Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

B-GJ-005-307/FP-090

UNIQUE OPERATIONS

CROWD CONFRONTATION

OPERATIONS

(ENGLISH)

(This publication is effective on receipt.)

WARNING

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS DOCTRINE IS WRITTEN

PRINCIPALLY FOR THE PURPOSES OF FORCE PROTECTION WHILE ON

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS. FURTHERMORE, INHERENT

CANADIAN FORCES CAPABILITIES AND EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS

MADE FOR CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS ARE IN NO WAY

TO BE INTERPRETED AS A DOMESTIC CAPABILITY.

ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT,

MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER THE

ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE

RELEASED.

Issued on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff

B-GJ-005-307/FP-090

UNIQUE OPERATIONS

CROWD CONFRONTATION

OPERATIONS

(ENGLISH)

(This publication is effective on receipt.)

WARNING

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS DOCTRINE IS WRITTEN

PRINCIPALLY FOR THE PURPOSES OF FORCE PROTECTION WHILE ON

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS. FURTHERMORE, INHERENT

CANADIAN FORCES CAPABILITIES AND EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS

MADE FOR CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS ARE IN NO WAY

TO BE INTERPRETED AS A DOMESTIC CAPABILITY.

ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT,

MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER THE

ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE

RELEASED.

Issued on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff

OPI: DAD7

2003-05-31

Crowd Confrontation Operations

PREFACE

GENERAL

This Canadian Forces doctrinal manual describes in detail the

multidimensional and joint concept of Crowd Confrontation

Operations (CCO). This manual expands upon the operational and

tactical responses to crowd confrontation situations, such as those seen

on recent operations. It is aligned with B-GG-005-004/AF-000

CF Operations, and B-GL-300-001/FP-000, Conduct of Land

Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army, and

B-GL-300-002/FP-000, Land Force Tactical Doctrine. While this

manual is primarily focused at the conduct of CCO during Land

operations, it is equally pertinent for Naval and land-based Air Force

personnel responding to crowd confrontation situations.

PURPOSE

The purpose of B-GJ-005-307/FP-090, Crowd Confrontation

Operations, is to provide doctrine to permit deployed forces to deal

with crowd confrontation situations on operations. Since it is a new

type of unique operation and previous doctrine on similar subjects (A-

OL-302-008/FT-001 to 003 Aid of the Civil Power (ACP) manuals,

22 December 1975) has been rescinded, it does not replace any

specific publication. Nevertheless, the following key documents were

used extensively and should be consulted when applicable:

DCDS 2/98 Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic

Operations, 10 July 1998;

B-GG-005-004/AF-000 CF Operations,

18 December 2000;

B-GG-005-004/AF-005 Use of Force in

CF Operations (Revision one), 1 June 2001;

B-GG-005-004/AF-004 Force Employment,

4 December 1997; and

B-GJ-005-307/FP-090

B-GG-005-004/AF-023 Civil-Military Cooperation

in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War, 15 October

1998.

SCOPE

This manual is based on the precept that crowd confrontation

situations could occur on any CF operation. The doctrine has been

designed to facilitate the use of CCO as a unique operation, which

may be a subset of any other CF operation. Where peace support

operations (PSO), domestic operations, or armed conflict examples are

used, the concepts presented are intended to cover all operations. The

manual stresses that the CCO hierarchy can be applied during any

operation to assist in the decisions of what equipment to acquire or

deploy and what training is to be based on. It provides the tools to

train and equip deployed forces to successfully control and disengage

themselves from crowd confrontation situations while ensuring

mission success, without having to resort solely to the use of deadly

force. CCO is envisaged as being applicable across the spectrum of

conflict and throughout the continuum of operations.

Chapter 1 deals specifically with the legal aspects related to

CCO. Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the backg2round of CCO

and explains the hierarchy associated with this type of Unique

Operation. It also outlines where CCO fits within the CF operational

hierarchy. It further describes the approach toward CCO, and

highlights the relationships with the Army’s combat functions.

Chapter 3 deals with the specific terminology of CCO and the nature

of crowds. Chapter 4 explains the planning process associated with

CCO. Force organization considerations and possible tactical

formations are also presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 deals

specifically with the practical considerations of conducting CCO,

including techniques to influence crowds, along with the CCO

hierarchy. Chapter 6 introduces some particular specialized

equipment considerations for CCO and amplifies the use of non-lethal

weapons in the conduct of operations. Equipment-specific drills are

not included in this manual. The intent is that these would be

promulgated separately. Key terms and abbreviations, used in this

publication, are found in the Glossary at Annex A. Finally Annexe B

provides tactical aide-mémoires that will be useful in a CCO.

Crowd Confrontation Operations

APPLICATION

CCO doctrine has been produced primarily to enable

CF forces to enhance force protection and achieve mission success on

international operations, even if crowds gather.

Furthermore, the authorizing of CCO mission subsets will be

carried out on a case-by-case basis for each mission and is unlikely to

exceed the first three subsets of: crowd monitoring, crowd avoidance

and crowd disengagement. Only in extreme circumstances where

there is no law enforcement agency (LEA) or specialized multinational

unit available, will higher-level subsets likely be authorized.

For the sake of completeness of doctrine this manual does

include consideration of the legal aspects of domestic and international

operations and also outlines the higher subsets of CCO. It is important

to note that the manual itself does not authorize the conduct of any of

the CCO subsets outlined within.

OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST

The Director of Army Doctrine is responsible for the content,

production and publication of this manual. Inquiries or suggestions

are to be directed to:

Directorate of Army Doctrine (DAD)

Director General Land Combat Development

PO Box 17000 Station Forces

Kingston ON K7K 7B4

TERMINOLOGY

The terminology used in this publication is consistent with

that of the Army Vocabulary and AAP-6 (2002) NATO Glossary of

Terms and Definitions.

10.

Unless otherwise noted, masculine pronouns contained in this

publication refer to both men and women.

iii

Crowd Confrontation Operations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

General

Scope

Application

iii

Office of Primary Interest

iii

Terminology

iii

CHAPTER 1 CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

AND THE LAW

SECTION 1 GENERAL

Introduction

SECTION 2 CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

International Law

SECTION 3 CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Introduction

The Use of Force Under Canadian Domestic Law

Peace Officer Status

SECTION 4 REQUIREMENTS TO CONTROL THE USE

OF FORCE

Key Concepts in the Use of Force in Crowd Confrontation

Operations

Principles for the Use of Force in Crowd Confrontation

Operations

SECTION 5 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN

SUPPORT OF CROWD CONFRONTATION

OPERATIONS

SECTION 6 CONCLUSION

B-GJ-005-307/FP-090

CHAPTER 2 INTRODUCTION TO CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 GENERAL

Background

Future Trends

Applicability to the Land, Maritime and Air Components

of the CF

SECTION 2 CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

DEFINITIONS

Terminology

Definition of Crowd Confrontation Operation

Crowd Confrontation Operations Hierarchy

SECTION 3 CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL HIERARCHY

General

Phases of Crowd Confrontation Operations

Categories of Operations

Unique Operations

SECTION 4 APPROACH TO CROWD CONFRONTATION

OPERATIONS

Crowd Confrontation Operations Across the Spectrum of

Conflict

Crowd Confrontation Operations Within the Continuum of

Operations

Current Limitations

Crowd Confrontation Operations at the Operational and

Tactical Level

Crowd Confrontation Operations on the Psychological and

Physical Plane

The Manoeuvrist Approach to Crowd

Confrontation Operations

Fundamentals

Crowd Confrontation Operations

Crowd Confrontation Operations Doctrine and

Operational Planning Process

SECTION 5 RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARMY’S

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

The Role of Operational Functions on Crowd

Confrontation Operations

CHAPTER 3 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

BATTLESPACE

SECTION 1 CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

BATTLESPACE

Tactical Battlespace for Crowd Confrontation Operations

Urban Areas

Rural Areas

Maritime

Strengths and Weaknesses of Crowds

Strengths and Weaknesses of Own Forces

Criteria for Success

SECTION 2 THE NATURE OF CROWDS

General

Terminology

SECTION 3 CROWD DYNAMICS

Characteristics of Crowds

Types of Crowds

Phases of Crowds

Crowd Dynamics

SECTION 4 CROWD LEADERSHIP

Development of Crowd Leaders

Role of Civic, Political and Religious Leaders

vii

B-GJ-005-307/FP-090

CHAPTER 4 PLANNING FOR CROWD CONFRONTATION

OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 GENERAL

SECTION 2 PLANNING PROCESSES

The Operational Planning Process and Crowd

Confrontation Operations

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace and Crowd

Confrontation Operations

SECTION 3 PLANNING FOR CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

Preparatory Planning for Crowd Confrontation Operations.. 48

Operational Considerations

The Operational Lessons Learned Process

SECTION 4 ORGANIZING FOR CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

Organization of the Force

Command and Control Requirements

Training

SECTION 5 ORGANIZATIONS FOR CROWD

CONFRONTATIONS

Types of Organizations

Components of a Deployed Force

Baseline Force

Detaining Force

Anti-sniper Screen

Reserve

Naval Boarding Parties

Airfield Defence Forces

Special Tasks

SECTION 6 TACTICAL FORMATIONS

viii

Crowd Confrontation Operations

Tactical Formations

CHAPTER 5 CONDUCT OF CROWD CONFRONTATION

OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 GENERAL

General

General Rules

Initiation of an Operation

Military Responses for Crowd Confrontation Operations

SECTION 2 CROWD INFLUENCING TECHNIQUES

Crowd Influencing Techniques

Influencing at Sea

SECTION 3 CONDUCT OF CROWD CONFRONTATION

OPERATIONS

Force Employment

The Deployment of Forces

Termination of an Operation

Dealing with Aggressive Crowds

Naval Boarding Parties

Airfield Defence Forces

SECTION 4 CROWD MONITORING

SECTION 5 CROWD AVOIDANCE

SECTION 6 CROWD DISENGAGEMENT

SECTION 7 CROWD CONTROL

General

Crowd Control Measures

Stopping or Blocking a Moving Crowd

Containing Crowds

Control of Movement

SECTION 8 CROWD DISPERSAL

B-GJ-005-307/FP-090

General

Deployment

Dispersal Measures

Confirmation of Dispersal

SECTION 9 CROWD MANOEUVRING

CHAPTER 6 SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT FOR CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 GENERAL

Types of Equipment

Use of Equipment

SECTION 2 LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

Lethal Weapons

Non-lethal Weapons

Categories of Non-lethal Weapon

Non-lethal Capability Set

103

Employment Considerations for Non-lethal Weapons

104

SECTION 3 MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT

106

ANNEX A

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

109

ANNEX B

AIDE-MÉMOIRES FOR SPECIAL

TASKS RELATED TO CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

119

APPENDIX 1 AIDE-MÉMOIRE ON DEFENSIVE

COUNTER-MEASURES IN CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

121

APPENDIX 2 AIDE-MÉMOIRE ON FIELD DEFENCES

AND OBSTACLES IN AN URBAN CROWD

CONFRONTATION SITUATION

Introduction

123

Obstacles

123

Field Defences

123

Sight Screens

125

Crowd Confrontation Operations

Conclusion

125

APPENDIX 3 AIDE-MÉMOIRE ON CORDON AND

SEARCH OPERATIONS

127

APPENDIX 4 AIDE-MÉMOIRE FOR SEARCHING

PERSONNEL AND CHECKING

DOCUMENTS

Introduction

143

Searches

143

Checking Documents

148

General Points

148

APPENDIX 5 AIDE-MÉMOIRE FOR SEARCHING

VEHICLES

Introduction

151

Passenger Vehicles

155

Commercial Vehicles

160

Buses

162

Cargo Vehicles

162

Motorcycles

163

Bicycles

164

Additional Considerations

164

APPENDIX 6 AIDE-MÉMOIRE FOR SEARCHING

BUILDINGS

Search of Buildings

167

Occupied Building

168

Search of Unoccupied Buildings

172

External Areas

175

Completion Tasks

175

Crowd Confrontation Operations

CHAPTER 1

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS AND THE LAW

SECTION 1

GENERAL

INTRODUCTION

For the purposes of Canadian Forces doctrine, crowd

confrontation operations (CCO) is defined as military operations

conducted by a military force to manage a crowd whose formation,

presence or anticipated behaviour is such that action is required. CCO

encompasses the entire spectrum of operations in which CF units or

elements interact or may interact with crowds whose activities

constitute a threat to CF personnel or the CF mission. There are six

elements to the CCO hierarchy: crowd monitoring, crowd avoidance,

crowd disengagement, crowd control, crowd dispersal and crowd

manoeuvring. These terms are defined in the Glossary at Annex A to

this manual.

