Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 24

 

  Index      Manuals     Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

 

Search            copyright infringement  

 

   

 

   

 

Content      ..     22      23      24      25     ..

 

 

 

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 24

 

 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Basic Internet Search Techniques  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

I-3 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

use to search for information.  Once identified, the analyst or collector records these search terms and uses 
them to locate information within the Internet. 

Example

:

 If a unit is planning a humanitarian assistance operation in the Sudan, the specific IR 

may be “Where are refugee concentrations in the Sudan?”  The task for the analyst could be, 
“Locate the humanitarian relief organizations operating food distribution centers in the Sudan,” 
“Locate population centers in the Sudan,” “Locate concentrations of militia forces in the 
Sudan,” and “Identify areas of militia operations in the Sudan that occurred in the last 30 days.”  
The location of NGO aid centers, food, water, and hostile paramilitary forces are possible 
indicators of where refugees may or may not concentrate.  Based on the SIRs and indicators, the 
search objective is to locate refugee concentrations based on the position of food and militia 
forces in the Sudan.  The indicators that may be useful search terms include:  Sudan, refugee, 
humanitarian relief, food distribution, militia, and water sources.   

I-8.

 

After determining the focus and keywords, the intelligence personnel use an Internet browser to 

connect to a previously identified Internet site.  If there are no previously identified sources, the analyst or 
collector can connect to a communications or service site to collaborate with other analysts or use a search 
engine to identify Internet sites, respectively.  Since search engines do not index the entire Internet, the 
communications capabilities of the Internet are important means of collaboration with authors, experts, 
points of contact, and other people who know the information or have the information stored in off-line 
databases or hardcopy.  

CONDUCT

 

SEARCH 

I-9.

 

Intelligence personnel should avoid the temptation of using one favorite search engine to the exclusion 

of others.  Each search engine has its strengths and weaknesses.  Organizational standards, research 
experience, and peer recommendations guide the selection of which search engine to use in any particular 
situation.  Generally, a thorough search often requires the use more than one search engine and even then, 
the information may not be complete.  As a rule, if a trained analyst or collector cannot find the 
information using multiple search engines and common search techniques within 30 minutes, it is possible 
that the information is not on the Internet, not indexed, or not in a retrievable format.  At that point, the 
analyst or collector should seek assistance from other personnel, digital but non-Internet resources such as 
commercial and in-house databases, and non-digital resources available at government or university 
libraries. 

Search Engines 

I-10.

 

Intelligence personnel use search engines and search terms to locate Internet sites and find 

information within the Internet site.  Search engines allow the user to search for text and images in millions 
of web pages.  The different commercial and government search engines vary in what they search, how 
they search, and how they display results.  Most search engines use programs called webcrawlers to build 
indexed databases.  A webcrawler searches Internet sites and files and saves the results in a database.  The 
search engine, therefore, is actually searching an indexed database not the content of the site or an online 
database.  The search results also vary between search engines because each engine uses different 
webcrawlers and searches different sites.  Most engines display search results in order of relevancy with a 
brief description and a hyperlink to the referenced Internet file or site.   

z

 

Webcrawler.

 Search engines have an index database built by a webcrawler.  The webcrawler or 

spider is a different application than the search engine.  The crawler is like some voracious 
monster with an insatiable appetite, it roams the Internet 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 
searching for information.  Once it finds a Website, it then indexes and saves it in a database 
relevant to the search engine.  Some search engines have their own spiders while others use 
commercial contracted spider programs to develop their databases.  In addition, each spider may 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Appendix I  

I-4 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

use a different approach to acquiring data.  One spider may be programmed to research only the 
titles of webpages and the first few lines of text.  Other spiders research virtually the entire 
website with the exception of graphics or video files.  Because search engines may use different 
webcrawler software with different ways to index and save data, each separate search engine 
may yield different results.  Also, the search engine provider can supplement or alter the spider 
software’s index to ensure the website of specific customers appears in the index.   

z

 

Relevancy Formulas.

 The relevancy formula evaluates how well the query results match the 

request.  For webpages that are commercially oriented, designing the page to achieve the highest 
ranking has become an art form.  For some search engines, the process is simple, the higher the 
bid, the higher the site’s ranking.  Search engines are continually changing their relevancy 
formulas in order to try to stay ahead of web developers.  Some web designers, however, load 
their sites with words like “free,” “money” or “sex” in an attempt to influence the search 
engine’s relevancy formula.  Other web designers engage in practices called “spamdexing” or 
“spoofing” in an attempt to trick the search engine.  The significance of the relevancy formulas 
to the user is the importance of understanding that the keyword in the search does not 
necessarily yield the same results with every search engine.  This becomes obvious when the 
user considers that relevancy formulas vary from search engine to search engine and are in a 
constant state of evolution.  In some formulas, the placement of the keywords yields different 
results if rearranged because the search engine’s relevancy formula places more emphasis on the 
first words in the search string.  Relevancy formulas may also assume importance depending on 
the type of search being done.  For instance, a field-search, which is limited to the webpage 
itself (for example,  title, URL, and date) may be more critical than a full-text search. 

I-11.

 

As search engines evolve, some engines have become adept at finding specific types of information 

such as statistical, financial, and news more effectively than other engines.  To overcome this 
specialization, software engineers developed the metasearch engine.  The metasearch engine allows the 
user to query more than one search engine at a time.  On the surface this would seem to be the final answer 
to the search question; just query all search engines at one time.  Unfortunately, it is not quite that easy.  
Since it must be designed to work with all search engines that it queries, the metasearch engine must strip 
out each search parameter to the lowest common denominator of each search engine.  For example, if a 
particular search engine cannot accommodate phrases in quotation marks or a type of Boolean function 
then the metasearch engine will eliminate that function from the search.  The resulting search, in many 
instances, then becomes too broad and less useful than a well-formatted search using a search engine that 
the user is familiar with and that is known to be good at locating the type of information required. 

I-12.

 

With an understanding how search engines work, intelligence personnel–– 

z

 

Conduct an initial search using unique key words or key word combinations and, if possible, 
multiple search engines.  Avoid using one search engine to the exclusion of others. 

z

 

Evaluate the relevance and accuracy of the search results to research objectives, indicators, and 
search parameters.  Do not rely on the relevancy formula of the search engine, particularly 
commercial search engines, to list the most relevant information source at the top of the list. 

z

 

Conduct follow-on searches using refined terms and methods.  Refining terms includes inverting 
the word order, changing the case, searching common misspellings, correcting spelling, and 
adjusting search terms.  Refining search methods includes searching within results that are 
similar to the desired information.    

Search by Keyword 

I-13.

 

In keyword-based searches, the intelligence personnel should consider what keywords are unique to 

the information being sought.  The analyst or collector needs to determine enough keywords to yield 
relevant results but not so many as to overwhelm them with a mixture of relevant and irrelevant 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Basic Internet Search Techniques  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

I-5 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

information.  They should also avoid common words such as “a,” “an,” “and,” and “the” unless these 
words are part of the title of a book or article.  Most search engines ignore common words.  For example, if 
looking for information about Russian and Chinese tank sales to Iraq, the analyst or collector should not 
use tank as the only keyword in the search.  Instead, they should use additional defining words such as 

Russian Chinese tank sales Iraq.

