Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6)

FM 90-8

provide rapid on-call support. Detectors and sensors are emplaced

to provide early warning.

BDF or other base unit reconnaissance patrols obtain target

acquisition data. They may penetrate known guerrilla-controlled

territory to install sensors that report the enemy’s presence along

infiltration and supply routes. In addition, such patrols observe

known infiltration and supply routes and report any activity

along these routes. They provide early warning of guerrilla

assembly of personnel; movement of weapons, ammunition, or

other supplies; and preparation of mortar and rocket firing sites.

In addition to the acquisition of specific targets, reconnaissance

patrols may be used to locate suspected areas where other types of

surveillance or acquisition systems may be employed to obtain

information. Indigenous personnel are valuable assets to

reconnaissance patrols. Their knowledge of the terrain, ability to

operate effectively in the environment, knowledge of the

language, and familiarity with local customs are useful.

Combat patrols, when used for base defense, are employed in

difficult terrain some distance from the base but within range of

supporting artillery. Combat patrols employ ranger-type tactics

and remain committed for relatively long periods. They may be

supplied by air and equipped to communicate with the base and

supporting aircraft. Such patrols may vary in size from squad to

platoon. They have the mission of making planned searches to

locate areas used by guerrillas to hide supplies, regroup, rest,

train, or otherwise prepare for offensive actions. Small groups of

guerrillas are engaged and destroyed. Large groups are reported

and kept under surveillance until they are attacked. Augmentation

in the form of local paramilitary guides or trackers increases the

effectiveness of combat patrols.

(1) Reaction force operations. When a guerrilla unit is

located, the reaction force is deployed rapidly to engage the

unit, disrupt its cohesion, and destroy it. If the guerrilla force

cannot be contained and destroyed, contact is maintained;

reinforcements are dispatched if needed; and the guerrillas

are pursued. When escape routes have been effectively

blocked, the attack is continued to destroy the enemy force.

The required mobility is provided by ground and air vehicles

and by rapid foot movement. Wheeled vehicles for reaction

forces are predesignated.

(a) Reaction operations are simple, planned, and rehearsed

day and night. Primary and alternate points are

predesignated for the release of reaction forces from

centralized control to facilitate movement against

multiple targets. Such points are reconnoitered and

photographed for use in planning and briefing. Within

security limitations, actual release points are used

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FM 90-8

during rehearsals to promote complete familiarity with

the area.

(b) Immediate reaction to any type of attack is essential

and is attained through employment of firepower and

movement of forces and their equipment. Immediate

reaction to accurate and timely intelligence may

permit destruction of the guerrilla force before an

attack. Immediate reaction to standoff mortar or rocket

fire may permit destruction of the guerrilla force during

an assault on the base and facilitate blocking routes of

withdrawal.

(2)Host and third country forces. The BDF commander

normally considers the integration of host and third country

forces in the overall base defense effort. Particular emphasis

is on integration of host country forces in patrol and

populace control activities. Both host and third country

forces provide local security for their own units; however, to

ensure maximum benefit, all such local plans should be

coordinated with, and integrated in, the base master defense

plan. The degree of participation in base defense by host and

third country forces depends on the orders and guidance of

their governments.

3-50. Securing lines of communication (LOC).

a. Guerrillas may attempt to sever lines of communications (LOC)

by various methods. Roads, waterways, and railways can be

mined, or ambush sites located adjacent to them. Bridges and

tunnels can be destroyed by demolitions. It is impossible to

absolutely secure long lines of communication, but measures can

be taken to minimize the effect of guerrilla activity against them.

b. Patrolling by counterguerrilla forces increases the chances of

detecting guerrillas before they can emplace mines or demolitions,

or establish ambushes or roadblocks. During Phases I and 11 of an

insurgent action, military police can do most of the patrolling of

ground lines of communication, but the tactical situation may

dictate combat forces having to perform this mission.

c. Patrolling is done regularly, but patrols should not establish a

routine which enables the guerrilla to avoid or ambush them.

Patrols must pay particular attention to probable ambush sites

and chokepoints where roadblocks or mines and demolitions

would be effective.

d._{Aerial patrols are effective for covering large areas in a short time.}

Surface patrols are slower, but they can check routes in greater

detail. Surface patrol members must be trained in the detection of

mines and booby traps. Mine detectors and infantry scout dogs, if

available, may aid them in this task.

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FM 90-8

The primary function of a patrol is to check the security of the

routes it patrols. Ordinarily, manpower constraints prohibit a

patrol from being organized and equipped to counter a large

guerrilla force; however, reinforcement by artillery and attack

helicopters increases a patrol’s capability to deal with guerrillas

they encounter. Patrols are organized with enough combat power

to survive an initial contact. Recent guerrilla activity provides

guidance on how patrols are organized. If the guerrilla is found in

strength, his destruction is the reaction force mission.

g .

Patrols always attempt to make initial contact with the smallest

of their elements, and they must be thoroughly proficient in counter-

ambush techniques.

h .

Roadblocks, checkpoints, and guardposts at critical chokepoints

(such as bridges and tunnels) are effective in preventing acts of

sabotage. Vehicles and persons are stopped and searched before

being allowed to proceed. Vehicles are not allowed to stop on or

under bridges or in tunnels.

i .

Critical chokepoints are watched carefully at night. Personnel

guarding them are equipped with night vision equipment, and

ground surveillance radar and sensors are used to cover the

immediate, surrounding area. Curves on railroads are also

watched. Mining indirect approaches to sensitive areas may help

to lessen the chances of ground attack. The area is ringed with

planned artillery fires, and bunkers are constructed to protect

guard personnel and provide them positions from which to fight

until reinforced. Underwater approaches to bridges are reinforced

by booby-trapped obstacles.

Engineers are used to help keep lines of communication open.

They can locate and clear mines, clear potential ambush sites,

and repair damage. They may also prepare defensive systems around

chokepoints.

3-51. Defending against guerrilla offensive.

a. When insurgent action enters Phase III, the guerrilla may begin

to attack using conventional tactics with the intention of

capturing and holding facilities, installations, bases, communities,

and t.errority. He also attemps to permanently sever critical lines

of communication. These attacks are similar to attacks conducted

by conventional infantry except the initial absence of established

lines enables the guerrilla to strike from any direction, or from

many directions at once. As host government and US forces react

to these initiatives, enemy and friendly lines may evolve;

however, during the initial stages of the guerrilla’s offensive

campaign, friendly bases, facilities, installation, and even cities

may be surrounded and come under siege.

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FM 90-8

b._{The organization of the defense and the construction of physical}

defenses must be at least partially completed prior to the

guerrilla’s attack if the defenders are expected to hold until a

counteroffense can begin.

Once enemy and friendly lines are established, conventional

tactics are employed by both sides. Initially, however, US forces

may have to conduct limited attacks to reopen lines of communi-

cation or to relieve besieged areas.

Section VII. Common Operations

Operations common to offensive and defensive counterguerrilla

operations may be conducted during any of the three phases of an

insurgency. The degree to which these operations are utilized is

dependent on the tactical situation.

3-52. Movement security.

All movements of troops and supplies are planned and conducted

as tactical operations with emphasis on extensive security

measures. These security measures may include:

(1)

Secrecy when planning and disseminating orders, strict

noise and light discipline during movement when appropriate,

and varying routes and schedules of movement.

(2)

Security forces organized and equipped to ensure effective

front, flank, and rear security during movement and halts.

Pre-positioning security elements along the route of movement

helps in performing route reconnaissance and movement

security.

(3)

Coordination with supporting air units to ensure a thorough

understanding of air support used to assist the movement,

both in taking preventive measures and in close combat

operations. The need for secrecy may preclude initial air

cover, but it will not preclude use of close air support when

required. The use of aerial photographs is critical.

(4)

Fire support elements which provide close and continuous

fire support for the movement.

(5)

Maneuver for counterambush actions, to include contingency

plans for immediate action against an ambush and use of

formations which allow part of the column to be in position to

maneuver against an ambush force.

(6)

Communications with supporting units, adjacent host

country forces, and higher headquarters, to include airborne

radio relay.

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FM 90-8

(7) Varying the location of leaders, communications, and

automatic weapons within the movement formation.

(8)Questioning local civilians along the movement route for

intelligence information, to include possible guerrilla

ambush sites.

(9) Movement by bounds with overmatching fire.

(10) Use of infantry scout dogs, if available, and other ambush

detection means.

Organization of the movement depends upon the type of

movement, whether by ground, air, or water.

Planning for movement is coordinated with military units along

routes of movement and considers the following:

(1) Communications. Communications are vital to the

success of movements. Radio communication is planned and

available between convoy serials and march units, with

artillery forward observers and air controllers, and with

units and population centers in the areas along the route of

movement. Visual and sound signals, which include colored

smoke, identification panels, and whistle or horn signals, are

prearranged. While limited, these communication means are

effective when prearranged meanings and responses are

understood and rehearsed.

(2) Artillery and mortar support. Artillery and mortar

support may be provided by units within range of the route of

movement or by artillery and mortars which may be

positioned within range of the proposed route. Movements

requiring artillery and mortar support have observers either

with them or in supporting observation aircraft. Strip maps

marked with planned targets enable personnel (other than

forward observers) to request fires. Coordination with fire

direction centers (FDC) capable of providing fire along the

route of movement ensures that forward observers can enter

the FDC net, make routine location reports, and request and

adjust fires. Call signs, frequencies, authentications, areas

of possible employment, schedules of movement, and target

numbers are coordinated.

(3) Aircraft. Experience has shown that the presence of

aircraft deters ambushes. Column movement covered by

traveling overwatch or bounding overwatch attack helicopters,

in conjunction with a route reconnaissance by scout

helicopters or fixed-wing strike aircraft, maybe requested.

Planning includes the type, number, and method of employ-

ment of aircraft. Methods of employment include column

cover, air alert, and ground alert. Column cover by fighter

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FM 90-8

aircraft is expensive in terms of crew fatigue and equipment

maintenance; therefore, light observation-type aircraft that

can direct on-call air support are used for short movements

over frequently used routes in more secure areas. When air

support is planned, communications information concerning

radio frequencies, call signs, and identification procedures is

provided to all who may need to use them. In addition, the

supporting air unit knows the maneuver intentions of the

ground element in case of ambush.

(4)

Route clearing. This operation may be conducted before

certain critical movements. The use of route-clearing

operations depends upon the availability of troops, the

importance of the movement, and the guerrilla threat within

the area. Normally the units responsible for the area through

which the movement will pass are used in route-clearing

operations. These route-clearing forces normally include

both mounted and dismounted elements. In addition to a

thorough reconnaissance of the main route of movement,

critical terrain near the route is secured. This maybe done by

placing pickets along critical stretches of the route or by

selective placement of tactical units.

(5)

Reserves. Reserves (ready forces) are vital to countering

ambushes. The guerrilla must be convinced that ambushes

produce a fast, relentless, hard-hitting response by counter-

guerrilla supporting forces, to include airstrikes and ground

pursuit. Prior to a movement, reserve force commanders and

aviators are briefed on the general area of operations;

landing areas, known and suspected guerrilla locations, and

communications are emphasized. If the distance to be

covered from a single location prevents quick reaction,

reserve ready forces are designated in successive areas. (For

further information on movement security, see Appendix G.)

3-53. Motor movement.

a . Special escort attachments may not be available to support all

motor movements; therefore, many convoys must be prepared to

secure themselves for part or all of the distance. When a maneuver

unit is designated to provide escort for a vehicle convoy, elements

of the unit provide escort through their respective areas of

responsibility. Armor or armored cavalry units are ideally suited

to provide convoy escorts. Reconnaissance of the route immediately

prior to the passage of the convoy is desirable. When a single unit

is to provide escort through other units’ areas of responsibility,

the single unit coordinates closely with those other units to ensure

adequate fire support and available reinforcements during

passage of the convoy.

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FM 90-8

Since there is seldom time to issue orders during an ambush, the

security detachment’s actions are planned and, when possible,

rehearsed by drills prior to the movement.

