Edition 1)

Table 1.2.2.b Minimum exterior distances (in meters) from a PES with ammunition of HD1.1.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.1

Exposed Site

Protection

500 kg

1 ton

5 ton

10 ton

15 ton

20 ton

25 ton

level

NEQ

Unprotected personnel

22.2

180

225

380

480

550

610

650

Q1/3

Semi-protected

14.8

120

150

255

320

365

405

435

personnel

Q1/3

Protected personnel

D= 8.0 Q1/3

140

175

200

220

235

Unprotected

POL-

22.2

180

225

380

480

550

610

650

installation

Q1/3

Protected

POL-

D= 1.2 Q1/3

installation

Unprotected civilian

22.2

180

225

380

480

550

610

650

Q1/3

Chemical industry

22.2

180

225

380

480

550

610

650

Q1/3

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Table 1.2.2.c Minimum exterior distances (in meters)from an unbarricaded open stack or light structure (e.g. ISO

container) PES with ammunition of HD1.2.1.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.2.1

Exposed Site

Protection

500 kg

1 ton

5 ton

10 ton

15 ton

20 ton

25 ton

level

NEQ

Unprotected personnel

D2*

220

257

337

370

389

402

412

Semi-protected

D6*

148

173

226

248

261

270

277

personnel

Protected personnel

N/A

No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD

Unprotected

POL-

D2*

220

257

337

370

389

402

412

installation

Protected

POL-

N/A

No QD

installation

Unprotected civilian

D2*

220

257

337

370

389

402

412

Chemical industry

D2*

220

257

337

370

389

402

412

* Ref. [10].

Table 1.2.2.d Minimum exterior distances (in meters) from an unbarricaded open stack or light structure (e.g. ISO

container) PES with ammunition of HD1.2.2.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.2.2

Exposed Site

Protection

500 kg

1 ton

5 ton

10 ton

15 ton

20 ton

25 ton

level

NEQ

Unprotected personnel

D1*

123

141

152

160

166

Semi-protected

D5*

103

108

112

personnel

Protected personnel

N/A

No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD

Unprotected

POL-

D1*

123

141

152

160

166

installation

Protected

POL-

N/A

No QD

installation

Unprotected civilian

D1*

123

141

152

160

166

Chemical industry

D1*

123

141

152

160

166

* Ref. [10].

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(Edition 1)

Table 1.2.2.e Minimum exterior distances (in meters) from the side- and rear walls of earth covered PES with

ammunition of HD1.2(.1 and .2).

Quantity-Distances for HD1.2(.1 and .2)

Exposed Site

Protection

500 kg

1 ton

5 ton

10 ton

15 ton

20 ton

25 ton

level

NEQ

Unprotected personnel

IBD*

Semi-protected

PTRD*

personnel

Protected personnel

EWD*

No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD

Unprotected

POL-

IBD*

installation

Protected

POL-

N/A

No QD

installation

Unprotected civilian

IBD*

Chemical industry

IBD*

* Ref. [10].

Table 1.2.2.f Minimum exterior distances (in meters) from a PES with ammunition of HD1.3C.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.3C

Exposed Site

Protection

500 kg

1 ton

5 ton

10 ton

15 ton

20 ton

25 ton

level

NEQ

Unprotected personnel

D= 6.4 Q1/3

110

140

160

175

190

Semi-protected

D= 4.3 Q1/3

110

120

125

personnel

Protected personnel

D= 3.2 Q1/3

Unprotected

POL-

D= 6.4 Q1/3

110

140

160

175

190

installation

Protected

POL-

D= 3.2 Q1/3

installation

Unprotected civilian

D= 6.4 Q1/3

110

140

160

175

190

Chemical industry

D= 6.4 Q1/3

110

140

160

175

190

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Table 1.2.2.g Minimum exterior distances (in meters) from a PES with ammunition of HD1.3G.