” 

I-14.

 

In some search engines, Boolean and Math logic operators help the analyst or collector establish 

relationships between keywords that improve the search.  Using the operators listed in Table I-2, the search 
engine searches for Russian and tank together when the analyst or collector places the words within 
parenthesis; (for example, 

Russian tank).

  If they want to exclude Chinese tank sales from the search 

result then he uses 

(Russian tank)

 

NOT (Chinese tank) sale Iraq 

in the search.  The analyst or collector 

can also use a “NEAR” search when the relationship and the distance between the terms are well 
established.  For example, if the analyst or collector is looking for incidents of earthquakes in Pakistan and 
news articles normally place the placename of the location of an attack within five words of “earthquake” 
in the title of body of the article then they use earthquake NEAR/5 Pakistan in the search. 

Table I-2. Boolean and math logic operators 

Search in Natural-Language 

I-15.

 

An alternative to using a keyword search is the natural language question format.  Most of the major 

search engines allow this capability.  The analyst or collector obtains the best results when the question 
contains good keywords.  One of the major downsides to this technique is the large number of results.  If 
the needed information is not found in the first few pages then they should initiate a new search using 
different parameters.     

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Appendix I  

I-6 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

R

EFINE 

S

EARCH

 

I-16.

 

Normally, the first few pages of search results are the most relevant.  Based on these pages, the 

analyst or collector evaluates the initial and follow-on search to determine if the results satisfied the 
objective or requires additional searches.  During evaluation, they compare–– 

z

 

Relevancy of the results to the objective and indicators. 

z

 

Accuracy of the results to search parameters (keywords, phrase, date or date range, language, 
format). 

z

 

Results from different search engines to identify missing or incomplete information (for 
example, one engine’s results include news articles but another engine does not). 

Modify the Keyword 

I-17.

 

If initial search attempts are unsatisfactory, the analyst or collector can refine the search by             

changing the following:  

z

 

Order.

  Search engines may place a higher value or more weight on the first word or words in a 

multiple word or phrase search string.  Changing the word order from “insurgents Iraq” to “Iraq 
insurgents” may yield different search results.   

z

 

Spelling/Grammar.

  Search engines attempt to match the exact spelling of the words in the 

search string.  There are search engines that do recognize alternate spellings or prompt the user 
to correct common misspellings.  Changing the spelling of a word from the American-English 

center

” to the British-English “

centre

” may yield different results.  Changing the spelling of a 

transliterated name from “

Al-Qaeda

” to “

al-Qaida

,” “

al-Qa'ida

,” “

el-Qaida

,” or “

al Qaeda

” 

generates different results that may be useful depending upon the objective of the search.  Some 
search engines provide this capability for a “sounds like-type” search that eliminates or reduces 
the manual entry of each variation. Looking for common misspellings or common, 
grammatically incorrect, short phrases may be useful in yielding results from a source for which 
English is a second language or the language of the webpage is in a second language for the web 
designer or web contributor. 

z

 

Case

.  Search engines may or may not support case sensitive searches.  Like spelling, some 

engines attempt to match the word exactly as entered in the search.  The intelligence personnel 
should use all lowercase letters for most searches.  When looking for a person’s name, a 
geographical location, a title, or other normally capitalized words then the intelligence personnel 
should use a case sensitive search engine.  Changing the case of a word from “

java

” to “

JAVA

” 

changes the search result from sites about coffee to sites about a software program.  

z

 

Variants.

  Intelligence personnel use terms that are common to their language, culture, or 

geographic area.  Using variants of the keyword such as changing “policeman” to “

cop

,” 

bobby

,” “

gendarme

,” “

carabiniere

,” “

policía

,” “

politzei

,” or other form may improve search 

results. 

Search Within Results 

I-18.

 

If the initial or follow-on search produces good but still unsatisfactory results, the analyst or 

collector can search within these results to drill down to the webpages that have a higher probability of 
matching the search string and containing the desired information.  Most of the popular search engines 
make this easy by displaying an option such as “search within these results” or “similar pages” that the user 
can select.  Selecting the option takes the analyst or collector to webpages with additional, related 
information. 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Basic Internet Search Techniques  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

I-7 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Search by Field 

I-19.

 

In a field search, the analyst or collector looks for the keywords within the URL as opposed to 

searching the entire Internet.  The best time to use a field search is when the search engine returned a large 
number of webpages.  While capabilities vary by search engine, some of the common field search 
operators are–– 

z

 

Anchor:  Searches for webpages with a specified hyperlink. 

z

 

Domain:  Searches for specific domains (see Table I-3 or visit 

http://www.iana.org

). 

z

 

Like:  Searches for webpages similar or related in some way to specified URL. 

z

 

Link:  Searches for specific hyperlink embedded in a webpage. 

z

 

Text:  Searches for specific text in the body of the webpage. 

z

 

URL:  Searches for specific text in complete Web addresses.  

I-20.

 

With the millions of URLs on the web, the analyst or collector is faced with a myriad of sites that 

may or may not actually be produced and maintained by the type of organization represented by the 
majority of web pages in that domain (see Table I-3). Certain domains, such as “.mil,” “.edu,” and “.gov” 
are consistently reliable as being administered and authored by those organizations. Several domains have, 
over the years of ever-increasing numbers of Internet participants, become highly suspect as to the validity 
of the organization using such a domain extension.  In particular, the open source information gatherer 
must not take “.org,” “.info,” or “.net” extensions as necessarily produced by a bona fide organization for 
that domain.  Each country has a two-digit digraph and registers domains with Internet Assigned Number 
Authority (

http://www.iana.org

).  The country digraph is important because it indicates the site in another 

country.  For example, .uk (United Kingdom) has more than a billion sites indexed; .cn (China) has 700 
million sites; .fr (France) has more than 600 million sites, while the domains you listed have fewer than a 
million sites each (for instance, .aero, .jobs, .museum, .pro). 

Search in Cache and Archive 

I-21.

 

Sometimes a search or an attempt to search with results returns a URL that matches exactly the 

search objective but when the analyst or collector tries to link to the site, the link or the site is no longer 
active.  If the search engine captures data as well as the URL locator, they can select “cached” link to 
access the original data.  Another technique is search in an Internet archive site such as www.archive.org 
for the content.  The analyst or collector needs to be aware that this information is historical and not subject 
to update by the original creators. 

Truncate the Uniform Resource Locator 

I-22.

 

In addition to using the search engine to search within results, the analyst or collector can also 

manually search within the results by truncating the URL to a webpage.  The analyst or collector works 
backward from the original search result to the webpage or homepage containing the desired information 
or database by deleting the end segments of the URL at the “/” forward slash.  This technique requires a 
basic understanding of how webpage designers structure their webpage. 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Appendix I  

I-8 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

Table I-3. Top-level domains 

 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Basic Internet Search Techniques  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

I-9 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

RECORD RESULTS 

I-23.

 

Intelligence personnel must save the search results that satisfy the research objective.  Saving the 

results enables the analyst or collector to locate the information later as well as to properly cite the source 
of the information in intelligence reports and databases.  While printing a hardcopy is an option, a softcopy 
(electronic) record of the search results provides a more portable and versatile record.  Also, some 
intelligence organizations have software tools specifically designed for creating a complete record of the 
webpage content and metadata.  The following are some basic techniques for saving an electronic record of 
the search results. 

z

 

Bookmark.

