Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 4)

Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

Page 2 of 36

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1

PURPOSE

1.2

SCOPE

1.3

LEGISLATION & STANDARDS

1.4

COMPANY REQUIREMENTS

1.5

STOPPING UNSAFE WORK

1.6

DEVIATIONS

1.7

DOCUMENT REVIEW

1.8

SSOW SPECIFIC CROSS REFERENCES

1.9

ENERGY ISOLATION GOLDEN RULES OF SAFETY

1.10

LANGUAGE FACILITATION

1.11

PROCEDURE SUMMARY

2 DEFINITIONS

2.1

DEFINITIONS

2.2

ABBREVIATIONS

3 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1

PERFORMANCE UNIT LEADER

3.2

ASSET MANAGER

3.3

OFFSHORE INSTALLATION MANAGER (OIM)/SITE CONTROLLER (SC)/SITE MANAGER

(SM)

3.4

AREA AUTHORITY (AA)

3.5

ISOLATING AUTHORITY (IA)

3.6

PERFORMING AUTHORITY (PA)

3.7

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

3.8

THE ONSHORE SUPPORT ENGINEER

3.9

CUSTODIAN

4 MONITORING AND AUDITING OF ISOLATIONS

4.1

MONITORING

4.2

SELF-REGULATION AND AUDIT

5 COMPETENCY, TRAINING AND AWARENESS

6 THE ISOLATION CONFIRMATION CERTIFICATION (ICC) PROCESS12

6.1

GENERAL

7 ISOLATION REVIEW AND LEVEL 2 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS 13

7.1

REVIEW AND RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

7.2

REJECTION OF ISOLATION DESIGN

7.3

RISK ASSESSMENT OF NON-COMPLIANT ISOLATIONS

7.4

RISK ASSESSMENT RECORDS

7.5

HAZARDOUS WORK

8 TYPES OF ISOLATIONS

8.1

BOUNDARY ISOLATIONS

8.2

LONG-TERM ISOLATIONS

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8.3

PERSONAL ISOLATIONS

8.4

ADDITIONAL ISOLATIONS

8.5

ISOLATION FOR CONFINED SPACE ENTRY

8.6

PROVISION FOR ISOLATIONS DURING MODIFICATION OF DESIGN AND NEW FACILITIES

8.7

ISOLATION OF HIGH PRESSURE SMALL BORE PIPING

9 REGISTERS

RECORDS

APPENDIX A: ISOLATION STANDARDS

GENERAL

APPENDIX B: GUIDANCE NOTES

B1 ISOLATION PLANNING

B1.1 ISOLATION PLANNING

B1.2 ISOLATION METHODS

B1.2.1 POSITIVE ISOLATION

B1.2.2 DOUBLE BLOCK AND BLEED

B1.2.3 SINGLE VALVE ISOLATION

B1.2.4 OTHER ISOLATION DEVICES

B1.3 PRECAUTIONS WHEN BREAKING CONTAINMENT

B2 ISOLATION IMPLEMENTATION AND CONTROL

B2.1 SECURITY

B2.2 IDENTIFICATION METHODS

B2.2.1 FLANGE TAGGING FOR BREAKING CONTAINMENT

B2.3 CONTROL OF ISOLATIONS

B2.3.1 CONTROL OF ISOLATIONS FOR WELL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

B2.3.2 LOCKED OPEN/LOCKED CLOSED VALVES

B2.4 TESTING ISOLATION INTEGRITY

B2.5 PLANT PREPARATION - FOR BREAKING CONTAINMENT

B2.5.1 POTENTIAL HAZARDS

B2.5.2 DEPRESSURISING AND DRAINING CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B2.5.2.1 PRESSURISED VESSELS AND PIPELINES/PIPEWORK

B2.5.2.2 ATMOSPHERIC TANKS AND VESSELS

B2.6 CLEANING AND GAS-FREEING METHODS

B2.6.1 WATER FLOODING

B2.6.2 INERT GAS

B2.6.3 STEAM

B2.6.4 AIR

B3.1 GENERAL

B3.2 DE-ISOLATION OF PLANT

B3.2.1 INTEGRITY CHECKS

B3.2.2 SEQUENCE OF DE-ISOLATION

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

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INTRODUCTION

1.1

PURPOSE

The purpose of this document is to ensure there is clarity to the detailed requirements that

applies to the preparation for isolation and reinstatement of process, utility and drilling

systems.

1.2

SCOPE

The contents of this procedure are applicable to all BP owned and managed sites /

installations in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Contractors working on BP owned or managed sites

/ installations are also responsible for alignment with this procedure.

This document does not replace the procedures prepared and adopted by specialist

contractors. Neither does it supersede any national and local regulatory requirements.

This procedure contributes to compliance with the “HSE expectations” contained in “getting

HSE right”, the „Golden Rules of Safety‟ and the Control of Work (CoW) standard that the

Hazards associated with BP activities are identified and that the Risks are assessed and

managed.

All guidelines contained shall be regarded as the minimum requirements for BP owned or

managed sites / installations in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The scope covers defined activities of BP and Contractors at all BP AzSPU sites and

installations.

1.3

LEGISLATION & STANDARDS

The aim of this Safe System of Work is to achieve ”no accidents”, “no harm to people” and

“no damage to the environment”. To achieve this aim, this SSOW complies with National

Legislation, the terms of the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) and mandatory BP

Standards.

The best International Oil Industry practice and relevant goal setting legislation have been

adopted to reduce the level of risk to as low as reasonably practicable and therefore well

below that mandated by applicable statutory laws and regulations.

In the absence of local regulations, BP Group Standards will apply. In addition, appropriate

UK and US regulations and industry best practice have been considered in setting suitable

goals and targets.

1.4

COMPANY REQUIREMENTS

It is a company requirement that all tasks are subjected to an assessment of risk to

demonstrate that risks have been reduced to as low a level as reasonably practicable

(ALARP). This can be achieved by complying with the Company‟s existing standards. Where

compliance with Company standards cannot reasonably be achieved, a formal level 2 Risk

Assessment will be undertaken to identify any additional controls and demonstrate that risks

remain as low as reasonably practicable. Whether by compliance with Company Standards

or through level 2 Risk Assessment, the Company‟s Golden Rules of Safety must be

complied with. Golden Rules are non-negotiable.

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1.5

STOPPING UNSAFE WORK

To stop the continuation of potentially unsafe work at the earliest possible stage the Control

of Work (CoW) Policy and this procedure for Energy Isolation - Process make it very clear

that all personnel are obliged and have the authority to “STOP” the work that they consider

to be unsafe.

1.6

DEVIATIONS

This procedure is written in sufficient detail that it should be able to be applied consistently

at all sites / installations. There may still be the requirement for some local rules covering

site

/ installation specific logistical/administrative arrangements and local variations in

responsibilities to reflect differences in organisational arrangements. These local rules

should not deviate from the core processes within this document. Any form of deviation from

this procedure, including but not limited to local rules, shall be requested and authorised in

accordance with SSOW, Deviations from Regulations and Procedures procedure (Doc. No:

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00011-2).

1.7

DOCUMENT REVIEW

This document will be reviewed on an annual basis when users from the sites / installations

will have an opportunity to propose changes to the existing processes and procedures. The

document Technical Authority will be responsible for coordinating this review.

1.8

SSOW SPECIFIC CROSS REFERENCES

This SSOW procedure shall, where appropriate, be used in conjunction with this suite of BP

AzSPU SSOW Procedures referenced below.

Document Number

Title of Procedure

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00011-2

Deviations from Regulations and Procedures

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Incident Investigation and Reporting

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00060-2

Permit To Work

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00012-2

Authorization

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00063-2

Task Risk Assessment

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00048-2

Energy Isolations-Electrical

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00013-2

Confined Space Entry

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00055-2

Leak Testing

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00002-2

BP Control of Work Standards

1.9

ENERGY ISOLATION GOLDEN RULES OF SAFETY

Energy Isolation is one of BP‟s Golden Rules. It states that:

Any isolation of energy systems, e.g. mechanical, electrical, process, hydraulic, pneumatic,

gravitational, chemical, radioactive, thermal, or other energy source that could cause injury,

cannot proceed unless:

 The method of isolation and discharge of stored energy are agreed and executed by a

competent person(s)

 Any Stored energy is discharged

 A system of locks and tags is utilized at isolation points

 A test is conducted to ensure the isolation is effective

 Isolation effectiveness is periodically monitored

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1.10 LANGUAGE FACILITATION

Due to the various languages spoken at sites / installations, there is a necessity to assist all

with “an ease of understanding”. Therefore, the development and use of information tools

are available.

1.11 PROCEDURE SUMMARY

A Procedure Summary has been developed in a form of a leaflet, which can be carried by

the Line Supervisors while conducting their day-to-day work tasks. The Leaflet summarizes

the contents of this procedure for Energy Isolation - Process. The Procedure Summary can

also be used as a guideline for Line Supervisors to deliver their daily toolbox talk. (See

Appendix E)

DEFINITIONS

2.1

DEFINITIONS

Auto Ignition

The temperature at which a flammable substance would auto ignite without an

external ignition source

Competent

A person who, by reason of his or her training, knowledge, experience and

Person

judgment is considered by management to be capable of planning and

supervising the safe isolation of plant.

Confined Space

A “confined space” is any enclosed space or partially enclosed space which is

large enough that an employee can bodily enter it and perform assigned work,

has limited or restricted means of entry or exit, unfavourable natural ventilation

and is not designed for continuous occupancy.

The general definition of “confined space” shows that many types of spaces

may be considered confined and therefore hazardous - large pipelines, tanks,

vessels, separators, ducts, sewers, mud, pits, flues, manholes and voids

between modules and in legs on offshore installations.

The definition also includes any space in which dangerous levels of

contaminants can accumulate and ventilation is restricted, e.g. excavations

(normally deeper than 1.2m), the space above floating roofs on floating roof

tanks, open topped tanks, closed or unventilated rooms, sumps and culverts

and any other poorly ventilated areas.

Hazardous

Corrosive, toxic or irritant chemical fluid, e.g., nitrogen, steam or hot water,

Utility

drilling mud, diesel oil, Aviation Turbine Kerosene, and other fluids that could

have an environmental impact.

Isolation

A method of preventing the passage of fluids through connecting pipe work

and the disconnection of all forms of motive power in order to allow safe

access to allow intrusive equipment maintenance.

Isolation

This combines in one document a record of all isolations required for a task to

Confirmation

be carried out safely.

Certificate

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Long Term

An isolation that remains in place after permit to work cancellation, and

Isolation

recorded as “Long Term”. A register is maintained of all Long Term Isolations

Mothballed

Equipment that has been taken out of service, and will not be used in the near

future. The equipment is disconnected from all energy sources. No isolation is

required.

Non-hazardous

Cold water, air, etc.

Utility

Performing

These terms shall have the meanings assigned to them in AZSPU-HSSE-

Authority, Area

DOC-00012-2, Authorisation.

Authority and

Isolating

Authority

Positive

Isolation by means of a fixed barrier, such as a blank flange (following spool

Isolation

removal), blind plate or spectacle plate, bolted or clamped in place and

conforming to the pipe work specification, which provides an equivalent

standard of containment to the pipe work in which it is installed.

Process Fluid

Well fluids, produced water, live crude, stabilised crude, gas, NGL or any other

produced fluid containing hydrocarbon gas or liquid. H₂S, Naturally Occurring

Radio-active Material or hydrates may also be present.

