Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6)

Chapter 2

separate from the detainee but transport them with the detainee because associating the captured materials

with a detainee is vital.

2-29. Capturing units also complete DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement) to accompany the detainee. (See

figure 2-4.) A sworn statement—

Provides more information about the detainee’s capture circumstances; the captured materials

with the detainee; and how, when, and to whom the detainee and associated captured materials

were transferred.

Indicates any items that were specifically receipted and to whom.

Details the detainee’s physical condition and any medical treatment provided, offered, or refused

by the detainee.

Includes other detainees captured with the detainee and may include any significant statements

made by the other detainee.

FIELD EXPEDIENT TAGGING PROCEDURES

2-30. The collection of captured materials associated with a detainee is critical to further intelligence

collection from the detainee and the captured materials. When DD Form 2745 is not available, capturing

units should use any paper available to duplicate the information as it appears on DD Form 2745. Record

the minimum information (as outlined in paragraphs 2-22 through 2-23 and 2-26 through 2-29) on the

paper and then attach it to the detainee and the captured materials using the best application available—

without causing harm to the detainee or the captured materials.

2-31. Captured materials from a captured site may also be tagged using field expedient methods if a

captured materials tag is not available. Notebook pages; meal, ready to eat (MRE) boxes; or the blank side

of other forms can be used to record information about the site. Units anticipating the capture of detainees

and other items should make every effort to keep a supply of DD Forms 2745 and captured materials tags

to ease the process. Regardless, the absence of these forms does not relieve a unit from recording necessary

information.

INVENTORY AND GROUP

2-32. Inventory and group captured materials based on their association with specific detainees or location

of capture. In other words, group together all captured materials associated with a specific detainee and

group separately from captured materials associated with a different detainee. The same applies to large

volumes of captured materials at a site—group based on their location of capture or group based on the

room of capture at a certain location. Units gathering captured materials from multiple locations in one day

should inventory and group them according to the location of capture.

EVACUATE

2-33. The initial evacuation of detainees, civilian internees, and captured materials is the responsibility of

the capturing unit. The capturing unit is normally responsible for moving the detainees from the point of

capture to the nearest initial detainee control point (IDCP) and evacuating captured materials to the next

higher echelon.

EVACUATE CAPTURED MATERIALS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH A DETAINEE

2-34. Once all captured materials from a site are bagged, tagged, and readied for evacuation, the capturing

unit gathers the captured materials and reports to the battalion or brigade intelligence staff for debriefing

and hand-over of the captured materials. Capturing units are responsible for ensuring the safe and speedy

evacuation of captured materials to areas designated by higher echelons and are required to use their

organic equipment.

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EVACUATE CAPTURED MATERIALS ASSOCIATED WITH A DETAINEE

2-35. Evacuate captured materials associated with a detainee through detainee evacuation channels—with

the detainee, but not on the detainee. If possible, units rapidly move CEDs and CEM to the IDCP. If located

at the IDCP, designated DOMEX personnel initiate screening and exploitation of captured materials as

soon as practical to provide time-sensitive information of immediate tactical value and to answer CCIRs.

Commanders or leaders do not delay the evacuation process or allow the separation of detainees and

captured materials. At the IDCP, military police take possession of the captured materials, which begins the

official chain of custody for source-associated captured materials.

CAPTURED MATERIALS TRANSMITTAL SHEET

2-36. Prepare a captured materials transmittal sheet for captured materials transported from any echelon.

DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document) can be used as a captured materials transmittal

sheet. (See figure 2-5.) Produce a captured materials transmittal sheet in triplicate—one each for the

exploitation element, activity, and facility that archives copies of the captured materials transferred.

2-37. Unit SOPs determine the exact format for a captured materials transmittal sheet; however, it should

contain at a minimum the following information:

Element receiving captured materials (include name and rank of Soldier accepting the materials).

Unit forwarding captured materials (include name and rank of Soldier releasing the materials).

Whether screened or unscreened.

Screening category, if applicable.

Transmittal sheet identification number.

Harmony numbers assigned to exploited captured materials, if applicable.

Captured materials serial numbers.

Transfer date and time in DTG format.

RETURN/RELEASE OF CAPTURED MATERIALS TO A DETAINEE

2-38. The return of materials captured with a detainee upon the detainee’s release from custody depends on

the intelligence value of the captured materials and on unit SOPs. Capturing units must not return captured

materials.

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SECTION III - BATTALION INTELLIGENCE STAFF

2-39. Since every Soldier is a sensor and a potential source of relevant information, the battalion

intelligence staff performs patrol debriefings to support the intelligence process. The battalion intelligence

staff is responsible for debriefing returning patrols, exploitation teams, DOMEX teams, leaders who may

have traveled to meetings, returning human intelligence collection teams, helicopter pilots, and others who

may have obtained information of intelligence value. The battalion intelligence staff debriefs personnel,

writes and submits reports, or reports information verbally, as appropriate. Following each mission, a

debriefing by the intelligence staff should take place. Leaders should not consider the mission

accomplished until the debriefings and reports are completed.

2-40. The battalion intelligence staff debriefing should include reviews of the route traveled, the mission’s

collection objectives, and the collection methods employed. When the intelligence staff performs its

debriefing, it should have the patrol report and all documents produced (such as mission logs, sworn

statements, spot reports, sketches, photographs, and videos) from the handling of captured materials. The

collector’s reporting streamlines the debriefing process, which allows the intelligence staff to concentrate

on filling gaps and following up on reported information. For example, by reviewing the collector’s actions

chronologically, the intelligence staff can help the collector to recall and record information that flows

logically because it has been organized based on time of occurrence. The intelligence staff should—

Use a map to determine the site’s location. If the capturing unit has completed a sketch, the

intelligence staff can use a copy as a reference during the debriefing.

Ask the capturing unit to provide a description of events that occurred during the exploitation of

the site.

Avoid asking questions that elicit a yes or no response.

Avoid asking only for information in response to the CCIRs. Doing so might limit the capturing

unit’s answers and cause something of significance to be missed.

Ascertain whether spot reports were disseminated; if not, disseminate the reports, as applicable.

2-41. DOMEX teams task-organized at battalion level provide the tactical commander with a means to

rapidly process large volumes of captured materials. DOMEX teams may comprise military intelligence

personnel assigned to the battalion intelligence staff or in accordance with the commander’s needs.

2-42. Based on the circumstances (for example, under enemy fire) under which the capturing unit or

exploitation team collected the captured materials, the battalion intelligence staff may be the first echelon

to establish a proper chain of custody for captured materials and follow the procedures as outlined in the

initial collection phase of the DOMEX process.

COLLECT

2-43. The reception of the captured materials constitutes collection at battalion level. The DOMEX team

performs the initial screening, extraction, and reporting of information of immediate tactical value. The

team determines if all captured materials are properly tagged and contacts the capturing unit, if necessary,

to gather the pertinent information. After the confirmation of all tagging information, the DOMEX team

inventories and groups the captured materials and prepares them for evacuation.

2-44. Although the DOMEX team at battalion level may have the capability to conduct hasty analysis of

captured materials, the team should not hold the materials at battalion level to accomplish hasty analysis;

rather, it should quickly evacuate the captured materials to the next echelon.

2-45. Under the direction of the battalion intelligence staff, DOMEX teams screen CEDs as they tag and

inventory the documents. Upon recognition, the DOMEX team immediately reports time-sensitive

information collected from a document using reporting guidance to determine when direct reporting to

affected units is authorized. The spot report in SALUTE format is used by most units for reporting time-

sensitive information unless otherwise specified in annex B of the OPORD or other reporting guidance.

The battalion intelligence staff also forwards a hardcopy of the reports along with evacuated documents to

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reduce the potential for redundant reporting. The typical battalion does not have the capability to screen,

exploit, or extract information from CEM, but a battalion should assign a preliminary category to the CEM

for priority of evacuation purposes.

SCREEN, CATEGORIZE, AND EXTRACT AND REPORT TIME-

SENSITIVE INFORMATION

2-46. Upon receipt of captured materials, the battalion intelligence staff, with the DOMEX team’s

assistance if applicable, evaluates the captured materials, assigns a preliminary exploitation category (see

paragraph 2-58), and reports time-sensitive information obtained from captured materials not previously

reported by the capturing unit or exploitation team.

2-47. Although the commander has the authority to determine a material’s priority designation,

prioritization is based on which captured materials contain the most value. For example, in Operation Iraqi

Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom the following items were determined to be of the most value:

Digital devices.

Communications equipment.

Contact information (names and addresses or phone numbers).

Large amounts of currency or narcotics.

Identification documents.

All other documents, including photographs, weapons, and currency.

Note. This generalized prioritization list of captured materials does not supersede CCIRs or the

commander’s guidance.

INVENTORY AND GROUP

2-48. Before beginning the inventory process, the battalion intelligence staff or DOMEX team must ensure

that hazardous materials are rendered safe. If space permits, the battalion intelligence staff should create a

separate location to screen captured materials, thus preventing the potentiality of hazardous materials in the

workspace. When in doubt about safe handling procedures, consult trained professionals, such as the EOD

unit, support battalion ammunition specialists, or CBRNE representatives.

2-49. By using captured materials tags to identify collected materials, the capturing unit greatly assists the

battalion intelligence staff. Additionally, details from the captured materials tag assist in inventorying a

batch. A batch is a group of captured materials seized in association with a specific individual or captured

at the same location. If the capturing unit does not have captured materials tags, the unit may use some

other type of field expedient marking technique to identify specific items. Regardless, the battalion

intelligence staff or DOMEX team must obtain specifics regarding the original disposition of captured

materials.

TAG

2-50. All captured materials must have completed captured materials tags. If captured materials are not

tagged, the battalion intelligence staff must contact the capturing unit, exploitation team, or other collection

team to obtain information to complete the captured materials tag before evacuating the materials to the

next higher echelon or processing site for processing and exploitation.

EVACUATE

2-51. Frequently, the battalion intelligence staff is the first element to receive captured materials from the

capturing unit and inventories them to ensure accountability during subsequent evacuation. Different items

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require different evacuation procedures. The staff determines evacuation locations of captured materials

based on their contacts and knowledge. (See paragraphs 1-23 through 1-29.)

LOGGING CAPTURED MATERIALS

2-52. Using the information on the captured materials tags, the battalion intelligence staff logs all captured

materials and their evacuation locations on a captured materials log (produced locally). If evacuation

locations are unknown or the proper evacuation is not possible, the battalion intelligence staff forwards the

captured materials to the next level for further evacuation. The staff annotates this information in the

captured materials log. The battalion intelligence staff—

Briefly describes the condition (for example, good, paper torn, cell phone partially burned) of

the captured materials in the remarks section of the captured materials log.

Annotates on the captured materials log whether the captured materials were captured in

association with a detainee or from a captured site. If associated with a detainee, the staff records

the detainee administrative number (see paragraph 2-22) and indicates this information on the log.

2-53. Proper inventory procedures and proper completion of the captured materials log ensures strict

accountability of all captured materials and preserves their evidentiary value.

DIGITIZED CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS

2-54. If resources and time are available, the battalion intelligence staff scans or photographs the CEDs to

create a digital record that accompanies the spot report or is sent directly to the processing site. Digitization

enables the staff to use machine language translation tools to identify important words, names, and phrases

through a rough translation of the document. The staff must annotate or otherwise include all information

from the captured materials tag with digitized documents to ensure document accountability and

traceability.

TRANSMITTAL OF CAPTURED MATERIALS

2-55. Since captured materials can contain valuable intelligence information (whether associated with a

detainee or not) and are seldom delayed at the battalion level, the battalion intelligence staff begins

evacuation procedures immediately following the inventory. To prepare for evacuation of the captured

materials, the intelligence staff uses the inventory information to complete the captured materials

transmittal sheet. The staff must identify in the captured materials log and on the transmittal sheet which

captured materials are being sent to a higher echelon or special processing sites

(such as technical

intelligence or signals intelligence facilities), and which captured materials are accompanying any

detainees. If an item, such as a weapon or weapon component, was captured with a detainee and is sent to

another exploitation site, the associated detainee must be annotated on the captured materials transmittal

sheet. Some captured materials, such as cell phones and Global Positioning System devices can and should

be evacuated with the detainee.

2-56. Attempts to process and report information derived from captured materials are annotated in the

captured materials log. Transmittal sheets are sent to higher echelons. Unit SOPs and reporting guidance

contain the precise format for a captured materials transmittal sheet.

2-57. Once completed, the battalion intelligence staff sends a softcopy of the captured materials transmittal

sheet and an estimated evacuation time through the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to

the destination-processing site. If the captured materials are associated with a detainee or contain

cryptographic information or technical information associated with CEM, include the appropriate

additional message addressees. A softcopy of the captured materials transmittal sheet helps addressees

anticipate and organize their captured materials processing resources as well as alerts multiple

organizations about information of potential intelligence value.

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Note. The battalion intelligence staff retains a copy of each captured materials transmittal sheet

along with any copies of resultant intelligence reports, translations, and digital images.

EVACUATION PRIORITIZATION OF CAPTURED MATERIALS

2-58. The battalion intelligence staff or DOMEX team evacuates captured materials not associated with a

detainee according to exploitation priority. Evacuate higher priority materials first. Determine priority

based on the category assigned to the captured materials during screening. Table

2-1 provides the

categories of captured materials and their basic descriptions. In addition to determining the priority for

exploiting and evacuating captured materials, categories also determine their handling procedures.

Table 2-1. Categories of captured materials

Category

Description

Critical, time-sensitive information that requires priority reporting, evacuation, or special handling;

answers priority intelligence requirements.

Information that answers a higher echelon information requirement.

Routine information that may have no intelligence value but requires accountability.

Routine information that has no information of intelligence value.

Note. Use DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document) for accountability or criminal evidence, currency, and other

potential high-value property items, such as works of art.

Handle cryptographic information as Secret.

2-59. At the time of evacuation, assign a category C to unevaluated captured materials. Ensure the captured

materials transmittal sheet clearly indicates that the captured materials are “unscreened” or “not evaluated.”

Evacuating units hold category C or lower priority captured materials that are not evacuated until scheduled

transportation arrives.

2-60. When determining evacuation priorities, the intelligence staff considers all captured materials that are

ready for evacuation:

Do not evacuate lower priority items—no matter how old—ahead of higher priority items.

A package of captured materials must contain materials of only one category.

Unscreened category C captured materials are not packaged with screened category C materials.

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Processing Phase

Unless the collector or capturing unit has a supporting document and media

exploitation (DOMEX) team, translator, or linguist, most units that collect captured

materials normally have no way of determining their intelligence value. Once

captured materials arrive at an echelon with a dedicated exploitation team, DOMEX

processing site, or other intelligence activity, trained exploitation personnel can

screen, process, and extract information from the captured materials. The degree that

the brigade-level and higher echelon sites process the captured materials depends on

the sites’ resources and missions and the categories of captured materials.

SECTION I - BRIGADE AND ABOVE DOMEX PROCESSING SITE

3-1. Processing captured materials at brigade and above includes the tasks as listed in figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. Processing phase

3-2. The majority of DOMEX processing involves digitizing, transcribing, and translating non-English

graphics, recordings, and text documents into English text format. Language capability is therefore

essential to processing non-English language documents. In addition, language-based processing activities

require procedures and management to ensure transcripts and translations are timely, accurate, complete,

and free of bias. Generally, the priorities for processing at brigade and above are based on the—

Categories assigned to the captured materials.

Commander’s collection requirements.

Established reporting guidance.

Commander’s situational understanding.

3-3. At the brigade level, the capability to exploit some media devices for time-sensitive information of

immediate tactical value exists as specialized DOMEX support teams. Specially trained media exploitation

personnel, assigned to these task-organized teams, assess whether the extraction of information of

immediate tactical value is possible before evacuating the media devices to the supporting signals

intelligence unit or the National Media Exploitation Center for in-depth exploitation.