In the 1990’s the original Aid of the Civil Power Manuals

were withdrawn from CF circulation. DCDS 2/98 Guidance for the

Conduct of Domestic Operations, 10 July 1998, specifically prohibited

training by the CF for law enforcement duties such as riot and crowd

control. However as a result of an increase in crowd confrontation

incidents experienced by the CF in international operations, and in

particular the Drvar riots of 1998 in Bosnia Herzegovina, a perceived

capabilities gap in the field of crowd confrontation incidents was

identified between the current CF intermediate weapons capability and

the use of deadly force.

The purpose of this manual is to provide doctrine for CCO

authorized strictly for the purposes of force protection or mission

accomplishment during operations, and to permit the training and

equipping of CF units. This manual does not authorize the conduct of

CCO or the procurement of the requisite equipment. For the purposes

of this manual the following definitions shall be applied:

Force Protection. All measures taken and means

used to minimize the vulnerability of personnel,

facilities, materiel, information and operations to

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

any threat and in all situations, so as to preserve the

freedom of action and operational effectiveness of a

force.

Mission Accomplishment. This term refers to the

accomplishment of those missions authorized by

competent CF military authority within assigned

mandates.

SECTION 2

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS IN

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law is the primary legal basis for establishing

the mandate for international operations from which both the authority

to use force and the parameters for the specific missions to be

conducted are derived. An examination of the specific mandate of an

international operation must be conducted to determine if CCO for the

purposes of force protection or mission accomplishment can be

lawfully authorized. If such operations are determined to constitute

part of the mandate, this authorization could then be issued in the

specific Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Operation Order (Op O) and

use of force direction would be provided in the CDS issued rules of

engagement (ROE).

The sources of international law include treaties, conventions,

agreements, international court rulings and customary international

law. The two primary components of international law are the Law of

Peace and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Either or both could

have significant bearing on the conduct of CCO. For example, in an

international operation as part of an armed conflict in which Canada is

a party, the Law of Armed Conflict applies and the use of riot control

agents (RCA) (e.g. pepper spray and CS gas) for CCO would very

likely not be authorized. In addition, even if the LOAC does not apply

as a matter of law in a specific international mission, it is CF policy

that the CF will apply, as a minimum, the spirit and principles of the

LOAC in all Canadian military operations other than domestic

operations (e.g. treatment of detainees and the CF Code of Conduct).

B-GJ-005-307/FP-090

Crowd Confrontation Operations and the Law

SECTION 3

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS IN DOMESTIC

OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

For the purpose of domestic operations, it must be

emphasized that the CF does not have a standing mandate to enforce

the laws of Canada. There are instances where municipal,

provincial/territorial or federal law enforcement agencies may seek CF

assistance in discharging their duties, and CF support to law

enforcement operations may be authorized. In this regard, CF

assistance, when provided, is always in a supporting role to the

civilian law enforcement authorities, who retain full responsibility for

enforcing the law. This is of particular significance for CCO in

domestic operations as it is generally the role of the police with their

specialized training to detain, arrest and process persons under

Canadian domestic law. The legal authority to permit the CF to

conduct domestic operations providing assistance to civilian

authorities is found in the National Defence Act (NDA) (e.g. under

section 273.6 Public Service) or pursuant to the Crown prerogative. If

the CF is authorized to assist civilian law enforcement authorities,

CCO may be one of the authorized types of assistance.

The CF has a standing authority to defend its personnel and

property. Accordingly, CCO may be authorized in those instances in

which a CF element, such as an auxiliary security force (ASF), is

tasked with securing a defence establishment. This section must be

read in conjunction with the current NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98

Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations or any document

that may replace it. This direction contains detailed instructions,

definitions, descriptions and a complete explanation of the legal

framework for CF involvement in domestic operations.

THE USE OF FORCE UNDER CANADIAN DOMESTIC LAW

The legal basis for the use of force during domestic

operations is the Canadian law, particularly as found in the Criminal

Code of Canada (CCC). The CCC is the primary legal source

regarding the use of force in the following situations:

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

protection of others;

prevention of the commission of an offence;

protection of property; and

the right to make arrests or the occasions when

arrests can be made.

These situations will not be applicable or authorized in each

domestic operation; the use of force will depend on the particular legal

mandate for the CF involvement or support in a domestic matter and

the CDS issued ROE applicable to that support. Further amplification

of the legal basis for CF domestic operations is found in Chap 3 of

B-GG-005-004/AF-005 Use of Force in CF Operations (Revision

One).

10.

The CCC sets out the limits for the use of force by all persons

in Canada. These limits are applicable to any domestic CCO.

Generally, section 25 of the CCC sets out the parameters for the

protection of persons administering and enforcing the law. The

general standard is that everyone who is required or authorized by law

to do anything in the administration or enforcement of the law or who

falls within the subscribed list of persons and acts on reasonable

grounds is justified in using as much force as is necessary for that

purpose. However, section 26 of the CCC imposes criminal liability

for the use of force in excess of that authorized by law:

26. Everyone who is authorized by law to use force

is criminally responsible for any excess thereof

according to the nature and quality of the act that

constitutes the excess.

PEACE OFFICER STATUS

11.

While performing CCO during a domestic operation, CF

personnel may have peace officer status by operation of law. This

does not mean that these CF personnel have the same powers and

duties as those of civilian police officers. While having peace officer

status is important legally, all CF personnel will continue to be

required to perform their duties as military members and they remain

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Crowd Confrontation Operations and the Law

liable to follow the direction and orders issued them by their military

superiors.

12.

Peace officer status permits CF personnel to enforce the law,

and to use force while doing so (as directed by the military chain of

command). Such status may protect them from criminal and civil

liability for actions taken within the scope of their duties while

enforcing the law. While peace officer status empowers CF personnel

to use force and provides them with protection for actions taken within

the scope of their lawful duties, the use of force will always be

authorized and controlled by ROE issued by the CDS.

SECTION 4

REQUIREMENTS TO CONTROL THE USE OF FORCE

13.

Whether a CCO is classified as domestic or international or

takes place in peacetime or during armed conflict, the use of force

during the operation must be controlled in order to protect people and

property from unnecessary damage or injury. This is done by defining

the situations in which force can be used and by delineating the

intensity and duration of the applied force. These legal parameters are

embodied in Canadian domestic law and international law, which

controls the use of force during domestic operations. The control of

the use of force during CCO provides significant challenges. First,

CCO can be highly intense with CF personnel being in close physical

proximity to crowds that will probably outnumber the CF forces

present. Second, the discernment of specific individuals whose

conduct may constitute hostile intent or a hostile act can be difficult.

Third, crowd density may increase the potential for collateral damage

to both persons and property, particularly if indiscriminate non-lethal

weapons (NLW) such as water cannon or chemical irritants such as

CS gas are employed. Fourth, the wider range of weapons systems

deployed for CCO, from NLW to lethal weapons, provides for a more

complex escalation through the use of force continuum when dealing

with a particular CCO situation. The presence of such intermediate

weapons as NLW may also raise an unnecessary expectation that there

is a requirement that these weapons be employed before resorting to

deadly force. Finally, training in CCO, with its emphasis on a

graduated response, must consider and, where necessary reconcile the

differences in training undertaken in preparation for general combat

operations.

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

14.

The CF may only use force in self-defence and/or as

authorized by ROE issued by the CDS. ROE are the command and

control instrument by which the CDS controls the use of force in all

CF operations. ROE will also be required for the use of specific

intermediate weapons and generally the ROE authorization message

(ROEAUTH) will also contain amplifications regarding specific

training on their use.

KEY CONCEPTS IN THE USE OF FORCE IN CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

15.

There are two levels of force used by the CF:

non-deadly force; and

deadly force.

16.

Non-deadly Force. That force which is not intended to

cause death or serious injury. This is usually through the use of

physical force short of the use of firearms or other deadly force.

Examples include pushing and lesser forms of striking or hitting and

physically or mechanically restraining persons and the use of NLW.

Notwithstanding that these weapons and techniques are not designed

to cause death or serious bodily harm their employment must still be

discriminating as death or serious injury could still be the consequence

of their use.

17.

Deadly Force. That force which is intended to cause death

or serious injury regardless of whether death or serious injury actually

results. This is the ultimate degree of force.

18.

Minimum Force. The concept of minimum force is related

to both non-deadly and deadly force and is the minimum degree of

authorized force that is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.

Depending on the circumstances, minimum force may include deadly

force. Certain circumstances such as an unexpected attack where even

a moment’s delay could result in death or serious injury to a CF

member may preclude a graduated escalation of force.

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Crowd Confrontation Operations and the Law

PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

19.

The principles for the use of force during CCO are the same

as for all other operations conducted by the CF and are set out in

Section 4 of Chapter 1 of B-GG-005-004/AF-005 Use of Force in CF

Operations (Revision One). The nature of CCO is such that there is a

high likelihood that elements of the CF may be subjected to

harassment or obstructionist behaviour. Every effort shall be made to

remain calm and professional in the face of such treatment as

inappropriate use of force may prevent the accomplishment of the

mission and could have serious legal implications. Many agitators are

experts at the art of troop baiting. Advance warning and thorough

briefings will prepare personnel for name-calling, insults, profane

language, racial slights, taunting, and minor forms of violence

designed to provoke overreaction. Also, gesturing with weapons may

be used as a means of intimidation, posturing or provocation. Force

shall not be used where assigned duties can be achieved without it.

Even when force is permitted, it must be limited to the minimum

amount necessary and must be designed to achieve the desired result

with minimum injury to persons and property.

SECTION 5

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

20.

The authority to conduct intelligence activities in support of

CCO must flow from the legal mandate under which a particular

operation is conducted. In other words there must be a nexus between

intelligence activities and the legally authorized CCO mandate. Even

when the legal mandate exists authorizing the CF to conduct CCO, the

specific and separate issue of conducting intelligence activities in

compliance with the law must also be addressed. Canadian law will

likely impose more legal constraints on intelligence activities

conducted in support of domestic operation (including force

protection) than during international operations. For example, the

application of certain Criminal Code provisions (e.g. interception of

communications) and the application of certain Charter provisions

(e.g. Section 8, Search and Seizure) may not be relevant in

international operations. In addition, limitations may be imposed as to

who within the CF is authorized to conduct CCO intelligence

activities, particularly in a domestic operation.