Quantity-Distances for HD1.3G

Exposed Site

Protection

500 kg

1 ton

5 ton

10 ton

15 ton

20 ton

25 ton

level

NEQ

Unprotected personnel

N/A*

110

140

160

175

190

Semi-protected

N/A*

No QD

personnel

Protected personnel

N/A*

No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD No QD

Unprotected

POL-

D= 6.4 Q1/3

110

140

160

175

190

installation

Protected

POL-

D= 3.2 Q1/3

installation

Unprotected civilian

D= 6.4 Q1/3

110

140

160

175

190

Chemical industry

D= 6.4 Q1/3

110

140

160

175

190

*It is here assumed that there are opportunities to evacuate personnel after alarm.

4.2.4.3

Acceptable activities for 4,000 kg NEQ HD1.1

The statements in Table 1.3a apply under the precondition that by means of protective measures it has been

ensured that in the worst case a NEQ of 4,000 kg of HD1.1 may detonate at once in an ammunition container. It is

assumed that temporary structural protective measures, barricades or other barriers exist at the PES. The exposed

sites must be protected by protective roofs especially against fragments and projections. The distances in Table 1.3a

are laid down in such a way that the direct and indirect consequences of an occurrence of damage will not lead to a

catastrophe.

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Table 1.3.a Tolerable activities in case there is a small probability of an accidental explosion of

4,000 kg

NEQ of HD1.1.

Minimum

Tolerable activities

Risk level and

range (m)

expected

consequences in

case of an explosion

350

Built-up area

Minor risk

Projections and

breaking glass

250

Billets if structural

Medium risk

protection is available

Injuries caused

Scattered buildings

by projections,

Public roads

collapse and

breaking glass

150

Billets if structural

Significant risk

protection against

Injuries caused

projections, breaking glass,

by fragments

and collapse is available

and projections

Unprotected personnel in

Fatalities

the open: 50 maximum,

temporarily

Public roads: low density

100

Personnel in the open with

Significant risk

individual protective

Injuries caused

equipment: 20 maximum,

by fragments

for a short time

and projections

Continuous parking of

Fatalities

armoured vehicles,

temporary parking of

vehicles

Storage of materiel

Maintenance work if

structural protection is

available

Guard personnel: 10

Significant risk

maximum, continuously

Injuries caused

Structural protection against

by blast,

projections and collapse

fragments and

Parking of armoured

projections

vehicles for a short time

aa) Fatalities

< 50

bb) Ammunition handling: 2 to

cc) Significant risk

6 persons and vehicles for a

dd) Fatalities

short time

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4.2.4.4.

Consequence-analysis tools

Hazard Diagrams

In practise, situations may arise in which the standard minimum quantity-distances can not be observed.

For some well-documented exposed sites, like unprotected humans and humans in buildings, the resulting

consequences are known. Figure 2.1.a shows a general hazard diagram in which the increase in risk as a

function of the actual distance between PES and ES is presented. The example curve represents the risk for

personnel in the open subjected to explosion effects of HD1.1 articles with a NEQ of about 5 tons.

The (upcoming) NATO publication AASTP-4 (Risk Manual) includes detailed information on risk

assessment and -analysis methodologies and tools. In the absence of AASTP-4, a useful methodology is

described in the following section.

100

500

Distance from PES (m)

Figure 2.1.a The increase of risk when advised minimum quantity-distances can not be met [7].

Hazard Formula

In the following the concept of the hazard formula is shown by means of an example. It uses quantities,

which on the one hand are closely related to the hazardousness of an accidental detonation and on the other

hand can be analysed with a relatively high degree of exactness. The proposed procedure leads to a clear

result: It thus enables the responsible officer to take his stand against risky storage situations.

The scenario: an amm unition container containing a load quantity with an NEQ of 4,000 kilograms

is to be stored. The numerical data regarding the hazard potential and the reduction factors are to be taken

as examples. Should the proposed approach be taken into consideration, it will be the responsibility of

ammunition safety experts to determine the parameters of the hazard formula.

The hazard formula: For the "hazard G" for persons staying in the environment of a field storage site, a

"hazard potential P" is determined. The "reduction factors F" reduce the hazard potential.

G = P / (F1ςF2ςF3...)

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The hazard formula is structured in such a way that for a positive decision a value G equal to or smaller

than 1 is required.

