Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6)

TB 380-41

of Couriers

5-16

CCIR

4-43

of Former COMSEC Custodian Memorandum 4-

SAIR

4-39

...............................................................................43

Unit Deployment

2-19

of Guards

5-7

CSLA Responsibilities

2-21

of Maintenance Personnel

5-4

COMSEC Compromises and Incidents

of Personnel Involved in Destroying Key

4-51

COMSEC Incident

7-1

Revocation

Cryptographic Incidents

7-1

AWOL

7-12

Personnel Incidents

7-1

Revocation or Suspension for Cause

7-13

Physical Incidents

7-1

Status

COMSEC Custodian

Unauthorized Access

See Physical Incidents

Absence

2-14

to CRYPTO Key

See Access to Crypto Key

Alterna te .2-13. See also COMSEC Custodian

to Un-keyed CCI

See Access to CCI

and Alternates

Clearance, Security

Discrepancies

2-14

Access to COMSEC Facilities

5-4

Responsibilities

2-12

CMCS

2-1

COMSEC Custodian and Alternates

Accountability

Access Requirements

2-11

Relief from

7-15

Appointments

2-11

Addresses

Custodial Obligations

2-12

Defense Courier Service

2-5

Duties

2-12

Internet Protocol (IP)

2-6

LCMS Operator Training

6-12

Mailing

2-5

Rank or Grade Requirements

2-11

Message

2-5

Relief from Accountability

2-15

Physical Location

2-5

Training

2-12

Architecture

2-1

COMSEC Directory Service

2-6

Army Structure

2-3

COMSEC Equipment

EKMS ID

2-5

Adhesive Labels on

4-49

Tier 1

2-4

Destruction of See also Emergency: Destruction

Tier 2

2-4

Storage

Tier 3

2-4

Unattended

5-8

as a Service Authority

1-3

Unclassified Equipment

3-3

Relief from Property Accountability

7-15

COMSEC Facility

Compromises

7-1

Access

See Access to a COMSEC Facility

and Incidents, COMSEC

7-1

Approval for HRH

2-6

Control

Approvals

2-6

CONAUTH

3-14

Approving Office

2-6

Key Material

3-16

Devices Used Within

5-5

Marking Messages

7-15

Downgrading

2-6

Restricting

Duration of Approval

2-7

User Holdings of Key Material

3-23

Establishing

2-8

Reviewing Messages

7-14

Identification

5-4

COMSEC Account

Non-Continuous Operations

5-6

CARP

2-8

Protecttion

5-3, 5 -5

CFAR

2-10

Mobile and Transportable

5-6

Change of Account Number

2-8

Request for Approval

2-7

Closing of

2-16

Supervision of

2-11

Establishing

2-8

COMSEC Incident

Inventory of

See Inventory

Reports

See Files, Forms, and Reports

Movement of

2-15

Routing of

7-7

Number ID Structure

2-8

COMSEC Incidents

7-1

Number of Accounts

2-8

Compromising Emanations

7-9

Numbering System

2-8

Cryptographic, Unauthorized Cryptoperiod

Reports

Extension

7-13

INDEX-2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TB 380-41

Discovery of Listening Devices

7-9

Report (SF 153)

4-26

Investigations

7-14

Reproduction of

4-47

Personnel, Absence

7-12

Request for Key Tapes

3-10

Personnel, Captured or Presumed Captured .. 7-

Requisitioning of (and Applicable Publications)

................................................................................12

..................................................................3-3

Personnel, CI Interview

7-12

Shipment

5-12, 5-13

Personnel, Defection or Subversive Intent ..7-13

Shipment of CRYPTO

5-12

Reportable

7-2

Storage

5-8

Reporting Addresees

7-8, 7 -9

Storage Containers

5-9

Reporting of

7-4

Storage of CONFIDENTIAL

5-9

Controlling Authority Limitations

7-6

Storage of CRYPTO

5-8

Reporting Responsibilities

7-5

Storage of SECRET

5-9

Reports Involving Joint-Staff Position Control

Storage of TOP SECRET

5-8

Material

7-7

Storage of Unclassified

5-9

Reports Regarding Satellites and Space

Storage Restrictions

5-9

Vehicles

7-7

Traditional Account Voucher Numbers

See

Satellites, Lost Material Aboard

7-11

Voucher:Numbers

Unauthorized Photography

7-11

Transfer of between COMSEC Accounts

4-31

COMSEC Key

Voucher Control Registers

4-12

AKMS

See AKMS: Electronic Key

COMSEC Witness

See Clearance of

Authorization to Receive

3-18

Duties

2-12

Authorized Exposure

4-23

CONAUTH

3-13

Availability

3-19

Assignment of CONAUTH Duties

3-13

Classification of

3-19

Contingency Operations

3-13

Control of Tape Segments

4-21

Designating Contingency Keying Material...3-18

Emergency Requirements

3-24

Determining Copy Count Requirements

3-23

Excess and Unserviceable Key

3-18

Key Material Compromises .. See Compromises:

Initial Issue

3-18

Key Material

Local Accounting

4-21

Key Material Reviews

3-17

Physical Accounting for Used Segments

4-23

Logistics Support

3-15

Premature Exposure

4-23

Management Responsibilities

3-13

Processing Requests for

3-19

Operational Responsibilities

3-14

Resupply Procedures

3-18

Reporting Defective Keying Material

3-17

Shipment of Physical Key

3-18

Transfer of CONAUTH Duties

3-13

Transfer Reports

3-18

Conversion Report

4-7. See also Files, Forms, and

User Holdings

3-23

Reports. See SF 153

Exceptions

3-23

Voucher Numbers

4-14

COMSEC Material

Couriers

AKMS Account Voucher Numbers

See

Requirements

See Clearance of Couriers

Voucher:Numbers

Responsibilities

5-16

Destruction Exceptions

4-50

CRYPTO

Destruction of

4-49

Access

See Access to CRYPTO Key

Destruction of Other Material

4-53

Caveat

5-2

Destruction of Paper-Based Material

4-51

Production of Physical Key

5-2

Destruction Procedures

4-51

Crypto-equipment

Equipment Modification

4-49

Destruction of

5-24

Hand Receipting of

4-32

Installation of (On-line)

5-5

Identification of

3-1

Quantity

3-7

Inspection

4-8

Screening from View

5-4

Inventory Prior to Transfer or Destruction of4-35

Special Cabinets for

5-11

Item Register (IR) Cards

4-14

Cryptographic Incidents

7-1, 7-13

Local AccountingSee Hand Receipt: Holder and

Cryptologic Media

5-16

Hand Receipts

Cryptonets

INDEX-3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TB 380-41

Elements

3-5

COMSEC Incident Reports, Amplifying

7-6

Establishing

3-6

COMSEC Incident Reports, Final

7-6

Expansion of

3-6

COMSEC Incident Reports, Initial

7-6

Size

3-6

COMSEC Incident Reports, Report Precedence

Types of

3-6

................................................................ 7-6

Cryptosystems

See also Access: LMD/KP

Number

CIK and PIN Number Storage

6-8

Five Digit Outgoing

6-7

Disaster Recovery Kit

6-8

Numbers

AKMS Account

4-10

Special Possession and Conversion Report 4-14

Traditional Accounts

4-11

Personnel Incidents

7-1, 7-12

Numbers, Exception to

See CCIR: Exception

Reports

See Files, Forms, and Reports

INDEX-5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FM 90-8

Preface

“This is another type of war new in its intensity,

ancient in its origins — war by guerrillas, subver-

sives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush

instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of

aggression, seeking victory by eroding and ex-

hausting the enemy instead of engaging him...it

requires in those situations where we must counter

it. ..a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different

kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly

different kind of military training.”

John F. Kennedy, 1962

The aims, objectives, and methods of guerrilla warfare differ greatly

from those of conventional warfare. To be successful in countering this

type of war, the planners of counterguerrilla operations must

understand the enemy and the unique environment in which he

operates.

This manual provides commanders and staffs of brigade elements and

below with concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counter-

guerrilla operations by US forces in insurgency and conventional

conflict environments. It provides a general overview of US counterin-

surgency strategy and the impact that strategy has on counterguerrilla

operations. It provides planning, training, and operational guidance

for commanders and staffs conducting counterguerrilla operations.

The doctrine provides principles to guide the actions of US forces

conducting counterguerrilla operations. In applying these principles,

the commander must be aware that the situation in each counterguerrilla

operation is unique. Techniques and tactics applied successfully in one

situation may not be suitable if applied in the same manner in another

situation. The principles in this manual are guides to be adapted to

each counterguerrilla situation.

The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Submit changes for

improving this publication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes

to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward to the Commandant,

US Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-B-ID, Fort Benning, GA

31905.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both

men and women are included.

90-8

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Section I. General

1-1. Overview.

This chapter discusses the type of activity that is characteristic of an

insurgency. A general overview of insurgency is provided to introduce

the planner of counterguerrilla operations to the insurgent. The host

government’s method to defeat the insurgency is discussed, as is the

difference between counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations.

The methods of response by United States (US) forces, and the general

doctrine for their use, are also presented.

1-2. Types of conflict.

a. The risk to national survival is greatest in a conventional conflict,

but the probability of such conflicts occurring is relatively low. On

the other hand, the risk to national survival is not as great in a

counterinsurgency conflict, but the probability of these types of

conflicts occurring is much greater.

b. Conventional conflicts imply a state of open belligerency between

nations and a direct confrontation of their armed forces. An

insurgency implies a situation where a country is threatened by

an internal attempt, frequently assisted by external support, to

overthrow the legitimate government. counterguerrilla situations

faced by US forces are likely to occur in an insurgency environment,

but may also occur in conventional conflict environments.

Counterguerrilla operations in support of a conventional conflict

(such as the partisan operations that occurred behind German

lines during World War II) are discussed in Chapter 4.

Section Il. Insurgency

1-3. Concept.

a. The concept of resistance applies to an organized effort by some

portion of the civil population of a country to resist, oppose, or

overthrow the existing government. Many of the methods of

resistance are part of the stock-in-trade of revolutionary activity.

There can be no revolution without a resistance movement, but

there can be a resistance movement without a revolution when the

objectives of the resistors do not envision a reallocation of power.

1-1

FM 90-8

This concept applies to an organized insurgent movement that

seeks to overthrow the established government. In this manner,

an insurgent organization can be considered a type of resistance

organization.

1-4. Prerequisites.

There are three requirements that must exist before an insurgency can

occur.

Vulnerable population. For whatever the reasons — social,

political, or economic — the population is generally open to

change. The insurgents will offer hope for change and exploit

dissatisfaction with the current government.

Leadership available for direction. A vulnerable population

alone will “not support an insurgent movement. There must be a

leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a dissatisfied

populace along the lines delineated by the overall insurgent

strategy.

Lack of government control. Lack of government control may

be real or perceived. The greater the control the government has

over the situation, the less likely are the chances for insurgent

success The opposite is also true: the less control the government

has, the greater is the chance for insurgent success.

1-5. Other required conditions.

There are a number of other conditions that must exist or be produced

for an insurgent movement to succeed.

Popular support. Support can be passive or active. It is not

necessary that the entire population actively support an

insurgency, but the majority of the population must passively

support it.

Unity of effort. The overall thrust of an insurgent movement

must provide a strength of unity that dedicates those involved to

achieving the same goal.

Will to resist. It is not enough for the population to resist their

government passively; at least a portion must be willing to resist

actively.

Leadership. The activities and effort of the insurgent movement

must be properly directed through the exercise of effective

leadership.

Discipline. The aspect of the movement must be strongly

maintained to ensure security and obedience.

1-2

FM 90-8

f. Intelligence. Because the insurgent movement is usually

inferior in numbers and combat power in relation to government

forces, the intelligence effort must provide security for the

insurgent organization and information to conduct successful

operations.

Propaganda. It is used to gain popular support and intensify

the populace’s dissatisfaction with the government.

h. Favorable environment. This includes attitudes of the people,

the political environment, and the economic situation.

External support. The preceding eight conditions are theoretically

the only ones that an insurgency must have to succeed.

Historically, however, there seems to be one additional condition

that must exist the condition of external support. This support

may be physical or psychological. Examples of physical external

support are equipment, weapons, supplies, ammunition, sanctuaries,

personnel, and combat units. Examples of psychological external

support include the political support given to the resistance when

a country recognizes that movement in the world arena and the

pressure a government might exert politically or economically to

influence world opinion in favor of the movement.

1-6. Insurgent organization.