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

SECTION 6

CONCLUSION

21.

This doctrine does not authorize the conduct of CCO in any

circumstance. It sets out guidance for CF commanders and their

subordinates if, and only if, a CCO has been authorized. Similarly,

this doctrine does not authorize the procurement or use of any new

weapon system, especially NLW. Procurement and employment of

any new weapon system and ammunition must comply with the law

and existing CF standing operating procedures for the procurement of

such weapons and such ammunition.

22.

All CF operations, including CCO must be conducted in

accordance with Canadian law and, where applicable, international

law.

B-GJ-005-307/FP-090

Crowd Confrontation Operations

CHAPTER 2

INTRODUCTION TO CROWD CONFRONTATION

OPERATIONS

Whether in domestic operations, peacekeeping or

combat operations, unanticipated crowd

confrontations can occur, and forces must have the

threshold training necessary to react to provide

security for themselves and their operation.

However, this training must not be confused for or

expanded into training for a pro-active role in

suppressing riots or performing other police duties.

Crowd confrontational duties remain a police

responsibility.

— B-GG-005-004/AF-000 CF Operations

SECTION 1

GENERAL

BACKGROUND

In the 1990’s the original Aid of the Civil Power Manuals

were withdrawn from CF circulation. DCDS 2/98 Guidance for the

Conduct of Domestic Operations, 10 July 1998, specifically prohibited

training by the CF for riot and crowd control. However as a result of

extra-territorial crowd confrontation incidents experienced by the CF,

and in particular the Drvar riots of 1998, a capabilities gap in the field

of crowd confrontation was identified. Depending on the mission,

deployed CF members were limited to the use of CS gas and pepper

spray with the use of these weapon systems confined to individual

self-defence or force protection during mission accomplishment. The

only alternative techniques or weapons involved the potential use of

deadly force. There was no capability for the use of proportional force

between these two as part of any use of force continuum.

There were a number of valid reasons at that time for

adopting this policy. However, experience on international missions

in recent years, has witnessed heightened threats to force protection

when involved with crowds, and has demonstrated that this policy is

not always possible in practice. Consequently, it was assessed as

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

prudent to produce doctrine that could maintain the intent of this

policy while improving readiness and force protection. Recent

Canadian experience on domestic and international operations has

resulted in the ad-hoc deployment of non-lethal weapons (NLW) and

protective equipment to deal with crowd confrontations and to help

disengage from aggressive crowds without any corresponding

doctrine. Consequently, the CF has decided that it must prepare for

situations where Canadian forces may participate in crowd

confrontations.

The purpose of this manual is to provide doctrine for CCO

authorized strictly for the purposes of force protection or mission

accomplishment during operations, and to permit the training and

equipping of CF units. The training and techniques and procedures for

operations continue to be mission-specific, but the overarching

doctrinal concepts are recognized as being required in the form of this

manual to permit deployed forces to deal with crowd confrontation

situations.

FUTURE TRENDS

CF personnel have been involved in many situations dealing

with crowd confrontation on operations. In addition to the obvious

situations involving Army personnel, the Navy faces similar situations

during the employment of its naval boarding parties and forces to

protect ships in foreign ports and likewise the Air Force at deployed

air bases on operations. As the nature of operations has changed over

the last decade, the frequency of interaction with crowds has greatly

increased. Further, future trends indicate an increase in operations in

urban environments, with a likely increase in interaction with

civilians, refugees and other non-combatants. Belligerent and

aggressive crowds may assemble in spite of measures adopted to

prevent these situations; in some cases, when the civil authorities may

be unable to cope, military assistance may be needed. In these cases,

it is most important that a commander selects the method of dealing

with a crowd that is most appropriate to the circumstances. On the one

hand a relatively amiable crowd may be inflamed by an ill-judged

show of force, while on the other an underestimation of the aggressive

intent of a crowd and the deployment of an inadequate number of

forces could be equally disastrous. The doctrine outlined in this

publication should be used as a guide. The commitment of the CF to

CCO is a last resort and must be viewed as such by the civil authority

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Introduction to Crowd Confrontation Operations

and by military commanders. The degree of CF involvement is never

to be greater than that necessary to accomplish the assigned mission.

APPLICABILITY TO THE LAND, MARITIME AND AIR

COMPONENTS OF THE CF

CCO covers those operational situations involving CF

personnel in crowd confrontation. For simplicity, the predominance of

Land operations for crowd confrontation situations is used as the

model to discuss CCO.

SECTION 2

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS DEFINITIONS

TERMINOLOGY

The term “crowd control” or “riot control” is perceived by

many to be a police function and has traditionally been only loosely

defined. There is a need for the CF to have tactics to deal with

crowds, but a new term is considered required to help differentiate

from the previously established biases with the term “crowd control.”

Neither “crowd control” nor “riot control” are viewed as a suitable

overarching term for military purposes. Consequently, the term

Crowd Confrontation Operations (CCO) is the overarching

operational construct, which defines and describes the CF activities in

this role. This new term helps to separate the perception of police

duties from military tasks while maintaining the concept of providing

commanders and soldiers with the capability to deal with crowds that

may interfere with operations. In order to achieve this, the term CCO

has been expanded to align with military operations in general, across

the spectrum of conflict and the continuum of operations.

In addition, on future international operations in an urban

environment, commanders must have the ability to influence civilian

populations for two main reasons. The first is to gain the cooperation

and subsequent assistance of the civilian population in the pursuance

of our own mission and tasks. This is not new and includes civil-

military cooperation (CIMIC), information operations (IO),

psychological operations (PSYOPS), and public affairs (PAff). As a

minimum, the aim is to prevent interfering with our operations either

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

intentionally or unintentionally. Refugee aid and control, as well as

the separation of civilians from the enemy will be of particular

importance in urban terrain against an enemy who mixes in with the

non-combatant for additional protection. The second reason is that

within current North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and

United-States (America), Britain, Canada, Australia (ABCA) concepts

for operating within the Urban Battlespace, a key issue is controlling

civilians and moving them from areas where we wish to conduct

fixing or striking operations in order to reduce non-combatant

casualties while increasing our own freedom of action for manoeuvre

and strike. In this light, CCO takes on a different look. Viewed from

this perspective, CCO adopts a meaning that is more operationally

focused rather than task-specific. Consequently, the CCO hierarchy

incorporates evolving operational issues.

DEFINITION OF CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATION

A CCO is defined as a military operation conducted by a

military force to manage a crowd whose formation, presence or

anticipated behaviour is such that action is required.

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS HIERARCHY

A COO hierarchy has been developed in order to identify

subsets of activities that may occur sequentially, concurrently, or in

isolation from each other. CCO covers the entire spectrum of crowd

interaction from observing a demonstration to manoeuvring a crowd

within the area of operations (AO). It encompasses the entire

spectrum of conflict and covers the continuum of operations. There

are six elements to the CCO hierarchy; they are defined and described

as follows:

Crowd Monitoring. Crowd monitoring consists of

activities to study, predict, observe and report on

potential and actual crowds.

Crowd Avoidance. Crowd avoidance consists of

activities aimed to minimize contact with a crowd.

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Introduction to Crowd Confrontation Operations

Crowd Disengagement. Crowd disengagement

consists of activities to separate a military force

from a crowd, or to extract a specified person or

persons from a crowd.

Crowd Control. Crowd control consists of

activities to physically alter the action and behaviour

of a crowd.

Crowd Dispersal. Crowd dispersal consists of

activities to break up a crowd.

Crowd Manoeuvring. Crowd manoeuvring

consists of activities to manage the movement of a

crowd. It may encompass some or all of the other

CCO activities.

SECTION 3

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS WITHIN THE

OPERATIONAL HIERARCHY

GENERAL

10.

Since CCO is a unique operation, it is important to align it

with the other CF Operations as described in B-GG-005-004/AF-000

CF Operations.

PHASES OF CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

11.

The five phases of all CF operations apply equally to CCO.

They are:

warning;

preparation;

deployment;

employment; and

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redeployment.

CATEGORIES OF OPERATIONS

12.

B-GG-005-004/AF-000 CF Operations identifies operations

as either routine or contingency, and for each of those operations there

are enabling operations that could support it. Details of these

operations as they apply to CCO are:

Routine. Routine operations are those operations

for which a given capability component (CC) has

been specifically tasked, organized and equipped.

Routine operations use existing command and

control relationships and there is no requirement to

use joint terminology. Doctrine for routine

operations is generally Environmental in nature.

Contingency. Contingency operations can be

conducted in either a domestic or international

theatre. If an operation does not clearly fall into the

routine category, then it is a contingency operation,

and a grouping, tailored to the operation is

generated. There are two types of contingency

operations:

(1)

Domestic Contingency Operations.

DCDS 2/98 Guidance for the Conduct of

Domestic Operations, 10 July 1998, lays

out the policy for domestic operations

specifying that training for law enforcement

duties such as crowd and riot control shall

not be conducted unless specifically

ordered. B-GG-005-004/AF-000 CF

Operations identifies that domestic

operations cover the spectrum from the

simple provision of military equipment and

personnel to assist in flood assistance or

fire fighting, armed assistance to

Corrections Canada, to the commitment of

combat capable land forces to deal with

major Aid of the Civil Power (ACP)

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Introduction to Crowd Confrontation Operations

missions. Domestic operations are

classified as either limited or complex and

are usually initially conducted by one of the

existing formation-based Headquarters

(MARLANT, MARPAC, LFAA, SQFT,

LFCA, LFWA, 1 CAD, CFNA):

(a)

Limited. Limited operations are

those that fall within the delegated

authority of the operational

commander, and can be conducted

with the resources integral to the

formation units. In limited

operations, task forces (TF) are

formed and task force

commanders (TFCs) are normally

appointed on the initiative of the

operational commander. In this

case, the TFC would report to the

tasking formation. Normal C2

relationships apply to the

formation-based HQ.

(b)

Complex. There are times when a

domestic contingency operation is

beyond the capabilities of the

formation-based HQ. Such

operations are often based on

NDHQ contingency plans and are

controlled by the DCDS, on behalf

of the CDS, through the National

Defence Command Centre

(NDCC). The designated TFC

would report to the CDS through

the DCDS. The JHQ may be

employed in complex domestic

contingency operations. In such a

scenario, the structure and C2

relationships would be similar to

an international operation.

(c)

Transitions. As a limited

operation develops, there may be

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indicators that it will soon

overwhelm the capabilities of the

initiating commander. The NDCC

must monitor all limited

operations to ensure that when

support is requested or the limit of

authority is insufficient, a

supplementary operation order is

issued to designate the operation

as complex and establish the

revised chain of command.

(2)

International Contingency Operations.

There is no standing direction for

involvement of CF personnel on CCO for

international contingency operations for the

spectrum of operations from peace support

operations (PSO) through to armed conflict.

Operational missions, tasks, and use of

force guidelines, including rules of

engagement (ROE), provide sufficient

details to commanders to determine

appropriate responses to operational

situations, including tactical crowd

confrontation situations. This publication

assists in defining the doctrinal foundation

for possible responses to these CCO

situations. Since most international

operations will be joint and combined in

nature, CF personnel must understand the

concepts, doctrine and procedures for

planning, organizing and conducting joint

and combined operations. Allied, coalition

and UN mandated operations are all

considered to be combined operations.