3-4. Army DOMEX processing sites at brigade and above do not normally possess capabilities for voice

recognition and identification, comparative analysis of video content, and cryptanalysis. The skills,

knowledge, and equipment for specialized processing are available at intelligence community organizations

through the communications architecture. Units can request that the following bulleted organizations use

specialized techniques and procedures to extract additional information from the collected audio and video

information. Application of specialized processing techniques and procedures may require the classification

of the processed information and restriction of its dissemination:

Defense Intelligence Agency.

National Ground Intelligence Center.

National Security Agency.

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Joint document exploitation centers (JDECs).

National Media Exploitation Center.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Other U.S. intelligence community or multinational organizations.

3-5. DOMEX processing also includes the recovery of damaged documents, the decryption of encrypted

documents, the translation of documents into English, and the extraction of documents from electronic

media, such as the downloading of files from a computer disk or hard drive. The need for document

recovery, translation, and other specialized processing frequently limits the amount of processing that

occurs without the assistance of a specially trained DOMEX team, other exploitation team, or outside

processing sites, such as a JDEC or combined media processing center.

INVENTORY AND LOG PROCEDURES

3-6. Accountability is the proper control, custody, and accounting of all captured materials through the

use of various custody documents. Strict accountability must be maintained by each element, echelon, or

activity that collects, handles, processes, or evacuates captured materials and their accompanying products.

They maintain accountability via the following inventory and logging procedures:

Log captured materials in and out using the captured materials log.

Inventory captured materials.

Initiate trace actions, if necessary.

SEGREGATION

3-7. Captured materials arrive in a variety of states, ranging from completely intermingled in a worst-case

scenario to already having been inventoried, segregated, and subsegregated by location of capture or

association with a specific detainee. Normally, captured materials do not arrive as neatly separated batches

with the names of the individuals who possessed the captured materials or the site where the materials were

collected; receiving neatly separated batches is an inappropriate assumption.

3-8. Captured materials are kept separate by category and batch to ensure the integrity of their intelligence

potential and evidentiary value, to facilitate screening at each echelon, and to assist in the interviewing of

detainees. Grouping items collected from a site as a batch assists in preventing the compromise of site

exploitation where items are collected as part of a criminal investigation.

3-9. Segregation of captured materials is critical to mission success. Soldiers must do their utmost to

ensure that different batches of captured materials remain separated until they can be transferred. It is

incumbent that leaders stress the importance of collection, handling, and segregation of captured materials

during mission briefings for patrols and other tactical missions.

PHOTOGRAPHS OF INCOMING CAPTURED MATERIALS

3-10. Each batch of incoming captured materials is photographed in its arrival condition to help identify

each batch. Two series of photographs should be taken—one with the batch name and one sanitized of all

markings that indicate the materials were exploited by U.S. forces. Sanitized photographs of detainees’

personal captured materials can be of assistance during detainee questioning sessions. Photographing

captured materials should occur simultaneously with completing the captured materials log.

CAPTURED MATERIALS LOG

3-11. Maintaining accountability of captured materials is essential; therefore, the first task in processing

captured materials requires that they be inventoried and logged into a captured materials log. Before

undertaking any processing, handlers of captured materials must adhere to proper handling procedures.

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3-12. The captured materials log can be established locally. The format is in accordance with unit standing

operating procedures

(SOPs), but it should contain the following information

(in accordance with

FM 2-22.3) for each captured enemy document (CED) or captured enemy materiel (CEM):

A sequential file number to identify the order of entry into the log.

Date and time of receipt in date-time group format.

Serial number from the captured materials tag.

Identification number of the transmittal document accompanying the captured materials.

Designation of the unit that forwarded the captured materials.

Identification of the individual who received the captured materials.

Date, time, and location of capture (as listed on the captured materials tag).

Identification of the capturing unit (as listed on the captured materials tag).

Captured materials category (after screening).

Description of each CED or CEM, including the original language, number of pages, type of

CED or CEM (such as a map, computer disk, letter, or photograph), and the detainee

identification number for each CED or CEM, if available.

Destination and identification number of the outgoing transmittal.

Remarks:

Include action taken based on the type of CED or CEM and any other information that can

help the unit identify the CED or CEM.

Include any other information that can assist the unit in identifying the captured materials,

including processing codes. (Processing codes, established in accordance with unit SOPs,

denote all actions taken regarding the CEDs or CEM while at the element, including

intelligence reports, translations, reproductions, or return of the CEDs or CEM to the

associated detainees.)

3-13. The DOMEX team or processing site inventories incoming captured materials and adds them to the

site’s captured materials log. An accurate yet rapid inventory of captured materials is essential since

understanding the details of the capture of documents and materiel helps produce accurate reporting and

analytical products. Therefore, all units involved in collecting, transporting, and processing captured

materials must maintain accurate records and accountability of all captured materials via the log.

3-14. Inventorying consists of comparing the captured materials to what is written on the tags and

accompanying transmittal sheets. This comparison identifies—

Transmittal sheets listing captured materials that are missing.

Captured materials not listed on accompanying transmittal sheets.

Captured materials tags not attached to captured materials.

TRACE ACTIONS

3-15. The DOMEX team or processing site initiates trace actions on all missing captured materials,

missing tags, and information missing from the captured materials tags. The site can complete this

corrective action swiftly if the DOMEX team or capturing unit completed DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner

of War Capture Tag), part C correctly and retained its document transmittal sheets, intelligence reports, and

digital images. If necessary, the trace action continues to the capturing unit and other elements that handled

the materials. If a captured materials tag is unavailable from elements that have previously handled or

transported the materials, or if the missing information and documents are unrecoverable, then the

processing site completes the captured materials tag using available information and annotates the captured

materials in the captured materials log. Attempts to obtain missing captured materials are critical because

of the information they might contain.

3-16. When a batch of captured materials is received without a transmittal sheet, the receiving element

contacts the forwarding unit and obtains a list of the captured materials serial numbers, if available. The

receiving element records all trace actions in its journal.

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3-17. The DOMEX team or processing site uses the captured materials tags, transmittal sheets, and results

of the inventory to create and maintain a log of all captured materials. The log is a record of what the unit

knows about the captured materials. In addition to information about the materials, the log also records all

actions taken of the captured materials at the site, including intelligence reports, transcripts, translations,

reproductions, and final disposition of the captured materials.

Sign-Out Ledger

3-18. When other elements, such as analysts, interrogators, counterintelligence

(CI) agents require

temporary use of captured materials, they must use DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document)

(see figure

2-5, page 2-11), if available, or locally produced captured materials sign-out ledger for

accountability. The captured materials sign-out ledger has no precise format; it is based on unit SOPs. The

captured materials sign-out ledger should include at a minimum—

Harmony numbers assigned to captured materials, if applicable.

Serial numbers of the captured materials, if applicable.

Name, rank, and unit of assignment of individual releasing property.

Name, rank, and unit of assignment of individual accepting documents.

Date and time the captured materials are signed out.

Date and time the captured materials are signed back in.

3-19. All products generated during the exploitation process should be archived in a manner that allows

them to be easily accessed. Archived products may include inventories of captured materials, digital

photographs of captured materials, spreadsheets containing contact information, batch reports, and

DD Form 2745, part B. (See figure 2-3, page 2-6.)

Military Police Accountability Procedures

3-20. When DOMEX teams or processing site personnel are co-located with detainee holding or detention

facilities, military police (MP) personnel maintain administrative control of detainees and their possessions,

including captured materials. In such cases, DOMEX teams or processing sites must coordinate with the

MPs to temporarily sign out source-associated CEDs for digitization. Once digitized, the DOMEX team or

processing site personnel return the original CEDs and related products and use the copies for processing

and exploitation or for use during an interrogation.

3-21. MPs also maintain a detainee information database that can be used to track detainees and their

associated captured materials. MPs use the Detainee Reporting System during in processing at internment

facilities. The system records data for detainee processing and tracking and is intended to interact with the

biometrics automated toolset system to avoid duplication of effort.

SCREENING CAPTURED MATERIALS

3-22. Screening captured materials is the rapid but systematic evaluation of CEDs or CEM to determine

which contain priority information. Screening captured materials is a key step in the DOMEX process

workflow; essentially, it is the hub for determining the exploitation priority and procedures for CEDs and

CEM.

3-23. Screening involves—

Reviewing and categorizing all captured materials.

Prioritizing captured materials for translation and exploitation.

Identifying captured materials requiring special handling and immediate evacuation to

specialized units for exploitation.

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3-24. Screening captured materials requires senior, experienced individuals who are—

Well-versed in the target language and collection requirements.

Capable of identifying time-sensitive information of national intelligence significance.

Capable of making rapid decisions based on minimal information.

3-25. Screening positions are normally filled by all-source analysts accompanied by linguists with the

requisite language capabilities. At higher echelons where time and resources are more readily available,

screening can be accomplished by most MI professionals whose experience and training enable them to

identify pieces of information that contribute to the entire intelligence picture. The number of screeners

required depends on the CED or CEM flow, which may range from only a few per day at lower echelons to

thousands a day at a theater-level activity.

3-26. During screening, the DOMEX team or processing site personnel systematically evaluate the

captured materials and their tags to identify reportable information and determine the priority of processing.

This screening may change the preliminary captured materials category that was assigned during the initial

evaluation of the CEDs and CEM. The DOMEX team or processing site also reports any unreported time-

sensitive information in spot report or intelligence information report format.

3-27. Captured materials can be screened using a qualified linguist or language translation tool with

keyword identification capability. (See chapter 7.) Screening of captured materials does not require the full

translation of a CED or CEM, but it does require sufficient translation to determine the significance of the

captured materials. A nonlinguist may be able to perform a preliminary screening based on a CED’s format

or CEM configurations and the circumstances of capture, such as the location where the captured materials

were found.

CATEGORIZING CAPTURED MATERIALS

3-28. As personnel screen captured materials, they assign or reassign one of the four captured materials

categories listed in table 2-1, page 2-15. Screeners at higher echelons can change the category of the

captured materials to more accurately reflect the requirements at that level. The category determines the

priority for processing, exploitation, reporting, and dissemination. Screening of captured materials requires

that the DOMEX team or processing site personnel remain abreast of the current commander’s critical

information requirements, collection requirements, the current friendly and enemy situation, the relevant

threat information, and the planned operations.

IDENTIFY SPECIFIC LIMITING CRITERIA CAPTURED MATERIALS

3-29. Specific limiting criteria (SLC) captured materials are of a cryptologic, counterterrorist, or CI nature

that could endanger ongoing operations and sensitive sources or methods, if compromised. Items

containing SLC information must be handled as Secret and evacuated immediately to the nearest CI

activity.

3-30. Items containing the following types of data should be designated SLC:

U.S. names (people, places, cities).

U.S. companies.

U.S. interests.

U.S. operatives or code names.

Documents containing U.S. classifications.

3-31. Items containing possible SLC data include—

Information that could cause risk to planned operations.

Evidence of espionage or CI operations.

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Information that identifies sources or their methods.

Information on illegal or inappropriate materials, such as counterfeiting, pornography, or other

like items.

3-32. Executive Order 12333 (EO 12333) addresses the powers and responsibilities of U.S. intelligence

agencies. EO 12333, paragraph 2.3, states that agencies within the intelligence community are authorized to

collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning U.S. persons only in accordance with procedures

established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General.

3-33. AR 381-10 defines U.S. person as a U.S. citizen; an alien known by the intelligence component to be

a permanent resident alien; an unincorporated association substantially composed of U.S. citizens or

permanent resident aliens; a corporation incorporated in the United States that is not directed or controlled

by a foreign government. A corporation or a subsidiary incorporated abroad is not a U.S. person even if

partially or wholly owned by a corporation incorporated in the United States.

Note. Captured materials containing or suspected of containing SLC information should not be

uploaded into the National Harmony Database by exploitation teams. Only CI elements are

qualified to handle SLC information. CI representatives can help if there is doubt or question

about a particular CED’s or CEM’s SLC qualification.

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR SECRET CAPTURED MATERIALS

3-34. Classified captured materials must be limited to personnel with knowledge of the particular Secret

captured materials and authorization to access them. Therefore, security requirements include ensuring—

Personnel handling Secret captured materials—

Have the appropriate security level.

Do not pose a security risk to the United States. This is particularly important when dealing

with non-U.S. translators. (At higher echelons, dealing with non-U.S. translators normally

requires a designated CI team to perform recurring personnel security evaluations.)

Secret captured materials are marked in accordance with AR 380-5 and proper security measures

are in place to prevent the compromise of information.

3-35. Recovered captured materials of U.S. origin should be handled in accordance with their original U.S.

classification unless directed otherwise by the commander.

GROUPING AND SEGREGATING CAPTURED MATERIALS

3-36. During screening, captured materials are grouped according to their assigned screening category. The

DOMEX team or processing site personnel must ensure captured materials are not separated from their

associated groups. These large groupings can be broken down into smaller groups or batches. Each of these

smaller groupings may consist of captured materials—

Captured by the same unit.

Captured in the same location.

Captured on the same day at the same time.

Received at the DOMEX element at the same time.

RECOVER

3-37. At larger processing sites, the recover task involves the recovery CEDs from captured materials.

Recover includes—

Cleaning soiled documents (return to former state).

Reassembling document fragments (return to right position).

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Decrypting coded documents (decode).

Extracting information from electronic devices or storage media (retrieve useful information).

3-38. Extracting information from electronic devices and storage media is performed by specially trained

media exploitation personnel on a DOMEX team or media technicians at a JDEC or other site with

specialized training, equipment, and software. DOMEX processing personnel at the JDEC work with

TECHINT personnel to process electronic devices or storage media. In addition to special resources,

processing at a fixed processing site prevents the introduction of corrupt and malicious software and other

forms of computer attack from entering U.S. communications and processing networks.

DIGITIZE

3-39. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel scan or photograph the captured materials to create a

digital record that they can then use for processing and analysis. Digitization also enables them to use

machine language translation (MLT) tools to screen CEDs for keywords, names, and phrases through a

rough translation of a CED. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel must annotate or otherwise

include all the information from the captured materials tag with the digitized CEDs to ensure their

accountability and traceability. Finally, digitization enables the dissemination of the CEDs into the National

Harmony Database, where other personnel, such as those in the Army Reserve Language Support Program

(RLSP) or at the Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center, can transcribe and translate the CEDs.

TRANSCRIBE

3-40. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel transcribe audio and video recordings into text

format. A transcript is a verbatim, native language rendering of the information in the audio or video

recording. For processing of non-English recordings, transcription is extremely important. The transcriber

uses native font or transliteration to represent the spoken language in the recording. The transcript,

particularly of video files, includes descriptions of the activity, setting, and conditions that the transcriber

hears in the audio and observes in the video. To ensure consistency and quality, the processing team applies

a standard process to translate spoken and written information into English (such as using transliteration

guides). Once completed, language-qualified analysts or other specialists use the transcript to produce

intelligence and update technical information. If required, the DOMEX team or processing site personnel

translate the transcript into English for nonlanguage-qualified analysts and other users.

TRANSLATE

3-41. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel translate CEDs and transcripts into English-language

text format, if able. As an integral part of the DOMEX processing phase, the translation of information

from the target language to English requires linguists who are qualified in both the target language and

English. They must possess target knowledge commensurate with the target population of the information

and have the appropriate clearance level. These skills and knowledge are important because a translation,

unlike a transcript, is normally not a simple word-for-word interpretation but an approximation of the literal

and implied meaning of the spoken or written language. To ensure consistency and quality, linguists use

online dictionaries, gazetteers, and working aids to improve the translation.

3-42. At lower echelons, translators require a more general knowledge; the same translator may perform all

functions—translate CEDs and transcripts, extract the pertinent information, and report that information. At

higher echelons, translators require a more specific knowledge; therefore, they often perform these

functions separately. Higher echelon activities, such as the theater document repository, group their

translation efforts by subject area. For example, all medical-related captured materials are grouped and

translated together.

3-43. All-source analysts use translations accomplished by qualified linguists or signals intelligence

analysts, human intelligence collectors, and some CI agents with the requisite language capability. At

higher echelons, where in-depth and precise translations are required, translations require the availability of

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military or civilian full-time linguists. At these echelons, military linguists typically oversee translation

operations, which contribute to the warfighter through virtual translation of CEDs via RLSP. Civilian

linguists have varying degrees of access and ability.