An insurgent organization may have both an overt and a covert

element. The overt element, the guerrilla, is readily identified. It is

supported by a clandestine element which makes up the insurgent

infrastructure. The insurgent organization also has political and

military structures.

1-7. Phases of development.

a. Once an insurgent organization is established and begins its

activities, it progresses through several phases in its effort to

overthrow the government. When the insurgency moves from one

phase to another is difficult to determine. The activities that occur

in the earlier phases will continue through the later phases. These

phases range from the weak insurgent movement until the time

the insurgent can confront government forces directly.

b. There is also the possibility that an insurgency may move directly

from Phase I to Phase III. Additionally, depending upon the lack

of success of the movement, there may also be a reversion from

Phase III to Phase II or even back to Phase I.

(1) Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency. Activity in

this phase ranges from subversive activity that is only a

potential threat to situations in which frequent subversive

1-3

FM 90-8

incidents and activities occur in an organized pattern. It

involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled

insurgent activity. The guerrilla force does not conduct

continuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism.

(2) Phase II: Guerrilla warfare. This phase is reached

when the insurgent movement, having gained sufficient

local or external support, initiates organized continuous

guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the

government. This is an attempt to force government forces

into a defensive role. As the guerrilla becomes stronger, he

begins to conduct larger operations.

(3) Phase III: War of movement. When the guerrilla attains

the force structure and capability to directly engage

government forces in decisive combat, then he will progres-

sively begin to use more conventional tactics and may obtain

combat forces from an external source. He may also begin to

conduct more extensive defensive operations in this phase to

protect the areas he controls.

The goal of the insurgent movement, if achieved, will result in the

replacement of the established government with a government

structure developed by the insurgent movement. If this occurs, it

is a political victory for the insurgents. The insurgent movement

does not need to defeat host country forces to accomplish this. A

parallel or “shadow” government may also be developed by an

insurgent force. It must, however, win the support of the people

away from the established government to achieve this political

victory.

Section Ill. Counterinsurgency

1-8. Three target groups.

The government’s weapon to combat insurgency is counterinsurgency

(COIN). The COIN mission includes a full range of measures used by a

government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,

and insurgency. They are actions taken by a nation to promote its

growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic,

social) that respond to the needs of the people. There are three target

groups that the government addresses: the population, insurgents, and

external actors.

1-9. Population.

The government must win back the support of the people. It does this

through providing them security and showing an honest effort to

correct those conditions which caused dissatisfaction.

1-4

FM 90-8

1-10. Insurgents.

The government must isolate the insurgent from the population,

both physically and psychologically, thereby denying him

personnel, materiel, and intelligence support.

The COIN strategy is based on the concept of balanced development,

mobilization, and neutralization. These three components are

interdependent and must occur simultaneously. If COIN strategy

achieves its goal, the government will regain populace support.

The military assists the COIN program through the conduct of six

major operations: intelligence, psychological operations, civil

affairs, populace and resources control, advisory assistance, and

tactical operations. The successful employment of these operations

contributes to the success of the COIN program. They are

normally conducted simultaneously, in conjunction with each

other, and require close coordination of diverse government

agencies.

1-11. External actors.

Current insurgencies target on external actors for support, passive or

active. Both the government and the insurgents use this tactic. The

insurgent tries to separate the government from its foreign support.

The government seeks to retain its support and separate the insurgent

from his foreign support.

1-12. Counterinsurgency — counterguerrilla.

There is a difference in the terms counterinsurgency and counter-

guerrilla. The internal defense and development (IDAD) program is

geared to counter the whole insurgency. It does this through

alleviating conditions which may cause insurgency. This program,

which addresses both the populace and the insurgent, can be termed

counterinsurgency. Counterguerrilla operations are geared to the

active military element of the insurgent movement only. To this end,

counterguerrilla operations are viewed as a supporting component of

the counterinsurgency effort.

Section IV. Foreign Internal Defense

1-13. US assistance.

All civil military action by a government to assist a host

government and to achieve a standard level of protection from

lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency is termed foreign

1-5

FM 90-8

internal defense (FID). The United States (US) Army has been

assigned a major role in providing military assistance to selected

nations in support of US national interests. The degree of

participation by US Army units is determined by US policy and

interests, an analysis of the insurgent threat, and the capabilities

and desires of the host country’s government.

b. The introduction of US combat forces into an insurgency to

conduct counterguerrilla operations is something that is done

when all other US and host country responses have been

inadequate. US combat forces are never the first units into a

country. They are normally the last. Preceding them is an array of

advisors, security assistance forces, mobile training teams,

combat service support units, and combat support units. Combat

commanders deploying to conduct counterguerrilla operations

should understand this and the fact that neutralization of the

guerrilla is only one-third of the COIN strategy. Balanced

development of the country and mobilization of the populace

against the insurgents must occur simultaneously for the

insurgency to be defeated.

1-14. US activities.

When deployed in FID operations, US forces ensure that their

planned activities support the goals and consequences of the host

country’s COIN program. Actions by US forces must not

undermine or be detrimental to COIN goals.

The response of US forces in any given situation must meet the

following requirements:

(1) Be appropriate — response is appropriate to the level of

threat and activity.

(2) Be justifiable - actions taken are justifiable in the eyes of

the host country’s population and the US public.

(3)

Use minimum force — the goal is to restrict the use of force

and the level of commitment to the minimum feasible to

accomplish the mission. However, the principle of minimum

necessary force does not always imply minimum necessary

troops. A large number of men deployed at the right time may

enable a commander to use less force than he might

otherwise have done, or even to avoid using any force at all.

Commanders must, however, keep in mind that a peaceful

situation could become hostile because of the provocative

display of an overlarge force. Doing too much may be a

greater danger than doing too little.

(4) Do maximum benefit - US forces should select operations

so they accomplish positive benefit for the population. If this

1-6

FM 90-8

is not possible then the operational concept is wrong and

should not be executed.

(5) Do minimum damage - US forces ensure that operations

preclude unnecessary damage to facilities, activities, and

resources. Since this is almost an impossibility, compensation

for any damage to property must be made and the property

restored, as much as possible, to its original state. In any

case, a major consideration is to plan activities to limit

damage.

Section V. AirLand BattIe and Counterguerrilla Operations

1-15. Challenges.

AirLand Battle is the Army’s operational concept for combat. It is

designed to deal with the worldwide challenges the Army faces. The

four basic challenges to the Army are the battlefield, leadership,

readiness, and training. The basic concepts of AirLand Battle doctrine

can be applied to counterguerrilla operations.

1-16. The battlefield.

The Army faces an enemy that may strike from any direction. It must

contend not only with military considerations in this environment but

with the political, economic, and social considerations which may

oftentimes outweigh military considerations. The Army must be able

to operate in all geographical areas and climates, and on all types of

terrain, with only the weapons, tactics, and assets permitted by the

political, social, and economic environment. The enemy will strike at

weak points and seek to avoid direct combat.

1-17. Leadership.

The complexities of counterguerrilla operations place a premium on

informed and trained leadership and independent operations. These

conditions demand more leader expertise and the ability to operate

independently at lower command levels than do higher levels of

conflict. The leader applies skill, imagination, and flexibility. He

effectively leads his troops and helps them to understand the problems

of counterguerrilla operations. He must be willing to reorganize his

assets to better accomplish his mission.

1-18. Readiness.

Units tasked to conduct counterguerrilla operations are prepared to

deploy and operate on short notice. Each soldier is prepared for battle

1-7

FM 90-8

and is able to perform his duties. Units train to operate in areas of the

world where they may be tasked to fight.

1-19. Training.

Training is the cornerstone for success and a full-time job for

commanders. The commander ensures that soldiers are proficient

in traditional, basic skills and also familiar with more complex

skills required for success in a counterguerrilla environment.

These skills include intelligence, civil affairs, populace and

resources control, psychological operations, and advisory

assistance.

AirLand Battle concepts outline the principles the Army must

apply when engaged in combat. Combat operations based on this

doctrine seek to locate, harass, and neutralize the guerrilla force

and deny it the capability to conduct offensive actions by

severing its linkage with the population. Coordinated efforts of

military and civilian organizations are required to achieve the

overall objective.

1-20. Operational concepts for AirLand Battle.

Generally, the purpose of military operations is to defeat the

opposing force. The use of armed forces in a counterguerrilla role

is primarily to provide enough internal security to enable the host

country to initiate counterinsurgency programs and pursue

national objectives.

The final resolution will not be by military means, but by

political, social, and economic action. With this in mind,

successful military operations are a means to an end. Success in

combat depends on the basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine:

initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.

(1) Initiative. To preserve the initiative, subordinates act

independently within the context of the overall plan. The

overall attitude of the Army is one of action, not reaction, to

the enemy’s initiatives. The characteristics of improvisation,

initiative, and aggressiveness, tempered with intelligent and

prudent decision-making, must be strong.

(2)

Depth. This refers to time, distance, and resources. The

commander is able to operate overlarge areas with minimum

logistical support while retaining the ability to react to

unexpected attacks. This battle-in-depth is designed to delay,

disrupt, or destroy the guerrilla’s uncommitted forces and

base areas. Reserves are kept to a minimum to allow

maximum use of the force, while still retaining the capability

to meet most threats.

1-8

FM 90-8

(3) Agility. This requires flexible organizations and leaders

who can quickly adapt to changing situations. The factors of

mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops (available),

and time (available) (METT-T) and the way they interface

with environmental considerations determine the type of

organization involved. The leader is innovative and flexible,

and he adapts to different situations. Mobility enhances the

agility of the force engaged in counterguerrilla operations,

but the force is not tied to its vehicles. At a minimum, the

force has mobility equal to that of the guerrillas.

(4) Synchronization. This means more than coordinated

action to achieve maximum combat power. In the counter-

guerrilla environment, it encompasses the effective, coordi-

nated use of available combat power and its interface with

noncombat operations. Tactical and nontactical, civilian

and military, host country and US force operations are

coordinated and supportive of each other to achieve the

overall objective. Additionally, US military operations are

aligned with US policy and aims in the host country. This in

turn may place certain restrictions on US forces.

1-21. Combat imperatives.

The seven combat imperatives of AirLand Battle doctrine find

their basis in the principles of war. These imperatives are:

(1) Ensure unity of effort. The principles for this imperative

are the objective, unity of command, and simplicity. Unity of

effort requires the commander to understand the overall US

objective and how his operations support that objective. He

applies the principles underlying this imperative in such a

way that the effects of his operations are not a detriment to

attaining the overall US objective.

(2) Direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses.

The principles for this imperative are maneuver and

surprise. The commander minimizes and protects his

weaknesses and uses his strengths against the guerrilla’s

weak points. To do this, he knows the enemy’s organization,

equipment, and tactics. In addition to knowing how the

guerrilla fights, it is important for the commander to

understand why the guerrilla fights.

(3) Designate and sustain the main effort. The principles

for this imperative are mass and economy of force. The Army

cannot be everywhere at once. It cannot do everything at

once. Priorities are set at tactical and operational levels to

determine where the main effort is to occur and what goal is

to be achieved.

1-9

FM 90-8

(4)

Sustain the fight. The force may have to operate for

extended periods on limited logistics. To sustain momentum,

the commander deploys forces in adequate depth and

arranges for service support when needed. The commander

is audacious and presses soldiers and systems to the limits of

endurance.

(5)

Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly. The principles

for this imperative are maneuver and mass. Speed and

mobility are essential. To avoid detection, US forces employ

deception techniques, communications security (COMSEC),

and operations security (OPSEC). While the overall conflict

may be prolonged, the tactical operations are executed with

speed to retain initiative and freedom of action. This is

balanced against the need for patience.

(6)

Use terrain and weather. The guerrilla force is familiar

with the terrain and comfortable with the climate. Recon-

naissance and intelligence (if accomplished effectively) give

the commander a decisive edge in anticipating difficulties

with terrain and weather. He uses both to his advantage.

(7)

Protect the force. Successful commanders preserve the

strength of their force. They do so through security, keeping

troops healthy and equipment ready, and by sustaining

discipline and morale. The guerrilla seeks to degrade the

morale of the force through the use of psychological

operations (PSYOPS) and harassment. His tactics are

geared to wear down his opponent’s will to fight. The

commander trains his soldiers and constantly reminds them

of exactly what the mission is and why it is important to

complete the mission.

Doctrine is a guide that delineates principles and fundamental

concepts. The commander uses these principles and concepts

when analyzing the situation and then uses them as a guide in

selecting his actions.

