Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6)

90-8

d. Typical situations that require planning for a patrol base include:

(1) A requirement to cease all movement to avoid detection.

(2) A requirement to hide the unit during a lengthy, detailed

reconnaissance of the objective area.

(3) A need to prepare food, maintain weapons and equipment,

and rest after extended movement.

(4) A need to formulate a final plan and issue orders for actions

at the objective.

(5) A requirement for reorganization after a patrol has infiltrated

the enemy area in small groups (used in conjunction with a

linkup point).

(6) A need for a base from which to conduct several consecutive

or concurrent operations such as ambush, raid, reconnaissance,

or surveillance patrols.

Any unforeseen situation occurring during a patrol mission could

lead to an on-the-spot decision to establish a patrol base.

E-4. Selection.

a. The location for a patrol base is usually selected by map

reconnaissance during planning. Selection may also be by aerial

reconnaissance or based on prior knowledge of a suitable location.

b. A patrol base established as the result of an on-the-spot decision

requires reconnoitering, securing, expanding, and organizing the

area occupied during a security halt.

A patrol base location selected by map or aerial reconnaissance,

or by prior knowledge of an area, is tentative. Its suitability is

confirmed by ground reconnaissance, and it is secured before

occupation.

d. Plans to establish a patrol base include consideration of:

(1) Alternate location. This is used if the initial location

proves unsuitable or if the unit is required to evacuate the

initial location prematurely. In counterguerrilla operations,

reconnaissance and surveillance of an alternate location,

until occupied or no longer needed, are desirable.

(2)

Linkup point. This is used if the unit evacuates the patrol

base by exfiltration in groups. The linkup point does not

have to be reconnoitered.

(3) Rallying point. This is used if the unit is dispersed from

the patrol base. It is a point over which the unit has

previously passed, and it is known to all.

E-2

90-8

E-5. Considerations.

When planning for a patrol base, passive and active security

measures are considered, as well as the mission.

With regard to passive security measures, base selection

includes:

(1) Difficult terrain that impedes foot movement and has little

tactical value.

(2) An area with dense vegetation (bushes and trees that spread

out close to the ground).

(a) An area remote from human habitation.

(b) An area near a water source.

positions; built-up areas; ridgelines and topographic

crests (except as necessary for maintaining adequate

communications); roads or trails and natural lines of

drift; and wet areas, steep slopes, and small valleys

that may be lines of drift.

With regard to active security measures, base selection in-

cludes:

(1) Outpost and listening post systems covering avenues of

approach into the area.

(2) Communications with outposts and listening posts.

(3) Defense of the patrol base (if required).

(4) Withdrawal, to include multiple withdrawal routes

(if

required).

(5) An alert plan.

(6) Enforcement of camouflage, noise, and light discipline.

(7) Conduct of necessary activities with minimum movement

and noise.

E-6. Occupation and operation of a patrol base.

a. A patrol base maybe occupied in two ways:

(1) By moving to a selected site and organizing the area in the

same manner as an on-the-spot establishment.

(2) By halting near the selected site and sending forward

reconnaissance forces.

E-3

FM 90-8

b. The method is thoroughly planned and rehearsed. The use of

patrol base drills (in either method) assists in the swift and

efficient establishment of patrol bases.

(1) Approach. The unit is halted at a suitable position within

200 meters of the tentative patrol base location. Close-in

security is established. Previously designated individuals

(preferably leaders of the unit’s major subunits) join the unit

leader (Figure E-1).

Figure E-1 Approach and reconnaissance.

(2) Reconnaissance. The leader designates a point of entry

into the patrol base location as 6 o’clock, assigns areas by the

clock system, designates the center of the base as headquarters,

and moves there. Subordinate leaders then reconnoiter

assigned areas for suitability and return to the unit leader.

Usually, two men are dispatched to bring the unit forward.

(3) Occupation. The unit leaves its line of march at right

angles and enters the base in single file, moving to the center

of the base. Designated men remove signs of the unit’s

movement. Each leader peels off his unit and leads it to the

left flank of the unit sector. Each unit occupies its portion of

the perimeter by moving clockwise to the left flank of the

next sector. The unit leader checks the perimeter by meeting

each leader at the left flank of his sector, moving clockwise

(Figure E-2).

E-4

90-8

(4)

Operation security. Only one point of base entry and exit

is used. It is camouflaged and guarded at all times. Fires are

built only when necessary and, as a rule, only in daylight.

Whether day or night, only necessary fires are built, and they

are kept as small as possible. Where terrain permits, fires are

built in pits and, if built at night, are carefully covered and

shielded. Building fires in pits reduces the danger of visual

detection and facilitates extinguishing the fires and

camouflaging the sites. The driest and hardest wood

available is used (to reduce smoke). In most areas, the best

time for building fires is when the air is thin and smoke

dissipates quickly (usually around noon); early morning

may be appropriate, however, in areas where there is ground

fog. The risk of detection, because of lingering odor, must be

weighed against the risk of detection due to visible smoke.

(a)

Noisy tasks, such as cutting branches, are accom-

plished at designated times, as early as possible

after occupation but never at night nor during the

quiet periods of early morning and late evening.

When possible, noisy tasks are performed when

other sounds will cover them, such as the sounds of

aircraft, artillery, or distant battle noises.

(b)

Movement, both inside and outside the patrol base,

is restricted to the minimum.

(c)

Civilians who discover the location of the patrol

base are detained until the base is moved or until

they can be evacuated to higher headquarters. Care

is taken to prevent detained civilians from learning

about base operation and future plans. If necessary,

they are tied and blindfolded and their ears are

covered.

(d)

When sufficient personnel are available, OPs are

manned by at least two men so they can alternate

and ensure alertness at all times. This also removes

the need for traffic between the OP and the patrol

base. Listening posts are manned by at least two,

preferably three, individuals so they can alternate

and remain alert.

(e)

A 1-hour stand-to is observed morning and evening:

30 minutes before and 30 minutes after light in the

morning, and 30 minutes before and 30 minutes after

dark in the evening. This ensures that every man is

acclimated to changing light conditions, and is

dressed, equipped, and ready for action.

E-7

90-8

(f) Each man knows the locations of men and positions

to his flanks, front, and rear, and knows the times

and routes of any expected movement within, into,

and out of the patrol base.

(5) Defense. Defensive measures are planned, but a patrol

base is usually defended only when evacuation is not

possible. Elaborate firing positions are not constructed;

nonetheless, camouflage and concealment are stressed.

(a) Artillery and mortar fires may be planned, if

available. Early warning devices may be placed on

avenues of approach. If the base is to be defended,

then mines and trip flares may be placed on avenues

of approach and in areas that cannot be covered by

fire. The value of these devices is weighed against

the fact that their discovery automatically com-

promises the patrol base.

(b) An alert plan includes evacuation and defense. All

members know the plans and the signals or orders

for their implementation. Plans cover pursuit and

destruction of the attacking force.

(6)

Communications. Communications are established

with higher headquarters, subordinate units, OPs, and

listening posts. The system provides for every man to be

alerted quickly and quietly. Radios, an excellent means of

communication, are carefully controlled. Wire can be used

within the patrol base if its bulk and weight, and the time

required to lay and pick up, are not disadvantages. Tug, or

pull, wires may be used for signaling. They are quiet and

reduce radio or telephone traffic. Messengers maybe used

within the patrol base.

(7) Maintenance. Weapons and equipment are cleaned and

maintained as required.

(8) Sanitation and personal hygiene. In daylight, catholes

outside the perimeter are used. The user is guarded. At

night, catholes are used inside the perimeter. Men wash,

shave, and brush their teeth as needed, consistent with

the situation (including availability of water). Cans, food,

and other trash are taken with the departing patrol for

security.

(9) Messing. Men eat at staggered times, as planned and

controlled. Preparation of meals is planned (if required).

(10) Water. Guarded water parties provide water. Lone

individuals do not visit the water source. No more than

E-8

90-8

two visits to the source are made in a 24-hour period. Use

of water is controlled (as required).

(11) Rest. Rest and sleep are permitted after all work is done.

Rest periods are staggered to maintain security. Consistent

with work and security requirements, as much sleep and rest

as possible are scheduled for each man.

(12) Resupply. If the unit is to be resupplied by air, the flight

path, drop zone or landing zone, and cache are located so that

neither the base nor possible objectives are compromised.

(13) Planning and conduct of operations. Details of operations

are passed to all unit members. Members are not assembled

atone time as this would endanger base security. Rehearsals

are limited to terrain models, with part of the unit rehearsing

while the remainder provides security. Weapons are not test

fired. If part of the unit is absent on an operation, the

perimeter is adjusted, if necessary, to ensure security. Orders

are as brief as possible. Maximum practical use is made of

fragmentary orders and references to SOPs.

(14) Departure. All signs of the unit’s presence are removed or

concealed. This may prevent the enemy from learning that

the unit is in the area, prevent pursuit, or prevent the enemy

from learning how the patrol base is operated. Night

evacuation

(in case of attack) is avoided if possible.

Evacuation is conducted as a unit when possible.

Section Ill. Battalion Operational Support Bases

E-7. Purpose.

When engaged in counterguerrilla operations, battalion elements often

establish a base for command and control and fire support resources,

protected by a perimeter defense. These resources are called the

battalion operational support base.

E-8. Perimeter defense.

a. The OSB perimeter defense location depends upon:

(1) Forces available to defend the combat base.

(2) Ability to support subordinate units with indirect fire.

(3) Defensibility of terrain.

(4) Ability to communicate with subordinate units.

E-9

FM 90-8

Before establishing the battalion OSB, the commander reconnoiters

to determine terrain defensibility. He also plans the defense force.

While the defense is designed to defeat the heaviest attack the

enemy is likely to conduct, it uses minimal forces. Essential

elements (reinforced as necessary) of the headquarters and

headquarters company (HHC) compose the force available to

prepare and defend the perimeter.

E-9. OSB commander.

a. The battalion commander normally designates the HHC

commander as battalion OSB commander in charge of perimeter

defense. Forces normally under control of the OSB commander

include:

(1) An antitank platoon.

(2) An air defense section, if attached (to man the perimeter and

provide antiaircraft fire).

(3) A heavy mortar platoon (to man the perimeter and provide

fire support).

(4) A rifle platoon (if provided for perimeter defense or as a

reaction force).

b. The scout platoon is normally used for patrolling or screening

missions, rather than perimeter defense. Use of specialty unit

personnel (air defense and mortar) for manning the perimeter will

reduce the responsiveness of those systems. An element of risk is

involved.