  Bookmark the link to the webpage using the “bookmarks” or “favorites” option on 

the Internet browser.  

z

 

Save Content.

  Save all or a portion of the webpage content by copying and pasting the 

information in text document or other electronic format such as a field within a database form.  
The naming convention for the softcopy record should be consistent with unit electronic file 
management standards.  As a minimum, the record should include the URL and retrieval date 
within the file. 

z

 

Download Files.

  Download audio, image, text, video, and other files to the workstation.  The 

naming convention for the softcopy record should be consistent with unit electronic file 
management standards.    

z

 

Save Webpage.

  Save the webpage as .mht, .pdf, .doc, .html––or other specified format––that 

creates a complete, stable record of the webpage content.  It may be necessary to include the 
date and time in the file name in order to ensure a complete citation for the information.   

z

 

Record Source.

  As a minimum, record the author or organization, title, publication or posting 

date, retrieval date, and URL locator of the information in a citation format that is consistent 
with the American Psychological Association and Modern Language Association style manuals.  
The following is an example of a American Psychological Association citation for an Internet 
document: 

BBC News (2005). Sudan: A Nation Divided. Retrieved 16 May 2005 from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/africa/2004/sudan/default.stm 

z

 

Identify Intellectual Property.

  Identify intellectual property that an author or an organization 

has copyrighted, licensed, patented, trademarked, or otherwise taken to preserve their rights to 
the material.  Some webpages list the points of contact and terms of use information at the 
bottom of the site’s homepage.  When uncertain, intelligence personnel should contact their 
supporting Judge Advocate General office before publishing information containing copyrighted 
or similarly protected intellectual property. 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

J-1 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Appendix J 

Operational Environment Assessment 

J-1.

 

Open source research, coupled with an understanding of the COE, is the basis for an operational 

environment assessment.  An operational environment assessment is a technique designed to apply the 
COE variables to a specific region, nation states, or non-state actors.  It encompasses all the conditions, 
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and the decisions of the unit 
commander.  The operational environment assessment consists of a detailed examination and analysis of 
the eleven critical variables of the COE, their interaction and reciprocal relationships.  Based on this 
analysis, the operational environment assessment identifies trends and issues with which units may have to 
grapple during their planning, preparation for, and execution of operations.  As an unclassified document 
(in whole or part), the operational environment assessment also serves as a useful tool for individual and 
collective training during preparation for operations in a specific area. 

J-2.

 

Every operational environment is complex, dynamic, and multi-dimensional.  An operational 

environment assessment provides a detailed look at a specific operational environment in terms of the 
eleven critical variables and their impacts.  It identifies the critical relationships between the variables in 
the operational environment, how they affect one another, and how this affects military operations.  Some 
variables are dependent variables, whose value is determined by that of one or more other variables.  For 
each dependent variable, the assessment identifies the most significant independent variables that are 
linked to it and shows their impact on the dependent variable under investigation.   

J-3.

 

To understand any operational environment, one needs to study and understand the synergy and 

interaction of variables and their reciprocal influence on one another.  Within the analysis by variables, the 
operational environment assessment identifies key actors (nation-state and non-state) and assesses their 
impact on the operational environment.  This analysis of variables and actors helps to identify relevant 
trends and issues in the operational environment over time.  Given the dynamic and fluid nature of the 
operational environment under investigation, an operational environment assessment requires continuous 
updates and additions in order to remain current and relevant. 

CRITICAL VARIABLES 

J-4.

 

Open source research must address the eleven critical variables that describe the conditions in the 

potential operational environment.  Collectively, these variables provide a complete framework for 
thoroughly assessing and understanding the complex and ever-changing combination of conditions, 
circumstances, and influences that affect military operations in any given real-world operational 
environment.  While these variables can be useful in describing the overall (strategic) environment, they 
are most useful in defining the nature of specific operational environments.  The variables do not exist in 
isolation from one another.  The linkages of the variables cause the complex and often simultaneous 
dilemmas that a military force might face.  Only by studying and understanding these variables—and their 
dynamic and complex combinations and interactions—will the US Army operational and tactical forces be 
able to keep adversaries from using them against them or to find ways to use them to its own advantage. 

J-5.

 

The eleven critical variables shown in Figure J-1 are discussed below. 

z

 

Physical Environment. 

The physical environment defines the physical circumstances and 

conditions surrounding and influencing military forces and the execution of operations.  The 
defining factors include urban settings and other complex terrain, all relevant infrastructures, 
weather, topography, hydrology, and environmental concerns. 

 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Appendix J  

J-2 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

z

 

Nature and Stability of the State (or Other Critical Actors).

 It is important to understand the 

nature and stability of the state or states with which or in which military operations take place. 
This variable, however, refers to the internal cohesiveness of the various political actors (nation-
states as well as non-state actors) with respect to the population, economic infrastructures, 
political processes, military and/or paramilitary forces, authority, goals, and agendas. 

Figure J-1.  Critical variables of the operational environment 

z

 

Sociological Demographics.

 Sociological demographics refer to the traits and trends that have 

an impact on the human population of a particular group, area, country, or region.  This includes 
its cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup. 

z

 

Regional and Global Relationships.

 Regional and global relationships include political, 

economic, military, or cultural mergers and partnerships.  An actor’s membership in or 
allegiance to such a relationship can determine its actions in terms of support, motivation, and 
alliance construct. 

z

 

Military (or Paramilitary) Capabilities.

 The military or paramilitary capabilities of various 

actors in the operational environment are a key concern.  This variable includes such factors as 
equipment, manpower, training levels, resource constraints, and leadership issues.  The military 
variable interacts with the other variables, and all the other variables can affect military and 
paramilitary capabilities. 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Operational Environment Assessment  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

J-3 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

z

 

Technology.

 Technology represents the level or sophistication of technologies an actor could 

bring to the operational environment.  Their level of integration and exploitation, and any niche 
technologies are important. 

z

 

Information. 

Information involves the access, use, manipulation, distribution, and reliance on 

information technology systems, both civilian and military, by a nation-state or non-state entity. 
Information technology is the systems or mechanisms for preserving or transmitting 
information. 

z

 

External Organizations.

 External organizations refer to those entities found in an operational 

environment, which come from outside the confines of that specific operational environment but 
could impact the battlefield and related battlespace.  Such impact could be both positive and 
negative in nature—at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and across the entire 
spectrum of conflict.  An understanding of each group’s varying and dynamic agendas, media 
philosophies, and international connections can be critical to the success of any military 
endeavor. 

z

 

National Will (or Actors’ Will).

 Will encompasses a unification of values, morals, and effort 

between the population, the leadership or government, and the military or paramilitary forces. 
Through this unity, all parties are willing to sacrifice individually for the achievement of the 
unified goal.  The interaction of military actions and political judgments, conditioned by 
national will, further defines and limits the achievable objectives of a conflict, thereby 
determining its duration and conditions of termination.  It is imperative to study not just the 
national will of the state actors but also the will of the non-state actors (such as ethnic groups, 
political groups, insurgents, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations) involved in the 
operational environment.  The will of non-state actors often affects the environment more 
significantly. 

z

 

Time. 