Reasonably

This term implies that an evaluation of costs versus benefits must be made.

Practicable

Where the cost or difficulty of a precaution is grossly out of proportion to the

reduction in risk likely to be achieved by implementing the precaution, the

precaution can be considered not reasonably practicable.

Any additional risks that may arise while installing or removing the precaution

must also be taken into consideration in determining what is reasonably

practicable.

Secondary

A method of isolation normally used only to support process isolation involving

means of

valves, with the objective being process isolation, e.g., isolation of an actuator

isolation

before isolating the appropriate valve, or isolation of an emergency shutdown

panel, providing a closed signal to a valve, disconnecting the actuator air

supply and then isolating the appropriate valve.

Spade

A physical obstruction to flow whose design characteristics are the same as

the plant, equipment and / or systems into which the obstruction is inserted,

e.g., a spade, spectacle blind or line blind.

Toxic Material

Material, which can cause harm by means of inhalation, ingestion or

absorption.

Control Tier: <<2>>

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2.2

ABBREVIATIONS

Area Authority

AzSPU

Azerbaijan Strategic Performance Unit

Carbon Dioxide

CO2

CARA

Chemical Agents Risk Assessment

COSHH

Control of Substances Hazardous to Health

COW

Control of Work

CoW

Control of Work

DBB

Double Block and Bleed

ESD

Emergency Shutdown

H₂S

Hydrogen Sulphide

Isolating Authority

ICC

Isolation Confirmation Certificate

L2RA

Level 2 Risk Assessment

Locked Closed

Locked Open

LSA

Low Specific Activity

MSDS

Material Safety Data Sheets

Nitrogen

NORM

Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material

OIM

Offshore Installation Manager

OSM

Operations Safety Manual

Performing Authority

PSA

Production Sharing Agreement

PTW

Permit to Work

Site Controller

Site Manager

SSOW

Safe System of Work

STT

Sanction to Test

SVI

Single Valve Isolation

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1

PERFORMANCE UNIT LEADER

The Performance Unit Leader is responsible for operating in accordance with this document

and for the self-regulation of compliance.

3.2

ASSET MANAGER

The Asset Managers are responsible for:

 Ensuring that the Processes applied at their sites are authorised by them prior to

implementation

 Periodic internal review

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3.3

OFFSHORE INSTALLATION MANAGER (OIM)/SITE CONTROLLER (SC)/SITE MANAGER (SM)

The OIM/Site Controller/Site Manager is responsible for ensuring that those performing the

roles of Area Authority, Isolating Authority and Performing Authority are competent to do so

and have overall responsibility for the implementation of the Permit to Work and isolation

procedures at their site. They are responsible for:



Ensuring the operation and assurance of the isolation procedure at their site, acting

upon all recommendations and proposing system improvements



Authorising the Area Authority and Isolating Authority (in writing) as competent to

carry out their responsibilities within the Permit To Work and isolations procedures



Maintaining a control log of all authorised personnel. Details of this control log are

included in AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00012-2 Authorization



Communicating the responsibilities of key participants within the isolations procedures

to those personnel under their direction



Approving all Level 2 Risk Assessments undertaken for non-compliant isolations



Ensuring the required competent personnel are available at the installation to carry

out isolation activities



Ensuring that plant and equipment isolations are subjected to the appropriate level of

self-regulation and audit

3.4

AREA AUTHORITY (AA)

The Area Authority is responsible for approving the isolation design, providing assurance

that the design achieves the highest quality of isolation reasonably practicable. He/She can

delegate the detailed isolation design to an Isolating Authority. The Area Authority is then

responsible for authorising the work to proceed under the appropriate controls. They are

responsible for:

 Ensuring only authorized personnel perform isolations

 Advising the OIM

/ Site Controller

/ Site Manager on Isolating Authority

(IA)

competence

 Ensuring isolation specification, application, removal, certification and security are

accomplished in accordance with this procedure

 Facilitating the Risk Assessment process in accordance with AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-

00063-2 Task Risk Assessment

 Approving all Energy Isolations

 The weekly review and quarterly audit of long-term isolations

 The control of all lock-off devices and tags involved with isolations

3.5

ISOLATING AUTHORITY (IA)

The Isolating Authority is responsible for:

 The specification, application, removal and recording of Energy Isolations in support

of a Permit to Work

 The design of process isolation when requested by the Area Authority. When

designing the isolation the Isolating Authority must agree the scope and content of

isolation with appropriate personnel e.g. the Performing Authority.

 Isolating specific sections of plant or items of equipment to the highest quality and

security of isolation, which is reasonably practicable.

 Demonstrating to the Performing Authority the integrity of the Energy Isolations

 Monitoring of isolations in-place

3.6

PERFORMING AUTHORITY (PA)

The Performing Authority is the person charged with the responsibility of carrying out the

work and has the right to request demonstration of the integrity of any isolation. They are

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responsible for checking that Energy Isolations `have been implemented in accordance with

the isolation specification before starting work.

3.7

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

Maintenance personnel work under the direction of the Isolating Authority and are

responsible for installing the means of isolation (e.g., spades) and removing equipment /

pipe work (e.g., spool pieces) taking into consideration the equipment rating and service.

3.8

THE ONSHORE SUPPORT ENGINEER

The Onshore Support Engineer is responsible for providing engineering advice and

guidance to the Area Authority.

3.9

CUSTODIAN

The custodian of this document is the Technical Authority for Energy Isolations Process.

The TA is responsible for ensuring that an annual review of this document is carried out.

MONITORING AND AUDITING OF ISOLATIONS

4.1

MONITORING

The integrity of each isolation point shall be monitored at suitable intervals to detect any

actual leakage or deterioration in condition caused, for example, by vibration or disturbance

(or changing pressure upstream). This monitoring may involve partial testing of valve

isolations. The minimum recommended frequency of monitoring is once per shift and

immediately prior to breaking containment. The results of any monitoring of isolation integrity

shall be recorded and will form part of the shift handover.

4.2

SELF-REGULATION AND AUDIT

Each Site / Installation shall:

 Undertake internal audits of the operation of Energy Isolations at each site.

 Maintain an Audit Register.

 Have in place a system for tracking recommendations through to closeout.

 Periodically review isolation-related activities including review of individual isolations

and the overall isolation process. Such reviews may also include:

o General compliance with this document and any local procedures

o The Level 2 Risk Assessment of non-compliant isolations and the extent of any

approved deviations

o A register of competent Isolating Authorities

The use of a standard audit checklist is recommended, to allow comparison with externals

audit results. Audits, which are independent of the location, shall be carried out and will form

part of the Site Safety Adviser‟s audit programme and the HSE compliance assurance

programme. The recommended frequency of audit is as follows:

Installation /Site personnel

1 permit and isolation confirmation (ICC) certificate per day

Site Safety Adviser

1 permit and isolation confirmation (ICC) certificate per week

SM / SC / OIM

1 permit and isolation confirmation (ICC) certificate per month

Note: Audits should be a cross section of activities ongoing i.e. hot work, cold work, and

spark potential. Installation

/ Site personnel should carry out audits of individual tasks

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covering both the PTW and the Isolation Confirmation Certificate (ICC) on a regular basis.

The SM / SC / OIM shall carry out regular internal reviews of the findings of Energy Isolation

Certificates, to ensure that any critical failings in the system, or its manner of

implementation, have been identified and appropriate actions have been or will be taken.

The Site / Installation HSE Department as part of their audit schedule shall carry out Energy

Isolation audits. Such audits shall examine a cross section of at least

20 Energised

Isolations together with compliance to this procedure and any deviations in place.

The results of the audit shall be discussed with Management and issued for information and

action as appropriate.

COMPETENCY, TRAINING AND AWARENESS

All personnel involved in Energy Isolations-Process shall be trained and deemed competent.

The competency of all relevant personnel shall be determined during the planning process

for any particular risk assessment.

The Area Authority and/or Line Supervisor shall ensure that the personnel involved in the

activity have the correct competencies by examining records, or requesting individuals to

produce relevant certification.

All training and competency requirements shall be followed as described in AzSPU CoW

Training Policy AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00088-2.

In special circumstances individuals can be assessed as competent isolators for specific

items of equipment providing that they have completed the formal training and have been

assessed as competent on the specific tasks. Site management is responsible for ensuring

that this is recorded so that it is clear which tasks these individuals are competent to

undertake.

THE ISOLATION CONFIRMATION CERTIFICATION (ICC) PROCESS

6.1

GENERAL

Where isolations are required an Isolation Confirmation Certificate (ICC) must be completed

as detailed in the Permit to Work (PTW) procedure.

The Isolation Confirmation Certificate supports the Permit to Work by providing the means

of:

 Recording the isolations which are required before the task detailed on the associated

Permit to Work can proceed

 Confirming that the isolations have been made for the task to proceed (subject to

authorisation of other certificates e.g., Confined Space Entry)

 Authorisation and recording of de-isolations and isolations which may be required to

test equipment under a Sanction to Test (STT)

 Authorisation and recording of de-isolation on completion of the task detailed on the

associated Permit to Work

Note: The Isolation Confirmation Certificate (ICC) must be completed before the

relevant Permit to Work can be issued

Control Tier: <<2>>

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Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00049-2>>

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The Area Authority, Isolating Authority and Authorised Electrical Persons involved must be

fully informed of the plant, equipment or system to be worked upon and the scope of work to

be carried out under each permit where isolations are required. Marked-up Process &

Instrument Diagrams and site checks must be utilised to ensure that the plant, equipment or

system is clearly identified for isolation.

When each isolation is complete, the Isolating Authority/Authorised Electrical Person enters

the isolation details onto the Isolation Confirmation Certificate. The certificate must be cross-

referenced to the initial permit and any subsequent permits that utilise the same isolations.

Note: The Isolation Confirmation Certificate is raised before the permit is issued, and

remains in force (as a minimum) until the permit is cancelled.

The Isolation Certificate shall only be cancelled when “WORK is COMPLETE”. The

Area Authority can then sign the “CANCELLATION” section.

A single individual may not define and approve the design of energy isolations. The

Isolating Authorities are responsible for designing the isolation but must liaise with

the Area Authority, Support Engineer (where applicable) and Performing Authority on

the scope, content and application method of proposed isolations.

ISOLATION REVIEW AND LEVEL 2 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

7.1

REVIEW AND RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Where an isolation cannot achieve the standard detailed in Energy Isolations Process the

Area Authority or Support Engineer is responsible for commencing the Isolation Review and

Risk Assessment:

As a minimum, the Area Authority or Support Engineer together with the Isolating Authority,

and the Performing Authority complete a Risk Assessment. There must be three members,

minimum for a Level 2 Risk Assessment.

The completed Risk Assessment shall be submitted to the OIM / SC / SM who will, if

necessary, discuss and clarify the isolation design with the team. If accepted, the OIM / SC /

SM shall approve the Risk Assessment.

When a satisfactory method of achieving isolation is agreed, isolations are planned, carried

out and documented in accordance with the methodology described in the Permit to Work

procedure, Energy Isolations Process procedure and the Task Risk Assessment procedure.

7.2

REJECTION OF ISOLATION DESIGN

Under no circumstances where the Isolation Review procedure is used, shall any proposed

isolation design be carried out without the agreement of the team involved in the Risk

Assessment.

Where the proposed isolation design is reviewed by the OIM / SC / SM and rejected, new

proposals in accordance with the Process Isolation Selection Chart shall be proposed, or a

new Risk Assessment Record sheet submitted.