During defense works construction, the perimeter is vulnerable to

attack, so it is completed as quickly as possible. Maximum

security is provided during construction.

E-10. Infiltration.

a. Guerrillas may be able to conduct large-scale attacks on fortified

positions, but they may disrupt operations by infiltrating one or

two men through the perimeter to place explosive devices on

command and control facilities, artillery pieces or mortars, or

ammunition storage areas.

b. This infiltration often follows a deceptive attack or probe. The

perimeter defense force maintains constant security, using early

warning systems and continuous patrolling. Starlight scopes,

OPs, unattended ground sensors, ground surveillance radars, and

trip flares are also used. Wire obstacles should be used to keep

infiltrators out of critical facilities.

E-10

90-8

A battalion OSB may have to remain in place for an extended

period, but it is not a permanent base. Continuous firing of

mortars and landing of helicopters make concealing its location

difficult. These factors require that the perimeter defense be

hardened. Overhead cover and sandbagged bunkers are provided

for all fighting positions. The tactical operations center and

command post (CP) require similar protection (or they maybe dug

underground). Mortars and artillery pieces are dug in or fortified

with sandbags.

E-11. Reserves.

a. A reserve for the defense is made up from attachments (engineers,

if available, or from off-shift personnel from tactical operation

center [TOC] and CP elements).

The reserve reacts to enemy attacks and reinforces the defense or

counterattack. It is rehearsed on signals and actions. Mortars are

employed to provide close-in fire support. Artillery pieces maybe

able to provide direct fire but may not be able to provide indirect

fire in support of the perimeter. Hence, the perimeter should be

within range of other artillery and mortar units for additional

protection.

E-12. Work priorities.

a. A priority of work is scheduled to construct the battalion OSB.

The priority placed on actions is dependent upon the tactical

situation and the availability of resources. Work is accomplished

in the following sequence, consistent with the tactical situation

and the availability of resources.

(1)

Step 1. Air assault and/or ground assault seizes the site;

immediate security is established to include OPs; area is

swept for booby traps; and mortars are laid.

(2)

Step 2. Communications are established; CP is set up; TOC

position is dug in; and selected TOC personnel are displaced

to perimeter defense.

(3)

Step 3. Perimeter positions are established; fields of fire are

cleared; reserve force is established; and wire is laid to all

positions.

(4)

Step 4. Barriers and obstacles are placed around perimeter

defense; early warning devices are emplaced; security and

ambush patrol plans are established; and final protective

fire (FPF) is called in.

(5)

Step 5. Positions are sustained; positions are hardened

with overhead cover; all other positions are improved; more

E-11

FM 90-8

fields of fire are cleared; the landing zone is enlarged; and the

latrine, generators, and ammunition supply point are estab-

lished.

NOTE: Camouflage is applied throughout base preparations.

b. The size of the base is dependent upon the situation and the

terrain available. When artillery is within the perimeter, then the

OSB is larger to accommodate the guns and supporting equipment

(Figure E-5).

Figure E-5. Example of OSB.

Section IV. Brigade, Division Support Base

E-13. Permanent-type base.

a. A brigade or division support base is larger and more permanent.

It is usually near an airfield and/or generally in consolidation

E-12

FM 90-8

areas. This section describes the responsibilities and organization

found in the defense of more permanent installations.

An area command is composed of those organized elements of one

or more of the armed services designated to operate in a specific

geographical area; these armed services are placed under a single

commander. The area command may range in size from an area

(theater) of operations to a small urban complex. The purpose of

such area assignment is to:

(1) Secure unity of effort in such operational missions as may be

assigned to commanders.

(2) Coordinate defense, logistics, and the use of available

facilities.

To provide for the effective defense of a base within his command

or for joint planning within his area of responsibility, the

commander must:

(1) Assign the responsibility for defense of the base and

surrounding local defense areas.

(2) Establish the method of command or coordination to be

exercised.

(3) Ensure the establishment of appropriate command relation-

ships between subordinate area and base commanders.

Command relationships, security, and defense responsibilities

vary at the base command level because of the possible multinational

and multiservice force combinations involved in the overall

defense effort of a given base. In most cases, base ownership,

national-level agreements, and mutual agreements among senior

commanders determine relationships and responsibilities. The

relationship between US service components and host country

forces is included in the directive of the US establishing authority.

This relationship is generally one of mutual coordination and

cooperation. Relationships among US service components using

the same base are also outlined in the directive of the establishing

authority. These relationships follow the principles designated

for joint operations, attachment, or support given in JCS

Publication 2.

E-14. Organization of forces.

The overall organization for base defense includes three basic

elements: permanent, as required, and as available.

E-13

160-739 O - 94 - 7

FM 90-8

Permanent. Permanently assigned elements for base defense

and/or security responsibilities are:

(1) Provisional-type base defense forces which have been

assigned a primary mission to defend the base. This force

includes personnel and equipment for command and control;

conduct of patrols; manning of outposts, listening posts, and

the base perimeter; and reserve and/or reaction force

activities.

(2) Component police and security elements make up the

internal security force. Although not normally a part of the

BDF, these forces perform their routine security duties in

close coordination with the defense force commander to

ensure complete protection and integration of defensive

planning.

(3) Combat support and combat service support units are

relatively static support units, such as communications and

maintenance elements, which exercise their support capabil-

ities from within the perimeter of the base.

As required. Elements assigned base defense responsibilities

on an “as required” basis include units, or elements of units,

normally occupying or operating in the base area whose primary

mission is not base defense. These elements, referred to as the

emergency augmentation force, supplement the capabilities of the

BDF when the degree of threat or intensity of guerrilla attack

dictates that they cease their primary functions and assist in base

defense. The emergency augmentation force may consists of US,

host country, or allied ground, naval, or air forces.

As available. Elements assigned base defense responsibilities

on an “as available” basis include:

(1) Transient units of US, host country, or allied military forces

temporarily in the base area.

(2) Tenant units on the base between operations.

(3) Host units or units of other nation(s) normally in areas

adjacent to the base perimeter that have been designated, by

their commanders, to provide assistance to the base when

their own operations do not require total effort.

E-15. Operational concepts.

Base defense includes all actions that units occupying the base

must take to protect themselves from enemy acts. Such actions

E-14

FM 90-8

inevitably interfere to some degree with the primary mission of

some of the elements involved. To reduce this interference, the

following principles apply:

(1)

Tenant units not assigned primarily for base defense are

normally used in the role or configuration for which they are

organized and trained — except when required for duty as

emergency augmentation forces during an all-out attack on

the base.

(2)

Combat, combat support, and combat service support

elements are specifically allocated for base defense missions

when guerrilla actions are frequent, prolonged, or severe.

(3)

When emergency augmentation forces are used in base

defense situations, they must be returned to their primary

functions as soon as the situation permits.

(4)

Base tenant unit personnel are responsible for local security.

The organization of a provisional defense force or the

assignment of a combat unit to provide security for the base

does not relieve them of this responsibility.

The overall concept of base defense includes all actions required to

preseve the operating integrity of the base.

Regardless of the military measures applied, there is no defense

that prevents guerrillas from attacking and damaging a base if

they are willing to pay the price in manpower and materiel.

Making them pay a high price holds down the number of attacks.

d. Defense of the critical areas is a primary consideration. The

critical areas are facilities and installations whose continued

operation is essential for the accomplishment of the primary

mission. These facilities and installations are designated by the

base commander or higher authority and include power stations;

petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage sites; ammunition storage

sites; aircraft facilities; and artillery emplacements.

Defense of a military base involves a combination of area denial

actions, aggressive offensive operations, and immediate reaction

to guerrilla threat or attack. While hardening of facilities and

maintaining an immediate reaction force are the responsibility of

the base commander, area denial actions and major offensive

operations are the responsibility of the area commander. Use of

barriers, field expedient flame weapons, natural obstacles, and

aggressive offensive actions deny guerrillas access to the area

immediately surrounding the base. If they are kept at a distance,

they cannot launch damaging rocket attacks on the base. If they

E-15

90-8

penetrate far enough to use rockets or other long-range weapons,

hardening and dispersal of base resources may reduce the

damage.

Plans are prepared to counter the threat or attack, and reaction

forces are kept ready to immediately implement these plans. This

preparation includes plans by area commanders to commit other

forces to base defense. Base defense plans are coordinated with

host country officials and other allied forces through use of the

area coordination center.

Responsive, rapid fire support is required for base defense

operations. Artillery and mortar fire can provide quick reaction to

the infiltration and standoff attack threats. If in range, naval

gunfire is used the same as artillery fire. In base defense

operations, base-positioned fire support units follow normal fire

support procedures. Fire support units positioned outside the base

area, but within support range, are included in the overall base

defense fire support plan. Also included are the fire support

capabilities of host country and other allied forces.

h. The fire support coordination center is operational 24 hours a day.

It must have immediate access to host country officials who can

autho rize fire within areas not predesignated as free fire zones.

E-16. Base commander.

The mission of the base commander is to exercise command,

control, and administration of the base and also to exercise

necessary control of resident and transient units not a part of the

base command.

b. A base commander may also be the area commander. At the same

time, he may also be the component Army, Navy, Marine Corps,

or Air Force commander; or he may be designated separately.

The base commander’s responsibilities include establishing the

overall defense organization as well as planning, preparing, and

executing all defense measures. If the base mounts or supports

operations of two or more services that occupy and operate

separate nonadjoining facilities within the base area, the base

commander, as base defense coordinating authority, plans and

directs the employment of these forces in base defense roles. The

base commander normally appoints a base defense force

commander to assist him in executing base defense functions

(Figure E-6).

E-16

FM 90-8

Figure E-6. Organization of base defense.

E-17. Base defense force commander.

a. The base defense force commanders normally appointed to

supervise the preparation of detailed defense plans to include

establishing defense sectors, conducting required training,

providing for or coordinating logistical support, and controlling

base defense operations. As the base commander’s special

representative, the BDF commander coordinates the planning

efforts of all elements scheduled to participate in the base defense.

During the defense, he exercises command authority over these

elements.

Commanders of base elements maybe given responsibility for the

defense training of their forces or for making their forces

available to the BDF commander for training. Additional

requirements such as procurement and storage of essential

supplies, construction of defense installations, medical support,

and communications assistance may also be levied against these

commanders, consistent with overall requirements.

E-17

FM 90-8

E-18. Base defense force.

a. The mission of the BDF, whether it be an assigned or a

provisional force, is to prevent or resist an enemy attack by

destroy in the enemy force, reducing the enemy capacity for

offensive action, and denying the enemy entry into the base area.