3-44. It is important for consumers to acknowledge that translations are not CEDs; rather, they are

subjective documents that are only as reliable as their translators. To be reliable, a translation requires input

from consultants on technical matters, operational matters, and technical language issues, as well as from

social, cultural, and historical experts.

TRANSLATION FORMATS

3-45. When CEDs and transcripts are selected for exploitation, linguists translate them into one of four

recognized translation formats:

Full translation.

Extract translation.

Summary translation.

Gist.

Full Translation

3-46. The translation of an entire document or transcript is a full translation. This translation format

requires intensive time and manpower, especially for lengthy or highly technical CEDs. Normally, only a

DOMEX processing site at theater or national level is adequately resourced to enable full translations,

which are relevant only when the value of, technical complexity, or political sensitivity of the CEDs

requires a full translation.

Extract Translation

3-47. An extract translation is a more precise translation of a specified portion of a CED or transcript.

Analysts request only what they need. Rarely does an entire document contain valuable information. Often

correspondence contains only one or two paragraphs of intelligence information that answers the collection

requirements. Extract translations are frequently performed before full translations to assess the value of a

CED’s parts before resources are committed to its full translation.

Summary Translation

3-48. A summary translation entails reading the entire CED or transcript. The linguist then summarizes the

main points of information instead of rendering an extract or full translation. Therefore, a summary

translation may be performed as part of the document screening process.

3-49. A summary translation is normally in writing, but a linguist may orally present the translated

information, especially at the tactical level. A summary translation requires a translator with extensive

analytical abilities. The translator must balance the need for complete exploitation of the CED against time

available in combat operations.

3-50. Translators with limited working knowledge in their translating languages may use a summary

translation. For instance, a Russian linguist may be unable to accurately deliver a full translation of a

Bulgarian-language document; however, the linguist may almost certainly render a usable summary of its

content.

Gist

3-51. A gist is the function of deriving abstracts or general meanings from a CED or transcript without

offering a verbatim or precise translation. In other words, the gist of a document is not a formal translation;

rather, it is a rough outline of the document’s meaning or topic. At the tactical level, a gist helps to evaluate

a document’s intelligence potential and identify it for further exploitation.

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RESERVE LANGUAGE SUPPORT PROGRAM

3-52. Managed by the 300th MI Brigade, RLSP provides real-time language training opportunities to

Soldiers to maintain their language skills during unit-training periods or cycles while providing intelligence

to tactical commanders on the ground as well as to national-level consumers.

3-53. The RLSP mission is to—

Provide translation support to Army and joint organizations.

Provide sanctuary linguist support to the warfighter.

Serve as a single point of contact for Reserve Component translation services.

Ensure that all translated documents are accounted for, accurately translated, and placed in the

correct databases, such as the National Harmony Database and the Worldwide Basic Information

Library.

3-54. To perform its mission, RLSP has more than 800 participating linguists from the Regular Army,

Reserve Components, and the other Services. The RLSP uses the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and

AKO-S (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET]) for continuous—

Access to the documents at the AKO Collaboration Center.

Global-availability access for participating linguists.

Online translation tools, training aids, or links to online aids available in most languages.

3-55. RLSP assists in the translation of documents in languages that are not typical for a particular theater

of operations, for example, a Korean document discovered in Iraq. RLSP has access to the following

languages: Albanian, Arabic, Armenian, Bengali, Bulgarian, Chinese, Czech, Danish, Dari, Dutch, French,

German, Greek, Hebrew, Hungarian, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Norwegian, Pashto, Persian

Farsi, Portuguese, Russian, Romanian, Slovenian, Spanish, Serbo-Croatian, Swedish, Tagalog, Thai,

Turkish, Ukrainian, Urdu, and Vietnamese.

MACHINE LANGUAGE TRANSLATION TOOLS

3-56. Understanding oral and written communication in a foreign language is central to effective

intelligence collection operations. The optimal solution is having a trained collector of native proficiency

who is well versed in the local situation and U.S. collection requirements, and has the requisite security

clearance and capability to translate and report accurately in English. These requirements are met through a

combination of MI linguists, contractors, native speakers within the Department of Defense system, and

locally hired civilian linguists.

3-57. Difficulties arise if the proficiency levels of MI linguists are not up to mission requirements, if the

linguists do not possess the proper language for the theater of operations, or if the native linguist does not

have a strong command of English. Using locally hired linguists raises security issues. An increasingly

viable solution to meet some of these requirements is MLT—the use of computer software to translate text

or speech from one natural language to another. MLT uses optical character recognition technology, a

visual recognition process that converts printed or written text into an electronic character-based file.

3-58. Foreign language collaboration tools employed during recent military operations have had a major

operational impact. The Army DOMEX program leveraged the power of MLT tools and human translators

to provide access to the large volumes of information found in thousands of captured materials. Since this

information is analyzed and shared, it contributes to enhanced force protection, follow-on tactical

operations, and the capture of high-value individuals.

DEPLOYABLE HARMONY DOMEX TOOLS

3-59. The five basic Harmony tools used to support the DOMEX community are the Deployable Harmony

DOMEX Suite (DHDS), the DHDS-Collection Tool, DHDS-Template, Theater Exploitation Database, and

the Dirty-to-Clean Conversion Tool. See table 3-1, page 3-10, for a description of each Harmony tool.

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Table 3-1. Deployable Harmony DOMEX tools

Deployable Harmony DOMEX Suite (DHDS)

DHDS, deployable at strategic centers and echelons above division, is an integrated set of tools used for

foreign language exploitation and identification of documents of interest. These documents are then sent

to linguists for full translation. DHDS uses advanced technology to improve the ability to input, organize,

screen, translate, and analyze captured information in virtually all formats and many languages. This

information can then be uploaded via secure closed networks to national repositories, such as the

National Harmony Database. DHDS component tools include—

• Document scanning.

• Machine translation.

• Optical character recognition.

• Information retrieval.

• Encoding format converter.

Deployable Harmony DOMEX Suite-Collection Tool (DHDS-CT)

DHDS-CT, deployable at brigade and division levels, is a highly flexible document exploitation system,

customizable to suit the user’s environment. Small or large groups can use the system to collect and

exploit data from all types of materials, including documents, computer files, and publications. DHDS-CT

provides ease-of-use and data-collection enhanced management to support tactical, operational, and

strategic DOMEX missions, as well as uploads to the National Harmony Database. Design features

include—

• User interface employing menu-based function selection.

• Enhanced search capabilities.

• Common-user desktop page.

Deployable Harmony DOMEX Suite-Template (DHDS-T)

DHDS-T, deployable with individual translators and units that feed one of the DHDS systems, is used to

generate metadata that supports inputting, translating, indexing, and searching foreign documents in the

National Harmony Database, as well as DOMEX activities and systems ranging from theater tactical to

national strategic applications. DHDS-T provides a means of collecting and organizing foreign documents

and translations and of associating people and other broad national intelligence, security, and law

enforcement activities.

Theater Exploitation Database (TED)

TED is a Web gateway interface on the DHDS system that allows for worldwide access to a theater-

specific DOMEX repository on a single network. TED provides general search engines to perform general

keyword searches or selects items in fields of interest.

Dirty-to-Clean (D2C) Conversion Tool

D2C is designed to exploit potentially dirty media or media containing malicious software by converting

and transferring the data in a safe format. D2C uses advanced technology to extract the data and render

it in a format devoid of active viruses, Trojan horses, logic bombs, or malicious codes. The data can then

be transferred to DHDS applications for further exploitation and mass screening and processing using

machine translation tools.

3-60. Harmony Version 3 is a prototype not yet in field use. This prototype Harmony interface, with Oracle

text search functionality, is designed to provide access to Harmony metadata and associated files for novice

and advanced users. Harmony Version

3 may be accessed on Joint Worldwide Intelligence

Communications System (JWICS) and SIPRNET from the Harmony home page.

REVIEW

3-61. Technically proficient linguists review each transcription and translation to ensure consistency with

reporting standards and for quality control of the translation. A U.S. Government linguist should review all

information that a non-U.S. linguist processes. Exceptions include operations involving long-term

coalitions and U.S. contractors with the requisite skills and the command’s confidence. Each transcript and

translation should undergo two levels of review—quality control and quality assurance.

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QUALITY CONTROL

3-62. A quality control linguist reviews a transcript or translation report for accuracy and to ensure it

clearly expresses the meaning of the original document. The quality control linguist also ensures the report

is complete, free of bias, and in accordance with reporting standards. The linguist returns the report to the

DOMEX team or processing site personnel for corrections or personally adds missed content, corrects

minor translation errors, and fixes minor format errors. Upon the completion of the quality control review,

the translation report is available for analysis.

QUALITY ASSURANCE

3-63. A quality assurance linguist reviews a transcript or translation report to ensure it contains all required

information and that the translation reads naturally in English. Once reviewed, the quality assurance

linguist saves the completed transcript or translation report to the local database. If authorized, a quality

assurance linguist disseminates the report to external databases, such as the World Basic Information

Library, or to the National Harmony Database, which links the report to the original CED.

SECTION II - PROCESS CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS FOR UPLOAD

INTO THE NATIONAL HARMONY DATABASE

3-64. The National Harmony Database is the national intelligence database for foreign DOMEX and

translations management. It is the single, comprehensive bibliographic reference for all available primary

source foreign-technical and military documents and their translations. The National Harmony Database

supports tactical through strategic users and is available to all units with access to the collateral classified

SIPRNET, JWICS, or StoneGhost networks. Users do not need to establish a separate account for access to

the National Harmony Database.

3-65. The National Harmony Database includes digitized versions of hardcopy documents and clean

versions of media pulled from battlefields, and raids supporting the ongoing operations, as well as from

items of interest acquired through different intelligence community foreign materiel programs. National

Harmony Database customers include warfighters deployed throughout the various theaters of operations

and analysts throughout the intelligence community. The National Harmony Database is a classified

database.

HARMONY NUMBERS

3-66. Valid Harmony numbers should be assigned to category A and B CEDs as soon as the screening

process is complete. The Harmony number is the report number for a DOMEX or media exploitation

report. It may apply to all the CEDs in a batch or to an entire stack of compact disks deemed as reportable.

The Harmony number comprises three parts: unit identifier prefix, the year, and a sequential report number.

Figure 3-2 exemplifies a Harmony number and an explanation of its format.

Harmony number: MNFZ-2007-M12345

Harmony number parts

Rationale

MNF

Multinational Force

Each DOMEX team or activity will have a unique National

Unit identifier

Harmony Database prefix to identify the unit conducting the

prefix

DOMEX Main

exploitation.

Year

2007

A report identifier “M” precedes the sequential report

Sequential report

12, 345th MEDEX

M12345

number when media is involved. DOMEX reports have no

number

Report of 2007

report identifier.

Figure 3-2. Harmony number format

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3-67. Determining valid Harmony numbers requires close coordination with higher echelons. To prevent

assigning numbers that are not compatible with the National Harmony Database, coordinate with the corps

DOMEX support element or JDEC to establish the appropriate naming convention.

BATCH NAME

3-68. In order to process CEDs within a given batch, a unique batch name must be established during CED

screening and disseminated to all elements that have a role in the custody and exploitation process or who

are consumers of the products produced by the brigade or above DOMEX team. The batch identifying

criteria are then referenced when tracking CEDs. Batch naming conventions should facilitate identifying

property belonging to specific individuals or designating property within the batch discovered in specific

locations.

3-69. Batch naming conventions are in accordance with unit SOPs. Regardless of the unit, within a batch

name the following should be incorporated:

Date of capture.

Mission or target name.

Detainee number, if applicable.

Location of capture.

3-70. The National Harmony Database requires the input of a batch name to display the batch

circumstances of capture. If a batch name is not assigned, the batch circumstances of capture will not be

available to the intelligence community.

BATCH IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

3-71. To facilitate access to CEDs and their translations in the National Harmony Database, CEDs are

processed for upload into the database. This process entails assigning CEDs within a batch a unique

identifier. Unit SOPs direct how the batch identification number is assigned, using Julian date and time

group. Higher echelons can provide assistance in developing batch identification conventions.

3-72. A sample batch identification number should minimally include identification of the collection

station, the year of capture, Julian date of capture, and batch serial number (unique sequential number

beginning with 01), for example, batch identification number MZ7155-212:

MZ—DOMEX (collection station).

7—2007 (year).

155—Julian date (4 June).

212—212th batch received by this collection station.

BATCH REPORT

3-73. The batch report is one method of disseminating an analytical summary of CEDs related to a

particular batch to the tactical commander to capitalize on information related to follow-on operations. The

precise format for a batch report is in accordance with unit SOPs, but it should minimally contain—

Harmony number.

Batch name.

Total batch contents.

Exploitation instructions.

DOMEX technician name and rank.

Descriptive title of CED.

Type of CED.

U.S. classification, if applicable.

Primary language.

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Date of exploitation.

Capture date.

Capture location.

Capturing unit.

Circumstances of capture.

Nonexploited CEDs in the batch not containing priority intelligence requirement-reportable

information.

Report summary (description of the contents of each CED in the batch).

WORKFLOW BATCH INFORMATION SHEET

3-74. A workflow batch information sheet is created when groups or batches of CEDs are in the processing

phase to facilitate the process and to assist in the creation of National Harmony Database records. Once

completed, a workflow batch information sheet uses the Julian date to track capturing units, detainees,

equipment, and any documents that may be needed to assist in the briefing and debriefing of the capturing

units.

MEDIA EXPLOITATION REPORTS

3-75. The media exploitation technician of the DOMEX support team at brigade or of a media-processing

site is responsible for screening and exploiting all analog and digital media that arrive in a batch of CEDs

and for meeting their reporting requirements.

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Analysis and Production Phase

As part of a multidiscipline intelligence effort, the use and integration of intelligence

derived from document and media exploitation (DOMEX) operations ensure that

decisionmakers have the benefit of all sources of available information. DOMEX-

derived information may provide information on threat capabilities, limitations, and

intentions that are crucial for commanders to conduct military operations. During

tactical operations, DOMEX may provide time-sensitive information of immediate

tactical value to facilitate follow-on tactical operations.

PRODUCING INTELLIGENCE

4-1. Intelligence personnel apply intelligence analysis techniques and procedures to extract, understand,

and report information of intelligence value from collected and processed information. An initial analysis

occurs at or near the point of collection and processing. This initial analysis focuses primarily on

identifying facts, evaluating a source’s reliability, and evaluating a single source’s information for accuracy.

Subsequent analysis and intelligence production use information from multiple information sources. At

each point in the transformation of information into intelligence, analysts at each echelon assess, extract,

analyze, and report information and intelligence to their supported command in response to known or

anticipated intelligence requirements.

4-2. At brigade and above, processing and producing intelligence requires analysts to perform the tasks

listed in figure 4-1.

Figure 4-1. Analysis and production phase

IDENTIFY AND EXTRACT REPORTABLE INFORMATION

4-3. A quick assessment of a document (performed during the screening and categorizing tasks of the

DOMEX process) identifies reportable information, such as immediate threats, and extracts information of

immediate tactical value. Documents are assessed on their relevance to the commander’s critical

information requirements. Documents that satisfy collection requirements are evaluated for time sensitivity

and credibility. Once identified, time-sensitive information is immediately disseminated before further

processing. Document assessment at the tactical level is referred to as tactical or hasty exploitation.

4-4. An assessment performed at higher echelons often involves extensive research, which can be difficult

because of the increased volume of available information. Regardless of the level, personnel who assess

information must relate their efforts to the unit’s mission to avoid wasted time and effort and to identify any

reportable information.

4-5. Captured enemy documents (CEDs) can be a valuable source of information—oftentimes providing

more information than a person being questioned. These documents can have significant intelligence value

either to the capturing unit, adjacent units, or at higher echelons. CEDs may also provide evidence for use

during legal proceedings against suspected criminals.