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CHAPTER 2

The Threat

Section I. General

2-1. Operations.

a. The guerrilla must be understood before he can be defeated. This

chapter discusses the characteristics, tactics, and environment of

guerrilla operations.

b. The guerrilla is the overt combat element of the insurgent

organization. The members of the guerrilla force are organized

under military concepts to conduct military and paramilitary

operations. Their duties usually include all the overt actions that

are conducted by the insurgent organization but may include

covert and clandestine operations. They are usually most active

in insurgent-controlled or contested areas. However, when the

insurgency calls for operations in government-controlled areas,

the guerrilla may conduct these operations.

2-2. Aims and goals.

Support overall goal of the insurgent movement. To this

end, the guerrilla operates to support the major goal of the

insurgent movement to replace the established government.

Gain support for insurgent movement. The guerrilla tries to

gain support for the insurgent movement through propaganda,

coercion, and terror. If he cannot gain active support, then he will

seek passive support: Silence on the part of the populace

concerning insurgent activities is considered passive support for

the insurgent.

Increase population’s vulnerability. Through the use of

selective terrorism, the guerrilla attacks or destroys economic and

political symbols upon which the government is founded.

Overreaction on the part of government forces or other elements

of authority contributes to the population’s dissatisfaction with

the government and its subsequent support to the insurgency.

Lessen government control. By defeating small government

forces and striking where government forces are not, the guerrilla

adds to the perception that the government cannot or will not

provide security for the population and its property. This adds to

the perception that the government cannot control the insurgents.

Provide psychological victories. To this end, the guerrilla

seeks to gain victories that psychologically benefit the insurgent

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movement, whether or not these victories are significant in terms

of material damage to the government or its armed forces. It is the

psychological advantage the guerrilla seeks.

Tie up government resources. By forcing the government to

expend resources on military operations against the guerrilla, the

guerrilla seeks to tie up resources that could best be utilized by the

government in development programs.

Weaken resolve of government military forces. By defeating

smaller elements of the government’s military forces, the

guerrilla further weakens the usually limited assets the government

has available. He also psychologically weakens the government

forces’ resolve to continue waging war.

Section Il. Environment

2-3. Factors.

The environment that the guerrilla operates in must be examined from

more than a geographical point of view. While terrain and climate are

important factors, the political, sociological, and economic aspects of

the environment take on added importance.

2-4. Terrain.

The rural guerrilla will prefer to continue to live in his own home. He

will go to camps if security does not permit him to live at home. He

favors level, well-drained campsites with good water supply, natural

fuel, cover, and adequate vegetation to provide concealment from

aerial observation. The preferred camps are also chosen with a view

toward easy access to the target population, access to a friendly or

neutral border, good escape routes, and good observation of approach

routes used by government counterguerrilla forces. When counterguerrilla

operations by government forces force the guerrilla out of his preferred

base camps, he tends to establish camps in rugged inhospitable areas

not easily penetrated by government forces.

2-5. Climate.

The fact that the guerrilla is usually a native to the area and is used to

the climate gives him an added advantage. If the government forces

are also familiar with this type of climate, then the advantage to the

guerrilla is lessened. If the government forces are not familiar with

operating in the climate, then the advantage to the guerrilla increases.

Generally, the climate of the area does not favor either the guerrilla or

the government forces to any great degree unless there are extremes

involved. Then the impact is on the logistical systems.

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2-6. Political factors.

The amount of government control in a given area directly impacts on

the ability of the guerrilla to operate. The more government control, the

less successful are guerrilla activities, whereas less government

control of an area improves chances for guerrilla success. The guerrilla

will attempt to disrupt normal government functions and destroy key

government facilities and personnel to reduce the level of government

control in an area.

2-7. Sociological factors.

The more fragmented a society is, the greater the opportunity for

dissatisfaction among the populace. The guerrilla will attempt to

increase friction between different groups in society. These groups may

be aligned along racial, ethnic, religious, or social lines. Language

differences or tradition may also be a reason for alignment. Religious

influences may play a significant role in the sociological factors that

affect the guerrilla.

2-8. Economic factors.

Low standards of living and desires for economic reforms may be

popular causes of dissatisfaction with the government. As with

political and sociological factors, the greater the degree of dissatisfaction

with the government’s economic policies, the better the guerrilla’s

chances for success. The guerrilla seeks to exploit this situation

through the use of psychological operations. Since the guerrilla derives

a major portion of his logistical support from the local economy, he will

normally not disrupt it drastically. Guerrilla forces will destroy a local

economy of an area as a lesson to the people living there to exact more

support or obedience from them.

2-9. Impact.

a. The impact that each of the factors has on the guerrilla, and his

ability to successfully operate, changes in each situation. A

careful analysis by the commander and his staff of each of the

factors is necessary to determine what the impact of each is prior

to conducting counterguerrilla operations. In all cases, each

factor must be analyzed to determine the peculiarities, weaknesses,

and strengths it may have in relation to the guerrilla.

In planning for counterguerrilla operations, the commander

exploits disclosed guerrilla weaknesses and deprives the

guerrilla, wherever possible, of any opportunities to exploit

government weaknesses.

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Section Ill. Characteristics

2-10. Considerations.

a. By understanding the general characteristics of the guerrilla, it is

easier to determine strengths which must be reduced or avoided

and weaknesses which can be exploited.

The characteristics discussed are general, and the commander

planning counterguerrilla operations must analyze a particular

situation to discover how these considerations apply.

2-11. Guerrilla strengths.

Intelligence. The intelligence networks in the infrastructure

usually provide continuous and current information on government

force dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. The

need for secrecy as an element of survival for the insurgent

organization makes government penetration and disruption of

these intelligence networks difficult. However, their structures

are vulnerable to penetration and careful, detailed analysis.

Intelligence collecting and analyses must be placed on a robust

footing early to build data bases. Pattern analysis and other

techniques can rob the guerrilla of this advantage. counterguerrilla

forces can also overcome this intelligence advantage through the

comprehensive use of deception, operations security, and

communications security.

b. Indigenous characteristics.

(1)

Guerrillas usually have the ability to blend with the local

populace. In many cases they are part of the local populace.

This enhances their capability to operate with secrecy in a

given area.

(2)

The counterguerrilla force must identify the guerrilla and

remove him from the civilian populace. This is best

accomplished through the effective use of population and

resources control.

(3) Care must be taken to ensure that civilians are not injured or

mistreated as a result of counterguerrilla operations.

Knowledge.

(1) The guerrilla’s knowledge of the local populace and terrain is

a strength. It gives him the ability to utilize psychological

operations effectively. The guerrilla can usually develop a

working relationship with the populace because they

identify to some degree with his cause. If he cannot persuade

them, he has the force to coerce them. The counterguerrilla

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force must try to overcome this advantage by fostering a

strong relationship between the government forces and the

populace. The creation of a local civilian defense force by the

government and the counterguerrilla force’s cooperation

with it is one way to do this.

(2) By knowing the environment he operates in, the guerilla has

a major advantage. This advantage may be overcome by

continuous counterguerrilla operations in a given area by a

permanently stationed counterguerrilla force and skillful

use of native assets.

Motivation and discipline. The guerrilla leaders are trained

and motivated. They reinforce motivation within the guerrilla

force through the immediate application of discipline. Usually,

the guerrilla is devoted to a cause almost to the point of

fanaticism.

Limited responsibilities. The guerrilla usually does not have

the responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations

toward society. This frees all his efforts to conduct operations in

support of the insurgency goals. However, the guerrilla force may

be tasked to perform certain political services (such as tax

collection) by the insurgency shadow government.

Tactics. The guerrilla can utilize a broad range of tactics, from

terror and sabotage through conventional warfare. This enables

him to escalate or deescalate antigovernment activity almost at

will.

Physical condition.

(1)

Guerrillas are usually of an age which places them in their

years of greatest physical stamina. One of the major

advantages the guerrilla has is his ability to endure

hardship. Usually, because of the situation, he has to make

do with less. This forces him to adapt and be innovative.

(2)

The general strengths described are designed to provide a

base to analyze the specific guerrilla threat. No two guerrilla

forces are identical. These strengths are applied against the

specific situation being addressed. Whatever the results of

that analysis, the obvious strengths must be reduced or

circumvented.

2-12. Guerrilla weaknesses.

Limited personnel and resources. The guerrilla normally

lacks the personnel and the logistics to intentionally become

decisively engaged with government forces. Difficulty in

recruitment and resupply to replace his combat losses in

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personnel and materiel may limit his operations. The counter-

guerrilla force should exploit these weaknesses by interdicting

supply routes and facilities, forcing desertion because of

hardships; and by inflicting combat losses that are hard to

replace.

b. Individual factors. Basically, the guerrilla endures a life of

physical danger and privation. These stresses can be exploited by

counterguerrilla forces. Numerically inferior to the government

forces facing him, fear of being treated as a criminal if captured by

the government, and fear of violence to himself and his family

(imposed by the guerrilla organization to ensure his cooperation)

are stress factors in addition to constant combat and a hostile

environment that weaken guerrilla resolve. In some societies,

good treatment, pardon, protection, food, shelter, and participation

in the government may be stronger incentives than the fear of

criminal punishment to induce guerrilla desertions.

Operational factors. Operational weaknesses may include

security, which requires extensive resources and slows down

responsiveness; bases that are difficult to acquire and operate;

and the lack of technology or ability to maintain captured

high-technology items. The dependence of the guerrilla on

popular support is also a weakness, since if that support wavers or

is withdrawn, then the guerrilla will not be able to operate

effectively. Another operational weakness may be the lack of

sophisticated communications, which could require the guerrilla

to spend an excessive amount of time preparing to launch an

operation.

2-13. Guerrilla support.

A major concern common to all guerrillas is support. Support can be

divided into two general categories.

Popular support.

(1) As discussed previously, the guerrilla must have either the

active or passive support of the populace to succeed. Popular

support alone will not ensure the success of guerrilla

operations. Ineffective operations, unwise decisions, and

poor leadership are examples of deficiencies that would

preclude his success. Popular support should be viewed,

instead, as a condition that must exist for the guerrilla to

initiate and conduct operations in a given area over a period

of time. If popular support does not exist or is withdrawn, the

guerrilla will not be able to conduct operations with any hope

of success. Therefore, one of the prime considerations for the

counterguerrilla force is to gain and maintain the support of

the populace. Areas where active support is given to the

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guerrilla are excellent targets for psychological operations.

Populace and resources control operations will play a vital

role in winning support away from the guerrilla.

(2)

In areas where only passive support is given to the guerrilla,

then government efforts through psychological operations

and civil affairs, as well as the provision of security, must be

initiated to gain active support and trust of the government.

In areas that the government controls and where the

populace supports the government, increased emphasis is

placed on all six major operations in IDAD to maintain that

support.

b. Logistical support.

(1) This is one of the guerrilla’s most vulnerable areas. In early

operations, the guerrilla relies on his base of popular support

for logistical requirements. As the guerrilla force develops

and expands, its logistical needs may increase to the point

that the internal support base can no longer provide for all of

the guerrilla’s logistical requirements. If the insurgent

movement has not reached the point where the attainment of

its overall goals is imminent, then the guerrilla may have to

receive additional logistical support from another source.

(2) If the guerrilla receives support from external sources, then

he is faced with the problem of security for supply lines,

transport means, and storage facilities. External support

should not be considered a prerequisite for the initiation of

counterguerrilla operations. It is an additional factor that, if

present and effective, will enhance the capabilities of the

guerrilla. In any case, the counterguerrilla force should seek

to interdict the logistic support that the guerrilla is receiving,

whether it be internal or external.

(3)

Since the guerrilla operates along military lines, he will

usually have temporary sites for headquarters, installations,

facilities, and operational units. These temporary sites are

called guerrilla base camps. It is in these camps that the

guerrilla has his command posts, training areas, communi-

cations facilities, medical stations, and logistics centers. The

guerrilla may also use these camps for rest, retraining, and

reequipping.

(4) It must be understood that these camps do not equate with

conventional force operational bases since the guerrilla does

not seek to defend them if they are discovered. They are

temporary and depend on secrecy for their existence. If

discovered, the guerrilla will usually abandon the site and

move his operation. These bases are kept small, and usually

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there is more than one base in the guerrilla’s area of oper-

ation.

(5)

Characteristics of a base camp area are:

(a)

Cover and concealment. The guerrilla will attempt

to locate base camps in areas where cover and con-

cealment provide security against detection.