The hazard potential: In order to obtain numerical values for the hazard potential P of an ammunition

container it is proposed that the hazard divisions and the compatibility groups available for all types of

ammunition be used. In accordance with the six hazard divisions, an exponential rise of hazard potential P

is allocated to the ammunition container. That means:

Hazard Division 1.6

Hazard Potential P = 2

Hazard Division 1.5

Hazard Potential P = 4

Hazard Division 1.4

Hazard Potential P = 8

Hazard Division 1.3

Hazard Potential P = 16

Hazard Division 1.2

Hazard Potential P = 32

Hazard Division 1.1

Hazard Potential P = 64

The reduction factors: In order to reduce the hazard G to the value 1 or smaller, reduction factors F are

used. For that purpose physical and organizational reduction factors are taken into consideration.

Physical reduction factors F_m:

As examples for physical reduction factors F_m for the ammunition container with NEQ = 4000 kilograms

the following factors are suggested:

•

Barricade in due form:

F_m1 = 4

•

Simple barrier:

Fm2 = 2

•

Making use of the terrain (under certain circumstances):

Fm3 = 2 through 4

•

Explosive quantity distance 500 m:

F_m4 = 16

•

Explosive quantity distance 350 m:

F_m5 = 8;

•

Explosive quantity distance 250 m:

F_m6 = 4

•

Explosive quantity distance 150 m:

F_m7 = 2;

•

Reduction of load quantity by 50 %:

F_m8= 2

•

Demonstrated measures to avoid detonation transmission:

F_m9= 2 through 16.

Organizational reduction factors F_o:

Hazard G can also be reduced by organizational measures. Periods in the endangered area can be limited in

regard to number of people present as well as to location and time. Examples:

The distance range R < 150 meters must be crossed. By means of organizational measures it is

ensured that only one vehicle at a time stays in the area for a few seconds. F_o1 = 2.

In the distance range R = 150 meters to R = 250 meters unprotected people stay for no longer

than a few hours for physical exercises. F_o2 = 4.

The rooms of a building on the side facing the storage site are not occupied.

F_o3 = 2.

Under certain conditions a strict guard, an alarm system, or video monitoring may contribute to reduce the

hazard.

There may be cases in which the decision must be made that only one or two of the organizational

reduction factors may be used.

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Renunciation: Application of the hazard formula may mean renunciation. If it is impossible to achieve risk

value 1 by means of physical and organizational measures there remains the possibility to reduce the

quantity of ammunition stored or to do without certain ammunition types.

Step-by-step approach: The procedure is completed by a step-by-step approach:

Operational pl anning: Storage of ammunition and explosives should be taken into

consideration when planning out-of-area missions. That planning is done at home by means of

ammunition catalogs, plane-table sheets, layout plan and so on. The result of the operational

planning is a hazard potential P and references to potential reduction factors. Operational

planning has to come to the result that it is possible to obtain the value G = 1 by means of the

hazard formula.

Local planning: At the operational location the first task will be to define the reduction factors

F. Can the reduction factors proposed within the scope of operational planning be implemented?

Local planning directs the measures which enable achievement of the value G = 1 by means of

the hazard formula.

Measures t aken on -site: The last decision level concerns the current situation on-site which

may constantly change during out-of-area missions. Does the hazard potential ascertained during

operational planning and local planning still apply? Are the reduction factors still valid? How

much ammunition has been added or taken away? Which changes have occurred in the

environment? Is equipment and materiel available by now to erect a larger barricade? Have there

been terrorist attacks? Has the situation changed in regard to sabotage? On site the measures

have to be taken which make it possible to obtain the value G = 1 by means of the hazard

formula.

Example: An ammunition container holds Q = 4000 kilograms of engineer demolitions of Hazard Division

1.1. According to operational planning it has a hazard potential with the value P = 64. At the operational

location a minimum explosive quantity distance of R = 350 meters can be observed - corresponding to

reduction factor F_m5 = 8. A barrier in due form reduces the hazard potential by a reduction factor F_m1= 4. In

order to achieve the hazard value G = 1, an organisational measure must be taken. The rooms of the

barracks facing the storage site must not be occupied: F_o3= 2. The hazard formula leads to the result:

G = P / (F_m5 ς F_m1ς F_o3) = 64 / (8 ς 4 ς 2) = 1.