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4-6. CEDs can provide crucial information related to answering commander’s critical information

requirements. They are analyzed together with other pieces of information to gain an understanding of an

overall situation. CEDs may potentially provide information on the adversary’s intentions and planning

(including deception), leadership, dispositions, tactics, communications, logistics, morale, intelligence

requirements and assessments, propaganda efforts, and funding. Human intelligence collectors often use

CEDs when preparing to screen and interrogate detainees.

4-7. Information that may be derived from a CED during assessment includes but is not limited to—

Composition (hierarchy, type of unit).

Disposition (location—past, current, anticipated).

Tactics (intent, propaganda, modus operandi).

Training and unit history (individual, unit, source of training).

Logistics (food, transportation, fuel).

Operational effectiveness (strength, goals, morale, equipment).

Electronic technical data or communications (emitter types, frequencies, Internet use).

Intelligence (surveillance, countersurveillance, deception).

Recruitment (local, national, regional, use of coercion).

Support (financial, media, sources).

Reach (databases, assets, connectivity, and architecture).

National agencies (loyalties, leadership, capabilities).

Law enforcement agencies (relationship with military, loyalties, capabilities).

International agencies and nongovernmental organizations (loyalties, agenda, leadership).

Personality (key leaders, education level, idiosyncrasies).

Other threats (natural diseases, biohazards, radiological, chemical hazards).

EVALUATE SOURCE RELIABILITY

4-8. Analysts evaluate the reliability of a source providing information based on previous reporting,

collection, and processing of DOMEX team comments. Table 4-1 lists source reliability ratings.

Table 4-1. Source reliability ratings

No doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of

Reliable

complete reliability

Usually

Minor doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of

reliable

valid information most of the time

Doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency, but has provided valid

Fairly reliable

information in the past

Not usually

Significant doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency, but has

reliable

provided valid information in the past

Lacking authenticity, trustworthiness, and competency; history of invalid

Unreliable

information

Cannot be

No basis exists for evaluating the reliability of the source

judged

4-9. If a source has not provided documents in the past, then the DOMEX team gives the source an “F”

reliability rating. An F rating does not necessarily mean the source is unreliable, but that the DOMEX team

has no previous experience with the source to determine the source’s reliability. For a CED discovered on

the battlefield or in the possession of a detainee, the type and origin of the document may carry more

weight in determining reliability than the source of the document itself. For example, a handwritten note

with apparent contact information may be judged as “fairly reliable” when considered with other factors

such as the circumstances of capture, location, and the condition of the document.

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4-10. If a document is extracted from an enemy computer, then the computer may be the source and the

analytical process may form the following questions:

Who had access to the computer?

Did high- and low-level fighters have computer access?

If a low-level fighter created the document, did that fighter have access that supports the

information?

4-11. If the source of a document is an open source, such as a local newspaper, it must be determined

whether the source is objective or is a known platform for the enemy—one that only prints what supports

the enemy and the enemy’s war efforts. Determining source reliability can be easy or difficult; regardless,

as new information becomes available, continuous analysis is necessary.

4-12. Since a CED is usually for an enemy’s use, CEDs are usually truthful and accurate. In some cases,

falsified documents have fallen into enemy hands as a means of deception, but these cases are not common.

Normal policy dictates not relying on single-source information. Following this policy prevents this type of

deception from being effective.

4-13. A CED can provide a portion of a larger body of information. Each CED, much like a piece of a

puzzle, contributes to the whole. In addition to tactical intelligence, technical data and political indicators

of importance to strategic- and national-level agencies can be extracted from CEDs. CEDs are often time-

sensitive; therefore, they must be quickly screened for possible exploitation.

4-14. At times, a friendly source provides a document with information critical to an ongoing operation. In

these cases, the friendly source’s identity should remain anonymous; otherwise, the friendly source’s life

may be endangered. A friendly source of information could be an individual who walks to a friendly base

and provides written or verbal information or an individual who works with a human intelligence collection

team. Regardless of the type of friendly source, procedures should be in place to protect information about

any friendly source.

EVALUATE INFORMATION ACCURACY

4-15. In addition to evaluating the reliability of a source of information, the DOMEX team also evaluates

the accuracy of the information based on previous reports from that source and information from other

sources. Table 4-2 lists information accuracy ratings.

Table 4-2. Information accuracy ratings

Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; consistent with other

Confirmed

information on the subject

Probably true

Not confirmed; logical in itself; consistent with other information on the subject

Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; agrees with some other information

Possibly true

on the subject

Doubtfully true

Not confirmed; possible but not logical; no other information on the subject

Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicted by other information on the

Improbable

subject

Cannot be

No basis exists for evaluating the validity of the information

judged

4-16. If information is new, the DOMEX team gives the information a “6” information accuracy rating. A

six rating does not necessarily mean the information is inaccurate, but that the DOMEX team has no means

of verifying the information. Information accuracy determination is more systematic than reliable. For

example, if a document references an attack, did the attack unfold as depicted in the document? If yes, then

one can determine the document information to be accurate. This determination is important because it may

substantiate the assumption that the information a detainee reveals is also accurate. Information accuracy

and reliability is critical because it determines if the information can be used by the warfighter. It is a

careful and deliberate process that takes thoughtful analysis.

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Chapter 4

ANALYZE INFORMATION

4-17. DOMEX team analysts evaluate processed information that meets the reporting criteria. Analysts

must readily identify activity indicators, pieces of information that could contribute to answering

requirements. The analysis of the processed information varies based on the DOMEX team’s mission,

capabilities, and time available. At a minimum, the team identifies and reports the basic facts (who, what,

when, where, why, and how) from the information based on information requirements. If the analysts have

the time, target knowledge, and situational awareness, then they can use analysis techniques and procedures

to reach conclusions about the meaning of the information. The analyst can solve problems through

deductive and inductive reasoning. (See TC 2-33.4.)

4-18. Analysis, in terms of DOMEX, typically means comparing screening forms and gist, summary,

partial, and full translations against collection requirements to identify information of intelligence value.

Analysis includes factoring in the current situation; collection requirements; past, present, and future

operations; and any information that may help focus the requirements.

USE ANALYTICAL TOOLS

4-19. Intelligence analysts use many tools to assist them in determining enemy intentions and future

actions. (See TC 2-33.4.) These tools include but are not limited to—

Incident overlays.

Pattern analysis plotting charts.

Time event charts.

Association and activities matrices.

Link diagrams.

INCIDENT OVERLAY

4-20. An incident overlay provides historical, cumulative information on trends and patterns of opposition

or enemy activity. Properly maintained, an incident overlay’s entries enable the intelligence analyst to make

judgments about—

The nature and location of opposition or enemy targets.

The relative intensity of opposition interest in specific areas.

Adversary control over the population.

Adversary support from the population.

Potential opposition areas or enemy operations.

4-21. While it is useful to gauge spatial patterns, the incident overlay can also provide a clear, visual

representation of chronological patterns.

PATTERN ANALYSIS PLOTTING SHEET

4-22. The pattern analysis plotting sheet shows patterns in time. It helps the analyst identify when the

enemy force tends to conduct specific types of activities. By analyzing the patterns, the intelligence staff

can better anticipate upcoming attacks and likely targets. The intelligence staff may possibly draw

conclusions about the enemy force’s vulnerabilities and capabilities.

TIME EVENT CHART

4-23. The time event chart serves as a chronological record of an individual’s or group’s activities designed

to store and display large amounts of information. It is a tool that helps reverse-engineer incidents to

determine threat operating patterns. For example, a time event chart can show that an improvised explosive

device activity occurs every day between 0100 to 0400 hours. When these indicators occur, the analyst can

reverse-engineer the sequence to estimate when the next likely incident may occur.

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Analysis and Production Phase

ASSOCIATION MATRIX

4-24. An association matrix depicts contact between individuals. When using this tool, analysts cross-

reference the names of individuals and mark known or suspected associations in a cross-linked square. The

association matrix is most effective when used to understand associations between individuals and

subsequently insurgent and terrorist groups.

ACTIVITIES MATRIX

4-25. An activities matrix only depicts relationships between individuals and activities. For example,

whereas an association matrix depicts the association between two individuals, the activities matrix depicts

that they are engaged in particular activities.

LINK DIAGRAM

4-26. Link diagrams combine the information in association and activities matrices into a single graphic. It

depicts how individuals and functional groupings of individuals are connected. For example, if an analyst

does not know the connection between the operational aspects of an insurgency and its sustainment or

support elements, a properly developed link diagram clarifies this connection. The link diagram also allows

an analyst to determine which individuals are critical to the functioning of the organization, thus allowing

development of high-payoff targets for targeting consistent with rules of engagement.

ASSESS REPORTING

4-27. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel continuously assess reporting to ensure analytical

products are satisfying the specific information requirements and reporting guidance in the command’s

collection requirements. Ideally, the team’s efforts enable the anticipation of requirements and delivery of

information to the tactical commander in time to influence decisions and actions:

Evaluating reports. The DOMEX team screens reports for—

Timeliness, completeness, and accuracy.

Their relevance to the command’s collection requirements.

Integrating information. The DOMEX team uses the reported information to confirm or deny

information collected by other intelligence sources.

Providing feedback. After evaluating the reports, the DOMEX team provides feedback to the

processing teams on what to sustain or adjust in their processing, analysis, and reporting.

UPDATE DATABASES

4-28. After the analysis of CED batches, the National Harmony Database is updated with any new

information. Other databases containing standardized CED files are updated as well.

4-29. Without databases, information is difficult or impossible to retrieve quickly, especially under adverse

conditions. Databases support many complex analytical functions and requirements, including—

Mission deconfliction.

Requests for information.

Summary reports and assessment preparation.

Threat and friendly situation tracking.

Analysis and requirements management.

Targeting.

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4-30. Additionally, databases—

Support analytical tools, such as time event charts, association matrices, and link diagrams.

Require a designated systems administrator at each echelon to verify the metadata for accuracy

and completeness, which ensures a high degree of integrity. Without accurate metadata,

databases cannot be easily searched for their information.

Allow operators, managers, and analysts to—

Compartment (protect) source-sensitive, operational database segments, files, records, and

fields.

Create, update, and maintain databases from locally generated information.

Import complete or partial databases from larger or peer databases.

Export complete or partial databases to peer or larger databases.

Share data and databases between peers, subordinates, or higher echelons with the

appropriate access authorization.

Provide systematic processing and automated parsing using standardized forms in intelligence

operations that are automatically parsed into appropriate databases for information storing,

sharing, retrieval, and analysis.

Allow query functions for decisionmaking, as well as for operational and analytical support.

Provide analytical programs that are able to correlate data. This facilitates information retrieval

from any data repository.

Incorporate information retrieval functions, such as browsing, keyword searching, and similar

functions.

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Chapter 5

Reporting and Dissemination Phase

Information collected from captured enemy documents (CEDs) is normally reported

in accordance with unit standing operating procedures

(SOPs) and reporting

guidance. Reporting involves placing extracted information into a coherent, properly

formatted report to facilitate the commander’s situational understating.

COLLECTED INFORMATION

5-1. At brigade and above, reporting and disseminating information collected from CEDs requires

analysts to perform the tasks listed in figure 5-1.

Figure 5-1. Reporting and dissemination phase

REPORT INFORMATION

5-2. Document and media exploitation (DOMEX) teams and intelligence staffs are responsible for

reporting information derived from CEDs in a manner that ensures the information reaches not only the

next higher echelon but also any tactical commander affected by the information.

Note. DOMEX teams and intelligence staffs are responsible for pushing information back down

to the lowest echelons to ensure there is feedback to maneuver units on whether the CEDs were

used, reviewed, or contained actionable intelligence.

5-3. Intelligence reports are typically forwarded electronically or as otherwise directed by unit SOPs and

operational instructions. Normally an electronic or hardcopy file of each report is—

Maintained at the unit of origin.

Submitted through intelligence reporting channels.

Forwarded with evacuated documents to the next unit who receives the documents to prevent

redundant reporting.

Note. When a collector includes intelligence derived from CEDs in an intelligence report, the

report must reference all identification letters and numbers, including the Harmony numbers of

the CED concerned, to avoid false confirmation.

5-4. Report formats include (reporting through other formats is discouraged)—

Spot report (standardized report).

Intelligence information report (IIR) or tactical report.

Batch report.

Analytical summary.

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SPOT REPORT

5-5. Spot reports are used at each echelon to ensure the timely reporting of time-sensitive information.

Although the precise format for a spot report is in accordance with unit SOPs, the standard spot report is in

the size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) format. (See figure 2-2, page 2-4.) Each

element, activity, or echelon receiving CEDs is responsible for ascertaining whether the time-sensitive

information has been previously reported before a spot report is issued, which prevents redundant

reporting. A copy of each spot report is forwarded with the original CED as it is evacuated through

intelligence channels.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

5-6. The IIR is widely used by the intelligence community. At higher echelons, or as time allows,

intelligence information is reported using an IIR, which is typically generated at a DOMEX facility, such as

a joint document exploitation center (JDEC) or joint interrogation and debriefing center, and staffed with

report writers. Writing IIRs at the tactical level is not usually feasible since IIRs can be time-consuming

and often require extensive editing and coordination with the reports officer.

BATCH REPORT

5-7. Once a batch of CEDs has been exploited, it is normally prepared at brigade and above in accordance

with unit SOPs. Batch reports are the key to providing CED feedback to maneuver units after CEDs are

evacuated through intelligence channels. Batch reports should be prepared in a manner that effectively

communicates the relevance of the captured item. For example, DOMEX teams or processing site

personnel must appropriately label any photographs or sketches that require explanation or emphasis.

5-8. Tactical units should receive their DOMEX feedback, such as a batch report, within a reasonable

amount of time in accordance with unit SOPs. Tactical units requiring additional feedback on materiel

captured in their area of operations initiate requests for information through their intelligence staff. The

intelligence staff should be in possession of CED serial numbers and batch names to assist in locating this

information.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

5-9. Tactical commanders, analysts, interrogators, and capturing and adjacent units often require an

analytical summary of captured materials related to a particular batch of CEDs. The intelligence staff is

responsible for disseminating the analytical summary via the batch report, thus giving consumers the ability

to access the National Harmony Database record, including linked translation reports. The format for an

analytical summary is in accordance with unit SOPs. The summary must be disseminated quickly to

capitalize on information related to follow-on operations.

REPORTING GUIDELINES

5-10. DOMEX personnel should consider timely, relevant, and complete information when preparing,

submitting, and using intelligence reports.

Timely Information

5-11. DOMEX personnel must remember that timely reporting, especially of enemy activity, is critical.

They must report accurate information as quickly as possible and not delay reports for administrative

reasons, such as assuring the correct format.

Relevant Information

5-12. Reports should contain only relevant information—information that supports decisionmaking and the

conduct of operations. Limiting reports to essential information reduces the amount of time and effort

subordinates must spend on collecting, organizing, and transmitting reports. Also, DOMEX personnel

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should send only the parts or lines of a report that contain new information or changes. As in radio

communications, brevity reduces transmission time and avoids overloading radio nets.

Complete Information

5-13. Most reports have prescribed formats to ensure completeness of transmitted information. Unit SOPs

should outline the format for each report. They should also explain how personnel can use each report and

under what conditions to submit it.

ASSESS REPORTING

5-14. As mentioned in chapter 4, paragraph 4-27, the task of assessing reporting is a continuous process.

The DOMEX team or processing site personnel continues to assess reporting in the reporting and

dissemination phase of the DOMEX process to ensure reporting is satisfying the specific information

requirements as they change. Ideally, the team’s efforts enable it to anticipate requirements and deliver

information to the tactical commander in time to influence decisions and actions. As new information

becomes available—

The accuracy of the information can change to more or less accurate.

Additional recipients of the information may be identified based on changing battlefield

situations.

Analysts can receive feedback or make adjustments in their analysis.

DISSEMINATE REPORTING

5-15. Dissemination need not be limited to standard reporting. Depending upon the tactical situation,

available resources, and the commander’s critical information requirements, critical pieces of information

are passed quickly to those who can use them—specifically affected commanders. The intelligence staff

must be prepared to use any form of communication to disseminate vital information. Again, intelligence

staffs are responsible for reporting and disseminating information derived from CEDs in a manner that

ensures the information reaches not only the next higher echelon but also any tactical commander affected

by the information. DOMEX teams or intelligence staffs are responsible for pushing information back

down to the lowest echelons to ensure there is feedback to maneuver units on whether the CEDs were used,

reviewed, or contained actionable intelligence.