(b)

Rough, inaccessible terrain. Usually, the rougher

the terrain, the less likely is the chance of being

surprised by government forces. Terrain is chosen to

provide security against detection. Key terrain, as seen

by the conventional force, is usually avoided. While

guerrillas avoid defensive combat, they emphasize

short-term defensive action in the base camp vicinity to

aid evacuation, if necessary.

bivouac area. Consideration is given to food and water

supply, grade or slope of terrain, access to trails, and

protective environment.

(d) Remoteness. Base camps are usually in relatively

remote areas for security. To preclude accidental

discovery, base camps are not usually near inhabited

areas. However, because the guerrilla must be able to

fill his logistical needs, his base camp usually will not

be more than one day’s march from a village or town. If

the counterguerrilla force can locate and disrupt these

camps, then the guerrilla can be kept off balance and

on the run, allowing the counterguerrilla force to gain

the initiative.

Section IV. Tactics

2-14.

Terrorism and harassment.

When guerrilla forces first become operational, they usually

engage in limited or small-scale activities and operations. If they

reach more sophisticated levels of organization, equipment, and

training, then larger operations utilizing more conventional

tactics may be expected.

b. Guerrilla tactics are characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and

brief, violent action. These tactics in the early phases can be

divided into terrorism and harassment.

(1) Terrorism. The guerrilla may use terrorism if it fits a given

situation and accomplishes his goals. Terrorist techniques

include bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, threats,

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mutilation, murder, torture, and blackmail. It must be

recognized that all guerrillas do not use terrorism as a tool. If

terrorism is utilized, it is usually for coercion, provocation, or

intimidation.

(a) Coercion. This is used to persuade individuals to act

favorably in given situations toward the guerrilla or

the insurgent movement. As an example, terrorism

might be used to persuade a local mayor to revise policy

concerning the guerrilla.

(b) Provocation. This is used to provoke an overreaction

on the part of government forces so that the population

will be alienated by government forces’ actions.

Targets are usually government soldiers, leaders, or

policemen.

Usually, threats or fear of harm, either to the individual

or his family and friends, are used. Intimidation can be

used to induce the populace to silence or noncooperation

with government forces. It is used to discourage

competent citizens from accepting critical low-level

governmental positions.

(2) Harassment.

(a) Most guerrilla operations are offensive, not defensive.

There is seldom an attempt to seize and defend

objectives for any length of tome.

(b)

The guerrilla uses dispersion during his movements,

but near the target area, small guerrilla elements mass

and then conduct operations.

forces, he seeks to attain local numerical superiority. In

this way he can attain victory over small elements of

the government forces. These tactics, if successful,

compel government forces to commit larger elements to

defensive tasks. Once government forces move to the

defensive, they lose the initiative and become reactive.

This allows the guerrilla time and space to develop to a

point where he has the capability to engage larger

government forces with more conventional tactics.

(d) The most common techniques employed by the guerrilla

are the ambush, raid, and small-scale attacks. These

techniques are usually targeted against security posts,

small forces, facilities, and lines of communication.

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(e) Harassing tactics are utilized to keep government

forces on the defensive. If successful, they make

government forces react to guerrilla operations, taking

away the government’s ability to conduct offensive

operations that would prevent successful guerrilla

operations.

(f)

Harassing tactics are also effective in weakening the

government’s resources and disrupting lines of com-

munication. One advantage of harassment is the

perceived image it gives of the guerrilla being able to

strike anywhere at will. It also makes the government

appear ineffective and incompetent by continuously

losing small battles.

2-15. Mao’s principles.

The principles of guerrilla tactics have been stated by China’s Mao

Tse-Tung:

• Enemy advances, we retreat.

• Enemy halts, we harass.

• Enemy tires, we attack.

• Enemy retreats, we pursue.

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CHAPTER 3

Counterinsurgency Operations

Section I. General

3-1. Different conditions.

a. As described in chapters 1 and 2, the nature of counterguerrilla

operations differs from the conditions most soldiers expect to face

in combat. The counterguerrilla commander faces an enemy

whose objectives, tactics, and concepts are usually different from

his own.

This chapter examines the role of tactical counterguerrilla

operations in relation to the COIN program. In addition, it

discusses planning considerations and principles for the

successful conduct of counterguerrilla operations, as well as

related operations that the counterguerrilla force must be

acquainted with.

3-2. US role.

The most common role in which US forces will conduct counter-

guerrilla operations will be as a foreign internal defense (FID) force.

The FID is designed to support the host country’s national objectives

and COIN plan. Two of the primary considerations for the FID

commander are the final goals of the host country COIN program and

how to coordinate his operations to support hose goals.

Section Il. Considerations

3-3. FID operations.

Most US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations will be

part of an FID force. The commander must understand how FID

operations support the host country COIN plan. In this sense, the

goals of the host country COIN plan become the goals for the FID

force and the counterguerrilla commander.

The primary consideration when planning counterguerrilla

operations is the effect operations will have on the populace.

Commanders must attempt to win the active support of the

population for the government. At a minimum, counterguerrilla

activities must eliminate incidents which the guerrilla may

exploit in his psychological operations.

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3-4. Support of coin.

a. US forces committed to FID in the host country have a dual

mission. First, they must defeat or neutralize the guerrilla

militarily so the host country government can begin or resume

functioning in previously contested or guerrilla-controlled areas.

Second, they must support the overall COIN program by

conducting noncombat operations to provide an environment

where the host country government can win the trust and support

of its people and ultimately become self-sustaining. Both aspects

of the COIN mission are of equal importance and are usually

conducted simultaneously.

A common mistake made by FID forces when trying to gain

popular support is that they sometimes win popular support only

for themselves. The commander must ensure that popular

support, in the end, is for the host country government. Credit for

successful campaigns against the guerrillas, or programs to help

the people, should go to the host country government and not to

the FID force commander.

3-5. Purpose of tactical operations.

Tactical counterguerrilla operations are conducted to reduce the

guerrilla threat or activity in the area, and to provide a favorable

environment for the host country’s development program. These

purposes are complementary. When the guerrilla threat is reduced,

internal development can begin, and when internal development

works, the causes of dissatisfaction which gave rise to the insurgency

are alleviated. This deprives the guerrilla of both popular support and a

reason for fighting (which he needs to survive).

3-6. Planning considerations — METT-T.

a. Mission.

(1) Foreign internal defense operations fall into six areas:

(a) Intelligence operations.

(b) Psychological operations.

(c)_{Populace and resources control operations.}

(d) Military-civic action.

(e) Tactical operations (both strike and consolidation).

(f)

Advisory assistance.

(2) The combat brigade is most often concerned with tactical

operations, but because of the nature of counterguerrilla

warfare, a specific tactical operation or campaign will

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probably involve elements of the five other operations to

some degree. The commander’s guidance for counterguerrilla

operations is more detailed and comprehensive than for

more conventional operations and must accommodate all

operational aspects inherent in brigade counterguerrilla

operations.

(3) Before receipt of a specific mission, the commander’s

guidance and subsequent planning is based on all probable

missions, to include supporting consolidation operations or

conducting strike operations, as well as on the specific

characteristics of the guerrilla, terrain, and population in the

specific operational area. After receipt of the mission, his

guidance becomes more specific and includes the extent to

which the brigade will become involved in each of the six

areas of FID operations.

b. Enemy. When evaluating the guerrilla capabilities and limitations,

the commander considers:

(1) National and regional origins.

(2) Organization, to include effectiveness and unity of command.

(3) Strength, morale, and status of training.

(4) Tactics being employed and tactical proficiency.

(5) Capability to attack, defend, and reinforce.

(6) Resources available:

(a) Food and water.

(b) Arms, ammunition, demolitions, fuels, medicines, and

neclear, biological, chemical

(NBC) protective equipment

(agents, detection devices, and employment assets);

external support — personnel, materiel, and morale.

(7) Leaders and their personalities.

(8) Relations with the civilian population.

(9) Status of supplies.

(10) Effectiveness of communications.

(11) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence, to

include the extent of infiltration of host country civil and

military establishments.

(12) Lines of communications.

(13) Vulnerabilities.

(14) External support.

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Terrain and weather. When evaluating the effects of terrain

and weather on counterguerrilla operations, the commander

considers:

(1)

Effects of seasons of the year (to include planting and

harvesting periods), phases of the moon, and coastal tides.

Particular attention is focused on the effects of the weather

on men, equipment, visibility, and mobility (on both US

forces and the guerrilla).

(2)

Suitability of terrain (to include landing zones and pickup

zones) and road nets for tactical and logistical operations. As

with weather, particular attention is focused on the effects

the terrain has on men, equipment, visibility, and mobility

(on both US forces and the guerrilla).

d. Troops and resources available.

(1)

The commander has a variety of combat, combat support,

and combat service support assets at his disposal. These

assets may be from US forces and civilian agencies, or from

host country forces and civilian agencies, or from a

combination of all these.

(2)

Successful counterguerrilla operations depend upon the

commander utilizing his available assets to maximize their

strengths and minimize their weaknesses. To do this, the

commander realistically appraises the capabilities and

limitations of his assets and then organizes and employs

them on suitable missions. Oftentimes, the commander finds

he lacks assets which would greatly facilitate mission

accomplishment. In these instances, he should request what

he needs from his higher headquarters. If his needs cannot

be met, he has the option of improvising a solution or doing

without.

(3)

The peculiar circumstances of counterguerrilla warfare

require that senior commanders allow subordinate leaders,

at all levels, a great deal of flexibility in accomplishing their

missions.

Time.

(1) Time is relative. The conditions leading to the development

of the insurgency did not appear overnight, and they will not

disappear overnight, either.

(2)

US forces involved in FID operations should anticipate

staying in the host country only as long as required to

complete their mission. Usually, this will only be as long as it

takes the host country forces to assume missions the

counterguerrilla force is accomplishing. No matter how

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successful FID forces are militarily, the insurgency is not

defeated until the political, economic, and social problems

which led to it are corrected or significantly alleviated. This

usually takes a considerable length of time.

(3)

In the area of tactical operations, time available for planning

and execution varies. When planning for long-term actions,

such as consolidation campaigns, a long lead time is

necessary to permit planning in meticulous detail. However,

when planning shorter term actions, such as strike campaigns

or offensive operations against fleeting guerrilla targets,

planning time is usually short.

(4)

Commanders at all levels can use the time available to them

more efficiently by planning for contingency missions. Lack

of hard information precludes planning in detail, but routine

tasks common to similar missions should be codified in

standing operating procedures (SOP) and understood by all

concerned. When the need to execute a contingency mission

arises, the basic plan can be reviewed and planning

expedited by making minor adjustment as required.

(5)

Planning time is often extremely limited. Warning and

operation orders are normally issued orally. In these

instances, the one-third rule applies: the commander utilizes

one third of the available time for his own planning and

allows two thirds of the available time for his subordinates to

develop their plans and issue their orders. In many cases,

planning time will be so limited that formal planning is

precluded. In these instances, commanders direct their

subordinates by using fragmentary orders.

3-7.

Restrictions.

US forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations function under

restrictions not encountered in other types of warfare. These

restrictions may appear to hamper efforts to find and destroy the

guerrilla. For example, the safety of noncombatants and the

preservation of their property is vitally important to winning

them over to the government’s side.

The guerrilla knows this and will attempt to capitalize on it by

engaging US forces at locations where US fire would endanger

civilians or damage their property. While the temptation to return

fire may be great, a few dead or injured enemy will in no way

compensate for the ill will of the local populace if some innocent

civilians are killed or injured or their homes and property

destroyed.

Political considerations influence the conduct of counterguerrilla

operations. It is essentially a contest between the host government

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and guerrillas concerning political, social, religious, or economic

issues. The government and its representatives must present

themselves and their program as the better choice.

d. Commanders must be prepared to operate in a broad range of

political atmospheres. The host country’s form of government

may be anything from an absolute, and not too benevolent,

dictatorship to a democracy struggling to establish itself, or

anything in between.

No matter what political atmosphere prevails in the host country,

the brigade commander must engage the guerrilla with every

asset at the commander’s disposal. He must realize that

democratic principles may not be immediately applicable.

However, he should act within the limits of his authority to

improve the circumstances of the government he was sent to

support. Any incidents of deep-rooted corruption, gross inefficiency,

or violation of human rights should be documented and reported

to higher headquarters. The commander can also offer other

alternatives to accomplish the same objective. It is the respon-

sibility of the US Government to influence the host

government’s attitude toward democratic principles; it is

not the responsibility of the commander.