Convoy command responsibility is clearly fixed throughout the

chain of command. The commander and as many of his

subordinates as possible are briefed on the latest information

about the area through which they are to pass. The commander

formulates his plans and issues his orders to include formation,

intervals between echelons and vehicles, rate of travel, and

detailed plans for action if a guerrilla force attacks the convoy. All

personnel board their vehicle in such a way that they can

dismount rapidly into predrilled formations. Arms and ammunition

are readied for immediate action, and vehicle commanders are

responsible for keeping personnel alert (Figure 3-1 ).

Convoys may be escorted by reconnaissance aircraft or attack

helicopters and may have tactical air support on call. The use of

reconnaissance Army aircraft to survey routes immediately

forward of a convoy often provides early warning of danger. ^-

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FM 90-8

3-54. Armor and cavalry movement.

a. During movements, unit vehicles and equipment are arranged to

facilitate their employment upon contact with, or interference

from, the enemy. Traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding

overwatch techniques are used in movement. (See FM 71-2 for

armor ground movement security techniques, and FM 17-95 for

cavalry movement techniques.)

b. Air cavalry can be used to provide column cover and to give early

warning of hostile activity. Security measures are employed to

keep the enemy from learning of the movement or its destination

once the column has begun moving.

c. Terrain and weather permitting, aground security force (advance

guard, flank security, and/or rear guards) are used to provide

security. When terrain precludes the use of these ground security

elements, air cavalry may perform these activities as part of the

security mission.

3-55. Rail movement.

Mission. The primary mission of train personnel and combat or

security troops is to get the train to its destination.

Concept. As long as the train continues to move, control

remains with the train crew; however, if an ambush or firefight

develops and the train is unable to disengage by movement

forward or backward, the escort commander takes command and

undertakes defense of the train with all available personnel. If

there is no escort, the senior military member aboard takes

command. Radio communications are used to call for assistance.

Security detachments guarding the right of way have their own

communication system which may be tied into the railway

communication system, when required.

Organization. Railway installations and rail traffic are secured

by establishing defined areas of responsibility. Standing

operating procedures on organization for rail movement are

normally published by the highest level of command. Rail

security is coordinated with area and tactical commands which

provide support.

Operations. Armored trains may be used for patrolling track

where guerrilla activity may be expected. Armored trains operate

tactically under orders of the appropriate military commander.

Since the operation of an armored train is quite different from that

of other trains, the military transportation service assigns a

specially selected train crew. This crew coordinates the train

movement with that of other trains and with proper regard for the

tactical situation. Railway gondolas may be prepared for defense

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FM 90-8

by piling sandbags on the floor and at the sides and by mounting

machine guns, mortars, and rocket launchers. These cars must

not be placed next to cars containing gasoline, ammunition, or

other flammables. Locomotives should be preceded by two or more

cars loaded with sandbags, rocks, or scrap material for protection

against mines and obstructions. On a single-track rail division

subject to guerrilla attack, the positive-block method of operations

is employed. In this method of operation, a following train is not

permitted to enter a block until the preceding train has cleared it.

This permits the train in the block, if attacked, to back up if

necessary and to receive reinforcements by train from either

direction.

3-56. Water movement and riverine operations.

Counterguerrilla operations may be conducted in large inundated

areas (lakes, coastal waters, flooded delta areas, and inland waterways)

which are inhabited by large population segments and which have

limited, or no, rail and road nets. The ability of the counterguerrilla

force to operate in these areas is a requirement for successful missions.

(See FM 31-11 and FM 31-12 for amphibious operations.)

Mission and concept. Boats may be used to perform a variety of

tactical as well as logistical tasks. Waterway movement of troops

and supplies is planned and conducted in much the same manner

as mounted movements on land; however, special characteristics

of water transportation must be considered. The counterguerrilla

force may participate in riverine operations along with host

country regular forces (particularly naval forces), paramilitary

forces, US Army waterborne transportation forces, and US naval

forces.

Organization. When a large waterborne force moves, it adopts a

march formation similar to a ground convoy. Advance and rear

guards in boats are organized. Flank security maybe provided by

patrols in boats in adjacent streams or on foot on the banks.

Unlike ground convoy procedures, movement is not necessarily in

file or column formation. The formation depends upon the

purpose of the movement, the strength of the friendly force, and

the width of the stream. It is based on the same considerations as

those for combat formations on land, to include control, security,

flexibility, speed of reaction, observation, and fields of fire.

Operations.

(1) Waterways afford little cover and concealment. Power-driven

boats are noisy and attract attention. Boats can be seen and

fired on easily in daylight, but this disadvantage can be

reduced by night movement and by traveling close to the

stream banks where shadow and overhead branches aid

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FM 90-8

concealment. Boats must go to or near the shore to unload,

thus affecting the reaction time in case of an ambush.

Landing operations may be difficult because of unfavorable

characteristics along the banks. Transported troops should

be assigned firing positions on board their vessels for

defense against ambush. The transported units should

position the maximum number of crew-served weapons on

board to engage enemy on the near bank or both banks of the

waterway.

(2) Combinations of blocking, attacking, and screening tactical

actions can be devised by the counterguerrilla force utilizing

the mobility of naval forces (river assault groups) and air

assault units. Teamwork between ground forces moving

along river banks, and supporting naval craft firepower and

floating artillery, can result in successful operations against

guerrilla forces in water areas.

(3) The amount of time required for planning increases with the

size of the force involved. Planning should be as detailed as

time permits, but quick reaction is necessary to capitalize on

current intelligence.

Planning includes:

(4)

(a)Reducing all planning facets of embarking and

debarking of troops and equipment to SOP.

Integrating and combining plans for US, allied, and

(b)

host country military forces and civilian agencies.

(c)Facilitating command and control means to unify

command and coordination of fires and other support.

(d) Reducing rehearsals to a minimum, based on habitual

employment; reducing activities to SOP; reducing

equipment and logistical requirements.

(e)

Obtaining detailed intelligence from the population

and civilian police.

(f) Obtaining information on currents and tides at

H-hour, beach conditions, and conditions of banks or

shores for exit routes.

(5)_{Crew-served weapons transported on water craft must be in}

position at all times to engage guerrilla ambush forces.

3-57. Foot and air movement.

a. Foot movement. Dismounted movements by small units are

planned and conducted using the principles for patrolling; for

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FM 90-8

larger units, the principles for movement to contact will apply

(FM 7-8, FM 7-10, and FM 7-20).

b . Air movement. Air movements are an integral part of counter-

guerrilla operations. The principles governing security of such

movements are contained in FM 7-10, FM 7-20, and FM 90-4.

3-58. Border operations.

While operations to control borders are normally a civilian

security agency mission, the brigade may be required to

participate in these operations by reinforcing or assuming

responsibility for border surveillance and control.

Brigades conducting or supporting consolidation or strike

operations may become involved in border control activities. In

some cases, the scope and combat requirements of controlling a

border may make border operations more a tactical than a civilian

security force problem, and may require the conduct of successive

strike operations by the brigade in its area of operations.

(1) Purpose. Border control operations require effective

measures to secure extensive land border or seacoast areas

and to preclude communication and supply operations (to

include aerial resupply) between an external sponsoring

power and guerrilla forces.

(a) Concept. In Phase I insurgency, operations in border

areas are normally a function of police, customs, and

other government organizations. Armed and paramili-

tary forces may assist these organizations, particularly

in remote areas. In Phases II and III, denial of external

support for the insurgency may require combat

operations in border areas. These operations require

close coordination and cooperation between the armed

forces, paramilitary forces, and all government

agencies involved. Physically sealing the border may

not be possible since it could require the commitment of

more government forces and materiel than overall

national resources permit. Since placing forces and

barriers at all possible crossings or entry sites maybe

impossible, priorities should be established. Natural

barriers must be used wherever possible. Using patrols,

sensors, and obstacles in selected areas increases the

effectiveness of natural barriers. Barrier and denial

operations are established after careful consideration

of the threat, the environment, and the location of the

infiltrator’s probable targets and methods of oper-

ation.

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FM 90-8

(b)

Organization. National border forces may be com-

posed of border police and guards and may include

paramilitary forces and regular armed forces with

supporting or direct responsibility for portions of the

international border.

(c)

Command and control. Border operations are

planned, directed, and supervised from the national

level. Authority to conduct these operations may be

delegated to subnational and other area commanders.

(d)

Structuring. Border task forces are tailored units

designed to meet requirements in their assigned areas.

They should contain sufficient combat support and

combat service support elements to support operations

for extended periods.

(2) Operations.

Restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones

(a)

can be established if needed. Either of these operations,

which could require relocating many persons, must be

carefully planned. Although armed forces may assist,

civil authorities normally are responsible for planning

and carrying out a relocation program. Forced relocation

is held to a minimum. The 1949 Geneva Conventions

prohibit forced population resettlement unless there is

clear military necessity.

(b)

While specific portions of an international land border

or shoreline maybe placed under effective surveillance

and control by use of static security posts, reserve

forces, ground and aerial observers, electronic listening

posts, and patrols, the continuous surveillance and

control of an extensive land border or shoreline is

difficult. Since it may not be possible to place brigade

forces at all the crossing or landing sites, a priority

system for the sites requiring military forces is

established.

(3) Surveillance. Continuous and detailed surveillance is

required to determine infiltration and exfiltration routes and

support sites, frequency and volume of traffic, type of

transportation, number and type of personnel, amount and

type of materiel, terrain and traffic conditions, and the

probable location of base areas and sanctuaries. Surveillance

and control of extensive coastal areas normally require the

use of coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline, coordinated

offshore patrols, aerial surveillance, strategic observation

posts along the shoreline, and an effective system of

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FM 90-8

licensing and identifying friendly military and civilian

watercraft.

(4) Military operations. Border units establish operational

support bases at battalion and company levels to direct

operations. Aviation, signal, engineer, and fire support

augmentation usually is required. These are normally found

in the brigade support base if not augmenting subordinate

units.

(5)

Border control methods. Two operational concepts for

the control of extensive land borders are the restricted zone

and the friendly population buffer.

(a)

Restricted zone. Under this concept, an area of

predetermined width along the border is declared a

restricted zone. Appropriate proclamations are issued

to the population so that everyone understands that

any individual or group encountered in the zone will be

considered as an element of the guerrilla force,

paramilitary force, or similar organization. So far as

practicable, the restricted zone is cleared of vegetation

and other obstacles to observation over the area.

Earth-moving equipment may be used for this purpose.

Defoliants, if authorized, may also be used for this

purpose, but this should be considered when no other

method is feasible. Since the clearance of the zone

along the entire border is normally not feasible, a

priority of areas for clearance is usually necessary. The

restricted zone is controlled by the use of ground and

aerial observers, electronic sensor devices, listening

posts, patrols, mines, and obstacles. It is preferable

that these activities be conducted by host country civil

police and paramilitary forces to economize on the

available regular armed forces’ combat power which

can be better utilized in tactical operations.

(b)

Friendly population buffer. The civilian population

in the area of operations is redistributed as necessary

to ensure that all civilians residing near the border are

sympathetic to the host country government. This may

entail the screening of all persons settled along the

border, relocation of those persons of doubtful sympathy,

and supplementary resettlement of the border area

with friendly elements of the civilian population. This

concept provides a potential informant net along the

border, it provides friendly local civilians for employment

in self-defense units to control the border area, and it

denies potential civilian contacts and houses of refuge

for use by the guerrillas in border-crossing activities.

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FM 90-8

Relocation of civilians is a sensitive legal and political

issue and should be undertaken with host country

authority in compliance with host country law. US

personnel should not be actively involved. US relocation

activities in an international conflict environment

must comply with applicable provisions of Geneva

Conventions IV. Relocation operations must be pre-

ceded by detailed economic, social, psychological, and

political preparation so the socio-economic stability of

the area is not endangered by the shifts in population.

The conduct of these operations without such preparation

can result in such undesirable effects in the area as

political instability, extensive unemployment, inequities

in land distribution, inadequate public utilities,

inadequate housing, and intermingling of population

with conflicting religious beliefs and social mores.