With the value G = 1 relative safety is achieved. In the case of an accident serious injuries and especially

fatalities should be avoided. A commander who gets the value G = 1 or lower three times - in other words:

who has come to a positive decision three times, may assume that he has done all that is humanly possible.

The remaining risk will be justifiable.

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(Edition 1)

Section V - Fire-Fighting

4.2.5.1.

General

Fire-fighting principles and procedures are the same as those given for permanent depots in Part I, Chapter

7 and Part II, Chapter 4 respectively. However, ammunition in field storage is more vulnerable to fire than when in

permanent depots, therefore more importance should be placed on fire precautions and fire-fighting in field storage.

4.2.5.2.

Symbols

Fire-fighting symbols must be displayed at each Field Storage Site. Symbols are fixed to posts, clear of the

ammunition and placed where they are easily seen by anyone approaching the site. To take into account the need for

camouflage as the situation may require, the colour of the fire symbols should be left to the discretion of the

National Authorities.

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AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

CHAPTER 3 - QUANTITY-DISTANCE PRINCIPLES FOR MISSILE INSTALLATIONS

4.3.0.1.

General

The quantity-distance principles missile installations are essentially the same as those given in Part I,

Chapter 4 for aboveground storage of ammunition. These distances do not cater for the inadvertent release of a

missile. Each missile installation is treated as a PES requiring Interior and Exterior Quantity-Distances as given in

Part I, Annex A, Section II. Judgement should be used to associate the missile installation with an appropriate

pictograph for a PES taking account of the particular design. Reference to Part III, Chapter 2 may also be necessary.

Interior Quantity-Distances required for system-determined technical and/or operational reasons are not taken into

consideration in this chapter. They are part of the weapons system regulations.

4.3.0.2.

Potential Explosion Sites

Launching platforms, warheading buildings, ready-round storage areas and other facilities where the

missile with warhead is serviced or stored are considered to be PES containing ammunition of Hazard

Division 1.1.

The "Definitive Drawings" for a missile installation should include the separation distances necessary to

prevent propagation of explosion. Where operational requirements for the missile system necessitate

smaller distances, the PES are aggregated and considered to be one PES as regards Exterior Quantity-

Distances.

4.3.0.3.

Exposed Sites

Military sites such as operation centres, readiness structures, radar and communication installations, fuel

stations, parking areas and guard shelters may be considered to be ES which are protected by appropriate

Interior Quantity-Distances. These ES may be inside the missile installation under consideration or inside

another military installation.

The "Definitive Drawings" for a missile installation are based on operational requirements which may

override the Interior Quantity-Distances and which must be taken into account by additional infrastructure

measures (site safety plans).

An Exposed Site outside a missile installation, not being inside another military installation, must be

protected by the Exterior Quantity-Distances given in Part I.

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4.3.0.4.

Measuring of Quantity-Distances

Quantity-Distances at launcher platforms are measured from the extremities of the missile(s) when in

normal position on the platform. As regards assembly buildings and storage sites at a missile installation the normal

procedure in Part I, paragraph 1.3.2.3. applies.

4.3.0.5.

Net Explosives Quantity

The normal procedure for computing the NEQ applies, see Part I, subparagraphs 1.3.2.3.a) and 1.3.2.3.b).

Information, which may be classified, on the effective NEQ of a particular type of missile should be obtained from

the design authority. Otherwise the actual NEQ must be calculated in accordance with the definition as follows: The

NEQ is the total explosives content of ammunition unless it has been determined that the effective quantity is

significantly different from the actual quantity. It does not include such substances as white phosphorus, war gases

or smoke and incendiary compositions unless these substances contribute significantly to the dominant hazard of the

hazard division concerned.

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AASTP-1

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CHAPTER 5 - QUANTITY-DISTANCE PRINCIPLES FOR

AIRFIELDS USED ONLY BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT

4.5.0.1.

General

This chapter recommends principles and safety requirements for airfields used only by military aircraft.

Air forces generally operate in war from the same locations that they occupy in peacetime. It may therefore

be necessary to store or hold weapons and ammunition as close to the aircraft as possible without exposing

personnel or facilities to unacceptable risk from an accidental explosion or the detonation of weapons or

ammunition as a result of enemy action in war. The following advice is intended to provide the minimum

levels of protection deemed necessary.