CURRENT METHODOLOGY

5-16. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel disseminate the original document or a copy,

transcript, or combination of these documents to joint, interagency, and multinational organizations. At the

tactical level, the DOMEX support team at brigade or processing site personnel send most documents to the

division or corps DOMEX element or the JDEC. At operational levels, DOMEX teams send processed

documents and media to the JDEC, the central theater processing point that ensures the dissemination of

information to the intelligence community. For transcripts and translations, DOMEX teams use a free-flow

message, a format in the translation software tool, or a translation format specified in annex B of the

operation order (OPORD). The DOMEX team or processing site personnel process and upload digital

forms of all original documents and processed information to the National Harmony Database, thereby

making them available to the entire intelligence community as well as to brigade and lower echelons.

5-17. A detailed batch report containing a copy of the translation should accompany the original document;

a copy of the translation should accompany any copies of the original document and, as required, the

intelligence reports. For a recorded audio and video document, a transcript as well as translation should

accompany the original audio and video document. A batch report should contain the following

information:

Identity of the element to which the report will be sent.

Identity of the element that prepared the report.

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Date-time group (DTG) of the document translation.

Report number as designated by unit SOPs.

Harmony numbers assigned to exploited documents.

Document serial numbers taken from the captured materials tag.

Document descriptions, including type of document or media, number of pages, physical

construction of the document, and enemy identification number, if applicable.

Original captured document language.

DTG document was received at element preparing the report.

DTG document was captured.

Location document was captured.

Identity of capturing unit.

Circumstances under which document was captured.

Name of translator.

Type of translation—full, extract, summary, or gist.

Remarks section for clarifying or explaining (include the identification of the portions of the

document translated in an extract translation).

Classification and downgrading instructions in accordance with AR 380-5.

WEB-BASED REPORTING

5-18. Web-based reporting is an effective technique for posting reports and transcripts, audio and video

files, and technical data for multiple users within and outside the area of operations. Through various Web

sites—such as Harmony, Media Exploitation, and Detainee Tracker—the DOMEX team provides units

with the status of CEDs as well as links to associated reporting. The DOMEX team can also provide

collection team personnel with access to online databases, including target databases that help them detect,

identify, and locate their targets.

5-19. Dissemination is in accordance with unit SOPs and other guidelines. Posting via Web sites and

reporting via batch reports help ensure that maneuver elements receive time-sensitive information in a

timely manner. However, these methods require maneuver units to search for feedback (pull) rather than

receive the information as disseminated from higher echelons (push). The most effective means for the

lowest echelons to receive feedback on CEDs related to their area of operations is for the intelligence staff

or battalion- or brigade-level DOMEX teams to track the location, status, and products associated with

those CEDs. Tracking may be readily accomplished using batch names and numbers, Harmony numbers, or

the detainee tracking system (a database listing detainees and such information as their names, dates of

birth, and items captured on the detainees).

UPLOAD REPORTS TO THE NATIONAL HARMONY DATABASE

5-20. Once completed, all reports must be uploaded to the National Harmony Database and any other

relevant databases. This ensures all authorized users have access to the information. Databases allow users

to retrieve reports, share information, search for information regarding a certain topic or area, and research

historical data. The National Harmony Database contains all reports generated from CEDs, thus allowing

for easy access to any updates on reports.

EVACUATE FOR FURTHER PROCESSING, EXPLOITATION, OR

DISPOSITION

5-21. CEDs are processed for information at each element having contact with the documents. Once each

element has exploited the CEDs, the documents are evacuated to the next higher echelon until they reach

the JDEC—the final collection point for all CEDs collected in a theater of operations.

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Chapter 6

Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Exploitation Structure

Recent military operations have seen numerous tactical, operational, and strategic

organizations involved in document and media exploitation (DOMEX) operations—

from capturing units and brigade combat teams (BCTs) to theater and Department of

Defense (DOD) elements. These organizations contribute to the decisionmaker’s

visualization and situational understanding of the area of operations. Commanders

use information derived from DOMEX to conduct military operations.

DOMEX REQUIREMENTS

6-1. Requirements for DOMEX operations at the tactical level are similar to requirements at the

operational and strategic levels. The number of personnel required to conduct DOMEX operations varies

with the echelon and with the volume of documents. Regardless of the size of the operation, when task-

organizing for DOMEX operations, units should consider the following tasks as the basis for manning,

organizing, and accomplishing DOMEX missions:

Command and control. Command and control organizations—

Provide management and oversight of subordinate collection, processing, and production

elements.

Have knowledge about DOMEX operations and requirements management.

Have the skills and knowledge necessary to synchronize collection and production within

their organizations and between echelons.

Understand the DOMEX collection and processing capabilities of intelligence and

nonintelligence units within the supported commands.

Ensure all aspects of DOMEX operations—accountability, screening, security

requirements, translation, exploitation, and reporting—are functioning properly.

Ensure adherence to policy and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); intelligence

oversight; and synchronization and deconfliction.

May have additional authority and training in languages or in contracting linguists to

support DOMEX operations. This task is generally accomplished by a military

intelligence (MI) officer and a senior MI noncommissioned officer.

Accountability. See paragraphs 1-13 through 1-16.

Screening. See paragraphs 3-22 through 3-27.

Security requirements. See paragraphs 3-34 and 3-35.

Translation. See paragraphs 3-41 through 3-51.

Exploitation. This task includes the identification and extraction of information in response to

collection requirements and requires a high level of expertise. (See paragraphs 4-3 through 4-7.)

Reporting. See chapter 5.

6-2. In the absence of dedicated DOMEX teams, organic assets can be task-organized to support DOMEX

missions. However, commanders are increasingly using augmentees from the Army and other Services with

MI or linguistic backg2rounds to perform these tasks.

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TASK-ORGANIZING DOMEX TEAMS

6-3. DOMEX teams are task-organized based on theater and national intelligence requirements, tactical

and operational force structures, threat environments, and assigned missions and roles. The corps or joint

document exploitation center

(JDEC) can organize DOMEX teams from its organic assets to meet

immediate requirements of echelons without DOMEX support. These teams may be attached to maneuver

elements and can deploy forward or support sustainment area units as required.

6-4. DOMEX assets and other assets assigned to a DOMEX effort may consist of multi-Service and

interagency components such as—

Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps intelligence personnel.

Foreign materiel exploitation teams.

Explosive ordnance disposal teams.

Chemical and biological intelligence support teams.

Media exploitation personnel.

Medical exploitation teams.

Hazardous material transportation office personnel.

Combined explosives exploitation cell personnel.

Weapons intelligence teams.

6-5. DOMEX teams are normally found at theater- and national-level organizations. However, the

overwhelming volume of DOMEX-related captured materials acquired during recent military operations,

and their potential for providing information of immediate tactical value, have created the need for ad hoc

exploitation teams to fulfill a variety of DOMEX tasks at brigade and lower echelons.

DOMEX ELEMENTS IN RECENT MILITARY OPERATIONS

6-6. For DOMEX products to be a force multiplier, the rapid exploitation of captured materials must

occur at the lowest echelon possible. Where tactical assets are insufficient, operational and strategic assets

can support a unit’s organic assets, either by personnel augmentation or by virtual or long-distance support

from DOMEX support elements worldwide.

Note. Planning identifies the specific requirements for the DOMEX element at each echelon.

Commanders must allow for the augmentation of DOMEX teams with all MI specialties and

non-MI personnel as directed by the mission.

6-7. Recent military operations have necessitated tactical DOMEX operations to augment their DOMEX

teams to handle and process high volumes of captured materials. The composition of augmentation

elements varies with the nature of the site and available resources. They can comprise a combination of

Army, joint, and interagency personnel.

6-8. The following teams were established due to recent military operations from Operation Iraqi

Freedom in response to requests for forces:

DOMEX intelligence teams at battalion.

DOMEX support teams at brigade.

Division DOMEX management team.

Corps DOMEX support element.

Raid support team (RST).

Multifunctional teams (MFTs).

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DOMEX INTELLIGENCE TEAM AT BATTALION

6-9. DOMEX intelligence teams at battalion, task-organized during recent military operations, have

provided the tactical commander a means to rapidly process large volumes of captured enemy documents

(CEDs). DOMEX teams comprise MI personnel assigned to the battalion intelligence staff specially trained

to perform the DOMEX mission. Depending on how the capturing unit or exploitation team collected the

CEDs, the DOMEX team at battalion may be the first echelon that establishes proper chain of custody

documents and procedures.

6-10. As part of the battalion intelligence staff, DOMEX team responsibilities and capabilities include—

Performing the initial assessment and rapid analysis of CEDs.

Providing appropriate translations of CEDs.

Extracting time-sensitive information of immediate tactical value from the CEDs and reporting

the information that directly pertains to the battalion commander’s critical information

requirements.

Quickly categorizing CEDs to facilitate their evacuation to higher echelons for further

exploitation and dissemination to the entire intelligence community.

Ensuring the chain of custody is established and maintained to preserve the intelligence and

judiciary value of CEDs.

Assisting in shaping the collection focus of future tactical operations.

Promoting site exploitation and DOMEX awareness to the supported commander.

Performing liaison between supported command and higher echelon DOMEX activities.

Immediately evacuating digital and communications devices to specialized elements with the

capability to exploit them.

6-11. Typically, digital media and communications devices contain valuable information that can be time-

consuming to exploit. Depending on the tactical mission in some specialized organizations, media

exploitation and communications technology resources may be co-located with the DOMEX team at

battalion to further expedite the exploitation of electronic media.

6-12. The DOMEX team’s most significant responsibility is to provide tactical units with reporting that

summarizes the intelligence value of captured materials collected from the captured site and is relevant to

their area of operations. The reporting could be in the form of an analytical summary, a batch report, or

other reporting in accordance with unit standing operating procedures

(SOPs). Whenever possible,

DOMEX reports, analytical products, and translations are returned to the capturing unit expeditiously to

facilitate follow-on tactical operations.

DOMEX SUPPORT TEAM AT BRIGADE

6-13. DOMEX support teams at brigade conduct all DOMEX functions, including translations and more

in-depth analysis in response to brigade requirements. The brigade may be the first echelon with the

resources to process and format CEDs and associated reports for entry into the National Harmony

Database. DOMEX support teams ensure timely dissemination of CEDs and associated reports to the

division DOMEX support team and the corps DOMEX support element via electronic network, and they

facilitate the transport of captured materials to specialized facilities for further exploitation.

6-14. DOMEX support teams at brigade are responsible for—

Tactical exploitation of CEDs to support ongoing tactical and detainee operations.

Processing all CEDs through all phases of the DOMEX process.

Managing and tracking the flow of CEDs.

Disseminating DOMEX-derived intelligence to the supported tactical commander.

Disseminating DOMEX products and reporting to the DOMEX support team and corps

DOMEX support element.

Uploading all DOMEX products and digitized CEDs into the National Harmony Database.

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Providing analytical expertise in accessing the National Harmony Database to search, identify,

and forward DOMEX-derived intelligence pertinent to the supported tactical commander’s area

of operations.

Maintaining chain of custody to support evidence handling procedures.

Providing support for site exploitation operations, as needed.

6-15. Forward deployment of tactical DOMEX teams is a combat multiplier. The command and support

relationships of tactical DOMEX teams must be clear to brigade and division commanders in order to

ensure proper support and employment of the teams. Logistic support to a DOMEX support team at brigade

includes—

Adequate workspace.

Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router

Network (NIPRNET) connectivity for the media exploitation technician.

Administrative computers for SIPRNET and NIPRNET.

Phones with Secure Voice over Internet Protocol and Defense Switched Network (DSN) access.

Billeting.

Administration on the forward operating base.

Expendable supplies.

DIVISION DOMEX MANAGEMENT TEAM

6-16. Division DOMEX management teams are located at division to conduct division DOMEX

intelligence staff support and analysis. The task-organized division DOMEX management team—

Ensures the brigade’s DOMEX support teams’ CEDs and associated reports are uploaded into

the National Harmony Database and forwarded to the corps DOMEX support element.

Provides liaison and DOMEX support to the division analysis and control element.

Provides oversight and coordination to the DOMEX support team at brigade.

Offers greater access and communications to DOMEX elements in theater of operations.

CORPS DOMEX SUPPORT ELEMENT

6-17. The corps DOMEX support element is an ad hoc organization task-organized to perform in-depth

analysis of captured materials in response to theater-specific requirements. Subsequent intelligence reports

are delivered to the corps 2X and shared with JDEC. Through the corps 2X, DOMEX-derived intelligence

is shared with units in the theater of operations. Corps DOMEX support elements have a more robust

capability and the additional requirement to support division teams during surge operations. These

operations primarily support such tactical operations as raids and cordon and searches. The size and

structure of each element is mission-dependent.

6-18. Corps DOMEX support elements—

Are responsible for mission requirements based on commander’s critical information

requirements in coordination with G-2X.

Provide DOMEX support and oversight of the DOMEX support team at brigade and the division

DOMEX management team.

Provide logistic, personnel management, and interpreter support.

Provide liaison between the JDEC and DOMEX support teams at brigade and division DOMEX

management teams, as well as other agencies.

Provide RST assets, as necessary.

Provide the file transfer protocol link for transfer of documents into the National Harmony

Database, as necessary.

Are responsible for providing DOMEX operations training to maneuver units in a theater of

operations.

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RAID SUPPORT TEAM

6-19. An RST is designed to reduce the burden on a capturing unit due to a surge of suspected high-yield

materials by assisting in exploiting a captured site, facilitating the rapid extraction of information from

captured materials, and enabling the priority evacuation of important documents to higher echelons. The

size of an RST is mission-dependent; it comprises organized detachments from multiple DOMEX elements

assembled to augment existing unit resources for a limited time. The RST may come from higher echelons

when coordinated through the corps DOMEX support element. Based on the nature of the captured

materials, technical specialists, such as digital media or communications experts, may augment the RST.

MULTIFUNCTIONAL TEAM

6-20. An MFT is an element task-organized in accordance with mission requirements. For example, recent

military operations have highlighted the need for specially trained and equipped Soldiers to exploit

captured materials, prioritize exploitation efforts, and be familiar with forensics and evidentiary issues

required to support priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and drive follow-on operations.

6-21. MI battalions and BCT MI companies may task-organize MFTs to provide multidisciplined

collection, exploitation, and limited analysis to generate information of immediate tactical value and to

detect, track, and locate targets. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring

Freedom, MFTs typically comprised elements in their areas of expertise—human intelligence (HUMINT),

signals intelligence (SIGINT), and site exploitation. However, in accordance with mission requirements,

the MFTs comprised any element necessary to exploit the site.

6-22. MFTs can perform the following DOMEX-related tasks:

Use manual translation and scanners to extract key information to support high-value individual

questioning. Collectors then pass that information and adjust collection plans as necessary.

Apply computer forensics techniques, using laptop and desktop computers with software

programs, to extract intelligence from media storage devices to support questioning of detainees.

6-23. Commanders may task-organize an MFT into smaller elements to operate independently with the

supported maneuver unit—depending on mission requirements—and then bring those elements back

together, as required, to leverage the MFT’s multidisciplined capabilities.

ARMY ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING DOMEX

6-24. The following Army organizations offer capabilities to support DOMEX operations:

MI battalion of the battlefield surveillance brigade.

MI brigade at theater army.

MI battalion (interrogation).

Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).