The time available for commanders to accomplish missions is determined by the goals 

and associated milestones established by the national political leadership.  It is within this 
“timeframe” that all the elements of power—diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic—must operate to achieve national objectives.  How much time is available and how 
long events might take will affect every aspect of military planning, to include force package 
development, force flow rate, quality of intelligence preparation of the AO, and the need for 
forward-deployed forces and logistics.  Time is often in favor of actors other than the US and its 
friends and multinational or coalition partners.  Such actors often can afford to prolong the 
conflict and try to outlast the US will to continue operations in a particular operational 
environment. 

z

 

Economics.

 There may be significant differences among nation-states, organizations, or groups, 

regarding how they produce, distribute, and consume goods and services.  Being able to affect 
another actor, positively or negatively, through economic rather than military means may 
become the key to regional hegemonic status or dominance.  Economic deprivation is also a 
major cause of conflict. One actor may have economic superiority over another for many 
reasons, including access to natural resources or energy.  Control of and access to natural or 
strategic resources can cause conflict.  Military personnel operating in this complex environment 
may need to look beyond political rhetoric to discover a fundamental economic disparity among 
groups. 

J-6.

 

Variables are fluctuating factors or elements that make up an operational environment.  When 

operationalized, they define the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of 
military forces and influence the options and decisions of the commander.  The starting point for 
understanding the operational environment are those critical variables that reside in all operational 
environments and have the greatest impact on the military. See FM 7-100 for detailed information on the 
critical variables and operational environments. 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Appendix J  

J-4 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 

J-7.

 

An operational environment assessment provides a methodology for examining and understanding 

any potential operational environment.  In effect, this assessment is an application of the COE concept to 
the specific operational environment under investigation. The methodology involves the following steps: 

z

 

Define Variables.

  Defining a variable simply means describing the nature and composition of 

each of the eleven variables in a specific operational environment.  

ƒ

 

To help focus and facilitate the research effort, it is necessary for analysts to break down 
each variable into its subcategories of information (main topics and subtopics).  This topic 
outline defines the scope and focus of the variable and serves as a guide for research on the 
variable in question.  

ƒ

 

All eleven variables are present in all operational environments, but different operational 
environments typically will require different outlines within the variables.  For example, a 
landlocked operational environment will not require discussion of coastlines or ports under 
the Physical Environment variable or of naval forces under Military Capabilities.  As 
analysts begin to populate the outline with information gleaned from their research, further 
refinements and additions to the headings and subheadings may be necessary. 

ƒ

 

Because of the interrelated and sometimes overlapping nature of the individual variables, 
some subsets of available information may have a place under more than one variable.  For 
instance, information technology might be addressed under both Information and 
Technology and could have an impact on several other variables.   

ƒ

 

Analysts may determine links between the subcategories of one variable and the same, 
similar, or related subcategories that may exist under other variables.  Thus, it may be 
necessary for one variable description to repeat some information contained under another 
variable or to cross-reference or provide an electronic link to it.  Such linkages may be 
obvious when constructing the original topic outlines for the variables, or may become 
evident later—when analysts are populating the outlines with information. 

z

 

Populate the Variable Outlines.

  Analysts then conduct extensive research to populate the 

outline for each variable. 

ƒ

 

This can be done with relevant information gleaned from all available open sources. The 
various sources can include official government documents, think-tank products, academic 
journals, open source periodicals, foreign press, websites, and interviews or discussions 
with various subject matter experts.  Each variable is described as it applies to the specific 
operational environment in question.  This step is an ongoing process, involving continuous 
updates as new or better information becomes available or when conditions change. 

ƒ

 

Much of the most useful information about the potential operational environment may be 
available from open sources.  An operational environment assessment can reveal key areas 
where information gaps exist.  These gaps may become PIRs during the planning and the 
execution of operations––to be targeted by further open source research or perhaps by 
scarcer, more sensitive intelligence means.  The operational environment assessment and 
underlying data form the basis of the GMI database and continuation of the operational 
environment assessment process when the unit deploys to the AO—possibly layered with 
additional information from classified sources.  

z

 

Analyze Relationships, Linkages, and Trends

. The next step highlights the key cause-and-

effect relationships and linkages among the variables (Figure J-2).  

ƒ

 

In any operational environment assessment, the key to understanding the significance of the 
variables is to understand the relationships among the variables and how these affect 
military operations in the selected operational environment.  Therefore, analysts can 
develop a matrix for each dependent variable that shows its critical relationships to other 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Operational Environment Assessment  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

J-5 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

variables.  This makes it possible to analyze each dependent variable from the perspective 
of its relationship or connectivity to other, independent variables.  From this relational 
analysis, critical trends and issues become more evident.  

ƒ

 

Clearly it is impossible to show every potential linkage and trend.  Analysts should, 
however, identify and examine the most significant independent variables (linked to the 
dependent variable) to show their specific relationships to and impacts on the dependent 
variable under investigation.  For instance, the variable of military capabilities is dependent 
on or influenced by virtually all the other variables. 

Figure J-2. Example of possible links between dependent and independent variables 

z

 

Identify Key Facts and Impacts.  Finally, analysts identify and highlight key facts and potential 
operational impacts for each variable.  

ƒ

 

From the definition of variables and relationship analysis, analysts can attempt to identify 
trends over time.  This trends analysis can provide an understanding of the dynamics of the 
variables and their impacts in a selected operational environment. 

ƒ

 

Analysis can also identify possible trigger events in the operational environment based on 
relationships of variables across time. 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Appendix J  

J-6 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

J-8.

 

As previously mentioned, the results of open source research such as the operational environment 

assessment contributes to the body of knowledge about the operational environment that enables 
commanders and their subordinates to better understand the many variables on the affect the military 
operations.  This improved understanding gained through continuous research and analysis of the critical 
variables assists commanders in defining better intelligence requirements that will drive the intelligence 
warfighting function throughout planning, preparation for, and execution of military operations.   

J-9.

 

Examples of operational environment assessments are available from the TRADOC Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Intelligence on the Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate’s 
website at 

https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

K-1 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Appendix K 

Media Analysis 

K-1.

 

The following OSC’s media analysis technique is a systematic examination over time of the content 

and behavior of a set of media in a country or several countries or on one issue to detect trends, patterns, 
and changes in the media and to explain them within the context of the media environment.  These 
techniques are based on methods and experience gained during OSINT operations focused on highly 
authoritarian political systems during World War II, the Cold War, where media control was tightly 
centralized within the regime.  Analysts have adapted these media analysis techniques to other media 
environments and political systems.   

MEDIA CONTROL 

K-2.

 

Applying media analysis to different media environments, the analyst must be aware of how the 

different elements of media control act within the media environment, how much weight attends each 
element, and which elements of control are of interest to us and our customers.  Media environments fall 
into the following types based on the degree control.  

z

 

Government-Controlled.

 Control over the media is tightly centralized within the authoritarian 

regimes.  The dominant element of control is the top political leadership.  These regimes use 
censorship mechanisms to exercise control over media content prior to its dissemination. 

z

 

Semi-Controlled

. Less authoritarian regimes and even some democratic regimes exercise partial 

control over media in some media environments.  The government does not exercise

 a priori 

censorship exercises but promotes self-censorship by pressuring media managers and journalists 
who publish items that displease the authorities. 

z

 

Independent.