The quantity-distances specified in this chapter apply essentially to PES which exist in peacetime. It

follows that Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) which contain armed aircraft and/or stocks of ammunition

in peacetime should be treated as PES. Commanders will need to decide the quantity-distances to be

applied to sites which only become PES in emergencies or wartime and such distances will need to be

catered for in the airfields' peacetime layout. In reaching his decision the Commander should bear in mind

that a reduction in recommended quantity-distances to non-operationally essential facilities may result, in

the event of an explosion at the PES in increased damage and casualties, whilst a similar reduction to

operationally essential facilities could result in the facility ceasing to function and the prejudicing of

operational plans.

Operational Commanders are advised that the more essential military resources may require additional

protection.

4.5.0.2.

Aircraft Parking - Designated Areas

Aircraft carrying explosives must be armed, loaded, unloaded or parked in a Designated Area. Where

possible such a Designated Area should be separated from other such areas and from ES by the quantity-

distances given in paragraph 4.5.0.4.

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A loading, unloading or parking area specifically designated for continual use presents a recurring hazard

as opposed to an occasional one and should be formally authorised for the purpose.

Exception

This requirement does not apply to aircraft containing only installed explosives and safety devices such as

authorised signals in survival kits, egress systems components, engine starter cartridges, fire extinguisher

cartridges and other such items necessary to flight operations.

4.5.0.3.

Aircraft Parking - Principles for Selecting Designated Areas

The following principles should be followed in selecting Designated Areas:

The safest possible area compatible with quantity-distances prescribed in this chapter and

operational requirements must be used.

The loading, unloading or parking area must be located outside runway clear zones. Aircraft

arm/disarm pads are exempted from the restriction¹

Whenever possible, the quantity-distances recommended in paragraph 4.5.0.4. should be observed

between adjacent loaded aircraft which are in the open. Where this is not possible consideration

should be given to grouping several aircraft together and separating the groups by greater

distances than can be provided between individual aircraft. If an explosion should occur, aircraft

in adjacent groups may be damaged by fragments; however, the explosion is unlikely to propagate

simultaneously. Subsequent explosions may be caused by fragments, debris or secondary fires.

In general, the applicable runway clearance is the 150 m lateral safety zone each side from the runway centreline. Further details

are given in the 6th or latest Edition of NATO Airfield Criteria.

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Ideally, aircraft should face the direction involving least exposure of personnel, equipment and

facilities to the line of fire of forward-firing armament. For practical purposes, aircraft should be

pointed so that no centre of population exists for 3 000 m within 5° on either side of the line of

fire unless this is intercepted by a suitable barricade.

Exceptions

Aircraft carrying their operational loads of gun ammunition, practice bombs and small rockets (e.g. 2.75"

HE rockets or others with equivalent characteristics) do not require the quantity-distances specified in

paragraph 4.5.0.4.

4.5.0.4.

Quantity-Distances

The following quantity-distances, which assume Hazard Division 1.1 loads, may be used for all hazard

divisions. Where Part I of the Manual permits, lesser distances may be used for hazard divisions other than

Hazard Division 1.1.

Quantity-Distances between Aircraft Loaded with Explosives

Unbarricaded individual aircraft, or groups of aircraft at Designated Areas, loaded with explosives

should be separated from one another by AD13-distances (12.0 Q^1/3) unless space limitations or

operational considerations dictate otherwise. At this distance, adjacent unsheltered aircraft may

sustain damage due to fragments but should, in most cases, remain operable. Where nearly

complete protection against fragments is deemed necessary, a distance of 270 m between aircraft

should be provided. Individual or groups of aircraft should be separated by AD10-distances (7.2

Q^1/3) to protect against propagation of detonation. If the aircraft carry ammunition of comparable

resistance to propagation as robust shells, AD9-distances (4.4 Q^1/3) may be used to protect against

simultaneous detonation. Lesser distances may be used for specific weapons where trials have

shown that such distances are adequate to minimize the probability of propagation.

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Barricades between adjacent aircraft will prevent simultaneous propagation due to high velocity,

low angle fragments. It should be noted, however, that a barricade does not necessarily prevent

subsequent propagation or damage caused by blast, lobbed items, debris or secondary fires.