National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION OF THE BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

6-25. The MI battalion of the battlefield surveillance brigade provides multi-intelligence organic collection

capability to the division. The MI battalion is responsible for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

management of organic and attached SIGINT, imagery intelligence, HUMINT, counterintelligence, and

measurement and signature intelligence capabilities. Through its collection and exploitation company, the

MI battalion has the capability to conduct military source operations and interrogations, as well as detect,

identify, and neutralize the adversary’s intelligence operations. When not required to conduct its primary

mission of military source operations and interrogations, the HUMINT collection teams may be tasked to

support DOMEX operations.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE AT THEATER ARMY

6-26. There are five MI brigades at theater armies operating under the administrative control of INSCOM

and under the operational control of the Army Service component commands (ASCCs) of their respective

geographic combatant commands. (These ASCCs are called theater armies.) Each MI brigade includes a

forward collection battalion with a HUMINT company that has one DOMEX team. Additionally, an Army

Reserve theater support battalion, which also includes a HUMINT company with one DOMEX team, is

assigned to the MI Reserve Command and operationally aligned to each MI brigade at theater army.

Note. As a rule, the DOMEX capability of an INSCOM MI brigade at theater army is limited.

The DOMEX capability focuses on supporting internal brigade HUMINT collection activities; it

is not designed to support a JDEC in a theater of operations.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (INTERROGATION)

6-27. The Army established an MI battalion (interrogation) specifically designed to operate as the Army

component of a joint interrogation and debriefing center (JIDC). The MI battalion (interrogation) includes a

HUMINT analysis and requirements detachment with a DOMEX team as a component of that detachment.

The DOMEX team is designed to perform DOMEX and analysis at the joint task force (JTF)-level JIDC.

The DOMEX team performs the following functions:

Coordinates document exploitation with the JDEC in a theater of operations.

Translates, screens, categorizes, and exploits CEDs and other source documents.

Tracks and logs CEDs and other source documents.

Determines the significance and reliability of incoming information; assists in integrating

incoming information with current intelligence.

Inputs intelligence information into the national databases for use by the intelligence

community.

Trains subordinates to support interrogation, screening, and analysis and fusion operations.

6-28. When an MI battalion (interrogation) deploys to support a JIDC, DOMEX team personnel assigned

to the HUMINT analysis and requirements detachment are tasked-organized under the JIDC J-3 to perform

their mission as part of the joint exploitation cell. The joint exploitation cell identifies detainees for further

exploitation to satisfy the JTF commander’s intelligence collection requirements through the execution of

face-to-face screening of detainees and through the exploitation of detainee property (CEDs or captured

enemy materiel [CEM]).

ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

6-29. The Army has vested its intelligence at the operational level with INSCOM, the direct reporting unit

responsible for the Army’s intelligence forces above corps. INSCOM’s mission is to conduct

multidisciplined intelligence operations for military commanders and national decisionmakers. INSCOM’s

strategy is to provide critical information and information capabilities to Army commanders. INSCOM

provides a globally focused, rapidly deployable, knowledge-based, adaptable force-packaged capability and

supports commanders and leaders with timely and relevant intelligence at the decision point. INSCOM

serves as the national-to-tactical intelligence bridge.

NATIONAL GROUND INTELLIGENCE CENTER

6-30. NGIC is a major subordinate command of INSCOM and the home of the Army DOMEX program.

The Army DOMEX program office is part of the Media Exploitation Division under the Collection and

Exploitation Directorate. The Media Exploitation Division provides management and oversight to and

execution of the Army DOMEX program, the National Harmony Database, and the Facilities,

Infrastructure, and Engineering Systems program. The Army DOMEX program standardizes and facilitates

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the DOMEX process for theaters of operations worldwide. The Army DOMEX program’s mobile training

effort provides instruction to support tactical DOMEX TTP.

6-31. The Army DOMEX program provides—

Direct DOMEX support to the warfighter through deployed military and contract personnel at

brigade, division, and theater or corps levels.

Deployable DOMEX-system hardware for mobile DOMEX teams.

2X staff officers and DOMEX support teams to multinational divisions, special operations

forces, and selected multinational units.

6-32. The Army DOMEX program capabilities also include—

Directing translation support for theater-of-operations PIRs via the Army Reserve Language

Support Program.

Assisting units in the development of site exploitation and DOMEX SOPs and TTP.

Providing references and recommendations for deployed DOMEX teams.

Evaluating unit DOMEX procedures for accuracy and timeliness.

Providing training support and participation in related peacetime training activities, such as

exercises and war games where DOMEX or site exploitation operations apply.

Providing DOMEX coordination and operational support.

National Ground Intelligence Center Reserve Component Augmentation

6-33. NGIC integrates the Reserve Components into its production mission. The integration consists of

drilling individual mobilization augmentees and six MI groups. The MI groups comprise

22 MI

detachments with a total authorized strength of 352 Soldiers. NGIC has support relationships with the 203d

MI Battalion (Technical Intelligence [TECHINT]) (Multi-Compo), the 629th MI Battalion (National Guard

Bureau, Communications Electronic Warfare Intelligence), and the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist). Army

Reserve and National Guard Soldiers provide an invaluable service to NGIC and have been integrated

within the various directorates. They perform analysis, production, materiel exploitation, TECHINT,

translation, and DOMEX missions in the continental United States and while forward deployed.

203d Military Intelligence Battalion (Technical Intelligence)

6-34. The 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT), directly subordinate to the MI Readiness Command, is a

multicomponent organization with a long history of TECHINT collection and exploitation. It is

headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and is the Army’s only TECHINT battalion. The

Regular Army Soldiers assigned to the battalion are NGIC’s tactical arm. As such, they are prepared to

deploy worldwide on very short notice to support TECHINT missions. The Soldiers assist in executing

foreign materiel testing and training under NGIC’s oversight. Reserve Component Soldiers are prepared to

mobilize and deploy worldwide with advance warning to support TECHINT missions and to establish a

captured materiel exploitation center (CMEC). They are also prepared to augment the Regular Army

Soldiers in their tasks.

6-35. The CMEC, which can serve as a joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC), provides

direct support to theater of operations commanders through the intelligence staff. The specialized teams in

the CMEC monitor materiel handling and evacuation and answer the commander’s PIRs regarding foreign

equipment. (See chapter 7 for more information on the JCMEC.)

6-36. The 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) is subordinate to INSCOM during contingencies and while at

war. In peacetime, the 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) is under the training supervision of NGIC. NGIC

provides training guidance and approves the battalion’s mission-essential task list, which is unique in

mission and structure. The mission is two-fold and provides battlefield TECHINT with foreign equipment

systems derived from the physical examination of equipment and materiel. This analysis provides

indicators of the enemy’s readiness, capabilities, and intentions.

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6-37. The 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) performs the following functions:

Analyzes and exploits CEDs, foreign equipment, weapon systems, and other war materiel.

Performs TECHINT collection and reporting to support validated scientific and technical

intelligence objectives.

Acts as the Headquarters, Department of the Army is executive agent for foreign materiel used

for training purposes.

Performs TECHINT training for DOD analysts and Reserve Component TECHINT personnel.

Supports INSCOM’s foreign materiel acquisition and foreign materiel exploitation operations as

directed.

Reports on the capabilities and limitations of enemy combat materiel.

Provides reports alerting the command of the tactical threat posed by technical advances in new

or recently discovered foreign or enemy materiel.

Provides countermeasures to any enemy technical advantage.

Provides foreign or enemy equipment for troop familiarization and training.

Provides recommendations on the reuse of CEM.

Supervises the evacuation of items of TECHINT interest.

Provides task-organized battlefield TECHINT teams to support a subordinate command’s

TECHINT effort.

DOMEX PRESENCE AT JOINT FACILITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

6-38. DOMEX operations are present in the following joint facilities and organizations:

JDEC.

JIDC.

Regional DOMEX center.

JOINT DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION CENTER

6-39. The JDEC, established by the JDEC Operations Division within the National Media Exploitation

Center (NMEC), is responsible for in-theater exploitation of CEDs. The JDEC is part of a contingency

operating base (with the JCMEC and the JIDC), if introduced, or a HUMINT operations cell. The JDEC is

the collection, processing, and dissemination point for CEDs in a theater of operations. It receives,

inventories, catalogs, selectively translates, reports, and disseminates all CEDs to theater of operations and

national intelligence databases. The size and composition of JDECs are determined by mission factors.

6-40. Directly supporting the joint force J-2, the JDEC is staffed and equipped to—

Receive CEDs.

Perform CED screenings.

Perform CED translations.

Disseminate intelligence information reports to the intelligence community.

Provide direct support to site exploitation operations.

Train unit personnel on tactical and strategic DOMEX operations.

6-41. The JDEC serves as the final collection point for all CEDs collected in a theater of operations.

DOMEX elements in a theater of operations send an electronic copy of CEDs, their translations, and all

associated reports through DOMEX channels, from the BCT to corps and to the JDEC for inclusion in the

theater of operations document database. The JDEC disseminates information to the intelligence

community through several databases.

6-42. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) furnishes a core JDEC comprising a staff of technical

experts, translators, support personnel, organic ground transportation, power-generating equipment, shelter,

furniture, automated data processing communications, and mission-specific equipment. The JDEC has

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sufficient dedicated communications to move media electronically to national repositories. The JDEC may

require other Service augmentation to meet emerging theater of operations DOMEX requirements. The

JDEC is activated during periods of joint force deployments. The joint force J-2 exercises staff

responsibility over all matters pertaining to DOMEX.

6-43. The JDEC conducts DOMEX operations to obtain information of theater, strategic, and national

value in response to national intelligence requirements, theater-of-operations PIRs, and other requirements.

The JDEC may be co-located with the JIDC and can provide the ability to translate, screen, categorize, and

exploit all types of detainee property.

JOINT INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING CENTER

6-44. An echelons above corps military police brigade normally operates a theater internment facility. The

joint force commander, with a J-2 staff lead, establishes a JIDC as an activity within the theater internment

facility. Normally, the JIDC is administratively and operationally self-sufficient. It functions as part of an

overall detainee command and control structure, as outlined in FM 3-39.40 or by policy.

6-45. The JIDC can comprise—

Facility headquarters.

Operations element.

Analysis element.

Editorial element.

Interrogation element.

Screening element.

DOMEX element.

6-46. In addition to interrogation and debriefing operations, the JIDC includes technical experts and

intelligence analysts who exploit CEDs, as applicable, from the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and

other government agencies.

6-47. The JIDC’s operations element coordinates with the JCMEC to facilitate the rapid exploitation and

evacuation of technical documents, media, and materiel that may warrant further, technical exploitation.

6-48. At a minimum, each JIDC contains a small DOMEX element to translate, screen, and extract

information from and report on information of intelligence interest from source-associated documents. The

JDEC in the theater of operations may be co-located with the JIDC.

REGIONAL DOMEX CENTER

6-49. A combatant commander may establish a regional DOMEX center for targeted DOMEX research

and analysis to support joint, intelligence community, and law enforcement agencies within one or more

theaters of operations. The center is engaged forward to support deployed forces and the JDEC, and it

surges to meet changing national- and operational-level requirements. The center is also a forward

deployed element for intratheater transportation of captured materials, information technology, and human

resource support. The Combined Media Processing Center-Qatar, located at Camp As Sayliyah, Doha,

Qatar, is an example of a regional DOMEX center.

6-50. A regional DOMEX center produces DOMEX intelligence products including—

Highlights.

Intelligence information reports.

Biographical reports.

Summary reports.

Multimedia products.

Analytical support briefs.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS

6-51. DOMEX operations are present in the following DOD organizations:

DIA.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

National Security Agency (NSA).

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6-52. DIA is a DOD agency and an important member of the U.S. intelligence community. With more than

7,000 military and civilian employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign MI.

DIA supports operations across the spectrum of conflict, including—

Basic MI.

Counterterrorism.

Counterdrug.

Medical intelligence.

Weapons of mass destruction and proliferation.

United Nations peacekeeping and multinational support.

Missile and space intelligence.

Noncombatant evacuation operations.

Targeting.

Combat assessment.

Battle damage assessment.

6-53. DIA provides intelligence to warfighters, defense policymakers, and force planners in DOD and the

intelligence community to support military contingency planning and operations, and weapons systems

acquisition.

NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6-54. The NGA mission is to provide timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence and geospatial information

to support U.S. national security objectives. NGA’s director advises the Secretary of Defense; Director,

Central Intelligence; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the combatant commanders on imagery,

imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. The Customer Support Office, Operations Directorate is

the focal point for interface with external customers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant

commands, Services, and national and defense agencies. Units may request that intelligence community

organizations, such as the NGA, be called upon to provide specialized techniques and procedures to extract

additional information from CEDs, such as audio and video information. However, application of

specialized processing techniques and procedures may require the classification of the processed

information and restrict its dissemination.

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

6-55. The NSA is a DOD agency that coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to

protect U.S. information systems and produce foreign intelligence information. It is also one of the most

important centers for foreign language analysis and research within the Government. NSA uses sensitive

equipment and techniques to perform exploitation and analysis of specialized captured materials.

6-56. NSA ensures cryptologic planning and support for joint operations. Working with a command’s

tactical cryptologic units, NSA provides SIGINT and information assurance that encompasses

communications security, computer security, telecommunications support, and operations security. The

personnel and equipment providing SIGINT, information security, and operations security comprise the

U.S. Cryptologic System. NSA, through the U.S. Cryptologic System, fulfills cryptologic command or

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management, readiness, and operational responsibilities to support military operations in accordance with

Secretary of Defense taskings, priorities, and standards of timeliness.

NATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS WITH DOMEX

CAPABILITIES

6-57. The following national-level organizations have DOMEX capabilities:

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC).

NMEC.

JDEC Operations Division, NMEC.

Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT).

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

6-58. The FBI is the principal investigative arm of the Department of Justice and has primary

responsibility for counterintelligence and counterterrorism operations conducted in the United States. The

FBI’s DOMEX capability is the Digital Media Exploitation Unit, which conducts computer analysis and

forensics and fingerprint analysis.

NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER

6-59. NDIC maintains a domestic DOMEX capability. DOMEX teams support field offices overwhelmed

with volumes of perishable data seized during national priority investigations. These DOMEX teams are

deployed against targets that have been deemed appropriate by the principal counterdrug operational

agencies. Their DOMEX teams help identify hidden assets, previously unknown associates, other related

information, and leads for further investigation.

6-60. NDIC’s DOMEX Division supports major federal drug investigations in the United States. In many

cases, the division provides investigators with key information and helps them organize their evidence to

prepare for prosecution. To help with the processing of evidence, NDIC has developed unique computer

software known as Real-time Analytical Intelligence Database (RAID). This software, along with their

DOMEX methodology, helps NDIC’s DOMEX Division assist investigators in sorting through what could

be hundreds of boxes of evidence and run queries to help find new leads.

NATIONAL MEDIA EXPLOITATION CENTER

6-61. NMEC is the Director of National Intelligence Center composed of the following partner agencies:

DIA, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, NSA, and the Defense Collection Coordination Center. DIA is the

executive agency for NMEC. In August 2003, NMEC was tasked with the mission to rapidly exploit and

share media throughout the intelligence community and to develop standards for its widest dissemination.

NMEC establishes procedures for exploitation of documents above combatant command level.

JDEC OPERATIONS DIVISION, NATIONAL MEDIA EXPLOITATION CENTER

6-62. Within NMEC, the JDEC Operations Division is the DOD focal point for forming a JDEC to support

contingency operations. The division participates in contingency operations planning and is prepared to

deploy trained personnel and appropriate equipment to an area of conflict to establish a JDEC to support

operating forces. DIA coordinates with combatant commands for augmentation and support to sustain

responsive support to the warfighter. During peacetime, JDEC operations support DOD customers

worldwide, including the Defense Attaché Service. In addition to contract translators, DIA draws upon

Regular Army and Reserve Component translators from all Services to conduct the DOMEX mission.

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

6-63. JITF-CT is the lead national-level intelligence organization for—

Indications and warning.

Production of timely all-source intelligence.

Integration of national-level analysis of all aspects of the terrorist threat.

Development and maintenance of an accurate, up-to-date knowledge base on terrorism-related

information.

6-64. JITF-CT also serves as the DOD focal point and senior defense intelligence representative within the

intelligence community for terrorist threat warnings, as well as for proposing and coordinating, within the

intelligence community, dissemination of such warnings to appropriate DOD organizations and combatant

commands.