There will be situations where well-defined responsibilities in a

local area may not be readily apparent. It is the duty of the higher

headquarters to determine these responsibilities and make them

known prior to the insertion of US forces, especially in the

execution of strike missions. However, there maybe eventualities

in which the counterguerrilla force commander may be required to

coordinate with numerous governmental officials to locate

sources of authority and decision. If the commander encounters

government officials who habitually hinder operations against

the guerrillas through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected

sympathy for the guerrilla cause, he should document his case

and forward it to the next higher commander for disposition.

3-8. Operating principles.

Intelligence. Tactical intelligence is the key to defeating the

guerrilla. It provides the commander with information about

guerrilla locations, activities, strengths, weaknesses, and plans

which enable the commander to seize the initiative. Without

intelligence sources, the chances of success (particularly in

offensive operations) are limited and the commander must react

to guerrilla initiatives rather than controlling the situation in the

area of operations. Every relevant source of information about the

commander’s area of operation should be exploited and include:

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FM 90-8

(1)

The brigade intelligence section (and augmentation):

(a) Ground surveillance radar

(augmentation from

division).

(b) Ground sensors (augmentation from division).

(augmentation from

division).

(d) Aviation assets (augmentation from division).

(e)

Aerial imagery reconnaissance (from corps).

(2)

The maneuver battalion’s intelligence section and recon-

naissance platoons.

(3)

The maneuver companies’ sightings and reports (combat

information).

(4)

Combat support units’ target acquisition batteries, military

police, chemical reconnaissance units (if available), and

sightings and reports (combat information).

(5)

Combat service support units’ sightings and reports (combat

information).

(6)

Other sources:

(a)

Local populace.

(b)

Intelligence agents (from division and corps).

(c)

Host government civilian agencies.

(d)

Captured enemy documents (from division and corps).

(e)

Enemy prisoners (from division and corps).

(f)

Intercepted enemy communications (from division and

corps).

(g)

Special operation forces.

b. Tactical situation. The organization for, and conduct of,

counterguerrilla operations is dependent on the tactical situation.

Units are organized and employed to counter the current guerrilla

threat. For example, if guerrillas are operating in platoon-size

units, then platoon- or company-size units are used against them.

These units conduct independent operations such as patrols and

ambushes, under centralized control (company or battalion). This

enables them to cover more area simultaneously than a larger

unit and still have the firepower to deal with the typical guerrilla

unit they might encounter. Employing a large force to counter a

significantly smaller guerrilla force is inefficient because it

compromises the chance of achieving surprise, reduces the area

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FM 90-8

that can be covered at any one time, and is more difficult to move

(than a smaller force) if it is required elsewhere. However, sending

a small force to counter a significantly larger guerrilla force may

prove disastrous unless the smaller force is supported by fire or

can be rapidly reinforced.

Flexibility. Forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations are

flexible and capable of adapting to rapidly changing tactical

situations. The nature of counterguerrilla warfare necessitates

being able to make swift transitions from large to small unit

operations; to adjust to extremes of terrain, weather, and

visibility; to move on foot, by vehicle, or by aircraft; and to

function in offensive or defensive modes. Adapting to changing

tactical situations keeps the guerrilla force off balance and

prevents it from developing effective tactical operations.

d. Mobility.

(1)

Counterguerrilla forces most possess mobility equal to or

greater than that of the guerrilla in order to find, fix, fight,

and pursue him. Since the guerrilla is primarilly footmobile,

counterguerrilla forces equipped with motorized, mechanized,

or air transportation assets would appear to have a

significant mobility advantage. However, the guerrilla

typically operates from terrain that precludes (or severely

limits) speed on a ground approach. The counterguerrilla

force’s mobility advantage may not be as great as it first

appears to be. When terrain, weather, or the guerrilla force

disposition precludes closing on guerrilla positions by

high-speed air or ground transport, then counterguerrilla

forces should be moved by the fastest available transportation

to the nearest suitable, safe area to launch footmobile

operations. A well-trained, footmobile counterguerrilla force,

that can use terrain better than the enemy, can achieve a

tactical mobility advantage.

(2) Commanders should not overburden soldiers with excessive

loads because the guerrillas will be able to outrun them.

Soldiers should carry only the things they need to find and

fix the guerrilla. Once this is accomplished, they can be

resupplied by ground or air.

Minimum use of force.

(1)

Only the minimal firepower needed to accomplish a given

mission is employed. If US forces come under guerrilla fire,

and if by returning fire noncombatant civilians maybe

injured or their homes and property destroyed, then only the

amount of fire necessary to protect US forces is returned.

Under these circumstances, the commander attempts to

suppress the guerrillas with minimal return fire (possibly

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FM 90-8

using snipers) and moves his forces to advantageous

positions from which he may engage the guerrillas while not

endangering civilian life or property. He may use smoke and,

if authorized, riot control agents to facilitate maneuver. If

the guerrillas cannot be engaged without endangering

civilian life or property, the commander moves his forces

(over covered or concealed routes) to positions that cut off

their escape routes and encircle them. Then he begins to

tighten the ring around them.

(2) The unrestricted use of firepower in the vicinity of civilians

or their property will result in turning their anger toward the

government and may turn them to the insurgent cause. US

soldiers must understand this and follow strict rules of

engagement. However, the right to self defense is never

denied.

(3) All available fire may be brought to bear on guerrillas when

it does not endanger civilian life or property. However, the

expenditure of ammunition should be appropriate: mortars

to knock out a machine gun position; small arms to kill a

sniper. The use of indirect fire, while effective in some cases,

is not a substitute for maneuver.

f. Patience. Counterguerrilla forces must anticipate long periods

without making contact. The guerrilla knows he is outnumbered

and outgunned and avoids engagement unless it is on his terms.

Counterguerrilla forces should not develop a false sense of

security if it appears the guerrilla has ceased operations in their

area. It must be assumed that the guerrilla is always observing

the operating patterns of the counterguerrilla force for weak

points, and waiting for lax security to strike with minimum risk. A

guerrilla attack must be expected at any time.

Reserves.

(1) The commander always maintains a reserve to take

advantage of sudden opportunities, and to counter guerrilla

initiatives. The size of the reserve depends on the size of its

parent unit and the tactical situation.

(2)

In offensive operations, a company might keep a squad in

reserve; battalions, a platoon; and brigade, a company.

(3) In defensive operations, because of the need for 360-degree

security, a reserve at company and battalion is complicated

by the fact that the on-line strength of the perimeter is

reduced.

(4)

The company or battalion commander may have to spread

his forces thin to protect his perimeter. In these instances,

the commander has four options: establish a small, centrally

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FM 90-8

located reserve at the expense of on-line strength; establish

no reserve but specify units on-line to be prepared to shift a

portion of their strength to other sections of the perimeter;

establish no reserve but reinforce the most heavily contested

section of the perimeter by fire; and consider reducing the

size of the perimeter.

(5)

Brigades too should maintain a company in reserve in

defensive operations. This mission should be rotated among

companies, with the company that has spent the most time

in the field (or that has seen the heaviest action) being

designated as the reserve. The reserve company can rest,

rearm, and train during the time it has the reserve mission.

(6)

The reserve unit should be highly mobile. Air transport is the

preferred method for moving the reserve because it is fast

and not dependent on open ground routes as are motorized or

mechanized modes of transport. Whatever its mode of

transportation, the reserve’s vehicles are dedicated to the

reserve and immediately available for employment.

(7)

Reserve units are prepared for contingency missions. If the

reserve is committed, the commander designates a new

reserve. In this case, his least committed unit is the first

choice.

Section III. Strike Campaigns

3-9. Targets.

This section provides guidance on the organization, missions,

concepts, and operations of strike campaigns. Strike campaigns

consist of a series of major combat operations targeted against

insurgent tactical forces and bases in contested or insurgent-controlled

zones. Other internal defense activities may support tactical forces

during strike operations. Strike campaign operations are usually of

relatively short duration (generally, one day to several weeks). While

the guidance outlined here is focused on the infantry brigade, this

section may be extended to apply to any combined arms organization

conducting counterguerrilla operations.

3-10. Organization.

Brigades assigned strike campaign missions either are relieved from

area responsibility in advance of the mission or, preferably, are

constituted as specialized forces held at the national or regional levels.

Brigade strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forces

capable of operating in areas remote from logistical bases. Brigades

are assigned support bases in secure areas for elements not committed

to operations.

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FM 90-8

3-11. Missions.

Strike campaigns are conducted against guerrilla forces and bases.

They serve to keep guerrilla forces moving and off balance. Strike

campaign areas are usually outside of those undergoing consolidation

or those under friendly control. Ground or water means of entry maybe

used, but air assault or parachute deliveries can be employed.

3-12. Concepts.

a. Strike campaigns include offensive tactics such as raids,

reconnaissance in force, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuit

(or combinations of these operations).

b._{Brigade strike campaign operations are conducted to:}

(1) Harass the guerrilla to prevent the buildup of personnel and

logistical resources.

(2) Destroy the guerrilla force and its base complexes.

(3) Demonstrate support for the government and for the

populace in the local area.

(4) Expand consolidation areas.

3-13. Operations.

Brigades committed to strike campaigns are assigned a tactical

area of responsibility. The brigade commander normally assigns

operational areas to the subordinate battalions which, in turn,

may assign areas to companies. Company commanders may

assign specific areas to platoons at times; however,’ platoons are

normally assigned specific missions rather than operational

areas. Each battalion normally establishes a separate operational

support base (OSB). Companies normally operate from patrol

bases, but at times may operate separate company OSBs. When

the areas assigned to units are too large to be reconnoitered

concurrently by subordinate units, commanders establish an

order of priority for reconnaissance of the areas.

b. Battalion commanders maintain reserve forces (ready forces) to

react quickly to situations requiring an immediate response. Each

rifle company patrols its area of operations continuously and

aggressively. The location of the company patrol base and patrol

routes are varied to ensure complete coverage of the area.

The rifle company moves to, secures, and occupies the company

patrol base with sufficient supplies to permit limited independent

operations. If it is to operate in the same area for a period of time, it

should consider establishing small ration and ammunition

reserves.

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FM 90-8

d. The company area is patrolled to provide complete coverage day

and night with emphasis on night patrols. Generally, platoon-size

patrols have sufficient firepower to handle the situation if a

guerrilla force is encountered. If additional support is needed, the

company commander may maneuver his other platoons against

the guerrillas, or he may request assistance from the battalion

reserve (ready force). Emphasis is placed on engaging the

guerrilla with organic means of fire and movement (if required)

and on employing supporting artillery and air support.

Orders issued to the company commanders include the area

assigned and resupply instructions. The conduct of operations is

based on decentralized planning and execution. Company

commanders plan and coordinate platoon activities to ensure

completion of the overall company mission. Platoons on patrol

carry light rations and store unneeded equipment at OSBs.

Rifle company mortars may (at times) be located in battalion

OSBs while fire support teams (FIST) move with the companies. If

the terrain and situation permit, battalion OSBs may be moved as

the companies move their patrol bases. If civilian communities

are in the area, and if security conditions permit, battalion bases

may be near (but not within) the community. Here, the battalion

may conduct psychological, intelligence, and military-civic

action operation.

g. Brigade commanders use all available means to locate guerrilla

forces and bases, and they give priority to destroying the guerrilla

forces. An attack on a guerrilla force normally requires superior

combat power. Reserves (ready forces) attempt to immediately

engage and destroy moving guerrilla forces before they can

disperse. Depending on the situation, either hasty or deliberate

attacks are made on guerrilla bases that contain fortifications.

After a successful attack on guerrilla forces, troops thoroughly

search the area for guerrilla personnel, supplies, equipment, and

documents. Pursuit operations are undertaken to destroy or

capture forces attempting to flee. Artillery, air support, and air

assault forces support ground pursuit.

h. The brigade does not normally occupy the area defensively for an

extended time following a successful attack. Operations to search

out guerrillas continue. Elements of the brigade may be rotated

through the brigade support base for periods of rest and training.

Speed and surprise are important in strike operations, especially

when attacking a known guerrilla stronghold. The sudden and

unexpected delivery of combat forces into a guerrilla-held or

contested area provides significant advantages to the counter-

guerrilla commander. If caught by surprise, the guerrilla maybe

unable to react in time to save himself. He is confused initially and

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FM 90-8

may panic. In the time it takes him to become aware of the tactical

situation, or to take effective action, the counterguerrilla forces

may encircle him. Speed and surprise may be achieved by using

air assault tactics to insert the first counterguerrilla forces into

the area of operations. Subsequent forces can be delivered on later

airlifts or by other modes of transportation.