Detecting and destroying enemy forces (organized in strength)

are responsibilities of the area commander; however, the BDF

commander may initiate offensive action in areas over which he

has operational control.

b. The accomplishment of this basic mission requires thorough

planning for an aggressive defense fully supported by other forces

of the area command.

E-19. Major tenant units.

a. All units assigned to the base constitute elements of the overall

defense force of the base. During an enemy attack or threat, some

elements maybe required to continue their primary function

longer than others. In this respect, all local unit defenses are

coordinated by the BDF commander to ensure that each

contributes to the overall defense of the base as well as to the local

security of the areas in which the unit is quartered or employed.

Since all tenant units may not be organized and equipped for base

defense tasks, they must be provided with appropriate weapons,

ammunition, and equipment, as well as combat and logistical

support.

E-20. Transient units.

Transient units, or other units not a part of the base command, maybe

placed under operational control of the base commander, or the BDF

commander, for emergency defense. Transient units may be elements

of US components, host country, or other allied military forces.

E-21. Employment of forces.

Forces whose primary mission is base defense patrol aggressively,

develop and occupy defensive positions within their assigned sectors,

and prepare immediate reaction forces to counter any guerrilla action.

These forces may be uniservice, joint, or combined, depending on the

composition of base area forces.

E-22. Defensive construction.

Shelters. Construction of personnel shelters throughout the

billeting, administrative, and maintenance areas provides

E-18

FM 90-8

individual protection against standoff attacks. Depending on

resources available, these shelters vary in construction. Shipping

containers, dugouts, and double-walled plywood shelters with

sand or gravel fill, all with sandbag reinforcement and overhead

cover, provide acceptable protection. These shelters are close to

the billets and work areas to permit rapid access.

Bunkers. Fighting bunkers may be constructed on position or

prefabricated and moved to position for assembly. These bunkers

should be strong enough to withstand direct hit by recoilless rifle

fire on the front and sides and a direct hit by a mortar round on the

top.

Revetments. Construction of revetments for critical resources

provides additional protection against mortar and rocket

fragmentation. These revetments may be of sand-filled, double-

walled construction, with either plywood or steel plate sides.

Overhead cover is provided when possible.

Wire. Tactical wire barriers should be used within the perimeter

to limit and canalize penetrations by enemy groups or individuals.

Initially, these barriers can be as simple as a single strand of wire

3 to 4 feet high. Generally, they should be placed to prevent a

direct approach to vital installations, and they should be covered

by automatic weapons fire. The barriers are constructed as

inconspicuously as possible and relocated periodically to disrupt

enemy plans. Further, the barriers must not preclude freedom of

movement by the reaction or reserve forces. These forces, and

other personnel, become thoroughly familiar with the location of

all barriers during the course of daylight and night drills.

E-23. Defense positions.

a. The key base defense positions consist primarily of bunkers and

towers in the base perimeter area. The positioning of bunkers and

towers affords maximum observation and mutually supporting

fires over the area forward of the perimeter to include the

perimeter barrier and sensor system.

(1) Bunkers. Full-time observation and all-round defense of

the base are essential. To reduce the number of personnel

conducting static defense missions, however, it may be

possible to designate key bunkers around the perimeter to be

manned at all times and the remainder to be fully manned

during darkness, reduced visibility, and increased enemy

threat. Individual fighting positions are prepared near the

bunkers to provide covering fires. Night and day vision

devices, automatic weapons, grenade launchers, and hand

grenades are common to the positions. Antitank weapons

cover possible vehicle approaches.

E-1 9

FM 90-8

(2) Towers. When coupled with night and day vision aids,

sensors, and flash-ranging devices, elevated platforms

enhance the capability of detecting perimeter infiltration

and the location of guerrilla mortar and/or rocket firing

positions. Either standard military towers or towers

constructed from local materials can be used. The installation

of sandbags or steel plating around observation platforms

provides protection against automatic weapons and small

arms fire. Construction of a ground-level bunker provides

additional protection when fires are directed against the

tower. Access to the bunker maybe by means of a fireman’s

pole or a ladder arrangement. Tower safety measures for

consideration include:

(a) Lightning arresters.

(b) Construction to withstand strong winds and to support

two observers and their equipment.

(d) Provision of safety nets round the tower when warranted

by tower height.

(e) Painting it a dark color to reduce reflection from moon-

light.

(f) Installation of a suitable roof to shield personnel from

the elements without interference to observation. A

double-roof design could cause mortar rounds to

detonate at a height that affords some protection to

observers.

Control is the key to a successful base defense. To achieve the

necessary control, a communication capability must be established

between the base defense operations center and commanders of

sectors of responsibility, and between the sector commander and

his bunkers, towers, and reserve. Additionally, bunkers within

each section can communicate laterally within the sector, and

flank bunkers of one sector can communicate with flank bunkers

of adjacent sectors.

E-24. Training considerations.

Individual and collective training. Most of the training

required in support of base defense operations is currently a part

of individual and collective training programs. Individuals

designated to take any part in base defense operations will

probably require additional training in areas applicable to their

roles in the base defense effort. Training may be on:

E-20

90-8

(1)

Techniques of ambushes and raids and defensive measures

against these types of operations.

(2)

Use of hearing, sight, and smell as detection means.

(3)

Police-type patrolling and the operation of roadblocks and

checkpoints.

(4)

Night operations to include use of night observation devices

and sensors and special challenge, sign, and countersign

techniques.

(5)

Individual and crew-served weapons cross-training within

the unit.

(6)

Marksmanship, especially night firing.

(7)

Observation post operations with emphasis on security,

sound and light discipline, and reporting procedures.

(8)

Operation and operator maintenance of special devices such

as radars, sensors, and night observation devices

(if

employed).

(9)

Familiarization with all communications equipment available

within the unit and communication techniques.

(10)

Barrier construction, mines, and booby traps.

(11)

Patrolling of all types.

(12)

Counterattack.

(13)

Fire control.

b. Area orientation. All individuals require an orientation on the

guerrilla and his tactics, local customs, social values, and the

civilian population in the area. The capabilities and procedures of

civil police and indigenous forces are explained, since elements of

the base and base defense force may operate in conjunction with

them. Status-of-forces agreements and rules of engagement

concerning use of weapons must be covered.

Technical training. The most up-to-date surveillance, target

acquisition, and night observation (STANO) equipment should be

used in base defense operations. Its installation and operation

require special training. If enough specialists are not available,

the scope of training is expanded. Additional maintenance

specialists are also required to keep equipment operational and to

advise and assist operators on their maintenance responsibilities.

Maintenance and operator training is scheduled periodically to

ensure a current capability to use the equipment.

Morale and psychological factors. The morale and psycho-

logical pressures on troops employed in base defense operations

differ from those normally found in regular combat operations.

Many of these pressures are caused by infrequent contact with

E-21

160-739 O - 94 -

90-8

guerrillas and the requirement for constant vigilance. Other

factors include:

(1) Boredom caused by recurring routine tasks, which tends to

lead to laxity.

(2) The tendency to become inattentive, which occurs because

little physical activity is required in operating or monitoring

observation devices or sensor equipment.

(3) The disruption of normal sleep and eating routines, which

occurs when operations continue day and night.

(4) Long periods of relative inactivity, which may result if

training is not pursued vigorously.

Leader participation. Leaders at all echelons must carry out a

continuing indoctrination and motivation program to offset

psychological pressures. This is an important part of the training

program. Physical training and athletic and recreation programs

are essential to maintaining high morale.

E-25. Defense exercises.

Defense exercises provide a means for rehearsing the BDF

defense plans, to include testing of the base defense alarm and

communication systems, and for training and diverse elements of

the defense force to act in a coordinated effort.

b. Defense exercises are the final and most important step in the

training cycle. These exercises familiarize all elements of the

defense force, and the base tenant units, with their assignments

in base defense. The exercises are conducted frequently, under

various weather conditions, and during both daylight and dark-

ness.

Exercises include, but are not limited to:

(1) Defense of sectors of responsibility to include rehearsing

counterattacks and manning defense positions.

(2) Employment of the reserve for counterattacking and for

reinforcing the defense positions.

(3)

Coordination of supporting fires and other means of support.

(4) Integration of the emergency augmentation force with other

units of the defense force.

(5) Coordination with other forces of the base, such as the air

defense units that may be used in a ground defense role.

d. Command post exercises should be held frequently to:

(1) Train the staffs of all headquarters involved in base defense.

E-22

FM 90-8

APPENDIX F

Smoke, Flame, Herbicides, and Riot Control Agents

F-1. Employment.

This appendix provides guidance on the employment of chemical

agents and munitions in counterguerrilla operations.

The munitions are useful where there is difficulty in pinpointing

guerrilla locations, and where the area coverage provided by riot

control munitions would be greater than that of other available

weapon systems.

F-2. Smoke.

Smoke may be used to identify, signal, obscure, deceive, and

screen. It may be used to identify and signal targets, supply and

evacuation point, and friendly unit positions. It may also provide

the counterguerrilla commander with prearranged battlefield

communications.

Obscuring smoke is used on guerrilla positions to reduce their

ability to see and engage friendly targets. Deceptive smoke is used

to mislead guerrillas as to friendly force intentions. Screening

smoke is used in friendly operational areas, or between friendly

and guerrilla forces to deny guerrilla observation of areas where

friendly units are maneuvering, or resupply or recovery operations

are in progress. This type of smoke employment usually is not

required by the counterguerrilla commander until the later stages

of Phases II and III.

Smoke sources include:

(1) Mechanical smoke generators (large screen areas).

(2) Smoke grenades (small screens, signaling, identifying).

(3)

M110-pound smoke pot (small screen).

(4)

ABC-M5 30-pound smoke pot (small screen).

(5)

M42A and M207A1 floating smoke pot (small screens,

ground or water base).

(6)

WP mortar and WP and HC artillery rounds (obscuring,

signaling, deceiving, identifying).

(7)

WP tank rounds, 90-mm and 105-mm (small screens,

obscuring, signaling, identifying).

(8)

Grenade-launched round by tanks, Bradley fighting vehicle,

and M203 (small, individual screens).

F-1

90-8

(9) Vehicle engine exhaust smoke systems, tanks, and Bradley

fighting vehicle (small, individual screens).