 Control over media is more diffuse in media environments governed by non-

authoritarian political systems that exercise only minimal control over media.  Governments 
may regulate allocation of broadcast frequencies, morality in content, ownership in media 
markets, and occasionally apply political pressure against media or journalists who displease.  In 
these environments, economic factors, norms of the journalist profession, the preferences of 
people who manage media, and the qualities of individual journalists who report or comment on 
the news all influence or control media content.  Some of these other factors and elements––it 
depends on the particular country or issue––are of interest to our customers, but others are not. 

K-3.

 

All media are controlled.  The issue for analysts is what factors and elements (elites, institutions, 

individuals) exercise control, how much relative power or weight does each factor or element possess, and 
which factors or elements are of interest to analysts and their customers.  Table K-1 describes each level of 
control, its factors, and its elements.   

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Appendix K  

K-2 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

Table K-1. Factors and elements of media control 

 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Media Analysis  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

K-3 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

MEDIA STRUCTURE  

K-4.

 

Media structure encompasses attributes of media material other than its manifest content.  Structural 

elements include the format or type of material, the media source, placement of the media item, intended 
audience, and the frequency and timing of its appearance.  These elements affect the meaning and 
significance of the content of the item and are often as important as the content itself.  Analysts use 
systematic analysis of these elements to uncover insights into the points of view of agents who control 
media, including the top political elites in media environments where control is highly centralized, and to 
establish the editorial slant or bias of foreign media. 

z

 

Selection, Omission, and Slant.

  Selection of news items is a fundamental editorial decision at 

the core of news reporting.   Selection includes media managers' decisions about which stories 
are covered and which are not as well as reporters' and editors' decisions about which 
viewpoints, images, and information should be included or emphasized in a news item and 
which should be omitted or deemphasized.  Selection decisions can contribute to an implied 
judgment, or slant, in a news item.  The nature of decisions made about omission.  

Table K-2. Hierarchy of power 

 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Appendix K  

K-4 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

z

 

Hierarchy of Power. 

 All political systems involve hierarchy of power (Table K-2); therefore, it 

logically follows that official statements issued from different elements in that power hierarchy 
will have a corresponding hierarchy of authoritativeness.  Authoritativeness can be thought of as 
the likelihood that the views expressed in the statement represent the dominant viewpoint within 
the political system.  The hierarchy will be obvious in many political systems––a statement by 
the prime minister trumps a statement by a minister.  In other cases, the hierarchy may not be so 
obvious and unique to the political system––a speech by the party chairman trumps a speech by 
the head of state. 

z

 

Format.

  Format can also mean the difference between a live news report or interview and one 

that is prerecorded, which gives higher level controllers more opportunity to influence the 
context of the item. 

z

 

Type of Media.

  Television is the medium with the largest potential audience in many media 

environments.  It presumably has a significant impact in shaping the impressions of the general 
viewing public.  Television has replaced radio as the population's main source of news except in 
media environments where poverty or distance prohibits mass access to television.  Fewer 
people may get their information from newspapers and Internet news sites, but these people may 
be richer, better educated, and more influential than the general television audience.  Specialized 
print publications and Internet sites reach a still smaller audience, but their audience will likely 
include officials and experts who can be expected to have influence on policy debates and 
outcomes.  Analysts who carefully examine differences in how a media story is handled in 
different types of media in highly centrally controlled media environments can gain insight into 
a government's strategies for influencing public and elite opinion among its citizens.  

z

 

Prominence.

  Does the story appear on the front page of newspapers or on the homepage of 

Internet news sties; how much space is the story given; in what order does the story appear in 
the news broadcast; is it featured in the opening previews of the newscast; how frequently is the 
story rebroadcast on subsequent newscasts or bulletins; and how much air time does it get?   
Clustering is another concept applicable here.  It involves analysis of the type and content of 
ideas that appear before or after or alongside the story.  

z

 

Dissemination.

  Attention to patterns of dissemination of leaders' statements is important in 

media environments where control is highly centralized.  Leaders communicate publicly in a 
variety of ways, with formal policy statements, with less formal interviews, and with 
extemporaneous remarks.  By comparing the volume of media attention given to a statement, 
analysts can determine whether it was intended to be taken as a pronouncement of established 
policy or merely as an ad hoc, uncoordinated expression, perhaps prompted by narrow 
contextual or temporal conditions. 

z

 

Timing.

  Analysts have traditionally paid close attention to the timing of the appearance of 

material in the media and that is still relevant today.  The appearance of information corresponds 
to the news cycle.  A news cycle is the process and timing by which different types of media 
sources obtain their material, incorporate or turn it into a product, and make it available to the 
public.  Differences between earlier and later versions of a news item attributable to the actions 
of a controller can reveal latent information about the controller's views.   

MEDIA SOURCE  

K-5.

 

Analysts can also learn more about media content by carefully comparing the different 

characteristics of different media sources (Table K-3).  Source analysis is the systematic comparison and 
analysis of the content and behavior of different media sources over time.  It is fundamental to media 
analysis.  Systematic efforts to identify patterns in differences among media have traditionally yielded rich 
insights into basic policy and leadership disputes.  Comparison of trends in the content of individual media 
with shifts in official policy has suggested that some media, at least more than others, will continue to 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Media Analysis  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

K-5 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

mirror the dominant policy line.  By establishing a track record for different media that suggests which are 
vulnerable to pressure to follow the central policy line, analysts will still have a powerful tool for 
identifying policy and recognizing policy shifts. 

Table K-3. Types of sources 

K-6.

 

The concept of source analysis remains valid in media environments where control over media is less 

highly centralized, but has to be applied more cautiously and over a wider range of actors.  In media 
environments where both official and nonofficial media are present, official media, at least, may be 
vulnerable to pressure to follow the central policy line.  Analyzing less-tightly centralized controlled 
media, the analyst must expand the concept of source analysis to the journalist and commentator level.  It is 
important to establish the track record of such individuals to discover if they have access to insider 
information from parts of the government or if they are used by officials to float policy "trial balloons."  
Differences in content between media outlets controlled by different official elites can reveal policy and 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Appendix K  

K-6 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

leadership disputes.  For example, a report on the president's speech by media controlled by the defense 
ministry may reveal differences from reports in other media or the full text of the speech published on the 
president's website. 

MEDIA CONTENT 

K-7.

 

Analysts can enhance the value of that information through the analysis of its content, both latent 

and manifest.  Analyzing the latent content involves determining and explaining the media context in 
which the information was conveyed and deciphering esoteric communication hidden in the manifest 
content.  During media content analysis, analysts consider two forms of messages or content in the media 
material are manifest and latent content. 

M

ANIFEST 

C

ONTENT  

 

K-8.

 

Manifest content is the actual words, images, and sounds conveyed by open sources.  One of the 

most important forms of media analysis has involved the careful comparison of the content of authoritative 
official statements to identify the policies or intentions they represent.  The practice of all governments and 
political entities and actors in general use statements and information released to the media to strengthen 
their support and promote their policies.   The importance of words in the political process make analysis 
of authoritative public statements an enduring and insightful tool for discerning leadership intentions and 
attitudes regardless of the overall nature of control in a given media environment.  Comparison of what is 
said and what is not said against the background of what others are saying and what has been said before is 
the core of open source analysis. 

z

 

Esoteric Communications.