Strike forces are most vulnerable just after entering a new area of

operations. Initially, there is some confusion until patrol bases

are established and patrols are sent out. counterguerrilla forces

must be especially security conscious the first few hours in a new

location. Upon arrival, they should immediately establish target

reference points, observation posts, and listening posts.

Section IV. Consolidation Campaigns

3-14. Control.

a. This section provides the brigade guidance on the missions,

organization, and operations of consolidation compaigns.

Consolidation campaigns are the application of all civil and

military aspects of internal defense and internal development

programs. They are designed to establish, regain, or maintain

control of specific areas.

b. The brigade participates in consolidation campaigns by conducting

tactical, intelligence, psychological, civil affairs, populace and

resources control, and advisory assistance operations.

Brigades committed to consolidation campaigns support the

overall host country internal defense and development (IDAD)

effort by applying their resources in the following manner:

(1) In the preparation and offensive phases, tactical operations

are stressed. Initial area control is established by clearing

guerrilla forces from an area, expanding it, and linking it to

other areas as they are cleared.

(2)

In the development phase, the primary mission is tactical

operations to maintain security of the cleared area. Concur-

rently, the brigade performs intelligence, psychological,

populace and resources control, civil affairs, and advisory

assistance operations. The brigade also conducts military-civic

action in conjunction with civil affairs programs.

(3) During the completion phase, when guerrilla activity within

a consolidated area has been largely neutralized and host

country agencies have resumed control of the area, the

brigade begins to phase out its participation in local

operations and prepares to conduct operations in another

area.

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FM 90-8

3-15. Preparatory phase.

Consolidation campaign plans are detailed and provide for long-range

commitment of both personnel and materiel. Plans are coordinated

with all agencies involved in the consolidation campaign. In addition

to planning, the brigade conducts necessary training and becomes

engaged in intelligence and other FID activities.

3-16. Offensive phase.

a. The offensive phase of a consolidation campaign involves

moving the civil-military task force into the operational area,

neutralizing guerrilla forces and sympathizers, and removing

insurgent personnel who may have infiltrated the local govern-

ment.

Patrolling, area surveillance, ambushes, and other small-unit

actions are used extensively. Offensive operations, such as

movements to contact, hasty or deliberate attacks, raids, or

pursuits follow the small unit reconnaissance as targets are

located.

Care is taken that once cleared, the friendly, controlled areas are

not allowed to revert to guerrilla domination.

3-17. Development and completion phases.

During the development and completion phases of a consolidation

campaign, brigade operations involve holding an area to permit

government agencies to conduct their internal defense and

development programs. Operations also involve training local

forces to assume the defensive and security missions from the

regular armed forces. Aggressive defensive operations provide

security against guerrilla attack, deny guerrillas access to

support, and provide a secure base from which to expand the

consolidated areas. Offensive action is continued to destroy

guerrilla forces; however, defense must be provided for population

centers, tactical bases, logistical installations, airbases and

airfields, and lines of communication.

b. Defensive actions are conducted to accomplish one or more of the

following:

(1) Destroy or capture guerrilla forces.

(2) Reduce guerrilla capability and opportunity for offensive

action.

(3) Deny guerrilla entry into an area.

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FM 90-8

(4) Provide security and thus develop favorable conditions for

other IDAD operations.

The normal defense in consolidation campaign operations

employs small-unit tactics, using air assault and other reserve

forces (ready forces) to immediately react to intelligence or an

insurgent attack. Artillery and air support is prearranged to the

degree possible, and plans are adjusted as required.

Security forces conduct extensive patrolling throughout the area.

The bulk of the brigade force may be assigned areas of responsibility

and be heavily engaged in patrolling and supporting efforts of

local security forces.

The composition of the brigade reserve varies with the size of the

area, nature of the enemy threat, and the terrain. Some brigade

units may be fragmented into small elements and required to

defend dispersed installations. In this situation, the reserve

elements are assigned contingency missions to provide reaction

forces for several installations.

Area coverage may require assignment of fire support units to a

much lower level than is normal in conventional operations. To

support dispersed security elements, decentralization of fire

support may be required. Direct fire supporting weapons

(including artillery in the direct fire role) can be effective at short

ranges when using time and super quick fuze. Direct fire support

weapons are important if the guerrilla force moves within the

minimum range of indirect fire weapons.

All military and critical civilian installations and population

centers must be protected against sabotage and attack.

The larger installations and communities and the surrounding

smaller ones mutually assist each other in their defense. Fire

support from several installations and communities can contribute

to mutual defense.

The defense of communities is primarily the task of local

paramilitary forces and police. The defense of communities is

conducted with special emphasis on physical security and

populace and resources control measures. In planning the

defense, military units may be required to secure lines of

communication in the area. They may do so by surveillance,

occupation of tactical positions, or use of guards for convoy

security, patrolling, and security posts. Along lines of communi-

cation, fixed security posts protect critical points such as

terminals, tunnels, bridges, and road or railway junctions. The

size of the security post depends on the mission and the type and

size of the hostile forces which may attack it. Security posts in

remote areas are larger than those near supporting forces.

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FM 90-8

Section V. Offensive Operations

3-18. Three phases.

This section discusses offensive operations which brigades (and

subordinate units) may have to conduct. For purposes of organization

and clarity, operations are discussed under those phases of an

insurgency in which they will most often have to be conducted.

Depending on the tactical situation, these operations, or variations

and combinations of them, may be conducted during any of the three

phases of insurgent activity: latent and incipient insurgency; guerrilla

warfare; and war of movement.

3-19. Phase I — Latent and incipient insurgency.

a. This phase ranges from subversive activity that is only a

potential threat, latent or incipient, to situations in which

frequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an organized

pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled

insurgency activity.

Possible insurgent activities during Phase I include attacks on

police forces, other terroristic activities, and some minor military

operations carried out to gain additional influence over the

population (or provide arms for the movement) and to challenge

the government’s ability to maintain law and order. Furthermore,

groundwork is laid for extensive external materiel support which

is essential in most cases for the expansion of the insurgency and

its eventual success.

3-20. Police-type operations.

To control the movement of insurgents or guerrillas, and their

materiel, police-type operations are conducted. These operations

are executed by host country police, paramilitary, or military

forces. For various reasons, this may not be possible, and US

forces may have to conduct police-type operations until host

country forces are available to relieve them. (Under US law, the

military cannot advise or train foreign police forces.)

If US forces must conduct this type of operation, military police

units are suitable for this function. If they are not available,

combat forces do the job.

When conducting police operations, host government representatives

are with US troops to serve as interpreters and advise on local

customs and courtesies. When performing these duties, US troops

treat passive civilians and their property with as much courtesy

and respect as the situation permits.

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FM 90-8

3-21. Searches.

The need for a counterguerrilla force to conduct search operations

or to employ search procedures is a continuous requirement. Most

search operations support strike operations or consolidation

operations, or they may be conducted as the main effort in

populace and resources control operations. A search maybe

oriented to people, to materiel, to buildings, or to terrain. It usually

involves both civil police and military personnel.

Since misuse of search authority can adversely affect the ultimate

outcome of operations agtainst guerrillas, seizure of contraband,

evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or minor items during

searches must be accomplished lawfully and properly recorded to

be of future legal value. Proper use of authority in searches gains

the respect and support of the people. Abusive, excessive, or

inconsiderate search methods may temporarily suppress the

guerrilla force or expose elements of it, but at the same time such

methods may ultimately increase the civilian population’s

sympathy for and/or support of the guerrilla.

Authority for search operations is carefully reviewed. Military

personnel must be aware that they perform searches only in areas

within military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful) for

purposes of apprehending suspects or securing evidence that

tends to prove an offense has been committed. Usually, there are

special laws regulating the search powers of the military forces.

These laws are given wide dissemination.

Search teams have detailed instruction on controlled items. Lists

of prohibited or controlled-distribution items such as chemicals,

medicines, machine tools, and other items should be distributed.

The military or civil police who administer the populace and

resources control program are contacted before the conduct of

search operations, or periodically if search operations are a

continuing activity.

Search operations involving US forces maybe ineffective when

language difficulties prevent full communication with the

indigenous population. US units given a search mission are

provided with interpreters as required.

The pace at which a search operation is conducted is slow enough

to allow for an effective search but not so slow as to allow the

guerrilla force time to react to the threat of the search.

If active resistance develops to the search operation, offensive

operations are conducted to eliminate the resistance.

Consideration is fiven to returning to a searched area after the

completion of an initial search to surprise and eliminate

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FM 90-8

guerrillas or their infrastructure that may have remained

undetected or may have returned.

3-22. Search of individuals.

The fact that anyone in an area to be searched can be a guerrilla or a

guerrilla sympathizer is stressed in all search operations. However,

searchers are tactful to avoid making an enemy out of a suspect who

may, in fact, support the host country government. It is during the

initial handling of a person about to be searched that the greatest

caution is required. During the search of an individual, one member of

a search team always covers the other member who makes the actual

search. (For information on how to conduct searches, see Appendix G.)

3-23. Checkpoints, roadblocks, and vehicle searches.

It will be necessary to maintain a continuous check on road

movement to apprehend suspects and to prevent smuggling of

controlled items. This requires the use of checkpoints. Since

checkpoints cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it is

important that the civil population understands that checkpoints

are a preventive and not a punitive measure.

Checkpoints maybe described as either deliberate or hasty. The

deliberate checkpoint is positioned in a town or in the open

country, often on a main road. It acts as a useful deterrent to

unlawful movement. The hasty checkpoint is highly mobile and is

quickly positioned in a town or in the open country. The actual

location of the hasty checkpoint is designed to achieve quick

success.

Concealment of a checkpoint is desirable, but often impossible.

The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back or

reverse a vehicle without being observed. Culverts, bridges, or

deep cuts may be suitable locations. Positions beyond sharp

curves have the advantage that drivers do not see the checkpoint

in sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages may

outweigh the advantages of such positions. A scarcity of good

roads increases the effect of a well-placed checkpoint.

A checkpoint requires adequate troops to prevent ambush and

surprise by a guerrilla force. An element of the checkpoint force is

positioned and concealed an appropriate distance (one hundred to

several hundred meters) from the checkpoint to prevent the escape

of any vehicle or person attempting to turn back upon sighting the

checkpoint. The vehicle, driver, and passengers are searched. If

the checkpoint is manned for any length of time, part of the force

is allowed to rest. The rest area is located near the search area so

that the troops can be assembled quickly as a reserve force. (For

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FM 90-8

information on how to conduct checkpoints and roadblocks, see

Appendix G.)

3-24. Search of built-up areas - cordon and search

operations.

Techniques. Search techniques in built-up areas are practiced

by police and military forces operating in populated areas. These

techniques are required for searching either a few isolated huts or

buildings, or for searching well-developed urban sections. Search

operations in built-up areas require thorough preparation and

rehearsal. Special emphasis should be given to the following:

(1)

Divide the area to be searched into zones, and assign a

search party to each. A search party consists of a search

element (to conduct the search), a security element

(to

encircle the area and prevent entrance and exit, and to secure

open areas), and a reserve element (to assist, as required).

(a)

The search element conducts the mission assigned for

the operation. Normally it is organized into special

teams.

(b)

The security element surrounds the area while the

search element moves in. Members of the security

element orient primarily upon evaders from the

populated area; however, they can cut off any insurgents

trying to reinforce. Checkpoints and road blocks are

established. Subsurface routes of escape, such as

subways and sewers, must be considered when operating

in cities.

(c)

The reserve element is a mobile force within a nearby

area. Its specific mission is to assist the other two

elements should they meet resistance they cannot

handle. In addition, it is capable of replacing or

reinforcing either of the other two elements should the

need arise.

(2) Consider any enemy material found, including propaganda

signs and leaflets, to be booby-trapped until inspection

proves it is safe.

(3) Thoroughly search underground and underwater areas. Any

freshly excavated ground can be a hiding place. Use mine

detectors to locate metal objects underground and under-

water.

(4) Deploy rapidly, especially when a guerrilla force is still in the

area to be searched. The entire area to be searched is

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FM 90-8

surrounded simultaneously. If this is not possible, observed

fire must cover that portion not covered by soldiers.

Principles. A basic principle when searching a built-up area is

to conduct it with limited inconvenience to the population. The

populace may be inconvenienced to the point where they

discourage guerrillas and insurgent sympathizers from remaining

in the locale, but not to the point that they collaborate with the

guerrilla force as a result of the search. The large-scale search of a

built-up area is normally a combined civil police and military

operation. It is planned in detail and rehearsed when possible.