(6)

Waterline borders. In addition to use of restricted zones

and friendly population buffers, as discussed above for land

borders, the surveillance and control of extensive coastal

areas and shorelines normally require the use of:

(a)

Coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline.

(b)

Coordinated offshore sea patrols of the shoreline and

river delta areas.

(c)

Reinforcing aerial, visual, and photographic surveillance

of the offshore waters and the shoreline.

(d)

Observation posts along the shoreline in the vicinity of

river mouths, ground lines of communication, and

accessible portions of the shoreline.

(e)

An effective system of licensing and identifying all

friendly military and civilian watercraft using the

offshore waters.

(f)

Effective, centralized control and coordination of all

these activities.

(7)

Sanctuaries. Guerrillas may establish base camps and

conduct cross-border operations from countries adjacent to

the host country. They will take advantage of an international

boundary to launch operations or evade pursuit with

impunity. Commanders operating in border areas must

respect the sanctity of international boundaries, but they

can conduct combat operations against the guerrilla force

once it crosses back over the border. Ambush patrols are an

excellent means of dealing with guerrillas who attempt to

use an international border as a sanctuary.

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FM 90-8

3-59. Urban operations.

Operations in an urban environment require different emphasis

and different techniques than those in rural areas. The presence

of many people and the characteristics of the area influence both

insurgent and government operations. During Phases I and II,

these areas are usually unfavorable for guerrilla operations.

Guerrillas will not normally fight in these areas; however, other

insurgent elements in the urban areas may incite rioting, use

terrorist tactics, or seize portions of the city and key facilities.

Armed forces may be required to reinforce police in combatting

riots and disorders provoked by the insurgents. Tactical

operations may be necessary if the guerrillas take direct action to

seize urban areas or critical installations within them. This may

occur in smaller urban areas during Phase II, and may occur in

large urban areas in the later stages of Phase III. (FM 90-10

discusses tactical operations in urban areas. FM 19-15 discusses

civil disturbances.)

The population density requires emphasis on the use of nonlethal

weapons and the careful use of weapons of destruction when force

is necessary. The application of “minimum essential force” to

minimize loss of life and destruction of property requires detailed

planning, coordination, and control.

Covert insurgent activity is extensive in urban areas. The

government must emphasize intelligence and police operations to

counter clandestine organizational, intelligence, logistical, and

terrorist activities. IDAD operations in urban areas maybe part

of a consolidation campaign.

Urban areas are critical and require a continuing IDAD effort

whether or not they are included in a specific campaign. Military

forces should participate in IDAD planning and operations in

urban areas during all phases of insurgency to be prepared to

assist other national security and law enforcement agencies if

situations requiring military forces develop.

(1) Operational environment. The characteristics of an

urban area normally include:

(a) A large, concentrated population.

(b) Government facilities.

(d) Communications facilities.

(e) Transportation terminals.

(f) Storage facilities.

(g) Food markets.

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FM 90-8

(h) Medical facilities.

(i) Public utilities.

(j) Educational centers.

(k) Ethnic, religious, and economic groups.

(l) Man-made features (multistory buildings and subter-

ranean facilities).

(m) Police force, paramilitary force, and other law en-

forcement agencies.

(2)

Government activity. Urban areas need more government

functions and services than rural areas. This requires more

and possibly larger government organizations for operations.

The activities and capabilities of all government agencies

should be considered in planning and executing IDAD

operations.

(3)

Subversive activities. A subversive element intent on

destroying the government may strain the capabilities of

local authorities. The insurgents will attempt to exploit local

civilian organizations by subverting their goals and

objectives. They will try to place them in opposition to the

government. Terrorist activities and psychological operations

will take place along with covert insurgent organizational,

intelligence, and logistical operations. Police, internal

security, and other government organizations will be high

priority targets of the insurgents.

(4) Operations. Operations require careful planning and

coordination, particularly those operations involving

application of force. Military forces designated to provide

assistance, if needed, make plans and prepare to implement

them. Military forces must be able to communicate with

police and other agencies involved in the operations. They

must collect and have readily available detailed information

on area characteristics and critical installations.

(5) Tactical operations.

(a) Tactical operations may be required inside or near an

urban area to defeat an insurgent attack. Any insurgent

attempt to seize and hold an urban area will probably

involve operations in nearby areas as well. When the

police and other internal security forces can cope with

the attack inside the urban area, military forces can

best participate by establishing security around the

urban area and by denying the insurgent reinforcement

or support. When military forces are required to

reinforce police or defeat insurgent forces inside the

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FM 90-8

urban area, operations must be closely controlled and

coordinated. Military forces should be withdrawn as

soon as police forces can handle the situation.

(b) When an urban area has been seized by insurgent

forces, an evaluation must be made from both a tactical

and psychological perspective whether to recapture it

using major military force or using other techniques.

The amount of force and the specific techniques to be

used to recapture the area are decided based on the

probable psychological impact on the enemy, noncom-

batant civilians, and friendly troops; the safety of

civilians and friendly troops; the destruction of

buildings; and the military forces available. The

principle of “minimum essential force” will help reduce

casualties in the noncombatant civilian population.

(c)

Riot control munitions can be used against targets so

that military forces can close with and capture the

enemy with minimum injury to the noncombatants.

Operations may be in the form of assistance to civilian

police. In any event, military operations must be

coordinated with the civilian police. (For information

on combat in fortified and built-up areas, see FM 90-10

and FM 90-10-1.)

3-50

CHAPTER 4

Counterguerrilla Operations

in Conventional Conflicts

Section I. General

4-1. Rear areas.

The conditions of conventional conflicts differ greatly from an

insurgency. This chapter discusses factors the commander must

consider when planning counterguerrilla operations during a

conventional conflict. The nature of the threat and tactics suitable to

counter the threat are discussed. The material in this chapter is general

and refers only to countering guerrilla activities in the rear areas of

friendly forces engaged in conventional conflicts (Figure 4-1).

Figure

4-1. Guerrilla rear action.

4-2. Threat.

A guerrilla threat may not exist in these situations. However, if it does

exist, it normally occurs in support of enemy forces engaged in

conventional combat with friendly forces and occurs in the friendly

force rear areas. (For further information on rear area operations, see

FM 90-14.)

4-1

FM 90-8

Section Il. Considerations

4-3. Guerrilla support.

a. Since a major goal of participants in a conventional conflict is to

gain control of territory through the use of regular armed forces,

the forms of guerrilla activity change. Guerrilla operations in this

case support the main effort of the enemy force by disrupting

command, control, communications, and logistical operations of

friendly forces. The guerrilla force also serves to cause commitment

of friendly forces, best used in the close battle, to the rear battle.

The ability of the guerrilla force to operate successfully does not

rely on the attainment of popular support. Rather, the guerrilla

force relies more on its ability to cause confusion in rear areas.

4-4. Guerrilla objectives.

The objectives of a guerrilla force in a conventional conflict are:

(1)

Disruption. The guerrilla force seeks to disrupt command,

control, communications, and logistics operations and

facilities. He may accomplish this by attacking key

installations such as headquarters, communications sites,

supply depots, maintenance facilities, and airfields. The

guerrilla force also seeks to cut lines of communication and

supply by interdicting supply columns, bridges, highways,

and communications lines.

(2)

Confusion. By destroying key facilities and interdicting

lines of communication and supply, the guerrilla force

causes confusion within the friendly force rear areas. The

greater the amount of confusion created, the greater the

ability of the main enemy force to discover and exploit

weaknesses of the friendly force.

(3)

Harassment. The guerrilla force remains a source of

harassment as long as it operates in the rear area. It may not

have to conduct continuous operations to achieve its goal.

The mere knowledge that the guerrilla exists within the rear

area, even though undetected, may be enough.

(4)

Support. By disrupting, confusing, and harassing vital

areas, the guerrilla supports the main enemy force by tying

up friendly combat units in countering the threat.

The guerrilla force may possess weapons, communications, and

technology equal to or superior to the rear battle forces. It must be

anticipated that nuclear, chemical, and biological, as well as

conventional weapons and tactics may be utilized to achieve

guerrilla goals.

4-2

FM 90-8

4-5. Factors affecting operations.

When considering the environment that the participants will be

involved in, the commander’s plans for counterguerrilla operations

must consider terrain and climate, as well as political, sociological,

economic, and psychological factors.

Terrain. Terrain affects men, equipment, trafficability, visibility,

and the employment of NBC weapons. The terrain aspects of each

area of operations must be evaluated to determine the impact on

both guerrilla and counterguerrilla forces. Generally, guerrillas

favor rough, inaccessible terrain with cover and concealment,

affording them routes of escape and withdrawal if confronted or

detected by counterguerrilla forces. Rolling, open terrain with less

cover and concealment usually favors counterguerrilla forces in

detecting and pursuing a guerrilla force.

Climate. Each geographic area is analyzed to determine the

effects of climate since no two areas have identical climates.

Generally, a mild climate favors the guerrilla force since it

induces less physical hardship, and may provide year-round

vegetation for subsistence, cover, and concealment. The climate is

also analyzed to determine the effect it will have on guerrilla

operations as regards trafficability, visibility, and equipment. A

cold climate usually favors the counterguerrilla force and

hampers guerrilla operations since it increases the logistics

required to support the guerrilla. The commander must also

consider that the effect of seasonal variations can either increase

or decrease his ability to conduct operations.

Political factors. Political considerations are reduced. Gen-

erally, the relationship between the counterguerrilla force and the

civilian population is governed by restrictions and agreements

that the US has with the government(s) of the country (or

countries) in which the conflict takes place. In the event that the

conflict takes place in enemy territory that is occupied, then the

policies concerning interaction the the civilian populace will be

formulated at theater level in consonance with guidance from the

US government. It must be recognized that, in some situations,

the political system of the area will be sympathetic to the

guerrillas.

Sociological factors. As with political factors, social factors

are considered, but their impact is usually reduced. Usually, when

US forces operate in friendly territory or liberate previously

captured friendly territory, the sociological factors generally

favor the counterguerrilla force. When US forces operate in

captured enemy territory, then the sociological factors may favor

the guerrilla force. In this situation, the guerrilla force may be

receiving some support from the populace.

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FM 90-8

Economic factors. Generally, the counterguerrilla force plans

its operations to minimize damage to the economic structure of an

area. The standard of living must be recognized as a contributing

factor to the psychological climate within the area. If the

counterguerrilla force damages civilian property and economic

structures, then it may have an adverse psychological impact.

Usually, a poor economic climate will favor the counterguerrilla

force since it will reduce the resources available to the guerrilla.

The counterguerrilla force, on the other hand, is usually not

dependent on the economy for its logistics. A strong economic

climate usually does not favor either force.

Psychological factors. A population that actively supports the

counterguerrilla force greatly enhances the capability to detect

guerrilla forces. Usually, this type of population is found when US

forces operate in friendly territory or liberate areas opposed to the

goals of the enemy force. Population support for the goals of the

enemy force usually favors the guerrilla. That situation may

occur when US forces operate in captured enemy territory. In most

cases, however, the military objective of destroying the guerrilla

force takes precedence over other considerations as long as

operations are planned to minimize damage to civilian property.

US forces must, in all cases, treat the civilian populace in a fair

and just manner whether the people support the US presence or

not. Inhumane treatment and criminal acts (murder, rape, or

theft, even under stress of combat and with provocation) are

serious and punishable violations under international law, the

law of land warfare, and the US Uniform Code of Military Justice.

4-6. Applying METT-T.

a . The commander of a counterguerrilla force in a conventional

conflict plans his operations by analyzing the factors of METT-T.

An understanding of the goals of a guerrilla force operating in

rear areas and a general analysis of the environment of the area of

operations provide a framework for planning. An analysis of the

factors of METT-T will provide the specific information and

indications to complete operational plans.

b . Some of the major considerations of METT-T are:

(1) Mission.

(a) All aspects of the mission must be analyzed. In this

analysis, the commander and his staff determine all

specified and implied tasks:

• Is the mission offensive?

• Is the mission defensive?

• Is the mission a combination of offense and

defense?