Note: No amendments or additions to the Risk Assessment Record sheet shall be made.

Control Tier: <<2>>

Revision Date: 09 September 2009

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00049-2>>

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7.3

RISK ASSESSMENT OF NON-COMPLIANT ISOLATIONS

In the event that the minimum recommended isolation standard cannot be achieved, a Level

2 Risk Assessment shall be carried out according to the following guidelines:



The assessment team shall specify appropriate safeguards, which may replace or be

in addition to those listed in Table 1 (Appendix A). The team shall be satisfied that

these safeguards shall reduce the risks to an acceptable level before the Level 2 Risk

Assessment is submitted to the OIM / SC / SM for the task requiring isolation is

permitted to proceed



When risk assessing non-compliant isolations, consideration shall be given to the

risks associated with swinging large spades compared with the risk associated with

the lower level of isolation



Consideration shall be given to: extended monitoring periods, prior to breaking

containment, reducing the duration of the tasks, provision of a permanent standby

man and development of a contingency plan for isolation failure



Full consideration shall be given to the alternatives including partial or full production

shutdown or deferral of the work



The recommendations from the Level 2 Risk Assessment shall be approved by the

OIM / SC / SM who may also recommend further review by technical specialists or

management before taking the decision on whether to proceed with the work

7.4

RISK ASSESSMENT RECORDS

The Risk Assessment shall be attached to the appropriate Permit(s).

7.5

HAZARDOUS WORK

Where hazardous or potentially hazardous work such as spading, removing a section of

pipeline, or electrical disconnection is required, a permit must be raised to carry out the

isolation.

TYPES OF ISOLATIONS

There are varying types of isolations, which are described within this section. These include:

 Boundary Isolations

 Long Term Isolation

 Personal Isolations

 Additional Isolations

 Isolation for Confined Space Entry

8.1

BOUNDARY ISOLATIONS

Where an area of plant is isolated such that several activities can safely take place within

this common set of strategically placed isolation points then this can be termed as a

'Boundary Isolation'. It must be clearly identified that the isolation is appropriate for all the

individual tasks to be carried out against the Boundary Isolation. An Isolation Certificate is

raised and identified, as Boundary Isolation and all individual PTW are cross-referenced to

this Boundary Isolation.

If any of the proposed tasks requires a level of isolation or implementation of control

measures greater than that covered by the Boundary then a separate Isolation Certificate

should be raised for this task.

Once work is in progress and subsequent PTW is applied for within the recognised

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framework of the Boundary Isolation, they can be added providing it is clearly established

that the existing isolation is appropriate for the task. However, this should be avoided if

possible and it is preferable to identify all activities when the Boundary Isolation is being

planned.

Entry to a confined space within a boundary requires separate Isolation and a Confined

Space Entry Certificate to be raised.

No isolations within Boundary isolation shall be removed until all applicable PTW having

been cancelled.

If for any reason work on a particular piece of plant within the Boundary needs to be

suspended (e.g. whilst awaiting spares) then a separate isolation shall be implemented and

an ICC raised before the Boundary Isolation can be cancelled.

Where the de-isolation of boundary isolations is proposed, an isolation review team that

includes an Area Authority shall ensure that all associated PTW have been cancelled. They

should also ensure that equipment within the boundary is in a safe condition.

8.2

LONG-TERM ISOLATIONS

Long-term isolations are defined as those that no longer have work performed against them.

Each site should maintain a detailed register of long-term isolations.

Long-term isolations shall be subject to two levels of review:

 A weekly review of the register to check the status of the isolations in place and

whether they should be removed or replaced by a plant modification

 A quarterly audit to physically check all the isolation points to confirm their security

and integrity

 Before any work is recommenced against a long-term isolation, a full integrity check

of the valved isolation shall be carried out.

8.3

PERSONAL ISOLATIONS

Personal isolations are intended for short duration tasks of relatively low risk; for example

replacing pressure gauges, filters or small valves, or other such tasks where the completion

of an ICC is considered to add no significant value in terms of risk reduction. The rules for

approval of a personal isolation are as follows:

 The task and isolation are performed by one person within one shift; the person may

receive assistance from others but he shall be present at all times when work is in

progress

 Before approval, the Area Authority must be satisfied with the competence of the

Performing Authority to both carry out the isolation and execute the work. Personal

isolations shall only be carried out by those deemed to be a competent Isolating

Authority. Where an isolation involves competency in more than one discipline eg

electrical, mechanical, instrument or process, personal isolation is only permissible if

the Performing Authority has all the appropriate isolating competencies

 The same isolation standards apply to personal isolations other than the completion

of the ICC

 The isolation points shall be labelled with a personal isolation label and locked

 If the worksite is left unattended, the plant shall be left safe, including capping or

plugging of any open ends

An ICC shall be raised whenever these conditions are not adhered to.

8.4

ADDITIONAL ISOLATIONS

An individual Isolation Confirmation Certificate must be completed for each Permit to Work

Control Tier: <<2>>

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

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requiring isolations; unless isolations are controlled by a Boundary Isolation Certificate.

Where working within a defined boundary, further isolations may not be required. However,

where additional isolations are identified, an Isolation Confirmation Certificate will be

required.

8.5

ISOLATION FOR CONFINED SPACE ENTRY

Positive isolation shall be effected on all live lines for any task requiring entry to a vessel or

confined space. Spool removal is to be preferred, although spade isolation may be used

where it is not reasonably practicable to remove pipework sections. It should be noted that

in some cases it may not be reasonably practicable to comply with this requirement in

making entry to mud tanks, pump pits, ballast tanks, or other utility systems. Here, a Level 2

Risk Assessment shall be undertaken and approval obtained from the OIM or Site Controller

before entry can be permitted under work control.

Vessel nozzles should normally be left open to assist with free ventilation. Air movers or

ducted fans may also be used to create a flow of clean air through the vessel. If there is any

likelihood of fumes, water or other contaminant entering the vessel from sources other than

the isolated pipework while persons are inside, the need to blank off any affected nozzles

shall be considered. Blanks used for this purpose do not need to be pressure-rated.

However non-pressure rated blanks shall be clearly identified by either a tag, painted

circumference or other marking. In the case of tanks with „swan necks‟, mechanical plugs

may be an option, to prevent ingress of fumes, etc.

The manway doors on a vessel being prepared for entry shall be removed last and

reinstalled first to reduce the risk of unauthorised entry.

Further details on Confined Space Entry are given in AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00013-2.

8.6

PROVISION FOR ISOLATIONS DURING MODIFICATION OF DESIGN AND NEW FACILITIES

In relation to existing Installations and Sites:

 The design of all modifications and new facilities shall include a review of the

provision of means of isolation for maintenance to ensure compliance with this

document

 Such reviews shall address both isolations within the modified/new facilities and any

opportunities to upgrade existing isolation facilities where these are inadequate

 New valves supplied as part of a modification or as a replacement shall be provided

with a facility to lock off in the open or closed position

8.7

ISOLATION OF HIGH PRESSURE SMALL BORE PIPING

When isolating small bore piping consideration shall be given to the pipe connection to the

isolating valve to ensure that there is no possibility of the security of the fitting being

dislodged during disconnection or reconnection of any pipe work used for invasive

maintenance. In addition to the isolation type consideration needs to be given to the integrity

of the system fittings/connections (i.e. Swagelocks).

REGISTERS

All Isolation Confirmation Certificates

(ICCs) shall be registered on the Isolation

Confirmation Certificate Register, which is maintained by the Area Authority(s). Where a site

has more than one Area Authority, the nominated responsible Site Isolating Authority (IA)

Control Tier: <<2>>

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Co-ordinator shall assume overall control of the Register.

RECORDS

When all the isolations have been implemented, the Area Authority signs and dates the

Isolation Confirmation Certificate. He then records the Isolation Confirmation Certificate

number on the permit. The Control Room Operator and/or the Permit Coordinator may also

perform this where they are appointed.

Isolation Confirmation Certificates shall be accessible to each Area Authority and are held in

the vicinity of the Control Room for ease of monitoring each area.

Control Tier: <<2>>

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

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APPENDIX A: ISOLATION STANDARDS

GENERAL

Experience has shown that for most types of fluid hazard, isolation by valves alone can be

adequate if used in conjunction with certain additional mandatory safeguards, appropriate to

the level of risk, to ensure effectiveness and security.

Minimum recommended isolation standards have been developed and should be referred to

when designing process isolation where it is not reasonably practicable to achieve positive

isolation (refer to Table 1). The minimum standard also identifies mandatory safeguards,

which the Area Authority is responsible for putting in place to reduce the risk level to as low

as reasonably practicable.

For short-term operational tasks such as corrosion coupon retrieval or filter replacements,

where no positive isolation is practicable or where the job duration is shorter than the time to

install positive isolation, then the „V‟ value from Table 1 can be considered as the minimum

recommended isolation standard. These tasks shall be conducted using a Permit and a local

operating procedure.

Note 1:

Any proposed isolation, which deviates from those shown in Table 1 must be

subject to an Isolation Review and a Level 2 Risk Assessment.

Note 2:

Isolation against a tested single valve is permissible while swinging a

spectacle blind, inserting a spade or fitting a blank flange to achieve a positive

isolation.

Positive isolation is regarded as the most secure method and shall be considered when

planning maintenance work. It is mandatory for entry into confined spaces.

Positive Isolation is also recommended in the following situations, in view of the additional

security it offers:

 Long duration isolations, eg more than one week

 Where equipment is to be removed from service, and all energy sources

disconnected

 Where naked flame hot work is to be undertaken

 For process fluids at or above auto-ignition temperature

 When breaking containment in systems likely to contain toxic material

Control Tier: <<2>>

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Table 1 Minimum Recommended Isolation Standards for Predetermined Risk Levels

Fluid Type

Operating Pressure

<10barg

>10barg <55barg

>55barg

Process fluids and hazardous utilities

V = SVI

V = SVI+B

V = DBB+A

I = SVI+A

I = DBB+B

Non-hazardous utilities

V = SVI

V = SVI+A

V = SVI+B

I = SVI

I = SVI+B

I = DBB+B

Valve configuration required to permit the installation of blank flanges and spades (positive isolation)

Valve configuration required to permit carrying out intrusive maintenance without positive isolation

Use mandatory safeguards as on List A

Use mandatory safeguards as on List B

SVI

Single Valve Isolation

DBB

Double Block and Bleed

Mandatory Safeguards

Category A

Category B

(Low Risk)

(High Risk)

Continuous gas monitoring (for hydrocarbon systems only)

Pressure build-up to test valve integrity

Regular monitoring of isolation integrity

Control and prevent nearby work

Operations Technician in attendance

Radio link to control room when breaking containment

Develop contingency plan against leakage

Identify backup isolation valves, shutdown systems etc

Minimise task time

Portable fire-fighting equipment available (for hydrocarbon systems only)

Minimise possibility of plant disturbance

Control Tier: <<2>>

Revision Date: 09 September 2009

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00049-2>>

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APPENDIX B: GUIDANCE NOTES

B1 ISOLATION PLANNING

B1.1 ISOLATION PLANNING

Isolation of any piece of equipment shall be planned such that the risk of removing it from

service and then reinstating it on completion of the work is minimised. The Flowchart

(Appendix D) should be referred to when planning any isolation. All isolations shall be

designed according to the standards set out in Appendix A (including Table 1).