CCO can occur on all joint and combined

operations. Specific details across the

continuum of operations are:

(a)

Combined, Alliance, Coalition,

NATO, or Unilateral. The

frequency of CCO in armed

conflict is likely to increase in

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Introduction to Crowd Confrontation Operations

urban environments. Generally,

however, CCO are still expected

to be minor occurrences during

armed conflict. Current

operational orders and standing

operating procedures (SOPs)

provide sufficient detail to

commanders, but as part of their

production, planners should

consider the implication of CCO.

ROE for combined operations are

as agreed by nations and

personally reviewed and approved

by the CDS for use by the CF in

accordance with CF doctrine. For

more detail see

B-GG-005-004/AF-005 The Use

of Force in CF Operations.

(b)

Peace Support Operations. The

term "peace support operations" is

used in a generic sense to describe

activities in international crises

and conflict resolution and

management in which the CF may

be involved. The frequency of

CCO on PSO is increasing and

commanders must understand the

limitations of CF contingents to

respond to crowd confrontation

situations. This is normally

provided via operational orders,

ROE, and DCDS guidance to

commanders. For more detail see

B-GG-005-004/AF-005 The Use of

Force in CF Operations. There

are five categories of PSO that

have gained general acceptance in

the UN and Canada, which may

involve CCO, and to which

elements of the CF may be

deployed:

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

preventive diplomacy;

ii.

peacemaking;

iii.

peace enforcement;

iv.

peacekeeping; and

peacebuilding.

UNIQUE OPERATIONS

13.

While B-GG-005-004/AF-000 CF Operations does not

currently classify unique operations, Army doctrine identifies the

following types of unique operations:

non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO);

search and rescue (SAR);

urban operations;

airborne operations;

airmobile operations;

amphibious operations;

special operations;

encircled forces; and

crowd confrontation operations.

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Introduction to Crowd Confrontation Operations

SECTION 4

APPROACH TO CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS ACROSS THE

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

14.

There is a need for CCO doctrine and training across the

spectrum of conflict, but like a menu, various elements of CCO could

be selected as required for specific operations following mission

analysis. From peace to armed conflict, there is increasing interest to

have the ability to respond with measured force applicable to a given

situation. Whereas deadly force is the norm in times of armed

conflict, in more peaceful situations, the military, employed as a force

of last resort, may desire a non-lethal response as part of force

escalation measures. Therefore, NLW become essential in order to

expand the number of options available to commanders and a clear

understanding of their capabilities and principles of employment needs

to be articulated for each CCO.

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS WITHIN THE

CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS

15.

CCO is an embedded part of all CF operations. If there are

civilians present in a theatre of operations, either domestically or

internationally, then the possibility of conducting CCO is present.

Domestic operations and international contingency operations, from

PSO to armed conflict, are increasingly conducted in urban

environments with a correspondingly higher likelihood of involvement

in CCO. Consequently, CCO should be considered in the planning of

all operations.

CURRENT LIMITATIONS

16.

Currently, operational and tactical commanders are restricted

in the initiation and conduct of CCO. In situations where CF

personnel become involved in a developing crowd situation, their

response would be limited to force protection measures or the

minimum force necessary to ensure mission success. Unless CF

personnel are ordered by competent military authority, control and

dispersal of crowds remain the sole responsibility of police riot/crowd

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

control forces. The primary focus of training is to be on techniques for

influencing crowds, extraction, and support to police forces including

multinational specialized units or similar organizations, where

deployed.

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS AT THE

OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL

17.

CCO can be conducted by a joint force or more likely would

be executed at the tactical level by a force from a specific

environment. CLS, CMS, and CAS could all have subordinates

conducting CCO as part of an auxiliary security force. All CF

members may require this doctrine, training, and equipment to

perform this task on domestic and international contingency

operations. The Land Force, as the main force generator for domestic

and international operations on land, has an obvious vested interest in

supervising the developments in this field. Specific tactics for CCO

are described elsewhere in this publication, but it is worth stressing

that the understanding of CCO-related concepts is vital to the CF as a

whole.

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS ON THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL PLANE

18.

Clearly CCO are conducted by both active and passive means

on both the psychological and physical planes. Indeed, gains on one

plane may negate activity on the other for certain subsets of CCO. For

example, if an information operations (IO) campaign were successful

in keeping people home, persuasion during crowd disengagement or

physical measures to avoid a force on force situation in crowd

manoeuvring may have been avoided. The use of IO measures such as

PSYOPS and PAff can enhance CCO without the risk of physical

confrontations.

THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

19.

As with all operations, the manoeuvrist approach is favoured

in CCO. This approach seeks to defeat the enemy by attacking his

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Introduction to Crowd Confrontation Operations

psychological, and physical cohesion, his ability to fight as an

effective coordinated whole, rather than destroying him by

incremental attrition. The concepts of pre-emption, dislocation,

disruption, and influencing the will of the crowd are all applicable to

CCO. Naturally the means to achieve these concepts may differ from

combat operations. Some examples are:

Pre-emption. Remove the source of grievance once

intelligence identifies it. This could be an access

route, a prisoner (moved to another location, freed,

providing visitor access), or similar measures that

reduce the popular need for a crowd formation, yet

do not interfere with the mission.

Dislocation. Shift the source of grievance, whether

physically (move prisoner or protected persons), or

temporally (shift time of departure for a convoy), or

similar activities.

Disrupt. As permitted by law, ROE, mission orders

and policy, establish barricades or impediments to

prevent crowd formation, or similar activities to

make it difficult for the crowd to form, or to be

fomented by organizers.

Influence the Will. The requirement to influence

the will of the crowd will be part of any crowd

control or crowd dispersal operation. This

requirement may include physical confrontation;

however, in order to avoid escalating to this level, it

may be better to consider this action in terms of

wearing down the will of the crowd to continue as a

crowd. PSYOPS will be useful tools, especially if

the crowd is contained.

FUNDAMENTALS

20.

Generally the following fundamentals apply to CCO:

focus on the crowd’s vulnerability (physical and

psychological);

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

use mission orders;

be agile—act quicker than a crowd can react;

support manoeuvre with necessary capabilities;

focus on main effort;

exploit tactical opportunities;

act boldly and decisively; and

command from a position to influence the main

effort.

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS DOCTRINE AND

OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

21.

CCO doctrine provides guidance for the conduct of CCO. It

does not replace the proper issue of the Commander’s guidance and

the operational planning process for domestic and international

contingency operations. CCO doctrine should be the basis for drafting

these mission products.

SECTION 5

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARMY’S OPERATIONAL

FUNCTIONS

THE ROLE OF OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS ON CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

22.

The Army’s operational functions are a framework for

capturing issues for CCO. Each function has some key areas that are

important for CCO. The five operational functions are:

Command. CCO demand a lot from the leaders.

Leaders must be properly sited and supported to

make timely decisions in what will likely be a fluid

situation. CCO favour decentralised decision-

making and command, and centralized control of

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Introduction to Crowd Confrontation Operations

which elements of CCO are authorized. Effective

command, reinforced by ROE, sound doctrine, and

well-trained forces, offers a powerful response to

crowd confrontation situations. However, during

CCO, there is an increased need for the tactical

commander to be aware of the immediate

operational situation. Command support aides may

assist in this process.

Sense. Like in any other operation, properly

planned and executed IO can greatly assist CCO.

The sensitivities of dealing with civilians could pose

some complications to an effective IO plan.

Planning and consideration of CCO situations during

the normal operational planning process (OPP) helps

to ensure that IO is synchronized with any potential

CCO.

Shield. CCO pose a high personal risk to soldiers

unless they are properly trained and led. Even with

the training, a CCO poses risk due to the volatile

nature of crowds, the imbalance in numbers of

people, and constraints that may be imposed on our

soldiers. The CF policy and intent is clearly

designed to minimize deliberate physical contact

with crowds. The threat from crowds must be

continually assessed and contingency plans

developed to extract any of our forces or those under

our protection, from crowds. The erection of

barriers to crowd movement can be considered,

whether or not a crowd is forming, to protect

installations or garrisons. The threat assessment

may also indicate that survivability measures may

have to be taken at fixed installations as

precautionary steps. Visible protection measures of

installations and personnel have to be balanced by

the commander to ensure that the correct message is

being sent to the population at large. This

assessment will be theatre and culturally dependent

but must be a conscious decision. As an example,

wearing of full personal protective equipment

(helmet, vest, etc.) could be seen as an expression of

threat or an expression of fear, depending on the

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

situation. Complete revetment of certain facilities

could be seen as fear or timidity. Military Police

(MP) will be an important part of the CCO

preparation, providing liaison with the local police

forces and providing advice on CCO. The nuclear,

biological and chemical defence (NBCD) trained

personnel can provide information and advice on

protection from riot control agents, NBC weapons

and improvised devices, toxic industrial materials

(TIM), and decontamination. Other information and

advice on TIM release could be provided by the

Engineer adviser, General Safety staff or the

Preventive Medicine Cell (Occupational Safety and

Health).

Act. The maintenance of the ability to manoeuvre

on the psychological and physical planes will be

critical on CCO. Mobility corridors, urban

manoeuvre, use of static and mounted forces,

domination of the zone of confrontation, and

anticipation all remain key concepts on CCO. In the

context of CCO, Act also includes all uses of force,

both lethal and non-lethal, available to the

commander. It must be coordinated and well

controlled. Since the goal is a peaceful resolution of

crowd confrontation situations, other crowd

influencing techniques may be preferable or an

escalation of force from negotiation to non-lethal to

lethal firepower as required should be pursued.

When the situation dictates, the appropriate use of

firepower on CCO may prove decisive.

Sustain. The sustain function is not significantly

affected on CCO but remains as important as on

other operations. CCO may demand additional

sustainment engineering support to assist in the

protection of facilities. At the same time,

sustainment engineering support may be heavily

tasked to support CIMIC or similar measures in

order to assist the population. This support could be

provided as a pre-emptive measure (remove a

grievance) or to build support for the mission from

the population. Additional sustainment concerns

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Crowd Confrontation Operations

CHAPTER 3

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CROWD CONFRONTATION

OPERATIONS BATTLESPACE

SECTION 1

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS BATTLESPACE

TACTICAL BATTLESPACE FOR CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

Unlike other operations where battlefield geometry may

dictate areas of interest and influence out to hundreds of kilometres,

the tactical battlespace for CCO is much smaller. CCO are generally

conducted within sight of the crowds and measurements are normally

in metres. Nevertheless, evolving technologies may permit longer

distances or greater reliance on machines and robotics for future face-

to-face tasks. Moreover, crowds are more likely to form in urban

areas. The three-dimensional aspect of urban environments must be

considered as well as the problems of collateral damage.

URBAN AREAS

CF operations in urban areas have been identified as a key

future trend and correspondingly there is an increased potential for CF

involvement in CCO. Cities and towns are the focus of economic and

political power. They are especially vulnerable to street violence and

other disturbances. Operational experience has demonstrated the

willingness of local governments and faction leaders to utilize their

population and crowds to gain their political objectives. Therefore,

CCO is a vital capability available to the commander to counteract this

growing threat. Furthermore, an urban area is attractive to the news

media because action is concentrated in a relatively small and easily

accessible area, the congregation of people ensures that there is likely

to be a ready audience and the material for a good story, and hotels

and communications facilities are usually available. The pressures on

public relations staff are therefore considerable, and every member of

the force is constantly exposed to media scrutiny of his conduct. Since

urban operations will continue to be an important feature in many

areas of the world, this publication provides some suitable tactics to

achieve effective results in these operations.