4-4

FM 90-8

(b) The authority a commander can exert within his area

of operations is critical. If the command and support

relationships are not clearly delineated in the initial

order, then the commander must ensure that he

receives that guidance prior to commencement of

operations. The restrictions, limitations, and rules of

engagement that the counterguerrilla force adheres to

must be defined. These may include specific limitations

regarding the use of firepower and types of weapons, or

they may be general regarding the relationship of the

counterguerrilla force with the civilian population.

(2) Enemy.

(a)

Since the general goals of the enemy are known,

specific information is gathered to produce a more

complete picture. The capabilities of the enemy are

examined. Some of the questions that should be

answered are:

• Can the guerrilla strike at will?

• What is the size(s) of his unit(s)?

Ž What type of weapons does he possess?

• Is this a true guerrilla force consisting mainly of

locally recruited indigenous personnel, or is this an

enemy regular military unit specially trained and

using guerrilla tactics?

• Does he have fire or air support?

• Does he have an offensive NBC capability?

• How long can he operate in the area?

(b)

The commander examines not only guerrilla capabilities

but also his vulnerable aspects, which include logistics

and ability to remain undetected. Usually, guerrillas

operating in a rear area then acquire logistical support

from external sources, from captured equipment and

supplies, and from the civilian populace.

(c)

External support by the enemy main force may occur

through clandestine parachute drop or through

waterborne, surface, or subsurface infiltration. If the

guerrilla’s only source of resupply is external, then

interdiction of his supply lines can decrease or halt

operations as the guerrilla’s supplies are exhausted.

(d)

If the counterguerrilla force prevents the capture of

friendly equipment and supplies, then again the

4-5

FM 90-8

guerrilla must decrease and finally halt operations

because of lack of supplies.

(e)

Reliance by the guerrilla on the civilian populace for

support may occur more often in occupied enemy

territory or in territories where the population favors

the enemy force. Effective use of populace and resources

control operations and psychological operations can

reduce the logistical support received through the

populace.

(f)

Because the guerrilla operates in rear areas, the

difficulty of maintaining his lines of resupply usually

keeps the size of his force at a relatively static level. If

the counterguerrilla force can detect the guerrilla force,

then it is only a matter of time until the guerrillas are

fixed and engaged. The commander utilizes all available

human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence

(IMINT), and signal intelligence (SIGINT). In addition,

the counterguerrilla force maximizes all information

that can be gained from tactical operations to locate

the guerrilla force.

(g)

Probable courses of enemy action are identified. What

may be the least likely course of action for a conventional

force may be the most likely for the guerrilla force.

Often, the guerrilla strikes in this manner to gain the

advantage of surprise. The counterguerrilla force

identifies likely targets and takes measures to protect

them. In addition, facilities and operations that may

not seem likely targets may in fact be guerrilla targets

solely because of their vulnerability. The counterguerrilla

force commander must realize that destruction of

numerous insignificant targets may cause more

damage and confusion than the destruction or damage

of one important target.

Terrain. The terrain consideration also includes consider-

(3)

ation of weather. The weather is analyzed to determine its

effect on both the guerrilla and the counterguernlla force. It

is analyzed in terms of its effect on men and equipment,

trafficability, and visibility. Since the guerrilla force may

have the capability to use NBC, the effect of weather on NBC

and smoke is also addressed. The terrain is studied in

relation to the factors of OCOKA: Observation and fields of

fire, Cover and concealment, Obstacles, Key terrain (to

include likely guerrilla targets and base camps), and

Avenues of approach or escape. The effect of those factors on

the guerrilla and counterguerrilla forces is estimated, then

the counterguerrilla force commander uses his estimate in

4-6

F M

90 - 8

formulating his plan to attack the guerrilla weaknesses

while protecting his own vulnerable areas.

(4)

Troops available. The counterguerrilla force commander

may or may not have control over all forces in the rear area

for employment in rear battle operations. Forces he may

have might include combat, combat support, and combat

service support units. In addition, the commander may have

allied regular, paramilitary, and irregular forces under his

control in certain situations. The counterguerrilla force

commander will be provided guidelines and directives on the

current joint and combined procedures for establishing an

effective rear defense. He will effect liaison with all forces

operating in his area of responsibility, fix specific responsi-

bilities, and exercise overall control of defensive operations

in response to a guerrilla threat.

(5)

Time available. The time available for planning must be

wisely utilized. In most cases, the one-third rule may be

applied. The commander uses one third of the available time

for planning and leaves two thirds for subordinate planning

and preparation. However, reaction to intelligence may

require an immediate response. Operational planning is

conducted as early as possible.

Section Ill. The Threat

4-7. Type forces.

a. The guerrilla action supports the enemy’s main forces by causing

disruption, confusion, and harassment. These actions may be

conducted by conventional or unconventional forces utilizing

guerrilla warfare tactics.

b._{Conventional forces that may conduct guerrilla warfare include}

forces that have been cut off or that intentionally stay behind as

their main force withdraws or retreats. These forces generally

possess the weapons and equipment of the main enemy force.

Their combat power may suffer from killed and wounded

personnel and lost or damaged equipment, and they may have

logistical difficulties. Another type of force may be an armored

and/or mechanized unit with a mission to penetrate friendly rear

areas and cause disruption, confusion, and harassment. Only if

this force uses guerrilla warfare tactics is it considered a guerrilla

force. If it continues to operate within the area that can be

influenced by the main enemy forces, or if it utilizes conventional

tactics, then it is not considered a guerrilla force. Airborne,

heliborne, or waterborne light infantry forces may also compose a

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FM 90-8

guerrilla force if inserted to conduct guerrilla warfare operations

(disruption, harassment, or confusion).

c. In all cases where conventional enemy forces are using guerrilla

warfare tactics, the counterguerrilla force commander must

expect their degree of training, equipment, and sophistication to

match that found in the main enemy force.

4-8. Special units.

Unconventional warface forces that may conduct guerrilla

warfare consist of special units trained specifically for guerrilla

warfare and indigenous guerrilla forces sponsored by the main

enemy force. Special units trained for guerrilla warfare usually

have a primary mission to conduct guerrilla warfare operations

against targets of opportunity with a follow-on mission to train an

indigenous guerrilla force.

Initially, these units may possess weapons and equipment equal

to, or greater in sophistication than, US forces. The longer these

units operate, the more they expend their assets. If they stay in the

operational area for a prolonged period with no external resupply,

then their level of efficiency decreases until US forces possess an

equal capability. Their level of training is usually high, and these

units are skilled in weapons, demolitions, communications,

medicine, operations, and the ability to improvise when needed.

These special units may enter a friendly area through the use of

high altitude, low opening (HALO); high altitude, high opening

(HAHO); or low level parachute techniques. They I.., also be

skilled in and use overland and waterborne (both surface and

subsurface) techniques to enter the area.

In many cases, the indigenous guerrilla unit may be trained by

special units inserted by the enemy force. Usually, the indigenous

guerrilla force must rely on external support for its logistics

requirements. In some cases, if the guerrilla force is not too large,

then it may rely on captured or improvised equipment and

materiel.

The tactics used by both conventional and unconventional

guerrilla forces remain the same. They are characterized by

elusiveness, surprise, and brief, violent action. The techniques

used by these forces usually consist of raids and ambushes.

Depending on the composition of the guerrilla force, it may have

aviation and fire support assets available to it.

The counterguerrilla force commander must be aware that the

guerrilla force may have NBC weapons available to it. Because of

the capability of NBC weapons to cause a maximum amount of

confusion with a limited amount of personnel, their use must be

considered as a method that the guerrilla may employ.

4-8

FM 90-8

Section IV. Tactics and Operations

4-9. Rear battle.

Rear battle (FM 90-14) is defined as those actions, including area

damage control, taken by all units singly or in a combined effort to

secure the force, neutralize or defeat enemy operations in the rear area,

and ensure freedom of action in the deep and close-in battles. The basic

philosophy of rear battle doctrine is to maximize the capability of

combat support and combat service support elements to defend

themselves and render mutual support without requiring assistance

from tactical combat forces. If a tactical combat force is assigned to the

rear battle, it will be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of

the rear battle officer. Once it completes the tactical mission and

notifies the rear area operations center, it will be released to its parent

unit.

4-10. Concepts.

The concepts discussed in this chapter are geared to the needs of

the tactical commander but can be used by the rear battle officer

as well. In all instances, it is imperative that the principle of unity

of command be maintained to minimize confusion and indecision

that will occur if there is an inability to determine who is in

command.

The techniques used in rear battle operations are dependent upon

METT-T. Some of these factors include the force composition,

aviation assets, fire support assets, mobility, equipment, and size

of the counterguerrilla force. These same factors must be

examined regarding the guerrilla force. Generally, these

techniques can be classified as either offensive or defensive.

(1) Offensive techniques are used to locate, fix, and engage

guerrilla forces. These operation include reconnaissance

patrols, ambushes, attacks, encirclements, and movements

to contact.

(2) Defensive techniques are used to prevent disruption,

harassment, or confusion. They are also used to minimize

damage to a target if it is attacked. Preventive defensive

techniques include movement security, security patrolling,

and combat patrolling, among others. Examples of techniques

designed to minimize damage once an action starts include

base defense, counterambush, and reaction forces.

The distinctions between offensive and defensive techniques are

sometimes difficult to discern. Many offensive techniques can be

used as a type of defensive technique and vice versa. (Offensive

and defensive techniques are discussed in Chapter 3.)

4-9

CHAPTER 5

Combat Units

Section I. General

5-1. Composition.

The military force conducting counterguerrilla operations may not

necessarily consist of only light infantry. This chapter discusses the

various types of combat units that maybe available to the counterguerrilla

force. The composition of the tactical force to be used in counterguerrilla

operations — in other words, whether to use forces other than light

infantry — depends upon the forces available and the threat that is

faced.

5-2. Restricted firepower.

Generally, because of political, economic, and sociological considerations

that restrict the use of firepower, the farther the insurgency moves

toward Phase III, the greater the combat power that can be utilized

(Figure 5-1 ). In a conventional conflict, the same factors of availability

of forces and the Threat are considered, but combat power can be

applied at higher levels.

Figure

5-1. Combat power can be applied at higher levels.

5-1

FM 90-8

Section II. Counterinsurgency Environment

5-3. Type forces.

The types of forces that maybe employed (other than light infantry)

are infantry, airborne, air assault, mechanized infantry, armor,

armored cavalry, and aviation. Terrain, enemy forces, and capabilities

must be thoroughly assessed when deciding how to utilize these forces.

The impact of these forces on the populace must also be assessed before

they are employed. Normally, the majority of ground combat elements

are organized to fight as light infantry. However, the proper use of

other combat forces can provide the counterguerrilla force advantages.

5-4. Use of combat power.

a. The primary consideration is that counterguerrilla operations

support the host country’s IDAD plan. Extensive use of combat

forces (other than infantry) in this environment is usually

restricted because of limitations on the use of heavy weapons and

their collateral damage. In addition, the guerrilla habitually

chooses to operate from terrain that affords him protection

(Figure 5-l). Usually, this type of.terrain is rough, inaccessible,

and restrictive to ground vehicles. Military forces engaged in

counterguerrilla warfare must make maximum effective use of all

available assets, even if this means reorganizing and retraining

as light infantry, utilizing organic combat vehicles in a

supporting role for transportation only.

b.The measure of effectiveness of an asset is contained in the

concept of suitability. The extent to which various types of forces

can be effectively utilized must be measured against the following

criteria to determine if they will be suitable.

5-5. Impact on the populace.

The commander must determine both the physical and psychological

impact of using additional combat assets. In all cases, their use must

fall within any restrictions stated in the rules of engagement. In

addition, the psychological effect of the expanded use of firepower or

assets might result in the perception that the government forces are

losing or ineffective.

5-6. Meets the threat.

The commander must ensure that the additional assets he plans to

employ do not “overkill” the threat. If the threat is a light infantry force

of company size working in groups of five to ten men, then it is not

really suitable to have a battalion of armor arrayed against it.