The following key points should also be considered:

 Plant and equipment isolation requirements should be identified early in the work

planning cycle for the Installation or site so that adequate time can be made available

for formal risk assessment, should it become necessary. Where necessary, reference

shall be made to the Installation or site Operations Safety Manual (OSM) and the

identification of high-risk areas

 A boundary isolation may be put in place to cover several planned activities in an area

of plant. The Isolation Certificate shall describe the scope of work planned and the

Permits for these jobs shall be cross-referred to the same Isolation Certificate

 The need for good access and egress to allow isolations to be effected

 Isolations should be as close to the vessel or worksite as possible, to assist in

security and ease of monitoring

 Preparation for isolation involving draining, flushing, purging and venting of process

pipe-work shall be conducted under the AzSPU Safe System of Work (SSOW)

according to the appropriate procedures for the task and including the appropriate

isolation

 Amendments shall not normally be made to isolations in place other than to allow

testing of equipment prior to return to service. Amendments may be made to improve

the integrity of the isolation with the approval of the Area Authority. The reason for the

amendment shall be recorded and the Performing Authority advised of the change

 Pressure relief valves shall only be isolated following the provision of an alternative

means of pressure relief

B1.2 ISOLATION METHODS

The highest quality of isolation which is reasonably practicable shall be applied to every

individual isolation point. The methods of isolation normally available are detailed below,

listed in decreasing order of security and effectiveness.

B1.2.1 Positive Isolation

Positive isolation may be affected by either of the following:

 Spool removal - removal of pipework section and bolting/clamping blank flanges

rated for full line design pressure onto live ends

 Spade isolation - witnessed insertion between bolted or clamped flanges of a blind

plate; swinging of a spectacle plate. Any such insertion must be rated to the pipe

design specification. The insertion of spades shall be witnessed by the competent

Isolating Authority

Control Tier: <<2>>

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B1.2.2 DOUBLE BLOCK AND BLEED

Double Block and Bleed (DBB) consists of the closure of two block valves in series with an

intermediate bleed valve. The integrity of both valves shall be tested separately and the

bleed valve will then be left in the closed position, with periodic integrity checks. The Area

Authority shall specify how frequently this bleed valve is opened to check for pressure

buildup. As a minimum this shall include:

 Prior to the issue and/or revision of a PTW

 At the start of every work period (this includes after any form of work break between

normal periods of work).

 Continuous monitoring during any breaking of containment activity (including but not

limited to, the removal of spools, pumps, valves; the insertion of spades)

Emergency Shutdown (ESD) valves may be used as part of a DBB isolation, providing they

can be reliably immobilised.

Single valves of a type which provide a double seal in a single body and with a bleed

between the seals are also acceptable. Examples of such valves are suitably specified

double wedge gate, parallel expanding gate, double seating ball valves, etc, but not double

piston seal ball valves where the cavity pressure provides the downstream positive seal.

Where double-seal single valves are used, additional identification of the isolation on the

valve shall be included, as full loss of isolation will occur on inadvertant valve operation.

Additional means of identification for this type of valve shall be two (2) appropriate locking

devices. Each shall be individually labelled and identified appropriately as

“Upstream

Isolation” and

“Downstream Isolation”. Both shall be recorded on the ICC and be

sequentially numbered.

It should be noted that „standard‟ ball valves “do not’ provide a double seal. In such cases it

is important to note that the integrity of the isolation is critically dependent upon the security

of a single valve operating stem. Also, it is not normally possible to perform a full integrity

test as the two seals cannot be applied independently.

B1.2.3 Single Valve Isolation

Single Valve Isolation (SVI) consists of the closure of a single block valve. A measure of

additional security can be achieved by closing several valves in series but the absence of a

bleed or vent in the intervening volume means that this method must be classified as SVI.

The hazard of trapped pressure due to thermal expansion may be created in this case.

Any valve used for SVI must provide a reliable seal. Non-return valves, flow control valves

and other valves which may not provide tight shut-off must not be used.

B1.2.4 Other Isolation Devices

Devices such as mechanically expanded plugs, stopple bags or frozen plugs shall not be

used as primary forms of isolation, except where the application has been properly

engineered, risk assessed and approved by the appropriate Technical Authority.

Conventional mechanical plugs or stopple bags may be used as a vapour or liquid seal to

contain and direct to vent any small amounts of vapour. Flammable vapour monitors shall be

used where the presence of vapour could create a hazard.

In all cases, contingency measures against injury or damage caused by sudden ejection of

the isolation device shall be put in place.

B1.3 PRECAUTIONS WHEN BREAKING CONTAINMENT

The key safeguards for both low-risk and high-risk isolations (refer to Appendix A, Table1

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Categories A and B respectively) are the pressure buildup tests on the integrity of each valve

immediately prior to breaking containment, together with the appropriate level of regular

monitoring of the isolation integrity. The Area Authority shall control and prevent nearby work

and ensure continuous gas monitoring at the worksite. An Operations Technician shall be

present during breaking containment and any other critical phases of the task.

Isolations with Category B safeguards require additional control and contingency measures.

The key additional safeguards are to minimise the task duration, ensure plant stability and to

develop a contingency plan against leakage.

The contingency plan shall consider the following:

 How to respond to a leakage

 Identifying additional isolation valves and the expected action if the isolation fails

 Knowing the position of the local ESD facilities

Firefighting equipment shall be readily available and the work party shall be in radio contact

with the control room.

Other precautions that should be considered when breaking containment are as follows:

 Consideration should be given to hot bolting flanges prior to the operation and all

materials for the job shall be available at the job site

 Bolts are to be slackened off in the correct sequence. No bolts shall be removed until

they have all been slackened and the joint cracked, and until it has been confirmed

that the line contents will not be released in an uncontrolled manner and any

appropriate gas testing has been carried out

 Particular care shall be taken with clamp lock type fittings. With nuts slackened, the

fitting should be physically dislodged to confirm there is no residual pressure, before

final disassembly

 The person who opens the flange shall do so in such a way as to minimise the

possibility of contact with the contained fluids and of sudden escape of large

quantities. Suitable Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) shall be worn

 Where there is a danger of H

2S being present, full H2S procedures covered in the BP

Hydrogen Sulphide Procedures shall be followed

 The Area Classification procedure used for the selection of electrical equipment in

hazardous areas does not consider abnormal operations when breaking containment.

Consideration shall be given to restricting the use of electrical (and other) equipment

during breaking containment due to the risk of releasing flammable gas

Control Tier: <<2>>

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B2 ISOLATION IMPLEMENTATION AND CONTROL

B2.1 Security

Any isolation must achieve and maintain effective containment of the relevant fluid for as

long as required. Valves shall be locked or otherwise immobilised to prevent unauthorised

operation. It may be necessary to apply additional immobilising devices under certain

circumstances.

Where valves are required to be locked (open or closed) as part of an isolation, only the

following methods are acceptable:

 The use of wire locking loops to immobilise the valve which would require

considerable effort to force the valve from the lock position

 Padlock and chains which likewise would take considerable effort to force the valve

from the locked position. Where this method is used, padlock keys shall be held by

the Area Authority

 The use of specifically designed tamper-proof valve interlocks. The activation of the

interlock shall be controlled by the Area Authority utilising the master key held at

the site

When isolating any valve that cannot be locked and may inadvertently be opened by

accidental contact, the valve handle shall be removed where practicable.

Electrically operated valves shall have the power supply positively isolated and any handjack

shall be manually locked. If the valve cannot be physically immobilised it should not normally

be used for isolation purposes.

Pneumatically and hydraulically operated valves which fail closed shall have their control

lines isolated and physically disconnected.

Pneumatically and hydraulically operated valves which fail open should not normally be used

for isolation purposes. If no other alternative is reasonably practicable, the valve shall be

prevented from moving. Under this situation the isolation shall be considered as non-

compliant with Energy Isolations-Process and a Level 2 Isolation Risk Assessment carried

out.

It is not necessary to lock bleed valves in a DBB arrangement as they are required to be

opened periodically to check the integrity of the isolation.

Personal isolations (refer to section 8.3) shall be secured to the same standard to prevent

unauthorised operation of the valves.

B2.2 Identification Methods

All valves, spades and blank flanges used for isolation purposes shall be identified by means

of tag-labels. The following information shall be identified on the tags:

 The Isolation Confirmation Certificate (ICC) Number

 The Equipment Tag No

 The IA‟s Name (clearly printed) and their Signature

 The date of Isolation

Bleed points shall also be labelled with the same format.

Control Tier: <<2>>

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Where padlocks are used, the individual key number shall be listed on the ICC and a means

of referencing the correct key to the isolation point included. Keys should be held centrally in

a secure fashion and controlled by the Area Authority either by using a master key cabinet or

individual key safes.

Where there are overlapping isolations where some of the isolation points are common to

more than one isolation then these points shall have a separate locking device and tag from

each isolation. Each isolation shall be registered and controlled by its own individual ICC.

B2.2.1 FLANGE TAGGING FOR BREAKING CONTAINMENT

Flanges used in breaking containment should be identified as an aid to ensuring that they

are reinstated and their integrity is confirmed once all work is complete. A tag-label shall be

used as the method of identification. Both halves of the label are completed by the person

carrying out the work and the details recorded on a Breaking of Containment Register. When

the flange or connection has been re-made, the lower half of the tag is removed and

recorded on the register. The upper half is left to allow the integrity of the reinstated joint to

be monitored during leak testing and startup. The tag is removed when the plant is back up

to its normal operating conditions and kept in place for a minimum of 2 days after startup.

Consideration should be given to tagging critical neighbouring joints which have not been

broken but which could be affected by the reinstatement activity.

B2.3 CONTROL OF ISOLATIONS

The ICC, cross-referenced to all relevant Permits, shall be the principal means of control

once isolations are in place. The ICC performs the following functions:

 Identifies the plant concerned and the reasons for isolation

 Authorises isolation by disciplines

 Records the complete list of isolations and valve tag numbers used for a

particular task

 Records bleed points for checking valve integrity. The operation of the bleed valves to

check integrity need not be recorded as an amendment on the ICC

 Confirms that the isolations have been effected

 Authorises any temporary de-isolations and isolations necessary for testing

 Authorises and records de-isolation on completion of the task

The ICC shall show a complete list of isolations and valve tag numbers. A marked-up

P&ID/EFD or other suitable drawing must be attached to the ICC, together with a record of

the Isolation Level 2 Risk Assessment where this is needed.

B2.3.1 CONTROL OF ISOLATIONS FOR WELL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

During well operations the isolation of the xmas tree from the process plant shall be

controlled via an ICC. This isolation should be used in conjunction with a Well Handover

Certificate to manage the handover to well operations. The recommended practice is to

include the appropriate flowline isolation valves, the wing valve and the hydraulic supplies to

the UMV and DHSV, on the ICC, thus documenting the isolation from the process. The Well

Handover Certificate details the status of all tree valves at handover and confirms valve

integrity and depressurisation details thus documenting the isolation from the reservoir.

During the wireline operations, the swab valve, upper and lower master valves and DHSV

are under the control of the Wireline Supervisor and the appropriate detailed operating

procedure which will cover removal and reinstatement of the swab cap. On completion of the

wireline work the Wireline Supervisor will use the Well Handover Certificate to document the

Control Tier: <<2>>

Revision Date: 16 February 2009

Document Number: <<AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00049-2

Print Date: 01/02/2011

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tree status for handover to Operations. During production logging operations where it is

necessary to flow the well a specific PERMIT will be raised for the wireline work that requires

the well to be online and this will be cross-referenced to the ICC described above and run

under sanction to test.