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

Deployment in an Urban Area. The two broad alternatives

are to base forces outside the locality in which they are to operate, or

to base them within their operational area. The pros and cons of each

are:

Bases Outside the Area:

(1)

Advantages. A secure base can be set up

where off duty soldiers can relax and rest

and possibly enjoy some recreational

facilities. The protection of such a base can

be assured with fewer sentries and probably

fewer defences. It is reasonably accessible

to administrative transport, thus re-supply

and the repair and maintenance of

equipment and transport could well be

carried out on the spot.

(2)

Disadvantages. The reaction time is much

greater and reserves may therefore have to

be kept at short notice and possibly

deployed in anticipation of a requirement to

use them. Because forces may be unable to

return to base between patrols and other

commitments, there could be a demand for

sending some administrative transport

forward into the operational area; however,

it requires an escort and could possibly

become a target. The journey time to and

from the base eats into the period available

for rest and personal administration.

Bases in the Area:

(1)

Advantages. Reaction can be speedy and

reserves can be readily deployed in

response to rather than in anticipation of an

incident. Forces become more closely

identified with the area in which they live

which improves their chances of getting to

know the local population, the detailed

geography and the habits of adversary

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Characteristics of the CCO Battlespace

groups. The ability to dominate the area is

probably made easier.

(2)

Disadvantages. Forces can rest but not

relax; they are constantly exposed to the

danger of attack and as more soldiers are

needed for local protection, their hours on

duty are longer. All administrative traffic

should be escorted and this also places a

strain on manpower.

RURAL AREAS

CCO in rural areas are expected to be the exception rather

than the rule. Tactics for rural operations usually involve relatively

small bodies of forces because the crowds will be relatively small.

Large numbers may be required if several mutually supporting

operations are mounted concurrently. The characteristics of rural

operations are that:

the adversary has to rely more on force of arms,

stealth or field craft for his protection;

rural operations are thus conducted in a similar

fashion to those of conventional operations;

while there is the inevitable difficulty of

distinguishing between neutral and aggressive

members of the population, once aggressive groups

have been identified by some aggressive act, they

can, if necessary, be engaged by fire and manoeuvre

with less chance of collateral damage; and

the relatively open nature of the countryside, in

comparison to the town, provides more scope for

mobile operations and the use, where these are

justified, of heavier weapons and aviation.

Rural communities are often small and isolated, thus they are

more vulnerable to local intimidation and are difficult to protect. For

this reason it is often easier to control a scattered rural community than

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

a neighbouring town. Also, even in areas where the authority of the

elected government is recognized, aggressive groups may be able to

operate with relative freedom because local people live in fear of

intimidation and reprisal. This gives rise to two broad types of rural

operations:

Those where control by the authorities still exists.

In this case relatively minor operations can be used

effectively to control if not eliminate the threat of

aggressive activity.

Those where authority has been so eroded that

officials can no longer move freely about their

business, and effective control of an area may even

lie in hostile hands. This calls for a wider scale of

operation with, possibly, the need for measures

falling not far short of those employed in full-scale

military operations.

Approach to Tasks. The planning principles for rural

operations are similar to those applying elsewhere, but because of the

necessarily greater dispersion of forces and the larger distances, more

emphasis has to be placed on the following:

Planning and Intelligence. All operations should

be carefully planned and controlled to make

optimum use of resources, and have to be based on

the best information and intelligence gained on

hostile tactics and habits.

Selectivity. Operations whilst being firm, positive

and effective, also have to be selective, and must be

seen to be so. Speculative area searches are often a

waste of time in a large rural area, and invite

ridicule.

Strength and Reserves. Mutual support is often

difficult to achieve, and security forces can easily

become isolated. Operations therefore must always

be mounted in sufficient strength to match the threat,

and in addition adequate reserves have to be

maintained at all times.

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Characteristics of the CCO Battlespace

Use of Aviation Patrols. Recent experience in

land-based operations has shown that good use has

been made of a separate aviation tactical area of

operational responsibility (TAOR), overlaid on one

or more ground unit areas. In the event of an

incident, the commander who is able to control the

incident more clearly would take control. This is

often the aviation patrol commander who can then

move resources to suitable locations to achieve the

task or resolve the incident.

MARITIME

CCO in support of maritime operations are expected to be

primarily land-based. Aggressive or intransigent crews of other ships

whose actions or inaction necessitate the use of boarding parties could

in certain instances be physically considered as a distinct type of

crowd; however, as the Master of a Vessel has legal jurisdiction over

his crew, there are very different dynamics involved. Tactics for

dealing with crowds in a maritime context follow the general

principles of CCO, but the tactical execution of boarding parties is

considered as a unique naval task that is best expanded upon in naval

procedures. Maritime operations usually involve relatively small

bodies of forces, although large numbers may be required if the

situation so dictates.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CROWDS

The greatest strengths of a crowd are its mass,

unpredictability, ability to mask combatants mixed in with civilians

and volatility. Exploitable weaknesses of a crowd are often its divided

commitment to sustained violence and the divided reasons for

participation. The potential lack of commitment by the majority of the

crowd will often permit it to be contained in certain areas (e.g. by

barriers) or influenced by actions such as the use of water cannons,

and dismounted or horse-mounted policemen. If the crowd is under

the influence of a limited number of agitators, the detection and

removal of these instigators could provide an influence on the crowd

behaviour out of proportion to the numbers involved. However, if the

crowd is highly motivated to ideals or spontaneously forming in

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

response to a grievance, they may have a commitment to violence that

will prevent small groups of forces from influencing them.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF OWN FORCES

The greatest strengths of own forces are organization,

discipline, training, initiative, authority, and will. Weaknesses that

may be exploited by the crowd include human nature, level of

experience, cultural differences and its knowledge of our tactics,

capabilities and ROE.

CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS

10.

Forces should be able to conduct CCO in domestic and

international contingency operations with minimal risk of casualties.

The CF objective is to train and equip to successfully control, achieve

mission success and disengage from crowd confrontation situations

without having to resort solely to the use of deadly force. It must be

emphasized that the CF intent is not to employ CF forces in a crowd

control role but to provide deployed CF elements with a capability to

deal with crowd confrontation situations in order to maintain force

protection and achieve mission success.

SECTION 2

THE NATURE OF CROWDS

GENERAL

11.

When civil actions become riots and civil disturbances,

civilian law enforcement authorities may request the assistance of the

CF. Today, most international operations involve forces from various

nations. When the forces of these nations are combined in executing a

particular operation, it is likely there are several perspectives on how

crowds involved in riots and civil disturbances should be controlled.

Multinational forces differ in their doctrine and training, especially in

the use of force. Because military forces may be called upon to assist

the police, it is necessary that all ranks understand the nature of

crowds and causes of riots. Any CF action must, however, be in

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Characteristics of the CCO Battlespace

keeping with operational orders and instructions and applicable

Canadian and international laws.

TERMINOLOGY

12.

The following are terms related to the nature of crowds:

Gathering. A gathering is a group of people in a

recognized area. Gatherings can be either legal or

illegal and may be orderly or disorderly. Any

gathering can begin orderly and become disorderly.

Orderly gatherings are generally not of concern, but

those with potential to become disorderly may

warrant monitoring. Disorderly gatherings are those

that exhibit increased violence and illegal activity.

For the purpose of this manual, large gatherings with

potential to impact on operations are termed crowds.

Crowd. A crowd is defined as a concentration of

people whose present or anticipated behaviour is

such that it requires action for the maintenance of

order. A crowd that meets according to local laws

and moves with no hostile intent is not illegal.

However, such a crowd has the potential to commit

criminal acts or to impact on CF operations. Every

crowd is different in its composition, attitude and

intent. This definition of a crowd is primarily

focused at a civilian body. The use of the term

“crowd” encompasses a plethora of other non-

doctrinal terms that previously were used to

demonstrate some subtlety. For example

disturbances, strikes, parades, legal and illegal

gatherings, and mobs could be argued as separate

bodies worthy of distinction. For the purposes of

doctrinal clarity, these may be considered as related

and interchangeable terms, but crowd will be

considered as the overarching term to include them

all. Two legally distinct crowds are demonstrations

and riots; they are described as follows:

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(1)

Demonstration. A demonstration is

defined as a crowd that is exhibiting

sympathy for or against authority, or some

political, economical, or social condition.

They may be legally sanctioned or illegal,

but the process of expression often has

statutory and constitutional protection.

Mass demonstrations constitute the

assembly of large crowds at a particular

place and time for a common purpose.

They may easily become violent through

the actions of agitators. Mass

demonstrations and related parades are

normally contained by police, who have

ample warning of the event because of the

wide publicity required to muster the

crowds.

(2)

Riot. A riot is an unlawful assembly that

has begun to disturb the peace. A crowd

can quickly lose control and develop into a

riot that may involve some members of the

crowd committing violence/crimes. This is

the worst-case scenario and involves

significant policing and security force

activities. Riots tend to be massive and

rioters normally significantly outnumber

riot control forces. Riots are often carefully

organized by faction leaders; they are not

just spontaneous outbursts by the local

populace and may involve large numbers of

women and children.

SECTION 3

CROWD DYNAMICS

CHARACTERISTICS OF CROWDS

13.

An understanding of the dynamics of crowds is pertinent to

all CCO. Characteristics of most crowds are:

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crowds are powerful and a product of natural human

organizational behaviour;

they generally form to accomplish a task;

they consist of either loose or tight knit groups;

the mood varies within the group;

there will be a single theme with sub-themes

present;

there may or may not be a leader;

individuals perceive themselves as anonymous; and

emotions within the crowd can be contagious.

TYPES OF CROWDS

14.

There are many academic classifications of crowds, but

generally, the following types of crowds are recognized:

Orderly. Orderly crowds for the purpose of CF

CCO doctrine are self-controlled, operate on reason,

lack instructional organization, have leaders willing

to keep peace, and hesitate to take group action.

Examples of orderly crowds are:

(1)

Casual. Casual crowds are self-controlled,

act as individuals, lack structure and

common purpose, have no leaders and

respond well to requests from authorities,

e.g. shoppers.

(2)

Cohesive. Cohesive crowds act as

individuals with unity of purpose at the

moment (an event), lack structure, have no

leaders nor dependence on others in crowd,

and as a rule respond well to firm requests

from authorities, e.g. hockey fans.

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(3)

Expressive. Expressive crowds are

generally in agreement about supporting a

position and have a common purpose, may

have some structure and control, usually

have identifiable leaders, and are generally

emotional but not normally aggressive, e.g.

political rallies.

(4)

Demonstrative. Demonstrative crowds are

ruled by reason as they continue to act as

individuals, have statutory and

constitutional protection, generally in

agreement about supporting a position and

have a common purpose, are organized

with identifiable leaders, and are generally

emotional, but disciplined and non-violent,

e.g. strikes, social action rallies.

(5)

Aggressive. Aggressive crowds are very

emotional, have individuals and groups

showing strong feelings or defiance, may

have identifiable leadership, may become

violent after losing control and could lead

to a disturbance.

Disorderly. Disorderly crowds have an active

nucleus, draw spectators, and are unpredictable.

Disorderly crowds are usually very emotional, often

progress to some form of aggressive action, are

bordering on violence, and could quickly develop

into a riot. They usually have identifiable militant

members agitating the crowd by taking leadership

and using other individual agitators circulating

through the crowd. Examples of disorderly crowds

are:

(1)

Acquisitive. Can be characterized by

random looting by individuals, often using

some other demonstration as a cover for the

casual vandalism and theft by individuals.

These actions may be started by an

instigator group as a cover for a specific

objective of that group.