(10) Aircraft-delivered smoke ordnance (large screens).

d._{Depending on the weather and terrain, smoke screening may not}

always be effective. For example, the wind could be too strong or

be blowing from the wrong direction. Signaling, identifying, and

obscuring are all good smoke missions in all phases of a

counterguerrilla operation.

F-3. Flame expedients and the M202.

Flaming fuel and hot shrapnel, exploding over an area up to 100

meters in diameter, is an effective defensive weapon. If a target is

to be pinpointed, then the M202 rocket can be used to flame a

hostile position.

b. The flame mine is an omnidirectional expedient that can be

command detonated or activated by a tripwire. It will scatter

flame and shrapnel over an area 20 to 80 meters in diameter,

depending on the size of the mine.

The fougasse (flame/shrapnel) expedient is similar to the mine

except that its explosive force is directional

(rather than

all-round). A 55-gallon barrel is often used as a container for fuel

and shrapnel. The barrel is placed in a V-trench, sandbagged in

place, and an explosive charge is placed behind the barrel. When

exploded, the flaming fuel and pieces of metal are blown out to a

distance of 100 meters or more (in a broad V-pattern).

The M202 rocket launcher contains four rockets that burst into

flame on impact. The aiming device on the launcher provides

on-target accuracy for close-in combat.

F-4. Herbicides.

a. The United States renounces first use of herbicides in war except

use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use and the

rules of engagement, for control of vegetation within US bases

and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters

to clear observation and fields of fire.

b. Herbicides have the potential to destroy food production and

defoliate large areas. The US will not use herbicides in this way,

unless they are first used against US forces and the President

directs their use in retaliation.

F-5. Riot control agents.

a. The United States renounces the first use of riot control agents

(RCA) in war, except defensively to save lives. The use of RCA is

F-2

FM 90-8

not governed by the same policy as chemical agents. Since they

are not used to injure or kill and their effects are short lived, there

are times when the use of RCA is more appropriate than

conventional weapons.

Commonly used not control agents contain chemicals that cause

vomiting, sneezing, and watering (tears) of the eyes.

RCA containers include hand grenades and 40-mm cartridge

grenades (M203 launcher). When used, the grenades, whether

thrown or fired, are directed upwind of the target so the chemical

particulate (vapor) will drift onto the hostile position.

RCAs are used to force guerrillas from tunnels, caves, and

buildings in an effort to take them prisoner. When counterguerrilla

units probe possible ambush sites, RCAs may be employed to

flush guerrillas and take prisoners.

When counterguerrilla units are in defensive positions, canister of

RCA (containing the agent in powder form) maybe detonated by

remote control. This type of agent causes reactions similar to RCA

vapor agents and blisters the skin.

Counterguerrilla personnel will wear the protective mask and

cover exposed skin areas when employing RCAs. Decontamination,

after RCA missions, requires troops to wash skin areas and brush

or wash clothing.

F-3

FM 90-8

APPENDIX G

Operations and Techniques

Section I. General

G-1. Tactical variations.

Chapter 3 presents an overview of the most common types of

tactical counterguerrilla operations conducted in an insurgency.

This appendix presents techniques that may be employed when

conducting those operations.

Chart G-1 presents some of the most common operations and

techniques that a counterguerrilla force employs. Generally,

large-scale operations are more suited to the later stages of an

insurgency while small unit tactics are more suited to the whole

spectrum (see page G-2).

G-2. Standard operations.

With minor adaptations (Chapter 3), some operations discussed in FM

7-10 and FM 7-20 can be used for counterguerrilla warfare. These

operations include raids, movements to contact, hasty attacks,

deliberate attacks, reconnaissance in force, exploitations, and

pursuits.

Section Il. Operations.

G-3. Encirclement.

Encirclement is designed to cut off all ground routes for escape

and reinforcement of the encircled guerrilla force. It offers the best

possibility for fixing guerrilla forces in position and achieving

decisive results. Battalion and larger units may conduct en-

circlements.

b. The company and smaller units normally lack enough men and

command and control capability to conduct encirclements (except

against small, concentrated guerrilla forces). All units of the

brigade may participate in encirclements conducted by a larger

force.

Planning, preparation, and execution are aimed at complete

encirclement of the guerrilla force. Maximum security and

surprise can be gained by completing the encirclement during

darkness.

Encircling movements are executed rapidly. Use of air assault

and airborne troops can contribute speed and surprise to the early

G-1

90-8

Initial occupation is the most critical period of an encirclement. If

large guerrilla formations realize that they are being encircled,

they can be expected to react immediately to probe for gaps or

attack weak points to force a gap.

Units occupying the encircling positions provide strong combat

patrols well to their front to give early warning of attempted

breakouts and to block escape routes. Mobile reserves are

positioned for immediate movement to counter any threat of a

breakout, and to reinforce difficult areas such as deep ravines or

areas containing cave or tunnel complexes.

Indirect fire support can cloak an impending encirclement by

gaining and maintaining the guerrilla’s attention while encircling

units move into position. Fires, including field artillery, should be

planned in detail to support the encirclement after it is discovered.

G-4. Contraction.

Following the initial encirclement, the capture or destruction of

the guerrilla force is methodical and thorough. Fire and maneuver

are used in a simultaneous, controlled contraction of the en-

circlement.

b. As the line of encirclement is contracted, and depending on

terrain, units may be removed from the line and added to the

reserve. Against small guerrilla forces, the entire encircled area

may be cleared by contraction; however, against larger guerrilla

forces, it is probable that, at some point, some action other than

further contraction will be required (Figure G-l).

Figure G-1. Contraction technique.

G-3

90-8

One technique, employed after some degree of contraction, is to

employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the perimeter

while part of the encirclement forces the guerrillas against the

blocking force by offensive action. Either element may accomplish

the actual destruction, but it is usually accomplished by the

attacking element. This technique is most effective when the

blocking force is located on, or immediately to the rear of, a

natural terrain obstacle.

G-5. Hammer and anvil.

In this method, one or more units in the encirclement remain

stationary while the others drive the guerrilla unit against it (Figure

G-2).

Figure G-2. Hammer and anvil technique.

G-6. The wedge.

This method is used after some contraction. A unit is used to divide the

enemy while the encircling elements remain in place. After the

guerrilla force has been broken up into smaller elements, either

contraction or the hammer and anvil technique is used (Figure G-3).

G-4

90-8

Figure G-3. Wedge technique.

Section III. Civil Disturbances and Searches

G-7. US involvement.

While it is preferable to have host country forces control civil

disturbances, US forces may be forced by circumstances to conduct

them and be involved in search operations. (The type of civil

disturbance provides the necessary counteraction guidelines; for

detailed information refer to FM 19-15.)

G-8. Search techniques.

Searches are commonly used in population and resources control

operations. They include use of checkpoints and roadblocks to control

traffic and to reduce the capability of the guerrilla to move personnel

and materiel freely.

Special equipment required. For a checkpoint to achieve

maximum results, special equipment is required. Portable signs in

the native language and in English should be available. Signs

should denote the speed limit of approach, vehicle search area,

vehicle parking area, male and female search areas, and

dismount point. Lighting is needed for the search area at night.

Communication is required between the various troop units

supporting the checkpoint operation. Barbed-wire obstacles

G-5

FM 90-8

across the road and around the search area should be provided.

Troops must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to

halt a vehicle attempting to flee or crash through the checkpoint.

b.Method. The checkpoint is established by placing two parallel

obstacles (each with a gap) across the road. The distance (in

meters) between obstacles depends on the amount of traffic that is

held in the search area. The blocked section of road can be used as

the search area. If possible, there should be a place (adjacent to the

road) where large vehicles can be searched without delaying the

flow of other traffic (which can be dealt with more quickly). Areas

are required for searching female suspects and detaining persons

for further interrogation. If possible, the personnel manning a

checkpoint should include a member of the civil police, an

interpreter, and a trained female searcher. When searching a

vehicle, all occupants are made to get out and stand clear of the

vehicle. The driver should be made to observe the search of his

vehicle. The searcher is always covered by an assistant. When

searching, politeness and consideration are shown at all times.

The occupants of the vehicle can be searched simultaneously, if

sufficient searchers are available (Figure G-4).

Figure G-4. Area search technique.

G-6

90-8

G-9. Search of persons, areas.

Searches can be classified as searches of individuals and searches of

populated areas.

Searching individuals.

(1)

Frisk search. The frisk is a quick search of an individual

for weapons, evidence, or contraband. It is conducted

preferably in the presence of an assistant and a witness. In

conducting the frisk, the searcher stands behind the suspect.

The searcher’s assistant takes a position from which he can

cover the suspect with his weapon. The suspect is required to

raise his arms. The searcher then slides his hands over the

individual’s entire body, crushing the clothing to locate

concealed objects.

(2)

Wall search. Based on the principle of rendering the

suspect harmless by placing him in a strained, awkward

position, the wall search affords the searcher a degree of

safety. It is particularly useful when two searchers must

search several suspects. Any upright surface, such as a wall,

vehicle, or a tree, may be utilized.

(a)

Position of suspect. The suspect is required to face

the wall (or other object) and lean against it, supporting

himself with his upraised hands placed far apart and

fingers spread. His feet are placed well apart, turned

out, parallel to the wall, and as far from the wall as

possible. His head is kept down.

(b)

Position of searcher’s assistant. The searcher’s

assistant stands on the opposite side of the suspect

(from the searcher) and to the rear. He covers the

suspect with his weapon. When the searcher moves

from his original position to the opposite side of the

suspect, the assistant also changes position. The

searcher walks around his assistant during this

change to avoid coming between his assistant and the

suspect.

suspect from the right side. The searcher’s weapon

must not be in such a position that the suspect can grab

it. When searching from the right side, the searcher

places his right foot in front of the suspect’s right foot

and makes and maintains ankle-to-ankle contact.

From this position, if the suspect offers resistance, the

suspect’s right foot can be pushed back from under

him. When searching from the left side of the suspect

G-7

90-8

the searcher places his left foot in front of the suspect’s

left foot and again maintains ankle-to-ankle contact.

(d)

Initial position. In taking his initial position, the

searcher should be alert to prevent the suspect from

suddenly attempting to disarm or injure him. The

searcher first searches the suspect’s headgear. The

searcher then checks the suspect’s hands, arms, right

side of the body, and right leg, in sequence. The

searcher repeats the procedure in searching the

suspect’s left side. He crushes the suspect’s clothing

between his fingers; he does not merely pat it. He pays

close attention to armpits, back, waist, legs and tops of

boots or shoes. Any item found that is not considered a

weapon or evidence is replaced in the suspect’s pocket.