B2.3.2 LOCKED OPEN/LOCKED CLOSED VALVES

For integrity reasons, certain process and drain valves will be in the normally locked open or

locked closed position. It is vital that the position and security of these valves is carefully

controlled. A register shall be maintained of all these valves to record any changes from their

normal position and a regular audit shall be carried out to confirm the security and position of

these valves. It is important that these valves are in their correct position, particularly after

de-isolation where they have been part of an isolation. If these valves are moved from their

normal position for operational reasons or as part of an isolation then this movement and

subsequent return to their normal position shall be recorded in the register.

B2.4 Testing Isolation Integrity

All isolations shall be tested and shown to be effective before containment is broken.

Integrity tests shall be conducted for a minimum of 10 minutes.

Typical valve isolation integrity tests for DBB and single valve isolations are described in

Appendix C. It is important that all bleeds (vents/drains) are checked free from obstruction

prior to testing. It is also important to realise that a bleed which is hard-piped to a closed

drain or flare line will provide single valve isolation only from the drain/flare line.

On completion of checking valve integrity, a bleed valve shall be left in the closed position,

unlocked to allow regular monitoring. A pressure gauge may be fitted to the bleed valve to

monitor for pressure buildup.

An isolation can only be considered to be of DBB standard if the integrity of both valves has

been proven.

If zero pressure buildup is not achievable when checking integrity of a valved isolation,

consideration should be given to either including additional isolation valves, installing

positive isolation or carrying out an assessment of risk to determine whether it is acceptable

to proceed.

Alternative methods of valve integrity testing may be considered where there are practical

difficulties in using the conventional method, providing that they have been endorsed by the

relevant Technical Authority.

Once the Area Authority is satisfied with the integrity of the valved isolation and that the

system is depressurised and drained, containment may be carefully broken either to effect

positive isolation or to perform the required task

(taking into account all precautions

regarding H₂ S, pyrophoric scale, Low Specific Activity (LSA) scale, Naturally Occurring

Radioactive Material (NORM) or hydrates).

The extra security of untested but witnessed positive isolation, in addition to the valved

isolation used to effect it, is normally acceptable for most confined space entry tasks.

However, for longer term positive isolations (eg a week or more), or where the valved

isolation used to effect the positive isolation needs to be removed for operational reasons,

then integrity testing of the positive isolation is required. This shall be done by service leak

testing or formal leak testing of the joint, depending on the level of risk.

Where a single flare or vent valve forms part of an isolation it may not be possible to fully

test integrity. In this situation the valve cannot be considered as a reliable barrier and

therefore an isolation risk assessment shall be carried out to determine whether the task

should proceed.

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

Page 26 of 36

B2.5 Plant Preparation - for Breaking Containment

All plant preparation work covering the draining and flushing of vessels or pipework shall be

carried out under a Permit within the AzSPU Safe Systems of Work (SSOW). For more

complex operations a marked-up P&ID and a specific procedure should be used to support

the activity.

B2.5.1 POTENTIAL HAZARDS

Some of the potential hazards that should be considered when planning these activities are

as follows:

 Chemical reactions between cleaning materials and a tank or its fittings (eg acidic

cleaning fluid attacking a blanking spade installed for isolation)

 Leakage or collapse of a tank or its supports caused by reaction with cleaning

materials, excessive weight of wash solutions, or by creating vacuum conditions

 Accidental spillage during draining/flushing (environmental impact)

 Possibility of radiological contamination from LSA / NORM

 Pyrophoric scale which can be formed in systems that may contain H

2S. If these

systems are subsequently opened up and the scale is exposed to currents of air,

there is a danger that the scale could ignite. The pyrophoric scale shall be rendered

harmless by constant thorough wetting until the scale is either removed or the system

is again closed up

 Gaskets containing asbestos which shall be handled and disposed of in accordance

with the guidance identified in Working with Asbestos Procedures

 Explosions and fires caused by the sudden mixing of water with hot oil, either during

steam cleaning or on the admission of hot oil into systems which have just been

steamed or flushed with water and which have not been thoroughly drained and dried

 Static electricity as an ignition source or electric shock during steam cleaning or

high-pressure water jetting if equipment is not earth bonded

 Possible asphyxiation through personnel exposure to nitrogen

 Accidental spillage and freezing effects of nitrogen

B2.5.2 Depressurising and Draining Containment Systems

For this purpose containment systems may be divided into:

 Pressurised vessels and pipelines/pipework

 Atmospheric tanks and vessels

B2.5.2.1 Pressurised Vessels and Pipelines/Pipework

The precautions for depressurisation and draining of pressurised hydrocarbon and chemical

containment systems include the following:

1) The system shall be adequately isolated from fluid pressure and inventory for the

purpose of emptying.

2) The appropriate Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) and Control of Substances

Hazardous to Health (COSHH) or Chemical Agent Risk Assessments

(CARA) shall

be studied.

3) The pressure within the system shall be relieved in a safe manner and the system

drained. The residual pressure within the system shall be substantially atmospheric

before containment is broken.

4) Systems containing gas shall be depressurised to a closed system or a vent/flare

header designed to accept such gas. If possible, venting to flare is preferred.

5) Gas systems shall only be depressurised to the atmosphere under strictly controlled

conditions. Persons working downwind of any drainage/venting operation shall be

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

Page 27 of 36

warned by the Area Authority or his nominee and, if instructed, shall vacate the area.

All hot work shall cease within the affected area.

6) Where suitable facilities exist, liquid residues shall be drained to a closed system.

Where this is not possible, an estimate should be made of the quantity of liquid

remaining in the system. Catchment facilities should then be provided sufficient for at

least this quantity. Liquid can then be drained by carefully opening a flange at a low

point in the system. Precautions should also be taken to prevent the spread of any

accidental spillage.

7) The existence of possible „dead-legs‟ in the system must be borne in mind. Such traps

may have to be flushed with water to remove residual liquids if there are no flanges or

connections.

8) Oil contaminated/soaked lagging material shall be removed from hot equipment as it

is prone to spontaneous ignition.

B2.5.2.2 Atmospheric Tanks and Vessels

When emptying atmospheric tanks and vessels in preparation for either changing their

contents, carrying out inspections, repairs or modifications, or prior to dismantling, the

following guidelines shall be observed:

1) Prior to emptying any tank/vessel, reference shall be made to the as-built engineering

drawings. These drawings show in detail the internals of the tank/vessel which will aid

in the methods to be adopted for draining and isolation, eg a bottom offtake of a

vessel from the outside may lead to the assumption that the offtake is flush whereas

the drawing may show that the offtake is raised internally.

2) Storage tanks and vessels shall be emptied initially by means of the normal off-take

lines, until suction is lost. The contents should be transferred to another suitable tank

or, onshore, to a mobile tank, if appropriate.

3) When emptying and draining, care shall be taken to avoid pulling a vacuum. This may

occur if the atmospheric or vacuum vents are blocked, or by excessive lowering rates

through large diameter lines.

4) Once suction is lost through the normal offtake it may be necessary to remove

residual liquid contents by means of either a portable pump operating through

an open manhole

(by the use of the tank water drain valve) or possibly by

water-flotation, taking appropriate precautions against spillage.

5) The hazards of using portable pumps in an area likely to be contaminated with

flammable vapour must be taken into account. Appropriately sited, air-powered pumps

should be used where possible.

6) Residual liquids and sludge must be disposed of in accordance with the requirements

of pollution-control legislation.

B2.6 Cleaning and Gas-freeing Methods

After depressurisation and draining, residual hydrocarbon liquids, vapours and gases must

be removed before further work can proceed.

Caution: If a Confined Space Entry is required, please also make reference to procedure

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00013-2 Confined Space Entry

Various media can be used for this purpose but the choice is liable to be governed by what

is available at the work location.

B2.6.1 WATER FLOODING

Cold water is usually the most readily available cleaning medium. It is reasonably effective at

displacing hydrocarbons, although it does not easily remove sludges or oils trapped in

complex pipework or vessel internals.

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

Page 28 of 36

Before a tank or vessel is flooded with water, it shall be confirmed that its supporting

structure is capable of sustaining the weight. In addition, adequate run-down and draining

facilities shall be provided, due to large volumes of water usually necessary for these

operations.

To avoid a buildup of a static charge when this method is used, water shall be added from

the base of the tank or vessel. If a hosepipe is used, the velocity shall be kept low until the

end is submerged, and the nozzle shall be electrically earthed. Flooding with water shall not

be relied upon to remove all petroleum vapour, liquid or solid residues.

It is possible to carry out hot work on the external surface of a water-flooded tank or vessel

without further removal of internal hydrocarbon residue providing the work is below the water

level and an appropriate level of risk assessment has been conducted.

Water used for displacing and removing liquid hydrocarbons will be heavily contaminated

after use. It must be disposed of in an environmentally-responsible manner.

B2.6.2 INERT GAS

Nitrogen (N₂), Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) or combustion gas (N₂/CO₂ mixture) may be used to

displace hydrocarbon gas and vapour. This method may be useful if it is impracticable to

introduce water into a system in case of damage. Care should be taken to ensure when

injecting such mixtures not to induce localised freezing of valves, gauges etc due to

excessive injection rates.

Particular care should be taken with systems which may contain pyrophoric scale from high-

sulphur bearing hydrocarbons. If such scale is subsequently exposed to the air, it may

rapidly burst into flame. Water sprays may be used to prevent this by keeping the scale

constantly wetted.

A quantity of inert gas at least double the volume of the vessel being purged is likely to be

necessary to ensure adequate dispersal of hydrocarbon gases. Introduction of gas at

reasonably high velocity is also helpful in ensuring good mixing. Purge with inert gas until

concentration of flammable vapour is less than 4% in emerging mixture of flammable/inert

gas.

Normal flammable vapour monitoring devices will not work accurately in atmospheres which

are deficient in oxygen, therefore it is necessary to use specialised equipment to determine

the effectiveness of an inert gas purge.

Following the displacement of hydrocarbon vapour with inert gas, the vessel or tank should

then normally be purged again with air to displace the inert gas. This shall always be done in

cases where man-entry is planned, regardless of any intended use of PPE.

B2.6.3 Steam

At onshore sites, steam may be available in sufficient quantities to use for purging and

cleaning vessels, tanks and pipework. Steam is the most effective of the common media for

this purpose. It should be used at low pressure, not exceeding 1bar maximum.

Two methods of steaming may be employed; open or closed steaming:

 Open steaming is used where the tank, vessel and its associated system is fully open

to the atmosphere

 Closed steaming is used for closed vessels and their associated equipment. During

this operation, the temperature is raised allowing volatile liquids to vaporise and

disperse together with the bulk of the steam via a condensing system. The heavy

constituents can flow freely and be drained off with the condensed steam from the

base of the system

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

Page 29 of 36

For all but the largest vessels and tanks, sufficient steam should be available to raise the

external surface temperature to at least 95°C. Steaming should be continued until the

condensate flowing from the vessel is substantially free of hydrocarbon.

Steam may be used in the case of process vessels, small storage tanks and medium sized

insulated tanks. It is essential that following a period of closed steaming, adequate provision

is made to prevent damage due to a vacuum being drawn by condensation of steam. In

large tanks, the rate of condensation of steam is such that adequate purging is not possible.

After steaming, it is normal practice to cool down the equipment with copious quantities of

water, this gives an additional wash to help remove residual hydrocarbons.