5-2

FM 90-8

5-7. Capability to accomplish assigned mission.

The additional assets utilized must have the capability to perform

tactical and IDAD missions. When determining if the additional

assets do have the capability, the threat’s capabilities, structure,

weapons, and level of training must be considered.

In addition, the impact of the terrain on the force must be

determined. All of these factors must be weighed to determine if

the type of force that is going to be used will be an asset or a

liability. These same factors, plus the psychological factor,

determine if the force can support the accomplishment of the

overall IDAD objective, which is to defeat the insurgency by

winning the support of the populace for the host country

government.

(1) Airborne.

The essential difference between airborne forces and

(a)

other combat forces employed against guerrillas is the

capability of parachuting into an area. An airborne

infantry unit conducts ground tactical operations in

the same general manner as other infantry units.

(b)

Since airborne forces become light infantry upon

insertion into an operational area, they can be used

effectively in counterguerrilla operations. The primary

advantage of using this type of force is that it enables

the commander to position a large infantry force in a

short period. In addition, when inserting small

elements into a guerrilla-controlled or contested area,

this method may provide a relatively clandestine

means of insertion. Airborne operations are dependent

on several factors, to include drop zone availability,

airframe availability, terrain, and weather. In most

cases, airborne operations can be used effectively to

insert forces into suitable areas in all phases of

insurgency. (For further information on airborne

operations, see FM 7-10, FM 7-20, and FM 7-30.)

(2)

Air assault.

(a)

The helicopter provides battlefield mobility to the

counterguerrilla force that usually cannot be matched

by the guerrilla force. Air assault forces provide a

valuable contribution through the tactic of vertical

envelopment. They give the force commander the

means to rapidly disperse and concentrate forces at the

critical time and place and then quickly extract the

force and employ it in a different area, if needed. The

fundamental characteristic of air assault operations is

5-3

FM 90-8

the use of helicopters to provide a tactical mobility

advantage over the enemy. No other force on the

battlefield can respond to a tactical situation and move

considerable distances as rapidly as air assault forces.

(b)

Air assault forces can:

• Attack enemy positions from any direction.

• Strike objectives in otherwise inaccessible areas.

• Overfly or bypass barriers and obstacles, to include

NBC area contamination.

• Conduct raids using helicopters to insert and

withdraw forces.

• Concentrate, disperse, or redeploy rapidly to

extended their area of influence.

• Provide the commander flexibility by allowing him

to retain a smaller reserve and commit a larger

portion of his force to action.

• React rapidly to tactical opportunities and necessities.

• Place forces rapidly at tactically decisive points in

the battle area.

• Provide surveillance over a wide area.

(c )

Air assault forces, while suited to counterguerrilla

operations, have limitations that must be considered:

• Weather extremes that hamper or stop aircraft

flights.

• Helicopter lift capacity that restricts the type and

quantity of supporting weapons and equipment

that can be airlifted into the battle area.

• Air lines of communications, once inserted.

• Enemy tactical aircraft, air defense, and electronic

warfare systems.

• Reduced mobility on completion of air movement.

• Increased vulnerability during loading and landing

phases.

(d)

Flexibility, mobility, and speed are the key advantages

of utilizing air assault forces. In counterguerrilla

operations, the effective use of these advantages may

be a critical function for the commander. While seeking

to employ this type of force to maximize its strengths,

the commander must also ensure that he realizes these

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FM 90-8

operations have limitations and vulnerabilities. The

advantages and limitations must be weighed in terms

of the concept of suitability to determine if air assault

forces should be used in a given situation. In almost all

cases, air assault forces are well suited for use in all

phases of insurgency. (For further information on air

assault operations, see FM 90-4.)

(3)

Mechanized infantry.

(a)

Mechanized infantry forces, fighting mounted, are not

particularly suited for engaging guerrilla forces in

combat action on restricted terrain. However, terrain

permitting, the ability of infantry fighting vehicles

and armored personnel carriers to move forces rapidly

about the battlefield may give the counterguerrilla

force a mobility advantage and a distinct firepower

advantage. These advantages let the force close on

guerrilla locations mounted and then complete its

mission.

Because of the terrain the guerrilla habitually operates

(b)

on, and the tactics he normally employs, opportunities

to conduct traditional mechanized infantry operations

against him are extremely limited. When this is the

case, the mechanized force must be prepared to either

abandon its carriers or use them only as a means of

transport to the battle area where the mechanized force

will fight on foot. Terrain permitting, the advantage in

speed and mobility may allow for a larger area of

operations than is within the capability of a totally

light force of similar size.

(c)

In most cases, mechanized forces may have a role in:

• Providing convoy escort.

• Providing mobility for reserves.

• Conducting show-of-force operations.

• Assisting in base defenses.

• Participating in an economy-of-force role when

large areas require speed and mobility for adequate

coverage while crossing NBC contaminated areas.

• Providing limited armor protection against light

small arms fire.

•

Participating in air assault operations.

(d)

Mechanized forces are normally suitable to be employed

as a maneuver combat element only in the later stages

of Phase III insurgency.

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FM 90-8

(e) In Phases I and II, dependening upon the situation,

mechanized forces may be used for transport to the

battle area because of their speed and mobility. (For

further information on mechanized infantry employment,

see FM 71-1, FM 71-2, and FM 71-3.)

(4) Armor.

(a) Armor forces are usually employed with accompanying

infantry, but as with mechanized infantry forces,

armor forces are not particularly suited for use as a

maneuver combat element in a counterinsurgency

environment. An armored force does provide firepower,

protection, speed, and shock effect. These are usually

advantages. Its capabilities are decreased and its

vulnerabilities are increased in close and rough ter-

rain. The difficulty in using armored forces is due to the

restrictions placed on the use of firepower and increased

vulnerability because of environment. Normally, the

terrain that is involved is close, restrictive, and

generally suited to light infantry forces. Further

restrictions placed on what is generally considered its

strongpoint — firepower — result in an overall increase

in vulnerabilities and a decrease in capabilities when

using an armored force in counterguerrilla operations.

(b)

In most cases, armored forces maybe used in:

• Providing convoy escort.

• Providing mobility for reserves.

• Conducting show-of-force operations.

•

Assisting in base defenses.

• Participating in an economy-of-force role when

large areas require speed and mobility for adequate

coverage.

can usually be used as a maneuver combat element

only in the later stages of Phase 111. In Phases I and II,

its role is very limited. In these phases, armored forces

are usually effective when supporting base defenses

and show-of-force operations. (For further information

on armor operations, see FM 71-1, FM 71-2, and

FM 71-3.)

(5) Armored cavalry.

(a) The basic tasks of an armored cavalry unit are

reconnaissance and security. Terrain permitting, such

units may help the comma nder cover larger areas

5-6

90-8

because of their speed and mobility. The armored

cavalry force will suffer the same vulnerabilities as

mechanized infantry and armor if the members or the

force remain tied to their vehicles. For these reasons,

they can best be used for:

• Securing bases.

• Patrolling large areas.

• Providing quick reaction forces and mobile

reserves.

(b) When properly utilized and tailored to fit the situation,

armored cavalry can accomplish the specific missions

listed in all phases of an insurgency. As the conflict

progresses into Phase II, terrain permitting, armored

cavalry units begin to take on a more traditional role

and operate in a conventional manner. (For further

information on armored cavalry operations, see

FM 17-95.)

(6) Aviation.

(a)

Types. Three types of aviation units maybe available

for use in counterguerrilla operations: air cavalry

troops, attack helicopter battalions, and combat

aviation companies.

Air cavalry troops. These perform the same missions

(b)

of reconnaissance and security as ground cavalry.

Because of its

‘greater mobility, air cavalry can

reconnoiter and maintain surveillance over a much

larger area than its ground counterpart. For this

reason, depending upon the situation, air cavalry units

are usually suited for employment in counterguerrilla

operations in all phases of an insurgency.

(c)

Attack helicopter battalions. These provide highly

maneuverable, aerial-delivered firepower. When these

assets are used, the ordnance mix must reflect the type

of threat being faced. In Phases I and II, the threat is

usually light infantry, and a higher proportion of

20-mm rounds and 2.75-inch rockets is preferable to

heavier antiarmor ordnance. As the conflict moves into

Phase III, and if the guerrilla force starts to use

mechanized or armored assets, a higher proportion of

antiarmor ordnance maybe preferable. Attack helicop-

ters use natural cover and speed to compensate for their

vulnerabilities. They are suited for situations in which

rapid reaction time is important or where terrain

restricts ground forces. A vital element to the effectiveness

of these units is the suppression of enemy air defense

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FM 90-8

(SEAD). SEAD is any activity that neutralizes,

destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy air defense

systems in a specific area. Means of doing this include

the employment of artillery or United States Air Force

(USAF) and Army forces. Depending on the situation,

attack helicopter units are usually suited for combat in

all phases of an insurgency.

(d) Combat aviation companies. These units give

dismounted infantry tactical mobility by moving

combat elements as the commander dictates. They can

also provide critical supplies to areas when ground

lines of communication have been interdicted or

overloaded. Depending on the situation, combat

support aviation units are suited to all phases of an

insurgency. Because of their speed, mobility, and

flexibility, aviation assets can provide an advantage if

properly employed in most situations. (For further

information on aviation operations, see FM 1-100, FM

17-50, and FM 90-4.)

Section Ill. Conventional Conflict Environments

5-8. Concepts.

In conventional conflict counterguerrilla operations, forces other than

infantry take on larger roles. Their participation conforms more to the

concepts outlined for their use in rear battle doctrine. In these

environments, there are usually fewer restrictions on the use of

firepower.

5-9. Considerations.

Two major considerations, when employing forces other than

infantry, are suitability and availability.

Maneuver force mission suitability is usually discussed in terms

of METT-T. The commander must weigh the advantages and

disadvantages of using his force against the factors of METT-T. If

the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, then the force is

employed.

The commander must make the most effective use of all the forces

he has available. If a particular force would be more suitable but is

not readily available, the commander should seek to procure it. If

he cannot, then he maximizes the effects of those assets that he

has available.

d. In conventional conflicts, the use of combined arms is more

effective in almost all situations rather than the use of any single

type of combat force.

5-8

CHAPTER 6

Combat Support

Section I. General

6-1. Support units.

In addition to combat units, reconnaissance and surveillance

(R&S), fire support, intelligence, engineer, signal, military police,

and air defense artillery forces are integrated into counterguerrilla

force operations by the commander. This chapter explains the

extent to which these assets are used, depending on their

suitability to the situation.

The role of reconnaissance and surveillance in counterguerrilla

operations at all levels of conflict is of prime importance.

Reconnaissance and surveillance units are critical; without them

the chance of success in counterguerrilla operations is significantly

decreased.

The types of reconnaissance and surveillance units the counter-

guerrilla force may have are its organic scout elements and any

long-range surveillance units attached from corps and division. A

brigade-size force may also have supporting intelligence

collectors from the divisional combat electronic warfare intelligence

(CEWI) battalion. These assets may include SIGINT collectors,

remote sensors, and ground surveillance radars.

d. The types of fire support units the counterguerrilla force may have

are mortar platoons, antitank platoons or companies, field

artillery units, tactical air support, naval gunfire support, and air

defense artillery units.

6-2. Firepower constraints.

a. In counterinsurgencies, firepower is usually restricted in order to

limit damage. The use of fire support depends on its suitability

and prevailing restrictions.

b.^{The same restrictions do not usually exist to the same degree in}

conventional conflicts. The use of fire support assets in these

conflicts is expanded since restrictions are relaxed. Suitability in

these conflicts usually depends on the availability of fire support.

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FM 90-8

Section II. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units

6-3. Techniques.

a. Reconnaissance and surveillance are important techniques in

gaining current and accurate intelligence on guerrilla forces.

Current, accurate intelligence on the location, size, composition,

equipment, and morale of guerrilla forces is an absolute necessity

for successful counterguerrilla operations.

While all tactical units have the capability to conduct

reconnaissance and surveillance during operations, there are two

units that are trained and organized to fulfill these specific

tactical missions. These units are the scout platoon and the long-

range surveillance unit (detachment or company).