Physical reconnaissance of the area just prior to a search is

avoided. Information needed about the terrain may be obtained

from aerial photographs. In larger towns or cities, the local police

may have detailed maps showing relative size and location of

buildings. For success, the search plan must be simple and be

executed swiftly.

c. Command and control. Normally, a search involving a

battalion or larger force is best controlled by the military

commander with the civil police in support. A search involving a

smaller force is best controlled by the civil police with the military

in support. Regardless of the controlling agency, the actual search

is performed by host country police when they are available in

adequate numbers and have been trained in search operations.

(For detailed information on how to conduct cordon and search

operations, see Appendix G.)

3-25. Aerial search operations.

Search unite mounted in armed helicopters use the mobility and

firepower of these aircraft to the maximum. (This may seriously

affect the morale of the guerrilla force.)

Air assault combat patrols, conducting an aerial search,

reconnoiter an assigned area or route in search of guerrilla forces.

When a guerrilla force is located, the air assault combat patrol

may engage it from the air or may land and engage it on the

ground. This technique has little value in areas of dense

vegetation. Use of air assault combat patrols should be limited to

those operations in which sufficient intelligence exists to justify

their use and then normally in conjunction with ground oper-

ations.

In ground search operations, helicopters drop off troops in an area

suspected of containing guerrilla elements. With the helicopters

overmatching from the air, troops search the area. Troops are then

picked up and the process is repeated in other areas.

Members of air assault combat patrols should be trained in

tracking procedures in order to follow guerrillas to their base. If

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FM 90-8

the patrol encounters a large guerrilla force, the reserve (ready

forces) are committed. Plans must provide for evacuation of

prisoners, casualties, and materiel.

3-26. Civil disturbance and riot control.

a. US forces participating in counterguerrilla operations may be

tasked to assist host country police and military forces in

restoring order disrupted by civil disturbance or riot. If this

occurs, US force participation should be limited to containing the

disturbance and protecting US lives and property.

The suppression of demonstrators or rioters should be left entirely

to host country forces. Any direct action by US troops against

demonstrators or rioters will be misrepresented by the insurgents

and their sympathizers as brutal suppression of legitimate

dissent and be used by them as a propaganda weapon. (For

further information on specific techniques, see FM 19-15.)

3-27. Phase II — Guerrilla warfare.

Phase II is reached when the subversive movement, having

gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized

guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the

government. Examples of insurgent activities during Phase II

include:

(1) Activities initiated in Phase I are continued and expanded.

Insurgent control, both political and military, over territory

and populace, is intensified.

(2)

Guerrilla warfare is used on a larger scale, and limited

defense is conducted in some geographic areas.

(3)

An insurgent government is established in insurgent-

dominated areas as the military situation permits. In areas

not yet controlled, efforts are made to neutralize actual or

potential opposition groups and to increase infiltration into

government agencies. Intimidation through terror and

threat of guerrilla action increases and thus becomes more

significant.

Militarily, the major goal is to control additional areas; the

government is forced to strain its resources trying to protect

everything at the same time. Insurgent forces attempt to tie down

government troops in static defense tasks, interdict and destroy

lines of communications, and capture or destroy supplies and

other government resources.

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3-28. Small-unit operations.

Small-unit operations are used against guerrilla activities in the

second phase of an insurgency. They are effective since small units can

cover more territory than a large unit, they keep the guerrilla off

balance, and their friendly firepower (that can be rapidly massed) may

provide a favorable ratio in meeting engagements. In Phase II, the

guerrilla is usually operating in smaller units, too.

3-29. Raid.

A raid is an operation involving a swift penetration of hostile

territory to secure information, harass the guerrilla force, or

destroy the guerrilla force and its installation. It ends in a

planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. A

successful raid is based on accurate, timely, and detailed

information. Raids are usually targeted against single, isolated

guerrilla base camps. To assist in attaining surprise, the raiding

force uses inclement weather, limited visibility, or terrain

normally considered impassable.

The raiding force is normally organized into an assault element

and a security element. A larger raiding force may add a support

element while a small raiding force includes supporting weapons

in the assault element.

The use of airborne and air assault forces for a raid enhances

surprise. If night airborne or air assault raids are conducted, the

force must be accurately inserted and oriented on the ground. Air

assault forces supported by armed helicopters offer infinite

possibilities for conducting raids. This type of raid force can move

in, strike the objective, and withdraw without extensive preparation

or support from other sources. (For further information on the

composition and organization of raid forces, see FM 7-8, FM 7-10,

and FM 7-20.)

3-30. Patrols.

Conventional patrolling doctrine normally applies to counter-

guerrilla operations, but some techniques must be oriented to meet

the guerrilla’s activities and the operational environment.

Patrolling becomes more significant in counterguerrilla operations

because of the difficulty in locating and identifying guerrilla

forces and determining their intentions. Patrolling is used when

limited (or no) intelligence on guerrilla activity is available.

Personnel should be thoroughly briefed, carry only mission-essential

equipment, and be physically fit. Routes are planned carefully

and coordinated with higher, lower, and adjacent units, to include

air and ground fire support elements and reserve forces.

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Patrolling is done to find and destroy the guerrilla, and to deny

him use of an area. Patrols are usually categorized as either

combat or reconnaissance.

Patrols can be employed to:

(1) Saturate areas of suspected guerrilla activity.

(2) Control critical roads and trails.

(3) Maintain contact between villages and units.

(4) Establish population checkpoints.

(5) Provide security for friendly forces.

(6) Interdict guerrilla routes of supply and communication.

(7)

Establish ambushes.

(8) Pursue, maintain contact with, and destroy guerrillas.

(9)

Provide internal security in rural areas.

(10)

Locate guerrilla units and base camps.

d. Saturation patrolling is extremely effective in Phase II situations.

In this technique, patrols are conducted by many lightly armed,

small, fast-moving units and provide thorough area coverage.

Patrols move over planned and coordinated routes which are

changed frequently to avoid establishing patterns. Use of

saturation patrolling results in the sustained denial of an area to

guerrilla forces as they seek to avoid contact with the counter-

guerrilla units. In addition to harassment and discovery of

guerrilla tactical forces, this technique provides:

An opportunity to gain an intimate knowledge of the area of

(1)

operations.

(2)

A form of reassurance to the local population that the

government is concerned about their protection and security.

(3)

A means by which information about the guerrilla can be

obtained. (For further information on preparation, execution,

and operational techniques of patrols, see FM 7-10, FM 7-20,

and Appendix D.)

3-31. Ambush

An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upon

a moving or temporarily halted target. Ambushes give the

counterguerrilla force several advantages:

(1) An ambush does not require ground to be seized or held.

(2) Smaller forces with limited weapons and equipment can

harass or destroy larger, better armed forces.

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(3) Guerrillas can be forced to engage in decisive combat at

unfavorable times and places.

(4) Guerrillas can be denied freedom of movement and deprived

of weapons and equipment that are difficult to replace.

b. Well-planned and well-executed ambushes maybe the most

successful operational technique employed against guerrillas. It

is an effective technique to interdict movement of guerrilla forces

within an area. Selection of the site is a key step in developing a

well-organized ambush. Also, leaders must be proficient in using

mines, antihandling devices, demolitions, and expedient devices

for organization of the position. Fire support is prepared for

immediate delivery on call.

3-32. Night ambush.

Ambush during darkness is difficult to control, but darkness increases

the security of the ambush party and the confusion of those being

ambushed. A small ambush party generally is more practical;

however, the size of the party depends on factors such as the size of the

unit to be ambushed and the estimated guerrilla strength in the area.

(For further information on preparation, execution, and operational

ambush techniques, see FM 7-8, FM 7-10, and Appendix C.)

3-33. Encirclement.

Encirclement offers the best chance to fix guerrilla forces in

position and achieve decisive results. The battalion and larger

units will usually plan and conduct encirclements. The company

and smaller units normally do not have the manpower and

command and control capability to execute encirclements except

as part of a larger force.

Encirclements require accurate intelligence on the location of

guerrilla elements. Since it requires a major portion of the

counterguerrilla force to execute this maneuver, it is usually

targeted against large guerrilla forces or guerrilla base complexes,

a series of smaller base camps clustered within an area.

Planning, preparation, and execution are aimed at encircling the

guerrilla force rapidly. Maximum security and surprise can be

gained by occupying the initial encirclement positions during

darkness.

d. In large operations, air assault and airborne troops add speed and

surprise to the operation. Positions are occupied simultaneously

in order to block escape. If simultaneous occupation is not

possible, probable escape routes are covered first. Initial

occupation is the most critical period of the operation. When the

guerrillas become aware that they are being encircled, they will

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probably probe for gaps or attack weak points and attempt to

break out.

Encircling units provide strong combat patrols far to their front to

give early warning of attempted breakouts. Mobile reserves are

positioned to counter a breakout and to reinforce difficult areas

such as broken terrain or areas with caves, tunnels, or

fortification complexes.

Indirect fire support can serve to cloak an encirclement by

gaining and holding the guerrillas’ attention. Fires are planned in

detail to support the encirclement.

Following completion of the encirclement, the circle is contracted

to capture or destroy the guerrilla force. As the circle is contracted,

units may be removed from the line and added to the reserve.

Against small guerrilla forces, the encircled area may be cleared

by contraction and a final sweep. Against larger guerrilla forces,

however, at some point, some action other than contraction will be

required.

One technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerrilla

force to divide it and then destroying the guerrillas in each

subarea.

Another technique, employed after some degree of contraction, is

to employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the perimeter

while the remainder of the encircling force drives the guerrillas

against the blocking force. Either element may accomplish the

actual destruction. This technique is effective when the blocking

force can be located on, or immediately in the rear of, a natural

terrain obstacle. (For further information, see Appendix G.)

3-34. Phase III — War of movement.

The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when insurgency

becomes primarily a war of movement between organized insurgent

forces and forces of the established government. During Phase III,

insurgent activities conducted in Phases I and II are continued and

expanded. Larger insurgent units are used to fight government forces

and to capture key geographical and political objectives to be used to

defeat government forces.

3-35. Large-unit operations.

When an insurgency enters Phase III, the guerrilla begins to mass his

forces and challenge government forces openly. He may begin to use

conventional warfare tactics to a greater degree. He may even elect to

stand and fight in defense of terrain if he feels that it is in his interest to

retain it or if he feels that he can deal government forces a serious

military or political defeat by defending. In this phase, conventional

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warfare tactics can be effectively employed to defeat the guerrilla. (For

further information on how to employ these tactics, see FM 7-8, FM

7-10, FM 7-20, and FM 7-30.)

3-36. Movement to contact.

Movement to contact in counterguerrilla tactical operations is

basically the same as in conventional conflicts. Night movement,

clandestine movement, and counterambush precautions are

emphasized.

b. Care is taken to avoid ambushes in movement to contact. The

infantry maintains contact by aggressive frontal and flank

patrolling by small security elements, thereby exposing a

minimum of troops to ambush. Supporting fires are placed

close-in along, and parallel to, the route of advance.

3-37. Reconnaissance in force.

Reconnaissance in force is a limited-objective operation to

discover and test guerrilla positions, locations, and strength, and

to gather information. In counterguerrilla operations, the

objective is collection of information about guerrillas and the

destruction of units and facilities. The commander is prepared to

exploit meeting engagements and intelligence to achieve tactical

success by conducting a hasty or deliberate attack to destroy

discovered guerrilla units and facilities. The recon force may

conduct the operation as a unit, or selected subordinate units may

be committed on a limited scale.

Reconnaissance-in-force operations normally develop information

more rapidly and in more detail than do other reconnaissance

methods. When firm intelligence is lacking, the principal effort of

the recon unit may be a widespread and continuous reconnais-

sance-in-force operation coupled with mandatory security

missions. In arriving at a decision to reconnoiter in force, the

commander considers:

(1) His overall mission.

(2) His knowledge of the enemy situation.

(3) The urgency and importance of other information,

(4) The efficiency and speed of other intelligence collection

agencies.

(5) The possibility that the reconnaissance may lead to a

general engagement under favorable conditions.

(6) The continuing requirements for local and area security.

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FM 90-8

(7) The availability of adequate reserves (reaction forces) and

the resources to deliver them quickly to the area to be

exploited.

(8) The availability of adequate, all-weather fire support means.

The reconnaissance elements in the force should have mobility at

least equal to that of the enemy. Mobile reserves (ready forces)

quickly exploit guerrilla weaknesses and influence the action.