Where residual material is left on the tank or vessel surface after prolonged steaming, such

residual material may still evolve vapour on application of heat, eg burning or welding. In

such cases, cold cutting may be employed or the internal surface kept thoroughly wet during

the heating operation.

All temporary steam hoses used shall be electrically bonded and earthed.

B2.6.4 Air

Where it is not possible or practicable to use any of the foregoing methods, it may be

necessary to use air directly to ventilate equipment and remove hydrocarbon vapour.

When a decision is made to use this technique, every effort shall be made to pump out as

much oil and sludge as possible before opening the tank or vessel. Where practicable,

forced ventilation shall be used so that flammable vapour is cleared in the shortest possible

time. During this purging operation, the flammable range will be passed through, presenting

an explosion hazard if an ignition source is nearby. All electrical equipment used shall

therefore be suitable for use in a Zone 1 Hazardous Area. Other equipment within the

hazard range of flammable vapour shall be effectively isolated.

Air movers shall be fitted at the roof or top manhole so as to pull air in at low level.

Temporary trunking may be needed to achieve high-level disposal. In order to minimise the

emission of gas/vapour when the lower manhole door is opened, the air movers shall be

started up first to obtain a slightly negative pressure before the lower manhole is opened.

Vapour issuing from shell manholes may give rise to a dangerous concentration in a bunded

or confined area and, under such conditions, no kind of ignition source is allowed. Removal

of vapour by air movers attached to the roof manhole is the recommended safe practice.

Care shall be taken when using natural draught ventilation during periods of calm weather at

onshore sites, since vapour released from tanks can travel considerable distances without

being dispersed. Due regard shall be taken of wind direction and the risk to adjacent

premises or to the public.

Owing to the possible presence of pyrophoric scale within tanks or vessels which have

contained sour crude or products, provision shall be made for continuous wetting of the

internal surfaces by means of water from one or more water fog nozzles inserted into the

roof opening. The nozzles shall be turned on first and the air movers opened immediately

afterwards. A shell manhole shall be opened after approximately 5 minutes operation, when

the internals are thoroughly wet. With the air movers still in operation, the fog nozzles should

then be removed and loose scale dislodged with high-pressure water streams.

CAUTION: WHEN THIS METHOD IS EMPLOYED, THE WATER NOZZLES SHALL BE

EARTHED

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

Page 30 of 36

B3 PLANT REINSTATEMENT

B3.1 General

The reinstatement of plant and equipment requires equal attention to planning and detail as

the initial isolation. Historical data shows that many incidents involving failure of an

isolation occur during reinstatement. Reinstatement of process plant is not complete until

the section where containment was broken has been leak tested.

The reinstatement leak test is different from strength tests as required by Code, which are

pressure/strength tests to prove the structural integrity of the system.

The purpose of reinstatement leak testing is to render the production equipment and piping

systems safe for the introduction of hydrocarbon gases and liquids, and to create an

auditable record to demonstrate the integrity of all hydrocarbon production systems.

For an an overview of the leak testing process refer to the SSOW for Leak Testing

(Document No. AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00055-2).

B3.2 De-isolation of Plant

B3.2.1 Integrity Checks

Prior to reinstatement, the integrity of any isolations associated with the removal of spades

or other isolations devices should be reassessed to confirm that it is safe to proceed with the

reinstatement work.

B3.2.2 Sequence of De-isolation

In some cases the sequence of de-isolating plant is critical and requires planning to ensure

safe reinstatement.

B3.2.3 De-isolation of Non-manual Valves

Removal of a valved isolation does not necessarily involve any opening or closing of the

valves, just the removal of locking devices and/or other immobilising equipment. Particular

care should be taken with regard to electrically, pneumatically or hydraulically operated

valves, which may open or close on reinstatement of the operating source/medium.

B3.2.4 De-isolation of Safety Critical Valves

Care must be taken to ensure that safety critical valves are returned to their correct position

during de-isolation. These valves are registered as Locked Open (LO) or Locked Closed

(LC) and each site holds a register which records the current position of all LO/LC valves.

During de-isolation, these valves should be returned to their correct position for plant

operation and the register updated accordingly.

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

Page 31 of 36

APPENDIX C: TYPICAL VALVE ISOLATIONS INTEGRITY TESTS

Double Block and Bleed Isolation Integrity Test (Two Valves)

Diagram

Key

V1 - First (upstream) isolation valve from live system.

M1 - Live side-monitoring point (pressure gauge or vent/drain).

V2 - Second (downstream) isolation valve from live system.

M2 - Monitoring point between valves and break point (pressure gauge or vent/drain).

B - Bleed point between the isolation valves.

Procedure

1. If possible, ensure tapings at M1, M2 and B are not blocked and pressure gauges, where

installed, are operating.

2. Close downstream valve V2 and secure in closed position.

3. Record pressure at monitoring points M1 and M2.

4. Vent/drain section of line to be broken and monitor at M2 until the pressure is near zero.

5. Close vent/drain at break point and monitor at M2 for a minimum of 10 minutes. No

pressure build-up at M2 indicates the integrity of the downstream valve V2.

6. Close upstream valve V1 and secure in closed position.

7. Record pressure at M1 and B.

8. Vent/drain between V1 and V2 (B) and monitor at B until pressure is near zero.

9. Close vent/drain (B) and monitor at M1 and B for a minimum of 10 minutes. (No pressure

build-up at B indicates integrity of upstream valve V1).

10. Leave vent/drain (B) in closed position to allow further monitoring.

Isolation

Both block valves are now closed and secured. The bleed valve is closed but not locked. It is

Summary

possible for pressure to build up between the two block valves therefore regular monitoring of

the isolation is essential; a suitable calibrated pressure gauge may be fitted to the vent to

monitor for any pressure.

For further information refer to Section B1.2.2 Double Block and Bleed

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

Page 32 of 36

Isolation Integrity Test (BP-Approved Double Sealed, Single Valve)

Diagram

Key

M1 - Live (upstream) side monitoring point.

M2 - Monitoring point between valve and break point (downstream).

C - Cavity drain (between seals).

Procedure

1. If possible, ensure tapings at M1, M2 and C are not blocked and pressure gauges, where

installed, are operating.

2. Close isolation valve and secure in closed position.

3. Record pressure at M1, C (in cavity) and M2.

4. Vent/drain downstream section of line to be broken and monitor pressure at M2 until

pressure is near zero.

5. Close vent/drain at break point and monitor at M2 and C for a minimum of 10 minutes. (No

pressure build-up at M2 and no pressure fall-off at C indicates integrity of downstream

seal.)

6. Record pressure at M1 and C.

7. Vent/drain off fluid in cavity (between seals) and monitor at C until the pressure is near

zero.

8. Close cavity vent/drain (C) and monitor at M1 and C for a minimum of 10 minutes. (No

pressure build-up at C indicates integrity of upstream seal).

9. Leave vent/drain C in closed position to allow further monitoring.

Isolation

The double sealed, single block valve is now closed and secured. The bleed valve is closed

Summary

but not locked. Any fluid passing through the upstream seal will be detected at the cavity drain

C. Regular monitoring of the isolation is therefore essential and a suitable calibrated pressure

gauge may be fitted to the vent to monitor the pressure.

For further information refer to Section B1.2.2 Double Block and Bleed

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

Page 33 of 36

Single Valve Isolation Integrity Test

Diagram

Key

M1 - Live (upstream) side monitoring point.

M2 - Monitoring point between valve and break point (downstream).

Procedure

1. Ensure tapings at M1 and M2 are not blocked and pressure gauges, where installed,

are operating.

2. Close isolation valve and secure in closed position.

3. Record pressure at M1 and M2.

4. Vent/drain downstream section of line to be broken into and monitor at M2 until

pressure is near zero.

5. Close downstream vent/drain and monitor at M2 for a minimum of 10 minutes. (No

pressure build-up at M2 indicates integrity of single valve.)

6. Leave downstream vent/drain at break point in closed position to allow further

monitoring.

Isolation

The single isolation valve is now closed and secured, and the downstream vent/drain is

Summary

closed. Any fluid passing through the single valve seal would be monitored by means of the

mandatory additional safeguards listed in Appendix A, Table 1.

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

Page 34 of 36

APPENDIX D: ENERGY ISOLATIONS FLOWCHART

Requirement

for

Isolation

Is this

Yes

a CSE?

Is this

Positive

Yes

Assess breaking

Yes

breaking

isolation

Containment risks/hazards

tainment?

available?

Define cleaning / flushing /

purging method

Select

Is this a

Can minimum

Yes

ICC

Isolation

Special isolation

Isolation standard

method

technique

be ac

ieved

Yes

L2RA

Install initial isolation

ICC

Complete draining / flushing /

Purging of eqpt where necessary

Isolation

Yes

Install final

Yes

Isolation

rogress work, monitor

successfully

isolation integrity

isolation

roved?

STOP

Reassess and consider

Job complete

Yes

production shutdown,

lleak test req’d?

deferral of work and

further risk assessment

Is leak test

Prepare specific

covered by existing

Leak test procedure

rocedure

Yes

Carry out appropriate

Carry out leak test

Service test for

Level of risk assessment

And record results

Non-haz utilities

Process hydrocarbons.

Mandatory L2RA

Fully de-isolate and

return to service

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

Page 35 of 36

Revision/Review Log

Revision Date

Authority

Custodian

Revision Details

09 Sept 2004

Central Engineering

EI (process) Technical

Initial issue as controlled document

Senior Authority

Authority

07 Sept 2007

Alan McNulty

Steve Grittner

Table of Contents changed as follows:

CHSSE Manager

Central Engineering

Additional sub-sections added to Section 1:

Senior Authority

Introduction

General:

Throughout the procedure the document

numbering for referred SSOW‟s has been

changed from UNIF-HSE-PRO to AZSPU-

HSSE-DOC.

Section 1. Introduction:

1.2 is now Scope. 1.3 is now Legislation &

Standards. 1.4 is now Company

Requirements. 1.5 is now Stopping Unsafe

Work. 1.6 is now Deviations. 1.7 is now

Document Review. 1.8 is now SSOW

Specific Cross Reference. 1.9 is now

Golden Rules of Safety. 1.10 is now

Language Facilitation. 1.11 is now

Procedure Summary

Section 2. Definitions:

Definitions moved from Appendix „A‟ to this

section.

Section 3. Roles & Responsibilities:

3.3 OIM/SC/SM: 3^rd bullet point; updated

document number for Authorization.

3.4 Area Authority: 2^nd bullet point; added

Site Manager. 4^th bullet point; updated

document number for Task Risk

Assessment.

Section 4. Monitoring & Auditing of

Isolations:

4.2 Self-Regulation and Audit: Changed;

Each Business Asset shall: to Each Site /

Installation shall:…

Section 5. Competency, Training &

Awareness:

5.2 Levels of Training: Added competency

requirements shall be in accordance with

AzSPU Training Policy (AZSPU-HSSE-

DOC-00088-2). Training Matrix removed

from this section

Section 8. Types of Isolations:

Last bullet point; updated document number

for Confined Space Entry.

Appendix A. Is now Isolation Standards

Appendix B. Is now Guidance Notes.

Appendix C. Is now Typical Valve

Isolations Integrity Tests

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Procedure for Energy Isolation - Process

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Appendix D. Is now Energy Isolation

Flowchart

Appendix E. Is an addition - Procedure

Summary

Appendix F. Is an addition - Feedback &

Improvement Suggestions

16 February 2009

Central Engineering

Senior Procces

The Procedure has been reviewed and no

Senior Authority Chris

Engineer Murray

changes were made to.