Exterior Quantity-Distances from Designated Areas

Where possible, the appropriate Exterior Quantity-Distances in Part I should apply between parked aircraft

loaded with explosives at Designated Areas and ES not related to the servicing and support of those

aircraft. Safety is enhanced by towing aircraft, after loading, to a safer area rather than close to other

aircraft being loaded or unloaded.

Quantity-Distances between HAS and Associated Storage Facilities

HAS² and associated storage facilities spaced according to Table 5-II will prevent propagation

between such facilities. An explosion in one shelter or ready storage facility may destroy it and its

contents, but aircraft within adjacent shelters will be undamaged, provided the doors are closed.

Those aircraft may not be immediately removable due to debris.

HAS and associated storage facilities spaced according to Table 5-III may be damaged; however,

there will be a high degree of protection against propagation. These distances should be used only

in wartime or during periods of increased operational readiness.

Areas of hazard to front, side or rear of HAS or igloos as PES or ES lie in the arcs shown in

Figure 5-I. A particular face of an ES is deemed to be threatened by a PES face when both these

faces lie within the arc of threat or hazard of the other. In those cases where an ES lies on the line

separating rear/side etc. of a PES, the appropriate larger quantity-distance should be observed.

The tables in this chapter do not apply to Norwegian designs of third generation HAS for which tables will be published in due course.

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AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

Quantity-Distances to Runways and Taxiways

If the transient risk to military aircraft movements is accepted, it is recommended that the separation of the

PES from runways and taxiways which are considered to be operationally essential should ideally be such

as to prevent the runways or taxiways being rendered unoperational by ground shock as a result of an

explosion in the PES. The use of a distance equivalent to about three times the crater radius is

recommended. In normal soil AD4-distances (1.8 Q^1/3) should be used; in saturated soils or clay greater

distances may be advisable because of the increased crater radius. If the transient risk is not accepted,

AD13-distances (12.0 Q^1/3) should be used to provide protection to the aircraft.

Quantity-Distances to Explosives Workshops

Explosives workshops should be separated from other PES by AD11-distances (8.0 Q^1/3). Suitably

hardened explosives workshops may be sited at reduced distances.

Quantity-Distances to Facilities and Activities in Both Direct and Indirect Support of Flightline and

Aircraft Servicing

Use AD10-distances (7.2Q ^1/3) for separation of any PES where explosives are present on a long-term basis

from squadron operations buildings, flightline maintenance functions, flightline fire and rescue stations,

and other activities in direct support of flightline and aircraft servicing (e.g. alert crew, POL and LOX

facilities) unless the facilities are hardened to NATO criteria, when reduced distances may be used. At this

distance, damage to unstrengthened buildings may be of a serious nature with resulting casualties. Where

greater protection is required, AD12-Distances

(9.6 Q^1/3) should be used, except where

subparagraph 4.5.0.4.k) permits smaller distances. Use AD14-distances (16.0 Q^1/3) for similar unhardened

facilities in indirect support of flightline operations, with reductions for facilities hardened to NATO

criteria. In transition to war (TTW) and war, all facilities may be considered to be directly supporting and

the lesser distances used.

-IV-5-5-

Change 3

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

Quantity-Distances for Emergency Power Supply Shelter and POL Shelter for the Support of Hardened

Aircraft Shelters

If the quantity-distances prescribed in subparagraph 4.5.0.4.g) cannot be maintained, lesser quantity-

distances are permissible for the construction of Emergency Power Supply Shelter and POL Shelter for the

support of a nearby HAS under the following conditions:

Power Supply and POL Shelters must be hardened

- Wall and roof thickness

: at least 65 cm reinforced concrete

- Gate thickness

: at least 30 mm steel plate

The POL tank for this structure must be buried (minimum earth-cover 1 m).

The following quantity-distances to PES have to be maintained (see Figure -II):

- Minimum distance between the walls and PES : AD5-distances

- Minimum distance between the gates and PES : AD9-distances, at least 25 m

- At least 25 m for the buried POL tank.