If the suspect resists or attempts escape and has to be

thrown down prior to completing the search, the search

is started over from the beginning.

(e)

Switch of multiple suspects. When two or more

suspects are to be searched, they must assume a

position against the same wall or object but far enough

apart so that they cannot reach one another. The

searcher’s assistant takes his position a few paces to

the rear of the line with his weapon ready. The search is

begun with the suspect on the right of the line. On

completing the search of one suspect, he is moved to the

left of the line and resumes the positon against the

wall. Thus, in approaching and searching the next

suspect, the searcher is not between his assistant and a

suspect.

(3)

Strip search. This type of search is usually necessary

when the individual is suspected of being a guerrilla leader or

important messenger. The search is conducted preferably in

an enclosed space, such as a room or tent. The searching

technique can be varied. One method is to use two unarmed

searchers while an assistant, who is armed, stands guard.

The suspect’s clothing and shoes are removed and searched

carefully. A search is then made of his person, including his

mouth, nose, ears, hair, armpits, crotch, and other areas of

possible concealment.

(4)

Search of females. The guerrilla force will make maximum

use of females for all types of tasks where search may be a

threat. Counterguerrilla forces must make maximum use of

female searchers. If female searchers cannot be provided, a

doctor or aidman should be considered for use in searching

female suspects. The search of females is an extremely

G-8

FM 90-8

delicate matter. When male soldiers must search females,

every possible measure must be taken to prevent even the

slightest inference of sexual molestation or assault.

Searching populated areas. There are four fundamentals used

when conducting a search.

(1)

Approach. On some operations, the situation may allow

mounted movement directly into the area to be searched. On

others, the situation may dictate dismounted movement into

the area. Emphasis is placed on rapid and coordinated

entrance into the area.

(2)

Surrounding the area. During darkness, troops approach

silently by as many different routes as possible. At first

daylight, the area can be occupied by a chain of observation

posts with gaps covered by patrols. Normally, a large area

cannot be completely surrounded for any length of time

because of the number of troops required. If necessary, troops

dig in, take advantage of natural cover, and use barbed wire

to help maintain their line.

(3)

Reserves. If there is a chance that hostile elements from

outside the area could interfere, measures are taken to

prevent them from joining the inhabitants of the area under

search. Air observers can assist by detecting and giving

early warning of any large-scale movement toward the occupied

area.

(4)

Search parties.

(a)

The officer in command of the operation informs the

inhabitants that the area is to be searched, that a house

curfew is in force, and that all inhabitants must remain

indoors. Or, he may require the inhabitants to gather at

a central point and then have the search party move in

and begin the search. Search parties are usually

composed of search teams.

(b)

When a decision is made to gather inhabitants at a

central point, the head of the house should accompany

the search party when his house is searched. If this is

not done, he can deny knowledge of anything incrimi-

nating that is found, or he can accuse the troops of theft

and looting. In small searches, it may be practical to

ask the head of each household to sign a certificate

stating that nothing has been illegally removed, but in

a large search this may be impractical. In order to

avoid accusations of theft, witnesses should be present

during the search. A prominent member of the com-

G-9

FM 90-8

munity should accompany each search team, if

possible.

(c)

Buildings are searched from top to bottom, if possible.

Mine detectors are used to search for arms and

ammunition. Every effort is made to avoid unnecessary

damage. Each house or building searched is marked

with a coded designation. This same designation can

be used to list occupants who must be accounted for in

subsequent searches, and the designation helps ensure

that no building is overlooked in the search.

(d)

If a house is vacant, or if an occupant refuses entry, it

may be necessary to force entry. If a house containing

property is searched while its occupants are away, it

should be secured to prevent looting. Before troops

depart, the commander should make arrangements

with the community to protect such houses until the

occupants return.

(5) Search teams.

(a)

Special teams may be formed for search operations. In

searching small areas (a few buildings), small units

can conduct a search without special teams for each

function.

(b)

Search teams may require these capabilities:

•

Reconnaissance.

•

Physical or visual search.

•

Fire support.

•

Control.

•

Prisoner detection.

•

Mine detection.

•

Scout dogs.

•

Riot control agents, flame weapons, and demo-

litions.

•

Tunnel reconnaissance team.

•

Interrogation.

•

Documentation.

• Psychological/civil affairs operations.

G-10

FM 90-8

(6)

House search. Each search party assigned to search an

occupied building should consist of at least one local

policeman, a protective escort, and a female searcher, if

appropriate. The search party must first assemble everyone.

The civil police may give the necessary orders and do the

actual searching. The object of this search is to screen for

suspected persons. Apprehended persons are evacuated as

soon as possible. Troops may perform this task. Escort

parties and transportation must be planned in advance.

(7)

Village search.

(a)

Prior to conducting search operations in a village, a

reconnaissance patrol is sent out to gain information

about the village and its inhabitants. The patrol avoids

detection. A portion of the patrol maintains surveillance

over the village while the remainder of the patrol

returns with information. This is done to detect any

changes which may take place prior to the security

element going into position. Information of value to a

commander includes:

• Size and exact location of the village.

• Fortifications (mantraps, spiketraps).

• Warning systems.

• Tunnel systems.

• Where does the insurgent live? Does he live in the

forest at night and inhabit the village during the

day, or does he stay in the village night and day?

Does he inhabit one or more huts?

• How many people are there in the village?

(b)

The security and search elements use one of two

general methods of movement.

•

If aviation support is available, a quick-strike air

assault operation is employed. This type of operation

is characterized by speed.

• If the elements conduct a dismounted operation,

they normally use designated routes. This type of

operation is characterized by secure and rapid

movement.

• A village may be searched as follows:

• First method - assemble inhabitants in a central

location (if they appear to be hostile). This method

provides maximum control, facilitates a thorough

search, denies insurgents an opportunity to conceal

G-11

90-8

evidence, and allows for detailed interrogation. It

has the disadvantage of taking the inhabitants

away from their dwellings, thus encouraging

looting which, in turn, engenders ill feelings.

• Second method — restrict inhabitants to their

homes. This method prohibits movement of civilians,

allows them to stay in their dwellings, and discour-

ages looting. The disadvantages are that it makes

control and interrogation difficult and gives

inhabitants time to conceal evidence in their

homes.

•

Third method — control head of household. The

head of each household is told to remain in front of

his house while all others are brought to a central

location. During the search, the head of each

household accompanies the search team through

his house. Looting is minimized, and the head of

the household can see that the search team did not

steal property. This is the best method for controlling

the population.

(d)

Search teams must search thoroughly for insurgent

personnel, equipment, escape tunnels, or caches. Cattle

pens, wells, haystacks, gardens, fence lines, and

cemeteries should be investigated. Search teams are

constantly alert for booby traps.

(e)

After the house search is completed, the perimeter and

area between the security element and the village is

searched. There are two methods:

• One — if the security element has not been

discovered, the search element may be formed into

sections, each section searching a portion of the

perimeter. Should any section flush an insurgent

out of the vegetation or tunnel exit, the security

element captures the person, or shoots at him, if he

attempts to escape.

• Two — if the security element has been discovered,

it conducts the perimeter search. Part of this

element keeps the village isolated, while the

remainder conducts the search. Such a search

could take hours if the terrain is extremely dense.

Regardless of the terrain, the search unit checks

possible locations for caches of materiel or insurgents

in hiding.

(f)

In areas where tunnels have been reported, it is

imperative that the search unit have a tunnel recon-

G-12

90-8

naissance team attached. This team should be composed

of volunteers trained for this type of operation. They

should have special equipment such as flashlights or

miner helmets, protective masks, communication with

the surface, and silencer-equipped pistols. They should

know how to sketch a tunnel system, and they should

recover all items of intelligence interest.

Section IV. Movement Security

G-10. TWO categories.

Movement security can be divided into two categories: security of

convoys with strong security detachments, and security of convoys

with weak security detachments.

G-11. Strong convoy security.

Special combined-arms teams may be organized and trained to

accompany and protect convoys. The security detachment is

organized with adequate combat power to suppress guerrilla

ambushes. Its size and composition depend upon the physical

characteristics of the area, the capability of the enemy force, and

the size and composition of the convoy.

In any case, the security detachment should have the following

subordinate elements:

(1) A headquarters element to provide command, control, and

communication.

(2)

A medical support element.

(3) An armored element to provide firepower and shock effect.

(4)

A mechanized or motorized infantry element.

(5)_{A combat engineer element to make minor repairs to bridges}

and roads and to detect and remove mines and obstacles.

For large convoys, the security detachment should include field

artillery. Ideally, half of the artillery would be placed well forward

in the column and half near the rear of the column. The artillery

command and control element would move in the vicinity of the

security detachment headquarters. This arrangement allows the

most flexibility for providing artillery fire support to elements of

the column in the event of ambush.

The combined-arms security detachment is usually interspersed

throughout the convoy so that the various elements can be

employed either as a fixing element or attacking element, as

required.

The formation of a security detachment and its integration into a

convoy varies because the enemy may be expected to observe

G-13

90-8

convoy patterns and prepare their ambushes to cope with

expected formations. Tanks lead the convoy to gain maximum

advantage from their mobility and firepower. If no tanks are

available, a heavy vehicle with sandbags placed to protect

personnel from mines should lead the convoy.

A strong attack element is placed at the rear of the convoy

formation where it has maximum flexibility in moving forward to

attack any force attempting to ambush the head or center of the

convoy.

The enemy force may allow the advance guard to pass the site of

the main ambush and then block the road and attack the main

body and the advance guard separately.

At the first indication of an ambush, vehicles attempt to move out

of the kill zone. If necessary to halt, vehicles stop in place; they do

not drive to the roadsides or shoulders, which may be mined.

Specified individuals (following the unit SOP) immediately return

fire from inside vehicles to cover dismounting personnel. These

individuals dismount last under cover of fire by those who

dismounted first. Upon dismounting, personnel caught in the kill

zone open fire and immediately assault toward the ambush force

and then establish a base of fire. Tanks open fire and maneuver

toward the ambush force or to the most favorable ground in the

immediate vicinity.

While the engaged element continues its action to protect the

convoy, the commander rapidly surveys the situation and issues

orders to the designated attack elements to begin predrilled

offensive maneuvers against the guerrilla force. The fire of the

engaged security element is used to fix the ambush force and is

coordinated with that of the attacking element.

After the guerrilla force is destroyed or neutralized, security

details are posted to cover convoy reorganization. The convoy

commander, using the fastest communication available, briefs

his commander on the engagement. Captured guerrilla personnel

are interrogated as to where they planned to reassemble, and this

information is reported immediately to higher headquarters.