The scout platoon is organic to battalions; the long-range

surveillance detachment is organic to divisions; and the

long-range surveillance company is organic to corps. Each

one works directly for its (division, corps) commander. Elements

of these units may be attached to subordinate units, when

required.

If the reconnaissance and surveillance unit has vehicles, their use

for purposes other than transportation is determined by the

situation. In most cases, vehicles are used for transport to the

general area where the operation is to begin. The operation is then

conducted dismounted to enhance security.

6-4. Countering the guerrilla force.

a. One method that may be successful in countering guerrilla forces

is to divide the reconnaissance and surveillance assets into teams

of three or four men. These teams are inserted into the operational

area to “saturate” it. Since guerrillas travel in small units and

then mass at a predetermined point prior to the attack, this tactic

increases the chances of discovering one or more of these guerrilla

units before they mass. The chance of this method being

successful increases in proportion to the number of teams inserted

and operating.

b._{The reconnaissance and surveillance element is divided into as}

many teams of three or four men as possible and deployed to cover

an area. Of the seven teams deployed in this situation, only two

(three and six) discover enemy units (figure 6-1).

6-2

FM 90-8

In most cases, option 3 presents the best possibility for continued

success if the counterguerrilla force commander has time

constraints placed on his mission. It enables him to engage a

portion of the guerrilla force and weaken its overall capability

without losing a vital source of intelligence.

Option 1 maybe best in situations where the counterguerrilla force

does not have constraints placed on it and seeks to decisively

engage a larger guerrilla force. In any case, the commander

should wait until intelligence indicates that the guerrilla force has

reached its assembly area or base camp before he reacts with

maneuver forces.

He should place his reconnaissance and surveillance elements in

positions where they can best discover escaping guerrillas who

have slipped through the blocking forces (Figure 6-3).

Figure

6-3. Emplacement of R&S teams to discover fleeing guerrilla forces.

g. He begins the process again if guerrilla units escape (Figure 6-4).

6-5

FM 90-8

Figure

6-4. If guerrilla elements escape, R&S teams begin process again.

h.The key to reconnaissance and surveillance units operating

successfully in a counterinsurgency environment is the ability to

remain undetected. This capability is the result of comprehensive

training and experience. Communications equipment suitable for

the mission is also a prime factor. It does no good to gather

intelligence if the counterguerrilla force cannot use it in a timely

manner.

In conventional counterguerrilla conflicts, the use of the

reconnaissance and surveillance units is more in line with their

conventional missions. They can also employ modifications of the

tactics described for a counterinsurgency. The mission of the

scout platoon is to perform reconnaissance, provide limited

security, and assist in controlling movement of the battalion or its

elements. The types of operations a scout platoon can perform are

route, zone, and area reconnaissance, and screening.

6-5. LRSU.

a . The mission of the long-range surveillance unit {LRSU} (company

or detachment) is to observe, record, and report enemy

dispositions, facilities, and activities as well as battlefield

conditions.

b. The LRSU provides the commander with a dedicated, specially

trained and equipped, and highly reliable human intelligence

collection capability. A HUMINT collection unit provides the

commander with the capability to gather timely, highly reliable

information that does not require lengthy processing and

analysis. The trained observer augmented with modem sensor

6-6

FM 90-8

and communication systems is a reliable, flexible, and valuable

information-gathering asset and is essential to conducting

successful operations.

The LRSU is organized, trained, and equipped to enter enemy

areas to observe and report enemy movements and activities, as

well as battlefield conditions. At night, or during other periods of

reduced visibility, surveillance teams infiltrate by air, ground, or

water to selected areas occupied by enemy forces or to areas where

enemy activity is expected.

d. While avoiding contact with the enemy and local civilians, these

elements employ a variety of sensors and special purpose

equipment to detect, observe, and monitor enemy activities and

perform other specified tasks. As information is obtained,

periodic reports are sent to the LRSU operations element utilizing

secure, rapid-transmission communications equipment. This

operational element provides the reported data to the military

intelligence (MI) operation center for analysis and dissemination.

At a predesignated time, or on order, surveillance elements are

either extracted or evade enemy personnel to exfiltrate the enemy

area, or they link up with friendly forces. Members of the

surveillance elements are physically and mentally prepared to

remain in enemy territory for extended periods to accomplish

their mission.

Section Ill. Fire Support Units

6-6. Fire support planning.

a. The types of fire support units the counterguerrilla force may have

available are mortar platoons, antitank platoons or companies,

field artillery units, naval gunfire, tactical air, and air defense

artillery units.

An important factor in planning fire support is the restriction(s)

placed on its use. In counterinsurgency environments, restrictions

on its use (and damage caused) are greater than in conventional

conflict environments. The commander operates under the

concept of “minimum essential force” in counterinsurgency

environments. He integrates his fire support into his tactical plan

in accordance with prevailing restrictions, but always ensures he

has adequate fire support for likely contingencies. In many cases,

this means little or no use of fire support.

This difficulty is not as great in conventional conflicts, but in

these environments there are also restrictions. Usually these

restrictions do not hinge on the amount of firepower used, but

rather on collateral damage and coordination and control

6-7

FM 90-8

measures. Additionally, fire support may not be readily available

to the counterguerrilla commander because it may be committed

to fight in the main battle area.

d. Due to restrictions that may preclude the use of fire support, the

counterguerrilla force is prepared to operate with little or no fire

support.

Since areas of operation are usually larger in counterguerrilla

operations (than in more conventional operations), the counter-

guerrilla force must not become tied to the range of its fire support.

Operations will take place outside of fire support weapon ranges.

In such cases, the commander provides for increased capability to

reinforce or extract his engaged units, depending upon the

situation. In all cases, restricted or not, the fire support forces

available are ready to respond on short notice if restrictions are

lifted or when needed for self-defense.

6-7. Mortar platoons.

In a counterinsurgency, the firing elements of the mortar platoon

normally occupy positions within the battalion operational support

base. If elements are required to move to firing positions outside of the

base, additional security must be provided. The mortar platoon is

usually kept under battalion control and provides the most responsive

indirect fire capability available to a battalion. Depending on the

situation, the mortar platoon may or may not work from an established

base in a conventional conflict.

6-8. Antitank platoons and companies.

In an insurgency, the antitank units are not usually employed in

their primary role. In those situations where no armor threat

exists, consideration may be given to leaving the tube-launched,

optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile in a secure staging

area, either in or out of country, and using the crews as infantry.

Since these personnel are usually not experienced in light

infantry tactics, they may be best used as part of the security force

for the OSB.

b. In conventional conflict environments, the same situation may

apply when no armor threat exists. However, because of the

contingencies that the counterguerrilla force must be prepared to

encounter, the TOWS must remain with the antitank unit while it

is employed in a security role. These contingencies may include

countering enemy armor penetrations, or a change in mission

from rear battle to reinforcing frontline units, or even attacking or

defending as part of the main force.

6-8

FM 90-8

6-9. Field artillery units.

As stated previously, the use of field artillery may be extremely

limited because of restrictions on the use of firepower. In all cases,

the application of firepower must reflect the principle of

“minimum essential force.” The field artillery (FA) support

normally provided to light infantry divisions consists of the

105-mm howitzer. Artillery of larger calibers maybe provided by

artillery units augmenting the divisional artillery. If the

counterguerrilla unit is not light infantry, its organic capability

may consist of 155-mm howitzers. It is normal for artillery

batteries to operate from the battalion OSB when the battalions

are widely dispersed. Normal field artillery missions include

direct support, reinforcing, general support, and general support

reinforcing.

There is a fire support coordination center at each level of

maneuver command from company through brigade. They are

manned by personnel from the brigade’s direct support FA

battalion.

When the situation permits the use of indirect fire support, FA

units must be responsive and flexible. Timely and effective

artillery fire in response to guerrilla activity may discourage

subsequent guerrilla activity within artillery range. Quick

reaction times and the capability to shift artillery fires over wide

areas require a responsive and effective means of communication.

To provide effective fire support, artillery is employed to obtain

maximum area coverage with available weapons while retaining

the capability to mass fires. In addition to supporting tactical

operations, artillery may be positioned to provide area fire

support to defend depots, logistical complexes, population

centers, and other critical installations. Fires may be requested by

self-defense forces, police, security elements protecting logistical

complexes, and other support units, in addition to the supported

tactical force.

The senior field artillery officer at each echelon of maneuver

command is designated the fire support coordinator. (FM 6-20

gives information on fire support coordination for indirect fires

and fires from tactical air support. ) Fires must be closely

coordinated not only with tactical operations in the area but also

with civilian activities.

Counterguerrilla operations normally dictate:

(1) A greater decentralization of organic, attached, and re-

inforcing fire support.

(2) A reduced capability for brigade-level control and coordination

of fires within the operational area.

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FM 90-8

(3) Greater security requirements for firing positions of indirect

fire weapons to include planning of direct fires for defense.

(4) A requirement to fire in all directions.

(5) Provision for support to local defense forces and static

security posts.

(6) Discriminate use of fire support to avoid noncombatant

casualties that would alienate the population and produce

hostile attitudes toward the host government.

(7) Close coordination with host country officials in the

operational area.

Lack of time may preclude the preparation of a formal, coordinated,

and integrated fire support plan for every contingency; however,

SOP should provide for all likely contingencies. Close liaison and

continuous contact between the supported commander and the

fire support coordinators provide the required coordination;

however, in operations involving extensive employment of

maneuver and support forces, such as in the final phase of an

encirclement, coordination measures must be used to ensure that

converging friendly units do not call fire upon one another.

In conventional conflicts, the use of FA units is more along

conventional lines.

6-10. Naval gunfire support.

a. Naval gunfire support is delivered by ship batteries to support

amphibious operations and maneuver units operating in coastal

areas. When support is provided by naval gunfire, each gunfire

ship is assigned the tactical mission of either direct support or

general support. A ship in direct support normally supports a

battalion and delivers planned and immediate fires. A ship in

general support normally supports a brigade and delivers

adjusted fires, or it may be assigned on a fire-mission basis to a

subordinate maneuver unit. The counterguerrilla force commander

must take into consideration the fact that naval gunfire is

normally high velocity, low trajectory fire.

b._{In a counterinsurgency, the use of this asset will be governed by}

the same restrictions and the principle of “minimum essential

force” that pertains to firepower when using field artillery.

Generally, if FA can be used in an insurgency, naval gunfire can

also be used, if available. The same is true of naval gunfire in

conventional conflicts. One advantage of naval gunfire is that the

supported ground units do not have to provide security to the

firing batteries.

6-10

FM 90-8

A liaison platoon (from the US Marine Corps) will normally be

attached to the brigade to provide specialists and communications

needed to control, coordinate, and recommend employment of

naval gunfire or naval air.

6-11. Tactical air operations.

Tactical air operations are flown by the US Air Force in support of

counterguerrilla operations and cover six mission areas

(some

missions could be flown by Navy or Marine air assets) and special

operations.

Counter air. Objectives are to gain control of the airspace

environment. Counter air operations protect friendly forces,

ensure freedom to use the airspace to perform assigned missions

and tasks, and deny use of airspace to a hostile force. The goal is

air supremacy.

Offensive counter air (OCA). Air operations seek out and

neutralize or destroy hostile air forces at a chosen time and place.

Offensive counter air is designed to seize the offensive at the

initiation of hostilities, conduct operations in hostile air space,

and neutralize or destroy hostile air forces and the infrastructure

that supports their operations.

Suppression of enemy air defenses. These operations

neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade hostile air defensive

systems in a specific area by physical or electronic attack. SEAD

operations provide a favorable situation to perform missions

effective y without interference from hostile air defenses.

Defensive counter air (DCA). These operations detect,

identify, intercept, and destroy hostile air forces attempting to

attack friendly forces or penetrate friendly airspace. DCA defends

friendly lines of communication, protects friendly bases, and

supports friendly land and naval forces while denying hostile

forces the freedom to carry out offensive operations.

Air interdiction (AI).