  Analysts have also developed techniques for interpreting what are 

known as "esoteric communications"––public statements whose surface meaning (manifest 
content) does not reveal their real meaning or significance (latent content) or the author's chief 
purpose in making them.  Esoteric communication is particularly evident in political systems 
with strong taboos against public contention or in cases where especially sensitive issues are at 
stake, but a strong case can be made that such indirect communications of one form or another 
are common to all political systems.  Esoteric communication may be more formalized in some 
media environments than in others, but it is a common characteristic of all political 
communication, known in other contexts as "reading between the lines."  

z

 

Multimedia Content.

  Analysts analyzing multimedia can consider elements of content beyond 

the words used.  Facial expression and voice inflection of leaders giving speeches, persons being 
interviewed, or the anchor reading a script often provide additional information about the views 
of the subject.  They may, for example, provide clues as to whether a statement was seriously 
considered, intended to be humorous, or simply off-the-cuff.  Images accompanying text are 
also important indicators.  

z

 

Past Behavior.

  Information conveyed by open sources must be considered against the record of 

the source's (media outlet, journalist, or news maker) behavior.  Factors beyond immediate 
control such as time pressures, deadlines, or technical malfunctions, may affect the content or 
context of public information.  Analysts' judgments about a source's behavior must be made with 
careful consideration of previous behavior. 

L

ATENT 

C

ONTENT

 

K-9.

 

In the latent content, analysts can derive intelligence about the views and actions of the controllers of 

public information over and above what might be apparent in the information's manifest content.  This 
involves the systematic examination and comparison of content and context.  The analyst can uncover 
patterns and rules governing the structure and content of media.  These patterns and rules come from the 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Media Analysis  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

K-7 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

unstated context or "frame" that provides the underlying meaning of media content and behavior.  When a 
pattern is broken, some element changes or is omitted, or conventional language is replaced by polemics; 
for example, the analyst can infer that there has been a change in the context from which the 
communication emerged––a change in the viewpoint of the controller or a change in the balance of power 
among different controlling elements.    

K-10.

 

Analysts are not always able to draw conclusions from media content because there is–– 

z

 

Insufficient material to do so. 

z

 

Conflicting information on the same issue from multiple sources. 

z

 

No observable trend in the material available.  

K-11.

 

In these situations, an analyst takes care not to imply that they know what is the actual position or 

policy of the foreign government or other entity by using formula phrases like–– 

z

 

"Country A is projecting position B on issue C." 

z

 

"Country A's statement suggests hopes to achieve result B." 

K-12.

 

These phrases give readers of the report an idea of what the analyst thinks Country A wants the US 

reader to think.  Analysts often combine conclusions like these examples with material from other sources 
to give readers an idea of the political context in which Country A's government is operating.  This is a 
useful reporting technique for assessments of issues concerning countries where television and radio are 
government controlled and contain only selected information, but where the relatively free press provides 
much more detailed information that is available to the literate public. 

 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 FMI 

2-22.9 

Glossary-11 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Glossary  

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

ACE 

analysis and control element 

AJP 

Allied Joint Publication 

AKO 

Army Knowledge Online 

AO 

area of operations 

AOI 

area of interest 

AOIR 

area of intelligence responsibility 

AOR 

area of responsibility 

AR 

Army Regulation 

ARNG 

Army National Guard 

ASCC 

Army Service Component Command 

ASI 

additional skill identifier 

BCT 

brigade combat team 

BDA 

battle damage assessment 

C2 

command and control 

C3  

command, control, and communications 

CA 

Civil Affairs 

CADNET 

Collaboration and Data-Sharing Network 

CGS 

common ground station 

CI 

counterintelligence 

CIA 

Central Intelligence Agency 

COA 

course of action 

COCOM 

combatant command 

COE 

contemporary operational environment 

COIN 

counterinsurgency 

COP 

common operational picture 

CTID 

Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate 

DA 

Department of the Army 

DA IIS 

Department of Army Intelligence Information System 

DAC 

Department of Army Civilian 

DAVE 

Digital Audio Video Enterprise 

DCSINT 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence 

DHS 

Department of Homeland Security 

DIA 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

DNI 

Director of National Intelligence 

DOCEX 

document exploitation 

DOD 

Department of Defense 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Glossary  

Glossary-2 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

DODD 

Department of Defense Directive 

DOIM 

Director of Information Management 

DOS 

Department of State 

DTG 

date-time group 

EBSCO 

Elton B. Stephens Company 

FBI 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FM 

field manual 

FMI 

field manual-interim 

FMSO 

Foreign Military Studies Office 

FOB 

forward operating base 

FP 

force protection 

FS 

fire support 

.ftp 

file transfer protocol 

G2 

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence 

G3 

Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations 

G7 

Assistant Chief of Staff, Information Operations 

G9 

Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs 

GMI 

general military intelligence 

GWOT 

globar war on terrorism 

HUMINT 

human intelligence 

HVT 

high value target 

I&W 

indications and warnings 

IC 

Intelligence Community 

IED 

improvised explosive device 

IFV 

infantry fighting vehicle 

IIR 

intelligence information report 

IIS 

Intelligence Information System 

IMINT 

imagery intelligence 

INSCOM 

US Army Intelligence and Security Command 

INTELINK-SBU 

Intelligence Link-sensitive but unclassified 

IO 

information operations 

IP 

Internet Protocol 

IPB 

intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

IR 

information requirement 

ISM 

intelligence synchronization matrix 

ISP 

Internet service provider 

ISR 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Glossary  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

Glossary-3 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

JAC 

Joint Analysis Center 

JIOC 

Joint Intelligence Operations Center 

JP 

joint publication 

JWICS 

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 

LAN 

local area network 

LEA 

law enforcement agency 

LEO 

Law enforcement only 

MACOM 

major Army command 

MASINT 

measurement and signatures intelligence 

MDCI 

multidiscipline counterintelligence 

MDMP 

military decisionmaking process 

METT-TC 

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time 
available, and civil considerations 

MI 

military intelligence 

MOS 

military occupational specialty 

MSC 

major subordinate command 

MP 

Military Police 

NAI 

named area of interest 

NASIC 

National Air and Space Intelligence Center 

NCOIC 

noncommissioned officer in charge 

NEA 

Northeast Asia 

NGIC 

National Ground Intelligence Center 

NGO 

nongovernmental organization 

NIPRNET 

Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network 

OB 

order of battle 

OPORD 

operations order 

OPSEC 

operations security 

OSC 

Open Source Center 

OSINT 

open source intelligence 

PA 

Public Affairs 

PAO 

public affairs officer 

PIR 

priority intelligence requirement 

PRINCE 

Processing in a Collaborative Environment 

PSYOP 

psychological operations 

RFI 

request for information 

RISSNET 

Regional Information Sharing System Network 

S&T 

science and technology 

S&TI 

scientific and technical intelligence 

S1 

personnel staff officer 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Glossary  