Houghton

Athans

09 September

Central Engineering

Senior Procces

The Section 5, Training and Competency

2009

Senior Authority Chris

Engineer Murray

Requirements, with the purpose of bringing

Houghton

Athans

in line with AzSPU CoW Training Policy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Purpose/Scope

DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

Legislation & Standards

Ground Disturbance- Requirement associated with Control of Work GDP

Company Requirements

Stopping Unsafe Work

KEY RESPONSIBILITIES

Site Manager (SM) / Site Controller (SC)

Area Authority (AA)

Performing Authority (PA)

Machinery Operator

Banksmen

All Personnel

Environmental Adviser

EXCAVATIONS AND TRENCHES DEEPER THAN 1.2M

5.1

ACCESS ROUTES

5.2 ROUTE IDENTIFICATION AND PREPARATION

Locating and Marking Existing Pipelines

Pipeline Crossing Points

5.3 SITE SAFETY

Access and Security

Vehicle Traffic

Personnel

Equipment

The Use of Mechanical Equipment near Overhead Power Lines

Working Hours

Fires

5.4 PRE-EXCAVATION REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURE

BP Consent

Landowners

Third Party Services

Excavation Boundaries

Drainage Patterns

Excavation design requirements

Risk Assessment, Permit to Work and Supplementary Certificates

Environmental Impact Assessment

5.5 EXCAVATION PROCEDURES

Excavation Inspections

Toolbox Talks

Non-Mechanical Excavation

Mechanical Excavation

Excavated Materials

5.6 BACKFILLING PROCEDURE

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Preparation

5.7 SITE REINSTATEMENT

Drainage

Topography

5.8 DOCUMENTATION

6. KEY DOCUMENTS / TOOLS / REFERENCES

APPENDIX A: EXCAVATION SUPERVISOR COMPETENCY CHECKLIST

APPENDIX B: EXCAVATION ENTRY INSPECTION CHECKLIST

APPENDIX C: EMERGENCY PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF PIPELINE DAMAGE

INTRODUCTION

Purpose/Scope

This document sets out the precautions and conditions considered necessary for the safety

of all excavation works carried out on BP owned or managed sites in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

It has been produced so that all involved parties can make a uniform approach to

excavations.

The contents of this procedure are applicable to all BP owned and managed sites /

installations in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Contractors working on BP owned or managed sites /

installations are also responsible for alignment with this procedure.

This document does not replace the procedures prepared and adopted by specialist

contractors. Neither does it supersede any national and local regulatory requirements.

This procedure contributes to compliance with BP Group Defined Practice for Control of

Work requirements that the Hazards associated with BP activities are identified and that the

risks are assessed and managed.

All guidelines contained shall be regarded as the minimum requirements for BP owned or

managed sites / installations in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The scope covers defined activities of BP and Contractors at all BP AzSPU sites and

installations.

This document refers to:

 Method of excavation

 Excavation and protection of all pipelines and services

 Excavation of oil contaminated soils

 Backfilling guidelines

DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS

RoW

Right of Way

GIS

Geotechnical Information System

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GPS

Global Positioning System

Site Manager

Site Controller

Area Authority

Performing Authority

ALARP

As Low as Reasonably Practicable

COW

Control of Work

CSE

Confined Space Entry

ICC

Isolation Control Certificate

L2RA

Level 2 Risk Assessment

PTW

Permit to Work

RTC

Risk It, Talk It, Check It Pre-Task Risk Assessment

SSOW

Safe System of Work

TRA

Task Risk Assessment

Technical Authority

TBT

Toolbox Talk

ROPS

Roll Over Protective Structure

Competent

A person trained in soil analysis (as far as is reasonably practicable),

Person

the use of protective systems and hazardous atmospheric conditions

who has the authorization to take prompt corrective measures to

eliminate hazards

Excavation

Any man-made cut, cavity, trench or depression in an earth surface

formed by earth removal. Examples include ditches, trenches, bell

holes, etc

Way Leave

The strip of land through which BP has acquired the right to lay,

Strip

construct and maintain a pipeline

Hazardous area

Area where presence of hydrocarbons/toxic gases is possible

GDP

Group Defined Practice

RPU

Regional Production Unit

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

Legislation & Standards

- Operating Management System OMS Essentials 3.2(3.2.1) and 4.5(4.5.1)

- BP Group Defined Practice for Control of Work GDP 4.5-0001(Appendix 1)

The aim of this Safe System of Work is to achieve ”no accidents”, “no harm to people” and

“no damage to the environment”. To achieve this aim, this SSOW complies with National

Legislation, the terms of the Production Sharing Agreement

(PSA) and mandatory BP

Standards.

The best International Oil Industry practice and relevant goal setting legislation have been

adopted to reduce the level of risk to as low as reasonably practicable and therefore well

below that mandated by applicable statutory laws and regulations.

In the absence of local regulations, BP Group Standards will apply. In addition, appropriate

UK and US regulations and industry best practice have been considered in setting suitable

goals and targets.

Ground Disturbance- Requirement associated with Control of Work GDP

Work that involves a manmade cut, cavity, trench or depression formed by earth removal, or

driving of piles into the earth‟s surface cannot proceed unless:

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 A hazard assessment of the work site is completed by competent person(s)

 All underground hazards, i.e., pipelines, electric cables, etc., have been identified,

located and if necessary, isolated

 A permit has been issued

 Ground movement shall be controlled and collapse prevented by systematically

shoring, sloping, benching, etc., as appropriate

 Ground and environmental conditions shall be continuously monitored for change

 Unauthorized access is prevented

Where persons are to enter an excavation:

 A confined space entry permit must be issued if the entry meets the confined space

definition (deeper than 1.2 m etc., ref. AzSPU-HSSE-DOC-00013-2)

Company Requirements

It is a company requirement that all tasks are subjected to an assessment of risk to

demonstrate that risks have been reduced to as low a level as reasonably practicable

(ALARP). This can be achieved by complying with the Company‟s existing standards. Where

compliance with Company standards cannot reasonably be achieved, a formal level 2 Risk

Assessment will be undertaken to identify any additional controls and demonstrate that risks

remain as low as reasonably practicable.

Stopping Unsafe Work

To stop the continuation of potentially unsafe work at the earliest possible stage, the Control

of Work

(CoW) Policy incorporated into relevant procedure and this procedure for

Excavations make it very clear that all personnel are obliged and have the authority to

“STOP” the work that they consider to be unsafe.

Due to the various languages spoken at sites / installations, there is a necessity to assist all

with “an ease of understanding”.

KEY RESPONSIBILITIES

Site Manager (SM) / Site Controller (SC)

The Site Manager / Site Controller shall be responsible and accountable for the application of

this procedure in his area of responsibility, He shall ensure:

 That this procedure is strictly adhered to for all work activities that involve open

excavations in the earth‟s surface

 That only certified and experienced operators operate excavating equipment

 That all work activities that involve open excavations in the earth‟s surface are subject

to risk assessment and the Project Permit to Work System

 That all work activities that involve open excavations in the earth‟s surface are closely

monitored to ensure compliance with this procedure

 That suitably qualified and experienced personnel are appointed to control and

perform all work activities that involve open excavations in the earth‟s surface

Area Authority (AA)

Area Authorities are responsible for:

 Compliance with this Safe System of Work within their area of authority

 Determination of the RA level

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 The safety of personnel and the safe execution of activities within their area

 Ensuring daily equipment checks are completed on equipment within their area by the

Machinery Operator and that equipment is maintained in good working order

 Ensuring that all excavations are conducted in accordance with this procedure and

BP Group Defined Practice for Control of Work (ground disturbance)

 Pre-task worksite inspection prior to issuing a PTW to ensure all required safety

controls are in place

 Carrying out inspection upon completion of work

 Provision of instruction to personnel as required

 Monitoring work activities to ensure compliance with the requirements of safe

systems of work

Performing Authority (PA)

Performing Authorities are responsible for:

 Complying with the requirements of this procedure during the performance of all the

excavation work or preparing and submitting to the Area Authority, for review and

approval, their own Excavation procedure to cover the work

 Ensuring that only suitably trained persons are assigned to excavating and trenching

activities in their area of operation

 Ensuring that all workers under their control understand the specific excavation

safeguards and comply with this procedure and any other BP standard, local

regulation ands applicable safety rules, standards, and procedures during excavation

and trenching operations

 Conducting a recorded pre-task TBT to discuss in detail task related hazards, proper

task execution and required safety controls.

Machinery Operator

Machinery operators are responsible for:

 The safe and responsible operation of machinery under their control

 Immediately reporting to their supervisor if they believe the equipment they are using

is in a dangerous or unsafe condition

 Ensuring that the machinery or equipment they use has all the safety devices and

guards in place and that all guards are properly fitted.

 Ensuring daily recorded equipment checks are completed on equipment within their

area and that equipment is maintained in good working order

Banksmen

Banksmen are responsible for:

 Preventing access to working areas under their control by unauthorised personnel

 Providing safe guidance and assisting in the safe operation of machinery under their

direction

 Remain in communication with the rigger/slinger and crane operator at all times.

 Be known and clearly identifiable to all concerned by wearing high visibility

identification

All Personnel

All personnel are responsible for:

 Carrying out their duties in a safe and responsible manner

 For halting any work where they feel that conditions are unsafe and for bringing this to

the attention of their immediate supervisor

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Environmental Adviser

Environmental Advisers are responsible for:

 Providing advice and assistance to the Site Supervisor on environmental matters as

and when required

 Providing Geotechnical Information System information and Global Positioning

Survey coordinates regarding natural, archaeological and other important features

within and adjacent to the excavation site.

Note: Photographs of important features should also be provided if required.

EXCAVATIONS AND TRENCHES DEEPER THAN 1.2m

All excavations and trenches deeper than 1.2 metres in “hazardous areas” as defined by the

site / installation are classified as confined spaces.

In “non hazardous areas” where there are no significant hazards identified prior to entry, the

following criteria must be established before determining the requirement for a “Confined

Space Entry permit”:

 No risk of atmospeheric hazards either from surrounding area or from the task being

performed.

 The excavation does not require any form of isolation prior to entry.

 No risk of engulfment from Ingress of solids or liquids.

 No risk from excessive heat.

 Unrestricted safe means of access and egress for work party

 Unrestricted safe means of aceess and egress for rescue purposes

 Excavations benched or shored to reduce risk of collapse

 Continuous monitoring of O2, LEL and other toxic gasses are carried out inside the

excavation

The excavation / trench may be classified as “not a confined space” if all the above criteria

can be established and a Level 2 Risk Assessment is conducted.

Note: A Permit to Work and Level 2 Risk Assessment are mandatory for “all work” in

excavations and trenches deeper than 1.2m.

5.1

ACCESS ROUTES

Access routes to proposed sites shall be properly surveyed and, in particular, for all access

routes:

 Risk assessments shall be made, and actions documented, for all crossing points and

other points of difficulty recognised on the route

 Method statements shall be produced for negotiating all crossing points and other

points of difficulty

 The route shall be clearly marked

5.2

ROUTE IDENTIFICATION AND PREPARATION

Locating and Marking Existing Pipelines

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Note: At locations where there is hydrocarbon or a suspected leak a gas survey

must be carried out before pipeline location activities begin.