(1)

AI delays, disrupts, diverts, or destroys hostile military

potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against

friendly forces. These operations are performed at such

distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of

specific actions with friendly fire and movement forces is not

normally required. AI attacks are usually executed against

hostile surface forces; movement networks (including lines

of communication); command, control and communications

networks; and combat supplies. Interdiction can delay the

arrival or buildup of hostile forces and supplies, disrupt the

6-11

FM 90-8

hostile scheme of operation and control of forces, divert

hostile resources to other uses, and destroy forces and

supplies.

(2) AI is normally executed by an air commander as part of a

systematic and persistent campaign. Although an AI

campaign can bean independent air effort, an air commander

normally coordinates the campaign with a surface force

commander. A campaign is developed to limit the enemy’s

mobility to maneuver forces, while forcing the enemy into

high rates of consumption, and to create opportunities for

friendly forces to exploit the disabilities produced by

interdiction. The weight, phasing, and timing of interdiction

attacks can provide friendly forces the opportunity to seize

the initiative.

(3) AI against targets which could have a near-term effect on

friendly land forces is referred to as battlefield air interdiction.

The primary difference between battlefield air interdiction

and the rest of the air interdiction effort is the level of interest

and emphasis the land commander places on the process of

identifying, selecting, and attacking certain targets.

Therefore, battlefield air interdiction requires joint coordination

at the component level during planning, but once planned,

battlefield air interdiction is controlled and executed by the

air commander as an integral part of a total air interdiction

campaign.

f. Close air support (CAS).

(1) CAS supports surface operations by attacking hostile

targets near friendly surface forces. CAS can support

offensive, counteroffensive, and defensive surface force

operations with planned or immediate attacks. All such

missions require detailed coordination and integration with

the fire and maneuver plans of friendly surface forces. CAS

missions require corridors to the battlefield, timely intelligence

information, and accurate weapons delivery.

(2) CAS enhances surface force operations by delivering a wide

range of weapons and massed firepower at decisive points. It

can surprise the hostile force, create opportunities for the

maneuver or advance of friendly forces through shock effect

and concentrated attacks, protect the flanks of friendly

forces, blunt hostile offensives, and protect the rear of

surface forces during rear battle maneuvers.

g. Special operations.

(1) These operations influence the accomplishment of strategic

or tactical objectives through the conduct of low visibility,

6-12

FM 90-8

covert, or clandestine military actions. Special operations

are usually conducted in hostile territory or politically

sensitive areas and may complement friendly force opera-

tions.

(2)

Virtually all aerospace forces have the potential for

employment in special operations. Additionally, the Air

Force organizes, trains, and equips unique units to conduct

special operations as a primary mission. To execute special

operations, forces are normally organized and employed in

small formations capable of support actions and independent

operations that enable timely and tailored responses

throughout the spectrum of conflict. Special operation forces

may conduct or support unconventional warfare, counter-

terrorist operations, collective security, psychological

operations, certain rescue operations, and other missions

such as interdiction or offensive counter air operations.

(a) Airlift. Airlifts deploy, employ, and sustain military

forces under varying conditions, ranging from peace to

war. As a combat mission, airlifts provide combat

power through airdrops, extractions, and airlanding of

ground forces and supplies. Through mobility operations,

the joint or combined force commander can maneuver

fighting forces to exploit hostile weaknesses. As a

combat support mission, airlifts provide logistical

support through the transportation of personnel and

equipment. In peacetime, airlifts provide the opportunity

to enhance national objectives by providing military

assistance and civilian relief programs. In addition to

the special operations noted above, aircraft assets may

be used to dispense flares and leaflets as well as

equipped with speakers or spraying apparatus for

forest fire fighting. Airlifts, therefore, accomplish the

timely movement, delivery and recovery of personnel,

equipment, and supplies, and further military and

national goals. Airlifts may be strategic or tactical.

Strategic (intertheater) airlifts transcend the boundary

of any one theater and are executed under the central

direction of higher authority, normally in support of an

overall effort. In contrast, tactical

(intratheater)

airlifts are performed within a theater of operations

and support theater objectives through the rapid and

responsive movement of personnel and supplies.

(b) Aerospace surveillance and reconnaissance. The

objectives are to collect information from airborne,

orbital, and surfacebased sensors. Air Force surveillance

and reconnaissance efforts are part of the national

intelligence gathering effort and a systematic observa-

6-13

FM 90-8

tion process. These operations provide much information

that is key to the development of national security

policy, force postures, planning actions, force employ-

ment, and informed responses in times of crises.

Surveillance operations collect information continuously

from the aerospace and from the earth’s surface and

subsurface. Reconnaissance operations are directed

toward localizd or specific targets. Through surveillance

and reconnaissance, varied data are collected, such as

meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, electronic,

and communications characteristics. The products of

reconnaissance and surveillance operations have

strategic and tactical applications in both peace and

war. Strategic and tactical surveillance and reconnais-

sance provide timely notification of hostile intent and

actions as well as other information vital to the

national command authorities and combat commanders.

These operations are instrumental in identifying the

composition and capability of potentially hostile

forces. The Air Force also performs the following

specialized tasks that could support counterguerrilla

operations:

performed by aerospace forces to control selected parts

of the electromagnetic spectrum in support of strategic

and tactical operations. Electronic combat involves

actions to protect friendly electromagnetic capabilities

and actions to neutralize or destroy hostile electro-

magnetic capabilities. This enhances the ability of

friendly war-fighting systems to achieve objectives,

since the use of the electromagnetic spectrum can have

a major impact on the success or failure of military

operations. EC includes electronic warfare (EW), as

well as elements of command, control, and communi-

cations countermeasures (C³CM) and suppression of

enemy air defenses. EW is military action using

electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or

prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum

and also includes actions designed to retain the

friendly use of that spectrum. C³CM involves defensive

and offensive operations designed to deny information,

protect friendly command, control, and communications

(C³), influence hostile actions, and degrade or destroy

hostile C³capabilities. C³CM, supported by intelligence

operations, integrates the use of operations security,

military deception, jamming, and physical destruction.

SEAD, as an essential element of the counter air

mission, is aimed at gaining freedom of action to

6-1

FM 90-8

perform Air Force missions by neutralizing, destroying,

or temporarily degrading hostile air defense systems.

EC contributes heavily to SEAD in counter air ob-

jectives.

(d) Psychological operations. This is a specialized

task performed to support national objectives by

influencing the attitudes and behavior of hostile,

neutral, or friendly groups. All Air Force commands

and agencies are responsible for the conduct or support

of psychological operations. In planning and executing

operations, commanders should consider the psycho-

logical implications and opportunities inherent in

every action, and they must make a concerted effort to

ensure that the signals transmitted are perceived as

intended. Both action and inaction may communicate

information (which can exert influence and may be

used to reinforce actions) to enhance perceptions of

capabilities or to influence others to support friendly

objectives. Depending on the medium of communications,

national objectives, and planned actions, various

psychological efforts can be created to reinforce

operations. These include planned communications

through electronic means or printed material; a show

of force or demonstrations of superiority; an attack on a

specific, significant target for psychological effect;

actions to harass and disrupt hostile operations;

surprise, shock action, and deception; or humanitarian

operations.

(e) Weather service. This is a specialized task performed

to provide timely and accurate environmental infor-

mation to support strategic, tactical, and mobility

operations. The Air Force weather service gathers,

anal yzes, and provides meteorological and exoatmo-

spheric data for mission planning. Environmental

information is essential in conducting both airspace

and surface operations. The environmental information

provided by the weather service directly influences the

decision process for employing forces, including the

selection of weapon systems, routes, targets, and

delivery tactics.

6-12. Air defense artillery units.

Air defense is a combination of all active and passive measures to

counter hostile air operations. In an insurgency, the hostile air

threat may be minimal. In this case, consideration maybe given

to leaving air defense artillery (ADA) weapons in a rear staging

6-15

FM 90-8

area and using ADA personnel as additional security forces for

the OSB. If this course of action is selected, the ground

commander must recognize that an insurgency does not equate to

a low intensity air threat. If ADA personnel are separated from

their ADA weapons, even a minimal air attack could result in the

destruction of friendly force units. Commanders must plan for

such an attack by hostile or sympathetic forces.

When the guerrilla force has the potential to mount an air threat,

or when an air threat exists, the ADA assets must maintain the

capability to immediately react to an air threat. In a conventional

counterguerrilla environment, the roles of ADA are along more

conventional lines. (For further information on air defense

operations integrated with infantry operations, see FM 44-1, FM

44-3, and FM 44-18.)

6-13. Military intelligence.

Intelligence at the tactical level is of prime importance in

counterguerrilla operations. MI elements organic to units

conducting counterguerrilla operations are CEWI battalions at

division level, and staff sections at brigade and battalion level.

Because of the decentralized nature of counterguerrilla operations,

portions of the divisional assets are usually attached to brigades,

which may in turn attach elements down to the battalions. The

tactical MI assets coordinate their efforts with the existing

intelligence operations (either host country or US) in their area.

Division level MI assets are not capable of long-term, area-oriented

intelligence production without echelons above division support

and assistance. However, they are capable of short-term

collection and production efforts in support of the immediate

tactical operation.

The tactical MI element has two missions that are conducted

simultaneously. The first is to collect, process, and analyze

intelligence information. There are two categories of information

which are important to combat commanders: combat information

and intelligence. Combat information is raw data that can be used

for fire and maneuver decisions as received without further

processing, interpretation, or integration with other data.

Combat information is seldom developed above battalion level

and is a component part of intelligence. Intelligence is data

requiring some form of validation, integration, and comparison

with other data (or analysis) before it can be used or fully

exploited.

The disciplines from which these data are produced and collected

are HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT. In a counterguerrilla

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conflict, the area of HUMINT provides a large portion of

available intelligence. Technical and electronic assets, if used

effectively, can provide additional data to enhance the counter-

guerrilla force’s intelligence advantage. Some of these assets

include ground surveillance radar, sensors, communications

intercept (COMINT), and side-looking airborne radar (IMINT).

The second mission of the tactical MI element is to attempt to

disrupt or delay the enemy’s intelligence collection processes. The

discipline that accomplishes this task is termed counterintelligence.

These functions include deception operations, OPSEC, COMSEC,

and are for the most part performed by HUMINT assets. (For

further information on intelligence operations, see FM 34-1 and

FM 34-10.)

6-14. Engineers.

Engineer assets are usually found at division level and above.

Portions of these assets maybe attached to brigades and, in turn,

to battalions. The engineer system is divided into four areas:

mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering.

Mobility is geared toward improving the movement of maneuver

units and movement of critical supplies. It is oriented toward

reducing or negating the effects of obstacles. Examples of

mobility operations include landing zone construction, reduction

of roadblocks, construction of combat trails, and assault bridging.

Countermobility is designed to reduce the enemy’s mobility and

effectiveness. This is generally done through the installation of

obstacles. Some obstacles may destroy targets; most enhance or

complement weapon effectiveness. Examples of conventional

obstacles are minefield and wire entanglements.

Survivability is the development of protective positions. Examples

include construction of perimeter defense positions in operational

support bases.

General engineering missions do not contribute directly to

committed maneuver units. Examples of general engineering

missions include:

(1) Improving and maintaining essential supply routes.

(2) Developing areas for essential logistics.

(3) Replacing assault

(or destroyed) bridges with tactical

bridging.

(4) Carrying out civic action.

Engineer units spend most of their time and effort in survivability

and general engineering tasks, even though all four areas of

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engineer effort may be addressed. When determining if a project

should be considered general engineering or one of the other three,

the rule is: if the project’s primary purpose is to help the populace,

it is general engineering; if its primary purpose is to enhance

tactical operations, it will usually be one of the other three

categories.

Since engineers spend much of their time interfacing with the

populace during civic action projects, it is essential that engineers

understand the impact of their role on national objectives.

Engineer assets can be used to enhance infantry combat

operations as a contingency mission. Engineers are effective in

their primary mission and are utilized in their secondary role as a

last resort. Engineers can be used as trainers on basic mobility,

countermobility, and survivability skills to include identification

of booby traps, mines, and obstacles, and emplacement construction.