Quantity-Distances to Military Aircraft not Loaded with Explosives

Use AD13-distances (12.0 Q^1/3) for separation of PES from military aircraft in exposed parking (tankers,

transports), but damage may be sustained due to fragments (see sub-subparagraph 4.5.0.4.b).1.). Where

operational requirements outweigh consideration of asset preservation, distances may be reduced to that

dictated by operational necessity but minimum distances corresponding to the distance function 9.6 Q^1/3 for

embarking/disembarking military personnel for transport and distances corresponding to the distance

function 7.2 Q^1/3 for tanker aircraft should be considered.

Quantity-Distances to Open Stacks of Ammunition

Open storage of ammunition, barricaded effectively, is permitted at not less than AD13-distances (12.0

Q^1/3) from parked aircraft outside shelters.

-IV-5-6-

Change 3

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

Quantity-Distances to General Public and Central Airfield Administrative Support Facilities

Use AD16-distances (14.0 Q^1/3) from the rear and AD17-distances (18.0 Q^1/3) from the sides and

front of ready service igloos containing up to 10 000 kg NEQ at loading density of up to 20 kg/m³.

Apply a minimum distance of 270 m to central airfield administrative support facilities and low

density public traffic routes.

When the PES is a US third-generation or similar hardened aircraft shelter containing up to 5 000

kg NEQ, the AD18-distances (20.0 Q^1/3) from the front, the AD19-distances (25.0 Q^1/3) from the

side and AD14-distances (16.0 Q^1/3) from the rear may be used to protect an unhardened ES

against debris and blast. With NEQ of 50 kg or less in a HAS, a minimum distance of 80 m to the

front of the HAS and nil to the side and rear need only to be applied.

Use AD15-distances (22.2 Q^1/3) for other PES where explosives are present on a long-term basis,

and apply minimum distances of 270 or 400 m depending on the nature of the PES (open vs igloo)

and the ES (density of population).

Where ES have been hardened, lesser distances may be used depending on the degree of

hardening provided.

4.5.0.5.

Operational Considerations

When operational requirements necessitate the use of Table 5-III or distances less than those prescribed

above, particularly in the case of explosives of Hazard Division 1.1, the operational Commander should be

advised of any potentially serious risks in accordance with Part I, Chapter 3, Section VII, so that measures

can be taken to eliminate or at least reduce the consequences.

The aim should be to maintain the maximum practicable separation between unbarricaded aircraft loaded

with explosives of Hazard Division 1.1. The use of distances less than 270 m involves a progressively

increasing risk of propagation by blast, flame, radiant heat and projections.

Safety is enhanced by towing aircraft, after loading, to aircraft being loaded or unloaded.

-IV-5-7-

Change 3

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

TABLE 5-I (PAGE 1)

Q-D TABLE FOR AIRFIELDS HAZARD DIVISION 1.1

NEQ

Quantity-Distances

AD1

AD2

AD3

AD4

AD5

AD6

AD7

AD8

AD9

AD10

500

600

700

800

900

1 000

1 200

1 400

1 600

1 800

2 000

2 200

2 500

3 000

105

3 500

110

4 000

115

4 400

120

5 000

125

6 000

135

7 000

140

8 000

145

8 800

150

9 000

150

10 000

160

Distance

AD1

AD2

AD3

AD4

AD5

AD6

AD7

AD8

AD9

AD10

Functions

0.5

0.8

1.1

1.8

2.0

2.4

3.2

3.6

4.4

7.2

Q^1/3

-IV-5-10-

Change 3

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

TABLE 5-I (PAGE 2)