3-38. Hasty attack.

Once contact with the enemy is made, the commander deploys his

force, coordinating movement, fires, air support, and other means

in an attempt to immediately destroy the enemy or fully develop

the situation. Generally, if the leading element contacting the

enemy cannot defeat him quickly, the commander must decide

whether to conduct a hasty attack or to take time to develop the

situation more carefully and then conduct a deliberate attack.

At times, the intelligence available to the commander indicates

clearly which course he should follow. At other times, however,

judgment may dictate that he conduct a hasty attack to avoid

being held up by inferior forces and being unnecessarily delayed.

At the same time, he must be careful to avoid being drawn into

ambush.

Conduct of a hasty attack is a difficult and challenging operation.

Ideally, there should be no pause in the forward momentum of the

force upon initial contact. Maneuver units swing into action

immediately, using movement techniques appropriate to the

enemy and terrain.

The commander calls for available fire support. He coordinates

and maneuvers resources so as to apply the combat power needed

against the enemy. The hasty attack tries to fix enemy elements in

place with firepower and either overrun or encircle them. Speed is

essential. The reserve force has to be deployed early if maneuver

elements are held up. If momentum is lost, the hasty attack fails.

3-39. Deliberate attack.

a . When the force commander knows he has encountered a strong

enemy force in well-prepared defensive positions, he may

conclude that a deliberate attack is necessary.

A deliberate attack is characterized by detailed (and widely

distributed) knowledge of enemy positions, by large volumes of

effectively delivered supporting fires, by extensive deception, by

full exploitation of electronic warfare (EW), and by employing

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measures beyond those possible in a hasty attack. Continued

contact with the guerrilla force must be maintained to prevent its

escape.

3-40. Exploitation.

If an attack succeeds, exploitation and pursuit follow. Exploitation

is an operation undertaken to follow up success in the attack.

Following the principle of reinforcing success, immediate

exploitation using an uncommitted element of the force is

advisable.

b. The exploiting force drives swiftly to disrupt guerrilla command

and control functions, severs escape routes, destroys reserves and

equipment, and denies the enemy an opportunity to reorganize his

defense. The exploitation force is large, reasonably self-sufficient,

and well-supported by tactical air, air cavalry, and attack

helicopters. It does not pause to achieve minor tactical successes

against isolated or fleeing enemy units; it attempts to fix them

while concentrating on destroying the main guerrilla force. The

commander provides mobile support, including helicopters for

emergency supply of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) and

ammunition, and ensures sufficient follow-on forces to attack

guerrilla forces bypassed or fixed by the exploiting force.

3-41. Pursuit.

Pursuit is an offensive action against a retreating enemy. It is the

final phase of the exploitation and occurs when a large guerrilla

force attempts to disengage. Normally, it attempts to cut off

escape routes and encircle and destroy the guerrilla force. It

maintains pressure with an exploiting force.

As the guerrilla unit disintegrates, exploitation may develop into

pursuit. Pursuit may develop in any operation in which the enemy

has lost his ability to operate effectively and attempts to flee.

Pursuit requires energy and resolution to press on despite fatigue,

dwindling supplies, or the approach of darkness. Nighttime

pursuit increases the enemy’s confusion and speeds his disinte-

gration.

The primary purpose of pursuit is to destroy the guerrilla force.

Although terrain objectives may be assigned as control measures,

the primary objective is the guerrilla force.

d. In pursuit, the requirements and command relationships for

forces which follow and support are the same as in exploitation.

They destroy bypassed enemy strongholds, relieve supported

units that have halted to contain enemy forces, guard prisoners,

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FM 90-8

open and secure lines of communications, and control refugees. In

conducting a pursuit, the commander maintains unremitting,

direct pressure against the enemy while trying to envelop him to

cut his line of retreat. When conditions permit, the commander

orders double envelopments of the retreating guerrilla force. He

makes maximum use of fire support, air assault forces, and

offensive electronic warfare.

Section VI. Defensive Operations

3-42. Variations.

a. This section discusses defensive operations which brigades and

subordinate units may have to conduct. Depending on the tactical

situation, these operations, or variations of them, may be

conducted during any phase of an insurgency. In some instances,

the type of operation under consideration is identical to one

already discussed in Section V. The difference is the purpose.

b. For example, patrolling maybe either offensive or defensive in

purpose. When its purpose is offensive, it is done to locate the

enemy and destroy him. When its purpose is defensive, it is done to

deny the enemy access to an area, and to keep him from

organizing for offensive operation. (For similarities of offensive

and defensive operations, see Section V.)

This section also provides guidance to commanders concerned

with the defense of various types of temporary or semipermanent

bases, such as logistical installations, OSBS, airfields, and

airbases, under varying conditions of security that may exist in

an area of operations.

It is also applicable to the defense of civilian communities.

Commanders responsible for bases, facilities, and communities

should exercise those principles and techniques discussed which

apply to their particular situation.

3-43. Base defense environment.

a. Defense and security of tactical units and installations are

integral parts of combat missions. (The term “base” is used to

include all types of facilities to be defended.)

b. Base defense operations are executed under the guidance of an

area commander whose responsibilities include protecting the

resources of his area from interruptions caused by enemy

activities. This is a territorial responsibility in which base

commanders provide for the local defense of their immediate base

areas. In addition, base commanders may be asked to provide

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FM 9 0 - 8

resources for other activities which may be classified as rear

battle.

The base defense environment is established in an area generally

controlled by friendly forces but not sufficiently secure to prevent

guerrillas from moving in small groups, establishing firing

positions, or mounting small-scale attacks.

d. Conditions which may characterize the environment for base

defense include:

(1)

US forces are in a host country.

(2)

Other nations in similar roles may be in the same host

country.

(3)

Unity of command or a combined headquarters may or may

not exist.

(4)

Although there is organized armed conflict, there is no

recognized state of war.

(5)

Many of the guerrillas do not wear distinctive uniforms. At

times, some may appear dressed in government uniforms.

Guerrillas cannot always be distinguished from government

supporters or neutrals even when they are conducting overt

operations.

(6)

External support may be provided to the guerrillas, both

overtly and covertly. Nations or groups supporting the

guerrillas may provide sanctuaries where guerrilla forces

may establish base areas.

(7)

Paramilitary forces may assume increased responsibilities.

(8)

No military "frontline" exists where continuous contact can

be maintained.

(9)

Guerrillas usually do not hold territory. They may disperse

and avoid combat at the appearance of a stronger force.

3-44.

Missions, functions, and responsibilities.

Base defense consists of both normal and emergency local

military measures taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of

enemy attacks or sabotage. Base defense is conducted to ensure

the continued effectiveness of its facilities and units to fulfill their

missions.

The commander of an area or a subarea that contains a base is

responsible for its overall defense. The base commander, however,

is responsible for its local defense; he must have under his

operational control all forces, regardless of branch of service, that

are assigned to the base primarily for its defense. Forces assigned

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to the base for other primary purposes will also assist in local

defense during an attack. Each commander of forces located at a

base is responsible for:

(1) Participating in preparation of base defense plans. Training

his forces for base defense.

(2) Providing appropriate facilities and essential personnel for

the base defense operations center and appropriate personnel

for the base defense force staff.

(3) Providing for internal security of his own command.

3-45. Passive defense.

In addition to their assigned defense missions, all units in the base area

are responsible for maximum implementation of passive defense.

Passive defense consists of measures taken to reduce the probability

(and to minimize the effects) of damage caused by hostile action,

without the expectation of taking the initiative. Responsibility for the

conduct of specialized passive defense measures is assigned to

firefighting units, chemical units, medical units, and other appropriate

organizations capable of satisfying passive defense requirements.

Additionally, all units assigned to the base initiate passive defense

measures, such as dispersion, camouflage, blackout, and use of

shelters. These measures assist in preserving the operating integrity of

the base and ensuring decisive and effective action against enemy

attack.

3-46. Command relationships.

Command relationships for base defense operations provide unity of

command while preserving simplicity. The urgency of base defense

operations requires clear-cut authority.

3-47. Fundamentals of base defense.

a . Base defense. It is established to provide all-round security for

the base with available forces and is characterized by detailed

planning and centralized control. Security measures may also

include provisions to protect adjacent civilian communities, if

feasible. Constant and aggressive action by friendly elements

against enemy forces constitutes a major element of base defense.

Vigilance and sound security measures reduce enemy interference

with operations at the base and also tend to cause enemy forces to

divert their operations from the area.

b . Use of terrain. Proper evaluation and organization of the area

are essential to hold down the number of additional forces

required for base defense. Factors considered are:

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(1) Natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.

(2)

Use of artificial obstacles to enhance the natural defensive

characteristics of the terrain.

(3) Existing roads and waterways used for military lines of

communications and civilian commerce.

Control of land areas surrounding the base complex to a

(4)

range beyond that of enemy mortars and rockets, and also

control of water approaches.

Security. Early warning of pending actions ensures the base

commander time to react to any threat. Outposts, patrols, ground

surveillance andcountermortar radar, infantry scout dogs (if

available), and air reconnaissance and surveillance provide early

warning. Civilian informants and actions of indigenous personnel

near the base are excellent indicators of pending enemy actions.

Security measures vary with enemy threat, forces available, and

other factors; all-round security is essential.

Mutual support. Defending forces are positioned to ensure

mutual employment of defensive resources, which include fires,

observation, and maneuver elements. Mutual support between

defensive elements requires careful planning, positioning, and

coordination because of the circular aspects of the base area.

Surveillance, obstacles, prearranged fires, and maneuver are used

to control gaps. Defense plans provide for use of all available

support, including attack helicopters and close air support.

All-round defense. In defensive planning, the base commander

has to be prepared to defend against enemy attack from any

direction. Plans are sufficiently flexible, and reserves are

positioned to permit reaction to any threat. Base defense forces

(BDF) are assigned primary and alternate positions and sectors of

responsibility. All personnel are assigned duty stations or

shelters.

Defense in depth. Alternate and supplementary positions,

combat outposts, and mutually supporting strongpoints in front

of the base forward defense area extend the depth. The commander

plans fires throughout the defensive area up to the maximum

range of available weapons. Portable obstacles may be placed

around critical targets during reduced visibility to disrupt the

enemy’s plan and add depth to the defense.

Responsiveness. Attacks against a base may range from

long-range sniper, mortar, or rocket fire to attacks by suicide

demolition squads or major forces. The enemy has the advantage

of deciding when, where, and with what force he will attack. The

defender positions his forces and plans fires and movement so he

can respond to the widest possible range of enemy actions. The

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defender prepares plans, to include counterattack plans, and

rehearses, evaluates, and revises them as necessary.

h. Maximum use of offensive action. Since the objective of the

base defense is to maintain a secure base, the defender uses

offensive action to the maximum to engage enemy forces outside

the base. On initial occupation of the base site, friendly forces take

offensive actions to destroy enemy forces in the immediate area.

The area commander employs patrols, raids, ambushes, air

attacks, and supporting fires to harass and destroy any

remaining enemy force. Once the enemy has been cleared from the

area, the base can be defended by a smaller force. The BDF

commander maintains constant liaison with major tactical unit

commanders in the area to stay abreast of efforts to remove the

threat.

3-48. Defense preparations.

a. Implementation of base defense measures in a new base begins

before base units arrive, if possible. Normally, combat units

provide the initial defense in a new base area, These combat forces

remain in the base area, conducting aggressive offensive actions,

until base units are capable of assuming the mission.

When base units arrive, they immediately start organizing the

base defense. They perform many of the tasks concurrently, but

some tasks require priority. The base commander specifies the

sequence for preparation of the defense system. (FM 7-8, FM 7-10,

and FM 7-20 provide a recommended sequence for tactical

defense. For more information on base defense, see Appendix E.)

3-49. Patrols.

Base defense operations to counter small groups of enemy forces

include aggressive, frequent patrolling by squad- and platoon-size

forces to detect and capture or destroy small groups of guerrillas.

Infantry scout dogs, if available, maybe used to add security and

additional detection ability to patrol operations.

Patrolling is conducted by small, highly mobile units moving on

foot or by vehicles during daylight and darkness. It may include

the use of aircraft or boats. Populated areas near the base are

searched, and surprise checkpoints are established along known

or suspected routes of guerrilla communications.

Dug-in or concealed night ambush sites are manned outside the

barrier system trace on a random basis. Indigenous personnel

should accompany ambushes near populated areas. Their

knowledge of local populace and terrain assists the ambush

mission. Artillery and mortar targets are registered and plotted to

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6) - page 39