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(2)

Panic. A panicked crowd is an end state of

some other activity. The authorities often

cause it when they attempt to disperse a

crowd, but it could also be caused by a

serious incident within the crowd —

deliberately or accidentally caused. A

panicked crowd lacks organization, purpose

or control, and involves frenzied people

exhibiting uncharacteristically uncontrolled

and violent behaviour. Commanders must

understand the nature of panic. Panic is

extreme fear that inspires unreasoned and

frantic efforts to reach safety. It is highly

contagious and can cause people to become

so irrational that their actions endanger

themselves and others. Some causes of

panic are:

(a)

Perceived Threat. The threat

may be real or imagined, but it is

usually so imminent that there is

no time to do anything but to try to

escape, or to acquire some

material goods considered

essential for survival.

(b)

Entrapment. Entrapment occurs

when the number of exits are

limited or become blocked or

congested, or the quantity of

essential material goods appears

limited.

(c)

Front-to-Rear Communication

Failure. When route(s) become

blocked and the people in the rear

believe them to be still

functioning, pressure develops to

crush and trample people at the

front.

(d)

Natural Disaster or Employment

of Weapons of Mass

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Destruction. People will panic

and rush to escape the effects,

often trampling others and

ignoring civilian authorities, who

are trying to organize an orderly

evacuation.

PHASES OF CROWDS

15.

Most crowds have the following four phases:

Pre-mobilization Phase. This phase includes the

period of time in which differences occur in society

as a result of the growth of beliefs that are opposed

to the established order. These differences and

beliefs may take days, months, years, or even

decades to develop. The distinguishing feature of

this phase is the emergence of militant leaders and

dissident groups.

Mobilization Phase. The mobilization phase is the

time when a crowd forms as a result of some

precipitating event or incident. This phase may last

a few hours or days. For crowds to become

aggressive there must be communication about some

event that heightens tension and furnishes excuses

for violent behaviour. Frequently, the immediate

cause of a crowd becoming violent may be a

forceful harangue or an inflammatory rumour.

Outburst Phase. This phase is the period of time

during which groups or individuals commit serious

breaches of the peace. This usually involves an

active core of participants, and in some instances

instigators, working within the usually larger, and

the normally rather passive, remainder of the crowd,

who are almost spectators. As the situation

deteriorates more and more spectators join the

participants. Violence becomes the chief

characteristic of the group behaviour of the crowd.

Concurrently, leaders and their immediate followers

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direct their activities against the controlling forces

and public or private institutions. Elements opposed

to this group may decide to react against them

during the outburst phase. A common approach is

the formation of groups to actively engage others by

means of violence to their persons or property.

Generally, the formation of such groups provokes an

escalation of conflict, which keeps tensions high,

prolongs the situation, and permits agitators on both

sides to create violent situations more readily.

Post-hostility Phase. This phase begins when

controlling forces end collective violence.

Precautionary measures are continued, and legal

action is initiated against offenders. Of immediate

concern to the military are the practical measures to

maintain law and order. The long-term measures

concerned with eliminating the conditions that led to

the unrest in the first place are the responsibility of

the civil authority.

CROWD DYNAMICS

16.

How Crowds Naturally Disperse. Normally crowds

dissipate when the purpose is achieved or any further potential is

exhausted. Most people leave in an orderly fashion and at normal

pace, but some groups disperse more slowly or hang around to see if

anything further develops. Experience shows that crowds wear

themselves out, and individual members of any crowd begin to tire and

elect to go home. Patience on the part of forces dealing with CCO

pays off in the long run because a naturally dispersing crowd will

normally minimize collateral damage, as well as personal injuries or

loss of life to the crowd and security forces dealing with the crowd.

17.

In the emotive situation of dealing with aggressive crowds it

is necessary to cover, generically, the various types of crowd situations

that may develop. These range from that of minor, and possibly,

routine aggressive behaviour of crowds to the larger and more

potentially serious situations when aggressive assemblies, prison riots,

or anti-authority demonstrations occur. It is necessary to record all

these details because every situation is different and the military

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commander should have a range of tactical options available to suit the

need. The size of a crowd is no indication of its attitude. They often

consist of many more peaceful citizens and sightseers than

troublemakers. However, a crowd that has confined itself to shouting

slogans and making noise can quickly become violent if it is joined by

violent elements or provoked by an injudicious show of force. The

presence of the following can indicate an impending disturbance:

Advance media promotion.

Groups of more than 50 people.

Groups comprised mostly of military-age persons.

The presence of two or more opposing groups within

the crowd.

Gatherings of counter-demonstrators, or persons

intending to oppose the movement.

The crowd begins to swell uncontrollably.

Gangs of youths usually lightly clothed and possibly

armed with sticks, stones or bottles that may be used

as petrol or acid bombs. They are likely to be

organized and even paid to provoke trouble to spark

off anti-authority or fractional feeling by using hit

and run tactics. They may be scattered in loose

formation within a crowd, or combined in gangs

which may be numbered in hundreds.

The presence of weapons or any expression of

hostile intent, as defined at subpara 3 of para 109 of

B-GG-005-004/AF-005 Use of Force in

CF Operations. Gunmen within the crowd or in the

surrounding buildings and side streets may aim not

only to cause casualties, but also to provoke the

security forces into firing at the crowd.

Women and children, or large bodies of school

children, either used separately or as a shield by the

crowd. Once again the main aim is provocation, in

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Characteristics of the CCO Battlespace

the hope that the security forces over-react. Any

over-reaction can subsequently be exploited.

18.

Each crowd is unique unto itself; however, there is a general

pattern of indicators that must normally be met if the crowd is to

become aggressive. These indicators are:

An injustice, real or imaginary, must exist with

which participants can identify and for which

responsibility can be assigned.

The nature of the injustice must be such that a

significant part of the community or organization

can be expected to participate.

Participants must believe, or be able to convince

others, that existing government or institutional

mechanisms are unable or unwilling to solve the

injustice, thereby creating antagonistic attitudes and

distorted beliefs in the community at large.

Space must be available for potential rioters to

assemble and means to incite violence must exist.

The leaders or agitators must be there encouraging

some degree of collective disorder as a form of

protest.

19.

Potential Conflict Sources. Internationally, each operational

theatre has varying sources of conflict that should be identified during

the OPP. Sources of social, political, economic, religious, ethnic,

gender, race or legal; conflict should be anticipated and monitored.

20.

Goals of Crowds. Crowds normally have main themes and

sub-themes that may develop. Each crowd’s goal is different, but

needs identification to assist in a peaceful resolution.

21.

Techniques of Agitators. During the pre-mobilization

phase, agitators accentuate differences of opinion within the

community by creating hostile attitudes and beliefs. As the situation

develops, the mobilization stage is reached, and demonstrations and

meetings are held to attract crowds. By applying knowledge of group

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psychology, the skilful agitator may be able to turn a crowd into a

militant force, leading to civil disorder or a disturbance. Some of the

techniques used by agitators are:

Propaganda. Through the use of extensive

propaganda, agitators can get crowds to assemble

that are already incensed at real or imagined

inequities. Members of such gatherings may be

vulnerable to the violence-producing techniques of

agitators. Propaganda can be promulgated through

such means as posters, leaflets, word of mouth and

public address systems. This form of propaganda

aims to aggravate existing prejudices, grievances,

and desires.

Inflammatory Speech. The inflammatory speech

by a speaker is probably the most effective method

of inciting a crowd to commit violence. A good

speaker, using key emotional and spiritual words

and phrases, exploiting local prejudices, distorting

facts, and using emphatic gestures, can influence a

crowd to do things from which they would normally

recoil. Others may aid the speaker by shouting or

chanting slogans, displaying signs or banners,

burning flags, staging incidents, circulating through

the crowd to talk up objectives or spreading

rumours. Normally, this technique follows a

sequence in which a high emotional pitch is

generated, then a course of action is suggested, and

finally the suggested course of action is justified.

Exploitation of a Hate Figure. The timely

appearance of an object or individual irritating to the

crowd can be just the spark to ignite violence.

Successful Violence. The successful

accomplishment of an act of violence can initiate a

chain reaction within an otherwise peaceful crowd.

Agitators can plan this initial event or exploit

unplanned events. Success is important for the

initiation of further violence, since failure would

dull individual interest.

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Rumour. Nothing can intensify disorder faster than

emotion-provoking rumours. Agitators use rumours

to further their aims. In addition, naive persons may

start rumours out of a sense of self-importance.

22.

When violence and illegal activities occur during

demonstrations, it may be the result of a counter-demonstration, or

may be associated with a few radical members of a group. Indications

of the presence of radical instigators may include activities such as:

Flash demonstrations for publicity and dispersing

before the arrival of security force or using

manufactured photographic evidence as proof of

security force brutality.

Women and children may be placed at the front of a

demonstration to embarrass the security force.

Attempts to weaken the security force line by baiting

members and inviting premature action by security

force or using diversionary tactics such as fires or

feigned attacks to divert attention from the true

objectives.

Disrupting security force supply line by attacking

vehicles, placing nails and obstructions on roadways

or attacking with incendiary devices.

Disrupting security force communications by cutting

off electric power, jamming telephone lines or

making false calls requesting police assistance.

Seizing and holding buildings may be attempted.

This often includes destruction of property.

23.

Potential Behaviour. Crowd Confrontation situations that

may involve the use of CF personnel could involve the threat of death,

serious injury or property damage. Specific acts of violence may take

many forms, limited only by the ingenuity of the perpetrators. Some

actions are intended to provoke responses, while others are intended to

heighten the sense of anarchy and feed the violence of the crowd

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behaviour. Some of the specific behaviour that may be directed at

military forces are:

Verbal and Written Abuse. Military forces should

be prepared for abuse that aims to provoke anger

and individual responses that may later be exploited

by the agitators or media as acts of brutality.

Noise. Noise, coupled with increasing excitement

and aggressiveness of crowd members, heightens

tensions, causes fatigue, and can erode the morale of

military forces. It also interferes with the command

of those forces.

Attacks on Forces and Equipment. Vehicles may

be overturned, set on fire, have their windows

broken, their tires slashed and punctured. Command

vehicles are often the objects of such attacks. The

same kind of violence may be directed at

fire-fighting or other public utility vehicles and their

equipment. While these are often symbols of

authority, they are also being attacked to provoke

responses.

Missiles. A variety of objects may be thrown or

dropped from rooftops, overpasses, or other tall

structures. Missiles may include local material such

as rocks and trash, and prepared items like Molotov

cocktails and acid.

Moving Vehicles. Vehicles may be used against

road blocks or military forces, or to block routes.

Property Damage and Looting. Violence may be

directed at private vehicles, residences, and

businesses to divert military forces or for personal

gain. Fire hydrants and power lines may be

damaged, and poles knocked down across streets to

impede the movement of military forces. Power

stations, water facilities, and telephone exchanges

may be destroyed or damaged.

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Characteristics of the CCO Battlespace

Demolitions and Explosives. An explosion could

be set off by the agitators, within the crowd to set off

panic or heighten the perceived belief of oppression

by the authority (they blame the bomb and killings

on the authorities), or against the security forces.

Weapons and Firearms. Small arms, or other

deadly weapons, may be used within and from

outside of the crowd. A range of weapons and

firearms may be employed from inside or outside of

crowds to disrupt the security forces, or on the

crowd by the crowd agitators in order to incite the

crowd, claim first use by the security forces and

provoke an indiscriminate deadly response against

the crowd. Responses by forces involved in CCO

must be carefully considered, planned and rehearsed.