6-65. JITF-CT’s role in DOMEX is to establish relationships with and gain a better perspective of

DOMEX elements throughout the intelligence community and to support the warfighter. Specifically,

JITF-CT produces integrated all-source intelligence for the intelligence community and provides direct

support to the National Counterterrorism Center, the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, and the

Terrorist Identities Group by maintaining international terrorist watch list recommendations and

distributing those recommendations to the Terrorist Screening Center for additional screening.

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Support to DOMEX Operations

Assets required to support document and media exploitation (DOMEX) operations

vary by echelon, mission focus, and availability. The success of DOMEX operations

depends on—

• The coordination established between the personnel and intelligence sections.

• Where the DOMEX asset and supported unit reside.

• The various exploitation teams, facilities, commands, and agencies involved in the

DOMEX process.

DOMEX TEAM COORDINATION WITH THE SUPPORTED UNIT

7-1. DOMEX team coordination with the supported unit is critical in ensuring clearly defined roles,

responsibilities, and support requirements. The DOMEX team leader is responsible for managing the

expectations of the supported commander. DOMEX missions do not always support the unit to which the

DOMEX team is assigned. Occasionally, teams may be task-organized to support other missions, such as

raid support or site exploitation. Therefore, understanding the availability, capabilities, and limitations of a

DOMEX team helps the supported commander gain a realistic assessment of what a DOMEX team can

accomplish.

7-2. The DOMEX team leader must ascertain the supported commander’s collection requirements and

expectations. The leader must understand the supported unit’s standing operating procedures (SOPs),

particularly as they relate to—

Structure and capabilities.

Acronyms.

Movement procedures.

Communications procedures, reporting criteria, and report formats.

STAFF COORDINATION

7-3. Successful DOMEX operations require support from the supported unit’s staff elements. These

elements are collectively responsible for the planning and control of DOMEX operations.

S-1/G-1—Personnel

7-4. The S-1/G-1 DOMEX-related responsibilities include but are not limited to—

Maintaining a list of qualified linguists

(based on language and proficiency) within the

command.

Coordinating with the S-4/G-4 or S-9/G-9 for procurement and payment of other linguists

needed to perform DOMEX operations.

S-2/G-2—Intelligence

7-5. The S-2/G-2 is responsible for developing intelligence to support unit operations. Intelligence staff

DOMEX-related responsibilities include but are not limited to—

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Obtaining captured materials of intelligence interest, including visual and audio media and

electronic equipment

(such as computers, phones, personal digital assistants) taken from

detainees or loaned in coordination with the provost marshal and other elements.

Recording, evaluating, and analyzing collected information and providing feedback to maneuver

or capturing units.

Coordinating with the S-3/G-3 to ensure DOMEX personnel are included in unit training plans,

rehearsals, and debriefings.

Drafting instructions for handling, evacuating, and exploiting captured materials and

coordinating with the S-3/G-3 to ensure draft instructions are included in the command SOPs,

operation plans (OPLANs), and operation orders (OPORDs).

Projecting acquisition rates for captured materials.

Determining the number of linguists needed to perform DOMEX tasks.

Controlling procedures used to process and grant clearances to linguists as required.

Coordinating with other agencies to facilitate access to DOMEX records from other agencies not

otherwise accessible.

Coordinating with other agencies and DOMEX personnel for intelligence sharing and evacuation

of captured materials.

Coordinating with human intelligence (HUMINT) assets, such as mobile interrogations teams,

HUMINT collection teams, and HUMINT exploitation teams for access to captured materials for

exploitation and analysis.

Coordinating with designated media exploitation and signals intelligence assets to ensure the

smooth evacuation of time-sensitive information.

Coordinating with military police (MPs) at holding areas, detention facilities, and interrogation

and debriefing facilities to facilitate the sharing of captured materials and associated reporting

for exploitation and analysis.

Coordinating with the staff judge advocate for evacuation of potential evidence in criminal

proceedings involving significant crimes.

Coordinating for support of technical exploitation assets, such as communications technology,

weapons intelligence teams, multifunctional teams, explosive ordnance disposal units, and the

combined explosives exploitation cell, as applicable.

S-3/G-3—Operations

7-6. The S-3/G-3 is responsible for operations, organization, and training. DOMEX-related

responsibilities include but are not limited to—

Ensuring all unit SOPs, OPLANs, and OPORDs include instructions for handling, evacuating,

and exploiting captured materials.

Ensuring the main body of OPLANs and OPORDs under Tasks to Subordinate Units and Task

Organization include DOMEX organizations, elements, and assets.

Incorporating DOMEX operations into future operations.

Ensuring subordinate units are trained to properly handle, tag, and evacuate captured materials.

S-4/G-4—Logistics

7-7. The S-4/G-4 DOMEX-related responsibilities include but are not limited to—

Developing command policy for the evacuation and safekeeping of captured materials.

Providing logistic support to interpreter personnel.

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S-9/G-9—Civil Military Operations

7-8. One of the S-9/G-9 DOMEX-related responsibilities includes but is not limited to coordinating with

local U.S. Government representatives, personnel staff representatives, and host-nation armed forces for

procuring native linguists for interpreter support.

COORDINATION IN A MULTINATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

7-9. In recent military operations, the involvement of multinational partners has become the norm. This

has also been the case in recent DOMEX operations, particularly with regard to host-nation intelligence and

security personnel, who have been integral to the successful accomplishment of the mission in a

multinational environment. Multinational operations require special planning for command and control,

intelligence sharing, communications, and sustainment requirements. These relationships may be

established through the use of the OPLAN or a fragmentary order.

LINGUIST SUPPORT

7-10. Linguist support is a vital asset to the DOMEX mission. It is rare that captured enemy documents

(CEDs) are in English, so linguists hold a unique and valuable skill set and are a limited resource due to

high demand. Linguists can be used in all aspects of DOMEX operations, including searching, screening,

translating, and reporting functions. During the initial search of an objective, translators may be able to

identify information that might not be obvious or apparent to nonnatives or nonlinguists that poses an

immediate threat to U.S. or multinational forces. This information can be in the form of graffiti,

propaganda, or writing in the margins of a document or on equipment and materiel. At higher echelons,

linguists must have language proficiency and target knowledge commensurate with the target population of

the information.

7-11. Time management and prioritization are significant considerations when tasking linguist support,

which is a limited resource. Not every linguist may be the right fit for every mission or every document.

Other considerations include—

Security clearance.

Linguist qualifications.

Linguist categories.

SECURITY CLEARANCE CONSIDERATIONS

7-12. Military and civilian linguists must have security clearances appropriate to their mission

requirements. This normally equates to at least a Secret clearance since linguists must be aware of U.S.

collection requirements to facilitate their work.

7-13. Document translators usually require a clearance to translate documents. Open-source document

translation does not require a security clearance unless the information derived from the open-source

documents is linked to specific U.S. collection requirements, plans, or operations. If so, translators require a

clearance appropriate to the level of the particular contingency plan or operation to which the information

is linked. Linguists without a security clearance should not be used in the exploitation of CEDs. By their

very nature, the translation of these documents provides insight into the level of U.S. knowledge and the

direction of U.S. planning and intentions that prevent their translation by individuals without a security

clearance.

LINGUIST QUALIFICATIONS

7-14. Commanders can use various sources to obtain the linguists necessary to support DOMEX

operations:

Regular Army and Reserve Component military intelligence (MI) linguists. Based on their

mission requirements, Regular Army and Reserve Component MI linguists with the required

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language qualifications may be used as document translators. The advantage of MI Soldiers is

that they have the appropriate security clearance and a firm grasp of collection requirements.

Non-MI Army linguists. Non-MI Army linguists include numerous Soldiers proficient in a

foreign language, regardless of military occupational specialty. U.S. civilians and local nationals

can be contracted to provide linguist supports. Local-national hires provide the bulk of the

translator support, especially for noncollection duties.

LINGUIST CATEGORIES

7-15. Linguists are separated into three categories appropriate to their level of security clearance and

qualifications.

Category I Linguist

7-16. Category I linguists are generally local nationals or U.S. persons who have the ability to understand

local dialects and customs in the area of operations. They possess no security clearance and frequently

translate for U.S. forces performing liaison and coordination with host-nation government and civil

authorities. Every six months, category I linguists must undergo a counterintelligence screening and

possibly a polygraph. Although category I linguists are the most prevalent and possibly the most qualified

to decipher written and audio information (due to their understanding the nuances of the languages),

individuals without a security clearance should not be used in the exploitation of CEDs.

Category II Linguist

7-17. Category II linguists are generally U.S. citizens who were raised speaking the target language. They

possess a Secret security clearance. Typically, category II linguists have good English skills with varying

degrees of knowledge of the local dialects and customs. Category II linguists are often Government

contractors who may not have had any previous experience working with the military or within hostile

environments.

Category III Linguist

7-18. Category III linguists are U.S. citizens with a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information

security clearance. Category III linguists typically possess excellent English skills as well as exceptional

foreign language ability. Their knowledge of local customs and dialects vary.

Employment Considerations

7-19. Linguists’ knowledge of the commander’s critical information requirements, priority intelligence

requirements, specific information requirements, or any other information requirements has to balance

against their security clearance level and mission requirements. In order to effectively extract and translate

information from captured materials, categories II and III linguists must have a good understanding of the

command’s current requirements, specific mission information, and specific procedures to follow as

pertinent information is discovered.

7-20. Linguists are a vital part of the DOMEX effort; however, if a linguist is identified as having

questionable allegiance, notify the local counterintelligence detachment as soon as possible.

Counterintelligence personnel are specially trained to handle such situations.

COORDINATION WITH MILITARY POLICE

7-21. The MPs are responsible for maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment and

resettlement, law and order, and police intelligence operations. In holding areas such as detainee collection

points and temporary and fixed detention facilities, MPs maintain administrative control of detainees and

their belongings, including source-associated captured materials. Once detainees and their belongings are

processed into a detention facility, MPs maintain strict accountability of source-associated captured

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materials. If captured materials have not yet been processed into DOMEX channels, close coordination

with MPs is critical in order to obtain the captured materials for digitization and subsequent exploitation.

7-22. At higher echelon facilities, such as a joint interrogation and debriefing center (JIDC) with a resident

DOMEX element, the DOMEX element ensures that processed captured materials and their related

products are available to HUMINT collectors for planning and preparation of screening or interrogation

operations. The JIDC DOMEX element is also responsible for uploading information derived from

captured materials into the National Harmony Database.

THE ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND

7-23. The Army Criminal Investigation Command is the organization with primary responsibility for

investigating allegations of criminal acts or reportable incidents committed by or against detainees. During

screening, captured materials constituted as evidence in legal proceedings against persons suspected of

significant crimes are marked “CRIMINAL EVIDENCE” and kept separate from other captured materials.

They are stored under guard or in a secure area until turned over to a criminal or war crimes investigative

unit. Direct evacuation to an element outside the chain of command occurs at the lowest practical echelon

but is normally done by the first MI unit in the chain of command.

7-24. The staff judge advocate, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Marine Corps Criminal Investigation

Division (CID), or the Air Force Office of Special Investigations element should be consulted concerning

chain of custody requirements. They can provide legal support and advice on the interpretation and

application of applicable law and policy. The staff judge advocate is also a channel for reporting known or

suspected reportable incidents of abuse or inhumane treatment.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION AND PROVOST MARSHAL OFFICE

7-25. The local CID organization and provost marshal office are primarily concerned with identifying and

apprehending criminal elements. CID personnel in cooperation with MPs play a key role in linking criminal

intelligence to specific groups and events. Criminal intelligence results from the collection, analysis, and

interpretation of all available information concerning known and potential criminal threats and

vulnerabilities of supported organizations. (See AR 525-13.)

7-26. The criminal intelligence collection effort specifically targets weapons, drugs, organized crime, and

the identities of smuggling routes that result in a significant increase in the number of confiscated weapons.

The timely transfer of criminal intelligence products to tactical units enables a rapid response to serious

confrontations, increased confiscation of arms and ammunition, and improved stability in an area of

operations. The fusion cell within the analysis and control element develops intelligence products from

strategic, operational, and tactical sources. Due to the significant threat that criminal elements pose, CID

military agents and CID civilian analysts may be attached to the fusion cell to facilitate the MP intelligence

function.

SITE EXPLOITATION COORDINATION

7-27. Site exploitation are actions taken to ensure that documents, materiel, and personnel are identified,

collected, protected, and evaluated to facilitate follow-on actions (FM 2-91.6).

7-28. Site exploitation is critical to DOMEX—it is a major force multiplier that requires skilled and

proficient team members. Most captured materials are obtained through tactical ground operations. The

capturing unit performs site exploitation on an objective to collect material of possible intelligence and

evidentiary value.

7-29. Site exploitation elements are specially trained, cohesive search teams task-organized by the unit

assigned the mission. Depending on the size and contents of the site, capturing units that do not have

specially trained, task-organized exploitation teams may request exploitation support via a raid support

team or DOMEX support team at the brigade level.

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7-30. Site exploitation elements are typically organized along the same lines as other additional combat

teams, such as breaching teams and aid or litter teams. The use of a squad to breach and secure a site to

then function as the exploitation team is discouraged since exploitation teams require significant

equipment, coordination, rehearsals, and task focus to function efficiently.

7-31. Linguists are an invaluable asset to the site exploitation mission and should be made part of the team

whenever resources are available. Although a linguist is beneficial for identifying key information and for

the initial screening of CEDs, the site exploitation mission can be conducted without the linguist’s

assistance. Nonlinguist team members can be trained to identify and prioritize critical documents and

materiel by format and appearance. Machine language translation tools may be used to help nonlinguists

search for keywords to detect time-sensitive information.

NATIONAL-LEVEL SUPPORT AGENCIES

7-32. Intelligence agencies from the Department of Defense, national-level intelligence agencies, and law

enforcement agencies can all support the battlefield commander. In a joint task force (JTF), a national

intelligence support team works with the 2X to coordinate national-level activities with JTF and component

exploitation and analytical assets. Sometimes liaison officers are assigned directly to the 2X to facilitate

collection activities. The following are national-level support agencies:

National intelligence support teams.

National Institute of Standards and Technology teams.

National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC).

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAMS

7-33. National intelligence support teams provide mission-tailored national intelligence reach capability to

fulfill the intelligence requirements of the supported joint force land component commander. They are

typically composed of Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security

Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence resources, as required. At a

minimum, personnel deployed in a national intelligence support team provide access to agency-unique

information and supporting analysis.

7-34. The national intelligence support team concept is designed to create a dynamic flow of intelligence to

and from the JTF operational area. National intelligence support teams are able to provide unique

intelligence support to JTF commanders in several ways:

Provide reach to national intelligence community agencies and a thorough knowledge of each

agency’s resources and capabilities that normally does not exist at the JTF level.

Provide a direct agency liaison for the JTF and an excellent understanding of where to go in their

parent agency to obtain the best support for commanders’ priority intelligence requirements.

Usually accomplish reach capability informally—team members request encyclopedic

intelligence or query analytic resources with quick questions that do not require new tasking of

national assets.

Facilitate the flow of information to and from the area of responsibility via e-mail or video

teleconference.

7-35. Special intelligence teams may include specialized intelligence support personnel from within the

theater of operations, who are battle-rostered for JTF support. The JTF J-2 establishes and supervises

required functional intelligence organizations that may include a joint interrogation facility, joint captured

materiel exploitation center (JCMEC), joint document exploitation center (JDEC), and a joint imagery

processing center.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY TEAMS

7-36. Captured computers and associated media are a vital resource for investigating threat activities. The

National Software Reference Library data set developed by the National Institute of Standards allows

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investigators to rapidly and accurately search for suspect files disguised as legitimate programs. The

software works by looking for mismatches between machine language signatures hidden within files and

file extensions.

7-37. Collaborating with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Institute of Standards researchers have produced a new

technique for recovering data from damaged or altered magnetic tapes and computer disks. The system

allows rapid screening and authenticity analysis of tapes relevant to homeland security. With support from

multiple government agencies, the National Institute of Standards is developing tools and test methods to

verify the accuracy and reliability of computer forensics software. The Computer Forensics Tool Testing

project gives homeland security and criminal justice agencies confidence in their forensic investigation

results and gives software developers important information for improving their products.