Prior to the commencement of any excavation a site survey shall be carried out in order to:

 Locate, identify and mark any existing pipelines and foreign services and utilities and

any cathodic protection system components, using pipe locating equipment and hand

excavated trial holes

 Peg out the pipeline routing

 Define and log the point of excavation

Pipeline Crossing Points

Requirements

Construction traffic and other plant shall cross the pipeline only by:

 Public roads

 Previously agreed and clearly marked crossing lanes or bridges

Construction

All crossing lanes shall be fenced on both sides over a width to be specified and agreed by

the Pipeline Patrolman as far as is reasonably practicable as dictated by local conditions and

acts of vandalism. These fences shall be returned along the edge of the way-leave strip for a

distance of 6 m away from the crossing.

Where it is necessary at crossing points to install a temporary bridge to protect the pipeline,

the bridge will be of engineered design and approved by the Site Manager or Site Controller.

The design and construction of such bridges and crossings shall be made by a competent

person or approved civil engineering subcontractor where it is deemed necessary.

Markings

Any temporary crossing or bridge must be clearly marked by appropriate notices and flags,

and additionally with lights at dusk, at night or in foggy conditions.

5.3

SITE SAFETY

Access and Security

Guards and Barricades

Open pits/excavations shall be protected by hard barriers (jersey plastic, iron etc.). Open

excavations near public areas must be attended by a watchman and marked with a warning

sign.

Note: If a night watchman is used, he shall be equipped with appropriate communications

and shelter for use in case of prowling animals, sickness or other emergency.

Vehicle for night watchman to be provided as far as is reasonably practicable.

Fencing, Gates and Safety Notices

Erection of stock fencing, gates and bunting safety notices, etc., shall be undertaken over

access ways and worksites.

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When the pipeline is exposed outside normal working hours a security presence will be

required over and above that of the normal construction personnel. This service shall be

supplied by a BP approved Contractor.

Vehicle Traffic

Vehicular traffic should not operate within 1.5 m of a trench or excavation. Vibration created

by traffic may cause cave-ins.

Personnel

Warning: Workers should not stand on the edge of an excavation or between a

pipeline ditch and strung pipe resting on skids. The bank might slough, or

temperature changes in the pipe could cause skids to fail and allow the

pipe to fall.

Protective Equipment (PPE)

With temperatures experienced in Azerbaijan and Georgia the use of Inherently Fire

Resistant or Flame Retardant Coveralls during summer where personnel are working all day

outside could be unbearable. An alternative to IFR/FR coveralls for the low flash risk

applications is

100% cotton. Personnel involved in specific work activities near live

hydrocarbon lines should wear Flame Retardant coveralls.

During all activities on site all personnel shall wear minimum PPE

(helmet, safety

boots/shoes, fire coveralls, and eye protection).

Personnel involved in specific work activities shall wear additional PPE to suit the

requirements of the work as agreed/detailed at the pre-work toolbox talk.

Equipment

Type and Location

All equipment shall be checked and registered on the appropriate checklists and registered in

accordance with the site operating procedures. All operatives‟ certificates shall be checked

and logged prior to works commencing. They have to comply both with BP and local

legislative requirements where applicable. In addition all plant mobile equipment (such as

cranes, forklifts, cherry pickers etc.) drivers shall obtain license from state authority.

Warning: Machinery vibration may cause cave-in. No running plant shall be located

within 1.5 m of an excavation.

Equipment Inspection

Equipment shall be inspected daily and maintained as necessary to ensure that it is in good

working order. This includes the inspection of brakes, pivot pins, hydraulic cylinders, hoses,

snap rings, main attaching bolts, etc.

Adjustments and Repairs

Do not lubricate or make mechanical adjustments to the unit while the unit is in motion or the

engine is running.

Do not repair or tighten hydraulic hoses or fittings when the:

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 System in under pressure

 Engine is running

 Equipment hydraulic cylinders are under a load

Refuelling

A method statement covering spill containment and management of personnel injury risks

shall be prepared for all refueling operations. In all cases, equipment shall be shut down prior

to being refueled.

Lighting

All lighting shall be either explosion proof or located outside Zone 2, if there is a potential for

presence of hydrocarbons.

The Use of Mechanical Equipment near Overhead Power Lines

Introduction

All personnel working near overhead power lines with a machine or mechanical equipment

shall be made aware of:

 The dangers associated with power lines

 The precautions they should follow to deal with those dangers

 What to do if they make contact with a power line

 As a minimum one team member has to be trained as an Advanced First Aider

Warning: Physical contact with high-voltage overhead power lines is likely to be fatal

or cause severe and irreversible maiming.

It is impossible to say whether an overhead cable is a power line or a

telephone line from observation alone. The only sure method is to make

contact with the line owner.

Note: Further guidance on safe working in the vicinity of over head power lines can be

gained from HSE note GS 6; Avoidance of Danger from Overhead Electric Power

Lines.

Safe Vertical Working Clearance

The minimum safe working distance between mechanical excavation equipment and live

overhead power lines will vary according to:

 Type of power line (for example, insulated or un-insulated)

 Voltage carried by the power line

 Ground and weather conditions

To establish and maintain safe vertical working distances between mechanical equipment

and overhead power lines the following practice shall always apply:

1. Establish and record the maximum vertical reach of all machines on site.

2. Identify the routes of all overhead lines on or near the land to be excavated and

clearly mark these routes on site plans.

3. For each overhead power line, identify the line owner and establish clear

communication route, including for emergency situations.

4. From the line owner find out:

a. If the line can be conveniently made DEAD

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b. The line type (for example, insulated or un-insulated)

c. The voltage carried

d. The minimum safe working clearance for mechanical machinery operating near

the power line

5. If the line cannot conveniently be made DEAD then the established minimum safe

operating clearance shall be adhered to at all times.

Reducing the Risk from Overhead Power Lines

Risks associated with working close to overhead power lines can be reduced by:

 Taking care not to damage poles and stays

 Fitting shorter radio aerials or repositioning existing ones on high machines so they

cannot cause danger

 Carrying long items (for example, pipes or ladders) horizontally and not storing pipes

or other materials and equipment near or under power lines and their supports

 Designating safe areas for high-risk activities; for example, tipping trailers

 Using barriers and goalposts: by erecting goalposts and barriers, machines which

have to pass beneath lines can be limited to a safe height - an option especially

suited to gateways and tracks

If Contact is made With an Overhead Power Line:

 Never touch an overhead line - even if it has been brought down by machinery, or

has fallen through other means.

 Never assume that lines are dead.

 When a machine is in contact with an overhead line, electrocution is possible if

anyone touches both the machine and the ground. Stay in the machine and lower any

raised parts that are in contact or drive the machines out of the lines if you can.

 If you need to get out to summon help or because of fire, jump out as far as you can

without touching any wires or the machine - keep upright and away from the machine.

 Get the line owners to disconnect the power supply. Even if the line appears dead, do

not touch it - automatic switching may reconnect the power

Working Hours

Excavation work shall only be carried out during daylight hours where practicable. If the task

overruns dayshift then the area will be barriered off and adequately illuminated using

approved out side site lighting. Preferably this should be a mobile tower, diesel driven arc

light if available. These are additional requirements in addition to the site being fenced off.

Fires

Storage of material for lighting of fires within the pipeline way-leave or in the vicinity of above

ground installations associated with it is not permitted.

5.4 PRE-EXCAVATION REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURE

Note: Excavation activity should preferably be undertaken in the summer as far as is

reasonably practicable, in order to minimise both ground disturbance and soil

compaction.

BP Consent

Excavations may only take place on BP managed or owned property with formal consent

from BP, with 72 hours notice as far as is reasonably practicable. Where excavation is to

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take place, a Permit to Work and an Excavation Certificate shall be obtained before work

begins.

Requirements on Excavation Certificate are stated in the Procedure for Permit to Work

(AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00060-2)

Landowners

Ensure that access has been granted by the landowner, that a pre-entry survey with

photographs has been done and that compensation, access route and area protection have

also been agreed.

Landowners and neighbors in close proximity to the proposed excavation must be informed

that work is about to begin and that the inspection is of a routine nature.

Note: This requirement may be negated under an emergency situation.

Third Party Services

Owners of third party services shall be contacted before the excavation of their services

begins. A No Objection Certificate shall be obtained when applicable.

Excavation Boundaries

The extent of required excavation shall be clearly marked out prior to commencement of the

work.

All PTW for excavations shall include a drawing of sufficient scale to clearly define the

excavation boundaries.

Drainage Patterns

Prior to excavation, existing drainage patterns should be noted, so that subsequent drainage

schemes can mimic the original pattern (see 5.7 Drainage).

Excavation design requirements

Access

Whenever personnel will be in an excavation, ramps, stairways or ladders should be kept

within 7.6m of workers for all excavations over 1.2m deep.

A ladder, stairway or ramp shall be installed on both sides of the pipeline to provide ingress

and egress for workers.

Windsocks

In hazardous areas, windsocks or flags must be positioned on both sides of the excavation in

order to determine wind direction.

Portable Gas Detectors

Portable gas detectors are to be used in hazardous areas and they are to be sited up-wind of

the excavation. Care is to be taken as to ensure the work party are in audible range of the

detector. The detectors are to be checked and monitored regularly. It may also be necessary

to supply the work party inside the excavation an additional gas detector.

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Slope Requirements and Ground Type

Except in stable rock, all excavations must be shored, shielded (i.e., trench box), benched or

sloped if:

 The excavation is 1.2m or more in depth

 A worker‟s head is below the level of the excavation when bending or stooping to

perform the work task - as far as is reasonably practicable and/or required by Risk

Assessment.

Excavations deeper then 1m shall have the sides benched or battered back, as per

Figure 1 Minimum Acceptable Excavation Design Profiles for battered profile or figure 2 for

benched profile. Shoring shall be used when required and site specific drawings, for approval

by BP, shall be prepared.

STEEPER SLOPES

REQUIRES SOIL

CLASSIFICATION TEST

“C”

“B”

“A”

SEE OSHA STANDARD

FOR EXCAVATIONS

DEEPER THAN 20 FEET

Note: 20 feet = 6.1m

Figure 1 Minimum Acceptable Excavation Design Profiles

TYPE A

TYPE B

SOIL

53

45

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Figure 2 Benched Excavation

The following table describes the soil types and minimum acceptable slope requirements for

excavations.

Note: Soil type must be determined by visual and manual tests; otherwise, assume

Type C soil with 1 ½ to 1 slopes.

Soil Type

Description

Maximum Slope

(Horizontal to

Vertical)

Solid rock

N/A

Vertical (90^º)

Strong soils, compressive strength greater

¾ to 1 (53^º)

than 144kPa, clay or clay soils, hardpan,

caliche.

Medium soils, strength > 48kPa, but

1 to 1 (45^º)

<144kPa angular gravels, silty soils, Type A

soil that has been disturbed, subjected to

vibration or is fissured.

Weak soils, strength < or = 48kPa gravel,

1 ½ to 1 (34^º)

sand, wet (seeping or submerged) soil.

Planning for Water Accumulation

Works shall be suspended / re-scheduled during periods of severe/inclement weather. A

portable diesel driven dewatering pump with a suitable length of hose shall be in attendance

to drain the excavation if required.

When someone will be working in an excavation where water may accumulate, consideration

should be given to:

 Special support or shield systems

 Water removal equipment, and

 Emergency rescue procedures

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 4) - page 38