After an ambush, patrols maybe sent to interrogate and, if

necessary, apprehend suspected civilians living near or along the

routes of approach to the ambush positions.

G-12. Weak convoy security.

If the security detachment accompanying a convoy is too weak for

decisive action against a guerrilla attack or ambush, the

following principles apply:

G-14

FM 90-8

(1) Some of the troops are placed well forward in the convoy, and

the remainder are placed a short distance to the rear.

⁽²⁾ Radio contact is maintained between the two groups.

(3) Sharp curves, steep grades, or other areas where slow speeds

are necessary are reconnoitered by foot troops before

passage.

At the first indication of ambush, leading vehicles, if the road

appears clear, increase speed to the safe maximum in an effort to

smash through the ambush area. Troops from vehicles halted in

the ambush area dismount and immediately return fire. Troops

from vehicles breaking through the ambush dismount and

assault the flanks of the ambush position. Both attacking groups

must exercise care that they do not fire on each other.

If the enemy force allows the main convoy to pass through and

then ambushes the rear guard, troops from the main body return

and attack the flanks of the ambush position.

G-15

FM 90-8

APPENDIX H

Related Operations

Section I. General

H-1. Five operations.

This appendix describes the five major operations found in internal

defense and development, and in foreign internal defense besides

tactical operations. They are: intelligence, psychological operations,

civil affairs, populace and resources control, and advisory assistance.

H-2. IDAD support.

While the brigade commander is primarily concerned with tactical

operations in strike campaigns, he also recognizes that these five

operations exist and support a whole range of activities in a COIN

program. In consolidation campaigns, these operations normally take

precedence, and tactical operations assume a supporting role. While

the emphasis on any single operation may shift in response to the

requirements of the situation, all of these operations occur simultaneously

and continuously.

Section Il. Intelligence

H-3. Information sources.

When operating in a counterinsurgency environment, the

population is considered a major source of intelligence. Since the

conflict revolves around the population, the populace usually has

a wealth of information that can be exploited.

b. In FID, intelligence organization requirements fall into three

areas: preparedness, advice and assistance, and support of US

units.

(1)

The first area is preparedness. In this area, intelligence

requirements are generated and filled in anticipation of a

counterinsurgency. This intelligence production is designed

to fulfill contingency requirements. Examples of these

requirements are backg2round biographies, area studies, and

order of battle for guerrilla forces in areas likely to become

involved in an insurgency.

(2) The second area. is advice and assistance to host country

intelligence organizations. This advice and assistance is

H-1

FM 90-8

designed to increase the capabilities of the host country

intelligence organization.

(3)

The third area is designed to fulfill operational requirements

for committed US units.

Some of the primary objectives of US intelligence organizations

in FID are to:

(1) Determine the indicators of an impending insurgency.

(2)_{Obtain or develop enemy intelligence which can be utilized to}

launch surgical strikes by US forces.

(3)

Obtain information about the insurgent, weather, terrain,

and population.

(4)

Reduce to a minimum insurgent espionage; subversion, and

sabotage.

(5)

Identify the main sources of discontent among the people.

(6)

Identify the true nature, aims, leadership, potential power,

and most likely course of action of the insurgency.

(7)

Identify and penetrate the insurgent infrastructure.

The internal defense intelligence system consists of all host

country military and civilian intelligence systems plus all US

intelligence resources which are committed in-country to assist in

preventing or defeating an insurgency. These agencies are

coordinated and integrated under a single directorship in the

National Internal Defense Coordination Center. The intelligence

resources of committed counterguerrilla forces are an integral

part of this intelligence system. National agencies are usually

targeted toward more strategic demands that require long-term

intelligence networks and systems. Counterguerrilla force

intelligence assets are usually targeted toward tactical battlefield

intelligence requirements and use intelligence gained through

national systems.

H-4. Intelligence production.

Intelligence production in counterguerrilla operations in foreign

internal defense operations is done in accordance with the intelligence

cycle which consists of directing the intelligence effort, collecting raw

information, processing this information into finished intelligence,

and disseminating the intelligence for use by the commander and his

staff.

Directing. The intelligence effort is directed by the intelligence

officer. He translates the commander’s guidance and concept of

the operation into specific, prioritized intelligence requirements.

H-2

FM 90-8

A continuously updated collection plan provides the intelligence

officer with a logical, orderly system for directing the collection

effort. Ideally, it ensures that all information necessary is

collected in time to be of use and that all possible sources of

information are exploited by appropriate collection agencies.

Collecting. The need to exploit all sources of information will

require resourceful, flexible, and aggressive direction and

coordination of the intelligence collection effort. It is essential

that commanders and intelligence officers be fully aware of the

capabilities and limitations of all available intelligence resources

in order to make the best use of them. Among the collection

techniques employed is the use of standard procedures as well as

the use of expedients and improvisations necessitated or

permitted by local conditions and resources, and the employment

of specialized intelligence personnel and equipment which may be

placed in support of the brigade.

Processing. Processing is the phase of the intelligence cycle

whereby information becomes intelligence. Raw

(combat)

information from all sources is evaluated, correlated, and

analyzed to produce an all-source product. The effort to produce

intelligence necessary to support counterguerrilla operations in

foreign internal defense will require continual and close

coordination with higher, subordinate, adjacent, supporting, and

cooperating civil and military intelligence agencies and elements.

Disseminating and using. The timely dissemination of

available intelligence and its immediate use is of vital importance

in counterguerrilla operations in foreign internal defense.

Primary, alternate, and special intelligence channels of communi-

cation may be established when facilities and resources permit.

H-5. Civilian population.

Exploitation of civilian sources of information in counterguerrilla

operations normally requires a sophisticated intelligence organization

which is resident within the population. However, as the counterguerilla

campaign progresses, the civilian populace can be expected to

volunteer increasing amounts of intelligence information within the

brigade operational area.

a. Type of information. Civilian sources or informants normally

may be expected to provide the following information:

(1)

Details of the local terrain.

(2)

Ideological motivation and sympathies of local residents.

(3)

Logistical support available, or potentially available, to

guerrillas operating in the area.

H-3

90-8

(4)

Potential guerrilla targets or objectives.

(5)

Identification of covert or part-time members of the guerrilla

force.

(6)

Sabotage, espionage, and terrorism techniques and activities

of the guerrilla and underground support organizations.

(7)

Weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the guerrilla force.

(8)

Psychological operations by the guerrilla force and the

impact on the local population.

Information source file. To expedite the evaluation of

information provided by the civilian populace, it may become

necessary for brigade intelligence personnel to establish records

which quickly identify local sources of information and the degree

of reliability of such sources. When established, this information

source file should include such information as:

(1)

Name, photograph, and physical description of source.

(2)

Area in which source(s) can obtain information.

(3)

Factors contributing to source’s motivation to cooperate

with counterguerilla forces.

(4) Information collection capabilities of source, to include

indication of training received.

(5)

Method by which source is contacted.

(6) Record of payments or other remuneration, if made to source.

(7) Record of productivity and reliability of source.

Overt exploitation of civilian sources. In overt exploitation,

a source is contacted openly by the intelligence officer or one of his

recognizable agencies, and information is solicited directly. This

method has the advantage of providing for the immediate

collection of information, but frequently entails significant

disadvantages, to include:

(1)

The information requirements of the brigade or battalion are

made apparent to the source, thus entailing a security risk.

(2)

The source may not cooperate fully because of lack of

motivation or because of fear of reprisal.

Clandestine exploitation of civilian sources. Clandestine

intelligence techniques are necessary in counterguerrilla

operations in foreign internal defense to complement overt

collection efforts in determining location, strength, and capability

of guerrilla forces, underground cells, and civilian supporters.

Normally, at brigade or battalion level, it is difficult, if not

impossible, to establish an original clandestine collection or

H-4

90-8

informant system during the time the brigade or battalion is in a

particular area of operations. Therefore, the S2 should support

and utilize reliable informant or clandestine collection operations

being conducted by other US, allied, or host country agencies

within the brigade or battalion area of interest. Intelligence

collected through clandestine exploitation of civilian sources of

information is made available to counterguerrilla commanders

through an area control center, joint operations-intelligence

center, or a similar facility established to coordinate internal

defense and development operations.

H-6. Counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence increases the security of all forces and increases

the probability of attaining surprise in operations against guerrilla

forces. Adequate security measures are developed and continuously

enforced to prevent penetration of the intelligence operation by hostile

elements and to detect hostile elements already within the operation.

Since guerrilla forces are usually numerically inferior to those of the

host country, allied, and US forces opposing them, the guerrilla

depends heavily on intelligence for successful operations. US brigades,

in coordination with host country authorities, must habitually place

emphasis on counterintelligence measures.

Denial measures. Denial measures particularly applicable to

counterguerrilla operations may include:

(1)

Removal of compromised informant sources from the area of

operations.

(2)

Restrictions on movement and communication facilities of

the civilian population within the area of operations.

(3)

Thorough briefing of all US, allied, and attached host

country personnel in the intelligence practices and techniques

used by the guerrilla and his underground support organization

and on the security of information.

(4)

Emphasis on the secure disposal of trash and waste matter.

(5)

Employment of silent weapons by patrols.

(6)

Normal activity, while preparing for operations, to preclude

indication to the guerrilla force of a change in routine.

(7)

Maintenance of strict security concerning current or

projected logistical movements and the nature of supplies.

(8)

Conduct of major troop movements under the concealment of

darkness or during inclement weather and by the most rapid

means of movement available.

H-5

FM 90-8

Detection measures. Appropriate detection measures in

counterguerrilla operations may include:

(1)

Background investigations and screening of all civilians

employed by, or operating with, US and host country forces,

and those in civil positions. Particular attention is given to

the control of guides or trackers who are familiar with the

location, disposition, and objectives of the friendly forces.

(2)

Surveillance of all known or suspected members of the

guerrilla force and its infrastructure.

(3)

Extensive employment of trip flares and ambushes in areas

of suspected guerrilla reconnaissance activity.

(4)

Employment of infantry scout dogs, if available, in conjunction

with other security measures.

(5)

Maximum emphasis on visual and electronic observation.

Augmentation of organic visual aids and electronic detection

devices is frequently required.

(6)

Monitoring civil communication media.

(7)

Employment of civil policewomen for search and interrogation

of women and children.

(8)

Counterintelligence screening of the entire population of

settlements suspected of intelligence activities in support of

guerrilla force.