Glossary-4 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

S2 

intelligence staff officer 

S3 

operations staff officer 

S4 

logistics staff officer 

S5 

plans staff officer 

S6 

command, control, communications and computer operations officer 

S7 

information operations officer 

S8 

financial management officer 

S9 

civil-military operations officer 

SA 

South Asia 

SALUTE 

size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment 

SCI 

sensitive compartmented information 

SCIF 

sensitive compartmented information facility 

SEA 

Southwest Asia 

SIGINT 

signals intelligence 

SIPRNET 

Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 

SIR 

specific information requirement 

SITMAP 

situation map 

SJA 

Staff Judge Advocate 

SOP 

standing operating procedure 

SQI 

Special qualification identifier  

TACREP 

tactical report 

TDN 

TROJAN Data Network 

TECHINT 

technical intelligence 

TLP 

troop-leading procedure 

TOE 

table of organization and equipment 

TRADOC 

US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

TTP 

tactics, techniques, and procedures 

URL 

uniform resource locator 

US 

United States 

USAPACOM 

US Army Pacific Command 

USEUCOM 

US European Company 

USMC 

United States Marine Corps 

UCMJ 

Uniform Code of Military Justice 

WAN 

wide area network 

WARNO 

warning order 

WBIL 

World Basic Information Library 

WEG 

Worldwide Equipment Guide 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Glossary  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

Glossary-5 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

WFF 

warfighting function 

WMD 

weapon of mass destruction 

XO 

executive officer 

SECTION II – TERMS 

Acquisition (Collection) 

Obtaining of information in any manner, including direct observation, liaison with official agencies, or 
solicitation from official, unofficial, or public sources. (JP 1-02)   

All-Source Intelligence 

Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, 
most frequently including human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and 
signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source data in the production of finished 
intelligence. (JP 1-02) 

Analysis 

Determination of the significance of the information, relative to information and intelligence already 
known, and drawing deductions about the probable meaning of the evaluated information. (FM 2-0) 

Assessment  

The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation.         
(FMI 5-0.1) 

*Authoritative Source 

A source that reports information accurately because it is known to be accountable to or has a track 
record demonstrating accuracy in reporting information from the leader, government, ruling party, or 
other element. 

Chatham House Rule 

According to the Chatham House, "When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House 
Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of 
the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed." 

Civil Authorities  

Those elected and appointed officers and employees who constitute the government of the United 
States, of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, United States 
possessions and territories, and political subdivisions thereof. (JP 3-26)  

Civil Considerations  

The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the 
civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO on the conduct of military operations. 
(FM 6-0) 

Civil Support 

DOD support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement 
and other activities. (JP 3-26) 

Clandestine Operation  

An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to 
assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that 
emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the 
sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Glossary  

Glossary-6 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. See also covert operation; overt 
operation. (JP 1-02) 

Classified Information 

 Official information that has been determined to require, in the interests of national security, 
protection against unauthorized disclosure and which has been so designated. (JP 1-02) 

Collect  

An activity of information management: the continuous acquisition of relevant information by any 
means, including direct observation, other organic resources, or other official, unofficial, or public 
sources from the information environment. (FM 1-02)   

Collection 

In intelligence usage, the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing 
elements. (JP 1-02) 

Collection Agency 

Any individual, organization, or unit that has access to sources of information and the capability of 
collecting information from them. (JP 1-02)   

Collection Asset  

A collection system, platform, or capability that is supporting, assigned, or attached to a particular 
commander. (JP 1-02) 

Collection Management 

In intelligence usage, the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, 
establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, 
monitoring results, and retasking, as required. (JP 1-02) 

Collection Plan 

A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for 
transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. (JP 1-02) 

Collection Resource  

A collection system, platform, or capability that is not assigned or attached to a specific unit or echelon 
which must be requested and coordinated through the chain of command. (JP 1-02) 

Command and Control  

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and 
attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.  Commanders exercise command and control 
through a command and control system. (FM 6-0) 

Commander’s Intent 

A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed 
with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the operation’s desired end 
state. (FMI 5-0.1) 

Communications Intelligence 

Technical information and intelligence derived from foreign communications by other than the 
intended recipients. (JP 1-02) 

Confidential Source 

Any person, group, or system that provides information with the expectation that the information, 
relationship, or both, are protected against public disclosure. (AR 380-5)  

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Glossary  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

Glossary-7 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Control 

The regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the 
commander’s intent. (FMI 5-0.1) 

Controlled Unclassified Information 

Information that requires application of controls and protective measures not to include those that 
qualify for formal classification. (AR 380-5) 

Covert Operation 

An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by 
the sponsor.  A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on 
concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (JP 1-02) 

Dissemination (and Integration) 

In intelligence usage, the delivery of intelligence to users in a suitable form and the application of the 
intelligence to appropriate missions, tasks, and functions. (JP 1-02) 

Document 

Any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics including, but not limited 
to, all written material, whether handwritten, printed or typed; painted, drawn or engraved material; 
sound or voice recordings; imagery; punched cards, punched paper tape, printed output and associated 
material to include computer storage media such as floppy, compact and hard disks and magnetic tape; 
and reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process. Engraved material such as manufacturers’ 
plates and the like, permanently fastened to captured equipment is not considered a document.        
(AJP-2.5) 

Doctrine 

Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support 
of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02) 

Essential Task 

A specified or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission. Essential tasks are always 
included in the unit’s mission statement. (FM 5-0) 

Evaluate 

In intelligence usage, appraisal of an item of information in terms of credibility, reliability, pertinence, 
and accuracy. (FM 2-0) 

Execute 

To put a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational 
understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. (FM 6-0) 

Foreign Intelligence 

Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, and 
persons, but not including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist 
activities. (JP 1-02) 

Homeland Defense 

The protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against 
external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. (JP 3-26) 

Homeland Security 

A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. (JP 3-26) 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Glossary  

Glossary-8 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

Information 

Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. (JP 1-02) 

Infrastructure 

In intelligence usage, the basic underlying framework or feature of a thing; in economics, basic 
resources, communications, industries, and so forth, upon which others depend; in insurgency, the 
organization (usually hidden) of insurgent leadership. (FM 2-0) 

Intelligence 

The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and 
interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (JP 1-02)  

Intelligence Discipline 

A well-defined area of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific 
category of technical or human resources. (JP 1-02) 

Intelligence Process 

The process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. (JP 1-02)  

Intelligence Report 

A specific report of information, usually on a single item, made at any level of command in tactical 
operations and disseminated as rapidly as possible in keeping with the timeliness of the information. 
(JP 1-02) 

Intelligence Requirements 

1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the 
production of intelligence. (JP 1-02)  2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's 
knowledge or understanding of the battlespace or threat forces. (JP 1-02)  

Intelligence Source 

The means or system that can be used to observe and record information relating to the condition, 
situation, or activities of a targeted location, organization, or individual.  An intelligence source can be 
people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors. (JP 1-02) 

Intelligence Warfighting Function 

The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil 
considerations. (FMI 5-0.1) 

*Internet 

Publicly accessible communications network that connects computers, computer networks, and 
organizational computer facilities around the world. 