NBC. A range of NBC weapons may be employed

to disrupt the security forces, or on the crowd by the

crowd agitators in order to incite the crowd and to

claim first use by the security forces. This may

include the employment of riot control agents and

improvised chemical biological and radiological

devices (ICBRD).

SECTION 4

CROWD LEADERSHIP

DEVELOPMENT OF CROWD LEADERS

24.

Some crowds have a previously identified leader who may be

a chief speaker, person with celebrity, or some other obvious

individual. However, leaders may also emerge from within the crowd

through actions or comments. Unfortunately, the removal of one

leader often results in the follow-on development of another. The

identification of these leaders is a key activity in CCO.

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ROLE OF CIVIC, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS

25.

The role and potential participation of political or religious

leaders in large assemblies is a significant consideration in planning a

CCO. These individuals often legitimize a crowd’s activities in the

minds of participants. They can be powerful agitators or maintainers

of orderly conduct. Crowd monitoring and intelligence preparation

can assist in assessing the impact of their participation. At the same

time, it is possible for the crowd to be influence and radicalized

despite the presence of these prominent leaders.

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CHAPTER 4

PLANNING FOR CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

The problem is to grasp, in innumerable special

cases, the actual situation, which is covered by the

mist of uncertainty, to appraise the facts correctly

and to guess the unknown elements, to reach a

decision quickly and then to carry it out forcefully

and relentlessly.

—Helmuth von Moltke

SECTION 1

GENERAL

Like all military operations, planning for CCO is a critical

requirement in order to achieve mission success. As well as planning

the immediate mission, planners must also consider the second and

third order effects that may occur as a result of actions either taken or

not taken. Local information, including cultural understanding of the

likely reactions of the population is also key.

SECTION 2

PLANNING PROCESSES

THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS AND CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

The OPP is a process that is valid and useful for CCO. As for

all operations, it should be incorporated into training and the execution

of operations when appropriate.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

AND CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) recognizes

the contiguous, multidimensional and often asymmetric aspects of the

battlespace and is a vital element for CCO. IPB is used for operations,

yet locations where CCO situations occur may not always be

battlefields. The keys to success in accomplishing CCO missions are

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the development of operational IPB prior to deployment and

aggressive gathering of intelligence information during the operation.

The importance of considering CCO within the IPB is significant

today as units deploy more frequently to peace operations. The

deployment of units into potentially hostile urban environments and

their subsequent employment against ambiguous threats make IPB

critical. The primary difference between IPB for conventional armed

conflict and that for peace support operations is the focus. A high

degree of detail is required to develop patterns that allow a predictive

analysis to emerge. To conduct threat analysis for possible civil

disturbances there may be a need for an enormous amount of

demographic information, or for the use of different sources of

information than are normally considered on other operations.

Specific differences between IPB for conventional operations and for

CCO need to be identified and incorporated into staff training.

Consequently, how to deal with CCO situations should be a key aspect

of every staff wargaming session before operation orders are

produced.

Information is the key to developing plans for appropriate

responses to CCO situations. Coordination must be made with local

authorities, local police, and, as applicable, with other agencies such as

the International Police Task Force (IPTF), and the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), local universities, libraries, newspaper archives

and similar sources should all be considered in order to develop the

depth of local knowledge that may be required to prepare for any

potential CCO. Each CCO situation must be viewed as a potential

flashpoint.

SECTION 3

PLANNING FOR CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

PREPARATORY PLANNING FOR CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

Preparations for Crowd Confrontation Situations. In

preparing for possible CCO there are considerations that are general,

and long-term, as well as mission-specific. The long-term

preparations would include receipt of guidance for CCO on the

particular operation, CCO specific ROE, conduct of training to the

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Planning for CCO

decreed level (for commanders, staff and forces), and acquisition,

provision and storage of equipment that may be required.

CCO Contingency Planning. Contingency planning is a

key to military success. In the CCO contingency planning process, it

is very important to conduct a legal analysis of the proposed operation

to ensure that CF members are operating within an established legal

framework and that their proposed actions are legally appropriate. If a

CCO is expected, the contingency plans should be reviewed and they

could cover:

The establishment of joint police and military

operational headquarters where this is appropriate.

Review of applicable ROE and consideration of

additional rules of engagement request (ROEREQ),

if necessary.

An assessment of the different types of disturbances

likely to develop, their probable locations and the

strengths and action needed to control or suppress

them and any likely tasks or roles the military forces

may have.

An assessment of the forces required for each

locality, and the earmarking of forces for each task.

The arrangements for representatives of the civil

authorities, who may be police officers, to

accompany the forces.

Joint reconnaissance, if possible down to platoon or

section level.

The channels and levels of authorities through which

requests for military assistance should be made.

An assessment of critical areas and centres of

communication which must be securely held.

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The collection of information/documentation by

photographic means or by written or tape-recorded

eye witness accounts.

Arrangements for detaining, handling, holding and

transfer.

The preparation of any special stores likely to be

needed, e.g. public address equipment, barbed wire,

kniferests, sandbags, fire fighting equipment and

emergency lighting.

The reception, accommodation and administration of

forces and reinforcements.

The rehearsal of procedures and the testing of

communications. In all areas where operations are

likely there should be specific military frequency

allocations so that radio can be used immediately on

arrival.

Provision of CCO equipment and maps for

reinforcing units.

Maintenance of handover briefings for commanders

of reinforcing units on arrival.

Plans to divert civil traffic, including the provision

for maintaining cleared routes for use by military

reinforcements.

The use of interpreters during deployment.

Post operation protocols.

Planning for CCO During Operations. The anticipation of

military responses to CCO situations during operations is important.

Concurrent information gathering, communications, and updating of

plans are worthwhile to help conduct CCO. Lessons learned should be

noted. Planning for CCO is covered in this chapter and the actual

conduct of CCO is described further in Chapter 5.

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Planning for CCO

Post CCO Activities. After the conduct of CCO, planning

for the next situation should continue. Information gathering should

continue amplified by effective CIMIC including a rapid transfer of

any assumed military responsibilities back to the civil authority. As

for all operations, a concerted and formalised approach to capturing

observations and processing them into lessons learned remains a vital

activity.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Coordination of effort with civil authority. Normally,

operations are conducted with, or in support of, the civilian law

enforcement authorities. These joint operations require coordination

of:

intelligence and information;

use of force procedures for each type of situation;

transfer of command authority;

communications compatibility;

detention, custody and evidence responsibilities and

procedures;

provision of accompanying police officers and

provision of representatives of the civil power;

tasking or allocation of pooled resources;

casualty evacuation;

media relations; and

joint rehearsals and training.

10.

Liaison. As for any operation, liaison is very important on

CCO. The collocation of military and civil command posts provides a

partial solution to the problems of command and control. Police and

fire stations should be used for joint command posts where possible, as

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

they are usually strategically located throughout the area and because

of their special communications facilities. The collocation of military

and police headquarters provides:

mutual coordination and liaison;

good communications;

centralization of information and intelligence;

facilities for joint operations; and

unity of effort.

11.

Military Records. Military action in support of the civil

authorities may be the subject of subsequent enquiry. It is therefore

essential to be able to establish what happened, and a complete record

must be kept of all events as they occur. Headquarters radio logs, or

similar war diary information, are important. The use of a pocket tape

recorder can eliminate the need for laborious note taking and provides

a convincing record for subsequent use. Commanders at all levels

must ensure that a record is made of such things as:

important events in chronological order;

details of any orders received and issued, either in

writing or orally;

the names of civil representatives or police officers

with which the commander has consulted;

details of any requests, proposals and advice given

by the civil authorities; and

reasons for decisions, subsequent action taken and

results.

12.

Ammunition. Ammunition of all natures must be strictly

controlled and accounted for. The control of ammunition is

particularly important because it provides a check on the number and

type of rounds expended and acts as a deterrent to careless handling or

unauthorized firing by forces.

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Planning for CCO

13.

Enabling Operations:

Personnel Support. Personnel support, especially

chaplain functions, are important in support of CCO.

Health Services Support. Health Services Support

remains important from a force protection point of

view. Its specific importance on CCO may be

limited depending on the threat and actual level of

contact with crowds, but its use in support of the

OPP for CCO remains valid.

Intelligence. Intelligence and counter-intelligence

are critical throughout planning and conduct of all

CCO.

Military Police. MPs are key to CCO. They can

assist in liaison with local police forces and can

advise on police issues related to CCO. MPs can

assist in training forces in preparation for CCO,

including: interface with police, detention,

roadblocks, personnel search, use of pepper spray

and batons.

Surveillance. Surveillance remains critical for CCO

as for any operation. It forms an integral part of the

OPP and of crowd monitoring.

Engineer. Engineers provide close support to the

CCO, with mobility support (e.g. removing

roadblocks, clearing mines), counter-mobility (e.g.

emplacing roadblocks), survivability (fortifications

for fixed accommodations, EOD) and sustainment

(living quarters, advising on building construction,

acquiring and running flood lights, water supply,

pumps for water).

Geomatics Support. While a subset of Engineer

support, the geomatics support teams (GST)

deployed with Canadian forces can provide a

multitude of tools, ranging from maps to digital

representations on monitors. They must be involved

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

early, through the Task Force (TF) Engineer staff, to

allow them to gather international, national and local

data. They are capable of providing innovative tools

for commanders and forces to aid in the

visualization of the ground (or urban area), and

decision-making aids. Some of the information

compilation takes time, but digital data allows the

expansion of the information as it is developed.

Hence, a clear articulation of priority of effort helps

the GST and staff.

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence.

NBCD may provide some benefits during CCO.

The current respirator protects against most police

riot control agents, but is not effective against most

toxic industrial materials (TIM). Improved NBC

detection equipment is being developed which will

provide for exposure monitoring in low-level

radiation environments. A serious capability

deficiency is the lack of equipment in field units to

detect TIM. Decontamination capabilities are being

developed which should be useful in cleaning up

after TIM are encountered or riot control agents are

used. NBCD officers at unit and formation level,

along with the Engineer and Medical staffs, can

provide advice on the hazard posed by TIM.

Airspace Control. The immediate importance of

airspace control may be limited depending on the

organization of the crowds, but its use in support of

CCO remains valid.

Air Defence. Depending on the threat, air defence

likely remains critical for CCO.

Identification of the Threat. The identification of

the threat and the selection and application of the

appropriate means and degree of force to counter

that threat will be derived from the commander’s

OPP.

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Planning for CCO

Logistic Support and Movement. Logistic support

and maintenance plans to support operations towards

crowd confrontation situations will be important and

must be considered from the unique perspective

required for CCO.

Public Affairs (PAff). Public affairs (PAff) for

CCO are critical to a mission’s success. A PAff

plan, coordinated with an IO campaign through an

Information Operations Coordination Cell, is

important for passing the correct information and

messages to internal and external audiences at home

as well as in the area of operations (AO). CCO are

high risk operations in term of attracting negative

media coverage but professional deportment by the

forces involved and effective PAff strategy can help

to counter this risk.

Civil-military Cooperation (CIMIC). CIMIC

supports CCO by providing a means for the

commander to influence the activities of the civilian

populace and the leaders. It also provides a means

of information gathering as well as obtaining

feedback from the populace on issues that allow the

commander to adjust his plans.

Communications and Information Systems (CIS).

Whenever forces are called to aid the local

authorities it is the responsibility of the military

commander, not the local forces, to see that they can

communicate with each other. Even though this

may be achieved by the provision of a radio set on

the local net for use by the military, or by attaching a

liaison officer, it is still a military responsibility to

see that it is done.