(9)

Wide distribution of photographs of known guerrillas or key

underground personnel to assist in the apprehension.

(10)

Offering rewards for information leading to the capture of

informants or other agents supporting the guerrilla force.

(11)

Periodic photographs of all residents of villages within the

guerrilla area of influence and comparison of these photo-

graphs to determine additions to, or deletions from, the

population during the interim period.

(12)

Issue of closely controlled identification cards to all residents

of the area of operations. In counterguerrilla operations,

counterintelligence activities normally are complicated by

the presence of large numbers of civilians of unknown

reliance; it is difficult to distinguish among the friendly,

neutral, and hostile elements. All possible security measures

which facilitate identification of these elements are employed

continually.

Deception measures. In counterguerrilla operations, units

habitually plan and execute small-scale cover and deception.

H-6

90-8

Section Ill. Psychological Operations

H-7. Create support.

Psychological operations in foreign internal defense include propaganda

and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and

behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups to support the

achievement of national objectives. (For further information on

psychological operations, see FM 33-1.)

H-8. Brigade PSYOP.

The purpose of brigade psychological operations is to enhance the

probability of accomplishing the brigade’s various foreign internal

defense missions. This is achieved by employing psychological

principles to lessen or exploit the effects of tactical or nontactical

operations upon the population and/or the guerrilla force.

H-9. Concept.

a. The overall psychological operation program for a given host

country is established at the national level by a US-host country

agency. This program provides guidelines for succeeding lower

military and civilan echelons to use in the quest for popular

support.

b. Counterguerrilla units must ensure that their PSYOP is consistent

with and supports US national objectives and the host country

national PSYOP program. The brigade employs psychological

operations to support its tactical strike and consolidation

missions and to support intelligence operations, civil affairs

operations, and advisory assistance operations. Care is exercised

to ensure that the allegiance of the people is directed toward the

host country rather than toward US brigade forces, and that

announced programs and projects are attainable. Coordination is

accomplished in the local area control center.

H-10. Organization.

a. The psychological operations staff officer(s) and unit(s) perform

assigned missions in the same manner as other specialized units

or staff members that are attached to, or placed in support of, the

brigade or battalion. When such support is not available, a

member or section of the unit staff is assigned responsibility for

incorporating psychological operation considerations into plans,

action, and operations.

H-7

FM 90-8

b.Psychological operation resources are provided either from

higher headquarters units or from TOE resources. Psychological

operation units provide, in addition to advice, support in the form

of loudspeaker teams, leaflets, and various other audiovisual

media.

H-11. Operations.

Properly integrated and employed in the planning and conduct of

operations and activities, psychological operations can facilitate

the accomplishment of the brigade’s mission. Counterguerrilla

forces must consider the employment of psychological operations

in all missions. Commanders and staff officers must realize that

all military operations have psychological implications. PSYOP

officers must be included in planning all activities.

The establishment of support bases and operational support

bases necessitates gaining the support of the populace in the

vicinity. Propaganda themes stress the purpose of US support

and the military civic action program; the need for laborers; the

effects of pilferage on the counterguerrilla effort; and that people

do not discuss US and host country military activities.

Within an insurgency context, PSYOP has five major objectives:

(1)

Assist the government in gaining the support of its popu-

lation.

(2)

Assist the government in defeating the insurgent movement.

(3)

Assist the government in providing psychological rehabili-

tation for returnees from the subversive insurgent move-

ment.

(4)

Establish and maintain a favorable image in the host

country.

(5)

Influence neutral groups and the world community.

The major tasks of US PSYOP in an insurgency (when US combat

forces are not yet committed) are to:

(1)

Advise host country PSYOP personnel on how to best exploit

government programs.

(2)

Recommend techniques for maintaining morale of host

country forces.

(3) Assist host country and US information agencies and

activities in coordinating their efforts.

(4)_{Assist host country personnel regarding PSYOP programs}

which will motivate the people to actively support their

government.

H-8

90-8

(5)

Recommend programs which will adversely affect the in-

surgent.

The major tasks of US PSYOP personnel in an insurgency (when

US combat forces have been committed) are to:

(1) Coordinate PSYOP activities with host country units.

(2) Advise US and host country commanders regarding

insurgent activities and effects.

(3) Advise US commanders regarding the psychological effects

of military actions.

(4)

Assist in developing a PSYOP capability within host

country military forces.

There are five major target groups for PSYOP: the insurgent, the

population supporting the insurgent, the uncommitted population,

government personnel, and foreign audiences. Themes are

tailored to each of these groups to gain maximum effective

support for the government.

When targeting the insurgent:

(1)

The major PSYOP objective is to discredit the insurgent and

to isolate him from the population.

(2)

The most important direction of attack is against insurgent

unit morale.

(3)

Themes should publicize and exploit differences between

cadre, recruits, supporters, and the local population. Other

themes might stress lack of support, isolation, homesickness,

and hardships.

(4)

Amnesty programs often prove useful in neutralizing

insurgences. Amnesty programs are most effective when

they are sincere, credible, well publicized, directed against

lower ranking members of the insurgency, and offer

sufficient reason and benefits for quitting the insurgent

threat.

(5)

Amnesty programs do, however, have several disadvantages:

they recognize the insurgents as quasi-legitimate; they forgo

punishment of anyone accepting amnesty; and they increase

the image of the insurgent threat.

When targeting the population supporting the insurgent:

(1)

The PSYOP objective is to achieve withdrawal of support for

the insurgent and defection in place or person to the

legitimate government.

(2)

Themes should highlight insurgent shortcomings, ultimate

governmental victory, government successes, and the

H-9

160-739 O - 94 -

FM 90-8

practical advantages of surrendering or of accepting

amnesty.

When targeting the uncommitted population:

(1)

The major PSYOP mission is to build national morale, unity,

and confidence in the government.

(2)

There should also be a major effort to win popular acceptance

of the government force, and convince the people that

government programs serve their interests, government

forces can protect them, ultimate government victory is

assured, and the people have major intelligence and

counterintelligence roles to play.

When targeting government personnel:

(1)

Seek to maintain loyalties and develop policies and attitudes

which will result in group members who will realize the

importance of popular support, promote public welfare and

justice, take action to eliminate the basic causes of the

subversive insurgency, and protect the population from the

subversive insurgent.

(2)

Indoctrinate host country security and military forces

regarding the importance of the civilian population in IDAD

operations. Each soldier must understand that his actions

toward the people may spell the difference between success

and failure.

(3)

When government personnel interact with neutral and

nonhostile elements of the population, the emphasis should

be positive and constructive. PSYOP efforts should publicize

the tangible and visible accomplishments of the legitimate

government.

(4)

PSYOP should discourage public apathy and activity that

helps the insurgent.

(5)

The people should not be asked to undertake any activity

which is contrary to their own best interests.

When targeting foreign audiences, there are two major groups to

be addressed: neutral nations and hostile nations. For neutral

nations, the purpose of PSYOP is to achieve friendly neutrality or

active support for the legitimate government. For hostile powers,

the major PSYOP objective is to influence public opinion against

involvement in supporting the insurgency.

US PSYOP attempts to establish and maintain a favorable US

image. The themes most useful in establishing an image are that

the US presence is requested by host country government, it is

legal and necessary, it is temporary, and it is advisory.

H-10

90-8

In combat actions, every effort is made to provide for the safety of

the civilian population and, if possible, to separate them from the

guerrilla forces so that maximum available firepower can be

employed against the guerrilla. The decision to employ psychological

operation media to accomplish this task is carefully weighed

against compromising surprise and security.

Intelligence operations are facilitated by employing psychological

operation media to inform the people that they should report to the

proper authority information pertaining to strangers, suspicious

persons, unusual activities by neighbors, and guerrilla activities.

Posters and leaflets provide definitive instruction as to persons

and places that are available to receive this information. The

message indicates what rewards, if any, are available.

Captured or defected leaders of the guerrilla force are exploited.

Written and broadcast messages prepared by these individuals

and reviewed by trained psychological operation personnel are

used in communities suspected of supporting guerrilla forces, and

in tactical operations against guerrilla forces.

Section IV. Civil Affairs

H-12. Government-building.

The civil affairs (CA) role in FID takes the form of civic assistance

and civic action.

Civic assistance is defined as providing advice and assistance to

indigenous civil and military authorities in the sociological,

economic, and political aspects of a civil emergency, disorder, or

IDAD. It is commonly referred to as “government-building” since

it is directed toward the structures of government. Military civic

action is defined as the participation findigenous military forces

in short-term projects which are useful to the local population and

which contribute to social and economic development.

Civic action programs are divided into long-range and short-range

programs. The former deals with the resolution of social and

economic problems; the latter is designed to gain and retain the

loyalty of the population.

CA operations are a responsibility of military commanders at

every echelon. They include any activity of military forces

concerned with relationships between the military forces and the

civil authorities and people in the area. Activities may range from

military civic action projects to the exercise of certain authority

that normally is the responsibility of the local government.

H-11

FM 90-8

H-13. Operational scope.

The scope of CA operations varies with the type of local

government and is influenced by the economic, social, and

political backg2round of the country and people. Some major CA

activities include:

(1) Prevention of civilian interference with military operations.

(2)

Support of government functions.

(3)

Community relations.

(4) Military civic action.

(5) Assistance for populace and resources control.

(6)_{Civil defense.}

The overall objective of CA in FID is to mobilize and motivate

civilians to assist the government and military forces. The

operations are directed at eliminating or reducing military,

political, economic, and sociological problems. Close and

continuous PSYOP support is needed to maximize the effect of

CA.

All military units have a capability to conduct CA, particularly

military civic action. Major roles in military civic action are

frequently undertaken by engineer, transportation, medical, and

other units having assets suited to support military civic action

projects.

There are several judgmental factors that should be considered

before a military unit undertakes a civic action project:

(1)_{Is the project needed and wanted?}

(2)

Will military participation compromise civilian authority

and responsibility?

(3)Does the project support the unit’s political-military

mission?

(4)

Does the project comply with the host country FID plan?

(5)

Will the project duplicate other efforts?

(6)

Will the people be involved in the project?

(7)

Will there be continuity of effort?

Both civic assistance and civic action are geared to the phase of

insurgency they are facing.

H-12

FM 90-8

H-14. US role.

a. The normal role of the US military in civic assistance and civic

action is to advise and assist host nation military forces. Under

some rare conditions, US military units may enter into direct civic

action programs.

b. Units as small as a battalion task force may be assigned CA

elements to assist in carrying out CA plans. A civil-military

operations staff officer may also be assigned to such a task force.