They contribute more toward the achievement of national goals

as civic action units than as additional infantry. Engineers may

be used as infantry:

(1) During attacks on the operational support base.

(2) When all tactical units are committed and a threat arises.

(3) As reserves in situations where the guerrilla threat has

already caused the commitment of all available reserves.

(For further information on engineer operations and

capabilities, see FM 5-100.)

6-15. Military police.

Military police units can perform their normal functions as an

effective part of any counterguerrilla force. They provide a

distinct advantage in police operations in the populace and

resources control program. Military police operate in conjunction

with host country civil and military police.

b. Military police functions include:

(1) Populace and resources control operations. Operations

in an insurgency may involve extensive police activities to

control the host country populace and materiel resources,

including screening, identification, registration, enforcement

of curfews, operation of patrols and checkpoints, and

investigation of crime.

(2) Intelligence operations. Since guerrilla activities often

overlap with criminal activities, police activities over a

period of time can develop informants and informant nets

which produce intelligence and/or information.

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(3) Searches. Military police may conduct searches in support

of cordon-and-search operations. They support the operation

by manning or supervising search parties, securing persons

or property captured, and evacuating prisoners.

(4) Securing ground lines of communication. Military

police assist in securing lines of communication by road and

aerial patrolling, establishing traffic control points,

escorting convoys, and conducting reconnaissance in their

area of responsibility. In securing such lines, they may

apprehend individual guerrillas and their supporters and are

prepared to combat small groups of guerrillas or to act as a

fixing element until combat units arrive.

(5) Physical security. Military police provide physical

security to individuals and installations. This may include

designated communities.

(6) Prisoners. Military police process, secure, and evacuate

captured persons and detainees in accordance with FM 19-40

and Department of the Army directives.

A division usually has one military police company. Depending

on the situation, elements of this company may be attached to

brigades or battalions. They are utilized more in consolidation

operations than in strike operations. (For further information on

military police activities, see FM 19-1, FM 19-4, and FM 19-40.)

6-16. Signal.

Radio is the primary means of communication in counterguerrilla

operations. Planning and implementing radio communication

nets for the brigade and its maneuver battalions may become

highly complex. The brigade signal officer is prepared to advise

on the capability of available communications means to support

each course of action being considered.

Providing sufficient radio communication equipment to conduct

operations is a high priority in an insurgency. Aerial and ground

relay stations may be required to extend the range of FM

equipment. Since the brigade communication platoon has no

reserve from which to provide augmentation, special communication

needs of brigade elements are provided either by redistributing

equipment or by augmenting the table of organization and

equipment. For long-range radio communications between

battalion operational support bases and patrol bases, communi-

cation support teams may be required.

Extensive use of radio expands the communications security

problem. Never consider the guerrilla force too unsophisticated to

acquire communications intelligence. Conventional communica-

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FM 90-8

tions security measures are employed with emphasis on changing

operational codes frequently at the lower tactical echelons. Secure

voice nets will be provided from company level upward.

Long-range reconnaissance and surveillance units employed in

counterguerrilla operations should possess a secure, long-range

capability to enhance communications security.

Use of multichannel, high-frequency voice radio, radio teletype,

and tactical satellite should be considered for interconnecting

operational support bases. Normally, isolated relay stations

cannot be established in the counterguerrilla operational

environment. Therefore, the location of operational support or

patrol bases, and distance between them, seriously impacts on the

signal unit’s ability to provide a reliable multichannel communi-

cations system. The signal officer considers this when presenting

his recommendations on base locations to the commander.

The composition of the signal element committed in support of the

counterguerrilla force is modified to meet mission and situation

requirements. The signal support element can be either in direct

support or attached. A direct support role is desirable as it affords

the signal officer wider latitude and greater flexibility to meet

changing support requirements. In all cases, the supported unit

provides security forces for the signal elements. (For further

information on signal operations and capabilities, see FM 24-1.)

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CHAPTER 7

Combat Service Support

Section I. General

7-1. Assets.

a. This chapter explains how combat service support assets enhance

tactical operations and assist the unit in accomplishing its overall

mission.

b. These assets include medical, supply, transportation, maintenance,

and personnel and administration. They normally operate from

bases that support unit tactical operations. Depending on the size

of the unit, these assets may be organic or attached.

7-2. Essential elements.

Combat service support units include those elements essential to the

tactical mission and those elements that are not essential but are

necessary to the normal functioning of the battalion and brigade.’

Usually, only essential combat service support assets are located at the

battalion operational support base. Both essential and nonessential

tactical support elements can be found in the brigade’s support base.

Section Il. Bases

7-3. Operational support.

a. Operational support bases are usually established by battalions.

In consolidation operations, these bases are usually semipermanent.

In strike operations, they operate only as long as required by the

unit mission. The primary function of the battalion operational

support base is to support tactical operations. It may provide a

staging area for operations; a command, control, and communi-

cation center; a limited logistics base (battalion combat trains); a

fire support base; or a combination of all these functions. The

specific support functions it provides are determined by availability

and necessity. These bases have the minimum personnel

necessary to operate and provide security. All nonessential

personnel — those not crucial to the tactical mission — are

positioned in the brigade support base.

b. Battalion operational support bases provide certain advantages.

They:

(1) Establish a government presence in the area of operations.

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FM 90-8

(2) Aid in limiting guerrilla mobility in the immediate vicinity.

(3) Provide a measure of security to populated areas close by.

These advantages are secondary and do not take precedence over

the primary function — to support tactical operations.

7-4. OSB location.

When selecting a location for the operational support base,

several factors are considered. The location includes an area large

enough to meet the unit’s requirements, and it is on defensible

terrain. If the unit is going to use the base for fire support, it

provides the maximum possible coverage for indirect fire

weapons.

The operational support base is located far enough away from

population centers to preclude civilian interference with operations

and to minimize the possibility of the population center becoming

a collateral target.

The OSB is located so that it has, as a minimum, two methods for

resupply. For example, if the primary means for resupply is by air,

it should also have a secondary means, such as a road, in case

weather precludes the use of aircraft.

The brigade support base provides deployed battalions with

command, control and communications facilities; logistics

support

(brigade support area, BSA); staging areas; and

intelligence activities. The support base is usually in a secured

area within a government-controlled area. It is larger than a

battalion operational support base. The brigade support base

provides essential tactical and necessary operational support to

deployed battalions, and also provides a rear location for

nondeployed elements of the deployed battalions (battalion field

trains).

All combat service support elements, whether operating from

battalion or brigade bases, ensure that their activities support the

overall national objective. Since these operations usually involve

more interaction with the civilian populace than tactical

operations, it is necessary that personnel involved understand the

host country’s culture. Such understanding will preclude any

action that might be detrimental to the accomplishment of the

overall national objective.

The combat service support assets that normally operate from the

battalion operational base are medical and supply. These same

assets can also operate from the brigade support base. The

additional assets of transportation, maintenance, and personnel

and administration usually operate from the brigade support

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FM 90-8

base. The size of the element at each base depends on the

situation. A nonessential element (operational or tactical) should

not be deployed from the home station. It is important that

deployed elements consist only of those assets critical to the

tactical or operational functioning of the unit.

Section Ill. Use of Assets

7-5. Support levels.

Most of the combat service support assets are found at division or

higher level and are attached to brigades as needed. In some cases, the

brigade may receive a larger portion of the division assets than normal

if the situation requires it.

7-6. Medical.

The mission of medical units is to conserve the fighting strength

of the counterguerrilla force by preventive medical and sanitary

measures and by appropriate medical and surgical treatment. In

support of the IDAD effort, medical units and personnel may

provide medical assistance, advice, and training to host country

medical personnel. These units may also provide limited medical

support to the local populace on a temporary basis. However, such

support is conducted under the auspices of the host country and to

the credit of that government.

b. Aidmen are at company level and give emergency medical

treatment within their capabilities. They also ensure that

patients who need to be evacuated are properly prepared and

promptly moved.

c. An aid station is usually at battalion level. In counterguerrilla

situations, the station is within the battalion operational support

base. Aid station functions include:

(1) Receiving, recording, examining, and sorting patients and

returning the physically fit to duty.

(2) Giving emergency medical treatment and preparing patients

for evacuation.

(3) Providing limited medical support through military civic

action programs, as designated.

d. The battalion aid station is normally supervised by a physician or

physician’s assistant.

Depending on the seriousness of the wound, the patient maybe

moved directly to a division treatment station in the brigade

support base, or to a corps level hospital. Evacuation to medical

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FM 90-8

support facilities may be by ground, but aeromedical evacuation

is the preferred means in counterguerrilla operations because of

the speed and security of aerial transport.

Any medical facility maybe bypassed, and the patient evacuated

to a higher level when his condition warrants it and the means of

evacuation permit. Evacuation of wounded personnel does not

take precedence over mission accomplishment.

7-7. Supply.

Supply units in counterguerrilla operations, as in conventional

operations, provide all necessary classes of supplies to units

involved in tactical operations. Since the battalion operational

support base is as small as possible and provides only a limited

logistics base, the supply element at battalion is small.

A majority of the combat trains are collocated with field trains in

the brigade support base, so it is essential that supply lines to

battalions be maintained. Both aerial and ground resupply are

considered to ensure a backup system in case one method is

disrupted.

The brigade usually receives its portion of divisional assets, but it

may be augmented with additional assets as required.

Resupplying tactical units must not set a pattern. Resupply

should not occur on a regular basis, but only as requested by

tactical units.

Unit messes normally do not operate from battalion operational

support bases. Unit mess teams may move to (and operate from)

battalion bases for short periods to improve morale, or prepare hot

meals in the brigade base and transport them to the battalion

base. In some cases, local procurement of foodstuffs maybe

authorized to help bolster the local economy.

Currently prescribed supply systems and procedures can

adequately support counterguerrilla operations with minor

variations.

(For further information on supply operations and procedures, see

FM 29-51.)

7-8. Transportation.

a. Transportation requirements are classified as tactical and

nontactical. Tactical transportation deals with the repositioning

of men and materiel in the battle area, and is directly associated

with combat. Nontactical transportation deals with the movement

of men and materiel in a noncombat action.

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There are two major types of transportation means available to

counterguerrilla forces: ground and air transport. Less common

means of transportation are railroads, watercraft, and pack

animals.

Tactical transportation by aviation assets is preferred because of

their speed and flexibility. On occasions when aviation assets are

not suitable, ground transportation is utilized. Ground transpor-

tation requires increased security. Once the unit is repositioned,

soldiers move on foot to accomplish their mission.

Aviation units are located at division level and above. Aircraft for

brigade operations, or below, are attached or placed in support of

the using unit(s).

Nontactical transportation is accomplished by either aviation or

ground transportation assets. Generally, nontactical transportation

is used to move supplies and equipment, and for medical

evacuation. Ground transportation assets may be organic to units

at company and above. The use of ground transport is dependent

upon distance, security, terrain, and availability of routes, among

other factors.

Ground transportation requests are made through S4 channels,

consolidated at brigade S4, and forwarded to the division

transportation officer. He assigns priorities and missions to the

division’s track assets or requests additional assets from corps.

Requests for Army aviation are made through S3 channels and

forwarded to the assistant division aviation officer. He assigns

priorities and missions to the division’s combat aviation brigade

or requests additional assets from corps.

(For further information on transportation assets and operations, see

FM 55-2.)

7-9. Maintenance.

Maintenance involves all actions to keep equipment operationally

ready or to restore it to that status. Battalion maintenance elements are

located at the OSB (combat trains) and the brigade support base (field

trains). In addition, maintenance contact teams from the maintenance

unit supporting the brigade (forward support maintenance company or

forward support battalion) will also be located with the OSB.

Maintenance doctrine (fix as far forward as possible) is modified

slightly in an effort to keep the OSB as small as possible. As a result,

most maintenance, other than minor repair or replacement of parts,

will take place at the brigade support base in a relatively secure area.

(For further information on maintenance operations, see FM 29-2, FM

29-23, and FM 29-30-1.)

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6) - page 40