Command and Control Warfare (C2W) and

Electronic Warfare (EW). The use of C2W and

EW have a growing significance in CCO but in

Canada these may require a specific lawful

authorization. The increased dependence on

personal electronics by crowd organizers and

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

agitators requires careful consideration and

employment of this capability.

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). PSYOPS

can be effectively employed to influence, control

and disperse crowds. The use of PSYOPS within

CCO must be in accordance with a well-designed

IO plan.

THE OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS

14.

The operational lessons learned process is an essential part of

all operations. The collection of observations, their analysis and

identification of issues and their dissemination in order to learn the

lesson are also applicable to CCO. For further detail see

B-GG-005-004/AF-004 Force Employment.

SECTION 4

ORGANIZING FOR CROWD CONFRONTATION

OPERATIONS

ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE

15.

For each CCO situation, a commander has to design an

appropriate force based on an assessment of the threat, forces

available, and the operational orders and instructions received. This

process will allow the commander to integrate a full spectrum of

deadly and non-deadly force. Consequently, each CCO force will be

mission-specific. Similarly, the organization of the headquarters for

CCO will be mission-specific.

COMMAND AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS

16.

A well organized, supported, and informed C2 organization

with adequate communications and equipment and potentially

deployable infrastructure would be required. Once again, this

organization could be specially trained, equipped, and prepared for the

task or a dual-role.

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Planning for CCO

TRAINING

17.

As a unique operation, CCO will require specialized training

in the Use of Force Continuum and the employment of CF approved

NLW. Training for CCO across the spectrum of operations and within

the continuum of operations is in line with current CF training

methodologies. The inclusion of applicable CCO issues in individual

and collective training packages and as part of normal refresher and

mission-specific training may be required as part of national

directions. Training for operations is further covered in B-GG-005-

004/AF-000 CF Operations.

SECTION 5

ORGANIZATIONS FOR CROWD CONFRONTATIONS

TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS

18.

Types of Organizations. Generally, CCO forces are either

planned or ad-hoc:

Planned. Previously organized units are possible

and often preferable to deal with CCO situations.

Examples are:

(1)

Military Police. The use of MPs instead of

combat arms units would be preferable for

conducting necessary policing activities.

(2)

Military Specialized Unit. One type of

unit, which is effectively employed on

PSO, is the Military Specialized Unit

(MSU) in Task Force Bosnia Herzegovina

(TFBH). Canada does not have a role in,

nor will it contribute forces to such unit.

Such a unit is established and trained

specifically to act in a police role for

operations.

(3)

Re-rolled Unit. By exception a re-rolled

unit could be specifically trained and

planned for this unconventional role. This

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

is unlikely to happen, and would require

extensive preparation and equipping.

Ad-hoc. Previously organized units to deal with

CCO situations may not be possible within

deployment ceilings or not preferable as a result of

the mission analysis. If the potential for CCO exists

then an earmarked force must be trained, rehearsed

and prepared to react to CCO situations. Possible

examples include but are not limited to the

following:

(1)

Immediate Reaction Unit (IRU). An IRU

of a sub-unit to unit size could be identified

to train on a rotational basis for CCO tasks.

(2)

Task-Tailored Force. A force could be

drawn from existing sub-units and units

through the normal orders process and

groupings and tasks in reaction to

unforeseen CCO activities. The possibility

of this option would be mission-specific.

(3)

Quick Reaction Force (QRF). A force of

platoon to company size could be

permanently earmarked as a QRF to

respond to unforeseen emergencies

including potential CCO duties.

COMPONENTS OF A DEPLOYED FORCE

19.

Possible Components of a Deployed Force. Whether the

deployed force is trained for CCO, is planned, or is ad hoc, the

components of a force may differ between domestic and international

contingency operations. In some situations the police forces may be

well organized and equipped to deal with crowd disorders. In

addition, new tactics and weapons (possibly non-lethal) indicate that

all forms of dealing with disturbances should be rigorously examined

and rehearsed before being taken into use.

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Planning for CCO

20.

A military force designed to conduct CCO, especially crowd

control, crowd dispersal, and crowd manoeuvring should normally

have the following four components. The relative strength of each

component to the other components depends entirely on the situations

and the role allocated to the military force. These components are:

a baseline force;

an detaining force where appropriate;

an anti-sniper screen; and

a reserve.

BASELINE FORCE

21.

The baseline is a barrier from which action may be taken

against crowds, and behind which reorganization can take place. It

consists of a combination of vehicles and soldiers on foot carrying a

mix of weapons and shields. The line should be able to move

forwards or backwards whilst retaining a blocking capability. There

may be occasions, however, when the aim of the baseline is to remain

static, and in such instances there could be kniferests or some other

form of barricade in place of vehicles. The baseline is invariably

established as the first stage of controlling a crowd and serves as the

mainstay in dispersal or suppression tasks. Possible uses are:

Holding ground while the detaining force, in the

form of snatch squads, operates either through it or

around its flanks.

To move forward as an entity and in conjunction

with snatch squads, disperse the crowd, by forcing it

back.

Blocking or containing a crowd.

Keeping two opposing crowds apart.

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

Holding ground on flanks and side roads while the

main police force carry out blocking or dispersal

operations in the area of maximum trouble.

Acting as a back up to the police and moving

forwards or backwards behind the police while they

disperse the crowd in front of the baseline. In this

instance, the baseline also acts as a line behind

which the police can fall to reorganize before

recommencing operations.

22.

Baseline Force Composition. It should be noted that the

actual strengths and mix of weapons depend on each situation and

should be decided upon during the OPP. A suggested organization for

a platoon sized baseline is:

Two teams of shield personnel carrying shields and

batons. They will not be armed and will wear

helmets with visors down.

One team providing batons or any other non-lethal

systems in support of the shield line.

One team providing close anti-sniper protection and

lookouts for acid, petrol and blast bombs.

One team as snatch squad (or if provided from

elsewhere, the team can be used as extra shield

personnel).

One team (Commander's Team) including platoon

commander and platoon 2IC with two soldiers to put

out soldiers on fire, splash down acid bomb victims

with water and act as re-supply runners. They may

also be used to escort any detainee as applicable.

DETAINING FORCE

23.

Military forces may be required to detain persons either when

working in collaboration with the police or in isolation, as detention

sometimes is the only really effective means to force the dispersal of a

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Planning for CCO

crowd. This is the subject of specific operational direction and

clarification of peace officer status in domestic operations. Individuals

may be designated as the detaining force or a snatch squad may be so

empowered.

Snatch Squads. If snatch squads are used to effect

detention, the actual number and composition of

each would be dependent on the situation and the

number of forces available at the time. An escort

with a rifle may also be nominated as additional

anti-sniper cover for a snatch squad in those

circumstances where there is a reasonable

apprehension of a threat of death or serious injury

against CF or police personnel. Such cover would

normally be provided within the overall area plan for

protection. Snatch squads for CCO should be

carefully briefed on the following points:

(1)

Detention procedures, such as cautioning,

are legally required to assist in conviction.

(2)

The further forward they move from the

baseline—the more vulnerable they

become. A limit of exploitation should be

given.

(3)

Detain only one individual at a time: the

squad commander should make the

selection.

(4)

The dangers of splitting up.

(5)

The value of speed of action.

Employment of Snatch Squads. To dominate a

CCO situation, it may be necessary to actually

detain personnel who are leading the civil

disturbance. An instigator is identified as a person

that is "prodding" others to commit disruptive acts,

or the one who is orchestrating the group. Often, an

instigator carries a bullhorn or hand-held radio.

Lessons learned indicate that forcibly snatching

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

instigators from demonstrations or riots can alleviate

the organized violence of a crowd. The exit from

the baseline has to be decisive and unannounced.

The detention should be conducted very swiftly.

The smallest unit that can employ the “snatch-and-

grab” technique is a platoon. Before a platoon

deploys, a four-soldier snatch-and-grab team should

be identified. Two of the soldiers secure the

individual and two provide security. Once an

instigator is identified in a aggressive crowd, the

snatch-and-grab team deploys into the crowd and

grabs the assailant and pulls him back behind the

friendly picket line.

It is imperative that the four-man snatch-and-grab

team wears the helmet with face shield down and

fragmentation vest, but the team should not bring

weapons with them into the crowd. Only batons

should be carried into the crowd by the two-man

security team. The snatch-and-grab team needs to

remain in contact with the adjacent soldiers on the

line formation as they pass through. That formation

should remain ready to respond to any crowd actions

that threaten the snatch-and-grab team. Once the

snatch-and-grab team has apprehended the riot

instigator, it needs to go directly to a secure location

out of the crowd's line of sight.

Processing Detained Persons. In addition to the

snatch squads, it may be necessary (if this is not

being handled by the police) to have a detention

grouping to process detainees. Whilst correct

procedures and continuity of evidence are essential,

all involved must be aware of the necessity to move

a detained persons to police custody as soon as

possible. Once again, it cannot be assumed that CF

personnel involved in CCO automatically have the

authority to detain.

Interrogation. In CCO, detainees will normally be

processed and expeditiously passed to the local civil

authority. Any questioning or interrogation can only

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Planning for CCO

be conducted when specifically authorized and by

qualified CF personnel in accordance with CF policy

and doctrine.

Future Action. Finally, and especially if the police

is not present, full use should be made of video and

photography of the disturbance for further action by

the appropriate civil authorities.

ANTI-SNIPER SCREEN

24.

A military force could be requested to provide anti-sniper

cover for CCO, even those conducted by police forces. Military

snipers normally operate in teams of two: an observer and a firer. The

observer locates and identifies targets, gives fire correction, protects

the firer and handles communications. Sniper operations are described

further below in Special Tasks.

RESERVE

25.

Formation and Maintenance of a Reserve. As in any

military operation, a reserve is essential to afford flexibility to the

commander. The reserve should be positioned centrally, and must be

prepared for any task from thickening up the baseline to providing

extra anti-sniper cover or additional snatch squads. It must be mobile

and equipped to cover any eventuality. The formation and

maintenance of a reserve is a difficult but necessary requirement. A

reserve at the section and platoon levels is not normally feasible, but is

essential at the company level and higher. Ideally, command of

reserves rests at the level held, e.g. a company commander's reserve is

a component of the battalion commander's reserve. The

inter-relationship must be clear and all agencies must be advised when

reserves are committed.

26.

The reserve must be given clear orders concerning:

its role;

its possible and probable tasks;

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

special equipment and training required; and

limitations, if any, on reconnaissance, briefing, and

rehearsal.

27.

Some of the factors affecting reserves are the priority of

tasks, time and space, communications and duration of the emergency.

Commanders must also consider the following:

Rotation. The same forces should not remain

continuously in this role.

Off-duty Personnel. Personnel on rest must be

used in an emergency but they are not reserves, as

their primary task still has to be done.

Reconstituting the Reserve. When a reserve is

committed, a commander regroups or calls for

external reinforcement, to immediately reconstitute a

reserve.

28.

Establishment of an Administrative Area. The

establishment of an administrative area for the reserve, logistics or

dealing with detainees may be useful on CCO. Areas where forces

live, eat and rest in security and out of public view, should be located

inside or near the unit or sub-unit area of responsibility (AOR),

whenever possible. Armouries are often suitable, but other public

buildings such as schools, fire halls, police stations, or sports centres

can be used. In selecting a location, the following points should be

considered:

security of personnel and equipment;

living, sanitation and water facilities;

communication facilities;

proximity of the unit or sub-unit AOR; and

troop comfort.

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 49