CA liaison and coordination should be established between

military forces and government agencies. This can be accomplished

through organizations specifically designed for this purpose or

through CA staff elements.

d. CA operations require good relationships with the population. To

establish a good relationship, troop discipline, courtesy, and

honesty in dealings with the people are emphasized. Where

rapport has been established between host country forces and the

population, properly administered CA operations contribute to

the attainment of FID objectives.

H-15. Planning - five phases.

a. CA planning includes political, economic, social, psychological,

and military considerations. These considerations include:

(1)

A national development plan that involves projects which

support development programs that meet the needs and

desires of the people. Civic actions projects conducted simply

for the want of something to do may be counterproductive.

(2) Military civic action projects conducted by military forces.

(3) CA personnel and units required to support host country

agencies at subnational levels.

(4)

CA mobile training team requirements and resources.

(5) CA training program requirements for host country and

allied forces.

(6)

CA requirements to provide (where needed) government

administration in areas of the country.

b. CA responsibilities assigned to a tactical unit commander may

require the employment of specialized civil affairs personnel or

units. Host country CA plans should include provisions for CA

support to tactical unit commanders. (For further information on

CA organization, see FM 41-10.)

Emphasis on military civic action varies with the intensity of

insurgent activities. Whatever the level of military civic action,

H-13

90-8

projects are planned and coordinated with internal development

programs. During Phase I of an insurgency, military civic action

concentrates on the development of the socio-economic environment.

In the absence of tactical operations, many military resources

may be devoted to military civic action projects providing both

long-range and short-range benefits.

d. During Phases II and III, military civic action is concentrated on

projects designed to prevent intensification of the insurgency.

These projects produce noticeable improvements in a relatively

short time. Examples of such projects are farm-to-market roads,

bridges, short-range educational programs, basic hygiene,

medical immunization programs, and simple irrigation projects.

Advice is sought on projects to ensure they are needed, wanted,

and coincide with development plans for the area. In the

advanced stages of insurgency, priorities on military operations

may reduce military civic action to such immediate tasks as

providing medical aid to civilians and procuring and distributing

food and shelter for displaced persons.

Section V. Populace and Resources Control

H-16. Population protection.

a. Population and resources control (P&RC) operations are generally

classified as nontactical, police-type operations.

Populace and resources control is government action to protect

the populace and its materiel resources and to deny those resources

which would further hostile objectives against the government.

The objective of populace and resources control operations is to

assist in preserving or reestablishing a state of law and order

within a nation or area. There are three main tasks involved in

reaching this objective:

(1)

Providing security for the populace.

(2)

Detecting and neutralizing the insurgent apparatus.

(3)

Severing any relationship between the insurgent and the

populace.

H-17. Forces available.

a. There are three forces available to conduct populace and resources

control operations:

(1) The civil police are the first line of defense in the battle

against an insurgency.

H-14

FM 90-8

(2)

Paramilitary forces may augment or assist the civil police.

(3) The nation's military forces should reemployed only when

civil police and paramilitary units cannot cope with the

insurgent activity. Even then, priority should be given to

employing military police units rather than combat forces.

Control of the populace and resources should be performed by host

country agencies. This is a matter of practicality, but there are

also legal and psychological implications. US military should be

used as a last resort and only as augmentation to host country

units. Military police should be utilized before combat troops.

Populace and resources control measures can be classified into

three categories:

(1)

Surveillance of individuals, groups, activities, or locations

by overt or covert means.

(2) Restrictions such as curfews, travel permits, registration of

firearms, national registration and identification of all

persons, and control of selected foodstuffs, medical supplies,

and equipment.

(3) Enforcement through the use of roadblocks, checkpoints,

rewards, amnesty programs, and selective inspections of

homes at night.

These control measures should be well-planned and coordinated

to ensure rapid and efficient operations, with a minimum of delay

and inconvenience to the people.

Populace and resources control is designed to complement and

support other counterguerrilla operations and environmental

improvements being conducted by the military forces, and to

contribute to the overall stability of the country or the operational

area.

H-18. Central theme.

a. The central theme of populace and resources control is population

protection and resource management. PSYOP should convey this

theme and be designed to accomplish the following:

(1)

Persuade the people to accept the necessary measures,

priority to their implementation.

(2)

Convince the people that their full support will minimize the

inconvenience of the measures.

(3)

Place the blame for any inconveniences or discomfort

squarely upon the insurgents.

Border operations are taken (as part of populace and resources

control) to isolate the insurgent from his outside support. Outside

H-15

90-8

support covers a variety of activities. It may range from provision

of funds and training of individual insurgents by an outside

power to providing an active sanctuary for combat forces.

The most frequent populace and resources control operations US

units may participate in are:

(1) Border operations.

(2) Cordon and search.

(3) Augmentation of enforcement operations

(roadblocks,

checkpoints).

Section VI. Advisory Assistance

H-19. Tactical backup.

Advisory assistance is advice and assistance provided by US

personnel to host country regular, paramilitary, and irregular

forces and to civilian agencies to help them become effective in the

performance of their missions.

These activities support and, in turn, are supported by tactical

operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations,

populace and resources control operations, and military civic

action. Such assistance is designed to:

(1) Provide military assistance in conjunction with the Navy

and Air Force to the host country.

(2)Participate with other services in joint internal defense

training and exercises as mutually agreed upon by the

services concerned.

(3)_{Provide mobile training teams, combat service support, and}

combat support to advise, train, assist, and support host

country forces.

H-20. Army assistance.

a. The primary purpose of US Army assistance is to increase the

capabilities of host country armed forces.

b. The brigade may be required to organize, train, equip, and advise

host country civil and military personnel and units to perform

counterguerrilla missions. Tasks include:

(1)

Organizing, equipping, training, and advising paramilitary

and irregular forces (locally recruited) to assume local

defense missions from the brigade.

(2) Equipping, training, and advising host country regular

armed forces on new equipment provided by military

H-16

90-8

assistance programs (MAP) and foreign military sales

(FMS).

(3) Organizing, equipping, training, and advising host country

police organizations.

(4)

Advising host country regular armed forces, paramilitary

forces, and local governments in all aspects of internal

defense and development.

Brigade advisory assistance to host country personnel and

organizations, as differentiated from military civic action,

usually is performed to extend security assistance activities. Such

activities as organizing, equipping, training, and advising host

country forces may be accomplished while in base areas or during

the defensive phase of consolidation operations of counterguerrilla

tactical operations.

If US military assistance organizations are operational, advisors

usually are provided for this purpose. However, in cases where US

advisors or mobile training teams are not available, brigades may

be required to assume this function. Advisory assistance is

coordinated closely with both the internal defense and the

internal development programs through the local area control

center.

H-21. Brigade organization.

a. All brigade organizations should be prepared to provide

individuals or teams capable of performing advisory assistance

within their areas of specialization, if the need arises. Organization

for advisory assistance operations may require the tailoring of

specific teams to accomplish specific missions:

(1)

Military police, augmented by brigade elements, may be

required to train host country military police organizations

in the area, while combined arms teams may be required to

train local host country artillery and armor units in artillery

and armor tactics and techniques.

(2)

Training centers may be required if the training load is

sufficient to warrant them.

(3)

Teams from brigade units may be organized for on-duty

training of host country specialists. These specialists are

trained in the use of specialized equipment which is organic

to brigades but which will be supplied to host country forces

at some future date.

(4)

Mobile training teams formed by the brigade may be

dispatched to local host country forces to conduct training at

host country unit bases or training centers.

H-17

FM 90-8

APPENDIX I

Staff Functions

I-1. General.

This appendix describes some of the major functions and duties of staff

personnel that are inherent in counterguerrilla operations.

I-2. Executive officer

(XO).

a. The duties and responsibilities of the XO are tailored to the desires

and wishes of the commander.

b._{These duties and responsibilities encompass four major tasks:}

(1) Coordinate all staff functions.

(2) Assume command in the absence of the commander.

(3) Prepare for future operations.

(4) Ensure that liaison and coordination are conducted with

higher headquarters by the appropriate staff sections, as

needed.

I-3. Adjutant (S1).

a. The S1 is responsible for preparing the personnel estimate and

providing input on the effects of personnel status on operations.

b. In addition to this vital function, there are several other tasks that

the S1 must accomplish:

(1)

Maintain unit strength reports.

(2)

Process wounded in action.

(3)

Process killed in action.

(4)

Process prisoners of war (PW).

(5)

Maintain unit morale.

(6)

Maintain discipline, law, and order.

I-4. Intelligence officer (S2).

In counterguerrilla operations, the S2 is the driving force for all

operations. Without timely, accurate intelligence and current

estimates of enemy courses of action and locations, the S3 cannot

plan for tactical operations with any degree of success.

I-1

FM 90-8

To fulfill this vital role, the S2 must:

(1)

Maintain current intelligence information.

(2)

Develop and interpret intelligence information.

(3)

Gather intelligence information.

(4)

Determine likely and suspected enemy targets.

(5)

Prepare for future operations.

Some of the items the S2 accomplishes, to complete his tasks,

include:

(1)

Updating situation map based upon current intelligence

reports.

(2)

Collecting, interpreting, and disseminating information

concerning the effects of weather, terrain, and the guerrilla

force on the battalion mission.

(3)

Supervising the intelligence activities of attached and

supporting elements.

(4)

Monitoring command and intelligence communications nets

at all times.

(5)

Requesting intelligence reports from various sources (higher

units, attachments) and logging reports in the S2 journal.

(6)

Ensuring that the S2 section receives situation reports from

the S3 section, tactical fire direction system (TACFIRE), and

attachments according to the internal tactical operations

center communications SOP.

(7)

Evaluating and interpreting intelligence information and

determining enemy probable course(s) of action.

(8)

Disseminating intelligence information to his commander,

staff, higher headquarters, units or attachments, and

adjacent units according to SOP.

(9)

Supervising and controlling reconnaissance and surveillance

plans (in coordination with the battalion S3).

(10)

Briefing and debriefing patrols operating in accordance with

reconnaissance and surveillance plans.

(11)

Determining reconnaissance patrol plans, reports, and the

use of scouts (recommends use of same to S3).

(12)

Supervising the interrogation of PWs, to include civilians

who may have information of immediate tactical value.

(13)

Examining captured enemy documents and expediting

evacuation of PWs and captured materiel to higher head-

quarters after coordinating with the S4. Unless the S2 is

I-2

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6) - page 42