NATIONAL VIRTUAL TRANSLATION CENTER

7-38. The FBI, as the NVTC’s executive agent, is responsible for supporting the NVTC program office.

NVTC provides timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence to all elements of the intelligence

community, including the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and National Security

Agency. NVTC’s goal is to augment existing government translation capabilities by—

Acting as a clearinghouse for facilitating interagency use of translators.

Partnering with elements of the U.S. Government, academia, and private industry to identify

translator resources and engage in their services.

Building a nationwide team of highly qualified, motivated linguists and translators connected

virtually to NVTC’s program office.

Applying state-of-the-art technology to maximize translator efficiency.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

7-39. Technical intelligence (TECHINT) includes the process of identification, assessment, collection,

exploitation, and evacuation of captured enemy materiel

(CEM) in support of national TECHINT

requirements. TECHINT acquired through captured materiel exploitation center

(CMEC) operations

provides rapid performance and vulnerability assessments of enemy equipment, thus giving a critical edge

to U.S. forces in current and future operations.

7-40. Each Service has a dedicated TECHINT organization capable of supporting CMEC operations.

TECHINT organization personnel receive specialized training to effectively operate these organizations in

hostile and austere environments:

CMEC.

JCMEC.

CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTER

7-41. The CMEC acts as the central location for the collection, safeguarding, identification, battlefield

exploitation and reporting, and evacuation of CEM of intelligence value in a theater of operations.

7-42. The recovery of CEM is both a combatant command and national requirement. Subsequent

exploitation of CEM can provide critical intelligence on enemy strengths and weaknesses that can

favorably influence operational planning and force protection. The CMEC normally conducts this

exploitation mission. Combatant commands or subordinate joint forces should notify the National Military

Joint Intelligence Center through command channels that CMEC support is required. This ensures the

appropriate allocation of Service component resources.

7-43. The combatant commander determines the CMEC location to facilitate the storage, movement, and

evacuation of CEM. The CMEC must consider force protection requirements and have easy access to

communication, transportation, and other support facilities. The CMEC should be located in close

proximity to the JDEC, the JIDC, and a captured materials holding area. The CMEC, JDEC, and JIDC

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facilities have common site selection criteria and complimentary functions that provide efficient allocation

of assets for movement, safeguarding, exploitation, and evacuation of detainees and CEM.

7-44. CMEC specialist exploitation teams may be formed to carry out highly specialized and technical

analysis of a particular and unusual CEM. The teams are formed in accordance with the task-at-hand and

may be dissolved when their mission has been completed. They may carry out their work in theater of

operations facilities, such as main workshops, or outside the area of operations at research and development

establishments with highly sophisticated test equipment, as necessary.

JOINT CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTER

7-45. AJP 2.5(A) stipulates that NATO nations may decide to establish a materiel exploitation center

operating within a joint framework on a permanent or ad hoc basis. In such cases, operations to technically

exploit captured materials may be conducted at a JCMEC, which is under the intelligence staff’s

supervision. A JCMEC is normally established for any operation with significant amounts and types of

CEM that may require field exploitation. Two or more nations may establish a combined joint captured

materiel exploitation center

(CJCMEC). CJCMEC personnel should comprise trained technicians,

engineers, and scientists supported by technical translators and interpreters.

7-46. The JCMEC or CJCMEC may be located in the theater of operations near main supply routes and air

and seaports to facilitate rapid evacuation of CEM. If possible, the JCMEC or CJCMEC should be co-

located with the joint interrogation center or the combined joint interrogation center to integrate HUMINT

and technical exploitation operations. Additionally, being co-located provides a single geographical area

where subordinate units can bring detainees and CEM, as well as consolidate many transportation and

security requirements. Regardless of its location, the JCMEC or CJCMEC is staffed and fully equipped

with sensitive and sophisticated test and communications equipment for—

Exploitation of CEM based on the supported commander’s requirements.

Production of TECHINT reports (including countermeasures) for commanders.

Provision of render-safe procedures, in coordination with explosive ordnance disposal staff, for

foreign munitions to combat units.

Coordination for the safe handling and removal of CEM and technical documents from the area

of operations to the JCMEC or CJCMEC.

Coordination with the joint interrogation center or the combined joint interrogation center for the

selection and technical interrogation of detainees assessed to have knowledge of technical

interest. Technical exploitation analysts and translators of technical documents may assist

interrogators during interrogation of a wide range of HUMINT sources of technical interest.

Recommendations regarding CEM disposition to the commander and staff.

Maintenance of the command’s TECHINT database.

Management of the command’s scientific and TECHINT requirements.

Coordination for the collection of TECHINT and information with the command’s intelligence

staff.

7-47. JCMEC technical exploitation teams can be organized by the JCMEC or CJCMEC from its organic

assets to meet immediate echelon requirements without TECHINT support. These teams may be attached to

formations and can forward deploy or support theater of operations units, as required. They carry out

complementary field exploitation of CEM on the site (operations permitting). These teams should have

sufficient expertise to perform field examinations and prepare TECHINT reports. Teams should be

organized based on safety considerations, timeliness, and geographical areas to be covered. They should be

equipped to carry out field examinations and communicate with and report to relevant agencies.

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The Role of Intelligence in DOMEX Operations

The Army intelligence enterprise is commonly organized through the intelligence

disciplines. Each discipline applies unique aspects of support and guidance called

technical channels.

The Army’s intelligence disciplines are—

• All-source intelligence.

• Counterintelligence (CI).

• Human intelligence (HUMINT).

• Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).

• Imagery intelligence (IMINT).

• Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).

• Open-source intelligence (OSINT).

• Signals intelligence (SIGINT).

• Technical intelligence (TECHINT).

ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-1. All-source intelligence is the intelligence discipline responsible for all-source products and the

processes used to produce them (FM 2-0). All-source intelligence also refers to intelligence products and/or

organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, most frequently including human

resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence,

and open-source data in the production of finished intelligence (JP 2-0).

A-2. At all echelons, document and media exploitation (DOMEX) operations are supported by analysts,

with the assistance of an appropriately qualified linguist, who perform all portions of the analysis and

production phase of the DOMEX process. In recent military operations, analysts have been instrumental in

DOMEX teams. They have been task-organized from intelligence assets in the S-2/G-2 or have been

formed in response to requests for forces and provided to brigade or division by higher echelons, such as

corps and the National Ground Intelligence Center.

A-3. Analysis is instrumental in converting information derived from captured materials and all

intelligence from each discipline into all-source intelligence products and targeting information. From the

multiple sources of information received, analysts identify and extract critical information, determine the

relevancy and accuracy of the information, and reach conclusions about the information. These conclusions

are immediately disseminated or used to form the basis of intelligence analysis products.

A-4. To support DOMEX, all-source intelligence analysis and production may include—

Providing analytical summaries, intelligence summaries, and other intelligence reports.

Updating or developing required databases.

Providing the enemy situation.

Driving collection to answer priority intelligence requirements.

Supporting situational understanding.

Providing predictive estimates of enemy actions, reactions, and enemy courses of action.

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Providing continuously updated intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

Providing all-source target packages (or folders).

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-5. The role of CI is to detect, identify, exploit, and neutralize all adversary intelligence entities targeting

U.S. and multinational interests. CI focuses on countering adversary intelligence collection activities that

target information or materiel concerning U.S. personnel, activities, operations, plans, equipment, facilities,

publications, technology, or documents, either classified or unclassified, without official consent of

designated U.S. release authorities, for any purpose that could cause damage or otherwise adversely impact

the interests of U.S. national security or its ability to fulfill national policy and objectives.

A-6. DOMEX operations are supported by CI collection, exploitation, and analysis, which are usually

conducted by CI collectors when the captured materials are associated with a source being questioned or

contain specific limiting criteria information. Captured materials containing information of possible CI

interest are identified and isolated during screening of captured materials for subsequent evacuation to the

nearest CI element for exploitation and processing.

A-7. CI special agents may coordinate with HUMINT collectors during screening operations to identify

captured materials, civilians on the battlefield, detainees, and other noncombatants who may have

information of CI interest or to develop CI leads. Information obtained during source or DOMEX screening

operations may be used to initiate CI investigations and operations or to cue other intelligence collection

disciplines, such as HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT. CI screening is also performed during the

process of hiring host-nation citizens for Army and Department of Defense (DOD) employment. When

appropriate, the administration of a polygraph in conjunction with this type of screening is a CI technical

service.

A-8. CI special agents are specially trained in the areas of computer forensics, computer operations, and

network theory and administration. In recent military operations, CI collection includes the collection and

preservation of evidence—specifically evidence derived from computer forensics—that may be used in

judicial proceedings or other investigations.

GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-9. Section

467, Title

10, United States Code

(10 USC 467) establishes GEOINT. Geospatial

intelligence is intelligence derived from the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information

to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the

Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information

(JP 2-03).

A-10. DOMEX operations are supported by GEOINT collection, exploitation, and analysis. When

geospatial information and services equipment and captured materials containing geospatial referencing

information are identified during screening of DOMEX materiel, they are evacuated to the nearest

GEOINT personnel for exploitation after initial screening for information of immediate tactical value.

A-11. GEOINT provides intelligence to the commander based on IMINT and the exploitation of captured

enemy documents (CEDs). GEOINT provides intelligence on threat capabilities, disposition, composition,

and intentions.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-12. Human intelligence is the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information

from people and multimedia to identify enemy elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions,

tactics, equipment, and capabilities (FM 2-0).

A-13. DOMEX is not solely a HUMINT function; it may be conducted by any intelligence personnel with

appropriate language support. Although DOMEX operations are activities supported by HUMINT

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collection, they are usually only conducted by HUMINT collectors when the captured documents are

associated with a source being questioned.

A-14. Captured materials are collected in several ways, usually as a result of tactical ground operations.

Since maneuver elements often lack the requisite time and resources, and many captured materials are

associated with detainees and other human sources, a HUMINT collector may be the first person to screen

captured materials. HUMINT collectors screen the documents associated with human sources and extract

information of use to the collectors in their immediate collection operations. Any information discovered

during the initial screening that might cue another collection effort is forwarded to the appropriate unit.

HUMINT collectors also use these documents during planning and preparation for interrogation or

questioning of the associated detainee.

A-15. DOMEX and translation operations were once considered purely HUMINT processing activities

directly associated with language capabilities and extensive backg2round knowledge in area studies. Current

doctrinal thought acknowledges that HUMINT is no longer the sole asset capable of conducting DOMEX

operations. Personnel involved in DOMEX do not require HUMINT training to screen or translate a

document, a piece of equipment, or other materiel—particularly since the unit may better use its sparse

HUMINT assets to conduct the HUMINT mission. DOMEX is an Army-wide responsibility, and while

HUMINT assets, when available, may be used to perform the DOMEX mission, HUMINT is a consumer of

DOMEX information rather than the major provider.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-16. Imagery intelligence is the technical, geographic, and intelligence information derived through the

interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials

(JP 2-03). IMINT is derived from the

exploitation of imagery collected by visual photography, infrared, lasers, multispectral sensors, and radar.

These sensors produce images of objects optically, electronically, or digitally on film, electronic display

devices, or other media. (See FM 2-0.)

A-17. DOMEX operations are supported by IMINT collection, exploitation, and analysis, which are usually

conducted by IMINT personnel when imagery information and captured materials containing imagery are

identified during screening of captured materials. After initial screening for information of immediate

tactical value, captured materials containing imagery of potential intelligence value are classified Secret

and evacuated where IMINT personnel, typically located at brigade combat team and higher echelons for

exploitation, use sensitive equipment and processing techniques to manipulate data extracted from captured

materials into a form suitable for analysis and intelligence production.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO

DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-18. Measurement and signature intelligence is intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative

analysis of data

(metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and

hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive

features associated with the emitter or sender, and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or

measurement of the same. The detected feature may be reflected or emitted (JP 2-0).

A-19. MASINT is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, or describes the

specific characteristics of fixed and dynamic target objects and sources. MASINT also includes the

additional advanced processing and exploitation of data derived from IMINT and SIGINT collection. (See

FM 2-0.)

A-20. DOMEX operations are supported by MASINT exploitation and analysis, which are usually

conducted by MASINT personnel when captured materials containing MASINT-related information are

identified during screening of captured materials. After initial screening for information of immediate

tactical value, captured materials containing information of potential MASINT value are evacuated to

MASINT personnel, typically located at division (specifically with the analysis and control element) and

higher echelons, for exploitation.

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OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX

OPERATIONS

A-21. Open-source intelligence is the discipline that pertains to intelligence produced from publicly

available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate

audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement (FM 2-0). The Army describes

OSINT as relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly

available information in response to intelligence requirements. (See FM 2-0.) Information is generally

collected by means of public speaking forums, public documents, public broadcasts, and Internet sites.

A-22. DOMEX operations are activities supported by OSINT exploitation and analysis and can be

conducted by multiple personnel of various military occupational specialties. The center of Army OSINT

operations is the military intelligence (MI) brigade at theater army. Each of these Army Intelligence and

Security Command (INSCOM) units conducts sustained, regionally focused intelligence operations to

support their Army Service component (ASCC) command and combatant command. While their OSINT

capabilities may vary, each of these theater-level MI units is the focal point within the combatant command

for managing Army open-source requirements and providing OSINT support to Army tactical units

deploying to or operating within the command’s area of responsibility. When open-source skills and

regional knowledge are not present in these deploying tactical units, personnel from the MI brigade at

theater army may deploy with and form the core of the tactical unit’s OSINT organization as well as

provide the control mechanism for synchronization and information exchange between echelons.

A-23. OSINT is part of a multidiscipline intelligence effort. Personnel from other intelligence disciplines

and multidiscipline intelligence activities use publicly available information and OSINT to update and

expand on research performed during the planning and preparation of operations. They use OSINT to

evaluate the reliability and credibility of information from confidential sources. Multidiscipline intelligence

personnel also integrate OSINT into reports from other intelligence disciplines to ensure their all-source,

HUMINT, CI, or TECHINT reports are accurate, complete, and objective.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-24. Signals intelligence is a category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all

communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence,

however transmitted (JP 2-0). SIGINT has three subcategories:

Communications intelligence is technical information and intelligence derived from foreign

communications by other than the intended recipients (JP 2-0).

Electronic intelligence is technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign

noncommunications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations

or radioactive sources (JP 3-13.1).

Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence is technical information and intelligence derived

from the intercept of foreign electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and

operational deployment of non-U.S. aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems. Foreign

instrumentation signals include but are not limited to telemetry, beaconry, electronic

interrogators, and video data links (JP 2-01).

A-25. SIGINT operations are activities supported by DOMEX collection, exploitation, and analysis, and

usually conducted by SIGINT collectors when communications equipment and CEDs contain cryptography

identified during screening of captured materials. The collected materiel is classified Secret and

immediately evacuated to the nearest SIGINT unit, the National Media Exploitation Center, or other

activity designated for exploitation in annex B of the operation order. SIGINT organizations use sensitive

equipment and processing techniques to transform information extracted from captured materials into a

form suitable for analysis and intelligence production.

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TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-26. Technical intelligence is derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data

and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological

surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed

to neutralize any adversary’s technological advantages (JP 2-0).

A-27. DOMEX operations are activities supported by TECHINT exploitation and analysis, which are

usually performed by TECHINT collectors. During the initial collection of CEDs, technical documents

associated with captured enemy materiel (CEM) are initially identified and evacuated to the captured

materiel exploitation center along with the CEM for exploitation. TECHINT analysts assess and exploit

foreign CEDs, equipment, weapons systems, and other war materiel. Once captured materiel exploitation

center personnel have digitized CEM-associated technical documents for their purposes, the documents are

reintroduced into DOMEX channels for DOMEX processing, exploitation, and evacuation, as applicable.

In some cases, technical documents are exploited during the planning, preparing, or executing of

interrogations.

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