Q-D TABLE FOR AIRFIELDS HAZARD DIVISION 1.1

NEQ

Quantity-Distances

AD1

AD15

AD17

AD18

AD19

500

130

270

160

200

600

100

135

170

215

700

105

145

180

225

800

110

150

190

235

900

115

155

195

245

1 000

120

160

200

250

1 200

105

130

175

215

270

1 400

110

135

180

225

280

1 600

115

140

190

235

295

1 800

120

145

195

245

305

2 000

105

125

150

205

255

315

2 200

105

125

155

210

270

265

330

2 500

110

135

165

220

275

340

3 000

120

140

175

235

305

270

290

365

3 500

125

150

180

245

330

275

305

380

4 000

130

155

190

255

350

290

320

400

4 400

135

160

200

260

365

295

330

410

5 000

140

165

205

275

380

310

345

430

6 000

150

175

220

295

405

330

--------

---------

7 000

155

185

230

310

425

270

345

8 000

160

195

240

320

445

280

360

8 800

170

200

250

330

460

290

375

9 000

170

200

250

335

465

295

380

10 000

175

210

260

345

480

305

390

Distance

AD11

AD12

AD13

AD14

AD16

AD17

AD18

AD19

Functions

9.6

12.0

16.0

**)

14.0

18.0

20.0

25.0

Q^1/

Q^1/3

AD15 = 5.5 Q^1/2 for Q < 4 500 kg

**)

AD15 = 22.2 Q^1/3 for Q

4 500 kg

NOTE: a)

see subparagraph 4.5.0.4.k)

-IV-5-11-

Change 3

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

TABLE 5-II (PAGE 1)

ASSET PRESERVATION

FROM

1st Generation

2nd and 3rd Generation

(PES)

Aircraft Shelter ^a)

TO (ES)

Side

Rear

Front

Side

Rear

Front

1st Generation

Side

AD8

AD6

AD8

AD6

AD8

Aircraft

Rear

AD7

AD5

AD7

AD5

AD7

Shelter

Front

AD10

2nd or 3rd Generation

Side

AD8

AD6

AD8

AD6

AD8

Aircraft

Rear

AD7

AD5

AD7

AD5

AD7

Shelter

Front

AD9

AD8

AD10

AD9

AD8

AD10

Distance Functions:

see TABLE 5-I

NOTE: a)

Limited to a maximum of 5 000 kg per shelter.

-IV-5-12-

Change 3

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

TABLE 5-II (PAGE 2)

ASSET PRESERVATION

FROM (PES)

Ready Service

Igloo ^b)

Magazine ^c)

TO (ES)

Side

Rear

Front

Barr.

Unbarr.

Barr.

Unbarr.

1st Generation

Side

AD3

AD7

Aircraft

Rear

AD3

AD7

Shelter

Front

AD9

AD8

AD10

2nd or 3rd

Side

AD3

AD7

Generation

Rear

AD3

AD7

Aircraft

Front

AD3

AD7

Shelter

Distance Functions:

see TABLE 5-I

NOTES:

Ready Service Igloo - An earth-covered explosives storage location, often utilizing an arch-type interior

shell, used to store built-up ammunition for combat aircraft loading. Storage is limited to not more

than 10 000 kg NEQ and a loading density of not more than 20 kg m^-1/3.

Ready Service Magazine - Any aboveground explosives storage facility, other than an igloo, used to store

built-up ammunition for combat aircraft loading. Storage is limited to not more than 10 000 kg.

-IV-5-13-

Change 3

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

TABLE 5-III (PAGE 1)

PROPAGATION PREVENTION

FROM (PES)

1st Generation

2nd or 3rd Generation

Aircraft Shelter

Aircraft Shelter ^a)

TO (ES)

Side

Rear

Front

Side

Rear

Front

1st Generation

Side

AD2

AD3

AD2

AD3

Aircraft

Rear

AD2

AD3

AD2

AD3

Shelter

Front

AD6

AD4

AD7

AD6

AD4

AD8

2nd or 3rd Gene-

Side

AD2

AD3

AD2

AD3

ration Aircraft

Rear

AD2

AD3

AD2

AD3

Shelter

Front

AD4

AD3

AD5

AD4

AD6

Ready

Side

AD2

AD3

AD2

AD3

Service

Rear

AD2

AD3

AD2

AD3

Igloo

Front

AD3

AD5

AD3

AD6

Barr.

Front

AD6

AD4

AD7

AD6

AD4

AD8

Unbarr.

Ready Ser-

Barr.

AD6^b)

AD6

AD6^b)

AD6

vice Maga-

Unbarr.

AD9

zine

Distance Functions:

see TABLE 5-I

NOTES:

Limited to a maximum of 5 000 kg per shelter.

This separation provides a high degree of protection (see Part I, subpara. 1.3.1.9.b)2)). AD3-distances may

be used for robust stores or in wartime or emergency situations and would provide a moderate degree

of protection (see Part I, subpara. 1.3.1.9.b)3)).

-IV-5-15-

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MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010) - page 19