Investigative Information 

All data developed as a result of counterintelligence investigative activities, such as investigations, 
operations, and services, and through liaison with local, State, and Federal agencies.  It may also come 
from unsolicited sources, and from public sources, such as newspapers, magazines, books, periodicals, 
handbills, and radio and television broadcasts. (Source:  AR 380-13) 

Metadata 

Information about information; more specifically, information about the meaning of other data.          
(JP 1-02)

 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Glossary  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

Glossary-9 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Military Intelligence 

Intelligence on any foreign military or military-related situation or activity which is significant to 
military policymaking or the planning and conduct of military operations and activities. (JP 1-02) 

*Open Source 

Any person or group that provides information without the expectation of privacy––the information, 
the relationship, or both are protected not against public disclosure. 

Open Source Intelligence 

1. Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. (JP 1-02) 2. 
Relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly 
available information in response to intelligence requirement (Army).

 

Operational Environment 

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military 
forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. (JP 1-02) 

Operations Process 

The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparation, 
execution, and continuous assessment. These activities occur continuously throughout an operation, 
overlapping and recurring as required. (FMI 5-0.1) 

Operations Security 

A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to 
military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary 
intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could 
be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and 
c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of 
friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (JP 1-02) 

Overt Operation 

An operation conducted openly, without concealment. See also clandestine operation; covert 
operation. (JP 1-02) 

Planning 

The process by which commanders (and staff if available) translate the commander’s visualization into 
a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. (FMI 5-0.1) 

Preparation 

Activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct the operation including, but not 
limited to, the following: plan refinement, rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and 
movement. (FM 3-0) 

*Primary Source 

A source that has direct access to the information and conveys the information directly and 
completely. 

*Private Information 

Data, facts, instructions, or other material intended for or restricted to a particular person, group, or 
organization.   

Priority Intelligence Requirements 

Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in the 
task of planning and decision making. (JP 1-02) 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Glossary  

Glossary-10 

FMI 2-22.9 

5 December 2006 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

 

Procedures 

Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. (JP 1-02)   

Process (Processing) 

A function of the intelligence process that involves converting collected data, which is not already in a 
comprehensible form when it is reported, into a form that is understandable and suitable for analysis 
and production of intelligence. (FM 2-0) 

Production 

The integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information from single or multiple sources 
into finished intelligence. (JP 1-02) 

Propaganda 

Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, 
emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or 
indirectly. (JP 1-02) 

Public Affairs Assessment 

An analysis of the news media and public environments to evaluate the degree of understanding about 
strategic and operations objectives and military activities and to identify levels of public support. 
Includes judgments about the public affairs impact of pending decisions and recommendations about 
the structure of public affairs support for the assigned mission. (FM 3-61.1)   

*Publicly Available Information 

Data, facts, instructions, or other material published or broadcast for general public consumption; 
available on request to a member of the general public; lawfully seen or heard by any casual observer; 
or made available at a meeting open to the general public.   

*Public Broadcasts 

Simultaneous transmission of data or information for general public consumption to all receivers or 
terminals within a computer, radio, or television network.

 

Public Information 

A general term describing processes used to provide information to external audiences through public 
media. (FM 3-61.1) 

*Public Speaking 

Distribution of information to audiences during events that are open to the public or occur in public 
areas.  

Regional Information Sharing System Network (RISSNET)  

The Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Program is a federally funded program consisting 
of six regional projects dedicated to the support of local, state and federal law enforcement and 
criminal justice agencies. 

Reconnaissance 

A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about 
the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the 
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 1-02) 

*Secondary Source 

A source that conveys information through various types of filters; uses intermediary sources; 
summarizes, paraphrases, or excerpts information; or translates from the vernacular. 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Glossary  

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

Glossary-11 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

Signals Intelligence 

A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications 
intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however 
transmitted. (JP 1-02) 

Source 

A person, thing, or activity from which information is obtained. (JP 1-02) 

Surveillance 

The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by 
visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02)   

Tactics 

The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.  (JP 1-02) 

Target 

In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence 
operations are directed. (JP 1-02)   

Target Analysis 

An examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of attack, and weapons 
required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. (JP 1-02) 

Target Folder 

A folder, hardcopy or electronic, containing target intelligence and related materials prepared for 
planning and executing action against a specific target. (JP 1-02) 

Target System 

All the targets situated in a particular geographic area and functionally related. (JP 1-02) 

Target System Component 

A set of targets belonging to one or more groups of industries and basic utilities required to produce 
component parts of an end product such as periscopes, or one type of a series of interrelated 
commodities, such as aviation gasoline. (JP 1-02) 

Techniques 

Nonprescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. (JP 1-02) 

*Transcription 

The process of creating a verbatim written record of spoken information.  

*Translation 

1. The process of transferring written information from one language into another. 2. A written 
document in a second language having the same meaning as the written document in a first language. 

*Unclassified Information 

Information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.

  

Warfighting Function 

A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common 
purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (FMI 5-0.1) 

 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

5 December 2006 

FMI 2-22.9 

References-1 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

References 

SOURCES USED 

These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication. 

US Marine Corps.  

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM:  Lessons Learned

.  26 July 2003.  Retrieved from 

Center for Army Lessons Learned at http://call.army.mil. 

White, Louise G.  

Political Analysis:  Technique and Practice. 4th edition

. Belmont, California: 

Wadsworth, 1999. 

Winder, Robyn. 

Untangling The Web:  An Introduction to Internet Research. 2005

.  Available online 

at 

http://www.interlink.gov

World Bank. 

World Development Indicators 2005

. Available online at 

http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2005/

 

101st Airborne Division. 

Lessons Learned Report (Part 1).  Division and Brigade Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations

.  30 May 2003. Retrieved from Center for 

Army Lessons Learned at 

http://call.army.mil

173d Airborne Brigade. 

Lessons Learned Briefing

. 24 January 2004. Retrieved from Center for Army 

Lessons Learned at 

http://call.army.mil

DA Form 2028.  

Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms

. Available online from the 

Army Publishing Directorate at 

http://www.army.mil/usapa

DD Form 2745.  

Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag. 

 1 May 1996. Available online from the 

Army Publishing Directorate at 

http://www.army.mil/usapa

Untangling The Web: An Introduction to Internet Research DOD Pamphlet.”

 

DOCUMENTS NEEDED 

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. 

AR 27-60.

 Intellectual Property

, 1 June 1993. 

AR 380-13. 

Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-Affiliated Persons and 

Organizations

. 13 September 1974. 

AR 381-10. 

US Intelligence Activities

. 22 November 2005. Available online from Army Publishing 

Directorate at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/index.html. 

FM 2-0. 

Intelligence

. 17 May 2004.  Available online from Army Publishing Directorate at 

http://www.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/index.html 

FM 3-0. 

Operations

. 14 June 2001.  Available online from Army Publishing Directorate at 

http://www.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/index.html 

READINGS RECOMMENDED 

These sources contain relevant supplemental information.  

A

RMY 

P

UBLICATIONS

 

AR 25-400-2.

 The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS).

 15 November 2004. 

AR 27-60.  

Intellectual Property

.  1 June 1993.  Available online from Army Publishing Directorate at 

http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/index.html. 

AR 115-11.  

Geospatial Information and Services

. 10 December 2001. Available online from Army 

Publishing Directorate at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/index.html. 

AR 340-21. 

The Army Privacy Program

. 5 July 1985. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Content      ..     22      23      24      25     ..